Brief for White Swan Co — National Labor Relations Board v. White Swan Co.
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CHARLES ELWORE CROPLEY
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1940. ~
NO. 529.
ys . °
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Vv.
| WHITE SWAN COMPANY.
On Certificate From the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
BRIEF FOR WHITE SWAN COMPANY.
*
4 | ; ' \
é
{
H. C. A. HOFACKER,
Attorney for White Swan Company. |
28 St. Nickolas Building, ae
Pittsburgh, Pa. * rs
’ ¢
SMITH BROS. CO. INC., LAW PRINTERS, 208-212 GRANT STREET, PITTSBURGH, PA,
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LANK PAGE
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.
INDEX.
. r .
oer eeeve eevee eeeewewneavr ee en eee eeneeeeeeeneaeee
The Laundry and Dry Cleaning Business Is a
Purely Local Service Industry Subject
Only to the Control of the States and to
Impose Federal Regulation Destroys the
Distinction Between That Which Is
tional and That Which Is Locz. .......\..
is I.
Was It the Intent of the Congress to Make the
Act Apply to Local‘ Service Establish-
WET tcc ccccccnesddcdoswuh jewees ‘Sade
The Answer to the First Question Certified by
the Lower Court, Should Be in the Nega-
tive, and-the Answer to the Second Ques-
tion Should Be inthe ais a rrre ee
Analysis of the Cases Cited by the Board in
' Support of Jurisdiction .... j 2 ue ee view aeeens
eo eee rrr Ls santiubaners Je ecaaleud spl
$ et fn
ey ae apse, a en
wae cla oft
Citations.
Citations.
40 ee 5 tidy PAGE
Abe Lainer, d/b/a Lainey Giesiners & Dyers Co., et.
al., Mass. L. R. C. Case Nos. U. P. 101, 134, 139,
4/21/88 ee he ee ee ee ee | Peeve vsees 28
Back Bay Chevrolet, Inc., et al., Mass. L. R. C. ocicia
| No. U. P. 46, 3/1/38 cee eeneSeeseces see TVET. ‘27
. Bonnano Laundry & Supply Co. (1940), Mass. i R. es
C. Case No. C. R. 408, Nov. 1940.............. - 28
Budget Laundry Co. et al., Pa. L. R. B. Case No. 170,
ME Eo be ic ee cancers evs cicexeve 29 .
Badger Nu-Way Cleaners, et al., Wisc. L. R. B. Case
No. 31, Ce 2, Dec. No. 19, Sept. 23, 1000...:5... 30
Cactus Mines Co., 21 N. L. R. B. 68.............. 16
Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v Kentucky, 154 U. S.
a Oh ae ck wk a OE KK oa ea eee ees 20
C. & W. Dyeing & Cleaning Co., Inc., et al., Mass, L.
R. C. Case No. U. P. 10, 2/10/38 aanewueny ee
Capitol Laundry Co. (1940), Mass. L. R. C. Case No.
fy & SS | Ree ans 28
—€onsolidated Laundry Corp. et al., 1937, N. Y.S. L
R. B., Dec. No. 4, Sept. 16, 1937........... 29
Crandall-McKenzie & Henderson, Inc., et al., ids
Pa. L. R. B., Dec. No. 92, 2/26/40............ 29
Community Laundry Co., inc., et al., 1937, Pa. L.
R. B. Case No. 123, May 13, 1939............. — 29
Co nwealth v. Pearl Laundry Co., 105 Ky. 259,
bs. Soe SPREE EPR EE rari ie Saar at ea . 34
etti v. U. S., 242 U.S. 470 at 490............° 35
E Consolidated Edison Company v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.
Ss. 197, 222 eceecevoenecboeeeeeetee eds meer eee Acces 39
eee Citations.
—
snes acre - PAGE
Eastern Overall¥Dry Cleaning Co. et al. (1940)
Mass. L. R. C. Casé No. U, P. 396, 1/19/40..... 28
Economy Clean Towel Supply Co. Inc., et al., 1938,
N. Y. S. L. R. B., Dec. 0. 198, July 20, 1938. . 29
East Cleaners & Dyers Inc. et al., 1938, Pa. L. R. B., :
WO; SG) ROE. BO Te ss vig oc bc cctv ccicinecess 2 /
Ellis v. Inman Paulsen & Company, 131 Federal 182 40
_ Francis V. and Edwin U. Cahill d/b/a Union Laun-
dry, et al., Mass. L. R. C., Case No. U. P. 93 May
| —+': i Ne Cea aay we a 6 od we we Oe eer bee bodes 28
"Farnsworth New Method Laundry Co., Inc., (1940)
Mass. L. R. C. Case No. C. R. 375, Aug. 13, 1940. 28
Fox Square Laundry Co., Inc., et al., 1939, N. Y. S.
_L.R. B., Dec. No. 669, Sept. 21, 1939.......... 29
Fehr Baking Company v. Bakers Union, 20 Fed.”
Supp. OP Fr Ser hhc ceye ceed) VPs Be cee eas 40)
Golden Bell.Cleaners Inc., 1940, Mass. L. R. C., Case —
No. C. R. 333, 4/29/40 bea ey GPa eidvinewekeres 28
* Howes Co. et al., Mass. L. R. C., No. U. P. 281, |
I a Sara a bah KOS ae Ca ew CER 28 +
Hub Laundry Co. (1940) Mass. L. R. C., Case No.
oa ae Ss Be ooo cent cb teks ueeks se 28 .
Hill Top Laundry Inc., et al. (1940) N.-Y.S.L. RR.
| " B,, Dee. No. 838, Case No. W. E.-156, Mar. 25, .
\ a
\ Kansas City pilin o Co. v. sialic: 5a U.S.51.. 40
Loyal Crown Linen Service Inc, et al., 1939-Mass.
_-L, RB. C. Case No. U. P. 251, 1/11/39.......... 27
Lewandos French Dyeing & Cleansing Co., 1940,
Mass. L. R. C.,-Case No. C, R. 341, 5/6/40.... 28
Lincoln Laundry Co. et al., 1939, Pa. L. R. B., Dec.
No. 136, Jan. 16, 2008. ee . .
ae iit
Seg Ser scammer PgR BER ee Od a |
Be, ,
Citations. y
PAGE
‘Liberty ae ey et al. ‘(1989), § Pa: L. R. B., Case
FEO. FE BAP PO ee ee ere lerve cau oicdie’s 30
‘Laundry Workers Int. Union et al. (1940), W.L. R.
B., Case No. 74, Ce-11, Dec. No. 47, ‘poanebaodian 30
Morgan Laundry Service Inc. (1940), Mass. L. R.
C., Case No. C. R. 386, 9/12/40 /............. 2
3 Midtown Laundry Ine. et al. (1940), N. Y.S. LR.
B., Dec. No. 804, Case No. S. E. ~4197, Feb. 8,
1940 ip PE RTE ET Oey is SS eS premee eee ' 29
N. L. R. B. v. Jones & — Steel Corporation,
i. SM BN aaa c creak seekers s 10, 17, 38.
N. L. R. B. v. Idaho Maryland Mines, 98 Fed. ae
Ps BO 6 kha Pe ELEY vs heed 4 Cale eee oo 17
Naif Makol World Cieaners & Dyers Co.,, et al; -
' Mass. *. R. C. Case No. U. P. 85, 5/23/38. . 28
N. L. R. B. v. Fainblatt, Oe OB GER iae vies veces 39
N. L..R. B. v. Bradford Dyeing & Finishing Ansocig-
tion, 60 Supreme Court 918...:./...........4 39
N. L. R. B. v. Hopwood Retinning Company, ‘ ,
. We TI Bo o.c o hcccwessqes cpececes ' 39
N. L. R. B. v. National New York Packing & Ship-
ping Company, 86 Federal 2nd 98............ 40
Protective Motor Service Co., 21 N. L. R. B. 50. 12
Pierce v. New Hampshire, 5 How. i SP eo re 20
Premier Linen Supply & Laundry Co., Inc. et al.,
1939, N. Y. S. L. R. B., Dee. No. 738, Nov. 22,
WE AEs y ccletunvebe ene sini so vetues dees 29
Prompt Family Laundry Inc., par (1940) N. vy. Ss.
LR. B,, Dec. No. 771,:1/9/40......... eede as 29
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168.................... 33
Quality Laundry Service Inc., et al. (1937), N. Mey
S. LR. B., Dec. No. 10, Nov. 1, 1937 5h 6-Sd esd 29
“iv .
Citations. '
: eos 2 PAGE
Shechter Poultry Co. v.U. 8, 295 U.S: 495.26. oe \18
"State v. Louisville R. Co., 97 Miss. 35. . ieee wr at |
. Sani-Wash Laundry Co., et al., Mass. L. R. C, Case
Wa: U.P) 901; 0/81/08... oo nr. 28.
Shub, J. H. et al. d/b/a American Dry Cleaning Co.,
(1940) Mass. L. R. C.; Case No. C. R. bss
: PE i Ss acca wae ce. ea PCr ewaccateeTinas 28
* §tapleton Service Laandry Inc., et al., (1938) N. Y.
' §. L. R. B. Dec. No. 206, Sent. “23, Us so hse cS 29
Sorrells v. U..S_287 U. S. Reports, page 435...... 32
Smith, Clerk v. Jackson, Supreme Court of .Tenn.,
12/20/1899, 54 S. W. Reporter Page 981, 103
EE 3 os ws PN eh os oe ewe oaks 32, 33
Scannon v. Kansas City Railroad , 41 Missouri
EE oa ci N A 54 oa bain Se hea eee Le 33
Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N. LR. B. 508 U. 8.
