Reply Brief for the Petitioner — Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp.

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“IN THE

7 _SIPENE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES :

OCTOBER TERM, 941.

EXHIBIT SUPPLY COMPANY, |.)

Petitioner,

WP ae | Wo 154,

‘ ‘ACE PATENTS CORPORATION, -

Respondent. 7

‘ GENCO, INC., :

mae Petitioner, — :

; VS. . * \ S Wo. 185. |

ACE PATENTS ‘CORPORATION, 7

. Respondent. 7

ae CHICAGO GOIN M MACHINE-COMPANY, ) ree

. Petitioner, | :

a, 4 WNo. 156.

we PATENTS CORPORATION,

Respondent. J

PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF.

CLARENCE E, THREEDY,

| JOHN H, SUTHERLAND,

. | _ Counsel for Petitioners.

St. Lovis Law Printine Co., 415 North Eighth Street. CE ntral’4477.*

tee

INDEX. _

The record amiply shows the intervening right icons 2

The Nelson application as. originally filed did not

cover the interv ening device.......--++seeee eee ‘3°

If, as respondent contends, infringement is deter-

mined by mechanical equivalents, the claim serves

no ‘good PUrpose......sceecepereeeeereeeege erste ae

The doctrine of mechanical equivalents as a device for

‘enlarging a. patent monopoly ‘beyond the terms of

- the claims is not in the public” iaterest, and should

be abolished...........--cecceceeeseeserrncences 6

The ‘one limitation which respondent admits having

made pursuant to the requirement of the Patent

/. Office clearly precludes suai somgie by Exhibits

6, 8,9 wf ee tseceedeteeseacnrerecedeces 8

Summary Boras NE oy fe POET PT LT sR LE Cian, 9

Cases Cited.

- Altoona Theatres y. Tri-Ergon Coyp., 294 U. S. 477.. 6

American Fruit Growers, Inc., v. Brogdex Co., 283

WL 8. 1,6. cg ewserceccceccecesecees Stegeeeeenenes 3,4 -

Burns v. Meyer, 100 U. S. 671....-.- essere ee eeeees 6

Carnegie Steel (“o. V. Cambria Iron Co., 185 v.! S. 403,

eet eo ckevsyasnvesevacs¢ neeesees oscars

- Cimiotti ‘Unhairing Co. v. American Fur Ref. oy

*-*

~~

198 U.S, 399......: = Br cee ow atemtibe ables 26's 0% 6

Cuno Engineering Corp. Vv. Automatic Devices Corp.,

62 Sup. Ct. 37, decided November 10, 1941. Evie steay £

Day.v. Fair Haven & W. Ry. Co., 182 *, Seer 6

‘Deering v. Wi inona Harvester Wrks., 195 U.S. 286.... 6

‘Grant v. Walter, 148 U. S. 547...... eee Ls ocx wleaehens 6

‘Haines v. McLaughlin, 135 U. S. 584......0e cere eee rag

_ Hoyt v. Horne, 145 U. S. 302 iowa ride sav eee S40e>

ii

Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 17... 2.20 - eens 8

I. T. S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U. 8.

Prk te sa tee ieatersicsetsenes ra tadeas ios 6

Ives‘ et al. v. Hamilton, We Ore Mas Cc uvosesovesate 5,10 .

. Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix lron Co., 95 U.S. m4 6

Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator” Co., 290

i Why Eee SVG bate eees COVER ead cgi sesVuad eden < 10

Merrill v. Yeomans; 94 U.-S. 568.............5....: 6

Minerals Separation v. Butte & Superior Mining ‘Co,

ela es Lbs 6 hbk Keine eens.0S0s cahepewe 6

Morton Salt ‘Co. v. G. 8. Suppiger Co., decided Janu-

ary = eee le vpacede vege sosdeodcsoevsiddcos 10

Pepin Ve, Bee Whe Ek Oca ons cess ste vicsecseosce 6

Powers Kennedy Co. v.' Concrete Co., 282 U. S. 175,

De. swe sacar cases ee Wale tee Were ead eR Rha Cee say as dee 10

Railroad Co. v. Mellon, 104 U. S. 112................5 6

Railway Co. v. Sayles, 97 U.S. 554, 563, 564......... 10

Sargent v. Hall Safe & Loek Co., 114 U.S. 68. ....... s

Sehriber-Sehroth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.

tO ere be dew Gnerawyide Ove cobey scutes et

Schriber-Schroth vy. Cleveland Trust Co., $1) U. S.

