Brief for the Respondent — Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1942

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Text

iN THE

_ Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER ‘Tram, x. D. 4941.

Ne. 706 |

. .

° .

CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, BOARD

Ok HEALTIL OF TH CITY OF CHICAGO, DR.

Aone: RT A. BLACK, Health Commissioner and

Acting President of the Board of Health of.the City of

Chicagy, «Nig, ; ,_ &

ED, ” Petitioners,

CO OS. .

FLELDCREST .DATRIES, INC. - s

Respondent.

° a] ; \ J :

CERTIORARL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SEVENTiL CIRCUIT, THERE HEARD ON APPEAL RROM ‘THE

UNIRRE. STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, FASTERN DIVISION ae

: ;

. re = ° 5 a e

: ore:

‘ Frep A. Gariepy

>

: vv 1 North LaSalle Street, “‘Chicgga, Illinois,

\ OwgRn Ratu, Pees “yf

135 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois.

JOHN SPALDING, Aiea

, | North LaSalle Street, Chicago, Tlinois

Attorneys for Respondent,

9

" BakNAuD & Mipcer. Printers: Fra nklin 0562, Curcaco

* ay

INDEX AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

-

; ; ; PAGE

List of Authoriti@s 5” BRO eta aa ee ates ‘s¢eeSece Hil

Stitement OF The Desc: os ecaess sb yekow eee yee |

a dete oY oe ahah naaeds ‘ enbietunes “ee wee

_ I. The Ordinance Is Sapient to the Illinois Stat-

ute of 1939 and Is Therefore Invalid.:........ 4

Effect of the 1939 Statute on the Powers of

Cee: ke © iciisisccccuel as wodee te

II. State Approval of Single Service Containers Is

* Conclusive that Prohibition of Such Containers

by ‘a slain arate Is Unreasonable as a Matter

OE Be Os kovndcceouascns a Semaine ee aia ewes + hea

TIL The Ordinance Is Pitaiaushs as a Matter of

Patty... 2.0. ccecesceccestevcevcees s walbatve eons Gl

'.. Sanitation and Absorption.:............... ae

Parafiin« Used on Paper Containers......... 74

Odors From Paraffin....... eeav eatin ee 78

The Sanitary Control of Paper Containers... 1

Transparency and Cream Line in Paper Con- .

nS EG ors ete pt jevousccsgerens OG

Presumption of Legislative Correctness esas 90

Use of Single Service Containers ‘Throughout

the United States.............cecscecceeees 91

<

es Ce -

Oe ee se gegen ete ae

.

een)

PAGE

Serdiation of Paper Milk Containers by the —

Stafe of Illinois ghee PEG Sm nes eee Py - 101

“Regulation of Paper Milk Containers in the

- Model Ordinance of the United States _— é

BRON I iis woh daccchecies ae

Use of Paper Containers for Other Purposes 102°

' The Proposal by the Board of Health that the”

City Council Permit the Use of ‘ Paper Con-

aE EN Cae petincastvhwys See iss 103

The Conclusion on the Question of Reason- t

ableness Sees heeh se haven wenned s Oo Se eleeeees 104

IV.: The Respondent’s Single Service Container Is

a *‘Standard Milk Bottle’’............ CB

V. Conclusion ......... tre teees o weedevevtee ~ 54/ *06

ie

* et

iii

List oF AUTHORITIES.

CASES CITED.

: PAGE«

Bullman v. City of Chicago, 367 Ill. 217 (1937)...... 10°

Carolene Products Co. v. —— 365 Ill. 62

(1936) ons eekee NES A a a EN 63

Chicago and Alton’ Railroad Co. v. 7. City of Carlinville,

200 Ill. 314. § 4 ee Pees bay oa avg 52-53, 61

Consumers Co. v.. City oY Chicago, 313 Ill. 408 (1924) 11

City of Chicago v. Ben Alpert, Inc., 368 TIL. 282 :

(1988) .../.. a ate La eimene es | soot 108, 114

City of Chicago v. Bowman, Dairy Co., 234 Til. *294

ve Spee ile ROTA e oe eer Crhe Kite Sat adbh ce bes 21.

City of Chicago v. C, & N. W. Ry. Co., 275 Tl. BD “

NE ees s ser bAbbs piles sé eade chen sees 22, 53

City of Chicago%, Drogasawacz, 256 Tl. 34 (1912). .16-17

City of Chicago v: Jensen, 331 Tl. 129 (1998) he mer ane 12-13

City of Chicago V. Murphy, 313 Tll. 98 (1924)....2... 0 11.

City of Chieago v. Union Ice Créam Mfg. Co., “252 Til.

B11 -(191L) wnyicee ieee cc ecs we evass 15-16, 21, 22, 93, 55

City of Lake View v. Tate, 130 Tl. 247 (1889). ween 52

City of Lewistown v. Harrison, 282 Ill. 461 (1918)

keeaesen re Gy ea a. ee oe

City of Litchfield v. " Phorvorth, 337 Ml. 469 (1929). .18-19

City of Marengo v. Rowland, 263 TIl. 531 (1914)... 17, 55

City of Mt. Vernon v. Tilian, 369 TH. 447 (1938)... 54, 61

City Bf Ottawa Vv. Brown, 372 Til. 468 (1939) ed oak a 36, 37

City of Rockford v. Hey, 366 TI.-526 (1937 Divine 19. 50

Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52 (1933).......... reg

iv vitics.

PAGE.

Kizer, v. City of Mattoon, 339 Ti. 545 (1928) . re “87, 38

Koy v. City of Chicago, 263° Tl. 122 (1914).. ;

ba abies Wire PEt bee Nate ee ad cehek De mnetenee 21, 29, 53, 61,89 .

McGregor, Jr. v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co.,

. U. S. ..., (No. 179, October. ‘Term, 1941, de- .

cided February 16, - TIED os i cin cdies wards seenases 4)

~ Northern Trust Co. v. Chieago Rys. Co., 318 Tl. 402

SE Guavdieaeecdssans Ri Sip ips ae Mood Be 13, 45-46, 54

Pacific States Box & Basket Co.-v. White, 296 U.S.

176 (1935) ET Pee SITE L CETTE CET TT ee Lee ep a

People v. Barnett, 319 Tl. 403 TIOGGS 5 8.5 Senvaees 108, 109 .

_ People x. esi —— Co. 345 ‘Ill. 166 (1931)

Pe ck-sne terete telcrterited rcs verre erriee 56, 57, 63

People v. Price, 257 Wl. 587 (1918)... 0%, iachee 63 —

People v. Robertson, 302 Ti. 422 (1928) ..........000. 53

~ Railroad Commission ‘of Texas'v. Pullman Co., 312,

me | Rk | ee ee ee 4

Shelton v. City of Shelton, Tt Conn. 433, 159 Atl.

811 (1930) eS eT eS Ss Shiga i ecsi skeverucss 41-43

Standard Oil Co. v. City of Watwovitie, 279 U. >=

(1928) Pe OP ee EN POA Pee Cpr i te _101

State ex rel. Knise, et a. vy. ‘Kineey, 314 Mo. 80, 989

S. W. 437 (1925)...... peeasune LET Oe ee 39-41

Uservo, Ine. v. Selking, 217 Ind. 567, 98 N. E. (2nd)

Oe I i ri ois ke he Fea LORE hee 110-111

_ Vandenbark v, Owens- Mlinois - Glass nde 311 U.S.

“es s Oe (A941). FusGaruivots usc savevesepeugnrs al Paes a4.°

Village’ of’ Atwood v. Cincinnati, I, & W. Ry. Co., 316

em | Serre eee ee “FESESESEPE ETL 44.45

Wilkie v. City of Chicago, 188 Ill. 444 (1900)... . 4S

. .@

‘ STATUTES CITED.

; ‘ ‘ PAGE

1 Tilinois Session Laws, 1941, p. 809....... pesesescns 82

Illinois Revised’ Statutes, 1939, ¢.- 38, ‘‘Criminal

Code”, Se BOs iccun cass Vedeekeuen esas ie eieres 77,

Illinois Revised Statutes, 1925, ¢. 564, “Foods”, .

SEE, bceah ce teeceease eet stisaavsaessieudes 24, 26.

’ Tllinois Revised Statutes, 1937, ¢. 564, “Foods”, pars.

OS PSSA Ie Pa ee otra enn aabdce aaa ae ap se ge 24, 25

Niinois Reyised Statutes, 1941, ¢. 564, pars. 115-134,

oe as Milk Pasteurization Act of 1939. .2, 3, 4,9, ‘

, 24, 25, 26-30, 31, 32-33, 34, 35, 36, 46, 47, 48, 49, ‘60, 54, 87 -

7 Minots Revised Statutes, 1941, c. 564, ‘‘Foods’’, pars.

TEE Shcbvcra devs eredacccvevestss5kseusteu se 32

, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ‘ce. 1114, ds

a, ae - DE see Ay pe tre - 30

Mlinois Revised Statutes, 1941, c. 127, ‘‘State Govern-. Nag:

ment’’, PAT. DO... e cece e eee eee cence tseeees » B0

* Regulations of the Director of Department of Health

of Tlinots (4a60 cc beawewbsee sence tet eeetnenetes es

DICTION ARIES, TEXTS AND TREATISES CITED.

Century. Dictionary and Cyclopedia... .. faaee me figss. nee

43 Corpus Juris, 215-217.............. AN OPE See et)

Crawford’ on Statutory Construction, 612 (1940)... 35

. Funk and Wagrialls’ New Standard Dictionary ee 111

a Barnet, Law and The Modern City (1937)..10,12

2 Lewis’ Sutherland on Statutpry Construction 678

MEDS uccnsh ds coneccdmaegnaveeeenses pebakeheaes

2 MeQuillin on Wasldna’ Cocsentionk 572 (2nd ed.

RE he Senda ci pana ken ead spatesrsssvurseuesel 15

_Webster’s New Titeenetloun! Dietionary ane Ea. ‘Un-

abridged) (1987) ..-.-..ceeeequereeeeeeesees 9a.

IN THE

, Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, A. D. 1941.

sf

zs No. 706

CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, BOARD

OF HEALTH OF .THE CPTY OF CHICAGO, DR.

ROBERT A. BL ACK, Health C ‘ommissioner and

A@ting President of the Board of — of the C ity of

Chicago,

af * Petisionors:

v8.

-FIELDCREST:. DAIRIES, INC.,

| 0 . © Respondent.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT, THERE HEARD ON APPEAL FROM THE

“UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. FOR THE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN . DIVISION.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT .

© STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Regarding the reasonablesiess: -of the ordinance, ‘peti-

tioners fail to state that the Master in Chancery who heard :

the evidence found (R. 1734) :

‘‘There is, in my opinion, strong basis for-a finding

. that plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the

*

2

ae a |

evidence that its containers are meritorious and should -

be. permitted to be used. 4

Both courts below, sitting in Illinois and being familiar *

with Mlinois law, were in agreement ‘that the state Milk

Pasteurization: Act of 1939 withdrew from the City of

. Chicago the power to prohibit, as, ‘distinguished from

regulate, plaiftiff’s single service. containers.

The District Court held that the ordinance was un-

reasonable, | ‘and therefore invalid, under Illinois law, if -

- construed to prevent thes use of paper milk bottles .as

. Petitioners argue it’ their brief -

(pp. 34-36) that the Circuit Court of Appeals also held..

J

- standard milk bottles’

that the ordinance was unreasonable. That Court, after

holding that the City of Chicago -had no.power to enforce

the’ ordinance prohibiting paper_m milk bottles after the

passage of the Milk Pasteurization Act of 19: 39, sti ted:

" * Havi ‘ing thus concluded we find no occasion to dis-

cuss at length or decide other controverted questions

as to the validity of the ordinance.’

In view of this statement, it is difficult toeagree with the

petitioners that the Circuit Court’ of Appeals actually de-

cided that the ordinance was invalid’ for-unreasonableness,

but we can freely’ concede that the comments made in the

majority opinion do not in any way disapprove the find-

ing of the .Distriet Court on this issue. .

One of the points on which- we rely in this Court is

that the plaintiff's paper milk bottle is a ‘‘standard milk

” hotile”’ and, is therefore tiot prohibited by section 3094

of the Chicago ordinances.. The trial court so held, but. .

this holding was disapproved by the ireuit Court of

Appeals.- We believe that considerations not adequately

presented to that court, but whieh will be found in our |

_ Point IV, Selow, indicate that the trial. court. was correct

in fmding that. the container is a standard milk bottle.

*

*~

\

3 . i °?

The trial sides considered the oar exhibits

for’ several months and then found that respondent’ s

single- -service containers present: “no new or. unusual

-health hazard’* (R,-1752) and that respondent’s single-

service containers ‘‘confogm with the sanitary ‘and health °

ay are of the city ordinances of the City = Chi-

o”’ (R. 1753).

et trial court also found that **the evidenee shows that

they are safe and sanitary containers in ‘which milk may

be delivered. The uncontradicted evidence shows also

- that containers and receptacles less meritorious in struec- |

ture and design from those of plaintiff’s are in daily

- ouse in the City of Chicago for the sale of milk, chocolate

milk, ice cream, and other. liquids by drug’ stores, hotels,

restaurants and soda fountains. . . The dispensing of such ©

articles—ineluding milk and milk’ products—in pape? con-

tainers is not, as shown by the evidence, deemed to create

any hazard to, the publie health’? (R. 1752-1753).

We respectfully contend that in- determining the mean-

‘ing and validity of the ordinanze in question and the effect —

_ of the 1939 Milk Pasteurization Act enacted by the legis-

- lature, the Circuit Court of Appeals and the trial court

, Were bound to decide the issues of law according to the

law of Illinois as pronounced. by legislative action and by

the decisions of the Supreme Court of the State. Vanden.

bark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co:, 311- U.S. 538, 543. Adopt-

ing the rule set forth in ‘this decision, the Circuit Court of

Appeals and the trial court found the issues of law in favor

‘ of, the respondent and we submit that their decisions are in

harmony with the law of the State of Illinois.

4

®& ::

eS

; The Ordinance Is Repugnant to the Lore of 1934 3

and Is Therefore Invalid.

[Answer to ‘Petitioners’ Brief, pp. 12 to 33 |

"The city contends (pp. 17-22) that the: Illinois Milk Pas-

: teurization Act of 1989 (Il. Rev. Stat. 1939,\¢. 564, pars.

115-134) did nof—contrary to the opinion of both courts

below—withdraw from the City of °C hicago the power to

prohibit the use of paper bottles. We strongly contend

that it did, and that the trial court, as ‘a Federal Court, .

was bound to and properly did, gfve effect to the state

law, although it was enacted during the pendency of the

suit. Vandenbark v. ‘Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S

No Illinois case interpreting the statute involved has

been cited and so far as we krew no Illinois court has

passed on it. We agree that the Kederal Courts, in whic ‘h.

the present suit was pending, were entirely competent to

. decide the question of Illinois law and that this. Court is

likewise - eqmpetent. to decide the’ question of local law if

it is¢willing to add or substitute its judgment for. that, of #

the courts below. os gf [4

FE

On pages 31-34 of their brief. the petitioners show ‘that.

there is nothing in Railroad ‘Commission of ¢ Texas v, Pall.

man’ Co., 312 U. 8S. 496 (1941) or in Hawks v. Hamil, 288

U. 8. 52 (1933) which should preclude a decision of the

question of local law by, a Federal Court. The only -con-

« e ;

= . We

-_->

o

te

5 : es

_ trary intimation, that has ever., zbeen ee in this case

appeared i in the petition for certiorari (pp, 36-38) and in

_ petitioners’ reply to our answer (pp. 3-4), and we can

therefore agree with the statement on page 31 of the peti-

- tioners’ present brief :

“The position of the petitioners: on this aspect of ©

‘the case requires an explanation.”

o

Jurisdiction of the Federal Court wis invoked in .the

*present case solely because of diversity. of citizenship

and we know of nothing in any decision of this Court -

in any way disabling the District Court or the Circuit

Court of. Appeals from deciding as a matter ‘of local law

the effect to be given to an Illinois statute: passed while

suit was pending. The fact that the statute was passed

while suit was pending is sufficient proof that plaintiff did

not select the forum with its. eye to a favorable ruling as

‘to the meaning of the statute. :

The construction of the statute being one of local law,

we think that the recent opinion of this. Court in thé case

of MacGregor, Jr. \.- State ‘Mutual Life Assurance Com-

pany of Worcester, Massachusetts, (No. 179, Octobet-ferm,.

1941, decided February 16, 1942), might well be adopted.

in the present case, There, after allowing certiorari and

hearing oral arguments, this Court filed the following

per curiam opiiion : (eer Se ae Ry

. _‘* Petitioner brought this action to recgve er the premi-

um of adife annuity contract purchased. by his decedent.

The sti Was begun in a state: court. ot Michigan, but

was removed, because of diversity of citizenship, to the

United. States District Court, for the Eastern’ District

of Michigan. Petitioner’s claim is founded ‘on the ap-

plicability of Michigan legislation regulating the con-

. duct _of insurance business in Michigan. The District

Courg held‘ that. ‘the contract involved herein having

grey executed outside the State of — the

"Es

\

ee ‘No decision of the Supreme Com, of Michigan,

- or of any other court of that State¢onstruing the +

6

statutes of the State of. Michigan relied. upon by thes

plaintiff. are not applicable.’ Accordingly judgment

went against petitioner. This judgment: was aflirmed

— Circuit Court of Appeals, 119 F. 2d 148°. |

relevant Michigan law has been brought ‘to our atten- ,

. tion. In the absence of such auidannk we shall leave

undisturbed the interpretation placed upon. purely -

local law by a Michigan federal judge of long ex,

perience and by three circuit judges en circuit:

includes Michigan.’’ Affirmed. -

/ the present casé. the trial ‘sages was: for many years

a lawyer of the IHinois bar, was an assistant attorney .

general of the State, president of the Illinois Constitu-

tional Convention of 1920, and a member of the Federal

' district bench since’ 1929. The author:of the majority |

opinion -of the Cireuit Court of Appeals likewise was ar —

« Illinois practitioner of long standing. (having been ,ad-

mitted to the Hlinois bag in 1910) ‘and was a replesite

tive in Congress and a Federal district judge before his

elevation to the Circuit Court of Appeals. | er:

The concurring judge in the Cireuit Court<of Appeals, -

»galthough not a member of the Illinois bar, has since 1929

‘been a member of the Cfreuit Court of Appeals. of the 7th.

