Appellees Brief — Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis v. Trainmen
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Supreme Court of the United ‘States
Ocroser Term, 1942.
No. 218
‘TERMINAL RAILROAD ASSOCIATION OF -
ST. LOUIS,
Appellent,
vs.
BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, RICH-
ARD ABRAM, Cuamatan anv State Lecrstative Repre-
sENTaTIvE, anD ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION,
Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF TEE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
_{ GEORGE F. BARRETT,
Attorney General of Illinois,
Attorney for Illinois Com-
merce Commission, Appel- .
lee.
A. A. Scuwarzpace and
/ Avvx E.Srem,- . |
ttorneys for Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen,
Richard Abram, Chairman
and State Legislative _—
Representative, Appellees.
William C. Wines,
' . Assistant Attorney General
_ of TUinois,
‘ Of Counsel.
peramne company, rie west sscason.cmeseo QB 56 has
fos
)
INDEX.
I. The regulation in question is a reasonable exer-
cise of the state’s police power and imposes no
unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
» (i) Assuming that the order in question is
not in conflict with applicable federal
regulation, it must be sustained if it is a
~ reasonable measure having for its pur-
pose and legitimate object the preserva-
tion of life and health and the promotion
of safety, even though it may be enforced
with respect to interstate conimeree.... 18
(ii) -The order in question is, upon a consid.
eration of the particular factual complex
eee in the instant case, inherently reasonable 24
II. Congress has tiot by affirmative action pre-
- empted the subject matter of the present order
’ from the jurisdiction or powers of the State
OF Tienehs noni cnc ccc icdcccccccccqcvecc’ccpes 26
a State action, if within the police power,
~ is valid unless Congress has affirmatively
excluded its exercise by acting directly
and immediately upon the subject matter
in question so that the state action is re-
pugnant to the pledged action. Such
-power is not excluded merely because
* Congress has regulated a part of the field 27
(ii) The present order is not in conflict with
any applicable federal act or regulation. 31
i. The order does not deprive appellant of ite.
property without due process of law. ......... M
Conclusion ............ DS Ss aie eke 41
Taste oF Cases Crren.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Georgia; 284 U. &
Atlantic Coast Line R. RB. Co. v. North Carolina Corp.
Com., 206 U. 8. 1, 51 L. Ed. 933, 945... ........... 12,30 *
. B. & Q: BR. B. Co. v. Commerce Commission, 364 Ill.
BED a tocccccccccccocesgccpectéocvacoboscecsocece 13, 37
California v. Thompson, 313 U. 8. 109, 85 L. Ed. 793. 12,19
Chesapeake & Obio Railway Co. v. Public Service
Comm., 242 U. 8S. 603, 61 L. Ed. 520.............. 13, 38
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Railroad Com., 237 U. 8.
220, 229, 59 L. Ed. 926, 931... . 6. cece eens 12, 39
Chicago, R. L. Pac. BR. R. Co. v Arkaneas, 219 U 8.
Ge ccocccdeocsoccedonccecsendssccosecneseatacs 12,2
City of Detroit v. Wabash Refining Co., 223 Ill App.
DOB, BBB... . ns nceccevevecccedecvesccens pasecscase 12,%4
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 neseccocubons 12, 14, 17, 28
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co..v. Kansas, 216 U. 8. 262.12, 14, 24, 39
Missouri Pac. R. R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U. 8. 249.13, 28,
New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. 8.
GED wecinscccccccccctccpececceccecsece 12, 14, 20, 22, 40
Northwestern Bell — Co. v. Nebraska, 297
WB. Ba GER Secccvencccckdgasccasocccccsecccetecece 13, 29
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Com,
BBS GH. DB GB ccccccccscqvoccccsccccetecsccsecce 14, 39
Permsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 261 U.S. 393...... 14, 40
Penn. B. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 250 U.
BD, GED geccccccvcccccccccosccccaccoccccepteccces 13,3
Railroad Commission ¥. Southern Pacific, 264 U. 8
BTS wcowodacgcocecescccqnccedoccccobccacccccccs 13, 38
iii
Robinson v. B. & O. R. R. Co. 222 UL S. 508, 512... 13, 36
South Covingten & Cincinnati St. Ry, On. &'Usvington, ;
SN Th [iT ands nnd sien acc cetneacedatesaneses 12,21
* Thompsoy, v. Missouri Pacific R. R. Co, 15 Fed. (2d)
BR TRG GS, B. GID noc cccccccccecsiccccccoscess 13, 34
‘Washington ex rel, Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild,
BD We Gb BD paqecccdcccocsccccccccccccesececes 13, 39
Welsh v. New Hampshire, 306 U. ft nniediiiadl 13, 30
Wickard, ete, v. Filburn, 87 L. Ed. 57 (decided Nov.
DB, TRGED ccscccccccccceccsccetecesecces —TTTT 12, 15, 18
Srarcres Cire,
Boiicr Inspection Act (45 U. & ¢. A., page 78, See.
SD GREED cecccccapccococded geecceddecceces 13, 31, 4
‘ Interstate Commerce Act, particularly See. 1, Pars.
(10) through (17), and (21); Seé. 26, and See, 0 .
(a) (U.S.C. A, Tithe 49)-...... eebocevicseces 13, 31,32 |
Railway Labor Act (U. 8. C. A., Title 45, Supplement
236, et weg.) ........ se eeeaebeesenemeees peees 13, 31, 32
Safety Appliance Act (45-U. 8. C. A., See. 1, et seq,
page 3, et ABRD occccccccccccciseseccsecsscoes 13, 31, 34
,.
“
“
IN THE’
Supreme Court of the United States
Octoper Term, 1942.
No. 218.
TERMINAL RAILROAD. ASSOCIATION OF
ST. LOUIS, —
Appellant,
vs.
BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, RICH-
‘ARD ABRAM, CHAIRMAN AND State Lecistative Repre-
SENTATIVE, AXD ILLI NOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION,
Paar ‘ | Appellees.:
—
APPEAL FKOM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Appellant’s statement of the case is in some _particu-
lars inaccurate and is, in the view of appellees, ‘in other
particulars inadequate. Appellees therefore make the fol-
lowing additional statement :
The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen is an organiza-
tion representing trainmen and switchmen who are em-
ployal by the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis,’
Respondent (R. 18, 60). Appellant is an association
which performs terminal services in the switching dis- |
trict of East St. :Louis, Hlinois, for and on behalf of
its proprietary lines and other railroad companies desir-
ing use gf its facilities (R. 151). The corporate control
of the Términal Railroad Association is vested equally in
each of the following railroad companies: The Alton Rail-
road Company; Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Rail:
road ‘Co,; Chieago & Eastern Illinois Railway; Chicago,
en
2
Burlington. & Quincy Railroad Co.; Chicago, Rock Island
& Pacific Railroad €'o.; Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago &
St. Louis Railway (6.; Illinois Central Railroad Co.;
Louisville & Nashville. Railroad Co.; Missouri, Kansas,
Texas Railroad (o.; Missouri, Pacifie Railroad Co.; Mis-
souri Pacific Acet.; St. Louis Iron Mountain & Southern
- Railroad Co.; Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis
Railroad Co.; St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.; St.
Louis Southwestern Railway Co.; Southern Railway Co.;
and Wabash Railway Co. | cet
_Switechmen are assigned to partieular crews. The
switehmen make and break up trains in yards, switch in-
dustries, make deliveries from connectioris to the Terminal
Railroad Association "from through lines, make. trans-
fer runs from and to various yards of the Terminal: Rail-
‘road Association and perform that work in the yards or
industries required to make up trains and ¢ouple cars
together. They see that the air ‘brakes are coupled and
_in order on the train. When a train leaves the yard
for 8 destination, the switehinen take their proper posi-
tions on the train, the rear .man taking his position
on the rear ear of the train (R. 20). The rear man is re-
quired to ride the rear coapler of the car where overhead
and side structures do not clear him on the top or side of
the car (R, 20). He lines all switches back in a prope:
position when they have been used by his train and, in
case of reyerse movement, when a train is shoved, he is
required to protect street and highway crossings to keep
the public from-being killed or injured. When ‘shoving
—a train ‘near or on private crossings, he is required to
be on top of the rear car, unless prevented by overhead
or side structures that do not clear the switehman (R.
1, 29).
The length of the trains in operation handled by train.
men on one trip vary from one to a hundred ears (R. 86,
“99, 100, 101, 103).
3
A caboose or safety cab is a railroad car furnished for the
housing of train crews and equipped for their safety. They
are needed to avoid side’ and overhead. structures which en--
danger the life and limb of the switchmen and to previde |
for them a safer place in case of derailment of the train |
or sudden jerking or sudden stops which would be likely
to throw switclmen from the top, side or end of the car
(R. 21). In case a train breaks in two, it is very dan-
gerous for a man to be on the rear end of the train, as
it is easy to be knocked’off thé top or end by a sudd:n,
jerk or stop (R. 22). It also protects the switchmen from ~
the inclement weather in both winter and summer. Dur-
ing the winter months the hand-holds, drawbars and sill
steps of cars are often covered with ice, making it difficult
for the switehmen to get on top of a car and making jt
very easy for said switchmen to be jerked or bumped off
(R. 22, 40, 60). He could discharge his-duties from the
interior of the caboose or from the steps outside the
caboose (R. 60).
A caboose also provides a place Nor the switchmen to
‘keep and carry their. necessary flagging equipment, cloth-
ing such as rain- clothes, coats, ete., and to carry their
necessary first aid equipment and lunches and permit the ”
lighting of red lanterns during inclement weather. It is”
also used to do such eclérical work as is necessary when
the train is en route (R. 21,41). Switchmen:-can observe
‘their train better while it is en route and watch the side
of their train from a caboose. It is hazardous for a switch-
man on top of a car or on the end of a car to observe the -
side of his train (R. 22). A eaboose is properly equipped
with a whistle and a conductor’s valve, an air brake, which
permits the switchman on the rear end of the ‘train to have
practically the same control of the train that the engineer
has with reference to stopping or sounding a warning sig- “a
~—halon approaching a highway crossing, ete. (R. 22, 29.) He
~ ¢an perform all the necessary work better from the caboose
4
(R. 22). Where no caboose is provided, switchmen are re-
quired to carry their lunch in their pocket or tie it on the -
car if some suitable place can be found (R. 29).
A switchman can perform the necessary duties far better
‘from a caboose in observing the running condition of his
train, and in flagging and in getting off and on the rear
end of his train, in moving motion, also in shovi ing or back
‘up movements of trains,(R. 22).