RRA rr aa metab are Peele acre ea eae 38
‘Spokane & Inland R. Co. v. U. S. 241 U. S. 344. 40
. Tudor Laundry Co., et al. (1939) N. Y. S. L. R. B,, fi
Case No. S. U. 3581, July 12, 1939............ 29
UO, hw Dewitt, 6 Wel. OA... .. 20
United Laundries Co. et al. (1938) Mass. L. R. c. )
Se WR Iie: Cee OP EIS cob oko coe acvaeece 28
Veazie v. Moore, 14 Ow. om... i ao oh A ae 19
' Wash Rite Laundfy Co., et al., 1938 Mass. Ea: <.
Case No. U. P., 121, 6/20/38...... Ae eee 27
White Cleaners & Dyers Inc., et al., 1938, Mass. L.
R. C,, Case No. U. P. 147, 6/20/38..:........ 27
Wilson Laundry Co., et al., 1939 Pa. L. R. B., Case
oe J. En 3 BE er ere erie ee
Waukesha Palace Laundry Co., et al., Wisc. L. R. B.,
Case No. 406, C-24, Apr. 30, 1938. AEN ee ure 30
4
a
Y ,
tt:
U. S. Law Week Vol. 1 Part 2 (1934) Page 845...
U. S. Law Week Vol. 1 Part)2 (1934) Page 847....
U. S. Law Week. Vol. 1 Part 2 (1934) Page 851...
Senate Committee Report May 2, 1935, No. 573. dime
~-
. we “4 -
Citations. 5
° ad if - a
) | STATUTES: 4 «Mil
\ 2 : PAGE
* Act of July 5, 1935,-C. 372, 49 Stat. 449; 29 U. 8. C.,
Supp. V., Sec. 151, et seq......~. Vie iviengenes 30
: MISCELLANEOUS:,
eoN U.S. Law Week Vol. 1 Part 1 (1933-34) Page 518. .
\
In THE
Supreme Court: of the United: States
“OCTOBER TERM, 1940.
_ ace /
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
-. Vv.
_ WHITE SWAN COMPANY.
°
On Certificate From the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
o
' BRIEF FOR bri SWAN COMPANY. .
7 ,
' | STATEMENT.
‘The White Swan Company conducts a laundry and
dry cleaning service in Wheeling, West Virginia, Wheel- e
ing béing located on one side of the Ohio River. The
- Ohio River at this point divides the states of West Vir-
ginia-and Ohio...__,
The Company owns one laundiy, one office, main-
tains no branches, has no branch sales forces in any ~*
other community other than in Wheeling for the solici-
tation of business. The Company now employs approxi-
mately eighty (80) people. For a period of fifteen years —
; _ to 1934 the company had not paid a single penny:
7
ow
En ae ene ee trite MegQVeros oY : oh @ a
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> fi — P < sam A
" ‘ — So
a coal} fe
| \ ae ange
of dividend to stockholders. It finally went into bank-
ruptcy and —_ oe receivership S€V- ,
eral years. Se,
In the ‘latter pert of 1936, Mr. T. ‘I. Murvin pur-
chased the controlling interest in the comp&ny from the_
receivers and then proceeded to rehabilitate the machin-
ery and operate the.company itself. Mr. Murvin was a
very able and experienced operator having a long record ~ |
. of expérience in different laundries.
In looking over the plant, he found that the great
bulk of the machinery was obsolete and worn out and
needed replacement with more modern machinery. Con-
_ siderable new machinery was purehased, in fact an un-
usual amount of new machinery, greater than the nor-
mal purchases that would ordinarily be made in a laun-"
_ dry, were made during the years 1937 and 1938.. Con-
. tracts for the purchase of this Machinery were all con-
summated at Wheeling, West Virginia.
The company operates 17 laundry routes by i means
of trucks. Fourteen of these routes operate exclusively
in West Virginia, three of the routes cross the Ohio River
at a bridge located in Wheeling and serve the other side
' ‘of the river which is the Ohio side of the river. The
- company’s service confines itself exclusively. to what_is——|
‘. known as the “Wheeling Industrial District” which dis-
trict may be defined as that area comprised within a
radius of 15 miles of the City .of Wheeling.
On May 8, 1939, a complaint was issued by the CiO
against the respondent company alleging that 12 people
were discharged for union activities. The union charged’
that the company interfered with, restrained, and
coerced. members and that the company discouraged
membership in, Local No. 308. A hearing was held there-
on and the Trial Examiner in making his Intermediate
Report upheld the company in the. dismissal of nine out
of the 12 employees involved. |
ra
°
i wee
Os AGI LAS Sk Cae ae a, RE ES , ‘ — a —_ _ , . =
ae x ore 2 ats - Cs gee ae oa eo it
% ‘ j y
Statement. , | 3
The Examiner ordered thé reinstatemént Of three
out of the 12 employees. The case proceeded before the
National Board for argument and the National Board °
upheld the-Examiner’s report. The Board then peti-
+ tioned the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for enforce-
ment of the’order and the entire case was argued before
the Fourth Circuit Court of Apyeam, Veoh
-
et The Company contended from the very outset of the.
case that the National Board was without jurisdiction in
this case for the reason that the respondent company
was not engaged in interstate commerce and that juris-
diction, if-any, would be within the purview of the State
- of West Varginia and not the National Board.
- Respondent company also contended that its sees.
ness was purely local and was a service business and that
the Act did not apply to it.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred in
the contentions advanced by the respondent to the effect .
that they were divided and in doubt and therefore certi-
fied to the Supreme Court two questions of law for in-
struction and advice. These questions they held were
indispensable to the proper decision -of the case. The
, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in their Statement of
Facts states that the
" “Volume of interstate business thus involved is not
sufficient in our opinion to bring the business with-
in the jurisdiction of the Board.”
" They also stated:
“The business involved is necessarily of a purely
local character as the record shows that a radius of
15. miles is the practical limit for a laundry and dty
cleaning business in this territory. The fact that
_« « business is done in Ohio outside of the state in which
. : /y ;
x e
s é y - —s .
MEAS gs a Keir i SR ROOT BOURGET ARTE IRE: LAKE ss ‘= Y rae ~~:
tsi ee. coe nled wieaeenes Byes ts 4 ion i
? ~
e « ,
4 ? ‘Statement. |
- #spondent’s laundry is located results from the fact
- that this purely local business is caus in a city on
=a state line.”
The Court further stated:
“We recognize that the collection and delivery of
garments across state lines * * * constitutes
interstate commerce. We are advertent, however,
to the admonition of the Court that in applying the
t we are to bear in mind the distinction between
what is national and what is Jocal in the activities
of commerce and * * * and although the letter
* of the National Labor Relations Act may govern
such collections and deliveries in interstate com-
merce as are here involved, the question arises
whether a proper interpretation of the Act in view
of the intent of Congress would include them.”
In another part they state: cs vgn enc
“We are divided and in doubt as to whether such col-
lection and delivery which results from the fact that
business of a local character, such as a laundry, is
glecated on a state line is sufficient to bring such
business within the jurisdiction of the Board under
the National Labor Relations Act. ‘To so hold would
bring under the jurisdiction of the Board a great
variety of businesses of purely Aocal character sim-
ply because they maintain a delivery service in
cities located on state lines as there are many such
cities in the United States. The question seems to
us one of sufficient importance to justify us in cer-
tifying it to the Supreme Court so that it may y a§
definitely saaseeell "
The Solicitor. General then filed a motion in ni the’
js -
4
Court below asking that the certificate be amended and. °
asked’ that the questions which had been sdbmitted to
.
. a 3
ae ih Se ent
;
;
ar
4
the Supreme Court be rephrased. This the lower Court
refused to do for the reason that the phraseology as set
up in the certificate to our mind distinctly and clearly
sets forth to the Supreme Court the issues here involved,
while the suggested phraseology asked for by the Solici-
tor General did not in our opinion properly state the
question. At this stage now the case is before the Su-
_— Court.
|
- By way of further explanation it might be stated
that to our knowledge this is the first involving the
laundry industry which has gone ‘clare any of the
Courts wherein an attempt was made to apply the Na-
tional-Act. Heretofore the laundry business has always
' been exempt from the National Acts even exempted from
the NRA on,the theory that it is a purély local business,
rendered service only and did not engage in the com-
‘modities of interstate commerce and it has always here-
tofore been classified i in the same category as the barber
and shoe repairman, both of whom render service only
and irfour opinion do not engage in interstate commerce.
This case undoubtedly would not have arisen had
, this particular laundry been located off a state line, but
due to the fact it is situated in a border line city the
question arises.
:
i
ee
A
The ‘Laundcy and Dey Cledaing Business Is a Prisely
Local Service Industry Subject Only to the Control
of the States and to Impose Federal Regulation
Destroys the Distinction Between That Which Is
‘ js National and That Which Is Local.
The National Labor Relations Act is not applicable
to respondent. Respondent has consistently held and
now strenuously contends that the Att itself is’ not ap-
plicable to the respondent. As yet there has been no >
» decision in the Federal Courts wherein the status of the
laundry and dry cleaning business has been definitely
decided when applying the National Labor Relations Act.
Whether such business is intrastate or interstate or na-
tional or local or whether it actually affects interstate .
commerce is now before\ythe Court for the first time.
he Laundries and dry cleaning establishments in every city
a and community are as numerous as the local restaurants,
Me da shoe repair shops, local butcher shops, drug stores, and
aor grocery stores, and in practically every busy city block
f we find several laundry and dry cleaning establishments
- and in almost every town of any size we have the local
‘segs chinaman who operates a laundry and for this reason it
is familiarly termed the Chinaman’s business.
> " The distinguishing characteristic of. the laundry and
dry cleaning business as compared to other types of
business over which the National Labor Board has as-”°
sumed jurisdiction is that the laundry and dry cleaning
business is® purely a service industry and therefore is
necessarily local in nature. To attempt to apply the
ie theory of interstate commerce to a local service com-
: pany requires an unlimited amount. of f imagination plus
— PRESET PG SEE oe : oS aes TORE ty
x *
Argument. ’ 7
a reckless overlooking of the fundamental elements
which comprise the working conditions of a laundry.
