Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Bonavitacola Electric Contractor, Inc. v. Boro Developers, Inc.

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31667 APR 192006

NO.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

BONAVITACOLA ELECTRIC CONTRACTOR, INC.,

ET AL.,

Petitioners,

V

BORO DEVELOPERS, INC., ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Third Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

STEVEN F. MARINO, ESQUIRE

301 Wharton Street

Philadelphia, Pa 19147

(215) 462-3200

Attorney for Petitioners

tea come aiihe . 2A LPI

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the Complaint sufficiently alleged facts

supporting the existence of a predicate act, a pattern of

racketeering activity and injury suffered by appellants to

give rise to cause of action pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A.

§§1962(a) and 1962(c) [relating to the Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations Act] and pendent state claims.

-

LIST OF PARTIES ‘

Petitioners

1. Bonavitacola Electric Contractor, Inc.

1467 County Line Road

Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006

2. Local Union No. 654 International Brotherhood of

Electrical Workers

600 Turner Industrial Way

Ashton, PA 19014

3. Local Union No. 98 International Brotherhood of t

Electrical Workers

1701 Spring Garden Street

Philadelphia, PA 19130

4. Curtis Bell

26 Elm Street

Trenton, NJ 08611

Respondents

5. Boro Developers, Inc.

400 Feheley Drive

King of Prussia, PA

6. Frederick J. Shapiro

400 Feheley Drive

King of Prussia, PA

7. Bruce H. Shapiro

400 Feheley Drive

King of Prussia, PA

-ili-

Petitioner, Bonavitacola Electric Contractor, Inc. has

no parent corporation and no publicly owned company owns

any stock in it. Petitioner, Local Union No. 654

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers has no

parent corporation and no publicly owned company owns

any stock in it. Petitioner, Local Union No. 98 International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers has no parent corporation

and no publicly owned company owns any stock in it.

-iV-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Table OF Cite@ AWEIOTitiO ....0seccsccescssesecscennsscesecesessvansons V-vi

UE OE FUNGI OIIOND vic essiisiseesincsrvscarsciscintinsencepicieeaniins l

I ercinnnintinincnionimninnitiiiotaiaons l

Constitutional Provisions, Treaties, Statutes, Rules and

TRGGRIOINE THVT IG oss ci cceinicrseescovixtevsensesnctscientontpucenes 1-2

PT I vis sccscictein cebstsnsdihectincttnnnteeoiaans 2

I Fe caiicsesihccctivencnaniendnainecisiiaemetiobientin 2-12

PRR Tar CAPRI WT esos siesicvccicricmemiicinenns 12-25

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Appendix:

Judgment of Court of Appeals .................ce App. 1-18

5 SI citiicstiticesccicinicionin App. 19-54

Constitutional Provisions, Treaties, Statutes, Rules and

Regulations INVOIVEG «....isescceiscsecsesseseecccesesees App. 55-77

Asma COWRA oo... <6.scsssiecessevensosseseeses App. 78-148

—

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CASES

Commercial Cleaning Services v Collin Services Systems,

Inc.,271 F.3d 374 (2" Cir. 2001)...c.cccccsccsseeeee, a ahs 21-23

H.J., Inc. v Northwestern Bell Telephone Company,

492 U.S. 229, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989)... 19

Leonard S. Feinberg, Inc. v Central Asi Capital Corporation,

Limited, 1997 WL 230812 (E.D.Pa.)......cccecccsscsesesessseeees 19

Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496,

105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) .....cceccscscssesecesssees 12

Seville Industrial Machinery Corp. v Southmost Machinery

Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3rd Cir. 1984...............ecccscescescoceoeees 16

Tabas v Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280 (3rd Cir. 1995), cert denied,

--- US. ---, 115 S.Ct. 2269, 132 L.Ed.2d 275 (1995)... 19

Warden v. McLelland, 288 F.3d 105, (3d. Cir.2002) ....... 12

STATUTES

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,

18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), 1962(c), 1961(5) cecccccccccscssescsseccoseeoee

Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §276 et Seq. ...c.ccecsesseseseeeees

