Brief for White Swan Co — National Labor Relations Board v. White Swan Co.

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CHARLES ELWORE CROPLEY

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1940. ~

NO. 529.

ys . °

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

Vv.

| WHITE SWAN COMPANY.

On Certificate From the United States Circuit Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

BRIEF FOR WHITE SWAN COMPANY.

*

4 | ; ' \

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{

H. C. A. HOFACKER,

Attorney for White Swan Company. |

28 St. Nickolas Building, ae

Pittsburgh, Pa. * rs

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SMITH BROS. CO. INC., LAW PRINTERS, 208-212 GRANT STREET, PITTSBURGH, PA,

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INDEX.

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oer eeeve eevee eeeewewneavr ee en eee eeneeeeeeeneaeee

The Laundry and Dry Cleaning Business Is a

Purely Local Service Industry Subject

Only to the Control of the States and to

Impose Federal Regulation Destroys the

Distinction Between That Which Is

tional and That Which Is Locz. .......\..

is I.

Was It the Intent of the Congress to Make the

Act Apply to Local‘ Service Establish-

WET tcc ccccccnesddcdoswuh jewees ‘Sade

The Answer to the First Question Certified by

the Lower Court, Should Be in the Nega-

tive, and-the Answer to the Second Ques-

tion Should Be inthe ais a rrre ee

Analysis of the Cases Cited by the Board in

' Support of Jurisdiction .... j 2 ue ee view aeeens

eo eee rrr Ls santiubaners Je ecaaleud spl

$ et fn

ey ae apse, a en

wae cla oft

Citations.

Citations.

40 ee 5 tidy PAGE

Abe Lainer, d/b/a Lainey Giesiners & Dyers Co., et.

al., Mass. L. R. C. Case Nos. U. P. 101, 134, 139,

4/21/88 ee he ee ee ee ee | Peeve vsees 28

Back Bay Chevrolet, Inc., et al., Mass. L. R. C. ocicia

| No. U. P. 46, 3/1/38 cee eeneSeeseces see TVET. ‘27

. Bonnano Laundry & Supply Co. (1940), Mass. i R. es

C. Case No. C. R. 408, Nov. 1940.............. - 28

Budget Laundry Co. et al., Pa. L. R. B. Case No. 170,

ME Eo be ic ee cancers evs cicexeve 29 .

Badger Nu-Way Cleaners, et al., Wisc. L. R. B. Case

No. 31, Ce 2, Dec. No. 19, Sept. 23, 1000...:5... 30

Cactus Mines Co., 21 N. L. R. B. 68.............. 16

Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v Kentucky, 154 U. S.

a Oh ae ck wk a OE KK oa ea eee ees 20

C. & W. Dyeing & Cleaning Co., Inc., et al., Mass, L.

R. C. Case No. U. P. 10, 2/10/38 aanewueny ee

Capitol Laundry Co. (1940), Mass. L. R. C. Case No.

fy & SS | Ree ans 28

—€onsolidated Laundry Corp. et al., 1937, N. Y.S. L

R. B., Dec. No. 4, Sept. 16, 1937........... 29

Crandall-McKenzie & Henderson, Inc., et al., ids

Pa. L. R. B., Dec. No. 92, 2/26/40............ 29

Community Laundry Co., inc., et al., 1937, Pa. L.

R. B. Case No. 123, May 13, 1939............. — 29

Co nwealth v. Pearl Laundry Co., 105 Ky. 259,

bs. Soe SPREE EPR EE rari ie Saar at ea . 34

etti v. U. S., 242 U.S. 470 at 490............° 35

E Consolidated Edison Company v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.

Ss. 197, 222 eceecevoenecboeeeeeetee eds meer eee Acces 39

eee Citations.

—

snes acre - PAGE

Eastern Overall¥Dry Cleaning Co. et al. (1940)

Mass. L. R. C. Casé No. U, P. 396, 1/19/40..... 28

Economy Clean Towel Supply Co. Inc., et al., 1938,

N. Y. S. L. R. B., Dec. 0. 198, July 20, 1938. . 29

East Cleaners & Dyers Inc. et al., 1938, Pa. L. R. B., :

WO; SG) ROE. BO Te ss vig oc bc cctv ccicinecess 2 /

Ellis v. Inman Paulsen & Company, 131 Federal 182 40

_ Francis V. and Edwin U. Cahill d/b/a Union Laun-

dry, et al., Mass. L. R. C., Case No. U. P. 93 May

| —+': i Ne Cea aay we a 6 od we we Oe eer bee bodes 28

"Farnsworth New Method Laundry Co., Inc., (1940)

Mass. L. R. C. Case No. C. R. 375, Aug. 13, 1940. 28

Fox Square Laundry Co., Inc., et al., 1939, N. Y. S.

_L.R. B., Dec. No. 669, Sept. 21, 1939.......... 29

Fehr Baking Company v. Bakers Union, 20 Fed.”

Supp. OP Fr Ser hhc ceye ceed) VPs Be cee eas 40)

Golden Bell.Cleaners Inc., 1940, Mass. L. R. C., Case —

No. C. R. 333, 4/29/40 bea ey GPa eidvinewekeres 28

* Howes Co. et al., Mass. L. R. C., No. U. P. 281, |

I a Sara a bah KOS ae Ca ew CER 28 +

Hub Laundry Co. (1940) Mass. L. R. C., Case No.

oa ae Ss Be ooo cent cb teks ueeks se 28 .

Hill Top Laundry Inc., et al. (1940) N.-Y.S.L. RR.

| " B,, Dee. No. 838, Case No. W. E.-156, Mar. 25, .

\ a

\ Kansas City pilin o Co. v. sialic: 5a U.S.51.. 40

Loyal Crown Linen Service Inc, et al., 1939-Mass.

_-L, RB. C. Case No. U. P. 251, 1/11/39.......... 27

Lewandos French Dyeing & Cleansing Co., 1940,

Mass. L. R. C.,-Case No. C, R. 341, 5/6/40.... 28

Lincoln Laundry Co. et al., 1939, Pa. L. R. B., Dec.

No. 136, Jan. 16, 2008. ee . .

ae iit

Seg Ser scammer PgR BER ee Od a |

Be, ,

Citations. y

PAGE

‘Liberty ae ey et al. ‘(1989), § Pa: L. R. B., Case

FEO. FE BAP PO ee ee ere lerve cau oicdie’s 30

‘Laundry Workers Int. Union et al. (1940), W.L. R.

B., Case No. 74, Ce-11, Dec. No. 47, ‘poanebaodian 30

Morgan Laundry Service Inc. (1940), Mass. L. R.

C., Case No. C. R. 386, 9/12/40 /............. 2

3 Midtown Laundry Ine. et al. (1940), N. Y.S. LR.

B., Dec. No. 804, Case No. S. E. ~4197, Feb. 8,

1940 ip PE RTE ET Oey is SS eS premee eee ' 29

N. L. R. B. v. Jones & — Steel Corporation,

i. SM BN aaa c creak seekers s 10, 17, 38.

N. L. R. B. v. Idaho Maryland Mines, 98 Fed. ae

Ps BO 6 kha Pe ELEY vs heed 4 Cale eee oo 17

Naif Makol World Cieaners & Dyers Co.,, et al; -

' Mass. *. R. C. Case No. U. P. 85, 5/23/38. . 28

N. L. R. B. v. Fainblatt, Oe OB GER iae vies veces 39

N. L..R. B. v. Bradford Dyeing & Finishing Ansocig-

tion, 60 Supreme Court 918...:./...........4 39

N. L. R. B. v. Hopwood Retinning Company, ‘ ,

. We TI Bo o.c o hcccwessqes cpececes ' 39

N. L. R. B. v. National New York Packing & Ship-

ping Company, 86 Federal 2nd 98............ 40

Protective Motor Service Co., 21 N. L. R. B. 50. 12

Pierce v. New Hampshire, 5 How. i SP eo re 20

Premier Linen Supply & Laundry Co., Inc. et al.,

1939, N. Y. S. L. R. B., Dee. No. 738, Nov. 22,

WE AEs y ccletunvebe ene sini so vetues dees 29

Prompt Family Laundry Inc., par (1940) N. vy. Ss.

LR. B,, Dec. No. 771,:1/9/40......... eede as 29

Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168.................... 33

Quality Laundry Service Inc., et al. (1937), N. Mey

S. LR. B., Dec. No. 10, Nov. 1, 1937 5h 6-Sd esd 29

“iv .

Citations. '

: eos 2 PAGE

Shechter Poultry Co. v.U. 8, 295 U.S: 495.26. oe \18

"State v. Louisville R. Co., 97 Miss. 35. . ieee wr at |

. Sani-Wash Laundry Co., et al., Mass. L. R. C, Case

Wa: U.P) 901; 0/81/08... oo nr. 28.

Shub, J. H. et al. d/b/a American Dry Cleaning Co.,

(1940) Mass. L. R. C.; Case No. C. R. bss

: PE i Ss acca wae ce. ea PCr ewaccateeTinas 28

* §tapleton Service Laandry Inc., et al., (1938) N. Y.

' §. L. R. B. Dec. No. 206, Sent. “23, Us so hse cS 29

Sorrells v. U..S_287 U. S. Reports, page 435...... 32

Smith, Clerk v. Jackson, Supreme Court of .Tenn.,

12/20/1899, 54 S. W. Reporter Page 981, 103

EE 3 os ws PN eh os oe ewe oaks 32, 33

Scannon v. Kansas City Railroad , 41 Missouri

EE oa ci N A 54 oa bain Se hea eee Le 33

Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N. LR. B. 508 U. 8.