It is admitted that no cabooses or ‘shelter cabs are pro-
vided by appellant for any of the crews working out of cer-.
tain vards herein involved (R. 163). As to other yards,
cabooses are furnished part of the year in some instances
and in ottiers all the vear round (R. 180).
There are various transfer runs within the confines of
the State of Illinois which go onto the Eads: and: Mer-
_ chants Bridgés which span the Mississippi River. (R. 187).
Most of the overhead and side clearances on these two
bridges are insufficient to clear a switehman (R. 20, 188,
199).
Cabooses are not‘fiirnished on most of the transfer runs.
out-of Madison Yard or CD Yard in Illinois moving :onto
‘these two bridges. Cabooses are’ furnished upon certain
transfer runs originating in the Wiggins No. 2 Yard Ili-
nois and moving onto the Merchants Bridge but only be-
tween October 15th and May 1st: (R. 187).
| many points there éxist numerous insufficient clear-
ances for a switchman to ride the top of the rear car (R.
32, 34, 35, 38, 52); andl the rules of the Terminal Railroad
Association expressly provide. that the switchmen. must
ride the top of the rear car (R. 32); although another -
rule provides that ‘‘riding on the inside of loaded open
top cars is prohibited.’’ (R.. 141.) Some of these clear-
ances are such that a switchman cannot ride the side of the
ear without being knocked off (R. 32, 34, 35, 36, 42, 52).
_ The testimony of one R. B. Thomas, Chief Railroad In-
aad . .
9)
spector for the Tlinois Commerce Commission, discloses
numerous insufficient vertigal and horizonta] clearances
on ‘various runs, including ‘the runs: onto the Eads and
Merchants: bridges. | His rts contain photographs
showing the switehmen ‘ding on the rear drawbar of
the last car of the train and also. showing the various in- -
sufficient clearances (R. 100-104, 174-177, inclusive). His .
testimony cledrly shows that the dangers and hazards in
question could be eliminated by providing a caboose. for
the man to ride in (R. 101, 175).
Often the rear switchman rides the drawbar at the
trailing end or the rear car. If the end of the car on which —
he was riding happens to be the end that was provided
with a break staff, the switchman is required to grasp it
as a means to secure himself in place. If no-break staff
is provided, he is required to reach. further out towards.
ihe side of the car in order to reach the end ladder or
other handholds. . He is also required to brace himself _
against the end of the car to avoid being shaken off due
to sudden stops and starts. Photographs showing #
switeliman in riding position and details of footing, ete:,
will be noted (R. 174, 175, 176, 177). Appellant admits
a very serious accident on the Eads Bridge to a switchman,
Mueller, who was riding on the rear drawbar, when he
was jerked off the car and injured (R. 141).
In many instances the trains move up steep inclines
‘fraught with danger. If cars break off, it is very diffi- _
cult to stop such cars and to avoid loss of life of the.pub-
lie (R. 33, 36, 37). The evidence shows many unprotected
crossings . (R, 33, 36, 37).
In many instances, where these is no caboose, the switch-
man is required to stand on the top of. the last car_in fhe
train while the train’is shoving, facing sleet and snow and
rain storms and wind. In-such cases the switchmen are
unable to see where they are going and are required in
o~
6
many instances to turn their — for shelter. If this is
done, such switchmen cannot observe highway crossings or
other dangerous points (R. 23)..
In many instances the rear switchman or fore-switchman
cannot see the head switchman (45 car lengths away) un-
til the train gets onto a straight road (R. 25). In some |
instances it is necessary to shove a train without being -
able to see. Sometimes the cars break off and roll down.
_ and it is impossible to stop them by hand brake, in. which |
case it is necessary for the switchman to run ahead’ of
the cars to protect the public (R. 25). A caboose with air
brakes properly -working would enable the rear man- to
stop the train in case of such an emergency, A. caboose
is provided with a conductor's valve (R. 26),, so. that |
he can control back-up movements on his train with an
air’ valve provided on the caboose for the purpose’ of
sgtting the brakes. He can also, with the whistle that
is provided on the caboose, warn the ‘public at or near
crossings (R. 60). The ability of a switehman: using
a caboose to stop the cars.or warn an approaching train
is far greater than it is when he is riding ona drawbar « or .
on the top of a car (R. 60-61).
The evidence shows that other railroads operating runs
‘parallel with the ‘Respondent operate with cabooses;
namely, the Pennsylvania, the run from Rose Lake to
Madison Yards; the Illinois Central; the C. & E. L, Madi-
son, Illinois, to East St. Louis, Illinois; the Rock . Island
_ Railroad, Madison Yard to East St. Louis, Illinois; the
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy at Madison. Yard and the
C. T. Junction; the Illinois Central; the Big Four from
East St. Louis, Minois to Granite City, Illinois; the Alton
Railroad out of Venice to various vards (R. 28).
The evidence also shows that various other railroads
operating over the Respondent’s tracks in Fast St. Louis,
Illinois: District and under substantially the. same condi-
7
‘tions have the use of cabooses. (R. 54, 58, 59, 84). Asa
switchman employed by the Illinois Central testified, ‘*we
Wee take a eaboose on any run we want a caboose on.'’ (R. 59.)
At the conelusion of the hearings before the Commis-
sion, ‘the Commission found that cabooses were necessary
on the runs in question because-of the operating hazards
and dangers to the life, health and safety of the trainmen,
employees and the general public and ordered the Appel-
lant to furnish such cabooses (R. 12-18).
The Circuit Court’s Order did not challenge the Com-
mission's findings as to the necessity for cabooses but re-
‘versed the Commission's order’ solely.on the ground that
to order the use of cabooses on such runs as went onto the
Eads and Merchants bridges constituted an interference
with interstate commerce beyond the power of the Illinois
Commerce Commission: (R. 204). |
+ An additional correction of appellant's statement should
be made: Appellant's statement indicates that the record
shows conclusively and without contradiction that it would
be impossible to cut off or couple a caboose on the bridges
in the middle of the river, so that a8 a practical mattér
the necessary effect of the. Mllinois Commerce _Commis-
sion’s order is to require the appellant to carry its cabooses:
across the river, and hence without the state of Illinois.
Although, as will appear. from the argument, appellees
do not deem it decisive or even important whether the com-
_pliance with the order requires the physical transporta-
' tion of cars bevond the confines of the State of Minois in
the light of authorities cited by appellees to the effect that
an: interstate carrier may be required ‘by. state action to
comply with orders respecting equipment or crews even
though such equipment or crews are necessarily trans-
- ported outside the state, we note that appellant’s statement .
-is in this respect insufficient, inadequate and rather mis: -
leading. :
—_— &
Counsel fails, for example, to point out that the evi-
dence shows that on the approach to the Eads Bridge on
the Illinois side there are two cross overs (R. 100), that,
on the approach to the-Merchants Bridge on the Illinois
side there is one cross over (R. 21), that it would be quite
possible to add other cross overs on these bridges in the
State of Illinois (R. 21), and that before the tracks enter
_the tunnel on the Missouri side there is an interval of
some 500 feet (R. 77). |
While it may well be that the che apest aad therefore
“most practical way to comply with the order in question
‘would be to leave the caboose attached to.a train after it
had left Tilinois- going West, and to attach a caboose on.
an East bound train before leaving. Missouri, it does not
- follow that the necessary effect of said order is to require
compliance in the State of Missouri.
At page 11 of appellant's statement of the case, counsel
say: ae .
‘*The furnishing of cabooses has always been con-
sidered a working condition and has been dealt with as
such by appellants and its switchmen, and eabooses -
have always been since 1910 and are being furnished
by reason of written contracts between the Brother-
hoods and appellants (R. 82)."’
- This is inaccurate. The record in no wise sustains coun-
sel’s statement that the furnishing of cabooses has been
considered a ‘working conilition”” and the balance of his
Statement is misleading in that it fails to make it clear that
cabooses were furnished only on certain runs and at cer-
tain times of the season. —
~ Counsel's statements, at page 270.of the record, re-
specting appellant’s evidence as to the delays and costs
to result fromthe order requiring cabooses fails to- point
out that the testimony in question was the purest kind of
hearsay and that it was, in-a large measure, based on in-
formation acquired by the witness second-hand from vari-
9
ous railroad officials. For example, appellant's witness
_testified (R. 142):
‘‘When I say there is a delay of one hour in the
Pennsylvania yard, I do not know that of my own
knowledge. I am taking their word for it.”
His estimate of a 40 minute delay and $10.00 cost per
run was likewise without factual basis in the record, and
his estimate of a $400,000 outlay for the first year was of
the.same incompetent character.
At page 270 of the record counsel briefly summarizes the
‘testimony of the Commission’s os sae witness and says that
his testimony was that
‘the initial cost of néw cabooses would be $44,000
and the extra annual expense in wages about $62,000,
but this estimate did‘ not include any thing except
wages (Tr. 2-123).’’
This is neither fair nor accurate. In the first place, his.
estimate for the cost of cabooses was not $44,000 per year.
It was’ a total investment in new cabooses. In the sec-
ond -place this estimate was hased on 36 néw cabooses at
* a cost of $1,233.69 each (Tr. 2-266) which is the cost esti-
mated not by appellees but_by the appellant itself (R. 179).
In the third place, the annual extra expense in wages for
those handling the added cabooses was estimated at #27,-
777.22, not $62,000 (R. 201). : |
‘Counsel also fails to point out that these estimates given
by the Commission's expert were not hearsay, but were
the result of ten or fifteen days spent by the witness in
appellant's vards riding the various cuts in company with
Tailroad officials. (R. 87 -89).
Furthermore, counsel’s statement that the ‘‘delay wauld
average 11 minutes per run’’ is not correct. The testi-
mony was that the ‘“‘handling time’’ would be 11 minutes
per run, which would actually result in perhaps only 3
minutes ‘‘delay’’ per run (R. 90).
10
Counsel’ ~ next statement that. -
‘‘The Supreme Court of Illinois found that the de-
Jay on each run would be from eleven, to penny minutes
- (Tr. 13),”° .
is likewise not correct. The menrent approach to such a
\statement in the opinion is to be found at page 412 of 379
Illinois, where the Court says:
“The evidence before the commission. as to the _
amount of time consumed was in conflict, ranging
from eleven minutes to forty minutes per movement,
although appellant (now appellee) concedes that some °
time ‘is required to add a caboose to these ents of
ears.’
Appellant's next statement ~— effect that the rear .
switchman would be able to use the caboose only from |
one-sixth to one-eighth of his working period, that during
_ the balance of his time he would be exposed tothe same or
additional hazards, and that the Supreme Court in its opin-
- jon so.found is not correct and is not supported by the
' record.
