Opposition Brief — Kloeb v. Armour & Co.

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IN THE

Supreme Court ofthe United States

October Term, 1939

No. 977 )

Frank L, Kiogs, Juoce or tHE District

Court oF THE Unirep States FOK THE

NorrHern District or Onto, WESTERN

Division,

Petitioner and Respondent Below,

x vs.

Armour & Company, an Intino1s Corporation,

Respondent and Petitioner Below.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT OPPOSING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Epwarp W. Kautsey, JR.,

Frep A. Surrs,

807 Ohio Bldg. ., Toledo, Ohio,

Joun P. Dovzz,

Armour & Company. OS ne,

ounsel fo seediil

Wettzs, Kersey, Cosourn & Harrrneton,

807 Ohio Bldg. Toledo, Ohio,

Of Counsel.

je

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Ti Options BROW fo ovis ccc ccs cdu cabccnsostecexs ~

Ti, Sebladiatio. 05sec sees ki code dabsavades “Sew 2

III. Statement of the Ott ois os tie ces gas 3

IV. Argument and Law............cceeceee- oh is 6

A. The Writ of Mandamus Is the Only Avail-—

able Remedy to Correct the Refusel of the

District Court to Give Full Faith and Credit

to the Judgments of the Ohio Courts........ 6

Conclusion. ......... Sala Boia éoeisd ase See ke cache 14

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

American Surety vs. Baldwin, 287 U. 8. 156.........2,7

Armour & Co. vs. Kloeb, 109 109 Fed. COR) Fie Cacats ska 5

Armstrong vs. Walters, BW OG, Ges o'ig sca beee ees 11

Baldwin vs. Iowa State ane. Men’s Assoc., 283

We Ba case sas dees 62 sea a ee eeinsvesewe 2,7

eeeoeveeeeeveev eevee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeaeeeeeev ee eeeeee

1

City of Boston vs. McGovern, 292 Fed. 705; 265 U.

O GGS site ad kad eee babs ete dees oaks 8

Clarke vs. Methewson, 12 Pet. 164.................. 10

Dane wa. Clerks, & Pet. 1.0. 6.5 cc rcccccedesnsaienes 10

= Reinsurance Corp. vs. Bryant, 299 U. S.

Decade Ceska vs chek oss arches baeheeteneree ees

Hammer et al. =. British Type Investors, Inc., 15

SR re oes ae 12

Hardenburgh vs. ee Ee a” Fee 10

Interstate B. & L. Ass’n vs. ee Hotel Co., 109

SR RRL ein ain SAN nA ste: 11

Kanouse vs. Martin, 15 How. SSPE ee

Kirby vs. American Soda Fountain Co., 194 U. S.

it, SOG asc cane PSS bs deus PRESEN OS RS OREN RS 10

Page

Kniess vs. Armour, 134 O. S. 482; 17 N. E. (2d) 734;

Le ee 6) Ae rer 3, 4, 12

Losito vs. Kruse, Jr., 136 O. S. 183..............5-. 12

Lucania, ete., vs. U. S. Corporation, 15 Fed. (2) 568.. 12

McGowan vs. Rishel, 125 O. S. 77, 80................ 13

Metropolitan Trust Co. 218 U. S. 312.............. 9

Mollan vs. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537................. 10

Morgan’s Heirs vs. Morgan, 2 Wheat. 290, 297...... 10

Mullins Lumber Co. vs. Williamson & Brown Land

Co., 246 Fed. 232....... RES iu ai wala we aidw kts © 6 11

is SB! Sir ie Se errr Te rere 10

Pullman Co. vs. Jenkins, 305 U. S. 534, 537.......... 11

Rogge vs. Michael Del Balso, Inc., 15 Fed. Supp. 499. 12

Rooker vs. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413........ 2,8

Stewart et al. vs. Nebraska Tire & Rubber Co., 39 Fed.

