Petitioners Brief — Walton v. Southern Package Corp.

Supreme Court brief1944

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Eas PREME COU RT OF THE UNITED ag a

OCTOBER TERM, 1943

No. 159 -

VRS. EULA MAY WALTON, Apinisrrat RIX OF “THE

sHsrare or Fieo Wares, Decrease

BP. foticinned

. /

+ e .

‘ SOUTHERN PACKAGE CORPORATION,

Os, , Ri Spoudei

oe ‘

i

neg

i ae

=

ON WHIT OF CERTIORARI LO THE.SUPREME COURT OF (tLE STA Th (+k

MISSISSIPPT,

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

\ ( AAs, I. INGLE; P

Vat } ‘> Vy SNENS (pp

(vrienrel fase Petitioner,

Bricer & Gitetsos, :

Ppt (rehixan. Moassissipy

(lt Couneel,

e se! *. .

ja Xe INDEN,

, Sunsecr [xpex.

8 Page

1. Opinion of the court helow l

Il. Statement of the casé ; iL

_ UL. Specification of errors \ an

IV. Argument — - ee +0

Sumary of argument . t

7 ~PomtaA iy ee QD

» (A watchman having tte duties of peti

: ; tioner’s decedent is covered by the

i a Fair Labor Standards Vet). See.

| 16(b). i :

Point B. oe ly

(A suit’ for overtime compensation —-

: under See. 160h) of the Mair Laber

\ Standards Act will survive for the

; . benefit of the malted: eiiplovee’= es

tate.) as : aks

Point. C. ee ie ; Hy.

ef (A suit) for overtime compensation, |

: liquidated damaes, and attorney’.

ie ~ fee under See, With) of the Fair.

Labor Stand: rd Act of T9858 Ka reise

‘dial action. ‘The Mississifipi Statute

of Tinitations Tor penalties does net

J apply.)

Tante or Casts Crrep,

Ahram vy, San doaqun Cotton ji Ca 465 |. Sanna.

aaa) : a |

Berar \. Clouser, DOF, ‘Sire: Gs. ree . »Y

Bowie vo Gone bates Tit 2. (al ti Site. COAL Ine

"Bright v. Rowland, 4 Miss 308 ye

Camphell ial Superior? -f), calcomia aii. f: bath pnd 7 | bs

W aved Hour Cases 347 - ae ie

Chreland c raue C mp, line rn fie Cas] by .

Pip Company, 16S -Ala: 250, 538 Soo RT e~ “a

— e ; rs >

—064 = +

il INDEX

| Oe Page —

oer fiykes Brotha NN. Y. 376, 143 NN. EK. 294; aa

, Fleming v. Kirschbaum C om pany. 38 EF. Supp. 204, .

4 Wave é Hour Rep. 171 : 12

Hargrave \ » Mid-Continent Petroleum C ‘orporation, .

42 F-Supp. 908° | 19

Hart v. Gregory, 2U8 N.C. 184, 1S. FE. (2d) 644.0 oO

Huntington vy, Attrifl, 146 U2. 657, 13S. Ct. 224 2

Imperial Film E vehang: Vv. General Film Co., 244

Fed. 98% ae pe

Wirschbauw € ‘ov tFattiiqgand me ral Binding Co or-

‘poration. v. Walling, 316 US. 517, 62S. Ot. 1116,

SO L.Ed. 1638). - . . 6,10

Lia Guardia v. Austin Bliss General Tire O., Lees, 41

"F.Supp. 678 — 19, 20, 4 |

Larue vy. S. HL, Robison a Compang, 156 S. EB. (2d) +

452 ' 2

Lefer rs v. Ge néral’ Expo Trow ina Metal Co., 38 a i

$3 F.Supp. S38 \ . ; 12

McCulloch vy. Maxyland, 4 Wheat. 315, 413 6

Momand ve Tweuticth Ceatury For Film Corpora-

tion. 37 FY Supp. 649 .. 8

Moore v. Backus, 296 U.S. 640, 56S. Ct. 173 16

New Style Hat Mfa. Co., 4 Wage Hour Rey. 29 oe

“ Overnight Transportation Cow Vv. Missel, 62-S. Ct.

a 1216 ry ... 17, 20,23

Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S.608, 22S. Ct. 49: 3. - 16

Robertson vy. Argus igh Mills, 121 Fed. (2d) 285. 2h

Shelton, Electric Co- a telor Talking Machine*Co.,

277 Fed. 433, 439. ne Ry oe

Southern I 'ackage’ Corporation.v. Walton, WW So.

(2d) 912 ertaG atts iy NM

Sullivan v. Associated BH Posters, 6. 42d) 100 ar

Townsend v. Boston M. R.R., 55 FB. Supp. 938 0. m4

United States v. Bethelehem Steel ( pondapitinc 8S. 105,

*.. 278. Ct, 450 Sep: ee

United States. Daniel, 6 Wow. 11, IDL, Ed. 323 Ib.

We agner % Gibbs, SO Miss. 53, 31 So, 434 Is

a

* se I . . ‘a s

: a

____ > INDEX ——

TaBLE oF Starutes Cirev.

-Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: aa,

Title 29, UL S.C. AL, Sections 2053 (j), 206, 207,

216(b) - -. ;

Title 29,,U. S.C. A., Section 20R(e )-

Title 29; U.S.C. A.., evitains 202 (2) and 2o2(b)

Federal jurisdictional statute regarding penalties,

28. S.C tT , .

Feder ral. statute of limitations for penalties, 2S

U.S. C. A. 791 ,

_ Mississippi Code of 1930, Section ‘ 2SO1, ee.

stitute of limitations for penalties | 33. he

Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. AL:

See. 1 et sey.

See. 15

Statute 4 Edw. HT, ¢. 7

Eseycroprptas AND ARTICLES ‘ITED.

Private Litigation under the Wage & Hour Law,

Rafus.G. Poole, XIV Miss. L. J. 162-164

17 Corpus Juris 941

~

Page

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED stares

OCTOBER. TERM, 1943

wl

- No. 159 /

4 ;

MRS. EULA MAY WAL mf. hoaaceireytix or ses

Estate or FrexWatroy, DECEASED, . ee

‘ea. ts Petitioner,

_SQUTHE RN PAC KAGE, CORPORATION,

«Re spondent.

x er

BRIEF -OF PETITIONER.