RRA rr aa metab are Peele acre ea eae 38

‘Spokane & Inland R. Co. v. U. S. 241 U. S. 344. 40

. Tudor Laundry Co., et al. (1939) N. Y. S. L. R. B,, fi

Case No. S. U. 3581, July 12, 1939............ 29

UO, hw Dewitt, 6 Wel. OA... .. 20

United Laundries Co. et al. (1938) Mass. L. R. c. )

Se WR Iie: Cee OP EIS cob oko coe acvaeece 28

Veazie v. Moore, 14 Ow. om... i ao oh A ae 19

' Wash Rite Laundfy Co., et al., 1938 Mass. Ea: <.

Case No. U. P., 121, 6/20/38...... Ae eee 27

White Cleaners & Dyers Inc., et al., 1938, Mass. L.

R. C,, Case No. U. P. 147, 6/20/38..:........ 27

Wilson Laundry Co., et al., 1939 Pa. L. R. B., Case

oe J. En 3 BE er ere erie ee

Waukesha Palace Laundry Co., et al., Wisc. L. R. B.,

Case No. 406, C-24, Apr. 30, 1938. AEN ee ure 30

4

a

Y ,

tt:

U. S. Law Week Vol. 1 Part 2 (1934) Page 845...

U. S. Law Week Vol. 1 Part)2 (1934) Page 847....

U. S. Law Week. Vol. 1 Part 2 (1934) Page 851...

Senate Committee Report May 2, 1935, No. 573. dime

~-

. we “4 -

Citations. 5

° ad if - a

) | STATUTES: 4 «Mil

\ 2 : PAGE

* Act of July 5, 1935,-C. 372, 49 Stat. 449; 29 U. 8. C.,

Supp. V., Sec. 151, et seq......~. Vie iviengenes 30

: MISCELLANEOUS:,

eoN U.S. Law Week Vol. 1 Part 1 (1933-34) Page 518. .

\

In THE

Supreme Court: of the United: States

“OCTOBER TERM, 1940.

_ ace /

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

-. Vv.

_ WHITE SWAN COMPANY.

°

On Certificate From the United States Circuit Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

o

' BRIEF FOR bri SWAN COMPANY. .

7 ,

' | STATEMENT.

‘The White Swan Company conducts a laundry and

dry cleaning service in Wheeling, West Virginia, Wheel- e

ing béing located on one side of the Ohio River. The

- Ohio River at this point divides the states of West Vir-

ginia-and Ohio...__,

The Company owns one laundiy, one office, main-

tains no branches, has no branch sales forces in any ~*

other community other than in Wheeling for the solici-

tation of business. The Company now employs approxi-

mately eighty (80) people. For a period of fifteen years —

; _ to 1934 the company had not paid a single penny:

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of dividend to stockholders. It finally went into bank-

ruptcy and —_ oe receivership S€V- ,

eral years. Se,

In the ‘latter pert of 1936, Mr. T. ‘I. Murvin pur-

chased the controlling interest in the comp&ny from the_

receivers and then proceeded to rehabilitate the machin-

ery and operate the.company itself. Mr. Murvin was a

very able and experienced operator having a long record ~ |

. of expérience in different laundries.

In looking over the plant, he found that the great

bulk of the machinery was obsolete and worn out and

needed replacement with more modern machinery. Con-

_ siderable new machinery was purehased, in fact an un-

usual amount of new machinery, greater than the nor-

mal purchases that would ordinarily be made in a laun-"

_ dry, were made during the years 1937 and 1938.. Con-

. tracts for the purchase of this Machinery were all con-

summated at Wheeling, West Virginia.

The company operates 17 laundry routes by i means

of trucks. Fourteen of these routes operate exclusively

in West Virginia, three of the routes cross the Ohio River

at a bridge located in Wheeling and serve the other side

' ‘of the river which is the Ohio side of the river. The

- company’s service confines itself exclusively. to what_is——|

‘. known as the “Wheeling Industrial District” which dis-

trict may be defined as that area comprised within a

radius of 15 miles of the City .of Wheeling.

On May 8, 1939, a complaint was issued by the CiO

against the respondent company alleging that 12 people

were discharged for union activities. The union charged’

that the company interfered with, restrained, and

coerced. members and that the company discouraged

membership in, Local No. 308. A hearing was held there-

on and the Trial Examiner in making his Intermediate

Report upheld the company in the. dismissal of nine out

of the 12 employees involved. |

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Statement. , | 3

The Examiner ordered thé reinstatemént Of three

out of the 12 employees. The case proceeded before the

National Board for argument and the National Board °

upheld the-Examiner’s report. The Board then peti-

+ tioned the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for enforce-

ment of the’order and the entire case was argued before

the Fourth Circuit Court of Apyeam, Veoh

-

et The Company contended from the very outset of the.

case that the National Board was without jurisdiction in

this case for the reason that the respondent company

was not engaged in interstate commerce and that juris-

diction, if-any, would be within the purview of the State

- of West Varginia and not the National Board.

- Respondent company also contended that its sees.

ness was purely local and was a service business and that

the Act did not apply to it.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred in

the contentions advanced by the respondent to the effect .

that they were divided and in doubt and therefore certi-

fied to the Supreme Court two questions of law for in-

struction and advice. These questions they held were

indispensable to the proper decision -of the case. The

, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in their Statement of

Facts states that the

" “Volume of interstate business thus involved is not

sufficient in our opinion to bring the business with-

in the jurisdiction of the Board.”

" They also stated:

“The business involved is necessarily of a purely

local character as the record shows that a radius of

15. miles is the practical limit for a laundry and dty

cleaning business in this territory. The fact that

_« « business is done in Ohio outside of the state in which

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MEAS gs a Keir i SR ROOT BOURGET ARTE IRE: LAKE ss ‘= Y rae ~~:

tsi ee. coe nled wieaeenes Byes ts 4 ion i

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4 ? ‘Statement. |

- #spondent’s laundry is located results from the fact

- that this purely local business is caus in a city on

=a state line.”

The Court further stated:

“We recognize that the collection and delivery of

garments across state lines * * * constitutes

interstate commerce. We are advertent, however,

to the admonition of the Court that in applying the

t we are to bear in mind the distinction between

what is national and what is Jocal in the activities

of commerce and * * * and although the letter

* of the National Labor Relations Act may govern

such collections and deliveries in interstate com-

merce as are here involved, the question arises

whether a proper interpretation of the Act in view

of the intent of Congress would include them.”

In another part they state: cs vgn enc

“We are divided and in doubt as to whether such col-

lection and delivery which results from the fact that

business of a local character, such as a laundry, is

glecated on a state line is sufficient to bring such

business within the jurisdiction of the Board under

the National Labor Relations Act. ‘To so hold would

bring under the jurisdiction of the Board a great

variety of businesses of purely Aocal character sim-

ply because they maintain a delivery service in

cities located on state lines as there are many such

cities in the United States. The question seems to

us one of sufficient importance to justify us in cer-

tifying it to the Supreme Court so that it may y a§

definitely saaseeell "

The Solicitor. General then filed a motion in ni the’

js -

4

Court below asking that the certificate be amended and. °

asked’ that the questions which had been sdbmitted to

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ae ih Se ent

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4

the Supreme Court be rephrased. This the lower Court

refused to do for the reason that the phraseology as set

up in the certificate to our mind distinctly and clearly

sets forth to the Supreme Court the issues here involved,

while the suggested phraseology asked for by the Solici-

tor General did not in our opinion properly state the

question. At this stage now the case is before the Su-

_— Court.

|

- By way of further explanation it might be stated

that to our knowledge this is the first involving the

laundry industry which has gone ‘clare any of the

Courts wherein an attempt was made to apply the Na-

tional-Act. Heretofore the laundry business has always

' been exempt from the National Acts even exempted from

the NRA on,the theory that it is a purély local business,

rendered service only and did not engage in the com-

‘modities of interstate commerce and it has always here-

tofore been classified i in the same category as the barber

and shoe repairman, both of whom render service only

and irfour opinion do not engage in interstate commerce.

This case undoubtedly would not have arisen had

, this particular laundry been located off a state line, but

due to the fact it is situated in a border line city the

question arises.

:

i

ee

A

The ‘Laundcy and Dey Cledaing Business Is a Prisely

Local Service Industry Subject Only to the Control

of the States and to Impose Federal Regulation

Destroys the Distinction Between That Which Is

‘ js National and That Which Is Local.

The National Labor Relations Act is not applicable

to respondent. Respondent has consistently held and

now strenuously contends that the Att itself is’ not ap-

plicable to the respondent. As yet there has been no >

» decision in the Federal Courts wherein the status of the

laundry and dry cleaning business has been definitely

decided when applying the National Labor Relations Act.

Whether such business is intrastate or interstate or na-

tional or local or whether it actually affects interstate .

commerce is now before\ythe Court for the first time.

he Laundries and dry cleaning establishments in every city

a and community are as numerous as the local restaurants,

Me da shoe repair shops, local butcher shops, drug stores, and

aor grocery stores, and in practically every busy city block

f we find several laundry and dry cleaning establishments

- and in almost every town of any size we have the local

‘segs chinaman who operates a laundry and for this reason it

is familiarly termed the Chinaman’s business.

> " The distinguishing characteristic of. the laundry and

dry cleaning business as compared to other types of

business over which the National Labor Board has as-”°

sumed jurisdiction is that the laundry and dry cleaning

business is® purely a service industry and therefore is

necessarily local in nature. To attempt to apply the

ie theory of interstate commerce to a local service com-

: pany requires an unlimited amount. of f imagination plus

— PRESET PG SEE oe : oS aes TORE ty

x *

Argument. ’ 7

a reckless overlooking of the fundamental elements

which comprise the working conditions of a laundry.

In all cases adjudicating other types of business

wherein the jurisdiction of the Board has been sustaired

the defendant has engaged in interstate commerce on a

large scale yet a fundamental difference exists between

those types of business where jurisdiction was upheld

and-the one at bar. We find that in all types of business

where the jurisdiction of the Board is upheld the com-

panies involved in interstate commerce either bought,

sold, bartered, or exchanged their product or they pur-

chased raw material and processed, manufactured, or

changed its form, substance, character, utility, or value

of the goods.