SD es Na aan doa ho Sh ks ones Seo eles s cae 12

St. Paul Indemnity Co. vs. Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283.... 10

Tillman vs. Russo Asiatic Bank, 51 Fed. (2d) 1023... 12

Wichita R. & Light Co. vs. Public Utilities Comm’n,

BE PA el er ane oy mre 10

Windholz vs. Everitt, 7¢- Fed. (2d) 834............. I

Young vs. Southern Pacific Co., 15 Fed. (2d) 280..... 12

Ohio General Code—Section 11312...7............. 13

U.S.C. A, Title 28—

Section 344(b) ............. ESE Oe ae 4,5

SE EES con ocuwnccdie ceacduewens cones 2

SUID CIE ois cw di ivsend cddadety lacemeeeeues 4,11

PIO NE oo oc oivresdbcnyadexwerienbcenshaane 5, 6

IN THE |

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1939

No. 977

-..

Frank L. Kioges, JupcGe or tHE District

Court oF THE UnitTep StaTEs FOR THE

NortHern District or Ono, WESTERN

Division,

Petitioner and Respondent Below,

vs.

~~ ww

Armour & Company, an Ituinots Corporation,

Respondent and Petitioner Below.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT OPPOSING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

I a

OPINIONS BELOW

The first opinion in the Circuit Court of Appeals for

the Sixth District was filed on December 5, 1939, and

appears in the record, page 66 et seq. It is reported in

109 Fed. (2d) 72.

The second opinion of said court has not been re-

ported, but was rendered on March 12, 1940, and is found

at page 71 of the record.

No petition for rehearing .was filed in the court

below.

ae of

JURISDICTION

1. The date of the judgment to be. reviewed is

March 12, 1940. (Record, p. 71.)

2. Petitioner requests this court to review this

judgment by virtue of the authority contained in Judicial

Code, Sec. 240, as last amended by the Act of Congress

approved February 13, 1925, C. 229, Sec. 1, 43 Stat. 938

(Title 28, Sec. 347(a), U. S. C. A.). Respondent con-

cedes this court has authority to review the judgment

below; but respondent urges that there are no reasons

pursuant to Rule 38 (Rules of the Supreme Court) or

otherwise for the exercise of this court’s discretionary

powers and asserts that:

This court should not grant the petition prayed for,

as the question involved has been settled by this court.

The cases believed to sustain respondent’s assertion are:

Rooker vs. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413;

Baldwin vs. Iowa State Traveling Men’s

Assoc., 283 U. 8. 522, 524-526;

American Surety vs. Baldwm, 287 U. S.

156, 164-167.

iit

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In the light cf the action of the petitioner in refus-

ing to retain jurisdiction of this cause, a review of the

proceedings prior to his decision is necessary.

Five plaintiffs filed separate actions against Armour

& Company, hereinafter referred to as ‘‘Armour,’’ and

Charles J. Burmeister, hereinafter referred to as ‘‘Bur-

meister,’’ in the Court of Common Pleas at Toledo, Ohio.

In all material respects, petitions of the plaintiffs are

identical. Each seeks to recover money damages for in-

juries claimed to have resulted from contracting a dis-

ease known as trichinosis due to the alleged presence of

trichinae in fresh pork sold by Armour to Burmeister,

and thereafter manufactured by Burmeister into a

smoked product known as mettwurst sausage, which was

‘‘a food product, ready for human consumption without

cooking or further treatment.’’ (R. 11.)

The case of George Kniess, who was one of the five

plaintiffs, was tried as a test case, and the other four

remained pending. The Supreme Court of Ohio, on No-

vember 30, 1938, rendered its decision in the case, George

Kniess vs. Armour, 134 O. 8. 432, 17 N. E. (2d) 734, 119

A. L. R. 1348. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the

judgment against both defendants on the grounds that:

1. The defendants were not jointly liable under the

laws of Ohio.

2. Separate causes of action against different de-

fendants may only be joined where the liability is joint;

and joinder of such distinct causes of action is improper

!

in the instant case under the Ohio statutes and does not

defeat the right of a non-resident defendant to remove

to the federal court the separate suit against such de-

fendant.

. 8. Armour was entitled to remove the cause of

action against it to the United States District Court.

4. The judgment against Burmeister was reversed

because he was not jointly liable under the laws of Ohio.

The mandate (R. 19) being returned to the Court of

Common Pleas, the petition for removal to the District.