-

The Opinion of the Court Below.

Tlie opinion ine the “Supréme Court ‘of Mississippi Is

reported in 11 Sp.. (2d) {12 and is set out ‘in the Record,”

pages 0-17.

II.

Statement of the Case. ©

Petitioner's decedent, Fred. Walton; brought suit in the

Circujt Court of Claiborne (‘ounty, Mississippi, under the- ~*~

Fair. Labor Standards Act of 1938 (52 Stat. at L. 1060,

i ee

* Nore: All referonees herein to “Ree ‘ord, page —" have re fererice to the °

offeial printed Transeript of Record,

ld,

13, 207, and 216.(b)

anise and. attor-

Title 23 U; S&C _ A, Sections 203 (j),, 2

_ for ove rime compe sation, liquidated

“nev’s fees’ (Record, page Sy. Afters

‘before judgment Wiis rendered in the C inecult

was filed and

urt of Clai-

‘borne County, Mississippi, Fred Walton died. By order

of said. court, petitioner, the, widow and duly }ippointed

administratrix of- his estate Wais substituted 2 as qlaintiff in

this canse (Record, page 3). The Cirg Trt of Cla

_ borne County, “Mississippi, renderedfa erste in her

favor for the total sum of £900.00 ; 400.00 for back wages

for overtime work, $400.00 for liquidated damages, and

“100,00: for attorney “s fees (Record, page 7). The South-

ern Package Corporation appealed to the Supreme Court of

the State of /Mississippi, and this gudgment was revérsed.

on-appeal dnd judgment rendered for appellant-defendant

on February 15, 1943, with Chief Justice Smith dissenting

i] So. (2d) 912; (Record, pages 0-17): This cause is now

prese ‘nted ty this Honorable Court upon order allowing.

certiorari (Record, page 18).

The-facts in this ease are brie fly stated as follows: The

defendant in the lower court, Southern Package Corpora-

tion, Was engaged in the manufacture of timber products in .

Claiborne County, Mississippi (Record, page 1). It em-

ploved the de fendant as a night watchman from August 1,

1939, to April-l, 1940 (Record, page 1); It was admitted

by defendant in the agreed statement of facts that a ‘‘sub-’

stantial part ef the prpducts so manufactured by dete ‘ndant

zie shipped outside the State of Mississippi,’’ and that this

corporation Was engaged in the same business at the time.

it cmployed Fred Walton as a night watehman. —

it was further admitted by the defendant corporation |

that: ‘fc was the duty of said Walton, as might watchman’

at said plant, to make an hourly round of the plant and

punch a night watchman’s clock located at various stations

‘

oo

lant and.to report any fires ‘and trespassers”? (Rec

2). at, therefore, appears. that Fred Walton had .

duties of a night watchman in guarding and pro-:

_ on suid

ord, pag

the usua

tecting re

manufactpbed ‘for interstate‘ commerce And where they

ondent? s plant, where timber products were

,

awaited trnsportation. It was also admitted by ‘the

respondent \that ‘‘if said: Fred Walton was entitled fo .

receive overtime, as prov ided for under ‘the Fair: ‘Labor .

Standards -Adt (Title 29. U.S: ¢. Yn Sections 201 to 216)

that there wohfd have accrued under the provisions of said

Act an additional sum of $400.00 for ove ‘rtime’’ (Ree ord,

page 3). The defendant corporation, therefore, admitted

that Fred Walton had not been-paid in accordane’ with the >

provisions of the Fair Labor St: indards Act of 1988; and,

the refore, ifehis eniployment was covet ‘od by the Act, under

the. terms of the Act he should ree vive $400.00 overtinie.

compensation, $ $400.00 liquidated damages, and a reasonable

attorney's fee. , . s |

The reapende nt contended in the lowe er core that a night

Watchman is not entitled to the benefits of the Fair Labor

Standards Act of ‘T938 when he is employed to euard and |

“ protect a pkant where timber: products are manufactured

for interstate commerce: that wi action of this’ nature for

‘ unpaid ove rth ne com pense :tion, liquid ited di nage s. and

attorney's fees Js an action for a penalty and would not Sut

vive for the benefit of the dleceased pli nintiff*s estate when

ihe original pl: inti tt die d after suit was brought: and that’

‘the Mississippi oue- year “statute of limitations for penalfi

~and forfeitures, Section 2501, Mississippi Cede lof 195 0h

would apply to this action so as,te bar an. action for the-

eniploye e's Claim for ‘overtime compe nsation. These mat?

ters were presented to the Mississippi ‘Supreme Court for

iIsadec ision in this cause | Record, pages 5-6).

\

~ ns || ¢

Specification of Errors.

1. The, Mississippi Supreme Court erred in finding: and

holding that a night watchman Whose duties were to etiard

and protect a timber manaiifiac turing plant where products -

were manufae tured for interstate gommerce is not engaged

ina ‘process or occupation necessary to ‘the production of |

| . for commerce.’ and is not entitled to the benefits \

the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Title 29 U. B.C.

Se ctions 203 ( i), 206, : 207, and 216 (b).

The Mississiqs ip Supreme Court erred j In not dnditias

that an. employee’ s suit for overtime compensation, liqui-

dated damages, and attorney's -fees under Section. 16(b)

of the Fair 1 athor Standards Act ‘of 1938 wil! survive, for

. tlie benefit of his estate and can be maintained by his admin-

istratrix when the “original « employee-plaintift dics alter’

filing suit and before, securing a judement.

The-Mississippi Supreme Court erred j in-not deciding -

that at an emplovee’s suit for overtime cof petsation, liqur-

dated? damages, and attorney's foo 's under Section 16 (hb)

of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1928 is not a suit for

a penalty, and that this action when origivated in the Cir-

cuit Court of Claiborne Connity, Mississippi, is not gév-

uk. hy the Mississippi one-year — of elimi ations

pehaltiés and forfeitures (Seetion 2301," Mississippi ’

ah of 1950). : > 3 -8 . .

ARGUMENT. :

Summary.