With wary to the facts custajning the Commission’ s
order as a reasonable and proper ‘‘police power’’ measure
to protect the lives-and' limbs of the trainmen and pas-
_sengers, the statement is completely. silent. In our opin-
ion this is unfair and. requires ns to add such facts so as
to have the true record before this court.
On page 13 of appellant's brief it is said that a
**the caboose would be used only by one employee
out of five in each run.’’ °
This statement is not true for two reasons. In the first _
place, a crew consists of three, not fire men. (R. 221). . In
the second place, all of the men of the crew would use the
caboose not only for the purpose of carrying equipment, |
but for the purpose of.temporary shelter-from the ele-
ments, even though all-of them could not ride in it at all
times. -Appellant’s statement (at page 13 of its brief)
ll
that an ‘employee. could use thre caboose only from one-
sixth to one-eighth of the time that he worked is without.
support in the record.
Appellant further makes the statement (Appellant's
brief, page 14) that the company's losses have been such
as to make the order unreasonable and confiscatory.
Appellant’s allusion to losses are during the ‘bad
~ years’’ from 1929 to 1937.. In 1939, however, the company
(which is in reality operated as a facility for other rail.
way companies and might perhaps be prudently operated
at cost or eve. with capital contributions) earned over
700,000. In 1928, a year of industrial activity comparable
to.that of the year in which the order was entered, and te
the period during which it was intended to operate, the
company earned $1,134)000, : .
Moreover, these are the earnings of a company whieh
was intended merely as a Corporate instrumentality oper.
ailing facilities for the use of proprietary railroads, whose
- earnings are not shown.
XX
ed
state's police power and imposes no unconstitutional
L. W. 4011.
Californea v. Thompson, a8 U.S. 109,
Chicago, R.1. Pac, BR. R. Co. +. Arkansas, 219 U.S.
453.
New York, N. H. &@ He R. Co. ve. New York, 165
U. 8. 628. =
Atlantic Coast Line BR. R. Co. ©. Georgia, 34 U. 8.
ol) .
Nouth Covineton & CC. Sh Ry. Co. ¥. Cormeton,
237 U. S. 357.
Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. +. Nansas, 2116 U.S. 262.
(ii)
Congress has not by affirmative action pre-empted the sub-
ject matter of the present order from the jurisdiction or
powers of the State of Illinois.
Kelly v. Washington, 322 U.S. 1.
not
merely because has regulated a part of the field.
Me. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Norwood, 233 T, 8. 249.
Kelly v. Washineton, 320 U. 8.1.
Northwestern Bell Teleph. Co. v. Nebraska, 297
U. 8. 471. .
Welsh v. New Hampshire, 306 U. 8. 79.
| i)
The present order is not in conflict with any applicable federal order
: or regulation s
ilway Labor Act (TU. SC. A, Tithe 45,
Supplement 296, ef #rq.). ,
The Interstate Commerce Act, See. 1, Pars. (10)
through (17), and (21); See. 26 and See, 20 (a).
‘The Boiler Inspection Act, (45 U. S.C. A. page
78, See, 22, ef seq.).°
_ The Safety Appliance Act (45 U.S.C. A., See. 1,
vt seq., page 3, ef 8eq.).
Moa. Pac, BR. RB. Co. ¥. Nerwood, 23 T. 8. 249.
R. R. Comm. +. Southern Pacific, 4 U.S. 331.
Robinson v. B. dO. RR. Co. 222 U.S. 56.
City of Detroit v. Wabash Refining Co. 223 TH.
. App. 246.
Thompson v. Missourt Pacific BR. R. Co. 15 Fed.
(2) 28 (C. C. A, 8th).
Peon, R. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 200
U- 8. 566,
-
14
. i y II.
The aa does ad deprive appellant of its property
without due process of law.
. CC. B&Q. RR. Co. v. Cosnmerce Commission, 364
ds,“ Il :
tle Che epeake &€ 0. Ry Ao fy. Pub. Ser. Comm., 242
All. ri ‘odstdeane R. Co. v. N. Car. Corp: Comm., 206
U. 8.1. ee
Mo. Pac.R. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. 8, 262.
WwW ashington ex rel., Ore. R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild,
224 U.S. 510,
C. B.€ Q. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 237 U. 8, 220.
Panhandle E. Pipe ‘Line Co. v. .€ omm,, 294 U.S.
613.
N.Y¥.,N.H. dH. Co. ¥. New York, 165 U. &. 628.
_ Atl, Coast Line Co. y. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280."
- Penn. Coal Co. v. Malion, 261 U. 8. 393.
15
ARGUMENT.
Brief Introductory. Statement.
Appellees” argument can,. it is believed, be more clearly
presented and more readily followed if, before developing
in detail the poiita under which it is presented, we briefly
. indieate, without the consideration of. authorities or ex-
terided comment, its essential substance and content.
‘Appellant argues first that the order is invalid because,
as appellant asserts, ‘‘Congress has oceupied the field’’ and
next argues that, even if Congress has not occupied the
’ field; the order is void because it ‘*diréctly and unconsti-
tutionally burdens interstate cortmerce.”’ However, appel-
lees conceive that ‘the question of the state’s power in the
absence of federal action logically precedes the question
whether that power has been supersedéd or abrogated by
federal. action. Accordingly we depart from the _sequetice
of appellant’s argument.
* oe . ’ 7 *
Appellees submit that appellant’s argument is pre-
possessed by certain fundamental: misconceptions as to
the general constitutional principles applicable to this and
similar cases. Although the classical idiom ‘of the older
opinions disenssing cases such as the present one insisted
upon a discrimination between ‘‘direct’’ and ‘‘indirect’’
burdens upon interstate commerce, it is clear ‘that these
terms early acquired highly sophisticated connotations;
and that, as this court has said in the Wickard case, No.
59, October term, 1942, they were frequently used to
‘‘state rather than reach a result.’’
As this court observed in the Wickard case, the use of
the term ‘‘direct’’ as opposed to ‘‘indirect’’
‘tof late * * * has been abandoned in cases dealing
with federal power under the ¢ommerce clause.’’
16.
Appelleés contend that, whatever may have’ been the
signification of the terms ‘direct’? and ‘‘indirect’’ in the
particular contexts in which they have frequently occurred,
’ this court has consistently amd, in the main, unerringly
perceived a fundamenta] distinction between those. in-
stances of state action which not only affect interstate —
commerceshut which have the regulation of interstate com-
merce, for the sake of such regulation; for their primary
and immediate purpose, on ihe one hand, and, on the other
hand, those state regulations which may no less certainly
influence interstate commerce but which affect it only inci-
dentally to the accomplishment of a purpose within the
police power of the state.
The first type of yesulation. « such as the levyi ing of im-
posts, the fixing of rates and charges for interstate transpor-
tation ‘and the like, is vord even though the regulation is
not inherently unreasonable and even though congress has*
not acted with respect to the subject matter.
The second type of rezulation, such as measures intended
' to preserve health, promote safety, or protect property; is
valid unless either (1) the linrden that it lays upon in.
terstate commerce is unreasonable in contemplation of the
object sought to be attained, or (2) it is in conflict with an
actual exercise of congressional power.
Under the first point of this argument, appellees contend |
that the order in question clearly had for its purpose and
object the protection of health and the promotion of safety,
not only of appellant “« employees, but of the public: that.-
its purpose was within the ambit of the police power; and
that the order was not intrinsically unreasonable. Appellees :
do not, under their first point, deal with appellant’s con-
tention that congress has occupied the field.
Appellant likewise misprises the general principle goy-
erning the quéstions raised bythe assertion that the order
ix in conflict with applicable fedéral statutes and regula-
17
tions. Appellant assumes that the mere fact that Congress
has legislated, perhaps rathet. comprehensively, with re-
spect to a given subject matter excludes state action. The
true rule, as shown in the authorities considered under
the second point of this brief, is that state action
‘is superseded only where the repugnance or conflict
is so ‘direct and positive’ that the two acts: ‘cannot
~ reconciled or consistently stand together,’ ’’ (Kelly
. Washington, 302 U.S. 101).
Under appellees’ second point, appellees demonstrate .
that, notwithstanding appellant’s argument to the contrary,
“congress has not occupied the field-or so exerted its power
as to exclude state action. In particular, it will be shown
that the matter of cabooses on appellant’s trains is not a
_ mere working condition; that the regulation pertains not
- only to the health of appellant’s employees, but to the-safety
of the public; and that the interstate commerce act has
expressly reserved to the states power to enact regulations
of the sort here in question.
Under the third point of appellees’ stgtinend ‘it will be
_very briefly pointed out that if appellees are correct in
their *rst contention that the order does not unreasonably
buraci. interstate commerce, a fortiori it is not so unreason-
_ able as to amount to a confiscation af appellant’s property
without due process of law; and that appellant’s conten-
tion that, compliance with the order would be so costly as
to amount to confiscation is without foundation in the
record.
I.
The regulation in question is a reasonable exercise of the |
state’s police power and imposes no unconstitutional
_ burden on interstate commerce. o
Under the present point appellees argue the following
premises.
18
Appellees’. major premise: |
Assuming (as is shown under Point IL of this argument,
post) that the order in question is not in conflict with appli-
cable federal regulation, it must be -sustained <if it is a
reasonable measure having for its purpose and legitimate
object the preservation of life and health and the promotion
of safety, even though it may be enforced with respect to
_interstate commerce,
Appellees’ minor premise: ae
Upon the facts in the instant case, the order is suelr a
réasonable exercise of the state’s police power as to. be
within the rule above stated as the major premise.
: ‘ \ ‘ .
Bs alt oe fi) |
- Assuming that the order in question is not in conflict with applicable
federal regulation, it must be sustained if it is a reasonable measure
having for its purpose and legitimate object the preservation of life ©
and health and the promotion of safety, even though, it — be
enforced with respect to interstate commerce.
“Appellees submit at the outset that it is ‘deer, without,
for the moment, considering any other questions that may
-be involved in this case, that the order in question may not
be condemaed as unconstitutional upon any theory that it
_ is void merely because it imposes a burden upon interstate
comnierce and by characterizing that (suppésed} ‘burden
as ‘‘direct.’’ : Mia
In the first place, as appellant itself concedes by quoting
‘at page 47 of its brief the language of this court in the
Wickard case above cited, insistence upon any categorical
distinction between ‘‘ direct?” and ‘‘indtrect’’ burdens
‘thas been abandoned in cases dealing with questions
of federal power under the commerce clause.”’
