RRespoondents Brief in Oppositionn — Smith v. Shaughnessy
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"Bomar W. Sacre, PETITIONER “
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FRANK J. didivtinedant: Couininos oF Soraisal ,
' Revenve or THE Uwsirep Srares: 3: 2 eae aa
TWENTY rer Disraior or Raw, Fomk G, Sn a ae
On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF r Cupribkaes To. THR UNITED |
STATES CIRCUE COURT OF APPEALS FOR rat SECOND
CIROUIT .
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BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
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- CITATIONS»
Disclitislsaw Beck’s Estate, 129 F. 24 268... ...: ZARA 4,8
Commissioner v. Hart, 106 F. 2d 269..___, -----.----... a oy
Commissioner v. Marshall, 125 F. 2d 943-.-....-.--- -o-- 45,8
Commissioner ¥. McLean; 127 F. 2d 942... - - CE aoe
* Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. 8, 39. ..... — 3, 4, 6,9
| Helwering v. Blair, 121 F. 24 945_. SLY SEER 8
_Helvering ¥, Bowers, 208... $18 - 26-2. ccna 9
_ © Heleering v. Bullard, 303 U. 8. 297... 20-6 ee -9
~~~ Heleering v. Hallock, 309 U. 8.106... 8,7, 8,9 -
hs “Helvering v. utchings, 312-U. 8, 303. paints
Helvering v. Rabinette, 129 F. 2d 832_- ivvecescdy O00
Herzog v. Commiasioner, 116 F. 24 591_- ae ‘ -. 862,90
- Heaslein v. Hoey, 91 F. 24 964, certiorari denied, 302 U. 8.
Ae aie i 6 |
| Higgins v. Commissioner, 120 F. 2d 287... 4,9
' Hughes v. Commissioner, 104 F. 2d 144. 4
Lilly. Smith, 96 F.2d 341, certiorari denied, 305°. 8.
604___ Sale ar dial epochs mhibd aba Q
Porter v. Commissioher, 60 PF, 2d 673, ‘affirmed, ws U.
436. : 6
Rasquin, y- Humphreys, 308 U. 8. 54. pha ndcoPhepent-« 4
Ryerson'v. United States, 312 U. 8. 405... ol ee oh tas .
Tyler v- United States, 281 U. Ae ave nba Be
s
__. United States v. Pelzer, 312 U. 8. 399... _..
Statutes:
Revenue Act of 1932, 2. 209. 47 Stat. 169: ae
. ie Se. 501_- ties. be arate we pak’ See
Bre See. 506. . 8,1
Sec. 802, aopiankiied be by Hh. Ree. 60, Shack 17, 1941,
e. 21, 55 Stat. 44_. Bee dsipanete. tes
489988—42 4 cr /
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Miss ¥h > io
suey 708, 728-Coog., list Sess., p27 SOA Com
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‘~° Corey Tanne, 1943;
No. 429:
| Hurtaur W. Smirz, PETITIONER —
. \.3 v. >. ee
Fux J. SHAUGHNESSY, COLLECTOR oF INTERNAL
Revenve or tHe Unrrep Sates FoR 7
_ Twanrr- Pinet Disraict or New Youx
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT. or CBRTIORARI TO THE UNITED 0s
STATES CIRCUIT COURT or mad pager For THE SECOND .
crreuiT. -
.
- : . 4 ts
——EEES
‘The -epiniori of the District Court Rs 36) is
‘reported in 40 F. Supp. 19. The opinion of the |
_ Citeuit Céurt of Appeals (R. 57) is -Feported in
; 128 F. (2a) 742. :
| JURISDICTION | :
_ The judgment off the Circuit: Court of. Appeals |
was efitered on July 6, 1942 (R. 58-59). .The peti- |
tion for a-writ of certiorari was filed September
29, 1942, The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under ‘Section 240. (a) of the Judicial -Code, as
amended a the Act of February 13, 1925.