“ Circuit, which disposes ‘yearly of a Jarge number of- cases

“earising in’ Ulinois and which itself sits in Illinois. In

fairness, it must-also bé said that the judge dissenting in

the Cireuit Court of Appeals has been judge of the, East-

ern District of IHinois since 1922, and had_ previously

been a practicing attorney in Ilfinois since 1904. We

think that the presence of a dissenting opinion does noth-

ing more than raise a doubt as to. the proper interpreta-

tion of the Illinois law. which should be resolved in favor -

of the sovereign state as done: by the other three judges.

‘

?

v

7

of the two courts below who held views contrary to the -

dissenting opinion.

We mention the personnel ‘of the courts belo ow who |

passed upon this case because of. the reference in ‘the

MacGregor opinion to ‘‘a Michigan federal judge of long

-experience and by three circuit judges: whose cirtuit in-

eludes Michigan.’’

We assume that this ‘Court looks not ofily to the spe-.

‘ cific qualifications of the personnel of the, courts below

but also to the fact that they as courts,dealing frequently

und jntimately with matters peculiarly of local law are

presumed to be competent. to decide such questions cor-

rectly. We felt that tliese eohsiderations: were relevant

reasons why this Court need not grant the petition for

certiorari in this case and we nog feel that upon a fuller”

; examination of the “case they will be found to be cas .

reasons for an affirmance.

We submit that in case,.of doubt whether certain

power lies with the sovereign state or with its instru-

mentality, a proper regard for the relationship between

.the Federa) courts. and the sovereignty of the state dic-

‘tates that such doubt bé resolved in favor of tne sovereign

° >

rather than in favor of its instrumentality, such as a

municipality. In the absence of authoritative decision of ..

the question by a state court, expediericy requires that

the doubt be resolved in ‘favor of the sovereign rather

than in favor of the creature. of the sovereign. Should

the decision of a doubtful question in favor of the crea-

ture be contrary to later. decision of the. question by a-

state-court, the Federal. court will in the interim have

permitfed the mere instrumentality of the sovereign to

delay the carrying out of state policy. Less harm ‘taf® °

. ° 6” ;

result from a decision in favor -of the sovereign than one

_ hak oe

“

in favor of its instrumentality.. All: doubts should be re-

solved in favor of the unimpeded action of the sovereign.

state -and no surrender of power by the sovereign to its

instrumentality should be implied by a Federal court..

Therefore, unless the decision be too.c! ar for argu-

ment, the question whether the power remains with’ the

sovereign state or has been surrendered to its instrumen-

tality ought to be decided by a Federal court in,favor

of the sovereign state. Of course, the petitioners here

contend ‘that the decision, whether it Has the power to

prohibit paper milk bottles, which the sovereign state

has legalized is too clear for doubt? Their position would

be more impressive had not both courts below held pre-

cisely contrary to the petitioner's’ contention.

In passing, it should be said that the attempt on the

rt of the petitioners to make it appear that the ‘Circuit

Court of Appeals bas taken some power away from the

state legislature of Lilinois is entirely fallacious. Peti-

tiongts say (Brief, p. 30):

“The boundary bétween the fields of state and loca)

. regulations may not be clearly defined. The decision -

- of the Cireuit Court of Appeals in effect takes away

from the state legislature the power to fix the-boun-

dary and the court, in the exercise of its function to

construe statutes, assures the power itself.’’

The Circuit Court of Appeals did not hold that the matter

_ was beyond the power of the legislature, but simply held

that in the exercise of its power the state. Jegisiature had

established a “public policy for the state which prohibited,

the enfore vement of an ordinauce outlawing what the state

legislature had approved. Thé. petitioners’ real complaint

is not that the decision of the Cireuit-Court of Appeals |

took any power away from the: legislature, but that the

court wrongly construed the language.of-the legislature

, /

- /

fh

in exercising its undoubted legislative power. The de-

cision takes nothing from the power of the state legisla-

ture. It does take away from the cify the power to defeat,

by prohibiting paper milk bottles, the liberal and progres-

sive attitude of the state toward the use under proper

regulations of modern centainers for milk.

~The courts below properly decided that adequate pro-

tection of the sovereign power of the State of Illinois and

- the realization of its objectives in passing the Milk Pas-

teurization Act of 1939 required a holding that its: crea-

ture, the City of Chicagd, had not been left with the

power to defeat such objectives by prohibiting the use of

paper containers in the sale-of-milk. Such a holding’ does

not improperly take away power from the state. It actu-

ally reinforces and pyotects the power of the state from

impairment by judicial implication from doubtful lan--_

guage contained in an ambigtious statute. In this holding

of the Cireuit Court of Appeals we firtd jo refusal by

that court-—**in effe ot’? or otheywise—to/give full recog-—

inition to the power of the state - legisfature.

The consideration by the petitioners of the effect of the -

Milk Pasteurization Act of 1939 on the po of the City

of Chicago to prohibit the use of single servide containers

for the sale of milk is prefaced by a- discussion of certain

preliminary matters which we shall refer to e in the

order in which they appear in petitioners’ brief.

(1) In the first place, a municipal corporatéon, in

dilinois, may exercise only such power as is eonferred

“upon it by the’ state legislature. Doubt concerning the -

existence of a power or whether such power has been

withdrawn is resolved against the municipality. ° The

doctrine of ‘“home- rule’’ has received no recognition.

The City of Chicago has nd inherent eowde It is a

rea

“-~

o.., ay

creature of the General Assembly. To. prohibit any article,

it must be able to point to a state statute giving it power

to do%o. Furthermore, grants of power to municipalities

are strictly construed. This is’ established by a long line

of.cases, has been the subject of frequent public criticism

by the distinguished corpetation counsel of Chicago, Mr.

Barnet. Hodes, but continues to be the law of Illinois, con.

trolling in this Case (Bullman, v. City of Chicago, 367 I ;

217 W937}): 9 as, oe

Hodes, Law and the Medern City” (1987) says (py. 36,

38): : ; . rs

“Over and over, IHinois Supreme Court has

clung to the traditioual View of all jurisdictions, and.

has declared:.A city ‘may exercise only such powers

as are expressly del legated to it by the Jegislature and

such as, are necessarily implied from those expressly

given. "And also: ‘A city ‘possesses no inherent power.’

Time and again, cities have attempted, first by one

device ‘and then by another, to break through the

barrier set up by these interpretations. But . thers

lias heen little success in this direetion."’,

*’ ‘* So. i . .

‘In applying the rule of strict construction wht

ever cities claim the right to exercise certain powers,

the courts are following a well settled principle which,

as much qs anything else, hamstrings municipalities

This rule; as reiterated in Arms v City of Chicago.

[314 dil. 316) a 1924 casesis:

-** *Statutes which grat powers to municipal

corporations are strictly construed, and any fair

or reasonable doubt of the existence of such pow:

ers is resolved against the municipality which

claims the right to exercise them.’”’ ;

* The author's pre face e states:

“The author, of course; accepts full responsibility for the

views aes Psi he in no Way express any official

| aad’

=

a oe

11 ’

The Illinois rule was stated thus in City of Chicago v

Murphy, 313 I, 98 (1924), (at p. 101):

‘Cities may exercise only such powers as are ex- ;

pressly delegated to them’ by the legislature. The

legislature is vested with all powers not taken from

it hy the State or Federal constitution. Many of its

powtrs may be delegated by it to the cities created by

its act. . Cities “are creatures of the legislature and

derive tlieir existence therefrom. They have no inher-

ent powerse All powers of cities are derived from

acts ef the legislature. The fact that the legislature

has the power to enact a law does not confer that

power upon city councils but the same must be by

legislative act conferred.” |

In Consumers Co. v. Cito Chicagh, 313 Hl. 408 (1924)

the Supreme “Court of Ilinots has expressed the rule in

the following language (pp., 411-412) :--—. - .

ae ‘municipal corporation possesses: and can exer- |

tise the following powers, and no others: First; those

grated ‘in spt words; second, those necessarily -

implied in or ineident to the powers ‘expressly granted ;

and third, those essential to the .Accomplishment of

the declared objects and purposes of the. corporation,

not simply ‘convenient but indispensable. (fluesing

v. | ity of Rock Estland, 128 Mi. 465; 1 Dillon on Mun.

Corp.- 5th ed.—see, 237.) Any fair oF reasonable

doubt concerning the existence of the - power must

be resolved against the municipality and the power

- denied. (19 R. C. L. 769; City of Chicago vy. M.

Hotel Co., 248 Ill. 264; City of Chicago v. Pet

| 267 id. 573. Ae

ae .

~

a municipal-

are strictly con-

ho corollarigs to the rule that the power

ity come from/the General Assembly

s{rued are the

- exercise a powér, inconsistent with any Act‘of the General

Assembly or with the public policy declared by it and

(2) the power granted by the “General Assembly may be

Tag

one, .

rules that (1) a npinicipality. may not - °

i

12.

withdrawn or curtailed at the will of that body. The

General Assembly may resume at any time the power

previcusly delegated to a sacisinisla'ty, and this, of course, n

may be done by unplication. Rae |

This doctrine of municipal law is also well stated by

the -distinguished corporation counsel of the City of

Chicago in Law and the Modern Ciy (Hodes, 193%, p. 44)

as. follows:

‘*‘We have seen, up to this point, how two salient

principles are invoked to restrict cities—the principle —

of expres§ authority trom the state, and the cangn of

strict construction aguiust the city.. Suppose a city,

-uv its efigrt to control its” own destiny sails by those

two Shoals. Is it then safe in the sea of state control?

Hardly. Ahead is a rew reef.

‘*The new peril is the principle that if the state sees

fit to exercise ‘power in its own name over an activity,

the city ‘is at once thrust out of the picture. 8 is

the case even where Kay? city lias had jurisdiction_

. for generations and its’ right to exercise the power

has been heretofore firmly established. Application

sof this principle in Illinois has resulted in a gradual

whittlng away of many powers of cities, ranging in

’ importance trom control of beauty shops, to oe

of transportation aa and other utilities.’’ . ‘

~

+ In City, of Chicago v. Jensen, 331 Ill. 129 (1928), the

/ défendant was conv icted @f operating a beauty paflor with-

out a license, in violation of an ordinance of the City of

Chicago. Prior to this conviction a state statute went into

_ effect, providing for the regulation of. beauty culture. . On

suppeal, the, judgment of conviction was reversed, the court

pointing out that the ordinance was inconsistent with the

~after-enacted statute. In discussing ‘prior decisions of the

Supreme Court, and the rule of law to be drayn there-

from, the court “said (p. 131): : NY fey aes

Jo

‘‘This court held that -while the legislature may .

_ delegate power to a municipality to grant a license

‘ 13

for a particular occupation and exact a license fee

therefor, it may at any time take away such power

and the State may. resume the exercise of the power;

that the legislature may repeal or amend any of the

provisions of the act for. the incorporation of cities °

and villages at pleasure, and if the provisions of the

' statute are inconsistent with the powers conferred on

the city, the statute will operate as.a repeal or. amend- /

ment of the powers so conferred upon the. city; that

- a city, as a subordinate political authority, cannot

. interfere with the validity or force of a license issued

by the State under a statute; that the statute controls ;

the whole subject matter. :

‘*The statute repealed ‘any power the city may have

had to regulate and license beauty eulture, the judg-

. ment convicting gs esr was erroneous, and it will.

be reversed.’’ :

tn a case well known in Illinois, Northern Trust Co. v.

* Chicago Rys. C'o., 318 Il. 402 (1925), holding that: the

~ Publi tilities act of Illinois repealed by implication the

power granted to tities and villages to regulate such

matters as headlights on street cars, it. was argued that .

since the ordinance requiring street cars to be equipped

. with brightly lighted headlights was passed prior to the

' enactment of the first Public Utilities act,’ the ordinanee

would not be abrogated until the Comiaiesiin had taken

some action under the statute inconsistent with the ordi-

nanee, The court said (p. 412):

“*When the first Public Utilities act came /into forée,

on January 1, 1914, the power of the cif over the

subject rattes of that act ceased to exist, and it could

not thereafter pass new ordinances or enforce exist-

ing ordinances with reference to matters ‘within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Utilittes Commis-

sion. The power to enforce-proceeds from.the present

or existing power or authority to enact or to provide.

A municipality carinot be said to possess the power —

to enforce an ordinance concerning a subject upon

which it has lost the power to pass the ordinance.

o

a oo

Any attempt, to entorse in =a a situatio would be

defeated by interposing the act withdrawing the/ mu-

nieipality’ ’s power to enact.’ ;

In the early case of VV rilleie v. “City of Chicago: 188 Ill.

‘444 (1900), a Chicago ordinance required persons desiring

te work as plumbers to obtain a license and pay an annual ¢ —

license fee of $30.00.- ‘Shortly theregfter the legislature

of Illinois passed an act. providing that persons, desiring

to engage in the business of plumbing should be examined

as to their -qualificatiors by a board. created.for that

_ purpose and that successful applicants should receive

certificates. In a,suit to restrain the enforcement of the Ks

~ ordinance on the -two-fold ground that (1) thé city was.

without power to license the business of plumbing, and

(2) even if it had such power, the ordinance was in con-

fiict with the later statute, and hence ‘invalid, the Supreme

Court affirmed a deerée restraining tlie enforcement of

the ordinance. . ae

After pointing out that the power of the city to license

_ the décupation of. plumbing was, at least, very doubtful,

the court said (yp. $5 2-453) +

“*While the legislature may delegate the power to

municipalities to grant a license for a partieular occu

Q pation and to exact a license fee, they may, at any

time, take away. such power or resume the exércise

of it thems ely es. The legislature may repeal-or amend

- any proyision of the act for the incorporation of

cities. ayid villages at their pleasure, and if the pro-

visions of the act ef 1897 are inconsistent. with the,

_power claimed by the city, they will operate as a

repeal or amendment of the charter to that, extent.

* By this law-the legislature have prese ribed the

test which shall enable a person to engage in the

- business of plumbing, and the city, by its proviso, has

prescribed another and additional test. The legisla-

ture, by the law, say he is authorized. to: work at his

trad& throughout the State if he has the” required —

?

15

certificate. The city of Chicago, b¥ the previso to the.

_ * ordinance passed in pursuance of that law, says that

_* he shall not work at his trade in that city except by:

) spaying $30 additional and receiving another license.

“The city, as a subordinate political authority, cannot |

“interfere with the validity or force of the license

issued by its board under the law.. That these pre

. Visions are inconsistent is plain,

The force aiid log&. of thissdecision is ineseapable. It is

clearly determinative of the invalidity of the prohibition

of paper bottles which the City of Chicago seeks to enforce

and thereby forbid what the superior’ political authority

approves and permits. The majesty of the state law ap-

plies to Chicago ordinances now with the same force as it

did forty years ago. — ale ‘

The texts on the subject .of municipal legislation an-

‘nounce the same rulg. See 2 McQuillin on Municipal Cor-

poration, 572 (2d. ed. 1988), quoted by: the. Circuit Cou

of Appeals. Sota

"In 43: Corpus Juris, 21 5-217, ** Municipal Kiepicatens,*

the additional rile is stated that a municipal ordinance °

- must not conflict with the public policy of the state as

‘determined by the state legislature, thus:

‘*Since a municipal corporation is a creature ef the

state,- continuing its existence “under .the sovereign

will and pleasure of the state, possessing such powers

and sich only as the state confers upon it, subject

to addition or diminution of power at the: state’s su-.

_preme discretion, municipal regulations must not di-

rectly or indirectly contravene the general law, nor

can such regulations be repagnant ta, the policy of

the state as declared in general legislation.’’ (Italics

ours. )/ .

The Hlinois cases are uniformly to the same “ ellect.

In City of Chicago v: Union. Ice Cream Mfg. Co., 252

Ti 311 (1911), gs by the abmeek re (Brief, pp. 12- 13)

A

“

*

i

P

oa 16 ; & i ©

the Suprenre Court passed upon the validity of Section

1160 of the Municipal Code of Chicago which then pro-

vided for a penalty | of not less than seca en more than

$100.00 fine for any ‘person who sold or’ offered for sale

any impure or adulterated food. A statute, the Pure

Food Act of July 1, 1907, enacted two years after Section

1160 of the Municipal Code Was- passed, provided for a

greater nalty. In sustaining the oo as valid the

court sajd {p. 313); es

ee

Me laws of.the stat operate. w thine eglimats of

municipal corporations the. same as else é, unless

otherwise. clearly provided by municipal charters or

statute, Local-laws and requlations are at all times

subject to fhe paramount authority of the legislature.’

sae ours.)

.

*.

In the last paragi raph of this decision’ the Supreme

Court used the felloting lanzuage which is indeed ap-

plicable to the ordinance here, saying at p. 315:

: -**Municipal aufherities cannot,’-under a_ general

grant of — such as artiele 5 of ‘the City- and,

Village act, adopt ardinances which infringe the spirit

of a State law or are repugnant to the policy ef the

- State-as declared hy déneral legislation, but the police

regulations of a municipality miy differ from those |

of the State upon the same subject, if they are not

inconsistent therewith. (McPherson v. V illage of Che--

banse; 114 Ill. 46.) Phis ordinance does. not. prohibit

‘ what the statute permits. While the’ ordinance -at-

taches .a less petialty for its violation than. does the

- statute, we find ‘no réepugnancy ‘between them. The

general policy under both is the same. ” (Italies ours. )

z

we The pertinent “not Ne in this decision is ‘‘this ordi

nance does ‘not prohibit what the ‘statute permits.’’ ‘Obvi-

ARE is the test to be applied when ¢ an ordinane e and

state statute are to be construed. .

In City of Chicago v. Drogasawacz, 256 Ill. 34 (1912) the

‘

.

7

7

re

. regulation of the- bread and bakery: business .by ordinance

Aa

9

was involved. The principal question was the right of the

3 city under the state statutes to enact the bakery ordinance.

~The ordinance was sustained as valid, not. being in con-.

flict wath the statute, aid on page 37 the. Court said:

“Municipal ordinances must “be in harmony with

the s assay laws of-the’State (City of Chicago v. Union

Ice Qream Mfg. Co., 262 Til. 311), but this ordinance

es Wet in any way conflict with the State law.’