Point A According to decisions of the United .State-

Supreme Caurt and according to a logical interpretation of

the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1988, a watchman where

. . »

je

~

{-

duties were to guard and protect a timber “manufiic turing

; plant where products: were manufactured for iifte rstate,

“commerce is angaved in ut ‘proceas or: occupation neces.

sary fo the’ production of - goods for commerce’? and is

| entitled fo-the benefits of the’ Pair Labor Standards Act

‘of 1958, Title 29 U.S.C. A, See tlons 203 _( I), 206, 2OT, and

216 (b). }

Point B. Under a “reasonable cCOMS struction of the law

eats anc in accordance with alecisions of analogous

eases an employee's suit for overtime competisation, Liq

dated damage% and attorney’s fees umder Seetion 16 tb)

of the Fair Labor Standards Net of 1938 will survive for

the benefit sf his estate and can be maintained, by his

administratrix when the original vmployee- plaintiff dies

after filing suit aun be tore securing a judgement:

Point C.) In accordance with : the prior decision of the

United States Supreme Court and: in nccordanee (with aa

reasonable and logical construction of the Fair Ipabor*

Standards Act.of 1988, an eniployee s sull under Section -

16 (b) of... stl Act for overtime compe sation, ditjuidated

damages anid attorney's fees is nota suit'for a penatty, and

when an action of this kind | ix originate i Ina state court of

the St ite of Mississippi, see tion 2: 304 | f the Mj

sissippi

Code of 1930, providing a one-year hatte of Initations

for actions brought 10 collect pe nalties or for feitrfes, is not

“applica le. ih

y OIN T (A.).

U ary ‘the facts of this case F rei) Ww ane liad been oni

ployed by respondent, Southern Package. Corporation, as-

a night watehinan, his duties being to guard and protect

respondents plant. by making rounds of the plant and re

‘porting fires and trespassers.) The auestion here: involved

is whether sn employee having the duties performed: by

eer | >)

T

*. Fred Walton. | ; * ,

6

red Walton is entitled to the benefits of the Fair Labor

Sti andards Act of 1958, .

Under the terms of the Act, Section 3 ( J), an einployce is

entitled te the benefits of the Act if he is engaged in any

provess or OCCU pation necessary to the production of eoods

Yor late sti ite comunmerce, While the Act itself does not de-

‘Tine the word “neeessary'’; it has bee judieially detined

by the Supre Hie Court of the U nited States in MeCulloch y

- Maryland, 4 Wheat. 315, 418. In that case Chief Justice

Marshall defined the word as follows: **To employ the:

negates necessary to an-end, is generally understoed as em:

ploving any means calculated to produce the end, 2nd not

fas being coutined to those single means, without Which the

This definition -of

the word s*ne ‘cessary”” has been applied in the construc tion ..

of the. Pair Labor Standards Act Of 1938 and was adopted

in the case of Flewing ve Kirschbaum Company (CL CL A,

,

ond would be entirety unattainable,

Bal), 124 Be etd) S67, acease involving the éniployne at of

Watenmen, which case Was later affirmed by the Supreme

Court of the United States in the case of Hirsch bang. v.

Walla (1942), O16 U.S. 517, 86 L. Ed: 1638,

The principles involved in this case Are controle: by the

eases of Kirschbaum Coo vy. Walling and Arse val Building

Corporateon efalyv. Walla (1942), 3816 U.S. 517. 62 S. Ut:

LI 6, 86 LL. Ed. 1638, since these cases, which were decided

together, are leading decisions of the United States Su

/ preme Court lnvolving the application: of the Pair Labor

Standards Aet of 1958 to emplovitiesgit similar to that et

A comparison of Kirschbaum Co, ‘. Walling and Ars val

‘ “Ruiblinag Corporation v. Walling, 2106 UL OS, D17, G6? &. ¢t.

116, 86 T. Md. 1688) sapra, and the instant ease reveals the

following similarity um facts: ie .

In the enses of Aursch ban Coo x, Walling aun bese a 1

SRuildina Corporatibx v. Walling, supras the United States

“

a

Supreme ‘Court states the facts regarding the emplovers’

—eecupation as follows: ‘*The facts in the two cases differ

Joaly incminoer detail Tn No. O10, the petitioner owns: and

operates.a six-story Toft building in Philadelphia, The

tenants are, for the Most part, manufacturers of men’s and .

boy's clothing. In No. U24, the petitioners own and operate

a twenty-two story Building located inthe heart of the New

York City clothing manufacturing district. Practically all

of the tenarts manufactare or buy and sell ladies* garments.

Concedéedly, in both cases the tenants of the buildings are

principally engaged tn the production of goods for inter-

* stateccommerve.”* pro aes

In the instant case the avroed staterment of facts (Records

. page 1) sets out thie facts regarding the employer's ocel pa.

tion as follows: C1) That. the defendant is a corporation

organized under the laws of the Stade of Delaware; and is

engaged in operating aweneer plant at Port Gibson, Missis-

sippi, at which plast fi nanufactures veneer from logs,

Thata substantial part of the products so-manutire ‘tured

by the dete ndr toate ship pierced outside of the State of Mis.

sissippi.”’ a. . ke

; The cyse ‘of Wires hhawim-w. Walling. Supa, like the in-

stant case invalved the rmployment of men acting as wateh-

omen, at sting forth their duties the United States Sn.

preme Court says that they performed the customary duties

of such employees and states their duties ais follows: ** The

Watchmen protect the buildings from tireand theft * "Phat

Fred Walton hac the same «luties as ar inary set

out in the agreed. statements of facts (Record, page 2):

“Ttwas the duty of said Walton, as nivht. wate ea at said -

plant, to rade uD ‘hourly roundoof the. poli ant ane panel u

Hight. watchman’s clock located at various stations on said

plant and te re port fires and tre spaissers.”

Since the facts in these two cases decided by the Su

preme Court of the United States are similar in all impor-

f-.