In the second place, even if we follow appellant in its
resort to the distinetion between .the terms ‘‘direet® atid:
| ‘‘indireet,”’ although appellant itself not only concedes but
. | 8 cond 19
argues that this contrast in terms has been abandoned, it
is clear that even under the older cases using those terms,
a burden charactrized as ‘‘direct’’ was almost invariably
either one not related to the exercise of the police power or
one which resulted in an unreasonable exercise thereof.
On the other hand, this court has consistently upheld state
action which had for its purpose the preservation of health }
or the promotion of safety and which was reasonably
adapted to that purpose, even though the regulation pre-
scribed equipment which must be carried on interstate
trains.
These distinctions have recently found pene ex-
pression in the decision of this court in California v. Thomp-
son, decided April 28, 1941, 318 U.S. 109, 95 L. Ed. 1219.
A pertinent. excerpt is printed in the margin.*
Other cases recognizing the right of the states to sitions
measures which are intrinsically reasonable, which havé
for their object those ends properly within the sphere of
the police power and which are not in conflict with existing
“© California v. Thompson, 313 U. 8. 109, at page 113:
“As this Cofirt has often had occasion to point out, the Commerce
‘Clause, in conferring on Congress power to regulate commerce, did not
wholly withdraw from the states the power to regulaée matters of
_ local concern with respect to which Congress has not exercised its
power, eren though the regulation affects interstate commerce. Fiver
since Wilson v. Black Bird Creck Marah €0.. 2 Pet. (U. 8.) 245, 7 L.
ed. 412, and Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. (U. 8.) 299, 13 L.-ed.
996, it has been recognized that there are matters of loch concern,
the regulation of which unavoidably involves some regulation of inter-
state commerce, but which becuuse of their local character and their
number and diversity may never be adequately dealt with by Congress.
Because of their local character. also there is wide ‘scope for local
regulation without impairing the uniformity of control of the national.
cemmerce in matters of national concern and without materially
obstriicting ‘the free flow of commerce. which were the principal ob-
jects sought to be secured by the Commerce Clause. Notwithstanding
* the Commerce Clause, such regulation in the absence of Congressional
action has, for the most part, been left to the states by the decisions . —
of this Court. subject only to other applicable. constitutional restraints.
See cases collected in Di Santo v. Pennaylvania, supra (273 U.-8. 40.
71 L. ed. 528, 47 &. Ct. 267). :
'“A state may license trainmen engaged in interstate commerce in
order to insure their skill and fitness. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U 8.
465, 31 L. ed. 508, 8 S. Ct.° 564, 1 Inters. Com. Rep..804: -Nashrille.
(. & St. L. R. Co. v, Alabama, 128 U.S. 96, 32 L. ed. 352. 9 8. Ct. 28,
2 Inters. Com. Rep. 238. It may define the size of crews manning
interstate trains. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. w- Arkansas, 219 U. &
453, 55 L. ed. 200. 31 S. Ct. 275; Missouri P..R. Co. v. Norwood,
-283 U. 8. 249, 75 L. ed. 1010, 51 8. Ct. 458, 30 N. C. C. A. 639, and
G 5 = : es :
20
federal regulation are noted under this point because a
study of them corrects iu general terms appellant's misap-
prehension of the distinction between state action which
burdens interstate commerce as its immediate purpose
and object, and such action as no less certainly affects
interstate commerce but “does so only incidentally to an
exercise of the state’s police or other proper power.
Such of these cases as are more immediately pertinent
to the instant case are considered in their more specific
applications in later and more appropriate points.
In Chicago, R. I. Pac. R. R. Cow. Arkansas, 219 U.S.”
453, this court upheld the Arkansas Full Crew Law, a stat--
lite fixing the minimum’ number of men required on trains,
notwithstanding the fact that the state of Arkansas en-
forced it in respect to trains travelling directly in interstate
© Commerce, | ‘ i :
In New York, NH, & H.R. Co. x. New York, 165 U.S.
628, this court upheld a state regulation preseribing the -.
type of stoves to be carried on interstate trains. ;
_ In Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 VU. S.
280, this court upheld a state statute requiring headlights of
a certain size and type, even though the statute was en-
forced with respect to trains trayelling between states.
In support of its contention that even in the absence of
prescribe regulations for payment of their wages. Frie R. Co. +
Wiliams, 23 U. &. 685. BRL. ed. 1155, 34 8. Ct. 761, 51 L. RA
(N. 8.) 1007. It may require interstate passenger cars to be heated
and guard posts to be placed on bridges of an interstate raflroad
New York; N. H. and H.R. Co. ¥. New York. 165 U. &. 628. 41 L. ed.
853, 16 8. Ct. 418. It may limit the ‘speed of interstate trains within
city limits. Erb v. M ch. ATT U. 8. S84, 44 L. ed. 897, 20 8. Ct. 819.
It may require an interstate railroad to eliminate grade crossing«.
Erie R. Co. ¥. Public Utility Comrs., 254 Us. 34. 408, 412, 65 1. ed.
AZ, 333, 334, 41 8. Ct. 169, P. wR. 1921C 143. Tt_may pass local
quarantine laws applicable to merchandise moving in interstate com-.
iderce as a means of protecting local health. Morgana, L. & T. R. &
8. 8. Co. ¥. Louisiana, 118 U. 8. 455, 30 L. ed. 227. 6 §. Ct. 1114:
Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. State Bd. of Health, ©
186 UT. 8. 380, 460 L. ed. T2009, 22 &. Ct. 811. It may regulate and
- protect ‘the safe and convenient use of its harbors and navigable
‘ waterv.ays unless there i conflict with some act of Congress. Wilson
V. "Black Rird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet, (U. 8.) 245, 7 L. ed. 412, supra;
see Clyde Maltory Lincs v. Alabama, 296 U. 8. 261, 2867, 80 L. ed. 215.
219, 56 8. Ct. 194.8 F ‘ 3
°
-@
oe
congressional action, the regulation now in question is -
invalid, appellant cites and relies heavily, if not principally,
upon this court's decision in the case of South Covington
& Cncinnatt Street Railway Co, vo Covington, 235 U.S. 537.
The fact is that the Covington case, cited by appellant as
conclusive of the issues in this case, in fact actually sup-
ports appellees’ contentions and confirms the principles
announced in the cases relied upon*by appellees, without
_in any wise changing, modifying, or reversing any of them.
“In'the Cov ington case, this court held invalid those por-
tions of a city ordinance that sought to regulate the number
- of passengers to be transported by street car from Ken-
tucky to Ohio, as well as those provisions that sought to
-regulaté the temperature of the cars. But in the same
opinion this court held valid those portions of the. same
ordinance which contained provisions forbidding the carry-
. ing of passengers on front and. rear platforms unless such
platforms were equipped with suitable rails or barriers.
The court further held valid those provisions which re-
quired cleaning and ventilation of the cars at least once
a week and fumigation with a disinfectant subject to con-
trol by the city board of health.
There is an incisive analogy between the decision in the
come case, which held valid the provisions with respect
to:*‘suitable hand rails” for the protection of the public,
and-the order in thé instant case, which requires the carry-
___ ing of a caboose on the rear of appellant's trains. The mere
fact that a caboose might be taken over the Kads Bridge
or the Merchants Bridge into Missouri is purely consequen-
tial, just as it was consequential that the rail or barrier on
the front and rear platforms of the street cars in the
, Covington case would necessarily be carried fram Kentucky
into Ohio.
Counse] for appellant erroneously assume that the basis
of the court’s distinction between those portions of the
ordinance which were held valid and those portions which ~
were held unconstitutional was that the provisions sustained
22 .
by this court could be complied with entirely in. the State
of Kentucky. This was not the distinction drawn by the
court. It is clear from a reading of the whole of the opinion
in this case that the provisions with respect to maintaining
"a minimum temperature and with respect to the number of
passengers which might be carried were held unreasonable,
since it appeared that it was not feasible to assure a
minimum temperature within the car regardless of varia-
tions of weather temperature, nor did the carrying of a
number of passengers greater than that which could be
comfortably accommodated resylt in real danger to life,
unless such ponges were crowded on n improperly guarded
platforms. : :
That the true basis of the court’s decision was not that
‘the provisions with respect to.hand rails might be enforced
solely within the territorial confines of the State of Ken-
tucky but was the reasonableness of the provisions, as op-
posed to the unreasonableness of other provisions, appears
bey ond all possible. doubt. from the followi ing statement of
this court at page 548:
‘We think these regulations come within tliat class
in which ber agp’ has sustained the right of the local
authorities to safeguard the traveling public * ° ° |
only incidentally affecting the interstate business, and
not subjecting the same to unreasonable demands. N+ "
> York, N. H. & H.R. R. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628}
‘Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. v. Ohio, 173 U.S
285; Atlantic Coast Line v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280, 991,
299° ‘y é :
The cases cited by the court in the excerpt immediately
above quoted as sustaining the statement above set forth
are cases in which the state regulations in qiestion could
not be complied with entirely within the geographical
limits of the enacting state. :
The first case ‘cited by the court in the excerpt above
quoted, New Fork, N. H. d@ H. R. R. v. New York, 165 U. 8.
628, upheld a statute of the State of New York which re-
quired the equipment of interstate trains with. stoves in
23
conformity with the terms of the statute, notwithstanding
the fact that such sto¥ es had to be transported in inter-
’ state commerce.
The case of Atlantic Coast Line v. Georgia, 234.U. S. 280,
cited by this court in support of its decision with respect
to the hand rails in the Covington case, required the
installation of headlights on interstate: trains. Appel-
lant is therefore clearly wrong in its contention that the
ordinance was sustained because it did not affirmatively
require the installation of handrails, provided that pas-
- sengers were excluded from the platforms in the State
of Kentucky. This court sustained the provisions in ques-
- tion not because the ordinance cauld be complied with 7
entirely - in Kentucky, but on the authority of cases sustain- .
ing police regulations, even though such Scena ap-
‘plied to interstate trains.
_ If the States of New York and Georgia may validly pre-
scribe the type of stoves and headlights to be carried by
interstate trains, if the cases sustaining such regula-
tions required a conclusion sustaining an ‘ordinance re-
specting hand rails on the front and. rear of interstate .
street cars in the Covington case, it is clear that the mere
fact (if, indeed, it is a fact) that appellant may have to
transport its cabooses across the state line into Missoun .
affords no basis for declaring invalid the order now in
question.