S Ge

Again, in the cane of City of Marengo v. Rowland, 263

Il. 531 #1914) the court held an ordinance -of the City of

Marengo requiring the closing of Kither shops on Sunday

invalid and again stated on page 534:. -

-**Municipal ‘authorities, dihex a ae grant. of

powey, cannot: sir ordinances which imfringe ‘the

Sie City of Clinton v. Wilson, [297 Ill. 580] supra.) The

Qublie poli¢y of the State is found in its constitution.

Soigy 25 Fg “t oe. poe ve. as., Seagate

and statutes, and, when they are-silert, in its judicial -

decisions and the constant practiée of its public of

ficials.’’ (Italies ours.) a '

We. submit’ that if, as the court said in these decisions,

pae:7 a get “ a Ae Te

a city cannot adopt-an. erdinanee infringing the {spirit: of

a state law, then it egrteimly cannot by any process of

reasoning, enforce one! Since the lewis! ature has clearly

s, expressed - ‘the public policy of Tilinois on. Itealth and the

use of - single servicé milk containers, such public policy

is not to he renderéd inoperative by ordinances or regu->

“dations of a city repugnant % it whether passed before « or

after’such statute.

In City of Lewistown w.- Harrison, 282 Til. 461 (i918)

the-Illinois Supreme Court held that an ordinance which

‘prohibited the barter, exchange or ‘sale. of. intoxieating

©

ae

r

Os 18

liquor’ was ich by the Illinois Cities and. Villages

- Act, which gave to niunicipalities the power to prohibit the

sale of such liquors. To make more definite _and specific

by ordinance what, is provided by general legislation is -

| ‘not a, violation of statute, but merely makes its applica-

tig more certain. But if the ordimance were in: conflict

with the spirit of state law, with public policy or incon-

-sistent with the. language of the stitute, then it would’ be

invalid. The rule was ‘clearly expressed hy “the court in

the LoheN ie word’ @. Hay: Saeed

sate A municipality may-by ordinanee restrict, rezu-

late and prohibit the same acts which are punishadly

and penalized under the law of. the State, so far as

authorized so to do by law, It may make more definite

, , {

regulations than are “ns@filly provided by general leg-

islation and enforce them by appropriate penalties.

It xannot, however, adopt ordinances which infringe

» the sprit of a State law or are repugnant to the pol-—

wy of the State as eelared by -general legislation,

but the police regulations of a city may differ from

those: of the State on the same subject if not incon-

sistent therew ith. ”*. (Italies onrs.)

é 4 ‘

? The fundamental Pin Rt in the Chicago erainance in

question is. thi it it prohibits (if construed as petitioner's

contend) what the statute in_erpress terms pe rmits. It :

not an effort to fill in the details of a broad, gentral ste

ute. To adept and enforce a‘corstruction prohibiting 7

use of singlé-we, rrice contdimers woyld re$ult. in nullifying

a provision-of the statute, which is the paramount regula-

tion. Legislatures are not subservient to: nvanie ipalities in

ro cMiied public policy. ; ‘ ae eae

{ @mstrnine Section 28 of the fiineis Prohibition.

se and an ordinance enacted b¢ the City of Litchfield

which prohibited ‘the manufacture and sale ‘of intoxicating

liquer, the Sripreme & ourt of Mlindis in sts 3 of Litch fi 7 |

&

E . : a

‘ . % . >

: & «

. 19

ae : a ; Po . i ; ;

v. Thorworth, 337 Tll. 469 (1929) pointed out that the

“eity was. bound by the ‘definition of intoxicating liquor

contained in the statute and had no authority to prohibit .

the sale, of liquor not prohibited by the statute. At page

405. the court said: | Tie

“Section 2 ofthe Prohihition Act defines the phrase

‘intoxicating liquor.’ It is the ‘sale*of liquor of the -

kind specified in-the statute that is prohibited. The

statute confers: authority on municipal corporations

to prohibit by ordinance the'sale of the kind of. liquor

prohibited by the statute. The municipality is bound —

-by th™definition contained in the statute and cannot

* prohibit: the sale of liquor uot prohibited hyo the

statute.” (Italies ours. ) “8 ; es

It. is clear bey ond perady enture fromthe foregoing cases

that the City of Chicago has no inherent power, that its

power to regulate milk con es from the State, that, the

“State has the right to take that power away before or

after the enactment of the city’s ordinances, that the ordi-

,°naneces must .not be in conflict. with the previsions -of .the

"+ State statutes, and that the city has no right to prahibit

what a ‘state statute or valid rules and regulations adopted

pursuant thereto -permit. | ae

It will be well to bear in mind those genefal rules in

considering. the ‘saving clause’? which the City reltés. on,

namely, Section 19 of the Att. Before passing to a dis-"

cussion of that questions We wish to call the Court’s atten-

tion to another limitation on the power of the city shown

by the case of City, of Rockfoyd v. “Ihe ¥f. 368, HH. 526 (1937).

In that case it was held that the ¢ fix of Rockford had no

power (under the same sections of the Statute. that the.

. City of Chieago is -retving on inthe present ease) to.

prohibit the sale in Rockford of ice cream mainfactured

in Sterling, THinois(and Dixon, Illinois; by requiring a

license finvolving’ an inspection of the factogies by Rock.

Td

e.

ford inspectors) as a conditién precedent’ to such sale.

This is the latest word of the’ Dlinois courts on the sub-

ject. The Court said (p. 530) ;

“Th [linois, a-city. organized under the ‘Cities and

Villages act has such. powers, only,.as are, therein

_ expressly delegated by the Genéral Assembly or nec-

" essarily ‘implied to render the grant of” specific powers

effective’*:

cand (p. 531) :

‘Legislative. powers of. mia 0 corporations are

. strictly censtrued, and any rational. doubt as to the.

existence of power must be resolved - against the

municipality.”* (Ttalies ours.)

&

e Court then concluded (pp. "533-334) :

“Tn short, the issue. is whether: plaintiff, the City

of Rockford, may require ice cream factories, located

- in other cities, to, meet sanitary requirements. pre-

~ _ seribed. by -the former city in order to entitle them to

Rockford licenses upon ‘payment of. the annual fee

for inspection of their plants: 8

_ “Municipalities have go-extra- territorial jurisdic-

& tien éxcent por do as-@t is expressly or impliedly

delegated -by statuf (55 A. L. R. 1183; City of Chi-

cago v. Brent, 356. Hi. 40; Strauss v. Town. of Pontiac,

40 id. 301. } An inherent or implied limitation upon

the city in the exercise of the powers delegated to it

"by, the legislature is thaf such powers’ shall be exer:

eised within the corporate. boundaries of the munici-

-palities. 3 Shiu

_ + . 5 a ; roe Re ”

“The legislature has not dslemated power to ‘mu.

‘nicipal. corporations to pass a regulatory and ‘license

ordinance, which ‘assumes ‘to regulate ice cream fac-.

tories outside their corporate limits. The. provisions -

which plaintiff admits extend to icé cream factories

in other cities are so inseparably connected with:

other provisiéns applicable. locally. as to’ render the

entire enactment void.”’ ,

: ‘

dt is clear under this case that control of the -re-

spondent’s plant_at Chemung, McHenry: County, Jlinois,

is exclusively within the jurisdiction cf-the Department of

. °. af i " a, ) . %

g r

Se oe

Sg a

* : }

Sf es

Health: of the State a Illinois and ‘that the’ State statute

(Petitioner’s brief, Appendix A, p. 80) relating to pas-

teurized milk which provides, in part, ‘that all pasteurized

milk shall be placed in its final delivery containers at ‘the

_ plant, that bottling or packaging of milk shall be done

“at the place of pasteurization : by” ‘approved , mechanical

equipment, and that it,shall be unlawful for ‘any person

to sell or serve any pasteurized miik ex¢ept> in the onig-

inal containey in which it was placed at the point of ©

* pasteurization, contemplates the approval of the State De-

partmem of Health of respondents’ operations and equip-

- ment ‘without’ requiring the approval of the ~~ of

| Chicago. . : ire

~ It is further apparent that if, after. the -state. has

approved: respondent’ s plant and equipment for packag-

ing milk in paper bottles, only, and has prohibited. the

respondent from selling its milk” in ‘any containets other

. than those in which it was placed: at the point of pas-

teurization, the City of Chicago is perthitted to step that

_ milk at- its eity limits and forbid its “sale, the city is

‘thereby pahen te to exercise iiidireetly an extra-terri-

-torial power over the respondent’ s plant and equipment

which the Hey case expressly forbids. “The City-of Rock-—

ford was therein. deriied power to prohibit, by an inspec-

7 tion” requirement, the-sale in t Rockford of. ice cream 1 made

elsewhere. |

It is important to ‘alles this geographical division of

authority _ between the State of Illinois and the City of:

-Chiedgo, because the sole reliance of the. City of Chicago ce

for its power ‘is on cases like Koy v. City of Chicago, 263 _

~) TIL 122; City of Chicago v. Bowman. Dairy Co., 234 IN.

204, and City of Chicago v.Union Ice’ Cream Co., 252 Til.

3H, Where. the: pasteurizing or ‘manufacturing plant was

located within the. confines of the City of Chicago.

— (2) It i is true, as the petitioners: contend (Brief, p. 12),

22 |’

that there is no ‘constitutional objection to regulation of

the same subject by statute and ordinance. Aside. from

the ‘constitutional question this rule ‘is subject to .the

qualification that the ordinance must be-in larmony With

the statute and with state policy; in the event of. conflict

or inconsistency the ordinance must give way. This quali.

fication of the rule is elaborated in City of Chicago ¥.

Union Ice Cream: Co., 252 Ni). 311 (1911), from which

both the petitioners and we have quoted.

(3) On the question of: the powers of municipalities °

[Petitioners* Brief, pp.-13-17], in Illinois, to Peru the .

sale and distribution of milk, it should be adde«

regulation must be reasonable and that whether “2

ticular’ regulation ‘is or is ‘not reasonable is a jadicial’

‘question. In Noy vy. C ity of Chicago, 263 Til. 122 (1914),

from: which the defendants have quoted extensively the

‘Court said’ (p. > Pee : ae, aoe

Bay hen -the legis: iture has authorizéd a city coun-

cil 16 pass ordinances upon any subject, the. power

thus conferred must he reasonably exercised. Whether -

its exercise in a particular case is reasonable is a

judicial question, and an unreasonable ordinance will

be held veid by the cqurts.’ : : wen

In- City of Chicago v. C. & N- W. Ry € O, 279, Tl. 30

(1916), the court, in holding unreasonable and therefore

invalid, a section of the ‘milk ordinance of the City of

‘Chicago, said (p. 38): :

“The city couficil has authority to pass ordinances -

regulating this question, and the question of regula-

tion, in the first. instanee, rests. with the municipal

: authorit! ‘s, but whether its exercise in a particular

* @ase is reasonable is a judicial question. There must

be some logi¢al connection between the object: sought

to be accomplished by..such an ordinance and _ tlie

means ptesecribed to ‘accomplish the end. An un

_ reasonable ordinance will be held void by the Courts.”’

* (Citing cases.)

Po

} i .

We _emphasize at: this point, the necessity that an ordi-

nance be reasonable.’ Whether tit particular ordinance

now in question is a reasonable exercise by the City -of ©

its power to regulate certain aspecjf of. the milk industry’

in the interest of. the public as

elsewhere in detail (Points II and Til, infra). .The asser-

tion of the city that it had power ‘‘to regulate. every de-

tail of the milk industry” (Brief, p: 15) prior to the .

- enactment of the Milk Pasteyrization Act, and that .it had

', power to prohibit the use of single service containers, is

sumptio which this suit was originally etait to: -

allenge.

(4) The assertion (Petitioners’ Brief, pp. 16.17) that

the ordinance. required the use of: glass‘ containers—

under the. construction placed by the Circuit Coutt~of

Appeals on the phrase ‘‘standard milk bottles’

“treated. fully under Point IV and the applicable rite~of

law -is discussed. It is sufficient here to point out that

under a more recent decision of. the Supreme Court of

Illinois than that cited to and relied on by the. Ciréeuit .

~ Court of Appeals the meaning of legislative language is

not static. The fact, therefore, that single service con-

tainers were not in general use on January 4, 1935,—

the date of the enactment of ~the ordinance—and conse- -

quently: were not considered by the Ry! Council at that

phrase in. tarpreting the: ordinance oli. We ‘submit

that the correct interpretation of the ordinance was

adep‘ed by the District Court which found single service

containers to be “‘standard milk hottles”’.

is a matter we discuss- .

. 24

After pointing - -out‘ that Section ° 19 of. ‘the Milk Pas-

». teurization Law of 1939, is in the same language as’ the

title of the A. , the petitioners develop’ in detail their —

contention that, by ‘reason, of that section, *‘ whatever

aspects of the niik industry may be subjected to state-

wide regulation by the statute, cities and villages retain —

to the fullest extent every power that they had thereto:

fore’? (Petitioners” Brief, p. 19).-This-result is said to >

- be revealed by a t‘cursory reading of the saving clause’’

and ‘a detailed expesition of the language of the section

leaves no possible doubt’? (Brief, p. 19). |

Before discussing the analy sis or exposition of this sec-

tion of “the Milk Pasteurization. Act of 1939, and its effect

on the regulatoty” “powers © “of the City. of ‘Chicago. over

certain phases of the milk industry, that Act must. be con-

‘sidered. in relation to. previous “egislation. on the Same:

_ subject. Sy ee es

In 1925 the Gensial Nakemblo enacted “An ‘Act i in rela- -

& “-: to. ‘the pasteurization of milk-’. * (Smith- ard Mn. B::

1925, «. DOs, pars. 101- 113.) _ In 1935, this Act was

meat (Il R. S. 39387; 564, pars. 101-114).

amended it was in force until the enactment of the ne

ent statute, Section 20 of which: “prov ides :

amended. June 29, 1935 », is hereby repealed: ig

’ The earlier Act prov ided for application to, and issu-

ance by, the State Department: of Public Health, , of ai

Certificate of Approval to persons or firnis’ engaged in

operating ‘a pasteurization plant. who comply with the

provisions of. the Act. The Act imposed certain require-

ments with respect’ to the construction of such plants, for

—

‘‘The Act entitled ‘An Act in relation to the pas- —

. teurizatfion of . milk’, approved June 30, 1925, as -

oa

25

vertain apparatus: for siiblleai temperatures during pas-

teurization and for filter—tests-for-sediment—or stain. In~

addition, employees. in pasteurization. plants were required —

to furnish annually to the State’ Department of Health a -

‘medical certifieate showing them to be free of certain

specified diseases, and provision was made for an ‘‘auto-

‘mobile laboratory”? to enable the Department of Health

to make chemical and other scientific analyses. Upon

failure to comply with the requirements of the statute,

provision was made for revocation-of the certificate of ap-.

proval, and a penalty was fixed for violation thereof.. _

In 1939 the legislature enacted the present Milk Pas-

_teurization Act. The two Acts cover the same subject .

“matter, but in the present statute each provision is

treated with an. elaboration not, présent in the earfier ©

Act. New requirements are added and the old made" ‘More

stringent. oo

There is, moreover, anether major difference in the

Acts. What might be characterized as a * saving clause”’

in the. old Act, but which it wovld perhaps be more ac- °

curate to describe as an “‘exception,”! . prov ides :

‘‘The provisions of this Act do not apply to pas-"

teutization plants located in and furnishing milk or, .

milk products for constimption in ‘municipalities eon-

taining 500,000 or more inhabitants, according to the

last census, which have established a system of regu-

lation and inspection of the pasteurization plants

supplying milk for consumption in-such municipalities

or to any pasteurization plant which supplies milk or

milk products solely for consumption in such munici-

palities.’’ (Ill. B. S. 1937, C. 563, ‘‘Foods’’, par.

Ma) SS ® @ |

f _ The evident ‘purpose of this section was to exclude the

City of Chicago from ‘the operation of the statute, since’

no municipality in INinois, then or now, except Chicago,

m .

SS

‘

%

6

———

ie a eee

satisfied the population requirement. ‘Obviously, the legis.

lature, in 1925, in. first entering this field, was satisfied

‘that the pasteurization regulations. then in effect in Chi-

cago were not inadequate, though even at that date it is: .

noteworthy that the scope of the ‘exception was corifined |

to plants supplying products solely for consumption in

that City. Tk es

~The-Mitk Pasteuriiation Act Of. “1925 w was the first ai-

tempt by the State of Blinois to regulate the distribution

and. pasteurization ‘of milk. J t was neither. comprehensive

nor exhaustive and did not cover the field in detail. The : |

~ City of Chicago, alone of the municipalities in the State,

by the device of .population classification, was excluded

from the’ operation of the statute. The present. statute,

avhich’ repealed the Act of .1925, makes standards, more .

stringent. Additional requirements extend’ the seope of .

prior regulations. The utmost care is taken to include

all important details with reference to the sale and dis-

tribution, as well as the pasteurization, of milk and to

give the State Director of Health power to supplement

the requirements. The application of this Act is state:

‘wide. No municipality is exempted. It is immaterial that

a city or village may or may not have established a sys-

-.- teni of regulation and inspection. No longer does the City

ef ‘Chicago have the exemption * provided by the 1925

- statute. °° 3 .

The intention of the legislature that the Act is to be

effective throughout the state without territorial or other

limitation is apparent - from thet Seaange of. the statute

(sec. 2): ~

"Any person operating. a pasteurization plant who

. distributes, delivers‘ or . sells pasteurized milk: or

_ pasteurized qnilk products for consumption , in the

State of Illinois shall annually make application to

ee ae

the Department for a Certificate of Approval. ” (Ital-

ies ours.) ;

Section 3 provides :

SEE ee

‘*Any person who shall bereatter engage in operat-.

ing a pasteurization plant for the purpose ‘of dis-

tributin selling pasteurized milk or

oe pasteurized milk» products for. consumption in the

State of Illinois, shall before engaging in such .busi-

_ ness make application to the Department for a Cer-

tificate of Spptoral, ’? (Italics ours.)