In all cases adjudicating other types of business
wherein the jurisdiction of the Board has been sustaired
the defendant has engaged in interstate commerce on a
large scale yet a fundamental difference exists between
those types of business where jurisdiction was upheld
and-the one at bar. We find that in all types of business
where the jurisdiction of the Board is upheld the com-
panies involved in interstate commerce either bought,
sold, bartered, or exchanged their product or they pur-
chased raw material and processed, manufactured, or
changed its form, substance, character, utility, or value
of the goods.
We find also that in other types of business where
the jurisdiction of the Act was upheld the business itself
was either nation wide or c mprised the area of
laundry and dry cleaning business which ‘ne
local only and operates within a restricted
In other types of business where the j |
Board was upheld it was found that althopgh perhaps
the company operated within the confines of one state its
product was one which was used in intersfate or foreign
commerce and the best illustration of this type of busi-
- ness comes from thdse cases where the company re-
paired and built ships and vessels operating in interstate
and foreign waters. Other cases involving other types
of business uphold the jurisdiction of the Board on the
theory that-the title to the commodity i in which the com-
pany deals ee hands in interstate commerce.
Applying all of these distinguishing features which
have arisen in other types of business wherein the juris: .
diction of the Act was upheld to the case at bar, we find :
that the business of the respondent — does not ,
ae : Argument.
come within the purview of any of the illustrations here- <
tofore recited. The opty bus in which the White
Swan Company i is engaged is the laundry and dry clean-
ing of clothes belonging to an individual who desires to
have them washed, cleaned, or pressed and these clothes
always belong to the individual customer. Therefore the
‘ respondent does not buy articles of clothing and wearing
apparel, it does not sell said articles, it does not process
said articles, it does not manufacture said articles, ore
fabricate the same. The title to the articles of wearing
apparel always remains in the customer and the charac-
ter, utility and value of the goods always remains the
same. :
We believe it is important to keep these elements in
mind because a perusal of all the bases decided to date
shows that where the Act was applied one of the dis-
. tinguishing items above mentioned was present. That
fompany which: in the cases decided, was ruled to be in
interstate commerce, either bought, sold, bartered, or
exchanged its product or it processed or manufactured
its product and thus changed the character, utility, or
value of the goods or it dealt in the specific gaqds and
passed title to the same. These distinguishing features
mark the striking difference between the case at bar and
those types of cases where the jurisdiction of, the Act
has been upheld.
To Lan that the National Act applies to this busi-
ness of a purely local nature automatically destroys the
distinction between that which is national and that
which is local. Such a decision would immediately have
the effect of applying the Natignal Act or giving the Na-
tfonal Act jurisdiction to every type of business regard-
less of how small. = states themselves would no
longer have any poweg to regulate erep the smallest
business operating within their confines, ‘ Laundries and
dry cleaning establishments are classified with the local
;
ye
L\ 3 Argument. 3 9
restaurant, butcher, grocer, and shoe repairman. The
barber, and the shoe repairman, and the laundry and dry |
cleaning owners have only one commodity to sell and that
sis service, and they have always been placed in the same —
category with reference to business, namely they, have e
‘ always been known as local establishments rendering
service only, and to now rule that these service busi-
nesses engage in interstate commerce makes for ab-
surdity. ee
Let us assume a barber operating in Wheeling
shaves a customer who cro#sed the bridge from the Ohio
side to the Wheeling side. Under the theory of the Board
the barber is in interstate commerce. Let us take the
—further’ illustration of an individual living on the Ohio
side of the Ohio River who either walks or crosses over
the bridge into Wheeling and has his shoes serviced or
repaired. Under the theory advanced by the Board this
shoe repairman is in interstate commerce. Or let us say
that the barber himself leaves his shop at Wheeling and
walks over the bridge to the Ohio side to shave a cus-
tomer. This, under the Board’s theory, would place him
in interstate commerce. - Or let us say the shoe repair-
man delivered the shoes which he had repaired over to
the Ohio side of the river and collected his money. Is he
in interstate commerce? Let us further give the illus-
tration of the Chinaman operating his laundry in Wheel-
ing. Some of his customers come from the Ohio side _
of the river and some of his customers he personally de- — —
livers the laundry to on the Ohio side. Does that place
his business in interstate commerce?
» The answer is plainly, no, this is not-interstate com-
merce, because all of these men, including the laundry-
men in this case operate a pu local business that con-
fines itself to an area of a few and the only reason
this case has arisen is because eCity of Wh z
happens to be located on a state line.
,
* Yim eagerness ee ee a
& Sea, ais
oft S, a ro aaa
i a i CL eo aon
a
‘10 . . Argument.
We must keep in mind the admonition of the Su-°
preme Court given in the case of N. L. R. B. v. Jones and is
ughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U. S., Page 1, ‘where the ° 4
urt warns as follows: ! :
s
“Powers of Congress to regulate commerce may not ” J
be ascertained so as to embrace effects upon inter- a
state commerce so indirect and remote that to em-
; brace them would effectually obliterate the distinc-
+ tion between what is national and what is local and
create a completely centralized government, the
question —— one of degree.” :
As we enbieatan’ the law, the question of Federal
rights and State rights is always before us and the
_ Court in that case points out the danger of allowing the
‘ Act to apply in every instance because to do SO\would
entirely eliminate the rights of the individual states.
Control of-all business regardless of how small would
pass from the States to the Federal-government. Many
‘of our States have passed their own little Wagner Acts
and ‘conflicts will inevitably ensue between the power
of the States and the Federal power if the National Act.
". js permitted to apply to a laundry business which is .
‘only a service and which of necessity must always re-
main purely local i in character and nature.
One of the distinguishing features therefore be-
tween interstate and intrastate business is that theory
of national or local’ proportions. It is easy to under-
stand why a business which operates nationally is in
interstate commerce. It attempts to serve all of the
states or many of them, has branch offices in many .
states, draws upon many states for its products and
fabricates them and reships them to the several states.
It advertises in many newspapers throughout the land,
buys raw materials, processes the same, and sells the
finished product, title to the article passes and the ef-
—
ee tttCi(‘“_“OS™SC;O;~O~™~*~™ et ee
~- Argument. 11
fects of such operations on interstate. commerce are im-
mediate and direct and undoubtedly these operations
conducted by a large business are profitable because
~~ continue so to operate.
~ Now eer difference do we find in the operation of
the respondént company which is,purely local and can-
not operate profitably on a national scale. We stren-
uously advance the fact that that laundry and dry clean-
ing business being a purely local business in its char-
_acter and nature cannot operate nationally at a profit.
We find that the respondent has seventeen routes serv-
~ ing customers, fourteen-of these_routes operate strictly —
within the confines of the State of West Virginia, three
of the routes merely cross the bridge over from Wheel-
ing into Ohio. In order to have a clear picture of re-
- gpondent’s business it is necessary to state that the
River and that the State of Ohio is onffhe other side of
the river connected by a bridge. eeling, with its
heavy industrial djstrict is naturally the focal point of
City of Wheeling is situated on one ie of the Ohio
- community life in this particular area and for the pur- .
pose of explaining the extent of respondent’s business
we refer in this brief to the “Wheeling Industrial Dis-
‘ trict” which is described as an area having a fifteen mile -
poe with Wheeling as the center of the circle or the
trict. The respondent’s business confines itself ex-
clusively to this area. .
The respondent cannot possibly engage in inter-
state commerce because to so engage would require con- -
siderable time to move one’s service to the customer.
In the laundry and dry cleaning business speed and
service must necessarily go hand {® hand and if a cus-
tomer gives a suit or dress to be laundered or cleaned
one day she expects to have it returned within a day
or two and the thought of transporting the suit or dress
J
Sa PoE I neh ai ae
sgsreront coer nee vegans permenant See
ad f
12 : Angument.
over a long distance between states and render such -
service is unthinkable because speed of service is ree |
quired by the customer and this must alweys keep the
laundry and dry cleaning business essentially local in .;
nature. ~
. As ance stated this case undoubtedly would not
be before the Court if it were not for thé fact that
Sic Wheeling i is located on a state line and-it just;so happens
that three of the seventeen routes operated by respond-
ent cross the bridge at the river over to the Ohio side.
_ Yet we find, however, that even the National Labor Re- |
—lations-Board-in-other types of business, namely the —
trucking business ruled that.a similar situation did not
affect commerce. Case of Protective . Motor Service
Company:
."Jn(“re Protective Motor Service Co., (Philadelphia, .
ie Pa.) and Twenty-five Employees, Case No. C-25,.
- ' " _ * Mar, 12, 1940 (21 N. L. R. B., No. 50.)
, Original decision reported at 1 LRR Man. 74;
such decision withdrawn: by order reported at 2
aig an Man. 552. :
hae ‘Operations of armored truck transport com-
pany are not sufficiently shown to affect commerce
with NLRA although such operations include two
daily routes to out of stdte points and although
company filed an application with Interstate Com-
merce Commission for a permit authorizing con-
tinuance of operations in interstate commerce under
Federal Motor Carrier Act, 1935, where greater part
of company’s business consists of tfansporting val-
uables for local concerns WITHIN ONE CITY.”
oo.