(1). :
4
“Whether. the aay of a \ trust of. sities,
"under which the ineome is to be paid to the
grantor’s wife for life and upon her death the prin-
| cipal is te.be paid to him if living, and, if he should _
~ not then be living, to her legatees or, if she should
die intestate, to her intestate successors, is subject
to gift tax under Sections 501 and 506 of the Reve eS
nue Act of 1932.
*
STATUTE AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED |
‘The statute and regulations involved aré set °
forth in the a infra, pp. 11 et oe: 5
, STATEMENT
On ag at 26, 1937, the en crested an
irrevocable trust the corpus of which consisted of ah
- securities valued at $570,937.50. The trust inden-
ture provided that the income should be paid to his
* wife for life, and upon death the principal to. .
be paid to him if living, or in the event of his prior :
death, the principal to be paid to the persons and
in the amounts directed in her will, but if she
should die intestate, the prineipal'to be paid to the.
persons and in thé amounts provided under New_
York law as though she had owned. outright the .
corpus of the.trust and had died intestate (R. 42-
43, 44).
In_his sits tax return ‘ho 1937 the taxpayer
reported the full amount of $570,937.50 as a tax-
- able gift, and ee a jax of $71, 674.22 thereon.
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eos Se a ate
_. Thereafter, the taxpayer filed a claim for refund "..
‘of the tax on the ground thatthe transfer did not |
constitute a taxable gift. The Commissioner. -
ie rejected the claim and the taxpayer thereupoti
‘brought suit in the District Court (R. 43-44). )
The District Court held. that the transfer in trust
constituted a complete and absolute gift only to the
extent of the life estate in. the taxpayer’s wife
- (R. 45), and accordingly’ on September 9, 1941,
ntered judgment of refund to the taxpayer in the
ount of $40,109.19. (R. 46-47). The taxpayer
jdid not appeal from the District Court’s decision:
A that the value of the life. , was subject to gift
“tax, On the Commissioner’s appeal the Cireuit -
Court of. Appeals in a memorandum opinion
reversed the judgment of the District Court and.
. vemanded the cause with direetion to dismiss the
complaint, .on the authority of its decision in
Herzog v.. Seracceemens Ret F. (2d) 591 Se
‘ 57-59). :
sae ARGUMENT . Retake
The taxpayer contends that the decision below is:
., apparently in conflict with the decisions of this
- . Court in Estate of Sanford Vv. Commissioner, 308
-U, S; 39, aud Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106: -
_ The contention seems to be based on the following
arguments: (1) Under the Sanford case a gift tax —
cannot be imposed unless the inter vivos transfer
-_ is complete, and the transfer in the present case is,
not complete ; (2) in any event since under the Hal-
as -
\\ atoner ¥. Marshall, 125 F. (2d) 943 (C. C. A.
. 4
. look case the corpus of the instant trust will be in-
cluded in the grantor's estate and will be taxed as
ag eye Il ap cH
tax. No conflict among the circuits is amerted. ln-
deed, petitioner's arguments have been uniformly _
rejected by the cireuit courts of appeals. Commuis-
ommissioner ¥. Molean, 127 F. (2d) 942 (©. C.
; Helvertng ¥. Robinette, 129 F. (2d)
(C..C. A. 3d); Mersog v. Commissioner, 116 F.\
(0. C. A. 2d); ef. Higgins v. Commis-
F. (2d) 237 (C. ©. A. Ist); }
"se Betate, 129 F. (2d) B43 (CO) OC. A.
2d), and Huphes v. Commissioner, 104 F. (2d) 144
(C.C.A.9th) >
(1) In Betate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308
U. 8. 39, and Rasguin v. Humphreys, 308 U. 8. 54,
this Court held that the grantor of an infer viros
trust who reserves the_power te designate new
beneficiaries other than himself, is subject-to a gift
tax at the time he relinquishes thaf power but. not
before then. Those cases are premised on the
proposition that a transfer by which the transferor
retains the power to alter the ‘transferees is 50
incomplete that it does net constitute a gift. Peti-
tioner seeks to expand those decisions to make them
applicable to a transfer by which the grantor purte
completely with control over the property, and its”
5
- interest. The cireuit courts have without exception
dismissed attempts of this sort.