Section, 9 -states: :

** Any person ‘selling, delivering or distritaiine anil

or milk products in the State of Tllinois.who shall

heat milk or milk products or subject milk or milk

products to other treatment in an effort to make the

milk or milk produets. safe for human ‘consumption

or to preserve its keeping qualities shall comply with

the provisions of this, Act.’ ’*. (Italies ours.) ;

_ Section 11 provides :

“No milk or milk products sold, distributed | or

delivered in this State shall be heated or subjected

to any other treatment hy ay effort to make it safy,

for hunian ‘consumption or. to! preserve its keeping

qualities unless such milk or milk. products are ~

* processed in compliance with fae _ provisions of this

‘Act.”’ (Italics ours.)

Other ‘sections of the “act indicate a recognition of sin- .

gle-service containers and show that the state has as- : |

sumed ‘control of the equipment for the packaging of. milk

and prohibited its sale except in containers filled: on such

equipment. at the pint of. pasteurization.

Section 8. provid OS :

‘All paste rinad milk sind milk products. shall be

placed in their final delivery containérs in: the plant.

in, which a are pasteurized. It met be unlawful

e

“ ae

.

. ~ °

2 . . “a °

‘

Ph Sak A \

for hetels, code fouttoties, restaurants, grocery stores,

milk depots, milk stations and similar establishments

to sell or serve ‘any pasteurized milky ‘milk _prod-

ucts except in the original container th hich it was

i placed at the point of pasteurization, provided that

this requirement. shall not apply ‘to milk or milk”

products consumed on the premises which — may he

served from the original container .or from a° dis-

penser approved by the Department for such service.

The sale or distribution of bulk, loose or’ dipped pas-

teurized milk or milk which has been heated within

the purview of this Act is hereby prohibited.”’

The first paragraph of Section 15 is as follows: ,

‘*Any pasteurization plant coming ‘under the pro-

-. ° Visions ef: this Act-shall conform with all of the. .-

: - +. following items of construction; equipment, mainte- .

| nance and operation and tn accordance with minimum

requirements adopted by the Director for interpreta-

tion and enforcement of this Act.”’ (Italies ours.) 9

‘Following and - as an integral part .of this section are

eertain items, including the following:

“Iteni 10. All multi-wse containers and equipment

-with which milk: or milk products come in contact

shall be constructed in such manner as to be easily

cleaned and shall’ be kept .in good repair. Single

service containers, caps, gaskets and similar articles

shall be*manufactured and transported in a sanitary

Se

manner. (Italics ours.) fon

‘Item 18. Bottling or packaging of milk and. milk

products shall be-done at.the place of pasteurization

by approved mechanical equipment.’ (Italies niga

- oO

tursuant to the power therein granted, the Director of .

the Illinois Department of Public Health has promulgated

“minimum reguérements’? for interpretation and enforee- .

ment offthis/ Act, providing, in part, as follows: :

‘*Satisfacgory compliance.—This item ; |

deemed to have been satisfied if: * * *

a a (9) All sengle-service containers, caps, gaskets and

- .

similar articles are manufactured and handled in

“accordance with requirements of the. Department.

(a). The buildings and rooms in which single-serv-

ice containers and container caps and covers are

manufactured, packed, stored, and handled shall be

clean, well lighted and ventilated, and free of dust

and flies, as prescribed in items’ ee "3, 4, 6, 7, 8

and 11. eet

(b) The average bacterial plate count m2 the stock

from which ‘single-service containers ‘and container -

caps and covers are made shall not exceed 100-col-

onies per gram. No substance shall be present in fin-

ished single-service containers and container mes.

‘and covers which is toxic.

(c) All operations of the fabrication slat EOE

during transportation .of the manufactured articles ©

- shall be so conducted as to reduce to a minimum the.

possibility of contaminating the manufaetured ar.

theles, as prescribed in items 13, 14-and 15.

(e). All single-service containers aud container’

caps and covers shall he so treated as to be as tm

pervious to milk and milk products as. precise.”

(Italics ours.) , . Lo

<

‘Section 16 of the statute is in part as follows:

“<The Department. may eitHer refuse to issue, or

“may refuse to renew, or may suspend, or may revoke

any certificate of. Approval. because of the violation-

‘of ‘any of the provisions of this Act or for any of

the following: causes : : R

(a) * Insanitary conditions of plant surroundings within |

the control of the plant management, insanitary

methods of nape. ar milk products or milk.

contamers or equipment ee

(b) Employment of careless, indifferent and -ineffi-

.\ cient personnel.

(c) Violation: of any of the provisions of this Act

or of the minimum requirements: for interpreta-

tion and enforcement of the Act.

“ce

re

wf

. “ ¥ . .

1 oe is,

. : e :

—— y :? , e . 30

-(d) Failure to display Certificate of iesouved to the :

public at all timgs when such. Certificate of Ap-

proval has been issued as prov ided in this Act:

(e) Displaving to the public any Certifieate of Ap-

-proval which has been suspended or revoked or

which has expired. * * *”’ ‘(Italics .ours.) .

We shal! refer below to the effect to be given to ‘Section

19 of the Act, relied upon ‘by the City (pp. 17 to 23) as .

preserving its right te prohibit. paper bottles which the |

| sovereign state permits. |

Another “statute should bé noticed, the st: atate (ill. Rev.

Stats. 1939, @ 1114, ‘*Publie Health’’, par.-22) ‘establish- =

ing the State Board of Health, whose duties are now

transferred to the Illinois Department of Health by Hiinols

Revised Statutes, 1941, ce. 127, ‘‘State Government’’, par.

55. The Public Health Statut® provides in part:~ .

**Sec. 2. The State Board of Health shall have the

- general superyision of the interests of the health

and lives of the people of the state. * * *

The Board shall have authority to make such rules

and regulations * * *

deem necessary for the preservation and improve-

ment> of the public health, *-* * :

‘At shall he the duty of adl loca! boards’ of health,

__-health authorities and offieers, * * * of:the State or

any “* * city:.* * * thereof td enforce the rules and

regulations. that‘ may be adopted by the State Board

of. Health * * *.”*- -

It will he noticed that under the terms of the above

Acts the Stat® of Illinois, as it has the undoubted right

to do, has taken ufito itself the approval of not only_ the

plant but also the eyguipment and methods of operation

of every _person who » ‘pasteurizes . milk for sale in the .

State of Illinois. It also has occupied the following fields

of milk sanitation: It requires that the ‘‘bottling or

°

@

as they may frony time to time _-

&

31

— <<

S

packaging”’ of milk shall be done at the place of pas-

. teurization. It requires that. all pasteurized milk shall be

* plaved in final delivery containers in the plant* in which

-it is pasteurized. It makes it unlawful for any person in

thé state. to sell or Serve any pasteurized milk except:

"in the original container in which it was placed” at the

point of pasteurization. $ : *

The State of Ilinois has cece’ imei, both by

the Milk Pasteurigation Statute and by the lawful require-

_ ments*made pursuant to it, that single-service containers .

(as ‘paper milk bottles are now known), when kept as ©

provided by the requirements and when ‘‘so treated as to

_.be as impervious to milk and milk products as practicable’? .

are entirely proper. containers’ for the ‘sale of pas-

teurized milk throughout the State of Tllinois. There is _

jot one phrase or word in the statute mentioning the ©

words **standard milk bottles’’, but rather the,entire stat-

ute is broad and uses the aords ‘multi-use containers’ .

“single-service contdiners”’, ‘container caps and covers”’,

and “fabrication plant”. , —_

it is apparent. that the. legislature: recognized and ap-

’ proved the use of single-serviee containers and that any

_ construction of the ordinance in question. which prohjbits

them is contrary to the spirit of the state statute and of

theptiblic policy it establishes. . °.

It is contended by petitionérs that the purpose’ of this

statute is to ‘‘preseribe minimum’ sanitary standards”’

and to place ‘‘a floor under municipal milk regulations”’,

with the result that a municipality may “impose higher

standards than these imposed hy the statute’ (Brie , DP.

22). The power thus reserved to inunicipalities is, peti-

tioners argue, subject only to the limitation “that the”.

municipal regulations must not fall below the- minimum

standards fixed by: the state’’. (Brief, p. 22).

. O

a: °

ke ae Petitioners eimtended: } in their petition for ‘certiorari

‘that the purposé of the saving clause was to provide state

regulation im ‘*many municipalities so small that their

officers are unable to adopt and enforce adequate regula-:

tions of the milk industry’’ (Petition, p. 27). In their reply

to our answer they claimed that thiw"language of theirs had

been misunderstood and ‘that really ‘defendants’ conten- °

tion is that the statute is designed to prescribe minimum

sanitary standards which are effective throughout the

state, both in rural and urban communities” (Reply to

answer to petition for certiorari, p. 11.). The latter idea

is repeated in the petitioners’ latest effort (Brief, p. 22

and the following comment is added:

i

ia.

“The statute thus places a floor: under municipal -

i _ milk* regulations.”* i ae

If this were the legislative intention, jt seems strange.

that language to that. purpose was not used in the present

saving clause. ” Piiat the Illinois legislature knows how to —

use such Janguage ji is apparent from ‘the 1941 act in rela-

tion-to Grade A Milk and Giade A Milk: Products, ap-

frigtigs July 11, 1941 (1 Tl. Session. Laws, 1941, p. », 809;

IW. R. S.,- 1941, ¢. rg, ‘*Foods’’,- paras. 152-169) of which

hietlia 18 (Ill. R.S., T941, es 564, para. 169) states:

‘ ‘s Nothing in this Act shall impair or abridge the -

power of any.city, village or incorporated town to

regulate the production, handling, storage, distribu-

tion, sale or delivery of milk or milk products, pro-

vided the minimum requirements under this Act are

observed.”’ (Italics ours.)

Furthermore, in the 1939 Act itself, the legislature used

words which would hfve been appropriate to express the

- . petitioners’ present construction of the saving clause when

in section 15. (Petitiongrs’ Brief, p. 84) it referred to .

ores,

. . °.

. . . 8

@ \

‘‘mintnum requirements adopted by the Director for

interpretation, and enforcement. of this Act’’.

The petitioners” contention that’ the . statute. simply

places ‘‘a floor’? ander the ¢ity Ordinance is reached by a —

novel method of interpretation. Beeause Section 15 of the

Act provides. that the construction, equipfrent, mainte-

nance and. operation of* pasteurization plants shall eon.

form with the requirements of said section and, in addi-

tion, be ‘‘in accordance with. mirfimum “requirements

adopted by the Director for interpretation and enforce-—

‘ment of this Act,’’ # is concluded that further; -require-

State and that this agency cou'd only be a city or a

*. village (Brief, .pp. 21-22). If such were the, intention ‘of

_ the. General Assembly it would. seem that’ appropriate

~ language to accomplish that, resnlt.- would have been em-

«ployed. In fact, however, the language itself negatives

* such interpretation. ‘Minimum requirements’’ is defined

in Section 1 (h) as ‘‘the code formulated by the Director

for iticrersneioed and enforcement of this Act.’’ .

4

The language of the statute thus far shows no intention

to permit cities and villages to oceupy the same: field of

regulation as the- state, in the sensé that an ordinance of-

— such minicipality may ‘‘prohibit what. the statute per-

-mits,’’ or impose different and inconsistent requirements -

'. from those enumerated in the statute. If cities: and Vil:

lages may ‘‘make further’ and more definite regulations”’

(in the language of City of Chicago'v. Union Ice Cream

Company, 252 Tih. 311, supra) snch regulations must **not

prohibit what the statute permits’’, a ‘condition laid Gown

-by the Supreme Court of THinois in that case which ~

qualifies and circumscribes municipal action in such in-

_ stances. The power of the City of Chicago to regulate

. the sale and distribution of ‘mille. is eqnditioned by the

ed

ments may ‘be imposed by ‘some agency other than the

limitation that it aval ‘not. prohibit what roe statute,

permits.’”’ : FI,

The saint (Petitioners’ Brief, p. . 21) that there is

no conflict between the ordinance which ‘‘prohibits’’ -the

use of* single service containers and the statute which~

permits and “‘regulates’’ their use is without merit. nine

It is the contention of. the petitioners now as it was,

in the trial court, that their tight to prohibit paper bot- .

. tles is preserved by Section 19 of the 1939. Milk’ Act

(Ti. R, S. 1939, c. 564, para. 133):

**Nothing in this act shall impair or abridge the |

@. ‘

- power of any city, village or incorporatéd town to.

regulate the handling, processing, laWeling, sale vr

distribution of pasteurized milk, and pasteurized milk |

2 Las bain, prov ided such regulation [does] not permit

, ahy-person to violate any of the provisions of this

id, Se ;

?

‘The be is not a part. of the act as + passed,

but. may fairly be implied...

We turn now to consideration ‘of the effect of this see-

tion. Ww e- have. seen that prior to 1939 the sale and dis-

tribution of pasteurized milk in Illinois was regulated by -

statute.. BY express provision of that statute the City of: -

Chicago was excepted. from compliance with -its require-

ments. The sale and distribution of pasteurized milk in

all other cities and villages in Illinois was , however, con-

trolled by the State: In 1939 the earlier ctateiia was sup-

planted by the present Milk Pagteurization Act. A com-

parison reveals ‘that the later Act is, in reality, an ex- .

haustive and comprehensive revision of, the earlier Act,

remédying certain omissions and regulating in detail the

entire field of milk distribution. By the new Act the City

of Chicago is placed on the same plane as other Iliinois

municipaiities.

Ja |

: ° i: ie | s 35

The office of a saving clause is to preserve from

destruction some spécial thing out of the general things

mentioned in the statute. Crawford on: Statutory Con-

struction, page 612 (1940) ;.2 Lewis’ Sutherland on Statu-

tory Construction, 678 (1904). Since its’ function is not.

to repeal the main provisions of: the Act, no’ saving ~~ .

claus# should beso construed as to destroy those pro- |

“ visions. Yet the contention of the petitioners that mu-

ni¢ipalities may. forb@l what ‘the statute permits is to

render the Act inoperative to that extent. Tithe Citw of

Chicago mav prohibit the use of single service containers

which are expressly sanctioned by the statute, ‘is there

* any reason why it may not ‘‘in a desire to exercise the

utmost vigilance”’ require a different method in the pas-

tevrization of milk although Section 11 of the Act specifi-

cally provides that no milk sold or delivered in the State

of Nlinois shall be subjected to any other treatment to maké

it safe for human consumption than the processing ees

vided by the Act? And if the City of Chicago may forbid

the use of -single service vontainers for the .sale and de. r

livery of milk within the municipal contines, is there any

reason why it.should not require additional or different o

methods of operation in pasteurization plants within the

territorial limits of such city, although Section 4 of the

_ Statute provides that upon compliance , with the provisions

of thé Act the Director shall issue a ‘Certificate of Ap-

proval to persons’ applying therefor? And if it may>

impose such additional requirements, is not such Certifi-

cate of Approval. rendered ineffective ! ?

- One difficulty with the City’ s argument that the statute

establishes ‘‘minimum requirements”’ is ‘in answering the

question: .Who determines whether a ‘Fequirement is‘ a

_ minimum era maximum? Is the City’s judgment on that

' question to prevail against the State’s?

are

a. is clear that the only effect: to be given, to Section

19 is, first. that it prevents a repeal by implication of al!

power of. the municipality to regulate: milk, and, second,

. that the city’s ‘power continues unimpaired as to all of

those numerous matters not governed ‘by the statute or

bt the minimum requirements promulgated pursuant

thereto. Ht gives the City no right to enforce ordinances -

in conflict with the statute or the. regulations made

thereunder.

‘That this is true is: apparent from the proviso to Sec. :

-*'tion 19, which expressly probibits any city, village ed

incorporated town from permitting ‘‘any persqn to. vio-

late any of the provisions of this Act.’’ To violate is ‘‘to

. infringe on”’, ‘to disturb’’, “to ‘disregard”’. Tf a munici-

pality may not permit any person ‘‘to infringe | on, or to’

disturb, or to disregard’’ any provision of the “Act, such

‘ municipality may not itself “infringe on, or disturb, or

disregard”? any provision of the Act,. But to forbid the

use of single service containers, the use of which is ex-_

pressly sanctioned by the statute, is “to infringe: on or

. to disturb or to bathe the plain language of the .

” statute. :

ce

>... Petitioners slate great reliance ‘upon City of Ottawa

v. Brown, 372 Ill. 468 (1939), which involved the following

- saving clause in “*An Act to regulate the Storage, Trans-

portation, Safe and Use of ‘Gasoline and Volatile Oils’’, in

force we be, 1919 (Til. Session Laws, 1919,-p. 692; Hurd’-

Illinois R. S. 1919, e. 38, Criminal Code, par. 4q). }

‘*Except.in cities or villages where ‘regulatory ordi-

nances upon the subject are in full force and effect.

the Department of Trade and Commerce shali have

power to make and adopt reasonable rules and regu-

lations governing the keeping, storage, transporta-

tion, sale or use of gasoline and volatile oils.’’

S

v

37

The petitioners point out that in this decision-the Su-.-

preme Court of [linvis held that a municipality in which, ’

on July 1,-1919, regulatory ordinances on the ‘subject were

in force, had the power to amend its oydinance later with-

‘ out regard: to any coniliet between city, and state regu-

lation. oe af 7

“Phe important thing about the saving ‘clause in this

statute is not that it was given the effect shown in

City of Ottawa v. Brown, but that the Supreme Court

in a - previous case gave to the saving clause a narrow

construction which withdrew all the power to regulate the -

subject matter involved from all municipalities except

those whieh. at the effective date of the act had ordi-

nances in force dealing ‘with. such subjeet matter. The

previous case was Kizer v. City .of Mattoon, 332 Ill. 545

(1928), where the coyrt had, before it thes validity of

an ordinance of the City of Mattoon enacted after July

_1,.1919, purporting to regulate the keeping, storage, sale,

ete., of gasoline. Plaintiffs: sought an injunction ayainst

the enforcement of thecordinance and losing in the trial!

court were appellants in the Supreme Court of Lifngis

There thé plaintiffs contended that the legisjature. had

taken the power of regulation from cities by the act of

July 1, 1919, and the defendants contended that . under

_ clause 65 of Section 1, Article 5, of the Cities and Vil-

lages Act enacted ‘in 1874 (which is the act relied on by

the City of Chieago here), the City of Mattoon had the

power to.enact and enforce the ordinance. The City of

‘Mattoon contended that the act of 1919 did not. repeal

its power under. clause 65 and ‘‘that thefe is not such

clear repugnancy between the provisions of these law:

that they cannot all be carried into effect’’. The court

said (pp. 549-550) :

“The power to pass ordinances such as the one

g

“

a

_ 38

here in question was delegated to cities by. the State

: through its legislature. Where the State delegates.