Court of the United States in each of said five cases was

granted by the Court of Common Pleas, and said causes

were removed to and duly docketed in the United States

District Court.

Instead of filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to

this court, as. provided by law, Title 28, Sec. 344(b), U.

S. C. A., the plaintiff, George Kniess, on March 3, 1939,

filed a motion to remand, as likewise did the plaintiffs in

the other four cases. In the George Kniess case, there

was filed an affidavit in support of the motion to remand

in which Kniess claimed to be an alien and a subject of

Germany, and to copf-rm to the «alleged facts, Armour

filed a motion in the District Court to amend its petition

for removal, so as to show that Kniess was a citizen and

a subject of Germany, if such was the fact, such amend-

ment being authorized by Title 28, U. S. C. A., Sec. 399.

The petitioner in this cause never made any ruling on

the motion to amend. Petitioner entered an order re-

manding the Kniess case and the four companion cases,

in which it is not claimed the plaintiffs are aliens, but no

opinion was filed in sustaining the motion to remand. ~

Thereupon Armour filed in each of said cases a motion

f

4

5

to vacate and set aside the order to remand (R. 36), but

said motions were overruled without opinion (R. 7).

Thereupon Armour brought an original action by fil-

ing a petition for a writ of mandamus in the United

States Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

(R. 2-7), leave having first been obtained (R. 1), request-

ing the United States Circuit Court of Appeals to issue

ty the writ on the ground that petitioner failed to give full

faith and credit .o the decisions and ofders of the Su- °

preme Court of Ohio and the Court of Common Pleas of

Lucas County, Ohio, as required to do by law (Title 28,

Sec. 687, U. S. C. A.) ; that the petitioner transcended his

power in remanding these cases, as there was not and

could not be any matter presented to him for determina-

tion that had not previously been passed upon and.finally

disposed of by the Supreme Court of Ohio and the Court

of Common Pleas of Lucas County, Ohio; that the de-

cision of the Supreme Court of Ohio to the effect that

the separate suit against Armour was removable was then

res adjudicata; and the power to review the decision of

the Supreme Court of Ohio is vested solely in the Supreme

Court of the United States (Judicial Code, C. 229, Sec.

1); 43 Stat. 937, as last amended February 13, 1925

(Title 28, U.S. C. A. 344(b)) and cannot be exercised by

the petitioner herein. (R. 7-10.) a

Armour’s contention in the above res for the Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals are set forth in a Memorandum in

support of its motion for leave to file the petition, which

appears in the record at pages 40 to 60. These conten-

tions were adopted by the United States Circuit Court of

Appeals in its opinion which is reported in 109 Fed. (2d)

72, and which appears in the record, pages 66, et seq.

IV

ARGUMENT AND LAW

A. The Writ of Mandamus Is the Only Available Rem-

edy to Correct the Refusal of the District Court to

Give Full Faith and Credit to the Judgments of the

Ohio Courts.

The respondent concedes that an order of remand

by a District Court is not reviewable by appeal or writ

of error and likewise concedes that the usual order of

remand following an original determination of the ques-

tion by the District Court is not reviewable by way of a

write of mandamus.‘

It is the contention of Armour in the instant case

that the action of the District Court went beyond the

usual order of remand, in that the District Court pur-

ported to make.a determinaticn of a matter that had

already been submitted to and passed upon by the state

courts, and that the order of the District Court in effect

refused to give full faith and credit to the decisions and

orders of the state courts. 28 U, S. C. A., Sec. 687, pro-

vides in part that:

s<# * © The records and judicial proceedings of

the courts of any State * * * shall have such

faith and credit given to them in every court within

the United States as they have by law or usage

— the courts of the State in which they are

en.’

It is well settled that a judgment in the courts of a

state is conclusive in the federal courts between the

(1) Employers Reinsurance Corporation vs. Bryant, 299 U. S. 374, 378-381.

7

parties whether the question determined was one of fed-

eral, general or local law, even though the state courts

may have decided a jurisdictional question erroneously.