2, 4, 6, 7, 8,9, 10, 16, 20

SOTO OPO SEH HEH EEOHEEEEEEEEEEESEEEEEEE EEE EEE EEEEEEOS

-vi-

Pennsylvania Wage and Collection Law,

GS FR S BOS Oi Wa icc caecntns icine 2

Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act, 43 P.S. §§165-1 et. seq.

stuveuséeensteseisennetigssiiiniiebemeleibsteslataieanaababenananiaaania: 2% 3,9

1S U.S.C A. SGN cciisnieniintnaad 6, 7, 10, 13, 15

16 USCA, DIU cstsmiaineemeamaans 10, 13, 15

RULES

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)........... ay De ee

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).............. 15, 16, 17, 18

~~ Se ee

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

December 8, 2003. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

pursuant to 28 USC § 1254 (1).

Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was invoked

pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S.A. §1291. Jurisdiction of the

District Court was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331

for claims arising under the laws of United States and

seeking redress for violations of 18 U.S.C.A. §1964(c).

OPINIONS BELOW

The December 8, 2003 opinion of the Court of

Appeals, whose judgment is herein sought to be reviewed, is

an unpublished opinion, case number 03-1713 (App., infra,

1-18.

The prior opinion for the District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, entered February 12, 2003,

is an unpublished opinion, case number 01-5508 (App.,

infra, 19-54.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, TREATIES

STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent texts of the following provisions (App.

infra, 55-77.)

x,»

1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,

18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), 1962(c). ............0 App. 55-56

2. Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §276 et seq..............

App. 57-63

3. Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act, 43 P.S. §§165-1

OE GI nantnesincnvianetiiccusesvaebindintdiovnandions App. 64-66

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OOOOH EEE HEHEHE EHH EEE EEEEEEE HEHE OEE EEEHHEEEEEEE

AMENDED COMPLAINT

This matter arises as a result of the Court of Appeals

interpretation of the sufficiency of the allegations contained

within the body of the Amended Complaint (App., infra, 78-

148) filed in the District Court by the petitioners.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The History of Litigation

This action was brought by Bonavitacola Electric

Construction, Inc., Local Union No. 98, Local Union No. 654,

and Curtis Bell by Complaint seeking relief pursuant to RICO,

18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), 1962(c), the Pennsylvania Wage and

Collection Law, 43 P.S. § 260 et seq. and common tort law

remedies, specifically interference of contractual relations and

é

unjust enrichment. On February 12, 2003, the district court

entered an order granting Boro Developers, Inc., Frederick J.

Shapiro and Bruce H. Shapiro's motion to dismiss the

Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. On December 8, 2003, the Court.of Appeals

affirmed the district court’s order. On January 20, 2004, the

Court of Appeals filed an Order denying Bonavitacola

Electric Construction, Inc., Local Union No. 98, Local Union

No. 654, and Curtis Bell's petition for en banc review. On

January 28, 2004, a mandate was issued by the Court of

Appeals. This instant petition follows.

B. Factual Allegations

Appellant Bonavitacola Electric Contractor, Inc. and

Appellee Boro Developers, Inc. are electrical contractors

engaged in the business of providing electrical services to

local, state and federal municipalities, city authorities, school

districts, and commercial and industrial accounts in

Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware. Bonavitacola

Electric is a signatory of Local Union No. 98, IBEW and a

party to the multi-employer Commercial Agreement between

Local Union No. 98, IBEW and the Philadelphia Division of

the Penn-Del-Jersey Chapter, National Electrical Contractor's

Association. Pursuant to the Commercial Agreement

participating employers, such as Bonavitacola Electric, are

_4-

required to make a variety of monthly payments to Local

Union No. 98 and Local Union No. 654 consisting of

contributions to the various multi-employer benefit funds

and the remittance of withholding of working dues and

vacation funds.