We find also that in other types of business where

the jurisdiction of the Act was upheld the business itself

was either nation wide or c mprised the area of

laundry and dry cleaning business which ‘ne

local only and operates within a restricted

In other types of business where the j |

Board was upheld it was found that althopgh perhaps

the company operated within the confines of one state its

product was one which was used in intersfate or foreign

commerce and the best illustration of this type of busi-

- ness comes from thdse cases where the company re-

paired and built ships and vessels operating in interstate

and foreign waters. Other cases involving other types

of business uphold the jurisdiction of the Board on the

theory that-the title to the commodity i in which the com-

pany deals ee hands in interstate commerce.

Applying all of these distinguishing features which

have arisen in other types of business wherein the juris: .

diction of the Act was upheld to the case at bar, we find :

that the business of the respondent — does not ,

ae : Argument.

come within the purview of any of the illustrations here- <

tofore recited. The opty bus in which the White

Swan Company i is engaged is the laundry and dry clean-

ing of clothes belonging to an individual who desires to

have them washed, cleaned, or pressed and these clothes

always belong to the individual customer. Therefore the

‘ respondent does not buy articles of clothing and wearing

apparel, it does not sell said articles, it does not process

said articles, it does not manufacture said articles, ore

fabricate the same. The title to the articles of wearing

apparel always remains in the customer and the charac-

ter, utility and value of the goods always remains the

same. :

We believe it is important to keep these elements in

mind because a perusal of all the bases decided to date

shows that where the Act was applied one of the dis-

. tinguishing items above mentioned was present. That

fompany which: in the cases decided, was ruled to be in

interstate commerce, either bought, sold, bartered, or

exchanged its product or it processed or manufactured

its product and thus changed the character, utility, or

value of the goods or it dealt in the specific gaqds and

passed title to the same. These distinguishing features

mark the striking difference between the case at bar and

those types of cases where the jurisdiction of, the Act

has been upheld.

To Lan that the National Act applies to this busi-

ness of a purely local nature automatically destroys the

distinction between that which is national and that

which is local. Such a decision would immediately have

the effect of applying the Natignal Act or giving the Na-

tfonal Act jurisdiction to every type of business regard-

less of how small. = states themselves would no

longer have any poweg to regulate erep the smallest

business operating within their confines, ‘ Laundries and

dry cleaning establishments are classified with the local

;

ye

L\ 3 Argument. 3 9

restaurant, butcher, grocer, and shoe repairman. The

barber, and the shoe repairman, and the laundry and dry |

cleaning owners have only one commodity to sell and that

sis service, and they have always been placed in the same —

category with reference to business, namely they, have e

‘ always been known as local establishments rendering

service only, and to now rule that these service busi-

nesses engage in interstate commerce makes for ab-

surdity. ee

Let us assume a barber operating in Wheeling

shaves a customer who cro#sed the bridge from the Ohio

side to the Wheeling side. Under the theory of the Board

the barber is in interstate commerce. Let us take the

—further’ illustration of an individual living on the Ohio

side of the Ohio River who either walks or crosses over

the bridge into Wheeling and has his shoes serviced or

repaired. Under the theory advanced by the Board this

shoe repairman is in interstate commerce. Or let us say

that the barber himself leaves his shop at Wheeling and

walks over the bridge to the Ohio side to shave a cus-

tomer. This, under the Board’s theory, would place him

in interstate commerce. - Or let us say the shoe repair-

man delivered the shoes which he had repaired over to

the Ohio side of the river and collected his money. Is he

in interstate commerce? Let us further give the illus-

tration of the Chinaman operating his laundry in Wheel-

ing. Some of his customers come from the Ohio side _

of the river and some of his customers he personally de- — —

livers the laundry to on the Ohio side. Does that place

his business in interstate commerce?

» The answer is plainly, no, this is not-interstate com-

merce, because all of these men, including the laundry-

men in this case operate a pu local business that con-

fines itself to an area of a few and the only reason

this case has arisen is because eCity of Wh z

happens to be located on a state line.

,

* Yim eagerness ee ee a

& Sea, ais

oft S, a ro aaa

i a i CL eo aon

a

‘10 . . Argument.

We must keep in mind the admonition of the Su-°

preme Court given in the case of N. L. R. B. v. Jones and is

ughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U. S., Page 1, ‘where the ° 4

urt warns as follows: ! :

s

“Powers of Congress to regulate commerce may not ” J

be ascertained so as to embrace effects upon inter- a

state commerce so indirect and remote that to em-

; brace them would effectually obliterate the distinc-

+ tion between what is national and what is local and

create a completely centralized government, the

question —— one of degree.” :

As we enbieatan’ the law, the question of Federal

rights and State rights is always before us and the

_ Court in that case points out the danger of allowing the

‘ Act to apply in every instance because to do SO\would

entirely eliminate the rights of the individual states.

Control of-all business regardless of how small would

pass from the States to the Federal-government. Many

‘of our States have passed their own little Wagner Acts

and ‘conflicts will inevitably ensue between the power

of the States and the Federal power if the National Act.

". js permitted to apply to a laundry business which is .

‘only a service and which of necessity must always re-

main purely local i in character and nature.

One of the distinguishing features therefore be-

tween interstate and intrastate business is that theory

of national or local’ proportions. It is easy to under-

stand why a business which operates nationally is in

interstate commerce. It attempts to serve all of the

states or many of them, has branch offices in many .

states, draws upon many states for its products and

fabricates them and reships them to the several states.

It advertises in many newspapers throughout the land,

buys raw materials, processes the same, and sells the

finished product, title to the article passes and the ef-

—

ee tttCi(‘“_“OS™SC;O;~O~™~*~™ et ee

~- Argument. 11

fects of such operations on interstate. commerce are im-

mediate and direct and undoubtedly these operations

conducted by a large business are profitable because

~~ continue so to operate.

~ Now eer difference do we find in the operation of

the respondént company which is,purely local and can-

not operate profitably on a national scale. We stren-

uously advance the fact that that laundry and dry clean-

ing business being a purely local business in its char-

_acter and nature cannot operate nationally at a profit.

We find that the respondent has seventeen routes serv-

~ ing customers, fourteen-of these_routes operate strictly —

within the confines of the State of West Virginia, three

of the routes merely cross the bridge over from Wheel-

ing into Ohio. In order to have a clear picture of re-

- gpondent’s business it is necessary to state that the

River and that the State of Ohio is onffhe other side of

the river connected by a bridge. eeling, with its

heavy industrial djstrict is naturally the focal point of

City of Wheeling is situated on one ie of the Ohio

- community life in this particular area and for the pur- .

pose of explaining the extent of respondent’s business

we refer in this brief to the “Wheeling Industrial Dis-

‘ trict” which is described as an area having a fifteen mile -

poe with Wheeling as the center of the circle or the

trict. The respondent’s business confines itself ex-

clusively to this area. .

The respondent cannot possibly engage in inter-

state commerce because to so engage would require con- -

siderable time to move one’s service to the customer.

In the laundry and dry cleaning business speed and

service must necessarily go hand {® hand and if a cus-

tomer gives a suit or dress to be laundered or cleaned

one day she expects to have it returned within a day

or two and the thought of transporting the suit or dress

J

Sa PoE I neh ai ae

sgsreront coer nee vegans permenant See

ad f

12 : Angument.

over a long distance between states and render such -

service is unthinkable because speed of service is ree |

quired by the customer and this must alweys keep the

laundry and dry cleaning business essentially local in .;

nature. ~

. As ance stated this case undoubtedly would not

be before the Court if it were not for thé fact that

Sic Wheeling i is located on a state line and-it just;so happens

that three of the seventeen routes operated by respond-

ent cross the bridge at the river over to the Ohio side.

_ Yet we find, however, that even the National Labor Re- |

—lations-Board-in-other types of business, namely the —

trucking business ruled that.a similar situation did not

affect commerce. Case of Protective . Motor Service

Company:

."Jn(“re Protective Motor Service Co., (Philadelphia, .

ie Pa.) and Twenty-five Employees, Case No. C-25,.

- ' " _ * Mar, 12, 1940 (21 N. L. R. B., No. 50.)

, Original decision reported at 1 LRR Man. 74;

such decision withdrawn: by order reported at 2

aig an Man. 552. :

hae ‘Operations of armored truck transport com-

pany are not sufficiently shown to affect commerce

with NLRA although such operations include two

daily routes to out of stdte points and although

company filed an application with Interstate Com-

merce Commission for a permit authorizing con-

tinuance of operations in interstate commerce under

Federal Motor Carrier Act, 1935, where greater part

of company’s business consists of tfansporting val-

uables for local concerns WITHIN ONE CITY.”

oo.

’ 9

OL UT Lia ach. F

The purely local nature of the- business itself is

manifested when we note that the respondent does not

maintain sales offices or agencies for the solicitation

of orders in any place outside of the City of Wheeling

| a N

eee

| a7? ~—« Argument. | 13

and the respondent maintains its only’ plant and execu-

- tive office in the City of Wheeling. It advertises its serv-

ices and facilities only in-Wheeling newsj apers. Is it

not fair to assume that if respondent’s business was in-

terstate in character it would have branch offices located

‘in all parts of Ohio and other states, is it not fair to.

assume that if the business were interstate respondent

would solicit and advertise for business in other states .

besides its home office in Wheeling; West Virginia? The

answer is clear. A laundry cannot operate in interstate ©

commerce profitably. To attempt to operate a laundry

——beyond-a_radius of fifteen miles is purely suicidal for

the reason. that the long haul that would be involved,

: first, eliminates any possibility of, profit, and, secondly,

prevents the laundry from giving the customer the im-

mediate one or two day service which the customer

: demai:ds. Therefore, every laundry must necessarily be

\

local in its nature and cannot hope or expect, to engage ~

in interstate commerce. It cannot hope to secure cus-

tomérs from many states and far distances for the very

reason that when one wants a suit pressed or cleaned

- or clothing washed and pressed, he expects delivery

within at two days from the time the articles are

picked up and no customer or group of customers could

be found Fra would wait weeks for delivery, such as is

common in those types of business which actually en-

gage in interstate commerce. The tendency of respond-

ent’s business: has been to consistently restrict the area —

. which it attempts to serve rather than enlarge because

a restricted territory enables one to derive a larger

profit:due to the shorter haul. The reason for restrict-

ing the territorv is also obvious when4we consider that .

laundry and dy cleaning establishments, shoe repair

shops, and harber shops, are multitudinous in every

community and when a laundry attempts to travel too

far from its base or plant to pick up and deliver laundry

it cannot compete with the numerous competitors who

a ;

14 Argument.

are located nearer to the customer ana do not have

to make the long haul which eliminates profits and for

this reason the laundry business must always remain

‘purely local in its character rather than national.