Other language of the ( aidnahin case indicating that the
basis of the court’s decision as to the validity of the pro-
visions respecting hand rails is that of reasonableness is :
_ set forth in the margin.*
* South Covington and Cincinnati St. Railicay Co. v. Covington, 235 U. 8.
537, at page 545:
“Reaching the conclusion that the traffic here regulated ig of an~
interstate character. and therefore within the control of the Federai
Congress, the further question is presented: Does the case come
within that class wherein the state may regulate the matter legislated
upon until Congress has acted by virtue of the supreme authority
given it by: virtue of the commerce clause of the Constitution. In
numerous instances this court ‘has sustained local enactments, passed
in the exercise of the police power of the state, in the interest of .the
public health and safety, notwithstanding the regulation may in-
24
Siniilarly, in the case of Missouri Pacific Railway ‘Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U.S. 262, this court upheld au order of a state -
commission ‘requiring the operation of a passenger .train
service between Madison, Kansas, and the Missouri-Kansas ~
state line, even though there were no terminal facilities at
the state line; so that asa practical matter, trains had to be
run into the adjoining state. ,.
- The case last cited is particularly: apposite to the instant
case since there, as here, the railroad could comply with
the terms of the order if it cared to build switch tracks at
the state line, precisely as appellant could, if it desired, use
the cross-overs on the bridges in the state of Ilinois (Tr.
"2-21, 2-29, 2-108). ee
Under the present point, as we aie indicated, it is ap-
pellees’ major premise that (without, for the moment, con-
. sidering appellant's contention that state action has beens
excluded by federal action) the order in question must be
sustained if its purpose is.within the police power and if,
upon a consideration of the particular factual complex in
the instant case, the influence exerted upon interstate com-
meree.is not unreasonable in contemplation of the relation
of burdens and benefits.
It is appellees* minor premise that’ the-present order-is
a reaconable exercise Of the police power in ‘the light of
the instant facts. We now turn to a consideration of the
proposition embodied in this latter, premise. ,
. (ii)
The.order in question is, upon & consideration of the partionlar factual
complex in the instant case, tly reasonable.
~ We do not deem it necessary to cite authority for the
fundamental principle that the question of reasonableness
cidentally er indirectly affect interstate commerce. The ‘subject was
given much consideration if the Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v.
Shepard) DOU. 8. 352. 87 L. ed. 1511, 48 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1151, 33
* Sup. Ct. Rep. 728, andthe previous cases dealing with this subject
are therein collected and reviewed. In the light of: these cases, and —
upen principle, the conclusion is reac that it is competent for the
state te previde for local improvements or facilities, or to adopt
reasongble measures in the interest of the health, safety,.and welfare
of the people, notwithstanding such Tegulations might incidentally
and indirectly involve interstate commerce.”
-23
or unreasonableness was one addressed, tn the first in-
stance, to the sound discretion and to the presumably in-
formed judgment of the Hlinois Commerce Commission;
and that, in the second. instance, this question was ad.
dressed to the Supreme Court of Hlinois.
~ Unless, therefore, this court can declare that both the
illinois. Commerce Commission avd the Supreme Court of
Illinois have reached a determination so arbitrary and un-
reasonable as to be unconstitutional, the issue of the reason-
ableness of the order must be deemed to have been con-
clusively foreclosed in favor of appellees.
We turn briefly, then, to the facts upon peice the present
order was entered.
The: leading facts, with appropriate reference to the
record, have already been set forth in appellees’ statement
of the case, to which statement reference is here respect-
fully made. In_ the present argument, however, we em-
phasize the fact that appellant's employees are required
‘to ride on. the rear coupler of the car ‘at points where
_ overhead and side structires will not give clearance for
them on top or at the side.of the ears, that therefore they
must ride on the rear coupler; that much of such riding
must be done in sub-zero og other inelement weather, when
the cars are’ coated witli ice and sleet; that the evidence
showed positively that such a position is essentially a
precarious one; that theré is particular danger of em-
ployees’ being knocked off the top or the end of the train
_ by a sudden jerk:or stop; that at least one seriots injury
has resulted from the dangers indicated by the conditions
in question;.and that many of the employees’ duties could
be discharged from the interior of the caboose. (See photo-
graphs, 175, 176, 177, 191, 193, 194.) ©
. Moreover, the evidence shows that cabooses are equipped °
with rear whistles and air brakes, the object of which is
important when trains are hacking at publi¢ crossings or in
_ yards where other employees may be working. The evi-
dence shows that the rear whistle ‘‘and conductor's valve,”
‘
\ 26
an emergency Drake, afford the switchman on the rear end
of the train practically the same control that the engineer
has with reference to stopping or sounding a warning sig.
nal on approaching highway crossings or in the yards.
Moreover, there is positive evidence in the record that a
switchman can better observe traffic and train operations
from the cupola of the caboose. The caboose also fur-
nishes a place for necessary clerical work and for the
storage of equipment, lunches and the like. ~
Although counsel writing this brief are anxious to re-
strain any argument in the nature of impassioned declama-_
tion, it is respectfully suggested that, if one imagines for,
buf a moment the case of a man hanging on the side hand-
holes or the rear coupler-of a freight train, for a matter of
hours, blinded by snow in a temperature well below zero,
clinging to iron bars coated with ice, -while the train
is going first forward, then backwards, with inter-
mittent jerks, kicks and stops, and if one -will contract -
this vision with that of. the interior of a caboose, he will be
unable to say that the Illinois Commerce Commission and
the Supreme Court of Illinois have acted so arbitrarily and
unreasonably in requiring cabooses on appellant's trains
that this court, has no alternative, under the mandate of
the Constitution, but to declare the regulation void.
n. we
Congress has not by affirmative action pre-empted the sub-
ject matter of the present order from the jurisdiction
or powers of the State of Illinois.
Appellant. contends that even if, in the absence of fed
eral action, the State of Illinois would have the authority
under its inherent police power and other faculties of it«
sovereignty to impose the regulation embodied in the pres.
ent order, it does not now possess that p wer because, as
appellant maintains, Congress has so far occupied the field
:
‘
‘ o7
as to pre-empt from the states control over the number of
cabooses on interstate trains.
This contention rests upon two. distinct fundqmental
misconceptions, which misconceptions may, it is submitted,
be corrected by the following observations:
First. Appellant ix incorrect in its basic assump
tien that state legislation ix invalid merely because it
relates to matters which have been the subject of
federal action. The true rule is that, assuming that
the state action ix xuch that it would he valid under
the police powers in the absence of federal action, it -
is valid“@nless. Congress has so exerted its ‘powers
t in the language of this court in Kelly v. Wash-
+ woton, 302 U.S. 1,
**the repugnance or conflict ix so ‘direct and posi-
tive’ that the two acts cannot ‘he Teconciled or
consistently stand together.’ *
In other words, mere regulation affecting the field wil!
_not oust state action. The federal regulation must be
of such character that it is inconsistent with the me
action in question.
Second. Appellant mixapprehends the scope of the
federal legislation upon which it relies in its argument
that Congress has pre-empted the field. It will be
shown that notwithstanding appellant's contention to
‘the contrary, the acts of Congress cited by appellant
._do not amount to such an assumption by Congress of
the subject matter of the present order as to exclude
state action. ~
i
Before qunsidering the specific acts upon which appellant
relies as excluding state action in the present case, we
briefly consider the stope of the principle that federal ~
‘ . é > . ™ \ >
| i -.-
| F : ®
a 4 . .
8,. ,
, | “ .
action with respect to interstate commerce excludes state °
“action.
The governing ériterion is set forth in the case of Mis.
sourt Pacific R. BR. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U. 8. 249. That
case has already been cited as supporting the present
order as a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power.
The case is likewise pertinent under the present point,
however, “for it dealt—adversely . to the contentions of
appellant in he present case—with the contention that.
federal action excluded state action merely because they
related to a similar subject, matter.
That case, as we -have' observed, involved the ‘dstigieks
Full Crew Law, which regulafed tlie number of men: on
crews of interstate trains. It was contended there, as it
is ‘contended here, that federal action had excluded state
action. ~ 3
This court said at pace 256: : et
‘*In the absenée of 3 a ¢learly expressed purpose so
to do, Congress will not be held to have intended to
prev ent the exertion of the poliee power of the states
for the regulation of the umber’ of men to be em-
ployed in such crews."’
This coart’s opinion in the case of- Kelly v. W ashington,
302 U.S. 1, already ‘briefly noticed, affords a clear exposi-
tion of the general principle in question. In that case it
was contended that state legislation providing for the in-’’
spection and regulation of motor tugboats operated im in
trasiate, interstate, ard foreign commerce over, navigable
- Waters was void, because Congress had occupied the field.
Federal enactments regarding motorboats constituted,
in the words of the court, ‘‘a maze of regulations”. How-
ever, the Federal Motorboat Act (1910, 36 Stat. 462),
which had been passed when internal combustion engines
were exceedingly uncommon, regulated only motor boats
powered by steam. An amendment passed in 1936 (ec. 628,
29
49 Stat. 1544) extended such regulation to motorboats of
— 300 gross tons and over, propelled by internal combustion
engines. Thus left unregulated by the Government were
respondent’s vessels, which, though having internal com-.
| bustion engines, were of less than 300 tons’ burden.
‘tn spite of this partial ogeupation of the field by Con-
gress, this court sustained state regulation over the ‘re-
spondent’s boats. The court said at page 9:
‘*Under our constitutional system, there necessarily
remains to the States, until Congress acts, a wide
range for the permissible exercise of power appropri-
ate to their territorial jurisdiction although interstate
commerce may be affected. Minnesota Rate Cases,
230 U. S. 352. States are thus enabled to dea] with
local exigencies and to exert in the absence of conflict
with federal legislation an essential protective pow er.
* * There is no constitutional rule which compels
Congress to occupy the whole field. Congress may
circumscribe its regulation and occupy only a limited
field. The principle is thoroughly established that the
_exercise by the State of its police power, which would
he valid if not superseded by federal action, is supér-
seded only where the repugnance or conflict is so
‘direct and positive’ that the two acts cannot ‘be
reconciled or consistently stand together.’ ’
Similarly, in Northwestern Bell Teleph. Co. v. Nebraska,
7 U.S. 471, this court sustained a state requirement of ©
a » comblicite depreciation rate of 344% on all its depreciable —
property in Nebraska, notwithstanding the fact that the
Interstate Commerce Act, See, 1 (1) and See. 20 (1)(5),
as amended in’ 1B LE (26 Stat. 555), wave the Interstate
Commerte Commission authority in its diseretion to pre-
seribe uniform systems of -accounts for telephone com.
panies, arid made it unlawful for them to keep any accounts
other than those prescribed by the Commission.