To procure electrical service, maintenance and

construction municipalities, city authorities and school

districts solicit competitive bids from competing electrical

contractors, such as Bonavitacola Electric and Boro

Developers, and award the public contract to the lowest

responsible bidder. In response to a request for competitive

bid proposals presented by municipalities, city authorities

and school districts Bonavitacola Electric and Boro

Developers often find themselves competing against one

another for the award of public work project contracts. Bid

specifications presented by soliciting municipalities, city

authorities and school districts require that participating

contractors promise, attest, or otherwise certify that the

participating contractor will comply with the Pennsylvania

Prevailing Wage Act, 43 P.S. §$165-1 et. seq. and/or the

Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §276 et seq. and pay workers

employed in the performance of the contract the applicable

prevailing wage. Bid specifications require that the

contractor awarded the public work project submit payroll

reports certifying compliance with the prevailing wage laws

e

to the awarding authority. Pursuant to the Pennsylvania

Prevailing Wage Act the secretary of the Department

establishes a minimum prevailing wage rate for each craft

and classification involved in the craft. It is the -

responsibility of a contractor to properly classify the work

performed by a worker and to pay the worker the applicable

prevailing wage rate as set by the secretary of the

Department of Labor.

On or about April 28, 1999, Boro Developers and

Bonavitacola Electric submitted timely competitive bids to

the Ridley School District to procure the award of a public

contract to supply electrical construction to Ridley High

School in connection with contract No. 9778-329. Boro

Developers, Inc. underbid Bonavitacola Electric by

approximately $81,000.00 and was awarded the public works

contact by the Ridley School District to supply electrical

construction to Ridley High School. On February 20, 2001,

Bonavitacola Electric, Local Union No. 98, and Loca! Union

No. 654 became aware that Boro Developers, Inc. had also

been awarded public work contracts by the Neshaminy

School District in the calendar year of 1993 and by the

Department of the Navy in the calendar year of 1996. On

February 20, 2001, Bonavitacola Electric, Local Union No.

98, and Local Union No. 654 became aware that Boro

Developers engaged in a fraudulent practice of

he

misclassifying the nature of the work performed by workers

employed in connection with the Ridley High School public

work and falsely pledged to comply with prevailing wage

laws- classifying workers who had performed electrical

construction as having provided duties of a laborer and

prepared Certified Payroll Reports reflecting the

misclassification. The fraudulent practice of misclassifying

workers permitted Boro Developers, Inc, to pay workers a

lower wage rate then would have been properly required by

the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act and/or the Davis-

Bacon Act and underbid its competition. On or about

February 20, 2001, in addition to Ridley School District

project, Bonavitacola Electric, Local Union No. 98, and

Local Union No. 654 became aware that Boro Developers

had engaged in the fraudulent practice of misclassifying

workers, falsifying certified payroll records and falsely

pledged to comply with prevailing wage laws in connection

with public work projects awarded to Boro Developers by

the Neshaminy School District and the Department of the

Navy. On or about February 20, 2001, Bonavitacola

Electric, Local Union No. 98, and Local Union No. 654

became aware that Boro Developers caused the frauculent

certified payroll records to be delivered by the Postal Service

or by a private or commercial interstate carrier to the

awarding agencies in violation of 18 U.S.C A. § 1341

., »

[relating to Mail Fraud]. Boro Developers submitted the bid

proposal to the Ridley School District with intent to engage

in the fraudulent practice of misclassifying workers’ job

status to subvert the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act

and/or the Davis-Bacon Act and gain an unfair competitive

advantage over other bidding contractors, such as

Bonavitacola Electric. But for Boro Developers investment

of the income, derived from its payment of lower wages in

violation of prevailing wage laws and as a result of its

fraudulent practice of misclassifying workers, into the

establishment or operation of Boro Developers, Bonavitacola

Electric would have been able to compete with Boro

Developers on a fair and honest basis and would have been

awarded the contract for public work by the Ridley School

District. Had the Ridley School District awarded the

contract for public work to Bonavitacola Electric,

Bonavitacola Electric would have realized of income and

revenue. Had the Ridley School District awarded the contract

for public work to Bonavitacola Electric, Local Union No. 98

and Local Union No. 654 would have realized income in the

form of contributions to the various multi-employer benefit

funds and the remittance of withholding of working dues anc

vacation funds.