’ 9
OL UT Lia ach. F
The purely local nature of the- business itself is
manifested when we note that the respondent does not
maintain sales offices or agencies for the solicitation
of orders in any place outside of the City of Wheeling
| a N
eee
| a7? ~—« Argument. | 13
and the respondent maintains its only’ plant and execu-
- tive office in the City of Wheeling. It advertises its serv-
ices and facilities only in-Wheeling newsj apers. Is it
not fair to assume that if respondent’s business was in-
terstate in character it would have branch offices located
‘in all parts of Ohio and other states, is it not fair to.
assume that if the business were interstate respondent
would solicit and advertise for business in other states .
besides its home office in Wheeling; West Virginia? The
answer is clear. A laundry cannot operate in interstate ©
commerce profitably. To attempt to operate a laundry
——beyond-a_radius of fifteen miles is purely suicidal for
the reason. that the long haul that would be involved,
: first, eliminates any possibility of, profit, and, secondly,
prevents the laundry from giving the customer the im-
mediate one or two day service which the customer
: demai:ds. Therefore, every laundry must necessarily be
\
local in its nature and cannot hope or expect, to engage ~
in interstate commerce. It cannot hope to secure cus-
tomérs from many states and far distances for the very
reason that when one wants a suit pressed or cleaned
- or clothing washed and pressed, he expects delivery
within at two days from the time the articles are
picked up and no customer or group of customers could
be found Fra would wait weeks for delivery, such as is
common in those types of business which actually en-
gage in interstate commerce. The tendency of respond-
ent’s business: has been to consistently restrict the area —
. which it attempts to serve rather than enlarge because
a restricted territory enables one to derive a larger
profit:due to the shorter haul. The reason for restrict-
ing the territorv is also obvious when4we consider that .
laundry and dy cleaning establishments, shoe repair
shops, and harber shops, are multitudinous in every
community and when a laundry attempts to travel too
far from its base or plant to pick up and deliver laundry
it cannot compete with the numerous competitors who
a ;
14 Argument.
are located nearer to the customer ana do not have
to make the long haul which eliminates profits and for
this reason the laundry business must always remain
‘purely local in its character rather than national.
It is difficult to understand how the laundry busi-
ness can be described as affecting interstate commerce.
If A owns a suit and sends it to a laundry to be cleaned
and pressed, what has the laundry done to‘that suit?
The title to the suit always remains in A, the laundry
_ has not processed or manufactured the suit, it has not .
taken a bolt of cloth, dyed it, and then cut it up and
- Madea suit out of it, the laundry has acquired no title
to it, it has not sold it, it has not purchased the suit, it
has not bartered or exchanged the suit, nér has it
changed ‘the character or utility or value of the suit.
It has merely cleaned and pressed it and then returned
it to the owner and that is what we call purely service.
The laundry business is only a service business, just as
the barber and shoe repairman rendered service only, so
does the laundry.
Stress has been laid on the fact that 18% of re-
spondent’s gross income is derived for work done on
articles brought to its plant from points in Ohio. It.
must be remembered that this percentage reduces itself
to 18% for the reason that 5% of the 18% is what is
known as a bob tail operation. By a bob tail operation
we mean, a situation where an individual, an independ-
' ent contractor, owns a truck and of his own volition ©
builds up a route servicing customers who desire laund-
ering and dry cleazing. It is within the province of
this bob tail route’*owner to have the goods of his cus-
tomers serviced at any laundry he desires: He is al-
‘Ways an independent contractor and therefore his busi-
ness is his own and -does not belong to the laundry.
Therefore, the correct percentage of respondent’s gross «
¢
Argument, <<" 7
income from Ohio reduces itself from 18% to 13%, or
‘jn dollars and cents for the year 1938 it reduces itself
from $23,088.43 to $17,647.18 for the reason that the
5% bob tail operation, totalling $6,441.21, is owned by ~
independent contractors and is not owned by the re-
_Spondent company.
Much stress has been laid By the Board on the
purchase of laundry supplies and equipment during the
year 1938.. We believe that these purchases are a
' rather remote way to analyze respondent’s business for
the reason that as has been before stated respondent
is not a manufacturer and does not fabricate or manu-
facture anything, and what few supplies are needed are
just incidental to the cleaning and pressing business.
However, in an attempt to bolster up these figures the
Board injects into the picture purchases of machinery -
made during the year 1938. It is obvious that unusual
purchases of machinery in a company are not made
. yearly and to allow these figures to remain in calcula-
tions to determine whether or not the company is en-
gaged in interstate commerce gives one a distorted view
of the picture. The White Swan Company had just
come out of bankruptcy and all machinery was sadly in
need of replacement. Much of the replacement was
made in 1938 and naturally these replacements. will
probably not have to be made again for another fifteen
years, or the’ life of the machinery, therefore, to take
these figures in-consideration would seriously distort
the issue. When the plant was en over by the new
owner late in 1936 the machinery needed rehabilitation.
It was obsolete and in the prior fifteen years of its his-
tory, prior to the bankruptcy, the White Swan Company
had never paid the stockholders a dividend, and it was
necessary-to install new and me‘ern machinery to place
the plant on a paying basis. The purchases for ma-
chinery were heavier in 1987 and 1938 than normal pur-
es oe we. °
ed
16 ~~" Argument. =
chases and after 1938 these purchases would no longer
be present hut you would have cnly the obsolescence :
‘ figure to consider: Note, however,.that the sales con; |
tracts for the purchase of new machinery were all closed —
at the. = office at Wheeling.
The total purchases for supplies and equipment
which included machinery for 1938 was $38,333.15. Ox
this amount, purchases, the contracts for which were
-. consummated at Wheeling, the goods, however, being
‘delivered from. out of state, were 20% or $10,810.90,
~ which resolves itself don to the following figures as
ae compared to the total sales for laundry and dry clean-
ing for the year 1938 which totalled $128,752.96; namely.
the purchases of goods which came from out of state,
the contracts however having been consummated in
Wheeling totaled a little over $10, 000 or 8% of total ‘
’ gales.
A °
: We believe that the question of machinery pur-
which were so unusual due to rehabilitation
should not be taken into consideration as giving a true
picture of the yearly normal purchases by a laundry.
o And in furtker view of the fact that all of said purchases.
were made in Wheeling, we believe that the machinery
purchases can be eliminated from consideration. en-
! tirely.
.. . Case of Cactus Mines Co.—In re Cactus Mines
Company (Willow Springs, Calif. and Interna-
tional. Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers,
~ Local No. 272. Case No. C—1185, Mar. 16, 1940 ©
+ (21 N. L. R. B., No. 68),——
“Gold and silver mining company’s. operations’ do
not affect commerce within NLRA where it sells
‘its entire output of concentrates and precipitates
to a smelting companyglocated withirt same state,
smelting company scl and silver recovered
«
Argument. — , "47
_ from mining company’s concentrates uae precip
_ tates to United States Government at its mint
located in same state, only 0.6 per cent of suppli:.:
are purchased outside of state, and all of perma-
nent machinery and equipment, although half of it
“was manufactured in other states, was ——
within state.”
See also National Labor Relations Board-v. Idaho,
Maryland Mines Corporation, 98 Federal Reporter, Sec-
ond wees, 129.
Respondent peter in the operation of its eleut
makes its own steam and purchases coal water for °
the same in the City of Wheeling.
In considering the case at bar, it is strenuously ar-
gued that respondent’s business is one, which is entirely
local. The distinction is so aptly stated in the Jones and
Laughlin Case, 301 U.'S., page 1:
“The.distinction between what is national and what
is local in the actj ities of commerce is vital to the
maintenance of/our federal system.” | |
Try as we oe, we cannot see how any operatio
of respondent co y would have an-immedia
direct effect upon commercé, The most that can be said .
of this local concern is that any effect that it might have
on commerce is indirect and remote. The very uature of
respondent’s business is such that it gould not profitably
engage in antoratate commerce.
We idigwd that the case at es chien us squarely :
up to the isshe. 9s to whether or not the state may con- -
trol laundries or whether all laundries shall be declared.
national in scope and in interstate commerce. We be-
lieve that for the Courts so to rule in this case would be
.
~ v
t
ad
sie
Dial hill ioe 2
eae - Argument.
carrying the Federal power too far as was so well stated
in the case of Shechter Poultry Co. v. U. 8., 295 U. S.
495. ;
“In determining how far the Federal Government
‘may go in controlling intrastate transactions upon
the ground that they affect interstate commerce,
there is a necessary and well established distinction
between the direct and indirect effects. The precise
line can be drawn only as ind:vidual cases arise, but
the distinction is clear in principle, but where the |
effect of intrastate transactions upon interstate
commerce is merely indirect-such transactions re-
main within’ the domain of state power. If the
commerce clause were so construed to reach all
enterprises and transactions that could be said to |
have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce,
the federal authority would embrace practically all
the activities of the people and the authority of the
state over its’ domestic concerns would exist only.
by Sufferance of the federal ' ongacoggn Indeed on
such a theory even the deVelopment of a state’d
commercial facilities would be} subject to federal
control.” |
a
—
The service as rendered by the respondent company
is a service rendered to the private individual consumer
who lives in the immediate locality or community in ©
which the laundry is loca No matter how we analyze
‘the business here, it seems impossible to take it out of
the purview of a purely loca} business.
In reviewing the Constitution of the United maton
"we find three parts pertinent to the issue:
Section A. The Congress shall have the power
to regulate. commerce with foreign nations and,
among the several | _states and with the Indian
- Tribes. ¢
Argument. 19
>
Article 9. The enumeration in the Constitu-
, st of certain rights shall not be construed to deny
oF eepennge others retained by the people.
“Article 10. The powers not delegated to the
" United States by the Constitution nor prohibited to
it by the states are reserved to the states respec-
tively or to the people.
It is the contention of the respondent here that it
merely serves the Wheeling Industrial Community com-
prising a radius of tae cans te We believe the follow-
¥ing case in point:
Veazie v. Moore, 14 Bw, 573, L. Ed. 545,
“Commerce with foreign nations must signify com-
merce which in some sense is necessarily connected
with these nations transactions which either imme-
diately or at somé stage of their progress must be
extra-tertitorial. The phrase can never be applied
to transactions wholly internal by the citizens of
the same community or to a polity and laws whose
ends and purposes and operations,are restricted to
‘the territory and soil and jurisdiction of such
community.” |
“The power vested in’ Congress was not de-
signed to operate upon matters essentially local in
_ their nature and extent.”