* Sav akounenee Uhoteeadctteabisesedcstebata- 6.

. Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U. &, 508, GOB. -. z....226s. s

Singer Mfg. Co. v. Cramer, 192 U. S..265...... aiken 6

Smith vy. Magie City Kennel Club, 282 W. S. 784. .° s

Snow v. Lake Shore & M. ‘8. Ry. _Co., 121 U. S.

Sy rece bUs co Rha Deu he heen wesbecbavesdesctacaps 4, 7, 10

-White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47.......... petedevesede 6

Winans v. Denmead, 36 U.S. S80... 2... eee eee 5, 6, 10

Yale Lock Co. v. Greenleaf, 117 U. S. 554........ ee.

ye Report of the Commissioner of coceaed 1869,

Th Wivecvnvenbecsdstavss pa eeieatde Rens pahigte abe 4,7

16 Stat. at aaa nk Diidedees Pitatdeewss Srekaicaiah heated ; &

: Gee COG A, Come Bis ais cas ccies obeebib ceeds 4 -

é . R 4 - 2

“ ;

: . ,

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER a 1941.

EXHIBIT ‘SUPPLY COMPANY, )":

Petitioner, “i

eA . ~ — b-No. 154,

ACE PATENTS CORPORATION,

Respondent. |

GENCO, INC., ’

Petitioner,

vs. 3 No. 155,

ACE PATENTS CORPORATION,

Respondent. J

CHICAGO COIN MACHINE COMPANY,

‘Petitioner,

V8. + No. 156. -

~ ACE PATENTS CORPORATION,

. __ Respondent. }

To the Honorable the/ Chief Justice and the rt

| Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

A

_ The colored plate at the end of Respondent's Brief does

not illustrate any of the accused devices. Hence, it appears

irrelevant. ]

Much of Respondent ’s discussion is quite-afield from the .

definitely crystallized questions of law presented by the

Petition and our main Brief on the merits. We deenrit.

‘unnecessary to reply to Respondent’s Brief, in gross, but

a few points require clarification in reply. ;

9 . ‘ . —

' The Record Amply Shows the Intervening Right.

‘ spondent’s witness Maloney, an officer of the pat- |

entee’s employer and brother of the original assignee, pro-

duced (R. 89, 91) a series of advertisements, including

Exhibits 23 and 24, relating to the ‘‘Homé Run”’ game, ~

which ‘‘appeared ‘about that, time”’ (February, 1937).* :

The advertisements of the ‘‘Home Run’’ game (Ex. 23,

R, 357; and Ex. 24, R. 359) as reproduced in the record are

~net so clear but that one, ignorant of the facts, might

misunderstand the vertical member to be a part of the

_spring, rather than a separate. nail-like pin; but Respond-

ent igpot ‘justified in so representing to this Court.

Any doubt about ‘thy dructure shown in these ititasihi.

ments of the ‘Home Run” game (Exs. 23 and 24) is dis-

spelled in the light of the testimony (R. 159- 160):

“XQ. 26. Mr. Koci, when you referred to the intro-

duction of the bumpef type game in the fall of 1936,

you were speaking of a game that employed a bumper

switch such as is mounted upon Plaintiff’s Exhibit

No. 11? (Mr. Ooms hands object to the witness.)-

A. Not in the fall. At the close of the year.

XQ. 27. At the close of the year?

A. That is:the bumper switeh.

XQ. 28. Who first produced ‘that switch do; you

know?

A. I believe it was the Bally Manufacturing Com-

pany.