C. The Essential Elements of Complaint

(i) Relationship of parties

is

The Amended Complaint provides factual

background and information about each of the parties,

identifying Boro Developers, Inc. and Bonavitacola Electric,

Inc. as companies who compete with each other for the

receipt of various electrical construction, service and

maintenance contracts awarded by local, state and federal

government, city authorities, school districts, and

commercial and industrial accounts in the Pennsylvania and-

New Jersey territories.

(ii) The Fraudulent Scheme

The Amended Complaint alleges that Boro

Developers, Inc. engaged in a course of conduct designed to

obtain the award of electrical contracts from the Ridley and

Neshaminy School Districts and the Department of the Navy

by fraudulently subverting the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage

Act and/or the Davis-Bacon Act. As described more fully

below, the pleading contains a series of fraudulent acts which

viewed in the entirety establishes Boro Developers, Inc.’s

scheme and plan to compete against other electrical

contractors on an unfair and dishonest basis.

(iii) Circumstances Constituting Fraud

The Amended Complaint provides factual allegations

detailing the circumstances constituting fraud. The Amended

Complaint identifies with specificity the nature of the fraud

perpetrated (1) Boro Developers, Inc. caused to be

-9-

submitted to authorities of the Ridley and Neshaminy School

Districts and the Department of the Navy competitive bids to

procure the awards of a public contract to supply electrical

construction and falsely pledged to comply with the

Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act, 43 P.S. §§165-1 et seq.

and/or the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §§276 et seq.; (2)

Boro Developers, Inc. caused to submit Certified Payroll

Reports with the Ridley and Neshaminy School Districts and

the Department of the Navy in connection with contracts it

was awarded falsely reporting the nature of the work

performed and applicable wage rate associated with certain

employees. The allegations in the Amended Complaint

identify documentation that demonstrates that during the

_time period of December 1999 through June 2001 Boro

Developers, Inc. falsifie’ ,7 weekly payroll reports in

connection with the Ridley School District public work

project; that during the time period of October 1996

through May 1997 Boro Developers, Inc. falsified 25 weekly

payroll reports in connection with the Department of the

Navy public work project; and that during the time period of

May 1993 through August 1993 falsified 15 weekly payroll

reports in connection with the Neshaminy School District

public work project.

(iv) Injury

-\0-

The Amended Complaint alleges that both Boro

Developers, Inc and Bonavitacola Electric, Inc. submitted

competitive bids to procure the award of the public work

project to supply electrical construction issued by the Ridley

School District and that Boro Developers, Inc. underbid

Bonavitacola Electric, Inc. and was awarded the contract.

The Amended Complaint provides factual allegations that

but for Boro Developers, Inc. investment of income it

realized from its fraudulent practices, Bonavitacola Electric,

Inc. would have been able to compete on a fair and honest

basis and being the second lowest bidder would have been

awarded the Ridley School District contract.

(v) Use of Mail/Wire Transmissions

The Amended Complaint alleges that to effect the

fraudulent scheme to procure the award of electrical |

construction contracts through its subversion of the

Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act and/or the Davis-Bacon

_ Act and carry out the coniracted duties Boro Developers, Inc.

knowingly and repeatedly used the United States Mails

and/or interstate wire transmissions in violation of 18 )

U.S.C.A. §1341 and §1343.

.D. The Rulings Below

The district court found that the Amended Complaint

sufficiently plead the element of “enterprise” required of a

RICO Complaint, but that it failed to plead the predicate acts

2k

of mail and wire fraud with sufficient particularity, finding

that the Amended Complaint did not contain any details of

predicate acts; failed to plead that predicate acts formed a

“pattern of racketeering activity”; and failed to plead that

Bonavitacola was injured as a direct result. The district court

dismissed the Amended Complaint’s RICO counts with

prejudice. |

The Court of Appeals agreed that that Amended

Complaint did not plead the predicate acts of mail and wire

fraud with sufficient particularity, but for reasons different

than the district court. The Court of Appeals acknowledged

that the Amended Complaint alleged that Boro Developers,

Inc. knowingly and repeatedly utilized the United Sates

mails and/or interstate wire transmissions to affect a

fraudulent scheme to obtain the award to electrical

construction contracts. The Court of Appeals acknowledged

that the Amended Complaint alleged that Boro submitted 3

separate competitive bids to 3 different issuing authorities to

gain the award public work projects and that each bid

contained fraudulent promises to comply with prevailing

wage laws. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the

Amended Complaint provided details of in excess of 100

certified payrolls falsified by Boro, detailing including the

date of the falsification, the nature of the falsification, and

identify of the document containing the falsification.