The petitioner's argument overlocks the distine-
tion between a grantor’s retention of 9 continyng
power to alter the distribution of the property and
his retention of a contingent interest, the fruition |
of which depends upon events wholly beyond his
control. Where the grantor retains the power to
shift the enjoyment of the fund, even though he
is excluded as a possible beneficiary of that power,
_ the absence of a complete donation is at once appa-
rent, for the grantor has retained one of the most
significant fagots of the bundle of rights constitut-
ing ownership, ee., the right to dispose of thé“prop-
erty. Stated another way, the grantor in such a
case retains control over the economic benefits of
the property. In that-cjreumstance the reason for
the nonapplieation of the gift tax becomes at once
apparent. The gift ie not effected until the relin-—
quishment of the power because until that time the
sine qua non of a complete donation, wis. the sur-
. render of the grantor’s control over the economic
benefits of the property, does not take place. How-
ever, the grantor in this case retained no control
- over the economid benefits of the property. Com-
missioner v. Marshall, supra. ‘It is this control or
‘command over the property taxed’? which was
said in the Savford case to be the eqence of the.
taxable gift. And- —s¢ erage cae
trol makes the gift
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-.,
‘a ‘in “‘aialee that. the; insenatie is’. a present |
_. ineomplete-the ‘petitioner also ‘emphasizes the. in-
de-finitenesy of theidentity of the ultimate donees. :
Relying: upon the. provision of the trust that. the.
"ig! ~ wife may digpose of the: trust estate by ‘her will,
_ hg argues that where the remaindermen are so inde-
terminable there can be no completed | gift of the
entire estate. A taxable gift inter vivos tnust, lie.
~_eontetids, ‘be ‘a complete bilateral transaction
~ iivelving a transfer to a determinable donee.
--Reliahee is placed (Pet. 10) on language appearing
in the decisions of the Second Cireuit in Porter v.
” Commissioner, 60 F. (2d) 673, 674, affirmed, 288.
U. 8, 436; and Hésslein v. Hoey, 91°F. (2d) 954, ,
. G56, certiorari denied, 302 U.S, 756. However, i in
_its later deeision in Hoveog v. Commissioner, supra;
-p, 595, the Second Ciremit said that the ianguage’
__ of its earlier decisions, relied on by the taxpayer |”
“— - here, was used only in respect to a power‘reserved
1 the grantor and, inferentially, was not appli- ”
- cable to a situation where the grantor had parted
with all ‘control over the éppointment: Similarly,
. the Sanford ease, supra, p. 46, which the taxpayer.
‘cites at this point (Pet. 10) was, addressed, as the
Bucceeding language (pp. 46-47) Blows, to the sit-
uation im which the grantor retains- the power to -
alter the donee: The statément ‘in that case’ on
___. — which the taxpayer relies was merély that Congress .
.. Gould not have intended to impose personal liability
upon the donee of a agin of property, so incomplete —
&s°
ng
4
a a
7
+ thathe might be deprived of it by the ‘eas the day
after he had paid the tax.
The same contention was discussed and rejected.
in Herzog v. Commissioner, supra, pp. 594-595,
and Helvering v. Robinette, supra, pp. 834, 835-836,
The test of: thie incidence of the.gift tax is ‘whether
the donor has completely parted with coutrol over —
the property. The language of the statute and
Article 3 of the Regulations makes it plain
that the taxable event i is not the absolute ‘vesting of
rights in particular, beneficiaries but the irrevocable
divestment of the donor’s rights in the property.
The argument (Pet: 9-10) that the interests of the ”
remaindermen are wholly dependent upon the mere
whim or fancy of a human being would have merit
, if the whim were that of the grantor. Buthérethe
grantor has placed the property beyond his con-
trol; “Whether he or.any particular «person ‘will .
. enjoy it is a matter beyond his power to determine.
2. Petitioner's second contention—that the pos-
' sibility that under the Hallock éase the corpus of
_Yhé instant trust will ultimately be included in the
petitioner’ 8 gross estate precludes the aden cre
of a gift tax now-—is | alao not borne out by the -
decisions. = 4
_At the very. outset, it should he observed that the
statute contemplatés a certain amount of overlap-
ping between the gift and estate tax provisions, and .