-

° S

ce *

inant respects to the instant cise, it would appear that the

same legal principles would he applicable. In the decision

of the United States Supreme Court it was held that the

spite nh Were ent: ited to the benefits of the Fair Labor’

Staridards Aet. - The opin ion delivered hw Mr. Justice

Prankfutter: interprets fhe Net as follows: ‘*The normal

sand spontaneous meaning of the are by which Con-

vress detined in See. (9) _ = U.S S. * A. See. 205 ( J), “thie.

dass of persons within ‘the he nefits of an. Act, to-wit: ems”

p hic sseneaved ‘in producing, uanutacturine, mining, han-

dling, transporting, or in any other manner working on such

foods, or Th aiy .process or occupation necessary to the

‘production thereof” encompasses these entployees, in view

vt their relation to the conceded production of goods for

commerce by the tenants. * * > Nor can we find in the

Act, as do the petitioners any requirement that employees -

‘must themselves participate in the physical precess of the

making of the eoods before they ean lie regarded as engaged

in their production. Such a construction erases the final

clause of Sees 3°(j) which includes emplovees engaged ° in

ANY process or occupation necessary to the production aril

tloes not limit the scope of the statute to the pre ceding clause

which dels veal emplovees Sin any other manner working

on such goods.’

The emplovers in the cases of Kirschbaum Company X.

Walling and Ars: wal Building Corporation ¥. We ling. su-

pra, Were the owners of buik lings leased to tenants engaged

in the produetion of goods for interstate commerce. Under

the faets of Nirschhawn Company ¥v. Walling, it would

appear that the-reason of the employer for chiring the

-watchmen’ was, to induce tenants to rent their premises

and to protect their Dnildings. Tlowever, under the terms

of the Bair Labor Standards Act the character of the

work done by the em iplovee ard not the employer's ‘reason

fr employing lin. determines whether or not his employ:

6

ment is covered’ by the Act. The Supreme Court of the

United States came to this ‘logical and reasonable con-

clusiow in the decision of the two cases cited above. | There-

fore, if in the instant case the employer hired Fred Walton

partly to.reduce insurance rates, this factor has néthing.

to do with, tlie application of the Fair Labor Standards

Act which depends on the character of the work performed

by the employee. It is admitted by respondent in the

agreed staterhent of facts (Recerd, page 2) that the duties

of Fred Watlton-weresmaking rounds of inspection of the

“respondent? = plant and guarding and protecting it by re-

porting fires and trespassers, “Hf the emplovee was in fact

engaged in “any process “or occupation necessary to. the

production?" of goods for interstate commeree, he is en-

titled to the benefits of the Act regardless of his employer's

reason for hiring him. The fact that one of the emploger’s S

reasons for employing -Walton was to reduce insurayte

rates is of no consequence in determining whether or not

he is entitled to the benefits of the Net, except that it w ould

seem that the attitude of responile at's insurance company

in requiring the employment of a night watehmiin in its

contract with respondent is an indieation that the duties

of such a watchman were necessary, :

The respondent, Southern -Packa ee Corporation —at-

tached “feat significance to. the fact that in the aereed

statement of facts in this exse it is stated that Pred Walton

Was not cneaged in the mannal and physical process oO!

making or manufacturing the woods for interstate cori

meree, The’ duties of the Watchmen. in this case and in the

Cases of Nirschbanim Company ve Wallin, supra, Were thes

“amie: guarding and protecting the plants and reporting

fires.and trespassers. The United States Supreme Court

in the Case at K inschbaun + OM pen wy W alli ive), sllpra, het

that other duties were un necessary in order to entitle the

tmplovee t » the bene fits of the Act and that, thie Statute

oS

i ; 10

could not be constr ned as meaning th: at the employee must_>

he engaged in thes physical process of making” thie coods

in order to be covered by the Act since the Act itself has

specifically provided otherwise. ARG ee

The Supreme Court of Mississippi commented. at length

-upon this: decision of the United* States’ Supreme Court

(Record, pages 14-16), and tn this discussion it apparentiy

views the entire Fair Labor St: andards Act avith disap

piroval. (Record, pages 15-46) It says: ‘tthe constitution-

ality of the ope was upheld in the ‘ase’ of United States vo

Darby, 312 UL S. roa, * *) * and the wanton waste of

‘plowing Bar: : Geslad hours of labor during a period of

manpower shortage in a great world evisis has until re--

cently: remained unhindered?’ “Tt will be noted’ that this

suit was brought long before our nation declared war, so

apparently this statement of the Mississippi Supreme Court

is not inadé& because it feels that the provisions of the

Aet should be relaxed in an emergeney but because it be-

lievessthe Act should have never been enacted. The con

ments of the Mississippi Supreme Court upon the case of .

Kirschbaum Company x. Walling, supra, show that he

state Supretne Court regards the Pair Labor Standards

Act of 1938 with distaver. (Reeord 14-16).

Althoneh it devoted.ia great deal of space to a discussion

of the decision of the United States Suprenre Court, the

‘Mississippi State Supreme Court necleeted te point out

the distiniction he ‘tween the ot Crises tlecidect I) the Loasited

States Supreme Court and the iustant case. Chief Pinstiee

Smith of the: Mississippi Supreme Court realized that Is

decision of the United States Supreme Court was dire

in point in oa consideration of this) case and Hacontes,

“being of the opinion that Fred Walton's employment In

the appellant was within and covered by the provisions of

the Pair Labor Standards ANetoof VO38. Kirsch bee ¢

VW alli 9,316 US. 517, 86 L. Ed. 163827" (Reeord, pas

| Fy :

\.

1

oe

11 s . . 4 as *

—— The Mississippi Supreme Court in its majority opinion

apparently interpreted.the Act differently from the United

States Supreme Court and instead followed: a decision -of

C, 184, 10S. Ey (2d) 644, 130 ALL. R. 265 (Record,

4 be 3 , .

of Kirschbaum Company v. Walling, supra, and allowed a

ioTte re filled up at night... The North ¢ ‘arolina Court im

plied that a watehman. ordinarily would not be covered by

‘the Act. It is hard to reconcile this “decision with logic

as-it would be difficult to distinguish the duty of {illire

boilers from the other duties of a watchman. Et world

appear that a watchman who prevented fires or trespassers

from destroying the boiles would be performing as valua-

ble a task to production as.one who kept the alice Bess

eburning dry by filling it. However, ‘the Supreme. Court

of North Carolina seems to be the only court that has ever

attached any -great significance to this distinction, cand its

decision Wes with a divided court. Justice Seavell dis

senting. Furthermore, at the time of this decision. the

North Carolina court did not have the benefit of a decision

-of the United States Supreme Court directly in Spoint te-

euide it in the construction of this Act.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi appeared sto accept

the theory that the watelimeagn must he eneneed-in ‘tother

.

manual activitic st (Record, page 10) inorder to be entitled

to the benefits of the Aet. Tt is difficult to see where Sactt

_ a requirement is made in the Act or imiplfed diy its ferns.”