<-.

Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Amended

Complaint did not plead the predicate acts of mail and wire

fraud with sufficient particularity because the pleading did

not identify any particular mail or wire transmission or how

any wire transmission are connected to the fraudulent

scheme. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the Amended

Complaint failed to plead that predicate acts formed a

“nattern of racketeering activity” and failed to plead that

Bonavitacola was injured as a direct result.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED ON

THE GROUND THAT THE RULING OF THE

COURT OF APPEALS, THAT THE

AMENDED COMPLAINT INSUFFICIENTLY

PLEAD CIVIL RICO, WAS NOT A PROPER

INTERPRETATION OF THE RECOGNIZED |

PLEADING REQUIREMENTS OF CIVIL RICO

A. RICO PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

To establish a RICO claim, a plaintiff must show "(1)

conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of ©

racketeering activity." ' The statute defines racketeering by a

list of criminal activities that constitute predicate acts for

1 Warden v. McLelland, 288 F.3d 105, 114 (3d. Cir.2002); Sedima,

S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d

346 (1985).

te.

purposes of RICO. Among these predicate acts are mail

fraud and wire fraud, the predicate acts plaintiffs have

alleged here. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a). A RICO claimant

must establish a "pattern" of such predicate acts, and

demonstrate the scheme caused injury. Id.

(1) Pattern of Racketeering Activity

(a) Predicate Acts

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the

Amended Complaint finding that Bonavitacola Electric had

failed to sufficiently plead mail fraud as a predicate act.

Arriving at its ruling, the Court of Appeals appeared to

acknowledge that the Amended Complaint provides factual A

allegations detailing the circumstances constituting fraud and

that Boro Developers, Inc. knowingly and repeatedly used

the United States Mails and/or interstate wire transmissions

in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §1341 and §1343 to effect the

fraudulent scheme. The Court of Appeals deemed the

pleading to have insufficiently plead the predicate act of mail

fraud on the basis that the Amended Complaint (1) “does

not identify any particular mail or wire transmission” or (2)

“allege how any wire transmission are connected to the

fraudulent scheme.”

If the strict standard of pleading a predicate act of

mail/wire fraud in a civil-RICO as stated by the Court of

Appeals which reviewed the instant appeal is correct, that is

-14-

to require the plaintiff pre-discovery to identify a particular

and precise mailing or wire transmission utilized by a

fraudulent offender to advance a fraudulent scheme, it would

impose an almost insurmountable burden on victims of

racketeering. The particulars of the dispatch or transmission

mode of a communication in almost every circumstance will

not be discovered by a victim until revealed through

discovery.

Paragraphs 31, 34, 35, 36, 37 of the Amended

Complaint specify acts of fraud engaged by Boro

Developers, alleging that Boro Developers engaged in the

fraudulent practice of falsely pledging to conform to

prevailing wage laws and falsifying certified payrolls and

other certifications which were required to be submitted to

the agencies who awarded Boro Developers public work

contracts. Paragraph 42 of the Amended Complaint, which

accounts for some 23 pages of the Amended Complaint, and

paragraphs 49 and 56 of the Amended Complaint provide

notice of the fraudulent statements - identify specific payroll

reports by number which contained fraudulent statements -

provide the exact calendar dates to which the falsified payroll

reports apply - provide an explanation of the content of the

fraudulent statement - identify how the statement was false

or misleading - identify who made the fraudulent statements

naming Boro Developers, Frederick J. Shapiro and Bruce H.