XQ. 29. And that was the first time you saw a game —

of that type on the market? ;

A. With that particular switch.

XQ: 30. Now, subsequently the Chicago Coin Ma-

chine Company made a device with-a switch of that

kind, did it not? ae :

A. Not of that type. : °

XQ. 31. What was the difference? :

*ioth Maloney and the patentee; Nelson, testified that they kept in-

formed about what was going on in the industry (R. 67, 98).

o

—3—

. -

oe The différence. was that it did. wit se the mem-

- ber 19 extending downward and it was merely an

angular annular spring and we ‘inserted four nails

.into the board. This merely turned on a.light or

turned off a light; in other words, once this bumper

spring was touched by a ball, it became dead. - °°

- XQ. 39. What about this switch, Plaintiff’s inet

SR Ba SO | :

A. That is the one. —-.

XQ. 40. You made that?

_ A. We made that.

~ XQ. 41. And when dia you begin making divest

A.-I believe the first game we started using that on

was a game caHed ‘Home Run,’ and that was in the —

early part of 1937.’?

The ‘‘Home Run’? game, it will be recalled, was the

subject. of the advertisements, Exhibits 23 and 24, pub-

lished i in February. and March, 1937 (R. 3574).

The claim in suit was injected into the Nelson applica-

tion June 10, 1937 (R. 443-446).

The Nelson Application as Originally Filed Did Not

-Cover the Intervening Device.

When Respondent asserts (Brief p.'6) that Claim 2 of

the original application covered the intervening device,

it evidently ov setlooks the fact that that claim, hike original

Claim 1, required a

‘spring including an siigebiashe (R. 437).

‘ The. only such” ‘‘extension” shown, described or’ sug-

gested by Nelson’s application, :as filed, was the depending

leg 19. - Words of a claim are a]ways read in the light .of

the specification (Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co.,

185 U. S. 403, 432;. American: Fruit Growers, Inc., v

_*Emphasis supplied throughout except when contrary is indicated.

Fr

Beoigdeiz Co., 283 U. 8.1, 6; Schriber-Schroth v. Cleveland ;

Trust Co., 305 U. 8. 47, 57 ).°°

If, as Respondent Contends, ‘tutitagemneat Is episnined

by Mechanical Equivalents, the Claim

Serves No Good Purpose.

It is idle for Respondent to sdy (Brief p. 8) that the doc-

trine of mechanical equivalents has béen applied ‘without -

difficulty’’ since Winans v. Denmead, 56 U. S. 330. On the

_ contrary, the difficulty forecast by the dissenting opinion

in that case has repeatedly. manifested -itself. (See cases

cited pages 13-14 of the Petition herein.) Indeed, in 1869,

the Commissioner of Patents iri his Annual Report to the

Congress. said (p. 8):

‘‘The great source of litigation is the conflict upon

the issue of infringement, or tlie effort on thé part

of the inventor to carry the patent beyond the limits

assigned to it by the’ Office at the time of its ‘issue.’’

The same Congress to which that report was made sub-

sequently passed the Patent Act of 1870, which was the

first statute requiring a patentee to “‘distinctly claim the

part, improvement or combination which he claims as his

invention or discovery.’’+ (Sec. 26, 16 Statutes at Large

198). This is carried verbatim in R. S. 4888 (35 U. S.

Code33), now in force.

The Commissioner’s. criticism, above quoted, cannot be

overlooked as an.element influencing the. statutory re-

. quirement Of a formal claim.

**Thé monopoly “cannot be enlarged by claims in the patent net sup-

ported by the description. Snow v. Lake Shore & M_S. Ry, Co., 121 U.S.

617.”

In Snow vy. Lake Shore & M.-S. Ry. Co. it was held that a patentee

disclosing but one embodiment and semsaaeed no atternatives: re.

stricted to that form.

tThe previous statute (5 Statutes | at = tae 117, Act of 1836) simply re-

quired the patentee to “particularly specify arti_point out the part, im-

provement or combination which he claims as his own invention or dis- -

covery.”

/

- , = a—

While Respondent cites nineteen decisions of this Court -

(Brief pp. 10-11). ma asserts that they represent reaffirma-

tion of the doctriné of mechanical equivalents, it is sig-

nificant that in but three of those cases, to-wit: Winans v.

Denmead, 56 U. S. 330; Ives et al. v. Hamilton, 92 U. 8S.