It is difficult to understand how the laundry busi-

ness can be described as affecting interstate commerce.

If A owns a suit and sends it to a laundry to be cleaned

and pressed, what has the laundry done to‘that suit?

The title to the suit always remains in A, the laundry

_ has not processed or manufactured the suit, it has not .

taken a bolt of cloth, dyed it, and then cut it up and

- Madea suit out of it, the laundry has acquired no title

to it, it has not sold it, it has not purchased the suit, it

has not bartered or exchanged the suit, nér has it

changed ‘the character or utility or value of the suit.

It has merely cleaned and pressed it and then returned

it to the owner and that is what we call purely service.

The laundry business is only a service business, just as

the barber and shoe repairman rendered service only, so

does the laundry.

Stress has been laid on the fact that 18% of re-

spondent’s gross income is derived for work done on

articles brought to its plant from points in Ohio. It.

must be remembered that this percentage reduces itself

to 18% for the reason that 5% of the 18% is what is

known as a bob tail operation. By a bob tail operation

we mean, a situation where an individual, an independ-

' ent contractor, owns a truck and of his own volition ©

builds up a route servicing customers who desire laund-

ering and dry cleazing. It is within the province of

this bob tail route’*owner to have the goods of his cus-

tomers serviced at any laundry he desires: He is al-

‘Ways an independent contractor and therefore his busi-

ness is his own and -does not belong to the laundry.

Therefore, the correct percentage of respondent’s gross «

¢

Argument, <<" 7

income from Ohio reduces itself from 18% to 13%, or

‘jn dollars and cents for the year 1938 it reduces itself

from $23,088.43 to $17,647.18 for the reason that the

5% bob tail operation, totalling $6,441.21, is owned by ~

independent contractors and is not owned by the re-

_Spondent company.

Much stress has been laid By the Board on the

purchase of laundry supplies and equipment during the

year 1938.. We believe that these purchases are a

' rather remote way to analyze respondent’s business for

the reason that as has been before stated respondent

is not a manufacturer and does not fabricate or manu-

facture anything, and what few supplies are needed are

just incidental to the cleaning and pressing business.

However, in an attempt to bolster up these figures the

Board injects into the picture purchases of machinery -

made during the year 1938. It is obvious that unusual

purchases of machinery in a company are not made

. yearly and to allow these figures to remain in calcula-

tions to determine whether or not the company is en-

gaged in interstate commerce gives one a distorted view

of the picture. The White Swan Company had just

come out of bankruptcy and all machinery was sadly in

need of replacement. Much of the replacement was

made in 1938 and naturally these replacements. will

probably not have to be made again for another fifteen

years, or the’ life of the machinery, therefore, to take

these figures in-consideration would seriously distort

the issue. When the plant was en over by the new

owner late in 1936 the machinery needed rehabilitation.

It was obsolete and in the prior fifteen years of its his-

tory, prior to the bankruptcy, the White Swan Company

had never paid the stockholders a dividend, and it was

necessary-to install new and me‘ern machinery to place

the plant on a paying basis. The purchases for ma-

chinery were heavier in 1987 and 1938 than normal pur-

es oe we. °

ed

16 ~~" Argument. =

chases and after 1938 these purchases would no longer

be present hut you would have cnly the obsolescence :

‘ figure to consider: Note, however,.that the sales con; |

tracts for the purchase of new machinery were all closed —

at the. = office at Wheeling.

The total purchases for supplies and equipment

which included machinery for 1938 was $38,333.15. Ox

this amount, purchases, the contracts for which were

-. consummated at Wheeling, the goods, however, being

‘delivered from. out of state, were 20% or $10,810.90,

~ which resolves itself don to the following figures as

ae compared to the total sales for laundry and dry clean-

ing for the year 1938 which totalled $128,752.96; namely.

the purchases of goods which came from out of state,

the contracts however having been consummated in

Wheeling totaled a little over $10, 000 or 8% of total ‘

’ gales.

A °

: We believe that the question of machinery pur-

which were so unusual due to rehabilitation

should not be taken into consideration as giving a true

picture of the yearly normal purchases by a laundry.

o And in furtker view of the fact that all of said purchases.

were made in Wheeling, we believe that the machinery

purchases can be eliminated from consideration. en-

! tirely.

.. . Case of Cactus Mines Co.—In re Cactus Mines

Company (Willow Springs, Calif. and Interna-

tional. Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers,

~ Local No. 272. Case No. C—1185, Mar. 16, 1940 ©

+ (21 N. L. R. B., No. 68),——

“Gold and silver mining company’s. operations’ do

not affect commerce within NLRA where it sells

‘its entire output of concentrates and precipitates

to a smelting companyglocated withirt same state,

smelting company scl and silver recovered

«

Argument. — , "47

_ from mining company’s concentrates uae precip

_ tates to United States Government at its mint

located in same state, only 0.6 per cent of suppli:.:

are purchased outside of state, and all of perma-

nent machinery and equipment, although half of it

“was manufactured in other states, was ——

within state.”

See also National Labor Relations Board-v. Idaho,

Maryland Mines Corporation, 98 Federal Reporter, Sec-

ond wees, 129.

Respondent peter in the operation of its eleut

makes its own steam and purchases coal water for °

the same in the City of Wheeling.

In considering the case at bar, it is strenuously ar-

gued that respondent’s business is one, which is entirely

local. The distinction is so aptly stated in the Jones and

Laughlin Case, 301 U.'S., page 1:

“The.distinction between what is national and what

is local in the actj ities of commerce is vital to the

maintenance of/our federal system.” | |

Try as we oe, we cannot see how any operatio

of respondent co y would have an-immedia

direct effect upon commercé, The most that can be said .

of this local concern is that any effect that it might have

on commerce is indirect and remote. The very uature of

respondent’s business is such that it gould not profitably

engage in antoratate commerce.

We idigwd that the case at es chien us squarely :

up to the isshe. 9s to whether or not the state may con- -

trol laundries or whether all laundries shall be declared.

national in scope and in interstate commerce. We be-

lieve that for the Courts so to rule in this case would be

.

~ v

t

ad

sie

Dial hill ioe 2

eae - Argument.

carrying the Federal power too far as was so well stated

in the case of Shechter Poultry Co. v. U. 8., 295 U. S.

495. ;

“In determining how far the Federal Government

‘may go in controlling intrastate transactions upon

the ground that they affect interstate commerce,

there is a necessary and well established distinction

between the direct and indirect effects. The precise

line can be drawn only as ind:vidual cases arise, but

the distinction is clear in principle, but where the |

effect of intrastate transactions upon interstate

commerce is merely indirect-such transactions re-

main within’ the domain of state power. If the

commerce clause were so construed to reach all

enterprises and transactions that could be said to |

have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce,

the federal authority would embrace practically all

the activities of the people and the authority of the

state over its’ domestic concerns would exist only.

by Sufferance of the federal ' ongacoggn Indeed on

such a theory even the deVelopment of a state’d

commercial facilities would be} subject to federal

control.” |

a

—

The service as rendered by the respondent company

is a service rendered to the private individual consumer

who lives in the immediate locality or community in ©

which the laundry is loca No matter how we analyze

‘the business here, it seems impossible to take it out of

the purview of a purely loca} business.

In reviewing the Constitution of the United maton

"we find three parts pertinent to the issue:

Section A. The Congress shall have the power

to regulate. commerce with foreign nations and,

among the several | _states and with the Indian

- Tribes. ¢

Argument. 19

>

Article 9. The enumeration in the Constitu-

, st of certain rights shall not be construed to deny

oF eepennge others retained by the people.

“Article 10. The powers not delegated to the

" United States by the Constitution nor prohibited to

it by the states are reserved to the states respec-

tively or to the people.

It is the contention of the respondent here that it

merely serves the Wheeling Industrial Community com-

prising a radius of tae cans te We believe the follow-

¥ing case in point:

Veazie v. Moore, 14 Bw, 573, L. Ed. 545,

“Commerce with foreign nations must signify com-

merce which in some sense is necessarily connected

with these nations transactions which either imme-

diately or at somé stage of their progress must be

extra-tertitorial. The phrase can never be applied

to transactions wholly internal by the citizens of

the same community or to a polity and laws whose

ends and purposes and operations,are restricted to

‘the territory and soil and jurisdiction of such

community.” |

“The power vested in’ Congress was not de-

signed to operate upon matters essentially local in

_ their nature and extent.”

From time immemorial it has always been under-

stood that the power of the Congress to regulate com-

merce cannot be broadened to such a point that it inter-

feres with internal trade. We sincerely believe that the

Jgundry and dry cleaning business, as well-as-the-barber

business and the shoe repair business, are the best illus-

trations of local internal business that can be found in

any state. "We believe that it was never conceived by

the, framers of the Constitution that Federal power

i. 4 &

20 : nee Argument. -

could be so extended as to reach these local service

businesses. ae

«. e U. 8. v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 44, 19 L. Ed. 593.

ie “This express grant of power to regulate commerce

among the several states has always been under-

stood as limited by its terms and as a virtual denial

; of any power to interfere with the internal trade

$ in business of the separate states.”