From time immemorial it has always been under-
stood that the power of the Congress to regulate com-
merce cannot be broadened to such a point that it inter-
feres with internal trade. We sincerely believe that the
Jgundry and dry cleaning business, as well-as-the-barber
business and the shoe repair business, are the best illus-
trations of local internal business that can be found in
any state. "We believe that it was never conceived by
the, framers of the Constitution that Federal power
i. 4 &
20 : nee Argument. -
could be so extended as to reach these local service
businesses. ae
«. e U. 8. v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 44, 19 L. Ed. 593.
ie “This express grant of power to regulate commerce
among the several states has always been under-
stood as limited by its terms and as a virtual denial
; of any power to interfere with the internal trade
$ in business of the separate states.”
_ The individual states have never conceded the sieht of
Congress to regulate purely local small businesses.
< .-These rights have always been jealously guarded by the
states. Nor have the states ever surrendered this power
to regulate local service to the government. |
Peirce v. New Hampshire, 5 How. 574, 12 L. Ed. 256.
. “The po f Congress does not extend further
than the regulations of commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states. Beyond these
limits the states have never surrendered their
power over tra@le and commerce and may still exer-
¢ise-free from any controlling power on the part
of the general government. Every state, therefore,
may regulate itself on internal traffic according to
its own judgment and upon its own views of the
interests and well being of its citizens.”’
The fact that three out of seventeen of respondent’s :
' routes merely cross a bridge separating two states and —_’
operate on the other side of the river to our mind has
+ such a remote effect on interstate commerce that it \can-
not be said that it in any way actually affects commerce.
: se Covington, etc. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S.
209. 's
“States have plenary- power and Congress has no
. right to interfere concerning the internal commerce :
|
i
J]
, -Ajrgument. en
of the state though\fhe regulations of the state may
affect interstate commerce indirectly, but their
bearing upon it is so remote that it cannot be
wee in any just sense an interference.”
We ‘feel that the State of ‘West Virginia still has
the absolute power to control the respondent company
even though a very slight part of the business of the -
* respondent .company merely crosses Oe river to the
Ohio side. : <<
State v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 97 Miss. 35, 51 So.
918. . : , 3
“A state is not deprived of its power of cont@l over —
domestic corporations because its action within the
sphere of its powers may indirectly affect interstate
commerce.” . -
That the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals realizes
the danger in upholding the jurisdiction of the Act in
this case is evidenced by a review of its statement of '
facts in the Certificate wherein it states:
“The volume of the interstate business thus. involved
is not sufficient in our opinion to bring the business
within the jurisdiction of the Board.”
, That it obviously recognized the fact that the busi-
‘ness was purely local:such as the barber and the shoe
repairman is found also in/its statement when-it says:
“The business involvéd is necessarily of a purely
‘ local character as the record shows that a radius
. Of fifteen miles is‘the practical limit for a laundry
_ . or dry cleaning business in this territory. The fact
that the business is done in Ohio outside of the
State in which respondent’s laundry is located
results from the fact that this puvely iocal business
is located in a city on a state line.”
22 h 7 Argument,
That the Circuit Court was also aware | of the
danger of applying the Act {gs shown by its statement:
“We are advertent, howevey, to the admonition of
the Court that in applying the Act we are to bear
ini mind the distinction betw what is national
and what is local in the activities~of Commerce.”
That the lower Court realized the fact ‘that to up-
hold the Act as to this particular type of local service
business would automatically allow the Act to be ap-
plied to all local small businéss ‘| is evidenced by its
statement reading: :
“To so hold would be to bring ‘dele the jurisdiction
of the Roard a great variety of businesses of purely
local nature alpoly because they maintain a. de-
‘livery service cities located: on state lines, as
there are many such Qties in the United States.
‘The question seems to us one of sufficient impor-
tance in justifying us to certify it to the Supreme
_ Court so that it may be definitely settled.”
The-N iticaat Board in its brief before this Court
attempts to show jurisdiction citing the history of other
laundries located throughout the country. We believe
that the illustrations are not jin point for the reason that
the record clearly shows that the respondent ¢ompany
does not operate a chain of laundries or a chain of es-
tablishments of any type, but merely operates entirely
and exclusively in the Wheeling Industrial District.
That the laundry and dry cleaning business has al-
ways been considered a local service enterprise may be
gleaned from a review of the history of the NIRA and we
find that under the NIRA it was early recognized that
laundries were purely local service industries, We take
the liberty here to quote part of the rulings given at the
wuah Bry toi
a
Page 845.
oly ‘ Argument. 23
: &
‘time’ cise the NIRA. See United States Law Week,
“Volume 2 Part 1, 1983+34, Page 518: :
“To foster fair competition and eliminate unfair
competitive practidés between local trade and serv-
ice enterprises such as respond to geographcial
rather than commodity organization and adminis-
tration~ :
Sec. 1. Naticnal Codes of. Fair Competition will
in general. be applied to those partially local trades
and industries such as retail stores, and filling sta-
tions, which provide necessary outlets for ee
tive enterprises of a national character.
2. Other classes of local trade and service en-
terprises such as\barber shops, LAUNDRIES, building
management, sddieuinela: and local transportation
facilities, will be encovraged to organize themselves
for regional self-government and to adopt regional
codes or agreements.
_. 5. State legislation should be encouraged to
give additional sanctions to the agreements region-
ally for regional trades and industries. nee No.
3265, Feb. 13, 1934)” ;
We find that this was shortly followed-up by an
executive order exempting laundries from A juris-
diction for the reason that it was here recognized that
the laundry business was purely a local busine d had
no national aspects and therefore should be regulated by
the states. See U.-S. Law Week, Vol. 1, Part 2, 1934,
“Service inshistries Exempted from NRA Code
Provisions. :
Basic revision of NRA policy was initiated by
the Executive Order announced May 28 authoriz-
ing the.exemption of service trades and industries
from trade practices rules imposed by national
codes.
° >
2 ’ . a :
2 , . ~ 3 y a > . ve
ew + re a | eh be a - oe - ~ - as
24 : _ Argument.
The Executive Order empowers the NRA Ad-
ministrator to designate the trade and industries to
- which the exemption will apply. |
The exemptions will take effect immediately in I
the following seven trades which have already been __
designated: by order of the Administrator as prop- —
erly included within the purpose and intent of the
Executive Order; Cleaning and Dyeing Trade; Bar-
ber Shop Trade; Shoe Rebuilding Trade; Motor Ve-
hicle Storage and Parking Trade; Advertising Dis-
play Installation Trade; ‘Advertising Distributing
Trade; Bowling and Billiard Trade.
| The President, in <n explanatory statement ac-. —
companying the Order attributed his action to the
need for a greater degree of autonomous local self-
government in service industries, stressed the im
practicability of imposing rigid trade-practi
standards on a national scale in such cases.”
See also the United States Law Week, Volume 1,.
Part 2, 1934, Page 847.
Executive Order Dated May 26, 1934
“Pursuant to authority vested in me by Title
I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, I, Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, do |
- hereby cirect that all provisions in codes of such |
service trades or industries as shall hereafter be ~
designated by the Administrator for National Re-
covery be hereby suspended.”
See also. United States Law Week, Volume » & Part
2, Page 847, mY
‘ } , “National Industrial Recovery Act—Codes of
. * fair competition—Executive interpretation of order
suspending trade practice provisions of codes for
service trades and industries— .
“F
‘ om
Argument. ; 25
“Most industries have a national community of
economic interest even though the operation of some
of their units is local. There are others which, not-
withstanding their having national trade associa-
tions, do not actually integrate themselves nation= |
ally. Whether an industry can govern adhd police
itself under the fair trade provisions of a National
Code depends on its degree of actual economic in-
tegration on a national scale and on the organiza-
tion and solidarity within the whole industry. A.
trial period of some months has shown that while
most industries, after organization for. this work
and a little experience with it, can secure uniform
national results, there are others to which a greater
degree of autonomous local self-government is de-
oe Ameng these are some, but not all, of the
o-called service industries—that is, industries en-
peter in the sale of services rather than of goods. e
Note also that the cleaning and dyeing industry was
expressly exempted from' the National Code, Adminis-
trative Order May 28, 1934, United States Law Week,
, Volume 1,.Part 2, 1934, Page 851,
“Codes of Fair Competition.—Service trades
and indystries—Exemption from trade practice pro-
visions of national codes—
“By virtue of the aythority Yested in me by the
President of the United States * * * I, HughS.
Johnson, * * .* hereby designate the following
trades and industries to be properly included within -
the purpose and intent of said Order:
Motor Vehicle Storage and Parking Trade;
Bowling and Billiard Trade; Barber Shop Trade;
Cleaning and Dyenig Trade; Shoe Rebuilding Trade;
Advertising Display Installation Trade; Advertising
ne Trade.”
3
- P 2 .
serene ued ee ,
. : . ‘ e :
Se EEE SAR Ee Ce ee te : oe
{
a
: 2
:
|
26 cs Argument.
Note: This order means that the cleaning and dye-
ing trade was exempt from me provisions of the Na-
tional Code.
When we ae over the report of the Senate at the |
time this bill was contemplated, namely the bill now
known as the National Labor Relations Act, we find that
the Committee reports that it was riot the purpose of the
Act to project the Federal Government into matters of _
pirely intyastate concern. We take the liberty here to
_ quote a part of the Senate Committee report, May 2,
1935 (report No. 573) :— —
“The term affecting commerce is inserted as a
short cut to prevent the repetition of lengthy juris-
dictional phraseology throughout the bill. The bill
limits Federal action to areas sanctioned by the
commerce clause. The bill does not project the Fed-
eral Government into matters of purely intrastate
concern. It applies only in matters which burden or —
' affect or obstruct interstate commerce, or which
have led or tend to lead to a labor dispute that
might have such effect upon interstate commerce.”
We now turn to the wording of the Act itself, Sec.
tion 2, which-reads as follows:—.