Shah aeiebe seein

ee a

-15-

Shapiro - identify who received the fraudulent statements

naming Ridley School District, the Department of the Navy

and the Neshaminy School District as the agencies to whom

the fraudulent certified payroll records and other

certifications were delivered. The allegations contained in

paragraph 42, 49 and 56 of the Amended Complaint alleged

details of predicate acts as required by Rule 9(b) and place

each defendant on notice of the precise fraudulent

misconduct with which they are charged.

Paragraphs 41, 48, and 55 of the Amended Complaint

alleging that - to effect the fraudulent scheme and carry out

the contracted duties, Boro Developers, Frederick J. Shapiro

and Bruce H. Shapiro knowingly and repeatedly used the

United States Mails and/or interstate wire transmissions in

violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §1341 and §1343 - sets forth facts

sufficient to place Boro Developers Frederick Shapiro and -

Bruce Shapiro on notice that false reports were delivered by

mail or wire transmission. Paragraphs 31, 41, 48, and 55 of

the Amended Complaint describe how the fraudulent

statements contributed to the fraudulent scheme and the

purpose of the fraudulent statements. The paragraphs

describe that - Boro Developers, Frederick Shapiro and

Bruce Shapiro engaged in a fraudulent practice of falsely

attesting that Boro Developers, Inc. would comply with the

Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage act and/or the Davis-Bacon

ltée

Act in an effort to deceive the Ridley and Neshaminy School

Districts and the Department of the Navy, and Bonavitacola

Electric by making it appear that defendant Boro Developers

was a responsible and qualified contractor - that Boro

Developers, Frederick Shapiro and Bruce Shapiro engaged in

a course of conduct designed to obtain the award of electrical

contracts from the Ridley and Neshaminy School Districts

and the Department of the Navy by fraudulently subverting

the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act and/or the Davis-

Bacon Act, thereby gaining an unfair competitive advantage

over its competitors.

It is well settled that allegations of fraud pursuant to

the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., are subject

to the requirement of pleading in conformity with 9(b). The

Honorable Third Circuit Court Judge James Hunter, II]

interpreting Rule 9(b) for the Third Circuit and its

application to the RICO statute explained in Seville

Industrial Machinery Corp. v Southmost Machinery Corp., ”

that:

"Rule 9(b) requires plaintiff to plead with

particularity the circumstance of the alleged fraud in

order to place the defendants on notice of the precise

2 Seville Industrial Machinery Corp. v Southmost Machinery Corp., 742

F.2d 786 (31d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 496 U.S. 1211, 105 S.Ct. 1179, 84

L.Ed.2d 327 (1985)

:

|

|

“i?

misconduct with which they are charged, and to

safeguard defendants against spurious charges of

immoral and fraudulent behavior. It is certainly true

that the allegations of date, place, or time, fulfill these

functions, but nothing in the rule requires them.

Plaintiffs are free to use alternative means of

injecting precision and some measure of

substantiation into their allegations of fraud."

In the instant matter appellants have provided the

defendants with more than adequate notice of the alleged

fraud. Appellants' Amended Complaint has detailed the

nature of the false and misleading statements, the source

documents reflecting the false and misleading statements, the

location of the false and misleading statements, the dates of

the false and misleading statements, and the manner in which

the statements were false and misleading. The facts

contained in the pleading direct Boro Developers, Frederick

Shapiro and Bruce Shapiro to the existence of specific

documents generated, prepared, executed or otherwise

certified by Boro Developers, Frederick Shapiro and Bruce

Shapiro which evidence the fraud which is the subject matter

of Bonavitacola Electric, Local Union No. 98 and Local

Union No. 654's claims. The pleaded facts afford Boro

Developers, Frederick Shapiro and Bruce Shapiro notice as

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to which actions or communications are alleged to have been

fraudulent in conformity with notice requirements of Rule

9(b). The pleading contains factual allegations which are

specific and precise enough to give fair notice to Boro

Developers, Frederick Shapiro and Bruce Shapiro and permit

the preparation of a responsive pleading. The Amended

Complaint conforms to the pleading standards required of

plaintiffs seeking to advance a fraud based RICO complaint

in the Third Circuit. Accordingly, the rule of pleading as

announced by the reviewing Court of Appeal’s decision is

not a proper interpretation of the requirements of civil RICO

pleading practice. The Court of Appeal subjected the

allegations of predicate acts of mail fraud set forth in the

Amended Complaint to too strict a scrutiny. Construing the

Amended Complaint in light most favorable to Bonavitacola

Electric, Local-Union No. 98 and Local Union No. 654, the

Amended Complaint has alleged the fraud-based offenses

with sufficient particularity to withstand a motion to dismiss

under Rule 9(b).