Could it logically be said that a Watchman who-wuards and’

protects his emiplovers plant and reports fires and tres

passers Is “hot oye ‘red by the Pair Labor Standards Net,

but if he OCCIS ions lly answers the teloshoue after. bisiies-

‘hours, he is entitled to all its benefits? (Opinion of .Mis

‘sissippi Suprefie Court, Record, pace 10). The United

the North Carolina Supreme te Hae Greqory, 21S.

page &). ‘This decision of the aoe Carolina Supreme:

Court was rendered in October, 1941, prior to the decision ’

Watchman a recovery die. to the fact that he also kort the

"ae

States Supreme Court in the case of Kirschbaum v. Walling,

supra, did not draw such a distinction but decided that the

watchmen were entitled to the benefits of the Act bec AUSE

as watchmen guarding and protecting -the buildings, they

were performing services necessary to interstate « commerce,

The Mississippi Supreme € ‘ort also attempts to distinguish |

the instant case from cases where the watchman is em-.

ployed only **to guard the goods While awaiting shipment”

and indicates that in the Intter cases the watchman is ¢n-

titled te the bene ‘fits of the Act (Reécerd, page 16). Lt would,

appear that a Watehman who enarded and _protectéd the

plant where the goods were manufactured for interstate

commerce and where the products would necessarily” be

kept while awaiting shipment wonld be, even more closely

connected with the production of goods for interstate com-

merce than one a merely watched the products lin fhe

Kirschbaum cu se, the wateliman avere. employees of the

owner of the building, and covegage in this decision Was

based on the theory that ‘tmaintenance of a safe, habitable

building is indispensable to” thie production of: woods for

‘interstate COMMETCE,, SIO UL S. at S24. The loeic of this

decision ix obvious from the puirase ology of the Act.

It further appears that there abe-creat mumbers of-le-

cisions which are based on the siihie reasoning ‘emploved

in the decision of Airs: lhbawn Company ve Wallivag, uprra.

and the great weight of dower court decisions are in accord.

Flemita ve A. Be Rirschbaun Canpany (D.C. BK. D. Pay

(1941), 4 Wage & Hour Rep. page 171: Joe Laka‘ s.

SL HM. Robinson & CTompany, lune. Ini Ss, BE. (2a)>-422,

affirming 156 S. W. (2d) 359; Leferers ve General Bavport

Tron and Metal Company, D. C..S. D. Texas (Corpus —

Christi Div.) (1940), 38 F. Supp. S88: Mararave. vy. Mid-

Continent Petroleum Corporatian (i. D. Okla.) 42. Fed:

Supp. 908 (1941); WL Le. Campbell y. Superior Decalco-

mario Company, Ine. (I. CoN. D. Tex., Dallas i ) (198),

I Wage & Hour Cases a . & ante i

18

The respondent in the lower courts cited numerous cases

which it Glaimce were authorities to the effect that a wateh-:

ian is not entitled to the benefits of the Fair Labor Stand-

cards Act. However, in petitioner’s opinion they are not

in point ina consideration of this ease for one or the other

of tyoteasons: (1) They involved: watchiien who were

a ae by retail businesses, or (2) the ‘ve involved ein-

plovees who were ot emplaye doas watchmen but were

engaged in some ‘other line of work less important and, only

remotely connected with production. ’

li does not appear that the Supreme ¢ ‘ourt of Missis- .

sippi ever pointed out a factual difference, between the

Cases decided by the U nited States Supreme Court and the *

instant case. ~ The State Supreme Court did) comment on

the fact ‘that the plant. where Walton worked did not

operate, regularly ait night, which is usually the éase with

most manufacturing plants of that kind under ordinary:

circumstances, [nits opinion (Record, page 9) the Supreme

Court of Mississippi says: ** Presumably the night wateh-

man slept during the day-time, while the other employees

were engaged in the production of woods for COMINEPCE, He

contributed nothing to such work or production, ey elf

Th the same paragraph the Court says: tif the plant had

been running at night, the: services of a nicht watchman

‘would not have been ene atonthoeven te satisfy the re-

quest of the insurance company.” Phe Mis-tssippi Supreme

Court sects tG sax that sinee cert Un mnanutacturing opera

tions are discontinued at the plant during the might. a

neh? watchman is not an employee necessary to production ;

and vet because of this very factshe is “required’. The

State Supreme Conrt refers te the fact that the.2oods were

Hot regularly manufactured at-emeht again ‘in the con

clusion of its GPLNLON, eIteIs petitioner's oOypiidon that this

fact is the ve ry reason that a watehman was necessary’

for prodiction singe he prote eted the plant from ‘damage or

“loss while other e employee; s slept. Tr Bowl 1-0: Frosade.sy. hii

On chen 4

14

KL (2d) 11, 20 (C2 C, AL 1) employees engaged in repair

and maintenance oe sugar ae in the dead season were held

- covered, The respondent apparently accords significance

to the fact that the employee in this case agréed to work

“fos respondent for much Jess than the wage provided ‘for

by, the Fair Labor Standards Act; and the Mississippi

Sistine Court also commented on this fact. It will be

noted that Fred Walton’s employ ment Was before the War

when employment was inuch scarcer than at the present

time. It is conceded that an employee in poor economic

condition might be driven by dire’ necessity to accept

employment for less than a decent living wage to-prevent

worse, suffering in his family. However, the provisions

of the Act itself (Seetion 3(¢) )° expressly prevent a defend:

ant from setting up such an unreasonable defense. .