7—‘The term affecting commerce means in
commerce or burdening or obstructing commerce,
or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tend-
‘ ing to lead to a labor dispute, burdening or obstruct-
ing commerce, or the free flow of commerce.” _
In view of the fact that the number of laundry and ©
dry cleaning establishments are as numerous in the aver-
age town as the barber and the shoe repair shops, it is
obvious that any-strike or any tendency towards strike
would not affect interstate commerce. The other numer-.
ous competitors.in the same town would immediately
. a
Argument, 3 27
absorb all of the business of the respondent, should such
a strike occur, and the strike in 2, laundry would have
no far reaching or national affects. We can readily ap-
: ciate that a strike, say in a steel mill in Pittsburgh
would affect the mining and distribution of ore in Michi-
gan, or mining and transportation of coal from Kentucky .
or West Virginia, but no such far reaching affects would
be prevalent in a laundry strike. Just as it is ridiculous .
to assume that a strike in a barber shop employing 10
or 15:men, or a strike in a shoe repair shop employing
10 men would affect interstate commerce, so it is also
absurd to suggest that a strike in. a laundry and dry
cleaning establishment would affect interstate com-
merce. !
We have before stated that this is the first case up
before the Court for décision, wherein|an atfempt’ is
made by the National Board to assume jurisdiction over
laundries. The question therefore becomes one, shall
the States assume jurisdiction over laundries with their
Local Labor Boards, or shail the National Board assume
jurisdiction. That the States which have enacted labor
lowing States and the cases decided nara by the
States.
' MASSACHUSETTS.
Loyal Crown Linen Service, Inc., et al., 1939 Mass.
L. R. C., Case No. U. P. 251, Jan. 11, ‘1939.
. Wash Rite ‘Laundry Co. et o7., 1938, Mass. L. R. C.
Case No. U. P. 121, June 20, 1938.
White Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., et al., 1938, Mass. L.
_ RC. Case No. U. P. 147, June 20, 1938. }
C. & W. Dyeing & Cleaning Co., Inc., et al., ' Mass.
L. R. C. Case No. U. P. 10, Feb. 10, 1938.
Back Bay Chevrolet, Inc., et al., Mass. L. R. C. Case
No. U. P. 46, March 1, 1938.
| 2 / Argument.
/ Abe Lainer d/b/a Lainer’s Cleaners & Dyers Co.,
] foes Case Nos. U. P. 101, 134; 139, April
1938. | .
Francis V. and Edwin U. Cahill d/b/a Union Laun-
dry et al., Mass. L. R. C. Case No. U. P. 93, May 23, 1938.
Naif Makol World Cleaners. & Dyers Co., et al.,
Mass. L. R. C. Case No. U. P. 85, May 23,1938. ~~
Howes Co. et al., Mass. L. R. C. Case No. U. P. 281,
. May 22, 1939. ‘s
Sani-Wash Laundry et al., Mass. L. R. C. Case No.
U. P. 391, Sept. 21, 1939.
. Hastern Overall Dry Cleaning Co. et al. (1940),
Mass. L. R. C. Case No. U. P. 396, Jan.-19, 1940.
Golden Bell Cleaners, Inc., 1940, Mass. L. R. C. Case
No. C. R. 333, April 29, 1940. ZEON
Lewando’s French Dyeing and Cleansing Co., 1940,
Mass. L. R. C. Case No. C. R. 341, May 6, 1940. 2
Shub, J. H., et al., D. B. A., American Dry Cleaning
Co. (1940), Mass. L. R. Cc. Case No. C. R. 347, May 20,
1940.
Bonanno Laundry & Supply Co. (1940), Mass. L. R.
C. Case No. C. R. 403, Nov., 1940.
Capitol Laundry Co. (1940), Mass. L. R. C. Case
‘ No. C. R. 406, Nov. 6. 1940.
Fornsworth New Method Laundry, Inc. (1940),
Mass. L. R. C. Case No. C. R. 375, Aug. 13, 1940.
Hub Laundry Co. (1940), Mass. L. R, C. Case No.
- C. R. 424, Dec. 12, 1940.
Morgan Laundry Service, Inc. (1940), Mass. L. R.
C. Case No. C. R. 386, Sept. 12, 1940.
United Laundries Co. et al. (1938), Masa L. R. c
Case No. C. R. 27, Feb. 16, 1938. $
Argument. . 29
NEW YORK.
Economy Clean Towel Supply Co., Inc., et al., 1938,
IN. ¥. 8. L. R. B. Dec. No. 198, July 20, 1938.
Stapleton Service Laundry, Inc., et al. (1938), N. Y.,
S. L. R. B. Dec. No. 206, Sept. 23, 1938.
Consolidated Laundry Corp. et al., 1937, N. Y. 8. L.
R. B. Dec. No. 4, Sept. 16, 1937.
Fou Square Laundry Co., Inc., et al., 1939, N. Y. S.
L. R. B. Dec. No. 669, Sept. 21, 1939.
Hill Top Laundry, Inc., et al. (1940), N. Y. S. LR.
B. Dec. No. 838, Case No. W. E~156, Mar. 25, 1940.
Midtown Laundry Inc., et al. (1940), N. Y. S. L. R.
B. Dec. No. 804; Case No, Ss. E.-4197, Feb. 8, 1940.
“Premier Linen Supply & Lattndry Co., Inc., et al.,
1939, N. Y. S. L. E. B. Dec. No. 738, Nov. 22, 1939.
Prompt Family Laundry, Inc., et al. (1940), N. Y.
S. L. R. B. Dec. No. 771, Jan. 9, 1940.
Quality Laundry Service, Inc., et al. (1937), >
S. L. R. B. Dec. No. 10, Nov. 1, 1937.
Tudor Laundry Co. et al. (1939), N. Y. S. L. R. B.
Case No. S. U. 3581, July 12, 1939. 7
PENNSYLVANIA.
Budget Lahdry Co., et al., ‘Pa. L. R. B. Case No.
170, April 12, 1938.
Cravdall, McKenzie & faesaiiey Inc., et al., 1939,
Pa. L. R. B., Dec. No. 92, Feb. 26, 1940. — RE
‘Lincoln Laundry Co., et al., 19389, ‘Pa. L. R. B. Dec.
No. 136, Jan. 16, 1940.
Wilson agreed Co. et al. 1939, Pa. L, R. _B. Case.
No. 34 Oct. 9, 1939.
Community Laundry Co., Inc., et al., 1937, Pa. L. R.
B. Case No. 123, May 13, 1939.
East Cleaners & Dyers, Irc., ae 1938, Pa. L. R. B.
No. 196, Apr. 20, 1939.
°
ae | | Argument. «
Liberty Laundry, et al., (1939) Re. L. R. B. Case No.
70, Nov. 21, 1939.
eS
WISCONSIN a
Waukesha Palace Laundry Co., et.al., Wisc., he R.
B. Case No. 406, C-24, April 30, 1938.
Badger Nu-Way Cleaners, et al., Wisc,, Li. R. B. Case
No. 31; Ce2, Dec. No. 19, Sept. 23, 1939.
Laundry Workers Int. Union, et al., (1940) W.L.
R. B. Case No. 74 Ce-11 Dec. No. 47 2/23/40.
a i.
Was It the Intent of the Congress to Make the Act Apply
_ to Local Service Establishments? hi
In order to ascertain the intent of the Congress at
the time of the passage of the bill, it is»well to review
again the findings and policy of the bill, as outlined in
Section 1 of the Act known as the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
Act of July 5, 1935, C. 372, 49 Stat. 449; 29 U.
_§.C., Supp. V, Sec. 151, et seq.
We here take the liberty to quote Section 1 of the
Act, which we deem pertinent to the issue:—
“The denial by employers of the right to employees
to organize, and the refusal by the employers to
accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead ©
to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or
unrest which have the intent or the necessary effect |
of burdening or obstructing commerce by
(a) Impairing the efficiency, safety or opera-
\ tion of the instrumentalities of commerce.
{b) Ocqurring in the’ current of commerce.
Ser sos Ree
-
ead
Sad ese
|
Rees, aaceceane | 31
git (c) Materially stockings restraining or con-
x trolling the flow of raw materials, or manu-
factured or processed goods from or into
the channels of commerce, or*the prices of
such materials pr goods in commerce.
(d) Or causing diminution of employment and
wages in such volume as substantially to
impair or disrupt the, market for goods —
flowing from or into the channels of
ecommerce. “3
It is obvious nica reading this Section that the Con-
gress had in mind when speaking of commerce, either
the instrumentalities of commerce or the flow of raw
materials with the manufacture of processed goods and
the reshipment thereof: into commerce. These are the
very things that a laundry does not engage in. As pre-
viously stated in this brief, raw materials are not manu-
factured or procéssed and reshipped into commerce.
Nor are even prices of such materials or goods in com-
merce affected by anything that a laundry or dry clean-
_ ing establishment does in the way of service. The whole
intent and purport of this Section of the Act is entirely
repugnant to the thought of merely servicing a garment
such as a laundry’ or dry cleaning ‘establishment
performs.
To attempt to apply the National Labor Relations
Act to either the laundry or dry cleaning industry would
be an attempt t» apply a statute which would .produce
results contrary to the plain purpose and policy of the
enactment, since the purposes and policy of the enact-
ment is to regulate business, which has a national aspect
_ rather than a purely local aspect.