(b) Relatedness and Continuity

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the

Amended Complaint finding that as a result the Amended

Complaint having failed to adequately plead predicate acts of

mail fraud, that the pleading alleges only 3 separate non-related

fraudulent transactions effected by Boro Developers, Inc.

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The term "pattern of racketeering activity" is defined

as "at least two acts of racketeering activity" within a ten

year period. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(5). To prove a pattern of

activity a plaintiff must show that the racketeering predicates

are related and that they amount to or pose a threat of

continued criminal activity. > Accordingly, a plaintiff must

show both relatedness and continuity. * Under the |

"relatedness" requirement, predicate acts are related if they

have the same or similar purposes, results, participants,

victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are

interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not

isolated events. ° The "continuity" prong of the analysis

requires "continuity of racketeering activity, or its threat.

Tabas, Id at 1295. It has been explained by the Third Circuit

Court of Appeals that continuity may be either closed-ended,

referring to a closed period of repeated conduct, or open-

ended meaning past conduct that by its nature projects into

the future with a threat of repetition. With regard to close-

ended conduct, the related predicates must extend over a

long period of time, generally exceeding one year. Id. at

3 H.J., Inc. v Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, 492 U.S. 229, 109

S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989).

4 Tabas v Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280 (3rd Cir. 1995), cert denied, --- U.S. ---,

115 S.Ct. 2269, 132 L.Ed.2d 275 (1995).

5 Leonard S. Feinberg, Inc. v Central Asi Capital Corporation, Limited,

1997 WL 230812 (E.D.Pa.).

-20-

1293. Opened ended continuity is established when the

commission of the predicates acts is a regular way of

conducting defendant's ongoing business or of conducting or

participating in an ongoing and legitimate RICO enterprise.

Id at 1295.

In the instant matter paragraphs 31, 41, 42, 48, 49,

55, and 56 of the Amended Complaint set forth allegations

that Boro Developers have repeatedly utilized a series of the

mail/wire transmissions to further a fraudulent scheme to

subvert the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act and/or the

Davis-Bacon Act in an effort to ¢ xin a competitive advantage

over other electrical contractors who bid for public works

contracts. The predicate acts of mail/wire fraud are alleged in

the Amended Complaint to be repeated, alleged to have a

similar purpose, result, and method of commission. The

allegations of the Amended Complaint demonstrate that the

predicate acts have been plead with sufficiency and are

interrelated and not isclated acts of Boro Developers. The

actions of Boro Developers as alleged meet the "relatedness"

of RICO pleading requirement as defined by the Third

~ Circuit. |

The allegations of the Complaint demonstrate that

Boro Developers, Inc. engaged in predicate acts of

racketeering which had the same or similar purposes, results,

and method of commission in connection with the

Sable eile ty aRANG A Meiphtrenil’) ab Aiea Bs th Dak A ata SALVA Ye Mine LN mE ta ard Nate ME PRBS A tS Phan pel Be

ai.

procurement and management of 3 different electrical

construction contracts, which were issued by 3 different

public agencies, in 3 different geographic areas, and spanned

a time period of 8 years. The totality of the allegations set

forth in the Complaint suggest that Boro Developers

routinely does business through the use of the predicate acts

or that there is real threat that Boro Developers will do so in

the future. Construing the Amended Complaint in light most

favorable to Bonavitacola Electric, Local Union No. 98 and

Local Union No. 654, the Amended Complaint has alleged,

the predicate acts of Boro Developers as alleged in the

Complaint meet the relatedness continuity and requirement

as defined by the United States Supreme Court.