The Court said. at page 480:
‘*No exertion of federal authority tit
the making of entries. ‘n appellant’ * accounts or the
?
doing of anything that is by the state commission's
order directed to be done. Pending action by the —
Communications Commission establishing deprecia-.
tion rates for te lephone companies, state control over
such rates remains unimpaired.”’ ©
In the case of Welsh v. New Hampshire, ‘ee U.S. 79, .
this court upheld a statuty of the State of New abpshir
which provided for th control of the hours of service of
drivers of motor carrie?sfin interstate comnierce. It was
contended that the provisions of the state act were exe
cluded by the Federal Motor Carriers act of 1935, and the
regulations preseribed under it by the Interstate Com.
merce Commission. This court sustained the regulation,
notwithstanding that: Congress had. addressed the same
‘subject matter, because there- was neither a conflict be-
tween state and federal regulations nor a-clearly evinced
intent by Congress to exelude state regulation. —
he purpose of the Commission's order in the present
casé is to preserve the lives, promote the safety, and pro-
tect the health of employees and of the public. It is‘sub-
mitted that federal intent to forbid such. action by the
state should ‘*not be lightly implied’; but that the order
should be sustained unless it ix in direct conflict. with appli-
_ eable federal regulation or ix patently inconsistent with a
clearly expressed federal purpose.
v nder the immediately fhllowi ing subpoint, we shall chow
that notwithstanding ‘appellant's argument to the con-
trary, the order in question is not in conflict with any
applicable federal statute or administrative regulation.
Yee |
(ii)
The jescent order is net in conflict with any applicable federal act
or regulation.
Appellant relies upon the following, acts or portions of
‘acts as constituting federal pre-emptian of the subject
matter of the present order: ~ ?
The Railway Labor Act (U.S. C. A., Title 45,-
Supplement 236, et seq.). f
The Interstate Commerce Act, particularly Sec. 1,
Pars. (10) through (17), and (21); Sec. 26, and
Sec. 20 (a) [U. S. C. A., title 49].
The Boiler Inspection Act (45 U. s. C. A., page
78, Sec. 22, et seq.). |
The Safety Appliance Act (45 U. 8S. C. A. See.
1, et seq., page 3, et seq.). | :
Appellees will emonstrete that none » of the enactments
above relied upon is either inconsistent with the regula-
tions or evincives of an intent to exclude from state author-
ity the subject matter of the present order.
The Railway Labor Act.
In the first place, the national Railway Labo Act per-
tains only to disputes between. employers and ‘employees’
‘with respect to working conditions and the like. The pres-
ent order was promulgated not only for the safety of ap-
- pellant’s employees, but for the safety of the public.
“In the second place, that act does not confer authority
_upon any federal agency to regulate the operations or
facilities of railroads, the primary intent-of the act being
to Compel the railroads to deal collectively with their em- —
ployees for the purpose of eliminating strikes. The act
provides, first; that employees may organize and bargain
collectively ; and that after a dispute arises they shall first
attempt to adjust it among themselves ; and that thereafter
32
either party may invoke the services of the adjustment
board, request mediation, or agree to arbitration.
The case of Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Norwood, 283
U. S. 249, has already been cited because it contains an
excellent statement of the principle that state regulation
will not be pronounced invalid unless in. conflict with the
express or clearly implied will of Congress. That case is
immediately in point in the present connection, hovever,
because in ‘that case it was contended that the Arkansas
Full Crew Law was rendered invalid by the National Rail-
way Labor Act. This court held that the Railway Labor
Act, by its reference to the subject of working conditions,
did not preclude the states from enacting a law ‘Zo WVerning
the number of members of crews on interstate trains.
The measure being one intended for the safety of the
public as-well as of eniployees, it could not be said’ that
the state sought to supersede the federal program for the
adjustment of disputes as to working conditions.
It is submitted that the order in question is not incon-.,
sistent with either the express provisions or the intent and ° -
purpose of the Railway .Labor Act.
: The Interstate Commerce Act.
Appellant argues that the order in question is in conflict
with the Interstate Commerce Act. Appellant does not:
point either te any provision within the text of that act or
to any regulition promulgated under its authority which
is in: conflict or inconsistent with the’ order in question.
Precisely the same contention was made in the Arkansas
Full. Crew case, alréady cited and discussed in other con-
nections {Missouri Pacific R. R..Co. v. Norwood, 283 U.S
_ 249). This court rejected the contention, holding that
nothing in the Interstate Commerce Act derogated’ from
the state’s power to adopt reasonable safety measures.
"Sec. 1, Par. 17, of the Interstate Commerce Act (U.S
C. ‘. A. Title 49, page 120) contains the following provisions :
‘46* .* © Provided, however, that nothing in this.
|, 383
chapter shall impair or affect the right of h State, in
the exercise of its. police power, to require just and
reasonable freight and passenger service for intra-
state business, except in so far as such requirement is
inconsistent with any lawful order of the commission
made under the provisions of this chapter.’’ -
It is clear, both from the text of the Interstate Commerce
Act and from the decisions of this eourt pronounced since
its enactment, that it was not the intent of Congress so to
pre-empt the field ef interstate railroading or that the states
should no longer have the authority, in the exercise of their
police power, to adopt reasonable measures for the preser-
vation of the lives and health of their citizens and of rail-
road employees. No such revolutionary or far-reaching
purpose has been expressed by Congress, nor has such a
purpose been recognized by any decision of this court.
This is clearly emphasized by ,the fact that Congress
itself has explicitly declared, in the excerpt above quoted,
‘that nothing in the entire chapter shall impair or affect
the state’s police power except in so far as any state re-
quirement may be inconsistent with any lawful order of
- the Commission made under the provisions of the chapter.
Appellant fails to indicate any provision of the act which
is repugnant to, the Interstate Commerce Act or which, in
the language of Congress,
‘‘is inconsistent -with any lawful order of the Commis- .
sion made: under the provisions of this chapter.”’
sion made under the provisions of this chapter,”’
or such that, in the lariguage cf this court, already cited,
' “the repugnance is ‘so ‘direct and positive’ that the
' two acts ‘cannot be .-reconeiled or consistently stand
together.””” . . .
Appellant relies on the case of Railroad Commission v.
Southern Pacific, 264 U. S. 331. That case is not parallel
to the instant case on the facts; but the principle which it
recognized supports the appellees, not appellant. In that
case this court said:
‘Only -a lawful order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission would raise the question of the power of
34
the state commission in such case, as the proviso of -
page 1%, Chapter 402," of the Transportation Act
shows,”’
the proviso “above cited being that immediately aaviad
above in this argument.
.
There is nothing in the record in. the: instant case to
show that the Interstate Commerce Commission has in
any wise sought to regulate appellant’ s cabooses or that
‘it has undertaken-to forbid state regulation.
In the absence of any such showing, the presumption
must be that there was no such regulation, since the state .
courts dé not take cognizance. of administrative orders of
the Interstate Commerce Commission, Robinson v. B.
O. R. R. Co., 222 U.S. 506, 512; City of Detroit v. Wabash
Refining Co., 223 Ill. App. 246, 251; Thompson v. Missouri
Pacific R. R. Co., 15 Fed. (2) 28, 31 (C. C. A, 8th). 7
Thus beth Congress and this court have declared that :
the Interstate Commerce Act (which act includes the
Transportation Act) does not derogate from the states’
police power unless the Commission has promulgated a
regulation which is in direct conflict with state action. -
Since no such regulation exists in the instant case, it.
must ‘be concluded that appellant is incorrect: in its argu-
ment that the present order must fail because of the Tuter-
state Commerce ‘Act.
The Safety Appliance Act and the Boiler Inspection Act.
Appellant's argument that the Safety Appliance. Act
. (45 U. S.C. A. See. 1, By seq., at page 3) and the Boiler
Inspection Act (45 U. S.C. A., page 78, See. 22) exclude ©
the Illinois cartes 8 jurisdiction. to enter the order
in question is likewise based upon the fundamental premise
that the mere fact that Congress has legislated with respect
to a particular subject matter is in and of itself sufficient
- to exclude state action. We have already shown under
35
Sub-Point (i) of the present Point, in this brief that this
initial premise is unsound, the true test being whether the
state action is directly repugnant to federal action.
Appellant fails to point out any provision of either the
Safety Appliance Act or the Boiler Inspection Act which
_ is.inconsistent with the regulation now under review. -
In support of the contention that the present order is in
conflict with the Safety Appliance Act, appellant relies on -
the case of Penn. R. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission,
250 U. S. 566. That case does not support appellant; but
it is nevertheless of interest in the present case because
it affords an excellent illustration of the kind of repugnance:
between state and federal action which is within the rule
that state regulation will not be sustained: when it contra-.
dicts federal regulation. -In that case the federal regula-
tion required caboose cars without platforms. The state
regulation: required caboose cars-With 30-inch platforms.
- It would have been impossible to obey the state regulation
without violating the federal. Jaw. We submit thatthe
mere statement of the facts in that case makes it evident.
that the decision in that case cannot control the decision
here. oy ’
In this case it does not appear that there is any regula-
tion on the part of the Interstate Commerce Commission
with respect to‘cabooses. But even if it appeared in this
case, as it affirmatively appeared in the case last above
cited, that the Interstate Commerce Commission had regu-
lated the type of cabooses which must ‘he used when-ca-
booses were to be used. at all, still those regulations would
be completely silent as to when, where, and under what ~
circumstances appellant would be required to carry ca
hooses gn its trains. Therefore, so far as anything in
the Safety Appliance Act is concerned, the State of Tlinpis
" -possesses the same power to order cabooses. that it has
_always had, in virtue of its police power, except that of
36
course it could not command a type of cabooses on interstate
_ trains which was forbidden ‘by act of Congress or a valid
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
. ° . ° ° *
Appeliant’s argument that the order is void. because
federal action has superseded the state’s jurisdiction is
erected entirely upon its assumption that mer¢ regulation
of the subject matter by Congress excludes regulation by
the states. ‘The correct rule i is, a8 has been shown, that the ~
state’ 8 police power is not impaired if its regulations are.
not so directly repugnant to federal action that both state
and federal regulations cannot stand. “Appellant has to-
tally failed to point to any regulation inconsistent, ‘either
in its direct terms or by fair implication, with the order in
question; nor has appellant cited any act by which Congress
has assumed plenary and exelusive jurisdiction of the field.