We believe the following case in point :—
4
‘not interstate commerce and we take the liberty to oo
32 Argument.
Sorrells v. U, 8., 287 U. S. Reports, page. 435, where
we take the liberty to quote:— - 1
“Where application of the.penal statute, according
to its literal meaning would produce results con-. —
trary to the plain purpose and policy of the enact- —
—ment and flagrantly unjust, another construction |
& should be adopted, if possible.” -
The question as to whether a ennitey i is in interstate
or intrastate commerce has been before.the Courts be-.
fore. See 54 Southwestern Reporter, Page 981. Smith,
Clerk, v. Jackson, Supreme Court of Tenn., December 20,
1899. This case arose out of a tax which the agent of
the State placed on an individual who was a loca] agent ‘
for a laundry situated in another State, and the individ-
ual claimed immunity from the local tax on the theory
that his laundry business was interstate commerce. The
individual collected soiled laundry from his neighbors
in Tennessee and shipped it to a laundry in Kentucky
be washed and laundered. When this was done, it was
senteback by the laundry to the individual in Tennessee,
who delivered it to the owners and received from them
the price of the entire service, which he divided equally
with the laundry. The question was, “Was this individ- .
ual engaged in commerce?” We find that it was here
recognized by the Courts that the laundry business is
the Court in detail on this point:— *°
“The word commerce found in this clause c can not be ,
held ‘to embrace a transaction such as is here pre- .
sented. It implies when-used by businessmen, as it
is defined by Mr. Webster, the lexicographer. Trade
or traffic as in the exchange of specific articles or.
commodities or else of these for money or its repre-
sentative; in a case like the present nothing, in the
true commercial sense, is — or exchanged. The
VYg—e
Argument. : . 33
agent takes the axticles committed to his care and
agrees with the owner that he will send’them across
the State line and have certain labor bestowed on
them, and when returned, then he is to receive com-
pensation equal to this- labor. There is no com-
modity created of which the ownership is changed. —
It is merely a personal contract based upon a val- -
~ uable consideration following within the protection
' of this clause of the Constitution. “ 7
vd The Court further likens this trenauction to the sale
of an insurance policy and quotes Paul y. Virginia, 8
Wall, 168, and likens the laundry business, which it de-
fines as a’ personal contract, unto the sale of insurance
policies, the Supreme Court has held is not
interstate mmerce.
" Since the respondent Company is located on the
State line, and we believe that this is the only reason
that this case ever arose, we velieve the following case
\ in point:
Scannon v. Kansas City Railroad Co., 41 Missouri
APP. 194
“A shipment of cattle to Kansas City, Missoyri, from
a point in the same State is not interstate commerce,
though the stock yards where the cattle are un-
loaded extend into both the States of Missouri and
Kansas, and though the actual point of unloading is
- in Kansas and the assignment is to cormmissioned
‘ merchants whose place of business is across the
State line in Kansas.” ; :
\ -
We find another laundry case cited in Smith v. Jackson,
54 S. W.. 981—103 Tenn. 673:—
7 ‘
eT EI PIT IE LES | ILE LOS OIE PILES RE RN WR ene -
34 Argument. -
“Laundry business is not commerce within the mean-
ing of this clause, and one whose business it is to
collect soiled laundry and express it to its principal
in another State to be washed and laundered and
when returned to deliver it to its owner or owners,
’ receiving from them ‘a price the entire service
which he divides with his principal, is liable for the
payment of a privilege tax.”
In this case, the privilege tax was a State tax, and
the defendant claimed immunity onthe theory that he
was engaged in interstate commerce, and the Court held
it was not interstate commerce, but was intrastate com-
merce.
To the same effect, see Commonwealth v. Pearl
Laundry Co., 105 Ky. 259—49 S. W. 26.
“ In the case at /bar' the lower ‘Court was bothered
with this question because it felt that a laundry busi-
ness was entirely local, and although it might come
within the letter of the statute, it does not come within |
the spirit of the statute, or even the intention of the
-- makers of the statute. We believe therefore, that the
following case is in point on this line of thought:
Holy Trinity Church v. U. 8., 143 U. S. 457:
“It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within
the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute because not within the spirit nor within
the intention of its makers.”
“Frequently words of general meaning are used in
2 statute, words broad enough to include an act in
question and yet a consideration of the whole leg-
islation or of the circumstances surrounding its en-
actment or of the absurd results which follow from
giving such broad meaning to the words makes it
Argument. 7 a ,
sg’
bah ans to believe that the legislator intended
to include the’ particular act.”
We feel that ‘to’allow the National Act to Sipply to
a small local business such as a laundry, would create
an absurdity, for the reason that to permit the act to
apply to a laundry would allow it also to apply to a
barber shop, a shoe repair shop, or any of the other
service industries of which there are so many fn every _
small community. In other words, the net result would
be that all business, regardless of type, would be’ en-
‘compassed by the National Act and the individual States
wou’? no longer have control of any business within
the State confines.
' ee 2
We believ@that there is serious danger in extend-
- ing this statute beyond its purpose. The following case,
we believe, is in point:
Caminetti v. U. 8., 242 U. S. 470 at 490:
“Reports to Congress accompanying the introduc-
tion of purpose laws may aid the Courts jn reaching
the true meaning of the’ legislature in cases of
doubtful interpretation.”—See also dissenting opin-
ion, page 502.
“There is danger in extending a statute- beyond
its purpose, even if justified by a strict adherence
to its words.”
wi
a 2"
SSeS
& ¢
lower Court, submit the question very fairly. It is
, argued by the Board, however, that the Court has not
bubmitted the question of purchases in its framed ques-
-tions, and the Board states in its brief, that the ques-
36 Argument.
Ill.
The Answer to the First Question Certified by the Lower
Court, Should Be in the Negative, and the Answer
to the Second Question Should Be in the Negative.
_ We believe that both questions, as submitted by the
tion of purchases also should be considered in arriving
at jurisdiction. The lower Court states, however, that
the matter of purchases, was insufficient, in its opinion,
to confer jurisdiction, and confines itself to the matter
of collection, servicing and. enn f primarily.
We agree whole-heartedly with the Court below on
the matter of purchases, as the same apply to a laundry.
It must be remembered that a laundry does not make
purchases with the idea of reselling them or fabricating
or processing these purchases, and changing the form,
substance, character, utility, or value thereof and then
resell them, but purchases in a laundry business mean
just those little incidental items that are used to per-
form the service on the garment. In other words, it
includes the purchase of bluing, tape which is used on.
presses, and padding which,is also used on laundry
presses. A laundry purch soap and bleach and sol-
vent, and these items are’ used to clean the garments.
Coal and water are used, but only for the purpose of pro-
ducing steam, etc., to wash the soiled clothing. None
of these purchases go into processing or manufacture, —
but these purch are immediately consumed and
therefore have no opportunity, of themselves, to become
a further part of interstate commerce. And in the case
at bar, it was definitey proved that the purchases, as
above outlined, were made in the City of Wheeling, which
aN
: Argument. ; ———
is the home town of tile respondent, and eventhough .
a few purchases may have originated: out of the State,
the contracts for the same were consumated in the City
of Wheeling. : ,
“With reference to the purchase of machinery, we
feel the Board has erred in attempting to consider pur-
chases of laundry machinery as an element of interstate
commerce. As we have previously outlined, the pur-
chases of machinery in the particular case at bar, for
one year were heavy for the reason that the Company
had just passed throtigh a. period of bankruptcy, and
much of the old machinery was junked and new machin-
ery purchased. Now it is absurd to use these new ma-
chinery purchases as a basis for determining whether
or not a particular company is in interstate commerce,
because once that machinery is purchased, probably no |
_. additional purchases of a similar type will be made for
15 or 20 years, and to use these machinery purchases as
a basis- for determining whether a Company is in inter-
state commerce, gives a distorted view of the actual
business itself, because they would not be normal pur-
chases from year to year. Furthermore, as we view
| purchases with respect ,to their effect on commerce, we
| believe the theory of purchases only applies when those
‘articles purchased are used and fabricated and processed
and become a part of a new product, which in*turn is
again shipped out into interstate commerte.
In this case, the articles purchased, which were in
‘the form of machinery, came to rest, and there they, will
stay for 15 or 20 years until again obsolete. Undoubt-
edly the Lower Court detailed the theory the same way,
_ and that is the reason that they éonclude the matter of
purchases in a laundry business as of little importance
in determining the true aspect of the business. as the
_ same affects commerce.
7
38 _ Argument. ;
As before stated, and as incidental, we might again
add that all of these purchases of machinery were ne-
gotiated for and the contracts consummated at Wheel-
ing, West Virginia, the home office of the respondent.
- We concur with the opinion of the,Court below with
reference 8 these so-called purchases, when it states :—
“We are clearly of the opinion, however, as stated
in our certificate, that the volume of interstate busi-
ness involved in the purchase of supplies is not suf-
ficient to bring the business of the respondent with-
in the jurisdiction of the Board.”
: wt. pes
Analysis of the Cases Cited by the Board in Support of
Jurisdiction.
We take the liberty of phinting out Brialiy the dis-
tinction between those cases which the Board cites in |
support of jurisdiction, and the case at bar.
N. L. R. B. v. J. & L., 301 U. S., page 1. Note, In
this case raw materials were drawn from several States,
fabricated, manufactured, and resold in different States.
(White Swan Company manufactures nothing, and sells
nothing. )
re
Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Company v. N. L. R. B.,
303 U. S. 453. Note, In this case the defendant’s busi-
ness was not service, but consisted of canning fruits
and selling them in the different States to which they
were shipped, and title to the fruit passed. The fruit
was. processed, its form, substance, quality and utility
changed, and then title passed in the goods in interstate -
“commerce. (White Swan Company does not buy or sell
or process, but merely renders a service.)
eT a! @
‘ Argument. 7 - 39
Consolidated Edison Company v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.
S., pages 197, 222. This Company-served three and one-
half million gas and electric customers. They manu-
facture gas, electricity and steam. They bought oil, coal
and gas and converted or processed it and then resold.
They also supplied other Companies dealing in inter-.
state commerce, such as railroads, steamship companies,
radios, etc. (White Swan Company manufactures noth-
ing, and does ndt sell the service to those who need the
same-in-interstate commerce. )
N. L. R. B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601. In this case
raw materials were transported from New York to New
Jersey to be fabricated or cloth was cut in.New York
and transported to New Jersey to be fabricated. After
the fabricating and processing was finished, the finished
goods were then-redelivered back to either New York
or to any other State in the union. (White Swan Com-
pany does not process and does not ship to all States
of the union, and does not change the form, color, or
texture of clothes, merely cleans them. )
N. L. R. B. v. Bradford Dyeing & Finishing Asso-
ciation, 60 Supreme Court 918. In this case the respond-
ent processed the gray cloth and manufactured or
changed the character of it. (White Swan does not
process, manufacture or ’ change the character of goods
it services. )
N. L. R. B. v. Hopwood Retinning Company, 98 Fed-
eral 2nd be CCA 2). In this case the respondent did
more than merely collect and clean ice cream containers,
but it retinned and resoldered same and bought and sold .
others, thus transferring title to the goods. (White
Swan Company does not buy or sell articles of laundry,
‘ merely cleans and presses them.)