The plaintiffs in the State Court had a right to liti-

gate either in the State Court or in the District Court the

question as to whether or not Armour and Burmeister

were properly joined. The plaintiffs, had they desired

to do so, could have permitted the Common Pleas Court

to issue an ex parte order of removal. On the other

hand, they could, and im this instance did, request and

receive a hearing on that question in the Court of Com-

mon Pleas and in the Court of Appeals of Lucas County,

Ohio and in the Supreme Court of Ohio.

It is the contention of Armour that an adequate state

rérfledy was available to the plaintiffs in the State Court,

and having invoked that and pursued it to final judg-

ment, they cannot escape the effect of that adjudica-

tion.

It was the duty of the Supreme Court of Ohio to

decide the questions presented to it. That decision,

whether right or wrong, was an exercise of jurisdiction.

If the decision was wrong, that did not make the judg-

ment void, nor subject to revision by the District Court

of the United States. It merely left it open to reversal

or modification in this court, providing an appropriate

and timely proceeding was instituted. Until reversed or

modified by this court, the decision of the Supreme Court

of Ohio constituted an effective and conclusive adjudica-

tion. No court of the United States except the Supreme —

ee vs. lowa State Traveling Men’s Association, 283 U. S. 522, 524-

y ae Surety Co. vs. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156, 164-167.

(3) American Surety Co. vs. Baldwin, supra; (1)

% Baldwin vs. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Association, supra. (1)

Court can modify that judgment. This court will compel

all courts of the United States to give full faith and credit

to that judgment until it reverses or modifies it in the

manner authorized by law.‘

It would be extremely rare for a District Court of the

United States to disregard a decision of the State Court

upon a question on which the state law is admittedly con-

clusive. Not only is this required by law, but it is indis-

peusable for the preservation of the proper relations be-

tween federal and state courts. The orderly administra-

tion of justice requires that courts of the United States

having no appellate functions over state courts should

enot be resorted to in order to nullify or supersede by

their decrees a decision of the highest court of the state

between the same parties. It was the right and duty of

the Cirenit Court of Appeals to give great weight to the

decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio and to respect it

and give effect to it as a decision which estopved the

parties from renewing the same contentions before the

United States District Court of Ohio. The highest de-

gree of courtesy, good faith and respect should mark the

relations between courts of different jurisdictions, and

since the petitioner herein failed and refused to give

@ffect to the judgment,of the Supreme Court of Ohio, it

was the duty of the United States Circuit Court of Ap-

peals to compel him to do so.“

The mere form of the application made to the Dis-

trict Court does not determine the issue decided. The

question before this court is not whether mandamus is

proper to review an order made in response to a petition

‘Rooker vs. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413.

(5)City of Boston vs. McGovern, 292 Fed. 705, 707-710-714-718. Certiorari

denied, 265 U. S. 581.

<

et a — _ ———————

designated as a motion to remand, but whether a District

Court of the United States has power to review a decision

of the Supreme Court of Ohio and in the attempted exer-

cise of that power divest itself of jurisdiction of a con-

troversy committed to it under the laws of the United

States. Mandamus is the appropriate remedy where

the District Court asserts a power it does not have.

If the petitioner’s contentions are correct, the Court

of Common Pleas of Lucas County, Ohio, is faced with a

mandate of the Supreme Court of Ohio ordering the

causes in question removed, and with a conflicting man-

date from the District Court purporting to make a sec-

ond determination and a contradictory order on the same

question. This situation certainly does not accomplish

the objects of the removal statutes ‘‘to suppress further

prolongation of the controversy.”‘” Surely it was never

intended that a question should be litigated through the

courts of Ohio and finally determined by the Supreme

Court of Ohio and that ‘the identical question could then

. be considered de novo by the District Court and decided

by the District Court contrary to the decision of the Su-

preme Court of Ohio, particularly when‘\it is admitted

that the question involved is determined exclusively by

the law of Ohio, as construed by the courts of Ohio.

Counsel for petitioner agree that the decision of the

Supreme Court of Ohio was res judicata on the question

of removability, but claim that the Federal] Court in re-

manding ‘‘does not decide that it was improperly re-

moved, but merely that it has appeared at a later stage

of the proceedings that there is in fact no basis for fed-

(6) Metropolitan Trust Co., 218 U. S. 312;

Windhols vs. Everitt, 74 Fed. (2d) 834.