426, and Hoyt v. Horne, 145 U. 8. 302, did this Court hold

a defendant .liable for infringement where. the accused

device was not reached by the terms of the claim. And ~

of those three cases, only Hoyt v. Horne involved a patent

applied for after the Statute had been amended to require

a formal claim. |

On the contrary, the substance* of the dissenting opinion

*“The patentee, not exaggerating the theoretical superiority of the form

- of his car, overlooked those facts which reduced its practical value to the

level of cars of a form w'dely variant from his own. The object of thie

suit is to repair that defect of observation. It is, that this court shall

extend, by construction, the scope and operation of his patent, to embrace

every form which in practice: will yield a result sypstantially equal or |

a Ste

approximate to his own (56 U. 8S. 346).

“The plaintiff confines his claim to the use of. the conical form, and ex-

cludes from his specification any allusion to any other. He muist have

done so advisedly. He might have been unwilling to expose the validity

of his patent, by the assertion of a right to any other. Can he abandon

the ground of his patent, and ask now, for the exclusive use of all cars

which, by experiment, shall be found to yield the advantages which h

-anticipated for conical cars only? .. ‘ ,

“The claim of today is, that an octagonal car is an-infringement of this

patent. Will this be the limit to that claim? Who cap tell the bounds

within which the mechanical industry of the country may freely exert

‘itself. What restraints does this patent impose in this branch of me-

chanic art? 7

“To escape the incessant and intense competition which exists in every ~

department of industry, ‘it is not strange that persons should seek the

- cover of the patent act, for any happy cffort of contrivance or construc-

tion; nor that patents should be very frequently employed to obstruct

invention, and to deter from legitimate operations of @kill and ingenuity.

This danger was foreseen, and provided for, in the patent act. The

patentee is obliged, by law, to describe his invention, in such full, clear,

and’ exact terms, that from the description. the invention may be con-

structed and used. Its principle and modes of operation must be ex-

plained; and the invention shall particularly ‘specify and point’ out what

he claims as his invention. Fullness, clearness, exactness, preciseness,

and particularity, in thé description of the invention, its principlé, and of |

the matter claimed to be invented, will alone fulfill the demands of Con-

gress or the wants of the country. Nothing. in the administration of this

law, will be more mischievous, more productive of oppressive and costly

litigation, of exorbitant-andunjyst_ pretensions and vexatious ‘demands,

more injurious to labor, than a relaxation of these—wise .and salutary .

requisitions of the act of Congrese. In my judgment, the principles “ot

legal interpretation, as well as the public interest, require, that this lan-

‘guage of this statute shall have its full significance arid import” (56

U. 8. 347). ; .

>.

a

= § —. .

in Winans v. Denmead had been adopted by this Court in|

many cases holding that the monopoly of a patent is.

limited by. the claims thereof. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U. S. |

568; Keystoné Bridge Co. v. Phoenix-Iron Co., 95 U. 8. 274;

Burns v. Meyér, 100 U. S. 671; Parks v. Booth, 102 U. S. 96;

Railroad Co. y. Mellon, 104 U. 8S, 112; Yale. Lock Co. v.

Greenleaf, 117 U. S. 554; White v. Dunbar, 119 U. S. 47;

Day v. Fair Haven & W. Ry. Co., 132 U. S. 98; Haines v.

McLanghlin, 135 U. S. 584; Grant v. Walter, 148 U. 8.

547; Deering v. Winona Harvester Wrks., 155 U. S. 286;

Singer Mfg. Co. ‘v. Cramer, 192 U. S. 265; Minerals Sepa-

ration v. Butte & Superior Mining Co., 250 U. S. 336;

I. T. S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U. S. 429;

Altoona Theatres .v. Tri-Ergon Corp. 294 U. S. 477;

Schriber-Schroth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 °U. 8.47; _

Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. American Fur be Co., 198

U.S. 399. “ | oo aa

Indeed, the dissenting opinion in Winans v. Denmead is .

not without recent recognition by this Court in Cano Engi-

neering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 62 Sup. Ct. 37,

decided November 10, 1941. hs ve

If, as Respondent contends, it is mechanical squivalencé,

and_ not the terms-of the claim, which determines the limits

. of a patent monopoly, the purpose thus repeatedly ascribed

to the claim, by this Court, is destroyed, and the claim

serves no purpose but to mislead. '

The Doctrine of Mechanical Equivalents as. a Device for

7 Enlarging a Patent. Monopoly Beyond the Terms of

the Claims Is Not in the Public Interest, and Should

, Be Abolished.