{
4 Mins
——
40 Argument. |
N. L. R. B. v. National New York Packing-& Ship-
ping Company, 86 Federal 2nd, 98. This Company acte1
as agent in shipments of national proportions Zo the ©
many States. It participated in the continuity of transit
from buyer in one State to seller in another State. Title
to the goods changed. The form of the packaged articles
changed. The articles themselves were alrea
in interstate commerce from State to’ State. te
“\Swan Company is agent for no one, it does not act as an
agent in interstate shipments, nor does it change the
character, substance or transfer any title to goods, nor
participates in the change of substance or character of
the goods. )
Kansas City Railway Company v. McAdow, 240 U.
S. 51. Note, that the question of Juriediction, was not
raised in this case.
Spokane & Inland R. Company v. U.'8., 241, U.S.
S44. This case has no real applicatio., since from time
immemorial railroads have always been considered in
interstate commérce by the very nature of their opera-
tions, but laundries have not been §° considered.
Ellis v. Inman Poulsen & Company, 131 Federal 182.
Note, That in this case, the goods which defendants dealt
in were bought and sold in interstate commerce. Title
passed in the goods. (White Swan Company does not
buy or sell in interstate commerce, or even in intrastate
commerce. It merely renders a service. )
Fehr Baking Company v. Bakers Union, 20 Federal
Supp. 691. Note, In this case bakery products were
manufactured in one State and were sold in another
State. (White Swan Company does not »uy and sell, it
merely renders a Seeveee. )
Argument. ~- fee 41
~ CONCLUSION.
It is respectfully submitted that the questions init.
fied by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit should be answered in the negative.
‘ ‘ tr
H. C. A. HOFACKER,
Attorney for White Swan einiitin
28 St. Nicholas Building, Pitts-
~. burgh, Pa. ° :
March, 1941. ~ ue
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. =
No, 529.—OgqrToszr Term, 1940.
National Labor Relations Board) On Certifcate from the United
vs. States Cireuit Court of Ap-
White ¥en Company. peals for the Fourth Circuit.
[March 31, 1941°] my oF
Pat
/ > ;
f Mr. Justice Dovauas delivered the opinion of the Court.
A certificate from the Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit submitted pursuant te § 239 of the Judicial Code (28
U.S. C. 6) is as follows: |
a’ petition for enforcer<nt of an order of the National Labor Re-
lati Board, which directed the White Swan Company, 4 corporation “of
Wheeling, West Virginia, engaged in the operation of a laundry and dry - :
cleaning business, to dease and desist from certain unfair labor practices .
and to offer employment with back pay to eertain employees held to have
been discharged because of union affiliation and activities. The findings of —
the Béard with mape $s the unfair labor practices and discriminatory dis-
of employees Are sustained by substantial evidence; but a question
has , a8 to which the members of the Court are divided and in doubt,
with respect to the jurisdiction of the Board-in the premises. ses p ars
_The respondent, White Swan Company epetates a combined erage By
- diy cleaning establishment in the city of Wheeling, West Virginia, “#¢
ceftain of its supplies are obtained from without the state, the volume of
the interstate business thus involved is not cufficient, in our opinion, to bring ©
the business within the jurisdiction of the Board. The record shows that
these supplies consist pf soap, Wang. bleach, solvent, coal, water, paper,
tape and padding, that respondent’s purchases thereof during 1938
amounted to $38,333.15, of which $10,810.90 came from without the state.
Respondent, however, operates delivery trucks in Ohio as well as in West
Virginia, three of the delivery routes from its plant being in Ohio and eleven
in West Virginia. The business involved is necessarily of a purely lotal
character, as the record shows that-a radius of fifteén miles is the practical _
limit for a laundry or dry-cleaning business in this territory. The fact that
‘business is done in Ohio outside the state in which respondent’s laundry is
located, results from the fact that this purely local business is located in a
‘sity on a state line. Respondent ag ye garments in its trucks from
those of its/customers who reside.in Ohio to its plant in West Virginia to
‘be serviced, and then after servicing tetutns the garments in its trucks to
the customers. Approximately 12.93 per cent of its gross income for 1938
was derived from this source. “In addition thereto, approximately 5 per. .
_eent ofits gross income during 1938 was derived from the servicing of gar: gh eae
ments which persons not in its émployinent collected in Ohio, brought to its Vite 4
plant for servicing and déliveted in Ohio after they had been serviced. i
,. Respondent’s total gross income in 1938 was $128,752.96. The total income
~
°
ete oe = = Se ee ee t wO~a> ox00
ee ,
2+ ° National Labor Relations Board vs. White Swan Co.
e
from the business obtained from persons in Ohio during this period was
$28,088.43.
We recognize that the collection and delivery of garments across state
lines, as above described, constitutes interstate commerce. We are advertant,
however, to the admonition of the e-urt that in applying the act we are to
bear in mind ‘‘the distinction between what is national and what is local in
the activities of commerce.’’ N. L. R. B. v. Jones § Laughlin (301 U. 8. 1,
30). And although the letter of the National Labor Relations Act may cover
such collections and deliveries in interstate commerce aa are here involved,
the question arises whether a proper interpretation of the Act, in view of
the intent of Congress, would include them. Cf. United States v. Sorrells,
287 U. 8. 435, 446. We are divided and in doubt as to whether such collec-
tion and delivery, which results from the fact that business of a local char-
acter, such as a laundry, is located on a state line, is sufficient to bring such
business within the jurisdiction of the Board under the National Labor Re-
lations Act. To so hold would be to bring under the jurisdiction of the
Board a great variety of businesses of purely local character simply because
they maintain a delivery service in cities located on state lines. As there
are many such cities.in the United States, the question seems to us one of
- sufficient importance te justify us in certifying it to the Supreme Court so,
that it may be definitely settled. ‘
Being divided and in doubt, 1 erefore, this Court fespectfully certifies to
the Supreme Court ofgthe United States, for its instruction and advice, the
following questions of law, the determination of which is indispensable to a
. proper decision of the case. : : :
_1, Should the National Labor Relations’ Act be interpreted as having ap-
plication to a business of purely local character, such as a laundry, merely
. because such business is located:in a city on a state line and derives a sub-
stantial portion of its income from business which involves collections or
deliveries of articles in a state other than that, in which the business is
located?
2. Where a local business, such as a laundry, is located in a city on @
state line, and is not engaged in interstate commerce, except in so far as it
may collect articles to. be.serviced and may make deliveries to customers
living across the state line, is such business, by reason of such collections
and deliveries, deemed ote in ‘‘commerce’’ -within the: meaning of Sub-
section 6 of Section ‘2 of the Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 29 U. 8. C. A.
152(6), so that an unfaiy/labor practice on its part would be an unfair labor
practice ‘‘affecting commerce’’ within the meaning of Subsection 7 of said
section (29 U. S. ©. A. 152(7)) and Subsection (a) of Section 10; 29 °
U. 8. 0. A. 160(a) 91 See ee.
The tertificate must be dismissed. : | .
-By §10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (49 Stat. 449,
453; 29 U. S. C. §160(a)) the Board is empowered ‘‘to prevent
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in
section 8) affecting commeree.’’ The term ‘‘affecting commerce’’
is defined in §2(7) as ‘‘in commerce, or burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to
~, lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the
‘free flow of commerce.’’g And ‘‘commerce’”’ by § 2(6) is defined so
1 The court denied a motion made by the Sol'citor Goneral to amend the certificate by
qubodring the purchase of supplies in interstate cw as well as the collections an
a
National Labor Relations, Board vs. White Swan Co. 3
as to include ‘‘trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communi-
eation among the,several States.’’ On a review ofan order of the
Board in a Circuit Court of Appeals the ‘‘findings of the Board as
to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.’’ § 10(e).
* The questions do- not focus ‘‘the controversy in its setting.’’
Lowden v. Northwestern National Bank & Trust Co., 298 U. 8. 160,
163. From the certificate we do not know on what greanee the
Board based its jurisdiction—that the business was ‘‘in com-
merce’’ or that it was embraced within the other categories de-
serjbed in § 2(7) of the Act. The terms ‘‘business, of purely local
character’’ and ‘‘local business’’ are meaningful for purposes of
§10(a) of the Act only in light of speéifie-findings of the Board.
To answer the questions we would have to make a supposition as to
thé sense in which the Board made. its finding under § 10(a) -that
the unfair labor practices were ‘‘affecting commerce’’. The neces-
sity of making that supposition reveals the hypothetical avd ab-
record the answe: might be clear whichever the* theory of ‘the
Board’s findings docs not make the questions any the less defective.
The reviewing court is passing on the validity of a specific order of
‘the Board. Since the questions certified do not reflect the precise
conclusions of the Bbard and the precise findings on whith those
conclusions were based, they necessarily have an ‘‘objectionable
generality’’. See United States v. Mayer, 285 U. S. 55, 66; White,
«V. Johnson, 282 U. S. 367, 371; Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U. S. 638,
648 ; Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 8306/0. S. 563, 571;
, they did reflect those tonclusions and findings, they would be de-
fective as calling for a ‘‘decision of the whole case’. News Syn-
dicate Co. y. New York Ceniral Railroad Co., 275 U. S. 179, 188.
' Dismissed.
ee : e 4
Clerk, Supreme Court, U. 8.
stract quality of theg questions. And the fact that on the whole °
Pflueger v. Sherman, 293 U. S. 55, 57, 58. And if, in this ease,:
=
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