_ The individual states have never conceded the sieht of

Congress to regulate purely local small businesses.

< .-These rights have always been jealously guarded by the

states. Nor have the states ever surrendered this power

to regulate local service to the government. |

Peirce v. New Hampshire, 5 How. 574, 12 L. Ed. 256.

. “The po f Congress does not extend further

than the regulations of commerce with foreign

nations and among the several states. Beyond these

limits the states have never surrendered their

power over tra@le and commerce and may still exer-

¢ise-free from any controlling power on the part

of the general government. Every state, therefore,

may regulate itself on internal traffic according to

its own judgment and upon its own views of the

interests and well being of its citizens.”’

The fact that three out of seventeen of respondent’s :

' routes merely cross a bridge separating two states and —_’

operate on the other side of the river to our mind has

+ such a remote effect on interstate commerce that it \can-

not be said that it in any way actually affects commerce.

: se Covington, etc. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S.

209. 's

“States have plenary- power and Congress has no

. right to interfere concerning the internal commerce :

|

i

J]

, -Ajrgument. en

of the state though\fhe regulations of the state may

affect interstate commerce indirectly, but their

bearing upon it is so remote that it cannot be

wee in any just sense an interference.”

We ‘feel that the State of ‘West Virginia still has

the absolute power to control the respondent company

even though a very slight part of the business of the -

* respondent .company merely crosses Oe river to the

Ohio side. : <<

State v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 97 Miss. 35, 51 So.

918. . : , 3

“A state is not deprived of its power of cont@l over —

domestic corporations because its action within the

sphere of its powers may indirectly affect interstate

commerce.” . -

That the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals realizes

the danger in upholding the jurisdiction of the Act in

this case is evidenced by a review of its statement of '

facts in the Certificate wherein it states:

“The volume of the interstate business thus. involved

is not sufficient in our opinion to bring the business

within the jurisdiction of the Board.”

, That it obviously recognized the fact that the busi-

‘ness was purely local:such as the barber and the shoe

repairman is found also in/its statement when-it says:

“The business involvéd is necessarily of a purely

‘ local character as the record shows that a radius

. Of fifteen miles is‘the practical limit for a laundry

_ . or dry cleaning business in this territory. The fact

that the business is done in Ohio outside of the

State in which respondent’s laundry is located

results from the fact that this puvely iocal business

is located in a city on a state line.”

22 h 7 Argument,

That the Circuit Court was also aware | of the

danger of applying the Act {gs shown by its statement:

“We are advertent, howevey, to the admonition of

the Court that in applying the Act we are to bear

ini mind the distinction betw what is national

and what is local in the activities~of Commerce.”

That the lower Court realized the fact ‘that to up-

hold the Act as to this particular type of local service

business would automatically allow the Act to be ap-

plied to all local small businéss ‘| is evidenced by its

statement reading: :

“To so hold would be to bring ‘dele the jurisdiction

of the Roard a great variety of businesses of purely

local nature alpoly because they maintain a. de-

‘livery service cities located: on state lines, as

there are many such Qties in the United States.

‘The question seems to us one of sufficient impor-

tance in justifying us to certify it to the Supreme

_ Court so that it may be definitely settled.”

The-N iticaat Board in its brief before this Court

attempts to show jurisdiction citing the history of other

laundries located throughout the country. We believe

that the illustrations are not jin point for the reason that

the record clearly shows that the respondent ¢ompany

does not operate a chain of laundries or a chain of es-

tablishments of any type, but merely operates entirely

and exclusively in the Wheeling Industrial District.

That the laundry and dry cleaning business has al-

ways been considered a local service enterprise may be

gleaned from a review of the history of the NIRA and we

find that under the NIRA it was early recognized that

laundries were purely local service industries, We take

the liberty here to quote part of the rulings given at the

wuah Bry toi

a

Page 845.

oly ‘ Argument. 23

: &

‘time’ cise the NIRA. See United States Law Week,

“Volume 2 Part 1, 1983+34, Page 518: :

“To foster fair competition and eliminate unfair

competitive practidés between local trade and serv-

ice enterprises such as respond to geographcial

rather than commodity organization and adminis-

tration~ :

Sec. 1. Naticnal Codes of. Fair Competition will

in general. be applied to those partially local trades

and industries such as retail stores, and filling sta-

tions, which provide necessary outlets for ee

tive enterprises of a national character.

2. Other classes of local trade and service en-

terprises such as\barber shops, LAUNDRIES, building

management, sddieuinela: and local transportation

facilities, will be encovraged to organize themselves

for regional self-government and to adopt regional

codes or agreements.

_. 5. State legislation should be encouraged to

give additional sanctions to the agreements region-

ally for regional trades and industries. nee No.

3265, Feb. 13, 1934)” ;

We find that this was shortly followed-up by an

executive order exempting laundries from A juris-

diction for the reason that it was here recognized that

the laundry business was purely a local busine d had

no national aspects and therefore should be regulated by

the states. See U.-S. Law Week, Vol. 1, Part 2, 1934,

“Service inshistries Exempted from NRA Code

Provisions. :

Basic revision of NRA policy was initiated by

the Executive Order announced May 28 authoriz-

ing the.exemption of service trades and industries

from trade practices rules imposed by national

codes.

° >

2 ’ . a :

2 , . ~ 3 y a > . ve

ew + re a | eh be a - oe - ~ - as

24 : _ Argument.

The Executive Order empowers the NRA Ad-

ministrator to designate the trade and industries to

- which the exemption will apply. |

The exemptions will take effect immediately in I

the following seven trades which have already been __

designated: by order of the Administrator as prop- —

erly included within the purpose and intent of the

Executive Order; Cleaning and Dyeing Trade; Bar-

ber Shop Trade; Shoe Rebuilding Trade; Motor Ve-

hicle Storage and Parking Trade; Advertising Dis-

play Installation Trade; ‘Advertising Distributing

Trade; Bowling and Billiard Trade.

| The President, in <n explanatory statement ac-. —

companying the Order attributed his action to the

need for a greater degree of autonomous local self-

government in service industries, stressed the im

practicability of imposing rigid trade-practi

standards on a national scale in such cases.”

See also the United States Law Week, Volume 1,.

Part 2, 1934, Page 847.

Executive Order Dated May 26, 1934

“Pursuant to authority vested in me by Title

I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, I, Frank-

lin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, do |

- hereby cirect that all provisions in codes of such |

service trades or industries as shall hereafter be ~

designated by the Administrator for National Re-

covery be hereby suspended.”

See also. United States Law Week, Volume » & Part

2, Page 847, mY

‘ } , “National Industrial Recovery Act—Codes of

. * fair competition—Executive interpretation of order

suspending trade practice provisions of codes for

service trades and industries— .

“F

‘ om

Argument. ; 25

“Most industries have a national community of

economic interest even though the operation of some

of their units is local. There are others which, not-

withstanding their having national trade associa-

tions, do not actually integrate themselves nation= |

ally. Whether an industry can govern adhd police

itself under the fair trade provisions of a National

Code depends on its degree of actual economic in-

tegration on a national scale and on the organiza-

tion and solidarity within the whole industry. A.

trial period of some months has shown that while

most industries, after organization for. this work

and a little experience with it, can secure uniform

national results, there are others to which a greater

degree of autonomous local self-government is de-

oe Ameng these are some, but not all, of the

o-called service industries—that is, industries en-

peter in the sale of services rather than of goods. e

Note also that the cleaning and dyeing industry was

expressly exempted from' the National Code, Adminis-

trative Order May 28, 1934, United States Law Week,

, Volume 1,.Part 2, 1934, Page 851,

“Codes of Fair Competition.—Service trades

and indystries—Exemption from trade practice pro-

visions of national codes—

“By virtue of the aythority Yested in me by the

President of the United States * * * I, HughS.

Johnson, * * .* hereby designate the following

trades and industries to be properly included within -

the purpose and intent of said Order:

Motor Vehicle Storage and Parking Trade;

Bowling and Billiard Trade; Barber Shop Trade;

Cleaning and Dyenig Trade; Shoe Rebuilding Trade;

Advertising Display Installation Trade; Advertising

ne Trade.”

3

- P 2 .

serene ued ee ,

. : . ‘ e :

Se EEE SAR Ee Ce ee te : oe

{

a

: 2

:

|

26 cs Argument.

Note: This order means that the cleaning and dye-

ing trade was exempt from me provisions of the Na-

tional Code.

When we ae over the report of the Senate at the |

time this bill was contemplated, namely the bill now

known as the National Labor Relations Act, we find that

the Committee reports that it was riot the purpose of the

Act to project the Federal Government into matters of _

pirely intyastate concern. We take the liberty here to

_ quote a part of the Senate Committee report, May 2,

1935 (report No. 573) :— —

“The term affecting commerce is inserted as a

short cut to prevent the repetition of lengthy juris-

dictional phraseology throughout the bill. The bill

limits Federal action to areas sanctioned by the

commerce clause. The bill does not project the Fed-

eral Government into matters of purely intrastate

concern. It applies only in matters which burden or —

' affect or obstruct interstate commerce, or which

have led or tend to lead to a labor dispute that

might have such effect upon interstate commerce.”

We now turn to the wording of the Act itself, Sec.

tion 2, which-reads as follows:—.