~suth “power to a municipality it may resume it

through legislative action and thus deprive the mu-

ep eed of the right to = it. (City, of Chicago

Phoenix Ins. Co., 126 Ill. 276; Wilkie, v.: City: of

Chicago 188 id. 444.) Prior to: July. 1, 1919, the #x.

clusive power gf regulation here involved was lodged

in cities» and villages by virtue of clause 65 above

quoted. By its act to. regulate the storage, transper- .

tation, sale and use ‘of gasoline and other. volatile

oils, in foree: July 1, 1919, the State withdrew from

° municipalities this exclusive power of regulation and

gave to the Department. of Trade and Commerce

exclusive power to make and adopt reasonablé rules

and regulations governing the keeping, storage, transS

= portation, sale or use of gasoline and vofatile oils,

“except in cities or villages where regulatory ordi-

nances upon the subject were in full force and effect.

** * The City of Mattoon on July 1, 1919, not having -

in full force and effect regulatory ordinances on the

subject, its delegated power to enact such ordinances

was automatically withdrawn, by the State and the

exclusive power to make -such regulations for the

City of Mattoon became vested in the Department -

of Trade and’-Commerce. The City of Mattoow-hav-

ing been divested of this power by the State, could .

not by its own action, re-acquire such power, but

could only regain it by subsequent action on the

‘part of the legislature.”

It will be noticed that in the above case the court cen-

strned the words ‘regulatory ordinances upon the ‘sub-

‘ject are in full force and effect’? as meaning in effect

on July 1, 1919, when the act became effective. A logical

construction of such language would reqiire the’ words »

‘sare in full force and effect’? to mean ‘tare in full force

from time to time’’. Logically there is no reason for

giving greater force and effect to an ordinance in force

on July 1, 1919, than_ one. enacted on July 2, 1919. The .

39 ‘ , hire ee ee cree

ea xe ; : »

--fact-is that a later ordinance would probably be a bette:

informed effort than ’an earlier one. Notwithstariding

the apparent logic of this consideration, the Illinois Su- .

preme Court ‘gave the ordinance the strictest possible

construction in, favor of state regulation—in favor of

withdrawing from mimnicipalities power which they had

had“under the general Cities and Villages Act upon which |

th itione*s in this ease place their complete reliance.

Other: courts have giv en saving clauses a narrow con-

struction.

In State ex rel. ‘Kaies et al. v. Kinsey Y, 314 Mo. 80, 282 .

S. W. 487 (1925), an Original petition for mandamus was

filed in. the “Supreme Court of Missouri to compel the

Board of Public Service of the City of St. Louis to issue.

permits to: the relators to sell milk in that city. An

ordinance of the city forbade the sale of ‘‘raw’’ or un-

pasteurized milk within. the confines of the municipality.

The State Legislature had also b® statute classified and

defined. various types of milk and milk products and

established standards of purity for such dairy ptoducts. -

‘‘Raw”’ or unpasteurized milk was one of the types of -

milk thus defined by the statute. te ‘

in contending that there was no conic hetween the

ordinance which prohibited the sale of unpasteurized milk,

and the: statute which recognized raw milk as: a lawful

product, the City of St. Louis placed great reliance on

Section 8646 of the Missouri statutes which provided:

‘“All-cities and towns in the state shall have power, *

by ordinance, to license and regulate milk dairies and

the sale of mijk, and ——- for the inspection

thereof.’’ : d

“The relators contended that since .“‘raw’’. or unpas-

teurized milk was declared by statute a lawful product

-

.

0°

that the City of. St. Louis was without power to prohibit

its sale, and that the ordinance purporting so to do wa

void. The Court ‘agreed with this. contention and said

(pp. 438-439 of 282 S. W.):

sé

plan i in defining and specifying different milk products

which it may be lawful for persons to deal in. Section

8646, quoted above, relating to cities, of course only

- authorized such cities to provide for inspection, li-

censes, and -regulations so as to secure conformity to

the general statute. The city may enforce such

regulations as are reasonable in requiring milk

dealers to comply with the law.

This statute shows a. vry comprehensive ©

- «*4 city has ample power by police. regulation to

protect the health of its inhabitants, but a municipal-

police regulation cannot infringe on rights guaranteed

by the Constitution or laws of the state. A, munici-

pality cannot. law fully forbid what the Legislature

has expressly ‘authorized (citing -authorities)

‘‘Here clause 1 of the statute of section: 11985 de-

fines milk. It is required to be fresh, clean, and come

from healthy cows, properly fed and kept. It is not

denied .. ag the- product so produced’ and kept is

wholesome. . . . It-is apparent that’ the statute has

made seeete classes of milk products, of which raw

milk is ene and pasteurized milk another. -The ordi-

nance under. consideration forbids anyone to deal in

raw milk, a product which the Legislature authorizes

as a lawful product and which admittedly is healtp-—

ful and harmless. It cannot be contended that pas=.

teurized milk is the “milk described cin clause + -of

the section, b&ause it is subjected to a process which -

gives it a.different .character. Therefore, under the

. tule of law as stated above, on ‘the face of- the

. ordinance and the statutes, the city had no authority

to’ forbid the dealing in raw milk, and could not

lawfully refuse permits to milkmen to sell it. .. .

Here is a lawful produet, made so by thé statute, of

the state, and the .ordinance-purports to forbid a citi-

zen his constitutional right to deal in that lawful and

harmless prdduct,, This does not mean that the city

may, not make regulations which the statute does

epee sot ascot aard icagO ocean aaa SE es

: Sw, Oak

—

~~

—

41

not impose, conditions which insure the purity: of

_ the product. The city . uray require standards of

. equality in the milk dealt in, where the statute makes.

none. One may violate an ordinance without violat-

‘ing.a statute. But the ordinance here is not limited - .

to those yegulations. It definitely and distinctly for-

bidseanyone to deal in a product which the statute

declares to be lawful.’’

The petition for mandamus was allowed.

“A Connecticut case also shows the extent to which the

_powet of the state over regulation of milk supersedes

municipal action.

In Shelton vy. City of Shelton; 111 Conn. 433, 150 Afl.

-811 (1930), the plaintiff was a licensed milk dealer doing

business in the City of Shelton. The plaintiff had com-

plied with the laws of the state, the rules ‘and regula-

tions of the state milk regulation board and -the -ordi-

nanceg of Shelton concerning the production, handling

‘and sale of milk, except one ordinance of that city which

provided, in effect, that no milk or cream should be sold “—

-at retail within the confines of the municipality unless -

it had been pasteurized or produces from tuberculin-

tested: cows.

The charter of Shelton empowered ‘the city to ide .

ordinances -——

‘“to license milk dealers. and to iewpeliahs the sale and

manner of distribution of milk and to -prohibit the

‘ sale theieof, unless in accordance with such regu-,

lations. =

The- city. was further. wathorised, in the same section

_of the .charter, to adopt, ordinances with reference to

Mee he | eee

‘‘and to prohibit the sale thereof when in such con-

dition as to endanger the public*health.”?

,

%

- the production, care, handling, marketing and sale, of

» milk. and cream .and gave the milk regulation board

-power- to make rules and régulations concerning the

marketing or sale.of milk or cream within the state ‘to

. protect the public from the use of milk and cream which

- is unsanitary or detrimental to public health.’’ .The stat-

3 shall affect the authority gf any town, city or bor-

| ding the sale of raw milk, grade A milk and certified milk.

_ product, was ine¢onflict with the statute and for that rea

‘son void. The court, after pointing out that ordinances

. with the general law of the state and with its public polict

ace a

a

Subsea ent to the incorporation gf the defendant. mu.

nicipality, the General Assembly of Connecticut ‘enacted

certain legislation concerning ‘the inspection of dairies and

ute recognized five types of milk and made all five lawful

provided the statutory .regulations were complied with in

their production arid sale. In addition to pasteurized milk

and milk from tuberculin-tested cows, the statute defined

and ‘recognized raw milk, ‘grade A milk and certified

milk. : aha : Bs

A ‘‘saving-clause’’ in the Act provided:

‘‘No provisions of sections 2485. to 2492 inclusive

ough to. enact ordinances or by-laws for the control,

regulation, sale or distribution, within its Tits, of

milk which may be detrimental to public health.’’ —

°

The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, despite

the saving clause, found that the ordinance, in forbid.

each of which was recognized by the statute as‘a lawful

must not conflict with statutes and must be in harmony

as expressed in: its legislation, said (p B15 of 150 Atl.):

“Obviously there is nothing in section 2491 [the

‘saving clause’) or in section 1 of Chapter 272 ¢

Public Acts of 1929 which gives the city’ of Sheltor

the right to prohibit the sale of milk or cream w

less it be produced from — tuberculin-tested cows 0!

43

pasteurized. There is nothing in the section which

°- grants to this city the right to pxohibit -the sale

of raw milk which meets the statutory qualifications,.

by a producer ‘or dealer who has complied with every

provision of the law.’

And continuing the court said (p. 816 of 150 -Atl.):

‘« |. , The ordinanee conyerts the permissive use

of tuberculin-tested) milk or! - pasteurized milk of ‘the

statute into avcompulsory one. . ‘It prohibits abso-

-lutely the sale and hence the use of raw milk, whose —

use and sale the statute grants conditioned upon

-compliance with. the statutory requirements. The

ordinance repeals this statutory grant within the

‘limits of this ‘city. The passage of this ordinance

was beyond the powers: granted fhis city. °

+The statutes as amended have covered the field

of milk *legislatidn;:at least so far as the General

Assembly: purposed, up to the time of the passage of

this ordinance. The subject- ‘matter is not an exclu-

sively local conditien. To the extent the state legis- _

lation has gone, it has pre- -empted the field. ;The de-

-fendant ‘under its general grant in section 66 cau aid

the purposes of this legislation. It cannot. override

it. It cann@t prohibit what, the ‘statute grants. ' It

» cannot set up new standards, in place of the legis-

“lative standards. It cannot substitute its “judgment

‘for the legislative judgment. It cannot overturn a

‘public policy evidenced in long-continued legislation ~-

over a subject state wide in its rangé and not only

intended to conserve the health of. people but cer-

tainly doing it.

“The statute law recognizes at least»five kinds of

milk and makes all fivé lawful ‘provided the .statu-

tory provisions are cqmplied with in their produc- .

tion and sale, viz: Raw milk, tuberculin-tested milk,

" pasteurized milk, grade A milk, and ceftified milk.

The, city of: .Shelton, was “without power. to. enact

an ordinance prohibiting the sale at retail of any

one of these kiads of milk which are authorized by.

‘. statute. Whether the city could in the exercise. of:

its. police power add to these regulatory provisions os

we have no need to inquire.’

The interpretation of the ‘‘saving clause’’ pf the Illinois

statute by the petitioners is subject to the criticism that .

.it would lead to an_unseemly conflict of jurisdiction . be-

tween the State and the City.

The Lllinois Pasteurization Act cannot mean_ that

specific matters’ shall be subject to determination by both

the state and by the city at one and the same time. That

would mean chaos oin regulation which. is not to. be at-

tributed to the intention of the legislature.and which can

be avoided by halding that the City’s power is withdrawn

by implication in the field actually océupied by the State

_ of Illinois. teen ve of

In Village of Atwood v. Cincinnati, Indianapolis dW. ;

-R. Co.3 316 Tl. 425 (1925), the question was whether the

Public Utilities Act of Illinois repealed by implication the

_ power long before granted to municipalities to require

* watchmen at. railway crossings. The [Illinois Supreme

- Court recognized. the rule that ‘‘the police power-is an at-

tribute of sovereignty and is primarily vested in the’

* General Assembly, which has the right at any time to —

recall. it from the agency to which it has been delegated,

‘and after being recalled to retain it or to. confer it ‘upon

- gome other gency or government. P? “(p. 433.)

After finding (p. 430) - that the Public. Utilities. Act

gave the Commission the power to require railroads to

°* station flagman at grade crossings, the court held (p.

_ 431): xe

“Tf both ‘the commission and die Village authori-

ties can exercise the power, their requirements with

reference to the~same crossing may be utterly con-

tradictory, for the village board may direct the sta-

tioning of a flagman while the commission may order

a separation of grades. Obviously, in such cases both

sik be obeyed, and concurrent authority often

leads to, conflict and — in confusion. The Pub-

lie Utilities act enjoins shalt: to the commis-

‘sion’s orders. That act’is. the later one and covers |.

the whole subject of promoting the safety of the pub-

lic at the intersections of streets and: railroads. It

is éomplete in itself and evidently was intended by

the General Assembly to supersede the power con-.

ferred by subsection 27 of section 1 of article 5 of

the general Cities and Villages act to require rail-

road companies to keep flagmen at street wen”

The court held: that the Publie- Utilities Act and: the

power of the village were so clearly inconsistent that botk

could not stand and that therefore the power of the vil-

lage was withdrawn and transferred to the Commerce -

Commission. pone

It is true that the question in. that case was whether .

there was ‘a repeal by implication of the powers granted

to municipalities but what the court said about the con-

flict of concurrent jurisdiction and about ‘the desirability -

of avoiding such conflict is very appropriate to the case.

at bar. The city has argued, and properly so, that. Sec-

tion 19 of the Milk Act is a saving clause not present in

the Public Utilities Act. We concede that except to the

extent that the state ‘by and pursuant to the 1939 Milk

Act occupies the field of milk regulation; the powers of

the City of Chicago are unimpaged. |

Again, in Northern Tru: Co. ¥. Chicago ‘Rs. Co.,-318 —

Ml. 402 (1925), already referred to, where the question

was-whether the. City of Chicago retained its power to re-

quire street cars’ to ‘maintain brightly lighted headlights,

the court said (p. 410) : me

_ “Pid the Public Utilities Act of 1913, which “¢on-

ferred this ample control and supervision over pub

lie utilities, including street railroads, deprive mu-.

nicipalities “ organized under, the general Cities and

Villages act of the power to pass ordinances requir-

ing street railroads to equip their cars with brightly

- 46

lighted headlights? _If both the commission and the

city could exercise the same power at the same time

with reference to the same subject matter their re-

quirements in respect to the same utility might be

-utterly contradictory. In such eases the utility could

not obey both the commission and’ the city council,

Yet the. Public Utilities aet enjoinéd obedience to the

commission's orders and prescribed severe penalties

for failures to comply. Obviously, concurrent author,

, aa — lead to conflict and confusion. ie

¥ a :

ae again, the question was whether the conflict i:

tween. the Cities and Villages Aét and the Public Utilities

Act was so complete as’ to indicate that the latter had

. repealed the former, but the-reasoning of the court sup- ,

* ports our conténtion that where the legislature has with- +

drawn a portion of the city’ 's power and conferréd it on a

new agency (in our. case, thé Director of the Department

of Health of the State of THinois) at least to the extent

of any conflict between the stata and municipal authorities

- the. state governs. ;

The question may be asked why Section’ 19 wae inserted

if conflicts between the State Department.of Health and ;

minicipalities are to be decided in favor of the state

authority. We believe that we have already properly

stated the purposes of Section 19, that i¢gwas intended . °

to prevent a fepeal of all municipal power. by mpliva-

tion and to jndi¢ate that the Milk, Act should supersede

the power of municipalities only-to the extent that the .

‘state had entered the field of milk regulation. i a

Petitioners coritend (Brief, pp. 29-30) that if there. is

_need for béth city and state regulations there are bound

to be differe nce s between them. They instance the failure

of the ‘state “statute t6 require the date on which the milk

is to be sot to. be placed on the label: They argue from

this that the statute permits the use of undated containers

, : :

47

and approves ‘their use so that if our contention be cor- -

rect the tity ordinance prohibiting the use of undated

containers is invalid. We make no such contention and the

petitioners” argument Shows an .unwillingness on their

part to admit that there is a clear distinetion between

supplemental regulations aud prohibitions.. There is noth-

ing. inconsistent between the requirement of the state

statute that the word ‘‘pasteurized’’ and the name and

pistofice addréss of the pasteurization _plant be. placed

on the label and the city requirement “that the’ permit

number of the Chicago Board of Health and the last date

‘on which the contents are to be sold shall be placed on

the label (R. 37).

What is actually ‘done is that the information required

by-both the: statute: and the ordinance is placed on the

label and there is nothing whatever inconsistent in the

.two requirements. ‘The example given by thé petitioners

isnot comparable to the situation here in which petitioners

attempt to prohibit what the state statute recognizes and

permits, An analogous instance would occur, however,

if the city attempted to forbid the placing of the post-:

office address of the pasteurization plant on the label by :

‘prese ‘ribing@a different fortn of marie and making it ex-

clusive, Sty eer on

"The failure of the state statute to require that~ con-

tainers be dated is neither an express nor implied approval.

of undated containers. The references in the statute to

single service #ontainers are, however, a lefinite recogni-

tion and approval of them. F urthermore, “the ‘grant of

power to the Director of Public Health of the state to

approve the. mechanical equipment for the packaging of

milk (Section 15, Item 18 of the 1939 Pasteurization’

A\et,. Petitioners’ Brief, p. 86) and the Director’s spe-

tific approval, as agent of the state legislature, . of. the

«

.

.

‘

e . : eit. : : OS

. plaintiff’ 8 equipment for the packaging of mill in single.

service containers ° makes the prohibitory ‘ordinance of

Chicago not simply regulatéry or supplementary to the

state action, buf directly in conflict. with it.

The C ireuit Court of Appeals correctly held:

‘“‘Neither do. we agree with defendants’ argument

that the prohibition of plaintiff’s single service con-

, einer: is a. mere regulation.”

As part of the record in. the present case “fhere has

been printed: (R. 23. 122) the milk ordinance of the City of

Chicago passed January 4, 1935, the rules and regulations

of the. Chicago Board of Health, and certain resolutions

by the Board of Health. ‘A comparison of. the. provisions

of the ordinance, and, particularly: the rules and ‘ regula-

tions of the Board of Health, ° with the 1939 Milk Act

passed by the legislature, will indicate to what greater

extent than the'state statute. the Chieago city ordinance

goes. It provides for licenses both of sellers and their

vehicles. (R. 33, R. °34), for the ‘display of the license

emblem on each vehicle (R. 36),-for the revocation of the

license (R. 37), for the labeling and placarding of all

"bottles, cans, packages, and other’ containers enclosing

- milk or any milk product (R. 37), for. the inspection of

dairy farms (R. 39), for the examination of samples. cR.