We insist that the.doctrine of mechanical equivalents,

as applied by the lower courts inthis case, following -

_ Winans v. Denmead, 56 U. S. 330, serves no purpose other

than to enable patentees “to carry the patent beyond the

-

ur

its re

me WEN

limits assigned to it by the Office at the time of its issue,”

as stated by the Commissioner of Patents in 1869, supra.

We dispute Respondent’s suggestion (Br. p. 12) that

abolition. of the doctrine of mechanical equivalents would

interfere with the practical administration of the patent

laws. ‘Every patent.applicant has full opportunity, in the

Patent Office, to make his claims as broad as the prior art

will permit, consistent with his disclosure. Any inventor

eqn draw his claims’ broad enough. to cover all the %literna-.

_ tive he contemplates at the time of filing, but failing to

do so, no doctrine of mechanical equivalents or any other

doctrine should entitle him to retroactively. broaden. his

a embrace unforeseen devéfopments of

others. ae

Contrary to Respondent’s contention (Br. p. 11) that

R. S. 4888 requires an inventor only to “set forth the best

mode of.applying the principle of his jpvention,” the stat-

ute requires, in addition, an explanation of the principle

thereof. As a practical matter, when an inventor explains

his principle, he can draw his claims in terms of “means”

and thereby acquire protection | upon the full range of.

’ alternatives or, mechanical equivalents by which that prin-

ciple can be reduced to practical purpose. But when, as

here, the “best mode” is itself the principle, the patent

must be limited to what ‘is disclosed, as this Court held in

Snow v. L. 8. & M.S. R. R. Co., 121 U.S. 617 (1. ¢. 630):

“It_is not_admissible to adopt the argument made

on behalf of the appellants, that this language is to

be taken as a mere recommendation by the patentee

of the manner in which he prefers to arrange these

' parts of his machine. There is nothing in the context

to.indicate that the patentee contemptated any alter-

‘native for the arrangement of the piston and piston-

‘ rod..*-* * the conclusion seems unavoidable that

the patentee intended the detachment of the piston

from its rod as an essential part of the combination

to be covered by the first claim. n

o- pehoe —,

=,

“The One Limitation Which Respondent Admits Having

+> Made Pursuant to the Requirement of the Patent Office

. Clearly Precludes apg ef Exhibits 6, 8, 9

and 10, ; -

_ That-Nelson did not : isin ‘ the Beeiniaer’s require-

ments in all respects does not mitigate the file wrapper.

estoppel created by his accession with respect to the man-

ner of mounting the complementary conductor.

_ Respondent admits, (Br. p. 17) that the claim in suit

~ was limited ‘‘with respect to the complementary ae ce

' (in Nelson the brass ferrule embedded in the board). ”

course, there can be no denial that the claim in-suit was

. limited, by amendment, to the complementary conductor

embedded in the board. When the amendment was made, —

_ Nelson’s solicitor remarked (BR. 450): .

‘‘Claim 7 has been significantly amended near the

end to define the complementary conductor contact as

¢ being embedded in the table.’’

Previously, the claim had merely required that the com-

plementary conductor be ‘‘carried by’? the table.*

That amendment clearly manifested an intention to dis- :

claim all forms in which the complementary conductor was

not actually embedded. in the -table. Shepard v. Carrigan,

> 146 U.S. 593, 598; Smith v: Magic City Kennel Club, 282

U. S. 784; Sargent v: Hall Safe & Lock Co., 114 U. S. 63;

Hubbell v. United States, 179 U. S. 77; eyo inenees

. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211. * sae

Even the majority opinion in Winans ¥. Denmead, supra,

would preclude infringement by a thing whose comple-

tary conductor was not. actually embedded in the

table. In the passage quoted by Respondent (Br. P. 9) the

court makes such an exception:

alialabhne hee 7

*At page 18 of Respondent's brief it is-admitted “the words ‘carried by

_ are far more\comprehensive than the substitujed mngunge ‘embedded in.’

ies

“the patentee * * * is,?in contemplation of law, deemed

to claim every form. in. which his invention may be

copied, unless he manifests an intention to Gocteten

some of those forms. xy

By deliberate sieeliaiid acquiescing in the jconieemeet

of ‘the Examiner, the embedding of the conductor in the

table became, if indeed it was, not already,.a. sine qua non .

of Nelson’ s patent. Nothing ean infringe which does not

include such a complementary conductor actually em-

bedded in the. table. Respondent’s brief makes no. asser~

tion that the complementary conductors of Exhibits 6; 8,

9 and 10 are actually aresipaade in the table. They cannot

infringe.