7—‘The term affecting commerce means in

commerce or burdening or obstructing commerce,

or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tend-

‘ ing to lead to a labor dispute, burdening or obstruct-

ing commerce, or the free flow of commerce.” _

In view of the fact that the number of laundry and ©

dry cleaning establishments are as numerous in the aver-

age town as the barber and the shoe repair shops, it is

obvious that any-strike or any tendency towards strike

would not affect interstate commerce. The other numer-.

ous competitors.in the same town would immediately

. a

Argument, 3 27

absorb all of the business of the respondent, should such

a strike occur, and the strike in 2, laundry would have

no far reaching or national affects. We can readily ap-

: ciate that a strike, say in a steel mill in Pittsburgh

would affect the mining and distribution of ore in Michi-

gan, or mining and transportation of coal from Kentucky .

or West Virginia, but no such far reaching affects would

be prevalent in a laundry strike. Just as it is ridiculous .

to assume that a strike in a barber shop employing 10

or 15:men, or a strike in a shoe repair shop employing

10 men would affect interstate commerce, so it is also

absurd to suggest that a strike in. a laundry and dry

cleaning establishment would affect interstate com-

merce. !

We have before stated that this is the first case up

before the Court for décision, wherein|an atfempt’ is

made by the National Board to assume jurisdiction over

laundries. The question therefore becomes one, shall

the States assume jurisdiction over laundries with their

Local Labor Boards, or shail the National Board assume

jurisdiction. That the States which have enacted labor

lowing States and the cases decided nara by the

States.

' MASSACHUSETTS.

Loyal Crown Linen Service, Inc., et al., 1939 Mass.

L. R. C., Case No. U. P. 251, Jan. 11, ‘1939.

. Wash Rite ‘Laundry Co. et o7., 1938, Mass. L. R. C.

Case No. U. P. 121, June 20, 1938.

White Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., et al., 1938, Mass. L.

_ RC. Case No. U. P. 147, June 20, 1938. }

C. & W. Dyeing & Cleaning Co., Inc., et al., ' Mass.

L. R. C. Case No. U. P. 10, Feb. 10, 1938.

Back Bay Chevrolet, Inc., et al., Mass. L. R. C. Case

No. U. P. 46, March 1, 1938.

| 2 / Argument.

/ Abe Lainer d/b/a Lainer’s Cleaners & Dyers Co.,

] foes Case Nos. U. P. 101, 134; 139, April

1938. | .

Francis V. and Edwin U. Cahill d/b/a Union Laun-

dry et al., Mass. L. R. C. Case No. U. P. 93, May 23, 1938.

Naif Makol World Cleaners. & Dyers Co., et al.,

Mass. L. R. C. Case No. U. P. 85, May 23,1938. ~~

Howes Co. et al., Mass. L. R. C. Case No. U. P. 281,

. May 22, 1939. ‘s

Sani-Wash Laundry et al., Mass. L. R. C. Case No.

U. P. 391, Sept. 21, 1939.

. Hastern Overall Dry Cleaning Co. et al. (1940),

Mass. L. R. C. Case No. U. P. 396, Jan.-19, 1940.

Golden Bell Cleaners, Inc., 1940, Mass. L. R. C. Case

No. C. R. 333, April 29, 1940. ZEON

Lewando’s French Dyeing and Cleansing Co., 1940,

Mass. L. R. C. Case No. C. R. 341, May 6, 1940. 2

Shub, J. H., et al., D. B. A., American Dry Cleaning

Co. (1940), Mass. L. R. Cc. Case No. C. R. 347, May 20,

1940.

Bonanno Laundry & Supply Co. (1940), Mass. L. R.

C. Case No. C. R. 403, Nov., 1940.

Capitol Laundry Co. (1940), Mass. L. R. C. Case

‘ No. C. R. 406, Nov. 6. 1940.

Fornsworth New Method Laundry, Inc. (1940),

Mass. L. R. C. Case No. C. R. 375, Aug. 13, 1940.

Hub Laundry Co. (1940), Mass. L. R, C. Case No.

- C. R. 424, Dec. 12, 1940.

Morgan Laundry Service, Inc. (1940), Mass. L. R.

C. Case No. C. R. 386, Sept. 12, 1940.

United Laundries Co. et al. (1938), Masa L. R. c

Case No. C. R. 27, Feb. 16, 1938. $

Argument. . 29

NEW YORK.

Economy Clean Towel Supply Co., Inc., et al., 1938,

IN. ¥. 8. L. R. B. Dec. No. 198, July 20, 1938.

Stapleton Service Laundry, Inc., et al. (1938), N. Y.,

S. L. R. B. Dec. No. 206, Sept. 23, 1938.

Consolidated Laundry Corp. et al., 1937, N. Y. 8. L.

R. B. Dec. No. 4, Sept. 16, 1937.

Fou Square Laundry Co., Inc., et al., 1939, N. Y. S.

L. R. B. Dec. No. 669, Sept. 21, 1939.

Hill Top Laundry, Inc., et al. (1940), N. Y. S. LR.

B. Dec. No. 838, Case No. W. E~156, Mar. 25, 1940.

Midtown Laundry Inc., et al. (1940), N. Y. S. L. R.

B. Dec. No. 804; Case No, Ss. E.-4197, Feb. 8, 1940.

“Premier Linen Supply & Lattndry Co., Inc., et al.,

1939, N. Y. S. L. E. B. Dec. No. 738, Nov. 22, 1939.

Prompt Family Laundry, Inc., et al. (1940), N. Y.

S. L. R. B. Dec. No. 771, Jan. 9, 1940.

Quality Laundry Service, Inc., et al. (1937), >

S. L. R. B. Dec. No. 10, Nov. 1, 1937.

Tudor Laundry Co. et al. (1939), N. Y. S. L. R. B.

Case No. S. U. 3581, July 12, 1939. 7

PENNSYLVANIA.

Budget Lahdry Co., et al., ‘Pa. L. R. B. Case No.

170, April 12, 1938.

Cravdall, McKenzie & faesaiiey Inc., et al., 1939,

Pa. L. R. B., Dec. No. 92, Feb. 26, 1940. — RE

‘Lincoln Laundry Co., et al., 19389, ‘Pa. L. R. B. Dec.

No. 136, Jan. 16, 1940.

Wilson agreed Co. et al. 1939, Pa. L, R. _B. Case.

No. 34 Oct. 9, 1939.

Community Laundry Co., Inc., et al., 1937, Pa. L. R.

B. Case No. 123, May 13, 1939.

East Cleaners & Dyers, Irc., ae 1938, Pa. L. R. B.

No. 196, Apr. 20, 1939.

°

ae | | Argument. «

Liberty Laundry, et al., (1939) Re. L. R. B. Case No.

70, Nov. 21, 1939.

eS

WISCONSIN a

Waukesha Palace Laundry Co., et.al., Wisc., he R.

B. Case No. 406, C-24, April 30, 1938.

Badger Nu-Way Cleaners, et al., Wisc,, Li. R. B. Case

No. 31; Ce2, Dec. No. 19, Sept. 23, 1939.

Laundry Workers Int. Union, et al., (1940) W.L.

R. B. Case No. 74 Ce-11 Dec. No. 47 2/23/40.

a i.

Was It the Intent of the Congress to Make the Act Apply

_ to Local Service Establishments? hi

In order to ascertain the intent of the Congress at

the time of the passage of the bill, it is»well to review

again the findings and policy of the bill, as outlined in

Section 1 of the Act known as the National Labor Rela-

tions Act.

Act of July 5, 1935, C. 372, 49 Stat. 449; 29 U.

_§.C., Supp. V, Sec. 151, et seq.

We here take the liberty to quote Section 1 of the

Act, which we deem pertinent to the issue:—

“The denial by employers of the right to employees

to organize, and the refusal by the employers to

accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead ©

to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or

unrest which have the intent or the necessary effect |

of burdening or obstructing commerce by

(a) Impairing the efficiency, safety or opera-

\ tion of the instrumentalities of commerce.

{b) Ocqurring in the’ current of commerce.

Ser sos Ree

-

ead

Sad ese

|

Rees, aaceceane | 31

git (c) Materially stockings restraining or con-

x trolling the flow of raw materials, or manu-

factured or processed goods from or into

the channels of commerce, or*the prices of

such materials pr goods in commerce.

(d) Or causing diminution of employment and

wages in such volume as substantially to

impair or disrupt the, market for goods —

flowing from or into the channels of

ecommerce. “3

It is obvious nica reading this Section that the Con-

gress had in mind when speaking of commerce, either

the instrumentalities of commerce or the flow of raw

materials with the manufacture of processed goods and

the reshipment thereof: into commerce. These are the

very things that a laundry does not engage in. As pre-

viously stated in this brief, raw materials are not manu-

factured or procéssed and reshipped into commerce.

Nor are even prices of such materials or goods in com-

merce affected by anything that a laundry or dry clean-

_ ing establishment does in the way of service. The whole

intent and purport of this Section of the Act is entirely

repugnant to the thought of merely servicing a garment

such as a laundry’ or dry cleaning ‘establishment

performs.

To attempt to apply the National Labor Relations

Act to either the laundry or dry cleaning industry would

be an attempt t» apply a statute which would .produce

results contrary to the plain purpose and policy of the

enactment, since the purposes and policy of the enact-

ment is to regulate business, which has a national aspect

_ rather than a purely local aspect.