‘indeed specifies that the gift tax-shall"be credited
“
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ALIS LOW STIS OOM It EY IR DOSE YB 8S Cot > 23k =
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against the estate tax to the extent that the same
. préperty is inelyded in the gross estate.’
As an initial matter, the unglossed text of See-
tions 501 (a) and (b)- and 506 of the Revenue Act
of 1932 (Appendix, infra), the provisions of Arti-
cles 2, 3, 17 and 19 of Treasury Regulations 79
(1936 ed.) (Appetdix, infra), atid the legislative .
history of the gift tax provisions,” all establish that —
the interests here created are subject to the gift tax.
Cf. Commissioner v. Beck’s Estate, supra, p. 244; |
Commissioner Vv. Marshall, supra, p. 945. For gift
tax purposes there may be immediate gifts of
future interests, whether vested or contingent.
Helvering ¥. Hutchings, 312 U. 8. 393; United
States v. Pelzer, 312 U. 8. 399; Ryerson v. United
States, 312 U. 8. 405; Commissioner y. Marshall,
supra, p. 945; Helvering v. Blair, 121 ¥F. (2d) 945
(C. C. A. 2d). But the petitioner contends that
the doctrines of the Hallack and*Sanford cases,
supra, must be read as a gloss upon the generality
of the provisions imposing the gift tax. It is clear
that although the Sanford case discusses the corre-
lation between the gift and estate taxes, it does not
suggest that the ultimate imposition of the latter
preeludes the incidence of the forriier. On the con-
trary, the case contains an explicit indication that
' Section 802, Reventie Act-f 1932, ¢. 200, 47 Stat. 169, as
amended by H. J. Res. 60, March 17, 1941, ¢. 21, SStat: 44,
*H. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., ist Seas, p. 27 (1939-1 Cum.”
Bull.,-Part 2, 457, 476-477) : S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., Ist -
Sess. p. 39 (1939-1 Cum, Hull: (Part. 2), 496, 524-525).
-
~
the two taxes are not mutually exclusive. . 308
. U. 8. at 45. And in Herzog v. Commissioner,
_ supra, Commissioner v. Marshall, supra, and Hel-
vering V. Robinette, supra, the courts approved a
gift tax on a transfer such as is here involved not-
_ withstanding the recognized possibility that an —
estate tax would also be imposed. " See also Higgins =
Vv. Commissioner, supra. Nor does the Hallock . -
ease; which dealt solely with ‘estate taxes, contain
any intimation ag to the incidence of gift taxes.
Moreover, instances of overlapping are fre-
quently found in ‘the decided CASES. - Thus, a vested
ease ete-3 eee
is subject to the éstate tax. Helvering v. Bullard,
303 U. 8. 297. ‘Yet it is inconceivable that the gift
tax would not also attach at the time that the
remainder was created. Again, the overlapping of
the two taxes is shown in the case of a tenancy by _
the entirety. Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497;
Helvering v. Bowers, 303 U. 8. 618; ; Lilly v. Smith,
- 96 F. (2d) 341 (C..C. A. 7th), certiorari denied;
™ 305 U. 8. 604; Commissioner vy. Hart, 106 F. (2d)
269 (C. C. A. 3d): The taxpayer’s. contention | :
necessarily assumes.that the Sanford case has
inferentially overruled the foregoing decisions, an
assumption that is unwarranted by the opinion.
In the court below the ‘Collector conceded that
. the-value of the grantor’ s reversionary Auterest
3 khould, be deducted from the entire ‘value of the °
securities transferred in trust. (R. 53; Pet. ae
oe] ,
oe , t pie
/
i,
10
However, the ‘effect of the decision below was to
tax the entire value of the trust estate without such
reduction. Aithough this result does ‘not ‘accord |
with Commissioner v.. McLean, 127 F. (2d) 942°
(C, C, A+5th), the taxpayer. nevertheless does not .
appear to have made a point of this oo ofthe ~
— botow (Pet. 5). ae | td
CONCLUSION
The ee pl below is in accord with the decisions
_ im other circuits and is not in conflict with appli-
_eable decisions: of this Court. It is respectfully
s@omitted that the petition should be denied: ~
| ea v CHARLES Fauy,
BTR bd ame oF? Solicitor Seainal,
- Save, 0, CarK, Jr., ?