Any contention that the benefits of the Aet do not-extend

to an employee unless he is engaged-in the ‘actual, produe-

‘tion’ tof goods, unless he is masiually and physieally making

the product would culy. show. a desperate attempt to escape

liability by taking refuge in flimsy technicalities of no rea

sonable significance, As Wi as stated by this Court in the

case of Kirschbaum Company vo Walling, supra, the final

ie of Section 3(7) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ‘can

not thus be read out of the Act; nor ean it be said by re-

spondent that W alton’s duties were not necessary to the

- production of gvods for interstate ‘commerce sirice it is

_admitted that he watched over respondent's nuinufacturing

plant, made regular rounds, and protected it from: loss 0

destruction by fires or.thieves. ; ,

From a-direct reference to the Fair Labor Standard=

Act. of 1988,-Section 3(j), the logie of the decision of: the

United States Supreme Court is apparent. The final eliiise

“of Section 3(j) states that an employee engazéd | Sim. ans

process or occupation necessary to the production” of

goods for interstate commerce is entitled to the benefit:

%

15

of the Act. Certainly it would seem that a watchman wlio

#rotects a timber manufacturing plant from destruction by

fires and trespassers is necessary to production and like the

watchman in ‘the ease of Kirschbaum Company v. Walling,

supra, who had identical duties, his eniployment is covered

by-the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1988. It is, therefore,

respectfully submitted that the ‘decision of the Supreme

Court of Mississippi i in the Instant case is not inaccord with

the decisions of this Honorable © ourtand a opt al inte Tpre-

tation of the Act itself.

= = Pon -(B).

From reference to similar cases regarding the survival

of actions it appears that an action for back Wages forvover-

time work, liquidated damgges,'and reasonable attorney's

fees as provided by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938

_ would survive the death of the employee for the benefit of lis

estate. ne

As the plaintiff’ s ‘edi ite was ‘diminighed and tlie “defend:

ant unlawfully enriched: by its iNewally , holding amounts

due the deceased plaintiff, it would Appear that there is

some" unalogy between this case and actions under the

Sherman AntivPrust Act, 15 U.S.C. AL Sec. 15, wherein

Federal Courts have held that the cause of action, would

survive. Momand vy. Tiventicth © ‘ vtury For Filin € unpre:

hon, WD. Okla. ST OF. Supp. G49 (1941).

re ‘re is an interesting discussion of the survival of the

action under Section 16(b) contatinedd. in NIV Mississip TD

Law Journal, pages 1o7 ef seq.. under the caption ** Pri-

vate Litigatton Under the Wage and Hour Act”, by Rufus

fi. Poole, Assistant Solicitor, in charge of opinions and

reviews, United States Departme “nt of Labor. This article

sunmarized the cases re warding survival and pointed out

that since actions under the “Anti-Trust Law-are held to

sirvive, an action under ‘Section: 16(h) of the Fair Labor

.

oy eae

Standards Act would logically. survive on n the same principle.

The dise ussion refers to the following Cases:

“In Sullivan v. clsseciated Bill’ bees (6, F. (2d) 100),

an action for triple damages ‘under the Anti-Trust Act was’

held to survive against the estate of the deceased wrong.

doers : and i in Moore v. Backus (78 F. ( (2d) o71) (C, C, A..

Tih 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 640, 56 Sup. Ct. 173, 80

L. Ed. 456 (1936)) avsimilar action was held to survive

in favor of the estate of the deceased . plaintiff. The

‘rule is apparently the s same where the ‘deceased party’ isa

dissolved ‘corporation. © (Linperial Filin Exchange v. Gen-

eral Film Co., 244 Fed. 985, 986 (S. D..N. Y.1915)). These

cases proceed upon the. theory that the-action for triple

damages is an action for iijury to the plaintiff's property —

asa result of an illegal.conspiracy; and that whilé such,

an action sounds in tort, it survives and may be pursued

aveamst the estate of-a deceased person beeanse the prop-

erty. or the proceeds or value of the property belonging

to the plaintiff have, been appropriated by the deceased

person and added to his own estate or money. | (Tinperial

Film Exchange v. General. Film Co., 244 Fed. 985, 986

(S. DLN: Y. 1915) (As to the claim of. an employee for

back wages alleged to be due him by his bankrupt employer,

see In re New Style Hat Mra. Co.,4 Wage Hour Rep. 29 (X. D.

Olfio 1940) ) (United States v. Daniel, 6 How. 11, 12 L.- Bd.

eg (U:.S. 1848); Ratton v. Brady, 184 U. S. GUS, 22 Sup.

. 493, 46 Ti. Ed. 715 (1901): Sidliran ve Associated Bill

pe 6 F. (2d), 1000 (c..c. a A. 2d, 192) Moore v.

Backws, 78 FF. (2d) 571 (CL. C. A. 7th, 1935) cert. dented,

296 U.S. 640, 56 Sup. Ct. 1738,°80.L, Ed. 455 (1936). - This,

~ exception, as originally stated in the Statute of Edward III,

covered only the death of the injured party. - However.

_ Judicial decisions have extended its application to cases

where the defendant wrongdoer is the deceased; provided, ,.

17

always, that the wrongful act resulted in both a decrease in

the estate * = injured party and ati increase in that of the

wrongdoer. .

From the cases cited above jt appears that the Aet sur-.

vives or not according to the principles of common law of

which’ the Statutp/of Edward TIT is regarded as a part.

The statute rdw. LIT, ©. 7, permitted executors to main-

tain actioy/of trespass for - ¢hattels taken’; ind carried away.

in the life time of the testator, but did- not cover cases

involving: the death of the defendant. If the injury giving

rise to the right affected the property of the dee ‘edent, the

tort action will survive, Moore. Backus, supra, and judicial

decisions have extended the application of the Statute of

Edward. II] to ‘eases whe ve the defendant wrongdoer is

the deceased, so long as the wrongful act resulted in a.

decrease in the estate of thé injuried party and an increase

intkat of the wrongdoer. Sulliray v. Associated Bill Pos--

ters, supra.. Since there is absolutely no reason in logie or

justice why a defendant should be allowed to escape liability

and enjo‘@the proceeds of his wrongdoing while the estate

of the injured decedent Dore the loss, there is small wonde a

that as far back as the enactment of 4 lidw. III, ¢. 7, it

was found necessary to prevent such iijustice by the ¢ Mi wt-

ment of this statute which has heer n incorporate “dl ‘inito

ie common ‘law. fe | ,

While: actions: under Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor

Standards Act are remedial and not penal, Overnight Motor

‘Transportation Company N. Missxel, Md.; 62 Sup. Ct. 1216

_ (1942), it is interesting to note that the Mississippi Supreme

Vourt held that an administrator could sue and recover +

ltnitive damages against a Wwrongdper:

“Punitory damages are inflicted for’ the. purpose - of

deterring a-culprit in the future, and the imposition of

them for such purpose is impossible-in thg case of a person

.