(1D) Employers Reinsurance Company vs. Bryant, supra (1)

10

eral jurisdiction.’’ The petitioner’s position is stated on

page 24 of his brief as follows: »

<# * * We agree that the decision of the Su-

preme Court of Ohio was res judicata on the ques-

tion of removability, because that question can

only be solved on a determination of the substan-

tive law of the State-of Ohio with respect to joint

liability. But the Cirenit Court of Appeals over-

looked the fact that a federal district judge in re-

manding a case under the above statute does not

decide that it was improperly removed, but merely

that tt appeared at a later stage of the proceedings

that there is im font no basis for yr nach jurisdic-

tion. Removability is determined from the peti-

tion and the petition for removal. But the right

and duty to remand under the above statute con-

templates a consideration of any and all facts

which may later appear and which may show that

in fact there is no basis for federal jurisdiction.

* * *.% (Italics ours.) |

In support of the foregoing statement, the petitioner

cites two cases that are in no wise in point. On thacon® °

trary it is well settled that the federal court does not lose

jurisdiction once it has attached, even though the plain-

tiff may amend to reduce his claim below the jurisdic-

tional amount; the plaintiff dismisses the case after

the defendant has filed a counterclaim below the jurisdic-

tional amount; the residence of the parties is changed

or a substitution is made so that the requisite diversity of

citizenship no longer exists;“® the plaintiff -files an

Tawa 15 How. 198; St. Paul Indemnity Co. vs. Cab Co.

(9) Kirby vs. American Soda Fountain Co., 194 U. S. 141, 146.

(0°) Morgan’s Heirs vs. Morgan, 2 Wheat. 290, 297;

Mollan vs. Torrance. 9 Wheat. 537;

Dunn vs. Clarke, 8 Pet. 1;

Clarke vs. Mathewson. 12 Pet. 164;

Phelps vs. Oaks, 117 U. S. 236;

H. g vs. Ray, 151 U. S. 112;

Wichita. R. & Light Co. vs. Public Utilities Comm’n, 260 U. S. 48.

OQ

11

amended pleading which would not have warranted a re-

moval originally ;“ or even if it appears from the orig-

inal petition that the defendant has a pississ defense on

the merits if asserted.“ y

Obviously the result of the sed does not affect or

- determine the jurisdiction of the federal court. -If it

did, the court could never enter a judgment for the plain-

tiff for less than $3,000 and could never enter a judg-

ment for the defendant, but would always be required to

remand the cause to the state courts.

The petitioner makes the further point that as to

one of the five cases involved, it appeared after an

amended complaint, stipulation and answer had been

filed in the federal court, that the plaintiff was not in

fact a citizen of Ohio, but was an alien. As previously

stated, Armour promptly filed a motion pursuant to 28

U. S. C. A. 399 to amend the petition for removal to

show, if it was a-facé, that the plaintiff was an alien. .

The District Court made no ruling on this motion and

by disposing of all five cases in the same fashion ap-

parently took the position the alienage of the one plain-

tiff was not material .to the disposition of the case.

- We agree that a cause cannot be removed on the

ground of separable controversy when the plaintiff is an

alien. However, it is well settled that where the plaintiff

has joined in the same petition a separate suit against

one defendant with a separate and distinct suit against

another defendant, either separate suit may be removed

1) Pullman Co. us. Jenkins, 305 U. S. 534, 537.

(12) Interstate B. & L. Ass'n vs. Ed. efield Hotel Co., 109 Fed. 692;

_. Armstrong vs. Walters, 219 Fed. 320

Mullins Lumber Co. vs. Williamson <a ° Brown Land Co., 246 Fed. 232.