We believe the following case in point :—

4

‘not interstate commerce and we take the liberty to oo

32 Argument.

Sorrells v. U, 8., 287 U. S. Reports, page. 435, where

we take the liberty to quote:— - 1

“Where application of the.penal statute, according

to its literal meaning would produce results con-. —

trary to the plain purpose and policy of the enact- —

—ment and flagrantly unjust, another construction |

& should be adopted, if possible.” -

The question as to whether a ennitey i is in interstate

or intrastate commerce has been before.the Courts be-.

fore. See 54 Southwestern Reporter, Page 981. Smith,

Clerk, v. Jackson, Supreme Court of Tenn., December 20,

1899. This case arose out of a tax which the agent of

the State placed on an individual who was a loca] agent ‘

for a laundry situated in another State, and the individ-

ual claimed immunity from the local tax on the theory

that his laundry business was interstate commerce. The

individual collected soiled laundry from his neighbors

in Tennessee and shipped it to a laundry in Kentucky

be washed and laundered. When this was done, it was

senteback by the laundry to the individual in Tennessee,

who delivered it to the owners and received from them

the price of the entire service, which he divided equally

with the laundry. The question was, “Was this individ- .

ual engaged in commerce?” We find that it was here

recognized by the Courts that the laundry business is

the Court in detail on this point:— *°

“The word commerce found in this clause c can not be ,

held ‘to embrace a transaction such as is here pre- .

sented. It implies when-used by businessmen, as it

is defined by Mr. Webster, the lexicographer. Trade

or traffic as in the exchange of specific articles or.

commodities or else of these for money or its repre-

sentative; in a case like the present nothing, in the

true commercial sense, is — or exchanged. The

VYg—e

Argument. : . 33

agent takes the axticles committed to his care and

agrees with the owner that he will send’them across

the State line and have certain labor bestowed on

them, and when returned, then he is to receive com-

pensation equal to this- labor. There is no com-

modity created of which the ownership is changed. —

It is merely a personal contract based upon a val- -

~ uable consideration following within the protection

' of this clause of the Constitution. “ 7

vd The Court further likens this trenauction to the sale

of an insurance policy and quotes Paul y. Virginia, 8

Wall, 168, and likens the laundry business, which it de-

fines as a’ personal contract, unto the sale of insurance

policies, the Supreme Court has held is not

interstate mmerce.

" Since the respondent Company is located on the

State line, and we believe that this is the only reason

that this case ever arose, we velieve the following case

\ in point:

Scannon v. Kansas City Railroad Co., 41 Missouri

APP. 194

“A shipment of cattle to Kansas City, Missoyri, from

a point in the same State is not interstate commerce,

though the stock yards where the cattle are un-

loaded extend into both the States of Missouri and

Kansas, and though the actual point of unloading is

- in Kansas and the assignment is to cormmissioned

‘ merchants whose place of business is across the

State line in Kansas.” ; :

\ -

We find another laundry case cited in Smith v. Jackson,

54 S. W.. 981—103 Tenn. 673:—

7 ‘

eT EI PIT IE LES | ILE LOS OIE PILES RE RN WR ene -

34 Argument. -

“Laundry business is not commerce within the mean-

ing of this clause, and one whose business it is to

collect soiled laundry and express it to its principal

in another State to be washed and laundered and

when returned to deliver it to its owner or owners,

’ receiving from them ‘a price the entire service

which he divides with his principal, is liable for the

payment of a privilege tax.”

In this case, the privilege tax was a State tax, and

the defendant claimed immunity onthe theory that he

was engaged in interstate commerce, and the Court held

it was not interstate commerce, but was intrastate com-

merce.

To the same effect, see Commonwealth v. Pearl

Laundry Co., 105 Ky. 259—49 S. W. 26.

“ In the case at /bar' the lower ‘Court was bothered

with this question because it felt that a laundry busi-

ness was entirely local, and although it might come

within the letter of the statute, it does not come within |

the spirit of the statute, or even the intention of the

-- makers of the statute. We believe therefore, that the

following case is in point on this line of thought:

Holy Trinity Church v. U. 8., 143 U. S. 457:

“It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within

the letter of the statute and yet not within the

statute because not within the spirit nor within

the intention of its makers.”

“Frequently words of general meaning are used in

2 statute, words broad enough to include an act in

question and yet a consideration of the whole leg-

islation or of the circumstances surrounding its en-

actment or of the absurd results which follow from

giving such broad meaning to the words makes it

Argument. 7 a ,

sg’

bah ans to believe that the legislator intended

to include the’ particular act.”

We feel that ‘to’allow the National Act to Sipply to

a small local business such as a laundry, would create

an absurdity, for the reason that to permit the act to

apply to a laundry would allow it also to apply to a

barber shop, a shoe repair shop, or any of the other

service industries of which there are so many fn every _

small community. In other words, the net result would

be that all business, regardless of type, would be’ en-

‘compassed by the National Act and the individual States

wou’? no longer have control of any business within

the State confines.

' ee 2

We believ@that there is serious danger in extend-

- ing this statute beyond its purpose. The following case,

we believe, is in point:

Caminetti v. U. 8., 242 U. S. 470 at 490:

“Reports to Congress accompanying the introduc-

tion of purpose laws may aid the Courts jn reaching

the true meaning of the’ legislature in cases of

doubtful interpretation.”—See also dissenting opin-

ion, page 502.

“There is danger in extending a statute- beyond

its purpose, even if justified by a strict adherence

to its words.”

wi

a 2"

SSeS

& ¢

lower Court, submit the question very fairly. It is

, argued by the Board, however, that the Court has not

bubmitted the question of purchases in its framed ques-

-tions, and the Board states in its brief, that the ques-

36 Argument.

Ill.

The Answer to the First Question Certified by the Lower

Court, Should Be in the Negative, and the Answer

to the Second Question Should Be in the Negative.

_ We believe that both questions, as submitted by the

tion of purchases also should be considered in arriving

at jurisdiction. The lower Court states, however, that

the matter of purchases, was insufficient, in its opinion,

to confer jurisdiction, and confines itself to the matter

of collection, servicing and. enn f primarily.

We agree whole-heartedly with the Court below on

the matter of purchases, as the same apply to a laundry.

It must be remembered that a laundry does not make

purchases with the idea of reselling them or fabricating

or processing these purchases, and changing the form,

substance, character, utility, or value thereof and then

resell them, but purchases in a laundry business mean

just those little incidental items that are used to per-

form the service on the garment. In other words, it

includes the purchase of bluing, tape which is used on.

presses, and padding which,is also used on laundry

presses. A laundry purch soap and bleach and sol-

vent, and these items are’ used to clean the garments.

Coal and water are used, but only for the purpose of pro-

ducing steam, etc., to wash the soiled clothing. None

of these purchases go into processing or manufacture, —

but these purch are immediately consumed and

therefore have no opportunity, of themselves, to become

a further part of interstate commerce. And in the case

at bar, it was definitey proved that the purchases, as

above outlined, were made in the City of Wheeling, which

aN

: Argument. ; ———

is the home town of tile respondent, and eventhough .

a few purchases may have originated: out of the State,

the contracts for the same were consumated in the City

of Wheeling. : ,

“With reference to the purchase of machinery, we

feel the Board has erred in attempting to consider pur-

chases of laundry machinery as an element of interstate

commerce. As we have previously outlined, the pur-

chases of machinery in the particular case at bar, for

one year were heavy for the reason that the Company

had just passed throtigh a. period of bankruptcy, and

much of the old machinery was junked and new machin-

ery purchased. Now it is absurd to use these new ma-

chinery purchases as a basis for determining whether

or not a particular company is in interstate commerce,

because once that machinery is purchased, probably no |

_. additional purchases of a similar type will be made for

15 or 20 years, and to use these machinery purchases as

a basis- for determining whether a Company is in inter-

state commerce, gives a distorted view of the actual

business itself, because they would not be normal pur-

chases from year to year. Furthermore, as we view

| purchases with respect ,to their effect on commerce, we

| believe the theory of purchases only applies when those

‘articles purchased are used and fabricated and processed

and become a part of a new product, which in*turn is

again shipped out into interstate commerte.

In this case, the articles purchased, which were in

‘the form of machinery, came to rest, and there they, will

stay for 15 or 20 years until again obsolete. Undoubt-

edly the Lower Court detailed the theory the same way,

_ and that is the reason that they éonclude the matter of

purchases in a laundry business as of little importance

in determining the true aspect of the business. as the

_ same affects commerce.

7

38 _ Argument. ;

As before stated, and as incidental, we might again

add that all of these purchases of machinery were ne-

gotiated for and the contracts consummated at Wheel-

ing, West Virginia, the home office of the respondent.

- We concur with the opinion of the,Court below with

reference 8 these so-called purchases, when it states :—

“We are clearly of the opinion, however, as stated

in our certificate, that the volume of interstate busi-

ness involved in the purchase of supplies is not suf-

ficient to bring the business of the respondent with-

in the jurisdiction of the Board.”

: wt. pes

Analysis of the Cases Cited by the Board in Support of

Jurisdiction.

We take the liberty of phinting out Brialiy the dis-

tinction between those cases which the Board cites in |

support of jurisdiction, and the case at bar.

N. L. R. B. v. J. & L., 301 U. S., page 1. Note, In

this case raw materials were drawn from several States,

fabricated, manufactured, and resold in different States.

(White Swan Company manufactures nothing, and sells

nothing. )

re

Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Company v. N. L. R. B.,

303 U. S. 453. Note, In this case the defendant’s busi-

ness was not service, but consisted of canning fruits

and selling them in the different States to which they

were shipped, and title to the fruit passed. The fruit

was. processed, its form, substance, quality and utility

changed, and then title passed in the goods in interstate -

“commerce. (White Swan Company does not buy or sell

or process, but merely renders a service.)

eT a! @

‘ Argument. 7 - 39

Consolidated Edison Company v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.

S., pages 197, 222. This Company-served three and one-

half million gas and electric customers. They manu-

facture gas, electricity and steam. They bought oil, coal

and gas and converted or processed it and then resold.

They also supplied other Companies dealing in inter-.

state commerce, such as railroads, steamship companies,

radios, etc. (White Swan Company manufactures noth-

ing, and does ndt sell the service to those who need the

same-in-interstate commerce. )

N. L. R. B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601. In this case

raw materials were transported from New York to New

Jersey to be fabricated or cloth was cut in.New York

and transported to New Jersey to be fabricated. After

the fabricating and processing was finished, the finished

goods were then-redelivered back to either New York

or to any other State in the union. (White Swan Com-

pany does not process and does not ship to all States

of the union, and does not change the form, color, or

texture of clothes, merely cleans them. )

N. L. R. B. v. Bradford Dyeing & Finishing Asso-

ciation, 60 Supreme Court 918. In this case the respond-

ent processed the gray cloth and manufactured or

changed the character of it. (White Swan does not

process, manufacture or ’ change the character of goods

it services. )

N. L. R. B. v. Hopwood Retinning Company, 98 Fed-

eral 2nd be CCA 2). In this case the respondent did

more than merely collect and clean ice cream containers,

but it retinned and resoldered same and bought and sold .

others, thus transferring title to the goods. (White

Swan Company does not buy or sell articles of laundry,

‘ merely cleans and presses them.)