‘

“8

deceased.- But where the trespasser is still alive, as in the |

‘ease at bar, there is no reason whatever why lie should

he exonerated becduse of the death’ of the ane on whom

- he las committed a trespass; for the punishment is imposed

nat to deter him from repeating his trespass as against the

particulary party assailed or injured, but to secure his

eeneral good behavior, - Wagner 'v. Gribbs, 80. Miss. i* ae

31 So. 434, 92 Am. St. ‘Ke pod, The rei sonable ness of: this

dee: ‘ision is obvious.

The Anti-Trust Act makes ee specific provision for sur

vival-of actiotis, but the authorities under which ‘this ‘uct

has been held to survive are numerous and the ir reason

ableness is apparent. .U uder the ‘rule set out in, the cases’

decided under the Anti- Trust Act cited above, it appe “urs

“that.a defendant can net. dodge Hability imposed by a law’

7 . x . . 6 .

ostply because the injured party died. It would certains

ae

sect, that if the Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 20% (1890, 50 Stal

GOR (1927 10S. c A. Sec. 1, ef seq. (1941) providing for,

triple damages for injury. to the plaintif's property. as 4

result of an illegal conspiracy, is held to survive, then, this

“action under Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards

Act of A958 for back wages for overtime work gnd for ligqui

dated | damages wonld also sure ive on, ‘the siuthy Yheory.* Tr

uy pears from the agreed statement. of facts (Record, pass

2) that Walfénawis paid nothing for 2 eousiderah le amomn

of overiiine work. By appropriating Watton’ s S400

and the amount of his liquidated darages the penne: Is

~till profiting by the loss susti ned by Walton and his e=tat

Ih ss instant case the amount due the employee *S estate

for hnconyensated services and the loss, to his estate is

more ensily determinable andthe injury to the property

of the deceased enrplovee is more obvious than iti the s

under the AntiTrust+Act. “That the respondent's estat

is Wegally enriched by the amount now due the decease’

= i . I E ’ " _ 9

cniplovee’s- estate, Which accrued to the em/ployvee prion t

|

UaW, cases involving, ieivotshit oko applicable — * J

19

his death, is also apparent., It is believed by petitioner

“that: this eause of action should survive under the same

theory that actfous under the Sherman. Anti-Trust Act

have been heid to survive. ogre

In regard\ to whether an action. under Section 16(b) of

“the Fair Siandards Net of 1938 will SUTVIVe for the benefit

of the employee's ‘legal ‘representative, two cases are. of

interest: Momund v. Tatentic th-( Contury Pow Film Corpora-

tion ef all, and Sane vy. ‘piriffith Amiisement Co.- (W. D.

Okla.) 37 F. Supp. gu CDSTT: and La Guardia v. Atistin-

Bitss General Pare (h.. Bucs, (S. D; N. Y. ) 4¥ FL Supp. G78

(1941), ) ts

Momand ve Titenticti-€ enters Bow Film C orporation,

supra, Was a’ suit vied Section 7 of the Sherman Anti

Trust Act.45,U. 8. € As Seem 5. The defendants contended ;

that the alleged canse of action’ sounded in tort and that

-plaintif could not ajaintain thes suits. as-an assignée’ be

cause Oklahoma Jaw. forbinis the iysigniment of a Ganse Of

action fora tort. Th e court held that this action to recover

treble damages for v isl: itiow of the anti-trust laws hy a COMM

bination and: ereement injuring Naintiff’s UssigQuor's “in

‘their, Dusiness pia property Was not barred hy this’ saa

hota stutute: forbidding the assignment ot causes of

‘tion for torts, The court in this case ae ee -igh

ofaction created by Section 7 of the Sherman Anti-Trust.

“Act, is nota penitlty but Beiairas rte the femedy granted

isto one injured in his businesk of property, by reason ot

.

the iets for sidden in the. Ee aN acctions of the Act.’

The court in tli hse also states. ‘What this ¢: Use of wetion

aider. the: Shertuan “Anti Tru 1 Act would survive for the

‘bene fit of the legal re presentat five of the injyted pe Fson,

It says ‘ Assignability and stirvivability arts COVE atible

terns” ‘and, for the purpose of t4onside ving the applicable

* wee

lt wonld, therefore, appear that if*& cause, of action was

’ ‘

Zo .

.

. .

.

; ‘

. - ,

b> EB

. .

.

“My

—

; rasivatble, it would likewise survive and could be main

tained by an executor or administrator, La’ Guardia vy,

Austin-Bliss General Tire Co., luc; 41 F. Supp. O7S, supra,

specifically held that an assignee of emplovees* claims wi

der the Pair Labor Standards Act. for unpaid overtime

compensation may maintain action therefor, «Since sas

signabrlity: and survivability: are .determined by similar’

factors, Momand ve Tare vtieth- ? niury For Film Corpora

fron, supra, it Wwould-seeni logical to conclude that the ac

tion under the: Pair Labor Standards Act would also sur.

vive for the benefit of the deceased empleyee’s estate.

.

eo ff

. Posy ¢C),

It appears frota numerous judicial authorities that Se

tion 2801, Mississipp: Code of 1930, the state One-vea

a

“statute of limitations for actions for petalties and fo

‘feitures, does not apply te Section 16¢ hy) of the Fan Labor

Stundatds Act-of 2938, previding an action for overtine

‘compensation, liquidated damages, and a reasonable attor

Dit \ Ye feo, © * ‘ os ‘ .

The Mississippi Supreme Court, in pele: api 0D

‘

instant case (Record, pages 13.14) states that tle liquidated.

ciataiwes provided for in seetjaa 16¢b) of the -RKatr Lata

Standards ALetisa premalty, It would seer that this apt iat

is rlso not in accord wath decisions of this Court, suc

Supreme Court of the’ United States held that an geectior

ithe? this provision of the Fair Labor Standards et ”

IMSS is notdesuit fora penalty and that the sulditions ma

aimennt is liquidated damages in the recent decision o

Ore recht mn fe Transportation Company Vs. NM wsel he

Sup. Ct 118 (1942).