Assisant Attorney General.
Sewa Key,
/ BENJAMIN. M. Bropsky,
Special Assistants to the Attorney General.
OcTOBER 1942. .
a
LLB RPE SSS SEES RE OIA POE AUR ERE NEB it 8h ORION RE ee
i _ APPENDIX
Revenue ‘Act of 1932, ¢, 209, 47 Stat. 169: <s
Src. 501. [Mpostrion OF TAX. a
(a) For the-calendar year 1932 nist aa calen-
dar year thereafter a tax, computed as provided
in section 502, shall be ‘imposed upon the transfer ©
~ during such. calendar year by any vr ndividual, resi-..
dent or-nonresident, of property by gift.
(bb) The tax shalt appiy whether the transfer. i is -
in trust or otherwise, whether the-gift is direct or
indirect, and whether. the SRagea is Teal or per- -
comet tangible or intangible: .
*. Sac ees *
Spe. 506. Giers MADE IN PROPERTY. _
., If the gift is made in property, the value thereof
at the date of the gift shall be- epeeceses: the
amount of the gift.
Treasury Regulations 79 (1936 ed.) :
- Art. 2. Transfers reached. —The statute imposes’ —
_ a tax whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, _
whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether
the property is real or personal, tangible or'intan-—
jis, for example, a taxable transfer may
be effected by the declaration of a trust, * * *.
Inasmuch_as the tax also applies. to gifts indirectly
"4 VA made, all transactions whereby property or prop-
rights or interests are donatively passed or’
contigo’ upon another, regardless of the means or
device employed, constitute gifts subject to tax. —
ee a ad amended by T. D. 5010, 1940-2 Cum.
of the property by the donee, nor is it mopereerily
(11)
s
Y
/
4
Cessation of donor’s dominion and
' control._—The tax is not imposed upon the receipt.
determined: by the measure of wists result-_
ing to the donee from the transfer, nor is it con- —
Si ditioned upon ability to identify the donee at the
time of the transfer. Cs Ss comeeey the tax is _~
a primary and personal liability of onor, is an
excise~ u his act. of making the honing is ef
Nie 17. Gifts made in property.—A zift made
ip’ properts a oahites si tie ton ie a contanee |
asa gift of ; ‘amount of-the gift is the
Hees date of the gift. ie Se
Arr. 19. Valuation of pro
The statute provides
| Rie Fonaened the value ‘thereof at‘ the te of the. gift
considered the amount of the gift. Ae. aR
i a Auawitiea: lifé, = and reversionary
tnterests.—For valuation of | annuities pees
from life insurance companies or other
issving annuity con see subdivision (9) of
oa ween coeliaed s ie te beche e =
. der ich & annul e .to
donee, the value of such Should be determined |
-. by using Table 4 or Tale B, whichever is appli-
- yrcste) shown at the ond ot this article. ors 8
*. .
If an annuity is tebe eet durin the life ofan _
‘ individual aiid in any event for a definite number
A
S
= or =
: ! — ded
- rate of income for a period equal to or or pone
the life expect of Z,
is fixed or deftly determinable “ the time of f the
if ‘eee sattthed mofo to the use of camtien :
'. gomne-producing property, a h etical annuity.
at the rate of 4 percent o the value of the property .
-shouid be mele ithe basis of the calculation.
Ri pod on gift is.of 2 remainder or reversionary in-.
es pee to an outstanding life estate, the © .
pop pa lr
Value o pro at the aah
figure in ‘ohn 3 6 Table A e.number _.
of years nearest to the age of. e ife tenant. | In
-- ¢ase the remainder or reversion is subject to an
: estate fora term. of years, Table B should be used.
& : SOVERMEFHT FRIKTING OFFICE: 18yt
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4
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