{

4 Mins

——

40 Argument. |

N. L. R. B. v. National New York Packing-& Ship-

ping Company, 86 Federal 2nd, 98. This Company acte1

as agent in shipments of national proportions Zo the ©

many States. It participated in the continuity of transit

from buyer in one State to seller in another State. Title

to the goods changed. The form of the packaged articles

changed. The articles themselves were alrea

in interstate commerce from State to’ State. te

“\Swan Company is agent for no one, it does not act as an

agent in interstate shipments, nor does it change the

character, substance or transfer any title to goods, nor

participates in the change of substance or character of

the goods. )

Kansas City Railway Company v. McAdow, 240 U.

S. 51. Note, that the question of Juriediction, was not

raised in this case.

Spokane & Inland R. Company v. U.'8., 241, U.S.

S44. This case has no real applicatio., since from time

immemorial railroads have always been considered in

interstate commérce by the very nature of their opera-

tions, but laundries have not been §° considered.

Ellis v. Inman Poulsen & Company, 131 Federal 182.

Note, That in this case, the goods which defendants dealt

in were bought and sold in interstate commerce. Title

passed in the goods. (White Swan Company does not

buy or sell in interstate commerce, or even in intrastate

commerce. It merely renders a service. )

Fehr Baking Company v. Bakers Union, 20 Federal

Supp. 691. Note, In this case bakery products were

manufactured in one State and were sold in another

State. (White Swan Company does not »uy and sell, it

merely renders a Seeveee. )

Argument. ~- fee 41

~ CONCLUSION.

It is respectfully submitted that the questions init.

fied by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-

cuit should be answered in the negative.

‘ ‘ tr

H. C. A. HOFACKER,

Attorney for White Swan einiitin

28 St. Nicholas Building, Pitts-

~. burgh, Pa. ° :

March, 1941. ~ ue

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. =

No, 529.—OgqrToszr Term, 1940.

National Labor Relations Board) On Certifcate from the United

vs. States Cireuit Court of Ap-

White ¥en Company. peals for the Fourth Circuit.

[March 31, 1941°] my oF

Pat

/ > ;

f Mr. Justice Dovauas delivered the opinion of the Court.

A certificate from the Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit submitted pursuant te § 239 of the Judicial Code (28

U.S. C. 6) is as follows: |

a’ petition for enforcer<nt of an order of the National Labor Re-

lati Board, which directed the White Swan Company, 4 corporation “of

Wheeling, West Virginia, engaged in the operation of a laundry and dry - :

cleaning business, to dease and desist from certain unfair labor practices .

and to offer employment with back pay to eertain employees held to have

been discharged because of union affiliation and activities. The findings of —

the Béard with mape $s the unfair labor practices and discriminatory dis-

of employees Are sustained by substantial evidence; but a question

has , a8 to which the members of the Court are divided and in doubt,

with respect to the jurisdiction of the Board-in the premises. ses p ars

_The respondent, White Swan Company epetates a combined erage By

- diy cleaning establishment in the city of Wheeling, West Virginia, “#¢

ceftain of its supplies are obtained from without the state, the volume of

the interstate business thus involved is not cufficient, in our opinion, to bring ©

the business within the jurisdiction of the Board. The record shows that

these supplies consist pf soap, Wang. bleach, solvent, coal, water, paper,

tape and padding, that respondent’s purchases thereof during 1938

amounted to $38,333.15, of which $10,810.90 came from without the state.

Respondent, however, operates delivery trucks in Ohio as well as in West

Virginia, three of the delivery routes from its plant being in Ohio and eleven

in West Virginia. The business involved is necessarily of a purely lotal

character, as the record shows that-a radius of fifteén miles is the practical _

limit for a laundry or dry-cleaning business in this territory. The fact that

‘business is done in Ohio outside the state in which respondent’s laundry is

located, results from the fact that this purely local business is located in a

‘sity on a state line. Respondent ag ye garments in its trucks from

those of its/customers who reside.in Ohio to its plant in West Virginia to

‘be serviced, and then after servicing tetutns the garments in its trucks to

the customers. Approximately 12.93 per cent of its gross income for 1938

was derived from this source. “In addition thereto, approximately 5 per. .

_eent ofits gross income during 1938 was derived from the servicing of gar: gh eae

ments which persons not in its émployinent collected in Ohio, brought to its Vite 4

plant for servicing and déliveted in Ohio after they had been serviced. i

,. Respondent’s total gross income in 1938 was $128,752.96. The total income

~

°

ete oe = = Se ee ee t wO~a> ox00

ee ,

2+ ° National Labor Relations Board vs. White Swan Co.

e

from the business obtained from persons in Ohio during this period was

$28,088.43.

We recognize that the collection and delivery of garments across state

lines, as above described, constitutes interstate commerce. We are advertant,

however, to the admonition of the e-urt that in applying the act we are to

bear in mind ‘‘the distinction between what is national and what is local in

the activities of commerce.’’ N. L. R. B. v. Jones § Laughlin (301 U. 8. 1,

30). And although the letter of the National Labor Relations Act may cover

such collections and deliveries in interstate commerce aa are here involved,

the question arises whether a proper interpretation of the Act, in view of

the intent of Congress, would include them. Cf. United States v. Sorrells,

287 U. 8. 435, 446. We are divided and in doubt as to whether such collec-

tion and delivery, which results from the fact that business of a local char-

acter, such as a laundry, is located on a state line, is sufficient to bring such

business within the jurisdiction of the Board under the National Labor Re-

lations Act. To so hold would be to bring under the jurisdiction of the

Board a great variety of businesses of purely local character simply because

they maintain a delivery service in cities located on state lines. As there

are many such cities.in the United States, the question seems to us one of

- sufficient importance te justify us in certifying it to the Supreme Court so,

that it may be definitely settled. ‘

Being divided and in doubt, 1 erefore, this Court fespectfully certifies to

the Supreme Court ofgthe United States, for its instruction and advice, the

following questions of law, the determination of which is indispensable to a

. proper decision of the case. : : :

_1, Should the National Labor Relations’ Act be interpreted as having ap-

plication to a business of purely local character, such as a laundry, merely

. because such business is located:in a city on a state line and derives a sub-

stantial portion of its income from business which involves collections or

deliveries of articles in a state other than that, in which the business is

located?

2. Where a local business, such as a laundry, is located in a city on @

state line, and is not engaged in interstate commerce, except in so far as it

may collect articles to. be.serviced and may make deliveries to customers

living across the state line, is such business, by reason of such collections

and deliveries, deemed ote in ‘‘commerce’’ -within the: meaning of Sub-

section 6 of Section ‘2 of the Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 29 U. 8. C. A.

152(6), so that an unfaiy/labor practice on its part would be an unfair labor

practice ‘‘affecting commerce’’ within the meaning of Subsection 7 of said

section (29 U. S. ©. A. 152(7)) and Subsection (a) of Section 10; 29 °

U. 8. 0. A. 160(a) 91 See ee.

The tertificate must be dismissed. : | .

-By §10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (49 Stat. 449,

453; 29 U. S. C. §160(a)) the Board is empowered ‘‘to prevent

any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in

section 8) affecting commeree.’’ The term ‘‘affecting commerce’’

is defined in §2(7) as ‘‘in commerce, or burdening or obstructing

commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to

~, lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the

‘free flow of commerce.’’g And ‘‘commerce’”’ by § 2(6) is defined so

1 The court denied a motion made by the Sol'citor Goneral to amend the certificate by

qubodring the purchase of supplies in interstate cw as well as the collections an

a

National Labor Relations, Board vs. White Swan Co. 3

as to include ‘‘trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communi-

eation among the,several States.’’ On a review ofan order of the

Board in a Circuit Court of Appeals the ‘‘findings of the Board as

to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.’’ § 10(e).

* The questions do- not focus ‘‘the controversy in its setting.’’

Lowden v. Northwestern National Bank & Trust Co., 298 U. 8. 160,

163. From the certificate we do not know on what greanee the

Board based its jurisdiction—that the business was ‘‘in com-

merce’’ or that it was embraced within the other categories de-

serjbed in § 2(7) of the Act. The terms ‘‘business, of purely local

character’’ and ‘‘local business’’ are meaningful for purposes of

§10(a) of the Act only in light of speéifie-findings of the Board.

To answer the questions we would have to make a supposition as to

thé sense in which the Board made. its finding under § 10(a) -that

the unfair labor practices were ‘‘affecting commerce’’. The neces-

sity of making that supposition reveals the hypothetical avd ab-

record the answe: might be clear whichever the* theory of ‘the

Board’s findings docs not make the questions any the less defective.

The reviewing court is passing on the validity of a specific order of

‘the Board. Since the questions certified do not reflect the precise

conclusions of the Bbard and the precise findings on whith those

conclusions were based, they necessarily have an ‘‘objectionable

generality’’. See United States v. Mayer, 285 U. S. 55, 66; White,

«V. Johnson, 282 U. S. 367, 371; Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U. S. 638,

648 ; Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 8306/0. S. 563, 571;

, they did reflect those tonclusions and findings, they would be de-

fective as calling for a ‘‘decision of the whole case’. News Syn-

dicate Co. y. New York Ceniral Railroad Co., 275 U. S. 179, 188.

' Dismissed.

ee : e 4

Clerk, Supreme Court, U. 8.

stract quality of theg questions. And the fact that on the whole °

Pflueger v. Sherman, 293 U. S. 55, 57, 58. And if, in this ease,:

=

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Brief for White Swan Co — National Labor Relations Board v. White Swan Co. · 313 U.S. 23 | Frix