Therefore it-,is submitted that -appellant’s argument
that the order in question is veid for repugnancy to federal
‘action cannot be sustained.
Il.
The order dees not deprive appellant of its property
_ » without due process of law. |
-It'is contended by appellant that the benefits. accruing
‘from the order are in effect so disproportionate to the
expense involved and that the ¢ost so exorbitant compared
to the benefits that the order constitutes a deprivation of
appellant's property without due process of law, in con-
travention to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States. rats: ,
It is contendéd that the order requiring the furnishing
~ of. cabooses for the protection of the life and safety of the
_trainmen, as well as of the public at large, would be of
slight benefit as compared with the cost to which appellant
would be put to. in complying with the order. In. other .
‘words, appellant seeks. to’ compare the benefits derived, :
from the order with the cost entailed by such compliance
ce *
“".
37
in order to determine whether or not the order violates
the dué process clause. °
Under Point I of the present brief, appellees have argued
that the order is inherently reasonable as an exercise of
the state’s police pow er as against the contention that it
unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce. Much of
that argument-is pertinent here.
However, under this Point, we reply te appellant's con-
tention that, without regard to any question raised by the
learning of interstage commerce, the order is confiseatory.
Appellant seeks @ minimize the dangers which the order
_ seeks to avoid, not only to the trainmen, but to the public
-at large, in the proper operation of a train. It is urged
that there is:only a small benefit accruing to one member _
.. of each crew by reason of furnishing cabooses and that
the undisputed evidence in the record shows (R, 228) that
_for a long time, injuries to employees on the rear end of
a traifi have been far less when no caboose was provided
than-when one was furnished. This is not a fact and the °
record fails to support appellant's contention. Appellant
_ relies upon its Exhibit 19, whieh is 4 compilation showing
- that there were eight injuries to switchmen due to sudden
_stops while they were in cabooses. The exhibit, however,
fails to show how many men were injured while not in
cabooses. tae ;
. We submit that this exhibit clearly emphasizes the ne-
- cessity for the order to protect the life, health and safety
of the trainmen. If as a result of sndden stops, switehmen
are injured while in cabooses, how much more so are they
likely to be injured while they are required to*yide the rear
coupler of a car and particulafly so during inclement
weather? Y:
In C. B. € Q. R. R. Co..¥. Commerte Commission, 364
TIL. 213, 222, one of the‘cases cited and relied upon appel.
lant, the Court, in_ passing upon this question aptly said:
‘*The fact thit only one employe has been killed ix
* not of itself sufficient to show that a dangerous con.
38 :
° .
dition does not exist. * * *. When a hazard is
shown to exist and-may be eliminated without unrea.
sonable expense or imposing onerous conditions, it is
not necessary to wait until cagualtios result before
requiring the evil to be remedied, even though other
hazards - necessarily incident to the business still re.
main."
' In the statement of facts, Supra, appellee has called
attentign to the testimony showing the reasonable expenses
involved in the furnishing of the equipment by appellant
‘and has pointed out that the extray agant claims as to ex-
orbitant costs by appellants are wholly eat wr oe by any
competent evidence im the record.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in the instant case, after ,
calling attention to the fact that there was a sharp dispute
-in the testimony on the question of expenses of labor in-
volved and the purchase of the caboose, said:
We are of the opinion that those expenses on this
record are to be classed with those inconveniences
referred to in the cases herein cited as not affecting
the power of the State to impose the regulation, unless
so clearly unreasonable as to be _ State oe
This record does not so indica 7
We submit that this decision of the Supreme Court of
Iinois on this record is correct.
Appellant in its brief relies upon numerous authorities
therein cited, some of which have no application whatever
to the case here under consideration, while the balanc:
fu.. support the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois
- herein,
In Chesapeake and Ohio Radway Sensei v. Public
Service Com, 242 U.S. 608, 61 L. Ed. 520, one of the cases _
cited and relied upon by appellant, this Court lay
down the rule applicable to the case herein in question
in the Yollowing language (page 607):
“(me of the duties of a railroad company doihc
business as a common carrier is that of providing rea-
sonably adequate facilities for serving the public. This
duty arises out of the acceptance and enjoyment of
the powers and privileges granted by the state, and
endures so long as they are retained. It represents
a part of what the company undertakes to do in return
for. them, and ita performance cannot be avoided
loss."’ (Emphasis ours.) Citing: Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. North Carolina Corp. Commission, 206 U. 8S.
1, 26, 51 L. ed. 933, 945, 27 Sup. Ct. Regpses, 11 Ann.
Cas. 398; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. 8. 262,
279, 4 L. ed. 472, 479, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 330; Washing-
ton ex rel. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, 24 VU.
S. 510, 529, 56 L. ed. Dngedy Fede deve Rep. 535;
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 237
U. 8S, 220, 229, 59 L. ed. 926, 931, P. U. R. 1915C, 309,
35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 560.
In Washington ex rel. Oregon R. & N. Mo. v. Fairchild,
224 U. S._ 510, likewise relied u appellant, this
Court said at page 529:
“If the order invelves the use ot property needed
in the discharge of those duties which the carrier is
bound to perform, then, upon proof of the necessity,
the order will be granted, even though ‘the
of such necessary a ee may occasion an
pecuniary loss.’ * :
In Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. ¥. State Highway Com.,
24 U.S. 613, also relied upon by appellant, this Court
_ Tecognizes that the police power of a state springs from
the obligation of the state to protect its citizens and to
provide for the safety and good order of society; that ar
a part of the governmental power of self-protection, it is
permitted reasonably to regulate rights and property; and
that a railway company, in accepting its franchise from
the state, necessarily does so subject to the condition that
it would conform, at its own expense; to any regulations,
not arbitrary in their character, which have for their object
the safety of the public or the promotion of the public
See also Atlantic Coast Line R, R. Co. v. North Carolina
Corp. Com., 206 U.S. 1, 25, 26.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of-Tlinois in the
instant case, various decisions are quoted in which this
-Court has: held 4hat the railroad companies were not de-
prived of their property without due process of law. New
York, New Haven Co. v. New York, 165 U. 8. 628; Atlantiy
Coastline Co. v. Ge orga, 234 U.S. 280,. and others. -
We submit that most of the cases relied upon by appel:
- lant fully support our position herein. A few of the cases
cited -by appellant are easily distinguishable on the facts,
such as that.of Penusylvania Coal Co, v. Mahon, 261 U.S.
“393, in whieh it was held that a statute forbidding the min- ©
ing of coal under private dwellings or streets was uncon.
stitutional ax taking property without due process of law
where the right to mine coal was expressly reserved under
a grant. . . a
We submit that if appellant elects to operate freight
trains and. employ switchmen in connection therewith, it
cannot evade its duty imposed by-law to furnish all rea-
sonable means and .methods to protect its crews and the
public against hazards, accidents and injuries.
The cost involved, we submit, is insignificant compared
to the good achieved and to be achieved by the order
entered by the Illinois Commerce Commission in providing -
for cabooses so as’ to avoid not only the accidents that
occur but alséo to minimize the dangers and hazards to
. which the switehimen are > subjected in the course of their
occupation.
The order does not, as contended, deprive appellant of ,
its property without due process of law.
. ‘ e . ; © *
In the foregoing discussion, appellees have argued the
merits of, the issue of confiscation precisely as though the
' question.of the reasonableness of the order were addressed
to this court in the first-instance. However, the question
properly’ before this’ court is, of course, not whether this
' 41° ay,
court would dispose of t question of confiscation favor.
ably to. appellant in the ¢ : of its independent judg-
ment, but whether the [litoix Commission and the Su-
preme Court of Illinois could reasonably find that the
order in question was proper,
It ix respectfully submitt , in 40 far as the ques-
tion of reasonableness and Confiscation is concerned, the
order is supported by very substantial evidence, and that
therefore it should not be disturbed by this court.
CONCLUSION.
For the’ reasons urged in the foregoing argument, appel-
“fees submit that the judgment of the Supreme Court of
«Illinois. affirming the order of the Ilinois Commerce Com
mission in question was correct and that it should be
affirmed. ah ‘
_¢ ; Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE F. BARRETT,
Attorney General of the
State of Mlinvis,
Attorney for Minois Com-
merce Commission, Appet-
lee. ,
A. A. Scnwanznacn and
Ary E. Sreew,
Attorneys for Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen,
Richard Abram, Chairman
and State Legislative
Representative, Appellees.
William C. Wines,
Assistant Attorney General,
Of Counsel.
‘SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
No. 218° Ocrones Tram, 1942.
_——
Terminal Railroad Assdcsation of St. Louis, |
Appellant,
: vs. :
rotherhoed of Railroad Trainmen, et al. |
in Appeal from the
\ Supreme Court of
the State of Hlinois.
* {January Is, 143.)
Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court
Appellant is f@ corporation engaved in performing terminal
wrviers and furnishing terminal facilities in and about East St.
Lowis, Miineis, to a number of railroad companies which share -its
ownership: and eontral It operates several yards for the sorting
atl classification and interchange of cars, with some service te
ndustries within the <Qitcehing district”
The Broth: rhood of Reiroad Trammen, one of the appellees
representing iremimen and switchmen employed by appe ‘lant, com
plained te thé Ilinois Commerce Commission of appellant's failure
‘to provide caboose cars for its employees. In answer the appellant
denied that the Commission had power to enter any order that
would relate toe movements in Gnterstate commerce, Which it sail
ineluded substantially all of its operations; and it contenced fur-
ther that iv had already provided ajl reasonably necessary facilities
The issues were sharply contested bettore the Commission, and the
evidence, while it may not have required, certainly permitted these
conclusions: ;
Appellant's «witching crews make and break up trains of cars
and deliver and transfer them. One man of each crew is required ~
to ride the rearecar of the train when it is in motion.” Depending
upon the distances by which fixed structures along the track clear
this ear, he rides its top or side, and in some places both top and
side clearances are so smal! that he must ride on the drawbar pro-
secting from the end of the car Sudden jerks and stops are common
and they have on eccasion thrown off switchmen. The duties of
the rear switchman include lining switches into position after. the
train has passed and watching street and highway crossings to
Terminal Railroad Assoc sation of St. Lowis
vs. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen et al
protect the public when the train. is backing up. In cases of
emergency he must stop the train by ‘turning an air valve locate:!
next to the drawbar, which he cannot readily or safely do if he
is riding on the tep or side of the ear.
During some seasons of the year he is exposed to rain,’ sleet,
snow and ice, which also cover the. parts of the ear to whieh he
must cling to stay on it, thus adding to his difficulties.