5

A

‘32 i

on the grounds of diversity, whether the plaintiff is an

alien or a citizen.“® __

The distinction between a separable controversy and

a separate suit had no significance until one of the plain-

tiffs claimed to be an alien. However, the Supreme

Court of Ohio held in the Kniess case that two separate

suits had been improperly combined in the petf€ion and

in fact reversed as to the defendant Burmeister, solely

on the ground that his demurrer for misjoinder of par-

ties should have been sustained. The holding by the Su-

preme Cqyrt of Ohio in the Kniess case is discussed

somewhat further in Losite vs. Kruse, Jr., 136 O. S. 183

(decided January 3, 1940). After citing the Kniess case

and several others, the court said at page 187:

‘<* * * Tn such case there can be no joinder in

a single action of the party primarily liable and

the party secondarily liable use there is no

joint liability. If they are joined in an action and

this relationship appears on the face of the peti-

tion it is demurrable for misjoinder of parties de-

fendant.- If it does not appear on the face of the

petition but develops from the evidence on the

triel, the plaintiff may, on motion, be required to

elect as to which one of the two he will pursue,

dismissing the other from the action, but not nec-

essarily from the claim. Canton Provision Co. vs.

Gauder, supra; Bello vs. City of Cleveland, supra;

(13) Lucania, etc. vs. U. S. Corporation, 15 Fed. (2d) 568;

Stewart et al. vs. Nebraska Tire & Rubber Co., 39 39 Fed, (2d) 309;

Tillman vs. Russo Asiatic Bank, 51 Fed. (2d) "1023

Hammer et al. vs. British Type ‘Investors. Inc., - Fed. Supp. 497;

Rogge vs. Michael Del Balso, Inc., 15 Fed. S 499 ;

Young vs. Southern Pacific Co., 15 ye (2d)

‘The oregoing cases hold that a right of removal exists as toa “separate

suit” even though it is permissible under the state practice to join it in the

same petition with a “non-removable suit.”

It necessarily follows that the right to remcve exists in the five cases

against Armour where the joinder in the same petition of the claims against

Burmeister is not under the Ohio law permitted.

13

Morris vs. Woodburn, supra; Village of Mimeral

City vs. Gilbow, supra; French, Admr., vs. Central

Construction Co., 76 Ohio St. 509, 81 N. E. 751,

12 L. R. A. (N.S.) 669; City of Rochester vs. Camp-

bell, 123 N. Y. 405, 25<N. E. 937; City of Chicago

vs. Robbins, 67 U. S. (2 Black) 418, 17 L. Ed. 298.”

%

In other words, had the cases remained in the state

courts, the plaintiffs would be required to file a separate

petition against Armour and a separate petition against

Burmeister“* under the provisions of Ohio General Code

11312, which provides:

‘*Procedure if causes are misjoined. When a

demurrer is sustained on the ground of misjoinder

of several causes of action, on motion of the plain-

tiff the court may allow him, with or without costs,

to file several petitions, each including such 6f the

causes of action as might have been joined; and

an action shall be docketed for each of the peti-

tions, and be proceeded in without further serv-

ice.”’

The petitioner also suggests that the petitions for

removal did not in terms state that ‘‘a separable contro-

versy’’ existed. The «xistence of a separable contro-

versy or of a separate suit which entitled Armour to re-

move was dependent entirely upon the allegations of the

plaintiff’s petition, and it is well settled that the petition

for removal should only include statements of fact not

already appearing on the record.“® Furthermore, the

petitioner in another part of his brief (page 24) states:

‘c* * * We agree that the decision of the Su-

preme Court of Ohio was res judicata on the ques-

tion of removability, because that question can

(14) Compare McGowan vs. Rishel, 125 O. S. 77, 80.

(15) Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad vs. Cockrell, 232 U. S. 146.

>

qe

14

only be solved on a determination of the substan-

tive law of the State of Ohio 110 with respect to joint

liability. dO eh

The petitioner agrees that this question has been

finally disposed of by the Supreme Court of Ohio. It is

also true that it was decided correctly. The petitioner’s

claim that he possesses, power to review and reverse the

decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio finds no support 4

in the statutes or authorities.

1

CONCLUSION

We respectfully submit that the action of the court

below was in all respects proper and that no substantial

purpose can be served except a further ‘‘prolongation of

the controversy’’ by granting a writ of certtorari in this

case.

Epwarp W. Ketsey, Jr.,

Frep A. Smirx,

Joun P. Doyzg,

Counsel for Respondent.

Of Counsel:

Wettss, Kersey, Copourn & Harrineron.

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