40), and the permissible ‘‘plate counts’? for bacteria (R.

44), none ‘of which subjects is covered-by the state statute.

It is obvious that thé intention of Section 19 was to pre-

- serve to the, City the right to continue the ‘ordinances

and régulations -on ‘those Lubjects not occupied. by the

state system of. supervision. |

, The next, and, we think, detgrmjnative question, is

: ‘whether in faet, the state of. Illinois has oceupied the

field of approving types of ‘containers so that any acticn

of the City of Chicago in ¢onflict-therewith is’ void. °

49

’ We submit that the state has by the Milk Pasteuriza-_

tion Act of 1939 given its approv al to paper containers

{termed in the Act single- service containers, but at the

present time. the only ginglé-servi ice containers in commer.

cial use are paper.) As ha¢ been seen, Section “4 of the

state statute provides for the issuance of a certificate of

_ approval to a~pasteurization plant after inspection ‘‘if

the plant, equipment and methods of-6peration’’ are found —

‘to comply with the provisions of the Act: It is admitted

by the ‘answer (R. 20) -that the respondent's plant is ‘at

Chemung, McHenry Couhty, Mlinois, and the evidence is

uncontradicted that respondent is equipped only for the

hottling of milk. in Pure-Pak paper containers ‘on two

machines leased from the Fx-Cell-O Corporation,. and. the

respondent-does not have facilities to bottle milk jin glass

containers (R. 890). aot nes |

An integral part of its *‘method of operation,”’ ap-

_ proved by the State of Mlinois 4R. 695-696) is the packag-

ing of milk in these paper containers. That the method

of packaging milk is just as much a part of the method

of. operation which the ‘Director af the Department of

Health of the State ‘of Mlinois ‘approved, is clearly indi-

‘cated by the requirements of Section 8,that all pasteurized

+ milk shall be _placed in final delivery containers in the

plant in which pasteurized and the provision of Section

_ 15, Item 18, that ‘bottling or packaging of milk and milk

products shail be done at the place of pasteurization

by approved mechanical equipment. ”

The Ex-Cell-O Pure-Pak machine, pictures of which are

rather poorly. re-produced i in the printed record (R. 1469,

R. 1498-1501) is equipment adapted solely to the packag-

ing of milk in Pure-Pak paper bottles by means of *

~~ mechanical operation whereby ‘that part of the naper

bottle coming in coritact with the milk is not touched by .

{ 50

human hands at the dairy and before. being filled with

milk is immersed in a hot paraffin bath, then cooled in the

refrigeration unit, eeieouness. filled, sealed and

stapled. .

Section 16 (a) of the state statute giv es wus ‘Depariatn :

‘the right to ‘suspend its certificate of EELS becausé .

of unsanitary conditions of ‘‘milk containers -or equip-

ment.’ This clearly shows supervision by- the-State of

Illinois of the pastenrization plant, the method of. doing

business, the equipment, ‘and milk containers, and is an

occupation of that field, at least with respect to the ap-

. proval of thé pre of container, to the @xclusion of the

City. : ¢

Lést the failure of the Cireuit Conv of Appeals to cite

the case of City of Rockford. v. Hey, 366 1. "526° (1937),

although called ‘to the attention ofgthat court, be’ treated

as a waiver hy us of- the applicability of that “case, we

here.expressly rely on it. See our diseussion ‘above (pp.

19-21). There the City of Rockford had no. power to—

‘prohibit the sale of ice cream in Rockford by requiring

a license andan inspection of a plant ontside the- city;

here the City of Chicago éannot prohibit the sale of milk

in Chicago by rejecting containers and the corresponding

plant Se the state has approv ed outside the

aly. ; os

We have show n above repeated references i in the statute,

and the state ‘Tuies and reguiations promulgated pursuant

-to it, recognizing paper containers; and in view of the

. approval by the State of Illinois, pursuant to the state

statute, of both the pastenrization plant and ‘the method

of operation, namely the use of paper containers instead

of glass containers, we insist that the State of Tlinois ©

has withdrawn fron the City of Chicago the right to pro-

‘hibit (as distinguished ie regulate) hice pottles. On

| ae

one hand the state approves the ‘pasteurization plant and

the type of container and makes it illegal to sell milk in

any way except in that container and ‘on the other hand

the City of Clfcago steps’ in and says: you may not sell

in that type of container. The City is net attempting

to regulate the container approved’ by the state, but to

prohibit it; and the decisive question undér this heading

of our brief is whether, a creature .of the state, such. as

the City of Chicago, may challenge the approval. by the -

parent state made purshant to state law, of a’ method —

of operation recognized ‘as entirely lawful by, although

uot. required by, the statute. -

a

We think, under the cases already cited under this

heading, the -answer is obvious.

Thgse cases hold clearly that in instanees of ecatiiet

between state authority and municipal authority, the latter

must give away, and-we can think of no sharper conflict

than the present instance in which the state appreves

ind the city. attempts to forbid.

We may ask whether in fhis caer ular case an apiplica-

tion of this rule will lead to justice or injustice. We

submit that it will clearly lead to’ justice..In_ this case

we have the City of Chicago alignine the supposed judg-

ment of fifty aldermen rendered in the year 1935, ata

_ time when these containers were not-widely known (and

were not used in (Chieago or its environs) against the

Board of Health of the City of Chicago acting in 1939,

the General Assembly of the State of Tllinois, (which

recognized, single-service containers as proper in the 1939 .

Act), the Director ‘of the Department of Health of the -

State of THlinois (who has approved the respondent’s plant

and its method of operation), the United ‘States Public

Health Service (which has amended jts model: ordinance

expressly to permit single-service’ containers),—and- the

practical- experience of hundreds of other municipalities.

°

emits

j cetang A Sere 52

/ ae |

a > ae 7 1m

' State- Approval of Single Service Containers Is Conclusive

_ that Prohibition of Such Containers -by a Municipality

Is Unreasonable as a Matter of Fact. aig tee

: @

Another line of reasoning leads to thé conclusion that

the ordinance of the City of - Chicago, if construed to

prohibit the-use of respondent’s ‘Pure-Pak bottles, is in-

valid. Under the law of the State of [linois, an unreason-

ible ordinance’ is void and the question of unreagonable-

ness is a judicial question. This point’is not to be confuged.

with a question of. const'tutionality (City of. Lake View

v. Tate, 130 Hl, 247 (1889)-at page 252)... sg

In Chicago-and Alton Railroad Co. v. City of Carlinville,

200 Hl. 314 (1902) involving’.the validity-of an ordinance

‘regulating speed of trains, the. court said {p. 321):

The rule’ adopted ‘in this State is,- that where

the ordinance is passed in purspance of power ex-

pressly conferred by. the legis!ature and the details

of such municipal legislation are préscribed by thie

legiSlature, an ordinance passed in pursuance of such

power cannot-be held invalid by the courts as being

unreasonable; but when the details of such legislation

are not prescribed, an ordinancé, passed in pursuance

of such power must be a reasonable exercise thereof:

or it. will be pronounced invalid. (Citing Authorities)

It is said in. the Tate casé, on page 242: ‘Where the

power to legislate on a given subject is conferred and

the modg of its exercise-is not prescribed, then the

ordinance passed in -pursuance thereof must be a

i reasonahje exercise of the power or will. be-pro-

~ , > nounced invalid.’ In Hawes v. City of Chicago, supra,

Mr. Justice Baker, in speaking for the’ court, in. dis-

cussing the question when a court may rightfully

hold an ordinance unreasonable, on page 658. said:

‘Where the power to legislate on a given subject is

conferred on a municipal corporation, yet if the

¥

By Cae

details of such legislation are-not prescribed. by the

legislature, there the ordinance passed in pursuance

of such power must be a reasonable exercise thereof

or it will be pronounced invalid. ——

' In ‘Koy v. City of Chicago, 263 Il.. 129, the court said

(p. 127): ae:

‘*When the legislature has authorized a city couneil

to pass ordinances upon any subject, the power thus

conferred must be reasonably exercised. Whether its

. exercise ina particular ease is reasonable is a judicial

question, and an‘ unreasonable’ ordinance willbe held

void by the courts.’’

” In City of Chicago v. . Chicago & North Western Ry. '

Co., 275 Il. 30 (1916), holding certain provisions of the |

Chicago Milk ordinance invalid, the court said (p. 38):

“*An unreasonable otdinance will be held void ~ .

the courts.”

The fact‘ that in this case the pow er of the ‘city concerns”

a- matter: of public health does not enlarge its .-powers.

In People. v. Robertson, 302 Ill. .422 (1922), which de-

termined that the City of Chicago had no power without

establishing a board of health, to delegate to the com-.

missioner of sed (gee to protnulgate rules to prevent . -

contagious .disease?, it was geld 4p. 4382) >

Ww hile the powers given. ‘to the health authorities

are broad and far- reaching they are. not without their

limitations. As we have’ said; while the courts will not

pass tipon the wisdom of the means adopted to re-

strict and suppress the spread of contagious and in-

fectious diseases, they will interfere if the regulations .

are ar bitrary and unreasonable.’

>

_ This case also. laid down a rule peculiarly applicable

to the facts existing’ in the present-case-(p. 434): d

. “One of the important elements in the administra.

tion of health and quarantine regulations is a full

measure of common sense.’ fe

oe aes ; \

54 : ? ) ° 3”

In the very recert case of City of Mt. Vernon v. Julian,

369 Ill. 447 (1938) dealing with a Sunday closing ordinance,

the court, after saying that city councils exercise only

delegated and limited powers and that the power to pas:

~ . an ordinance must be delegated in express terms or he

necessarily incidental to an express grant and not simply

-convenieft, stated (p. 449):

“When the power to ewialaks ona given subject

is conferred and the mode of its exercise .is not pre-

scribed in the charter, an ordinance passed pursuant

pongo must be'a reasonable exercise of that. power.

- City of Lake V tew i si 130 iil. 247, and maeemritiee

therein cited.” ie ©

These cases go on the well-established ' lh that the

grant of power by the state legislature té@a municipality

‘is a graift of power to pass reasonable ordinances and only

reasonable ordinances, It is’ not necessary, in order to

prove such an ordinance void, to prove that it is un-

constitutional, and:so the rule in Iilinois is much more

favorable to judicial review of municipal action than

that of other. jurisdictions.

The question before the Court is whethér, under exist:

ing circumstances, the city should be permitted to enforce

its ordinance, assuming: that it is to be construed as

prohibiting paper containers. The question of its reason

ableness .must be viewed today, because, as” stated ii

Northern Trust Co.. Vv. “Chicago Rys. Co., 318 ‘Hl. 402

(1925), (p. 412): , ees

“The power to enforce proceeds from the present

-or existing power or authority to enact or to provide.

A municipality cannot be said to’ possess the power

to enforce ‘an ordinance concerhing a subject upel

which it has lost the: power ‘to pass: the ordinance.’

Assuming! therefore, as. is contended by the city, - that

Section 19 of. the Milk Pasteurization Act preserves to the.

CS See

city the right to pass ordinances on*the question of milk

containers, the preservation of that right is a right to .

pass or to enforce only a reasonable ordinance on ‘that

subject, in view of today’s conditions. @ince the public

policy of the state is that which is declared by the General.

Assembly, and, since the General Assembly and state ‘of-

_ ficers acting under its authority have declared -single-

service containers proper milk container s, it is palpably,

unreasonable for the city to attempt to enforce’ an ordi-

nance absolutely prohibiting them. |

‘The state” having declared its policy Shat single ‘service

containers are proper does not mean. necessarily that the .

city -has been deprived ‘of the power to ‘regulate them,

but we are not talking here of. regulation, but of prohibi-’

tion——a_ prohibition by a child of the act of its aye

by a ward of the act of its guardian, by a creature of:

the agt-of its creator, and by an inferior of the act of”

its superior. “We rely, as. indicating, the unreasonable-

ness of the enforcement of the Chicago’ofdinance at this

particular time, on all‘of the cases which we have cited

under the preceding point which’ indicate that the ordi-

nances of a municipality may not violate or be imeon-

sistent with the public policy of the. State as declared

by the, General Assembly—see particularly the quotations

set forth above from the following: c “Ses:

City of Chicago v. Union Ice Cream Mfa. Co.,

252 lk. 311 (1911).

City of Marengo v. Rowland, 263 Hi 531 (1914).

City of Lewistown v. Alarrison, 232 NL 461 (1918). ;

We pean that. as a “a sinjple qdestion of tact——whetlier

or not the: prohibition of/ single- service containers is ‘a

-reasonablé prohibition—the decision must: be against the

ordinance in view,of the approv al of this type of container

by ” sovereign. : e

<<.

an

56

It cannot be supposed that the General Assembly of the

State of Illinoise would approve single- service containers

if they resented a. health hazard.’° Its recognition of

single-service Containers is a declaration -by the _state-that——

that type of container is-a proper one. ‘Still bearing in

mind that we are not complhining of some regulation

relating to single-service containers, we contend that under

iP ople v. Carolena Products Co, 345 Ill. 166 (1931) the

enforcement of the ordinance ‘prohibiting single-service—

containers: is iinconstitutional under the law. of Hlinois,

because. not even the legislature has any authority. to

. ‘pronounce the perforniance of an innocent act criminal.

In that case the court said (p. 168):

"The legislature has no authority ‘to pronounce

the performance ‘of an innocent act criminal when the

public health, safety, comfort or welfare is not inter-

fered with, (Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176) and may

o

not, under. the ‘guise of protecting the public interests, -

arbitrarily tterfere with private business or impose

unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful oc-

“eupations (citing authorities). No question. of imita-

~ tion or fraud ix involved in this case and the whole<

someness of carolene is admitted. In People v.:Price,

257 LL SST, this court said: ‘It may be conceded: the

legislature has no authority to forbid the sale of a

known wholesome article of food.’ ”’

a

We ailcalarnie ike and salt that the City of Chicago

-has no legal right. to forbid the use of a type of milk

container which the supreme legislative authority of this

state has permitted and approv ed and declared safe and

sanitary. *

We contend this this is one of the important questions

in this case, namely,’ whether.a city which permits the-

sale of milk and cream at retail in glass bottles has any

right to prohibit: the sale of milk and cream in paper

containers approv oe by. the state legislature and the

.

state officials; and especially when said container is not ‘

shown by ‘a scintilla of evidence’ or by any experience

to be a hazard to

fend that the Ulinois legislature i is. the paramount authority

in expressing the public health policy in this state and

that it is unreasonable as a matter of fact for its creature,

the Cify of Chicago, to- refuse to recognize and approve

that which its greator has approv ed.

in claiming that the approval of single « service con-

tainers by the state legislature does not preclude the

City of Chicago from prohibiting them, the city relies

entirely upon the language of the saving clause in the

1939 statute.

It says that if the aie had the power prior to the

passage of the statute to prohibit paper ‘milk bottles

it must now ‘centinue to have that power or the statute

will be either ‘‘impairing’’ or ‘‘abridging’’ the power

of the city,. contrary to the pane of the saving clause.

Prior to the passage of the-1939 act, the present suit

was filed challenging. the power of the city to ‘prohibit -

paper ‘containers, -so that the city’s assumption that it had

such” power prior to the passage of the statute is highly |

debatable and vigoroysly. contested. @ :

‘ But in the midst of this controversy the state Nowra

. of Illinois sanctioned the use of single service containers..

If any single one of the highly. imaginary fears (pp. 40-

69) that the petitioners argue in this Court. the City

Council of the City of Chicago might consider in excluding

paper containers were in’ any y_yespect real,.the state —

legislature never would have approved single service -

containers. As already pointed out, .under Illinois law

not even the legislature of the state has any authority

to prohibit the sale of wholesome articles (People v. Caro-

° .

.

.

. .

. o -

v 4 - .

: at

: . -° ;

YyY ‘Yd

lene Pr oducts C'o., 345 Ill. 166 [1931],) and it follows that

the City of Chitago itself has no such right.

In the absence of a legislative determination by the

General Assembly of the State of Illinois that single’

service containers were proper containers, it might: well

be that the presumption of reasonableness would. at-

tach to an ordinance of the City of Chicago prohibiting

them, but the moment that the state legislature. has made

a det termination then «certainly a subordinate | legislative

body such as the City Council of the -City ef Chicago

-is not acting reasonably -in ordaining -that what’ the state

legislature has‘ found to be wholesome is, in fact, un-

wifilesome, and if the presumption of legislative correct

ness is to be carried to the limits urged by the petitioners

Ye présumption should be. applied to the sovereign of the

__state speaking through the General Assémbly rather than

to — Council of tthe ( City of Chicago. 7 —>~>

Accepting ‘the determination by the General Asmoeabhe

of the reasonableness of: the use of single service con:

. tainers: is “not impairing or abridging’ the power of th

City ‘of. Chicago for it» power never exceeded the power

ta pass reasonable ordinances. — We have already pointed

out that under ‘the Hlinois: law .the grant of power by

the legislature to the city countil is: a grant of power-

to: pass reasonable ¢ airs only. ne

While admitting (Petitioners* Brief, pp. 69- 70) that, i

fact, the city council did mot have in mind in 1935 any a

the item#%namerated by. the master (R: 1734- 1735) upen-

which ‘the legislative body way reasonably. base its’ de-

_-eision’’, petitioners say (p. 70); ,

/

‘*Sinee -the question of feasonableness is deter-

-. mined. in the light of conditions existing today, we

. “© are not. concerned here with what the City Council

actually did consider before it. enacted the ordinance,

s

. 59

but with what jt might reasonably have considered

“assuming conditions to have been as they are today

or, rather, with what it might reasonably consider:

today in the light of today’s conditions. sy

One of today < conditions is the determination by the

General Assembly of the State of Lllinois in 1939 that

there was no danger from single service containers which

prevented the legislature from Focognising. them as. sdieagd

containers. .