43) this case respondent, Missel, Was TD Cripioves ft

} ‘ er re. ;

tit \loter Prausportation (4) Pert

peuitiotresy Civernig

- .

» * *-. . ‘ P Pb *

eur peter tion enraged In interstate motor thprspertacoe

: 5 / | , ’ ? is

Ms nm Corrimo Carrier, Hie neted ais cho rate sClLeOrK: LO tii

corporation: Responders, brought a starun@ ACTION we,

an

recover Unpaid overtime compensation, an additional equal

amount as liquidated damages, and counsel's fee unler’

the I “air Labor Standards Act of 1938.. In hélding that the

wet Was demedial, Mr. Justice Reed, who delivered the

opinion of the court said: +

‘The liquidated damages for taidure to pap amine

hes under Nection 6Ca) and Plas are compensation, mot a

nalts or punishsiont by the Gorernment. CF, ee a aq

Atrial, 146 U.S. 657, G67, GES, 674, 681, 183 , 2,

i, 228, 230, 233, 36 L:-Ed. 1128: Coa-v. l vhs pats rs,

iN. Y. 876, 148 XN. EB. 296. The ve ivntinn of acworkman’s

Da aH ie l/ re sult th damades too obse wre and difficult rif

navi f for « stimaty, other than bu Loe viele ate de damages.”

‘Ttalies supplied). In the footnote to this de « ‘Ision he ereat

mber of authorities are cited int sup port ol this Opintoms

of the nited States Supre me Court

hi the case of La Guardia. vy, Austin-Bliss Crenerald Tir

DN.Y.) 4) FL Supp. 47s (194) 1 the Coutt said:

*The , POCOVETY © f liquidated glamages ix’ not hy Wak ot

att It ny tt is additional con bp oern safion to the en prlegvare - fon

iis itlegalls deprived of their overthue, Robertson \

draus Hosiery Mills: supra, (12) Fed. @d) 285): 7

Boston it WO ROR. supra, (35 BL Supp. 888) 5 Berger vy.

user, supra (36 FB, Supp. FOS): Marararce vo Mire

Petroleum Corp. DOC. 36 BP, Supp. Lao

The recent case of Ahram if al.-v, TT Penguin ( cibhess

. 46 F, Supp. G89. (1942) is a case discussing what

‘atute of limitations is applicable to Seetion It ty) cal Uhae

hair Labor Standards. Act. The court, held that t| © lid

lated dlariawes recoverable from she eniplowes “wnieder tbe

Fair Labor Standards Act by an emplovee entitled ty re

over oVertinie compensation do wet amownt ton **penaliv’

Californian one-Vear statute of timoututrowus:

provision is more réadily construed as being for

~~ k _ . } ' :

Wited Camages and not as being a penalty when it would

« dificult to measure oreascertain actual damages..°&) 8

v: Bethlehem Steel Co,, 205 USS. 105," TS. Ct. 450, 1 L. Re:

io] Cleve land Crane ete., Cory. Seah Cast lron Pip

168 Nila. 250,53 Soo 313: Bright vo Rowland, 4 Miss.

308; 27 CLI. 94. In thy enactmeni of the Fair Labor

Standards Act, the United States Legislature realized

that it would be impossible to assess the exact extent of ;

working man’s injury’ by not receivingshis Wages at th

tine when he was first entitled to then: and for working

overtime without adequate compensation at the time to

this extra work cand effort; therefore, it Was vrov ided for

thie: emplovec to have an amount equal to his recovery for

hack Wawes’as liquidated damages. This Was 2 reasonabl

provision since the more back Wages a plaintiff is, entitled

tothe more he has been damaged by not receiving his pa’

at the proper time. In the ease of Shelton Electric Con

pani Nn, Pietor Talking Mackie Conepany, 277 Fed. 488

435, the Court said in discussing & problem: somewhat sin

ilar to the one in the instant case: **The treble damages.

which: the complainant seeks té recover, are neither :

penalty or a forteiture. but merely treble damage: ™

lowed by law for. the redress of a private injury."

The Federal jurisdictional statute, 2s U. at A. &

Ovi, makes the provision that suits for penilties under fey

‘eral statutes should be broveht in Tederal eourts. * Tt th

Vnited States legislature had regarded this Aet ast pe

in its nature, it would not have dedicated to the state cout

the power to enforce it. Tt this suitpwere a suit fo

alty, suit would be brought ina federal court and the!

eral five-vear statute of limitations wenld apoly 2

U.S.C. AS T9L. The reniedial nature of the act

phasized in thet Finding and Deciaration of Poli

tained in the Act itself. Sees. 2(a) amd (by. ;

dt iz} therefore, respectfully urged, that the decisto!

Mississippi Supréme Court in this cise was met)

cord with applicable decisions of thissCourt since the ‘stat

Supreme Court apparently arrived at the conclusion that

he liquidated datiages providedl-by the Fair Labor Stand

rds Act were penalties. Tt appears that the United State:

Supreniw Court im the case of Overnight Motor Trausporta-

on Company Vs. Messel, 62S. Ct. 1216, supra’ andtereat

waibers of lower court.decisions have held that Section

Wi) of the Pair Labor Standards Act is net penal but is

rentedial provision for.compensation, and it: seems’ clean-

that this is the interpretation of the Act the lawmakers in,

ended. Tt is petitioners belief that this point should

have been decided in necordance with the authorities cited

wove and that the Supreme Court of Mississippi should

ave held that this-action is under a remedial statute, and

that, therefore; the Mississippi one-year statute of limita

‘ious for actions for *tpenalties and Yorfeitures*’’, Seetion

OT. Mass” yp Code of 2930, has ho application to this

uibandspe io ater’s wetion is not barred thereby. Tt would

ppear trot the authoritres cited above that petitioner ts,

entitled to recover S400.00 as back wages for overtime work,

S00.00° as liquidated damages, and a reasonable attor.

av’s Tee, es s ie

it is, therefore respectfulls submitted that judement of

Mississippi Supreme Court shou

lk? be reviewed yy this

llonorable Court and finally: reversed. .

Cuas. F. ENG.e,

Nateh - Mississippe, :

Cornsel Lar P tatiowe ie

DERGER & GHIOLSON:,

By GCanvrurrs Giioison,

, Port Gibson. Mississippi,

OF Counsel,

(90642

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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