Appellant's trains, when not equipped with cabooses, have no
storage space for safety devices, flagging equipment, or for extra
clothing, lunches and drinking water of the men; ’nd they:provide
no space in which the men can perform their clerical duties.
The Commission found that by providing cabooses the appellant
could eliminate the necessity for the rear switchmen to ride tlie
tops, sides, or draw-bars of the rear cars; afford: safe and ready
aceess to the dir valve; and provide space for. storage and for
clerical work. It found that it was essential to the health, safety.
and comfort of the rear switchmen that the appellant provide
cabooses on all of designated runs in so far as they were within the
confines of the State, and made its order accordingly, The order
was sustained hy the Supreme Court of Illinois as ‘‘obviously pro-
mulgated to protect the lives and health of citizens of this State
engaged in appellee's business within the State,’’ and as not im-
posing an unlawful -burden upon interstate commeree.! _The case
is here on appeal.*
All but an insignificant number of the cars in the trains on
the specified tuns move in interstate commerce, so that the order
pertained to a matter clearly within the power of .Congress: to
regulate interstate conimerce. :
Appellant claims that there had been Congressional occupation
of the tield by virtue of the Boiler Inspection Act,? the Safety
“Appliance Act,‘ and the Interstate Commerce Act.’ It is not
contended, nor do we understand, that these statutes, by them-
a®:
+ 1379 TL 403.
2§237(a) of the — Code, 28 U. %, C. § 344(a).
345 T. 8. C. $¢ 22-3
445 U. 8. C. are
$49 U. S.C. $1 et seg. Particular reliance fs put upon paragraphs (10).
(11), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17) and (21) of § 1, relating to the Commis
sions powers in respect to car service; and upon paragraph 2 of § 20(a), re
lating to its powers over ‘the issuance of securities and the assumption of lia
bilities thereon. We have not been informed whether such issuance or assump
tion is needed to obtain the cabooses which the Illinois Commission has seams
to be used.
°
™
Terminal Railroad Association cf St. Louis : 3
vs. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen a al
selves and unimplemented by any action of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, lay down any requirement that cabooses shall ©
or shall not be used on any of the runs in question. Nor. is it
‘contended that the Anterstat® Commerce Commission itself has
sought to make any such requirement. At least in the‘absence of
such action these Acts do not themselves preclude the state order,
Atlantic Coast Line v. Geargia, 234 U.S. 280; ef. Welch Co.
v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, and it is unnecessary to cén- °
sider con this occasion and without the participation of the
Interstate Commerce Commission what may be the extent of its
power under these Acts. If it should in the exercise of granted
power determine ‘whether appellant must provide cabooses, the
State would be.powerless to gainsay it. This and no more is the
’ effect of Pennsylvania Raidroad c o. ¥v. Public Service Commission,
250 U.S. 566:
‘The Railway Labor Act,® also relied upon by appellant, remains
for consideration and presents questions of a ‘different order, not
heretofore examined in any opinion of this Court.?” The purpose
‘of this Act is declared to be to provide ‘‘for the prompt and orderly
_ Settlement of, all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working
se
; and *‘for the prompt and orderly settlement of all
disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or
application of agreements. covering rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions.** It places upon carriers and employees- the duty of
exerting every reasonable effort te settle these disputes by agree-
conditions
‘ment, and prohibits the-earrier from a!tering agreed rates of pay,
rules or working conditions except in the'manner provided by the
agreement or by the Act itself. Machinery is set up for the
adjustment, mediation, and arbitration of dispuftes which the parties
do not succeed in settling among themselves.’ The First Division
of the National Railroad Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over. -
disputes involving train and yard-serviee employees of carriers,
which may be referred to it by agreement. of both parties or by
ither party."' Its awards. are- made “final and. , Seding” upea
645 US. C. 6151 et seq.
7 re. Missouri Pacifie R. Co. v. Nerebed, 283 U.-8. 50, 258.
$45 UL S.C. 6 15la.”
945 U. 8. C. §152, paragraphs 1 and 7.
1645 U.S. CL $153 ef seq. .
1145 U.S. C. § 153(h) (i); see also’ § 155.
4 Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis
vs. Brotherhood of Railroad Traumen et al.
both parties ‘to the dispute’ and the carrier may be required by
the courts to comply, the Board's findings being, in a proceeding
fer such purpose, prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
The order before us is the outgrowth-of a dispute between. the
carrier and its-employees. The contract between the appellant
and the Brotherhood contains provision for cabooses for- certain
trains and services, but does not provide for those ordered by the
Illinois Commission. We assume, without deciding, that the de-
mand for additional “caboose service and its refusal constitute a
dispute about working conditions, and. that the National Railroad
Adjustment Board would have jurisdiction of it on petition of the
employees or their representative and might have madé an award
such as the order in‘ question or some modification of it. The
question.is whether the. Railway Labor Act, so interpreted, occu-
pied the field to the exclusion of thé state action under review.
We conclude that it does not, and for the following reasons:
The Railway Labor Act, like the National Labor Relations Act,’'. °,
does not undertake governmental regulation of wages, hours, or
working conditions. Instead it seeks to’provide a means by which
agreement may be reached with respect to them. The national
interest expressed by those Acts is not primarily in the working
conditiens as such. So far as the Act itself-is concerned these
conditions may be as bad as the employees will tolerate or be made
as good as they can bargain for. The Act does not fix and does
not authorize anyone to fix generally applicable .standards for
working conditions. The federal interest that is fostered is to
seo that disagreement about conditions does not reach the point
of ‘interfering with interstate commérce. The Mediation Board
‘ and Adjustment Board act to compose differences that threaten
- continuity of work, not to remove conditions that threaten the
health or _— of workers. (Cf. Pennsylvama R. R. v. Labor
Board, 261 U. S. 72, 84.
State laws iene long regulated a great variety of To
in transportation and industry, such as sanitary facilities and
conditions, safety devices and protections, purity of water supply.
fire protection, and innumerable others. . Any of ‘these matters.
might, we suppose, be the subject of a demand by workmen for
1245 U.-8. C. '§ 153(m). : in_
12 45 U. 8. C. § 153(p).
1429 U. S.C. $151 et seq.
,
a
Terminal Railroad Association of Rt. Lowie i 2
* ¥8. Brotherhool of Ratiread Trainmen et al.
better protection. and upon refusal might be the subject of a labor
‘dispute which weuld have such effect on interstate commerce that
federal agenciys might be invoked to deal with seme phase of it.
But we would hardly be expected to hold thatthe price of the fed-
eral effort to protect. the peace and continuity of commerce has
been to strike-down state sanitary codes, health regulations,
factory inspections, and safety prov isions for industry: and trana-
‘portation. We suppose employees might consider that state or
municipal requirements of fire escapes, fire doors, and fire protec. —
tion were inadequate and make them the subject of a dispute, at
least some phases of which world- be. of federal concenn. But it
cannot be that the minimum requirements laid down by state
authority are all set aside. We hold that the enactment by Con-
gress of-the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field
_ of reguiating-working conditions themselves and did not preclude
the State of IHinois from making the order in question.
We must decide the question of state power in this case in the
absence of any Act of Congress that conflicts with the order or .
may be said to oeeupy its field.
The order ‘of the State Commission requires that cabocnee be
used on appellant's trains making runs of two different’ sorts.
Runs of the first sort are made by trains which, although they
begin and end and make their entire movements within the State,
are+made up almost entirely of cars moving in interstate com-
merece. Runs of the second sort ate made by trains. whith move
between points in East St. .Louia, Mlinois, and St. Louis, Missouri,
‘- and cross one or the other of two bridges spanning the Mississippi
River and the state line. On its face the order requires only that
nears be used within Illinois, and does not require that they
be used in Missouri. . Appellant contends, and we rok how-
ever, that there do not exist, and that it is not reasonably practicable
to install, facilities for taking on and dropping off cabooses at
the points where the trains cross the state line; and that the prac-
tical: consequence of the order is that if cabooses are to be used
in Illinois on runs of the second sort they must also be -used at
least as far as the nearest switching point in Missouri.
As to both classes of runs, the effect of the order is in some
measure to retard and increase the Cost of movements in interstate
commerce. This is not to say, however, that the order is n ily
invalid. In the absence of controlling federal - legislation this
Court has sustained a wide variety of state regulations of railroad
6 Terminal Railroad Association of St. Lows
vs. Brotherhood of Railroed Trainmen et al.
_ trains moving-in- ititerstate commerce having such effect."5 The
governing principles were recently stated in Perker v. Brown (No.
46, decided January 4, 1943), pp. 14-15.
We are of opinion that under these principles the order is valid
as to runs of both sorts. It finds its origin in the docal climatic
conditions and in the hazards created by particular loca] physical
structures, and it has rather obvious relation to the health and
safety of local Workmen. The record in the case does not afford
a sure basis for calculating the costs to commerce resulting from
the order against the costs to the safety and health of the workmen
which it was intended to minimize, and there is evidence in the.
ease that nearby railroads have seen fit in the absence of legal
compulsion to provide cabooses in circumstances substantially
similar to these upon which appellant relies to establish absence
of state power.
If lack of facilities at the state line requires es a practical ae
that in order to provide cabooses in Llinois. appellant must also
provide them for some distance in Missouri, that tact does not
prevlude Hlinois from peguiating the operation to the liniits of its
territory. Missown, R. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U>S. 262; ef. South
Cavington Ry. v. Covington, 235 U.S. 537.
The judgment of the court below is
Affirmed.
—
—_-— — =
13 See cases cited in California vr. Thompson, 313 U. 8, 109, 113.114,
1 This case involved a atreet-car line running between Covington, Kentucky,
and Ciacinnati, Ohio, over a bridge connecting the two cities. Fhe Oity of
Covington required that: (1) passengers must not ride on car platforms un
less the platforms were equipped with suitable rails and barriers; (2) the cat
must be kept clean, ventilated and fumigated; (3) the téMperature of the ar
in the care must never fall below a stated minimum; (4) in pfactital effec’.
- that additional cars mast be run in CSncianafi as well as in Covington in exces
of the Cincinwati franchise rights and in such manner as to make probable th
creation of eorious impediments to other traffic in Cincinnati and conflict with
(C\ncinnati regulations. The first two requirements were sustained. The thir!
was struck down because the opening and closing of the car doors made com
phance tmpossible; the fourth, because of the likelihood that serious burdens
would be imposed upon interstate commerce by virtue of the impossibiittr of
compliance with probable conflicting’ regulations. ba) facters have not been
shown we exist in the + ome case.
_
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.