To sumnmarize, the power which ‘the City. of Chicago has

is the power 4 to pass reasonable ordinances. This arises

not out of any constitutional’ question at all but out of

_ Hlinois law which says that the grant of power to a sub-.

ordinate legislative body by the General Assembly is a

grant of’ power. only to pass reasonable ordinances and —

- that the.determination of reasonableness is for the judici-

tad

ary. id hat, ment be shpat te easonable in 1935

feesalavere- in 1939 ama g é fle. service containers

as proper containers it declared as a matter of state

policy that none of the fears about paper containers ;

now expressed by the ocity had any merit. The pre-

sumption of correctness ‘arising from .this, determination -

by the state legislature of Illinois overcomes any the- ~

~ oreticil presumption of-reasonableness attaching to the de- |

termination in 1935 by the Chicago City Council that

' single service containers should be prohibited.

Giving this effect to state action does not “impair”

or ‘‘abridge”’ the power of the city. Before the state™

statute wasgenacted the ‘city had the power to pass only

_ reasonablecordinane es; after the ‘state statute Was enacted

the city had the power to pass only reasonable ordinances.

“But in determining the reasonableness of an ordinance

which the city now seeks to enforee, the superior deter-

©

6

mination of the General Assembly of the state that single

service containers may-reasonabhly be used destroys any

presumption of legislative correctness tn the contrary

holding by the Chicago City Council. | .

Without impairing the power of the City of Chicago,

the determination by ‘the state Jegislature is the deter-

mination of the unreasonableness of the attempted en

forcement*vf the city’s ordinanay which in any ‘court

supersedes the presumption of correctness which -other-

wise might attach to the city’s action.

It was undoubtedly this which the Cireuit Court of Ap-

peals had in mind when it said:

.. ‘*The ‘authorities are uniform that any > ordinance

which conflicts .with any statute or public - policu

adopted by the State Legislature i is invalid.’ . (Italies

ours.) ** Say

and also when it said: | ha

‘‘The defendants’ contention, if sustained, would__

give the city a broader power than that prov ided by

the Legislature foxgsthe state. It would make the state

subservient to th@@rity. It would impute to the Leg-

islature the purpose of withdrawing the power there-

tofore exercised by the city and by the saving clause

reconferring such power. We are unable to believe’

that stich an incongruous result was infended.”’

The approval by the state of single service containers

constitutes the best guide for the courts in determining

whether a€ a question of fact the ordinance of the City

of Chicago. when sought to be enforeed in 1939, under

Fic chee pd in 1939 was any longer a reasonable

ordinance. ®

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals should

be’ affirmed.

°

61

| Tt.

‘The Ordinance: Is Unreasonable as a Matter of Fact.

[Answering Petitioners’ Point fT, pp. 34-79. |

Petitioners cite very few Illinois | cases on the ques- .

tion of unreasonableness of ordinances even though that

question is one strictly of local law. .In so.far as the

Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is

ae concerned, the deaisions of this Court are, of course) con-

trolling, but ‘in determining whether the erdinance is rea-—

sonable under Illinois law, the decisions of the Tilinois |

nw

Supreme Court are controlling.

We have pointed out ‘under the- preceding point the |

_Tllinois cases holding that there is a distinction in Illinois

between unconstitutionality of an ordinance and unrea-

sonableness. The following cases hold that where a gen-

——-pral grant of power is made to a city without the details

cise thereof or it will be pronounced invalid:

Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. City of Carlinville,

200 Til. “314 (1902) and cases therein cited;

_ City of Mount Vernon v. Julian, 369 Tk. 447, at

p. 449 (1938), 7

; P ‘ f , ; A “+

We have pointedout under Point IT that if due regard

~ heing prescribed by the legislature, an ordinance passed, es

_in pursuance of such power, must be a reasonable exer:

is to be given'to the legislative determination by the high. °

est legislative body in the State of Mlinois, the ordinance

passed and sought to be enforced by a subordinate mu-

nicipality cannot be sustained. In addition, we. submit

that the evidence in this record and matters of public |

notoriety, of which the. courts should take judicial notice,

. abundantly and conclusively show in the language of K ou

:

.@

r % 62

-Y¥. City ane Rica 263 TH. 122 (i914) that the probibition—

of paper coptainers ‘‘is so clearly’a and manifestly. wrong .

that there can be no doubt- about it’’. The rule. that an

ordinance or any other legislative act_is presumed to be

valid’arises from the fact that the judicial branch of the —

- government must recognize the right of a. coordinate

branch, the legislative, to determine facts for. itself, so

that’‘on a merely debatable question the court will not

substitute its own judgment that of. the legislative

body. . “7 ,

Viewing the present situation realistically, it is fanciful

to attribute any actual, legislative determination on the

question’af paper bottles to the City Council of the City

of Chicago when, as the Cireuit, Court of Appeals said

_(R. 1787), ‘that subject was not in their minds at all in

1935. It is a far stretch of the imagination, therefore, to

consider the question at bar as having received any. legis-’

lative détermination by the City Council in 1935; and in

view of the facts in the record showing ‘that the Board

of Health of | the City of Chicago made no effort what-

ever to- ase ertain the sanitary properties, of singlesservice .

containers until almost a week after this suit was filed

(R. 1003), it is also difficult to see where any. real admin-

istrative determination was made. ‘The petitioners’ plea

for attributing correctness to the legislative determination

‘is wholly technical.

Legislatures and city , councils in the exercise’ of the.

police power may, of course, prohibit all things: harmful |

to health and-to the safety and general welfare of society

even though the prohibition invades the liberty .or prop-

erty. of an individual, but when’ the articles or things pro-

hibited do not injure, the public health or the safety of

society, all reason tow the prohibition is absent and the

63

prohibition is not justified, and clearly amounts to con-

-fiseation of property and deprivation of liberty in viola: .

tion of Section 2 2, Article II of the Dlinois Constitution.

Under fhe laws of the State of Llinois the legislature ‘

has no right to prohibit the sale of a known, wholesome

‘article of food and the same consideration would preclude

a prohibition of a known, harmless, modern container

for amilk. :

People x ' Carolene Products Co, 345 Ul. 166

“(931): ; ,

C arolene Products Co. v. MacLaughlin, 365. Ill.

62 (1936); : °

People v. Price, 257 - Ill. 587 (1913).

in contending that the ordinance is both unreasonable

and unconstitutional, we do not overlook the rule of law

that innocent acts may sometimes be prohibited where

neeessary to abate an evil which is a proper subject of the

police power. This is not such a case. The evil intended —

to remedied by this ordinance is briefly and very

clearly stated in the ‘*Publie Health Reasons’’ explaining

the purpose of Section 3094 as follows (R. 109):

“The use of standard milk bottles for ‘delivering -

. milk ands milk products in quantities less ‘than one -

gallon is required in order to prohibit delivéry, in

such containers as buckets, fruit jars, ete., which may

be difficult to wash and to-subject to adéquate bae-

tericidal treatment, which cannot be filled and capped:

with the proper equipment used for these purposes,.

‘and which it is often difficult to label properly.”’

Conceding for the purpose of this’ point the right of

the City to require liquid milk and cream to be sold. in

containers, we deny the right-of the City to prohibit the

use of a container which is not within the object of this

section of the: ordinance ; and which though modern, por-

t

fd

ee re ae

motes publie health and proper-sanitatign as effectively as

the commoniy accepted and officially approved containers

and which does not lend, itself to any “f the evils which,

the City has the power to stamp out. © >

We submit that the action of the: petitioners is arbi-

‘trary and unreasonable. Suceinetly stated, respondent

is denied the right to use its paper miik. container to

compete with ~dairies using the ott-modéed «and much

_ abused glass milk bottle. This restriction fosters monop-

oly rather than protects against it. The restriction dis:

, courages competition: ‘rather than engourgges it. ° “Phe

result of the supposed. rerulation is not to ‘‘regulate”’

the sale of milk in paper containers, but to prohibit

_it and actudlly to preclude persons from engaging in

the milk industry in competition with glass bottle dairies.

The évidence shows,.as the trial court correctly found

(R. 1752}: that the use of the paper container creates

“no new or unusual health hazard,’’ and “that they are

safe and ‘sanitary containers in which mitk may be.

delivered.’ , | | fs

The trial court held in substance that in matters af

fecting public health the law should adopt the best scien-

tific thonght of the age. When research and investigatign.

coupled with vast experience, jastify the adoption of new

_ methéds without prejudice to public health, it should Uil-

hesitatingly be done. Were the rule otherwise, progress —

_ would he stifled (R. 1755). phe

In considering the reasonableness of the ordinance of

- the City of Chicago as a question of: fact we ‘first, of

course, have pointed to the approval of single service

‘ containers by the state iegislature. Next we point to the

approval of Pure-Pak paper milk. bottles and of the re-

spondent’s pasteurization plant by the Department of

° ; 65 .

Health of the State of Illindis,‘a fact which is disclosed

, by the stipulated testimony of Mr. S. V. Layson, Milk

Sanitarian of the Department of* Public Health of the

State of Illinois witb offices at Springfield (R: 695).

While the court may decide that as a matter of law the —

State Department of Health has no jurisdiction to compel

the petitioners. to permit the tise of sifgle-service con-

tainers in the-City of Chicago, the fact is undisputed that

. the Department of Pablic Health of the State of Illinois

has approved the Pure-Pak; single service container, and

‘that fact cannot be overlooked ' in determining whether :

_ the action, of the City of Chicago, in undertaking to pro-

hibit it is unreasonabie or 4s necessary to protect public

~ health.

In determining whether the petitioners are acting rea:

sonably the Court should also. take into. consideration the

‘fact that the United’ States Public Health Service, under

the supervision of Dr. Thomas Parran, has approved

paper milk containérs (R. 1661, 1678, 1699-1704). Con-

| cededly, the Unite Stat¢s Public Health Service has no.

plenary . jurisdiction in the City of Chieago, but it is: ad-

. mitted by the petitioners that. its standards are considered

high and are considered safe, so the action of. the United

States Public Health Service may not, be overlooked -ini

determining whether the City of Chicago is acting reason-

ably in excluding single service containers (Arnold, R.

1165).° ‘

2 ip record shows that the Board of Héalth of the City

of

icago has approved single service containers under

| the standards nid down hy the ‘United States’ Public

Health Service and has recommended an amendment in

the ordinance ‘here challenged to permit the sale of milk,

in single service containers (Bundes , R. 1211; R: 1698-

1704). Iti is true that the Board of Health has noe power

a c . . ° ‘ ‘

66° | | in

to change an n ordinance and that its tecommendation i is not

binding either upon the petifioners or upon the, Court,

but in determining whfether the petitioners are acting rea-

sonably in excluding single service containers, the action

of the Cc hicago Board of Health cannot be overlooked.

Oa Next, in determining whether the City of Chicago is -9

0 We reasonably, weight must be given to the experience °

of other cities where the use of single service containers

has been permitted and where there is not the slightest

suspicion that they have created or tended to create any

health. hazard. We are here not referring to the fact that

the municipalities which have ‘permitted. the use of Pure-

‘Pak containers are great in number on the theory of

9 counting noses (as the petitioners seem to think) but that

the favorable results of the use of the container in those’

municipatities may not be overlooked in deciding whether

the City of Chicago is acting reasonabl} in’ the present

. ease, (Furthermore, this evidence was admissible to: show

how widespread was the,-use of ‘these paper bottles to‘,

prove that they were standard bottles.)

The evidence proves that respondent is and has been

-. engaged in.the sale of wholesome milk and milk progficts

in the State of Hlinois and sells its products in’ these

containers in suburban communities in Cook, DuPage and °

Lake Counties without interference. This had been done |.

daily for almost two years. before the trial court's de-—

cision with no. consequent injury to public health. These

(Xperiences were persuasive to the/rial court; and obvi-

ously, if these experiences in the use of paper containers

* had@disclosed any health hazards, petitioners most cer-

tainly would: have presented. proof of this fact by com-

petent | evidence, and not relied on mere theory and Bm: ~"

jecture. 3 | :

Ci .

ie e :

“We Pam Pe that it can he safely and logic ‘ally assumed.

‘that the milk consumers‘in Evanston, Winnetka and Oak

Park and sixty-five other communities in and about Chi-

eago are no less susceptible to disease than are the resi-

. dents of Chicago. Ther is nothing pectliar about these.

milk consumers which distinguishes theni from -Chicago

citizens. This argument applies with equal, force to the

residents’ and milk. consumers. in -Washington® Detroit,

New York City, Boston and Philadelphia and hundreds

of other cities and villages which use paper containers

daily. . Geographical location does not result in new and

peculiar. health hazards ‘reasonably ‘related to milk con-

tainers. . , . Fe

No reason is advanced, and no evidence was offered,

to sustain the theory of the city that peculiar local ‘con-

ditions exist in the City of Chicago which prevent the

court ‘from considérmg ‘the: satisfactory, experience of

‘hundreds of other communities in using paper milk bot-™

- tles. Millions of quarts of milk in paper bottles are ‘be-

& ing. sold daily in Tllinois and. to army camps throughout

the United States (12,000 quarts daily are sold to Camp

Grant, Rockford, Illinois, by respondent), without sug™

gestion of ill-effect. one

That the city has‘no real fear of the-evils which it

argues the city council ight consider in prohibiting

paper milk containers is proved by the fact that since

the date of the decision of this case by the Distrigt

Court, October. 18, 1940, the city has permitted millions

of paper containers which are -not protected by any

injunction of any court—state or Federal—toe be used

freely in the City of Chicago. No harm has resulted from .

- the use of such other containers or from the distribution

of milk in plaintiff’ s containers under the protection of

' the present injynction and the fact that the petitioner's

- @,

have vielndiinally perinitted the use of these other con-

tairers is eloquent prgof that petitionérs well know. that -

no public health hazard is actually involved,

Another fact which ‘ought not to be overlooked in ie.

ciding whether the prohibition of paper. milk containers.

is .reasonable, is the universal use of paper containers |

daily for liquid, foods of all types. The point here is

not that the articles and uses are 80 similar, that the

City may not permit one without the other, but that

the widespread use of paper containers. stamps: as un-

reasonable when. treated as a matter of fact and not as a

matter of law, the action of the petitioners in: prohibiting

paper milk containers.

The City stipulated that it permits the | use of single-

- service’ paper contdiners for liquid coffee, soft drinks,

and ice cream sold by drug stores and restaurants without

restriction, inspection or regulation (R. 694). This is an

- administrative decision. which proves that they are not a-.

health hazard: Such containers are related to the public

health of. the inhabitants of the city and are used daily by

practically all citizens of-the city in consuming food and

drink. Infants, the aged and convaleseents are permitted

to pfirtake’of ice cream dispensed in. paper. containers

over which the Board of Health exercises no supervision.

Fibér-board pails, ice cream cartons, ‘drinking cups,

. tall paper tumblers and other articles of papier too nn

merous to mention which are much more lightly paraffined

than are Pure-Pak containers have heen used for vears

and are still being used: in Chicago without inspection

and, most signifteant of all, with-the acceptance bv the

common man that there is nothing more sanitary than

a single-service paper "container. |

‘It was stipulated that paper containers were permitted

‘without objection by the Board of Health apd without

69

_any test to determine the sanitary quality of the paper

used for the sale of ice cream,.butter, lard, cottage cheese,

other kinds of cheese, oprsters, ‘pickles, soft drinks and

liquid’ coffee; that. ice éream is sold in metal @ans with a

thin paraffined paper liner between the ice cream and

the container; that jgraffined paper is permitted to be

placed across the top of metal milk cans underneath the

metal cover of such cans? that paraffined drinking cups

and paraffined paper straws are, used in the (City of ©

Chicago, and that paraffined paper linérs for dishes in—

which ice cream is served are also used, all without objec-

tion or regulationoby the Board of Health (! Stipulation,

“R. 694). ;

The common man’s acceptance as a truism that paper

ontainers are sanitary is a better guide to the truth thign

Se ial theories of the experts, real or pretended.

it leads inevitably to the conclusion that paper milk

" containers are sanitary. The trial court considered all .

of this evidence and came to the conclusion that no

health hazard was presented. {)

Lastly, in determining whether the City of cthcago is

acting reasonably, we think the Court shouid give careful

consideration to the evidence hefore it in this case prov-

ing that the single servicd container’ in question has not

at any place or at any ‘time been“ even suspected of con-

stituting a healt! hazard. va, Hae

We now turn to the specific arguments advanced by

the city in support of its. theory that the prohibition :

of paper containers is reasonable.

ed ' FV

| Sanitation and. Absorption.

[Answer to Point. II-(b)-2; Petitioners’ Brief, pp. 44- 51. }

It ‘is argued that paper - milk bottles are rightfully

prohibited because the container* board absorbs a few

drops of milk- It is argued by the city that this factor

‘‘is of utmost significance?’ (p. 48). Yet the petitioners

do not point out, nor does the reeord show in any

respect, that a public health hazard exists merely because

a few drops of milk might be absorbed in the corners of

a paper milk bottle. There is no evidence in the record .

that anne ever became ill or infected, or was likely to

—becoiie so, by reason of a few drops. of milk ‘absorbed

by the paper board. No witness heard of any such ex-

perience, not ‘even Dr. Arnold, petitioners’ main expert

“witness, On the other hand, petitioners champion the

‘glass bottle which the evidence and common knowledge

show is nsed over and over by milk containers, different

ones. daily, many -times; and’ which multi- used glass

bottle is expose «dl daily on the house door-step; subject

to contamination by contact with alt the domestic animals

about the home or neighborhood, ordinary exposure to the

weather, irritants. in the air, breakage and leakage, if

hot or cold weather. In freezing weather it is common

knowledge that the: cream is expelled out of the mouth

of the bottle and exposed to contamination on the*door-

step, window-sill, rear porch or the other usual deposi-

tories for glass milk bottles: Petitioners’ argument that

- the absorbency of paper milk bottles. is of ‘‘the utmost

significance’ fails because of the absence of proof. that

such absorbency ever caused or might cause any. illness

or disease. The proof of the pudding is in the eating.

The argument - of petitioners is based on pure theory.’