Summary.

The patent in suit was limited by. amendment, pursuant

to requirement of the Patent Office, to a structure in

which the complementary conductor -was actually. em-

bedded in the table. Such an amendment constituted a

_ disclaimer of all forms in which the complementary con-

Guetor was mounted otherwise, ©

“Tn Exhibit 6, the complementayy conductor is mounted

in a plate, which rests: on the'top surface of the table.

The conduetor extends through a large hole in the table.

There is no embeddéd ‘relation.

In Exhibit 10, the complementary conductor is mounted

in an insulating plug ‘which, in turn, is mounted in-a .

plate which rests on the top surface of the table. The

conductor, as well as the plug, extends through a large

- hole in the table. .The embedded relation is absent. .

In Exhibit 8, the complementary conductor is a sleeve

surrounding the standard and connected with a plate

which rests on the top surface of the table. A wire ‘lead-

ee

—10—

eas to the: plate extends shiveideth a bids hole in ins table.

The embedded relation is again iooking:

In Exhibit 9, the comaplementary conductor is a sleeve

_ surrounding an insulating cap held well above the top|

surface of the table. A wire leading to the sleeve passes.

through a large hole in the: <table. None of these parts

. even touch the table. They. cannot be embedded therein. '

In Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 7 ‘the complementary. conduc-

tor is a nail-or pin driven into.the table. Construed by

the dictionary, this may be ‘embedded,’’ but circum-

stances exist here which require .a more ‘restricted : con:

struction of ‘‘embedded. 9 The circumstanees are:

(a) That after Exhibit 5 appeared on the market, the.

Ne]son’ application was amended ‘‘almost in the. very ~

words’? of Exhibit 5. If this does not ‘‘destroy the patent’

. (Powers Kennedy Co. v. Concrete Co., 282 U. S. 175, 186),

er constitute such unclean hands as to bar relief (Key-:

_ stone: Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U. S. 240; ;

Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., decided January 5,

1942), # at least compels a restriction of the claim by the

specification (Railway Co. v. Sayles, 97 U. S. 554, 563, 564;

» Schriber-Schroth v. Cleveland Trust’ Co., 305 U: S. 47, 57).

“ (b) That Nelson disclosed but one form in his applica-

tion, as filed, and suggested no -alternativé for the leg

extension 19 or the annular ferrule embedded in the table.

_ Inssuch circumstances, the patent must be restricted to the —

- form shown (Snow v. Lake Shore and M. S, /Ry. Go., 121

U. S. 617, cited with “approval in Schritler-Schroth. v.

Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U. S. 4i, 57). :

While we submit that. the .so- -called doctrine 4f mechani-

cal equivalents, as applied in Winans v. Denmea , 56 U.S. -

330; Ives v.. Hamilton, 92 U. S. 426, and Hoyt v. Horne, »

145 U. S. 302, to enlarge the monopoly a patent beyond

-_

aes}

the terms of its.claim should be abolished; it is clear that

such doctrine should not be applied to render nugatory ~

‘a file wrapper estéppel or an intervening right as estab-

lished in this case. Even if such doctrine of mechanical .

equivalents is not abolished, the exist¢nce of the file

wrapper estoppel, .and the existence of\ the intervening

right, would seem to preclude infringement by any one of

the accused devices.

be It is, therefore; respectfully submitted that the jedgmont

of the court below should. be reversed and the cases re-_

: manded to ‘the District Court, with directions to -disiniss

- the Complaints.

"Respectfully submitted,

" CLARENCE E. THREEDY,

_JOHN H. UTHERLAND,

st ‘ , ‘ounsel. for Petitioners.

St. Louis, Mo., o

January 10, 1942. es a

A