There is no danger in paper hotties compared to, paper

as 7

‘caps made’ ofthe same materia! and permitted by the city

to be used on glass milk bottles. These caps permit ab-

sorption of milk’ and they are taken off in common use

_ and exposed to the bacteria and the irritants in the air and -

afterwards replaced on -the bottle with ‘the bacteria on

the mside. This may easily contaminate the contents

of- the -bottle.-, The imperfect washing process on the

glass bottle and haphazard inspection of glass bottles by

the petitioners (1400 bottles beigg—yaapected over a period © -

of ayear when 365,000,000 quarts of. milk are .sold in

glass bottles_in the City of Chicago) offers slight support’

‘to the petitioners” efforts to discredit the single service

paper milk bottle on the absorption issue (R.'986 to 996).

- If the absorbency argument yow advahced by the de-

fendapts has any plausibility the Illinois. Legislatare ad-

judged 3 to be of slight significance.

The State of Mlinoik has repudiated shoccbener as

reason for prohibiting paper containers, for Item 5 (e) of

the minimum. requirements promulgated by the Director

of the Department of Health, (above, pages 28-29) pro-

vides only that ‘‘all single-service containers shall be

so treated as to be as impervious to milk as practicable,’’

thus re¢ognizing the impracticability of making them en-

tirely impervious. This policy of the state controls:

the action of the City of .Chicago.

Dr. John W. Rice of Bucknell University, per ea

Pa, found the paper bottle superior to the glass bottle

in abating the spread of. infectious diseases because of

‘its high inherent ‘sanitary quality (R. 406-7; 424). His

research work and ‘experience. disclosed ‘that the bacteria

found i in the’ paper board were not pathogenic. He ever

found any pathogenic baeteria on any paper board used

in paper milk bottles (R. 411). In his opinion, supported

by research, absorption ‘of milk in the” paper board —

. means.

presented no health firoblem (R. 425).. This witness was

requested to testify. by the defendants and his’ time and

expenses were paid by the city.

Dr. John R. Sanborn: of the New. York State Agricul

tural Experiment Station, Geneva, N. Y., testified posi-.’

tively that the absorption item was insignificant (R. 286,

289-290) and the disintegration test, furnisled an index to

the sanitary. condition of the manufacture of paper con-

; ** tainers. This being trne, all reasonable and necessary

safeguards exist in the matter of batteriological control

» and thus the absorption argument loses all: force.

_ Mr. M. J. Woodman of the Evanston, Illinois, health

‘department, testified that in his experience disintegra-

_tion tests offered adequate protection at all times and his

experiments showed that the empty paper container was

essentially free of bacteria in. 300 te 400 tests (R. 680).

Dr. -M. J. Prucha of the University of Mlinois, testified

that after>two and one-half years of research, study and

* experience he found the absorption by paper caps used

in glass milk bottles greater, relatively, than by Pure-

Pak containers becanse of lighter paraffining (R. 716),

‘but testified that even the absorption by the paper cap.

prese nted no health hazard (R. 659).

Dr. “Paul H. Traey of the University of Illinois, after

tivo and one half years of study, experiments and experi-

_ ence, found that the absorption of milk into the paper .

beard presented no health problem - “whatsoever! (R. 519).

- HLM. Packer of the Philadelphia Health Hepartment,,

_ with years of experience in Philadelphia, where, milkhas

‘been sold in paper containers for many -years, fourld: no

objection to the use of the paper bottle 3 ‘reason » of

any absorption (R. 1363, 1364).

Dr. E. H. Yunker of es with usinndile

“ :

“7 \

scactionl experience in, the use of the paper | milk battle,

was of the same opinion (R. 1387).

The City? ‘s. effort to capitalize on the absorption issue

finds: no. support from practical experience. As the case.

takes final forth, this appears to be ‘the chief reliance of

the defendants, All the expert witnesses ‘in this case (ex-

cept Dr. Arnold) were ynahimous that health authorities

possessed’ as adequate bacteriological control over paper

nulk bottles as they’ had over glass bottles.

‘We respectfully submit that the City’s argument on

the absorption issue has no merit whatever when consid-

yea in the light of wide practical experience for years. -

The container has had sufficient use in hundreds of: cities

and villages daily .so that if absorption presented any

o hazard to public health, the City would have readily pre-

sented such evidence. Not one witness was produced by ~

- the City to, testify *to any Bvaes supporting. this academic

e

objection. * .

It fs conceded that absorbency is matériel only iia

of fear of Gontamination from the milk container board,

yet Dr. Arnold testified that he had never found patho-

genie bacteria on, milk container board (R. 1148).

Dr. Arnold also &stified (R: 1165)-that the model ordi-

nance and code of the United States Public Health Service

were generally considered a reasonable and safe standard

for milk sanitation (R. 1165). Surely, since this service

recommends the use ‘of single-serv ice containers and ‘ap-

-proves them in its model milk ordinance, the “absorption

“of a few drops of milk now complained about by the City

is no’ real detriment: The present universal recognition

of the merits of single service containers in spite of some

slight insignificant absorbency, and the fact that there is”

no suspicion that this absorbency has- ever, oat at /

any timé, constituted a menace to health ‘is a com

° 2 ; ‘ \

74

“answer to the City’ s_ present argument. Practical’ ex-

perience is more ee proof than mere speculation.

Paraffin Used on Paper. ontain' S.

‘Anan to Point LL. (b) -3; Petitierer’s Brief, pp. bh 53.)

- The City contends that because a small particle of par-

aflin might get into the. milk, the containers must be

denied use by the: City. | ; ;

Dr. Robert A. Black, a member of the ‘Chica Board of ©

Health, testified (R. 1226), that he knew ‘‘nothing in way

of proof on either side’’-with regard | to the sanitary ‘as.

pects of the single-service container, and when asked. re-

garding the ‘merit er demerit of milk containing paraffin

being fed to infant babies, he said he would not? want ’

infants in his care to have milk containing -paraffin. He

further. said (R. 1228) that: paraffin was,°in his opinion, —

inert and that it was a by-product of oil. He further

testified that he never read‘or heard of a ease of a baby

~ being fed paraffin in milk which came-from siigle-service

‘paper nulk bottles and that feeding oil to children to se-

eure au evacuation of the bowels; in his opinign, ‘does -

not give any bad effects’® (R. 1228). He. further said

he never made any inquiry nor had afiy information with

. regard~to this suggested health hazard nor was inquiry

made in -communities and from officials in places. where

paper milk bottle were ‘used (R. 1225-30). |

Dr: Lloyd Arnold had ‘a theory that the ‘‘spicules”

would” injure the intestinal tract, but he forgot that _

spicules, if any existed, were dissolved in the milk, which :

was heated wheu fed to babiés, and he, too, never heard’

or knew of a ease of a baby being injured or of its in- ~

testinal tract being irritated by reason of drinking milk

- from paper, milk bottles (R. 1113-15). This is in sum and

75

—

substance a frank presentation of the evidence offered by ~

the City on this’ issue. eWe submit that there is nothing

in this’ type of testinteay which presents any genuine

*

objection ‘to the use of paper milk, bottles.. Conjecture

- and surmise do not rebut years of: “experience in the use -

‘of millions of paper milk bottles ‘daily throughout hun-

dreds’ of cities and villages in the Tnited States and

elsewhere. Jf there were any meritorious objection. to the

use of paraffin on paper:milk bottles, the health officials

in the hundreds of’ cities and villages using paper milk

hottles daily, including the City of Chicago at the present -

time, would certainly know of it and have proof of it by

now; and the City would most certainly have offered

some testimony to. support the objection-it now makes. ~

Paraflih is a wholesome product, and when applied to

the paper milk bottle’ affords udditi¢nal protection to the

bottle fid in no manner.does injury ta health. The City .

did not produce one witness who had any real information

or data to prove to the contrary.

Dr. Arnold testified that “he had never toaid ‘of any

child being made ill by ‘swallawing paraffin. (R: 1172) and

that he never: knew, heard: or read of any child or aged —

person having ainaiee of pera in their intestinal tracts

(R. 1172-1173). : Ppa ae

It is, in fact, a matter of common knowledge that par-

affin is not harmful to health.. It is commonly used by the

housewifé on her jellies and aty one time of another has

probably been chewed by every school boy. | ;

Dr, William D. McN ally, for 17. years coroner’s toxicolo- :

gist of Cook County, Tlinois, and one of .the outstanding

_ toxicologists in this section of the country, testified that

!

2 : anes

paraffin is not a poison either to adults or infants, .

that there is nothing about its chemistry - ‘which is harm-

ful. to, human health, either adult or: infant, that if .

” eq

76

the taking of pareflin were to cause disturbance to the

human body that would be the type of case that would

come to him professionally; that he was familiar with —

medical literature generally and that he knew of no in-

.stancé, either in literature or from his own experience

or from consultation with physicians or from any source,

where bodily disturbances of any kind were attributed

to or suspected of being caused by accidental or other

taking of paraftin; that the-witness himself had chewed

-paraflin and that he had seen numbers of other persons

who had chewed paraffin and undoubtedly swallowed par-

ticles larger than 100 milligrams without any ill effect

(R. 1262-1264). He stated that ..rge particles of paraffin

might act as an irritant to a-person with an inflamed

bowel, but that he could not conceive of such particles

coming from a Pure-Pak container (R. 1265). Paraffin

‘is an un- -nutrient medium for bacteria (R.. 1266). Bac-

teria do not penetrate paraffin, and this is the reason that

housewives use it for jams and jellies. because it’ prevents

the ‘bacteria and yeasts from entering them. A piece

‘of pafaflin twice the size of a kernel of wheat might

be irritating, but if it was in very small particles it would

not bé. (R. 1296). ;

Dr. Tracy of the University of Illinois gave similar

testimony (R. 481). He stated that paraffin was used by:

his mother in his boyhood and that in modern times it is

being used in treating all types of waxed papers, such

as cheese boxes, butter boxes, milk bottle caps and drink-

ing cups and that they used to make chewing gm out

of it (R. 481-482). He testified that the chipping off of

slivers of paraffin presented no health problem (R. 529-/

530}, aid that no diSeag@ had ever been traGed to Saati,

in the operatiop of the University dairy (R. 503),

Dr. Sanborn testified that‘in his opinion the parafining

. js

Fn A EE OE A EI eee /

“ne .

17

_ process is free f rom. public health hazard, that there is

-nothing in the paraffin that is detrimental to the prop-

erties of Grade A milk put into a container, that in his

opinion and experience it would not change the taste of

the milk or cause any odor to get into the milk (R. 178).

He testified that theré was nothing in the oily substance

of paraffin that was dangerous to health (R. 29%).

Dr. Prucha testified that he tested paraffin-in the ‘paraf -

; fin’ bath of an Ex-Cell-O machine and could. not find any

bacteria. The samples were taken under usual \\ orking

conditions: at the plant (R. 651).

Dr. Rice testified that th. paraffin presented no health

hazard (R. 413) and other witnesses testifiedAp the harm-

| less nature of. paraffin (Packer, R. 1363; Vaughn, .R. 1305).

The General Assembly of the State of Illinois and the’. _

State Department of Health have approved of the -use

of single-service paper milk bottles which are coated with

paraffin and have declared them proper,

_ Petitioners rely (Brief, p. 53) on the Criminal Code.

Illinois. Revised Statutes, 1939, ¢. 38, par. 14. It is ap-

parent from reading the criminal statute that it has no

i application herein and that the remote possibility of sinall

quantities of paraffin getting in the milk is not an adultera-

tion denounced by that statute, because the slight eal

. bility of minute particles or spicules of paraffin getting

into milk is not an adulteration of milk. It surely cannot —

he said that the Ilinois Legislature, in recognizing ard

approving paper milk bottles, and the Director of the

Department of Health of Mlinois and the United States

Publie Health Servic> in approving their use—and—pro-

viding minimum requirements for their use, would connte..-

nance any adulteration of ‘milk. ~

' 78

Odors From Paraffin,

{Answer to Point. II-(b)-4, Petitioners’ Brief, pp. 53-56. |

. The brief of the petitioners states: “It is a well-known

fact that milk rapidly absorbs odors to which it is ex-

posed’! (p. 53). From this they conclude that paper milk

containers may conceivably impart odors from paraffin or

from baeteria to the milk and mfy therefore be prohibited, °

It is highly signifieant that although the general | fact of -

‘ready absorption’’ is claimed,.the city offéred no evi.

’ dence whatsoever of odors eve rare into the milky”.

cither from paraftly (oxidized or hot) or from baeteria.

Dr. Sanborn, who i is quoted at le ngth on pages 54 and

oot the, petitioners’ brief, testified affirmatively that

‘there was no ey idence that paraffin had ever can Qh)

taste’ of milk (R. 294-295). Dr. Tracy testified that

one of the first tests made at-the University of Illinois

was to determine whether. paraffined paper bottles im-

parted a taste to the milk and he found that the paraffined

paper bottles had. no effect upon the flavor of milk (R.

494) and further said that paraffin had no flave or (R. 494-

497). The flavor of milk in dlasé bottles was changed

when exposed to light (R. 494-497).

There is not one witness or a particle of evidence in

this record proving or tending to prove that rancid odors

or any unpleasant odors have come from paraffin ised on

paper inilk-bottles. Elaborate effort ix made to support .

this theory of defense by referring to ‘the testimony of

Dr. Sanborn, who frankly admitted that paraffin heated

at high temperature would oxidize. Dr.. Sanborn did not

know What these temperatures were but stated that high

temperatures coupled with stale and uncleaned paraffin

bath chamber for three weeks would preduce ‘‘off'’ odors

(R., 304). This proves nothing. There is no evidence °

: i¥ aie

2

a 2

that anyone in using paper milk bottles ‘ever experienced -

off odors by reason of the oxidation of ‘paraffin.

Petitioners ‘refuse frankly to face the facts shown by

"the uncontradicted testimony of the witnesses, Howard

R. Peterson (R. 942-45) and Paul V. Keyser (R. 1334-

1555). . The latter testified that no: oxidation will occur

in paraffin below its melting point, which is 125° F. to

130° FL (R. 1347). As paper milk bot@es are not exposed

in the home or anywhere elsé to tetnperatares of from

125 degrees to 130 degrees F. oxidation could not. occur

after the paraflfinine process had been completed at the |

dairy. — ea .

— Howard'R: Petersen whose experience and experiments

with. paraffin used on paper containers are wholly unecon-

tradicted and unimpeached testified that in the bottling

operation paraffin at 210 degrees, F. w { oxidize for

twenty hours’ (Peterson, R. 943, 958-959). This

temperature than is ever reached in the nse of the Pure-

Pak machine (Pruecha, R. 711-712). The temperature CO

ficient of oxidation of paraffin is fifteen degrees, so that

af 195 degrees F. the initial resistance to oxidation ‘is

‘forty hours; at 180 degrees F. is eighty hours and at

165 degrees F. is .160 hours (Peterson, R, 943-944). The

Pure-Pak machine consumes about 30 pounds .of paraffin

per thousand containers (Peterson, R, 954, 957; Dean, R.

61), has a capacity of 110:ponnds of paraffin wax (Dean, «

R. 960), and coats between 00 to 2000 containers per hour

(Dean, R. 960: Peterson, R. 947) and the factor. of safety .

against oxidation is from M07 to 00% (Feterpon, R.

944-945 ), ; ‘

It is. eitauelea that oaieka idles is rareid in .odor

and easily détected (Sanborn, R., 304; Pete Sor my

It also changes Color (Sanborn, R. 304). ‘It is undisputed

that the Pure-Pak machine in operation. givés off no

a higher -

R. 956).

e

. Meee rae

rancid odor (Dean, R. 965: Peterson, R. 952, 955-956}:

Dr. Arnold witnessed the machine in operation in the

Risdon Dairy, Detroit, Michigan, for several hours

1160) while ‘gathering data for Plaintiff’s Exhibit \4, a

report dated December 4, 1937 favorable to paper ve

tainers, which see (R. 1397), and he “did not recall any

rancid odor (R. 1163). He-testified that, paraffin in its

‘natural state is/odorless (R. 1163).

Dr. Arnold also testified that he had.never heard of °

anvone becoming ill. from .the oxidation: of paraffin (R.

1179). There is no testimony either that the weak organic

acids resulting from the oxidation of paraffin have any

ill effects., or that paraffin used. on milk containets has

ever oxidized, ov that milk has ever received gan odor

from “paraftin, and the fact -that oxidation of paraffin

can be detected by simply smelling the container as Dr.

Sanborn did at the hearing is ample protestion against

_ any imaginary danger that the, City fears.

So much for the manufacturing process ul its lack

with milk, -

would -take hundreds of hours in the blazing sun to ous

the paraffin on the confainer (R. 966). So the possibility

' of oxidation there disappears.

of possibility of oxidation. When filled

. Tlie tests of Dr. Rice on thé odor of bacteria mentioned

on page 56 of: petitioners.” brief were not on Cherry River

‘board used in: Pure-PRak containers (R. 416, 6431-432): Te

got the same‘ odors from milk bottle caps (R. 416-417).

These ‘odors came from the bacteria (R. 416), and the

problem ‘resented. by’ odors from bacteria 6n paper bot’

tles is, therefore, no different than that presented: | vi

odors from bacteria on glass bottles or on paper capes

used on glass bottles. The language of the witness was

very picturesque and the City ¢annot be blamed for mak-

ing the most of it, but the’ fact: remains that the problem

has hothing more to do with paper bottles fhan it has to

do with glass bottles. The witness originally embarked

on: these experiments only to test paper caps for glass’ |

bottles (R. 415). :

That . the possibility of odors ne “bacterta if not: a

problem of paper ‘containers any more then of glass

containers is clear from the testimony of ihis witness;

that as a bacteriologist he considered paper containers

now in.a state of freedom from bacteria justifving their

use for milk and cream (R. 412) and that paper hottles .

are superior to glass bottles (R. 406-407, 424).

The final statement of petitioners (brief, p.. 56) that

it is not unreasonable ‘to prohibit thé. delivery of milk

in containers that impart an odor.to milk’? implies that

there was evidence. that odors had héen thus imparted

to milk by paper containers. There js no evidence what--

ever of this in the record. The absence of all evidence

of _odor “being transmitted tocmjlk by paraffined paper

containers is the complete answer. to the city’s argument

under this pointe

‘The Sanitary Control of Paper. Containers.

, (Answer to Petitioners’ Point T1-(b)-5: Petitioners’

Brief, pp. 56- 67.) “ Soph"

e In: petitioners’ brief, petitioners argue that because the

paper mills and: the

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