(2) INJURY

(a) Bonavitacola Electric

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Amended

Complaint upon the finding that Bonavitacola Electric, Inc.

Local Union No. 98 and Local Union No. 654 had no

standing to bring the suit on the grounds that their injury did

not bear a direct relation to the racketeering activity of Boro

Developers. Arriving at its conclusion the Court of Appeals

acknowledged and accepted, by way of its citation of

Commercial Cleaning Services v Collin Services Systems,

inc., 271 F.3d 374 (2™ Cir. 2001), that standing to bring suit

pursuant to the RICO statute has been conferred upon

22.

plaintiffs similarly situated to Bonavitacola Electric. In

Commercial Cleaning Services , a cleaning service who was

the second lowest bidder on a competitively bid janitorial

service contract, brought suit against its direct competitor

alleging that the competitor engaged in a pattern of

racketeering through an illegal immigrant hiring scheme

which allowed the competitor to gain an unfair competitive

advantage over the cleaning service. The cleaning service

alleged that but for the competitor's pattern of racketeering,

the contract awarded to his competitor would have been

awarded to the cleaning service. The United States Court of

Appeals, Second Circuit, ruled that the cleaning service

suffered a direct injury pursuant to the RICO statute as a

result of its competitor's pattern of racketeering activity. The

' paragraphs of the Amended Complaint allege that

Bonavitacola Electric, Inc. similar to the plaintiff in

Commercial Cleaning Services was the second lowest bidder

on public work projects who was underbid by a competitor

engaged in a pattern of racketeering. The paragraphs of the

Amended Complaint allege that Bonavitacola Electri, Inc.,

similar to the plaintiff in Commercial Cleaning Services,

that but for the competitor's pattern of racketeering

Bonavitacola Electric, would have able to compete in a fair

and honest basis and would have been awarded the contract

furnished by Ridley School District. There appears no

i.

difference in the injury alleged to have been suffered by the

victim of racketeering in the Commercial Cleaning Services

and the instant case. The Amended Complaint alleges that

Boro Developers was able to underbid its competition -

because its scheme to misclassify the class of a worker

permitted it to pay less wages for electrical construction. The

Complaint alleges that Boro Developers was able to qualify

for public work projects because it falsely pledged to comply

with prevailing wage laws. Accordingly, the Court of

Appeal’s rule of pleading that the Amended Complaint need

indicate the degree or extent to which Boro’s bid was lower

than Bonavitacola’ bid or specifically detail whether Boro’s

bid had lower labor costs than Bonavitacola’s bid to satisfy

the notice pleading requirement is not a proper interpretation

of the requirements of civil RICO pleading practice. The

Court of Appeal subjected the allegations of injury as set

forth in the Amended Complaint to a standard of scrutiny not

applicable to notice pleading. Construing the Amended

Complaint in light most favorable to Bonavitacola Electric,

the Amended Compiaint has alleged injury with sufficient

particularity to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6).

(b) Local Union No. 98 & Local Union No. 654

The Court of Appeal entered a finding that injury

suffered by the labor unions was indirect the on the grounds

xs

that the Amended Complaint did not allege allegations to

show how the revenues would have been realized by the

unions in the event that Bonavitacola Electric had been

awarded the electrical construction contract. Paragraphs 14

and 15 of the Complaint allege that Local Union No. 98 and

Local Union No. 654 supplied electrical workers to

Bonavitacola Electric and received an income flow from

Bonavitacola Electric in the form of contributions to multi-

employer benefit plans for workers employed on public work

projects. The Complaint provides that Local Union No. 98

and Local Union No. 654's loss of contributions and

remittance is a direct result of Bonavitacola Electric's

unsuccessful bid of the public works contact. Local Union

No. 98 and Local Union No. 654's loss of contributions and

remittance is reasonably foreseeable, anticipated and a

natural consequence of Boro Developers' RICO violation.

The Court of Appeals rule of pleading requiring that the

Amended Complaint rieecd more specifically detail how the

revenues would follow in the event Bonavitacola had been

awarded the contract to satisfy the notice pleading

requirement is not a proper interpretation of civil RICO

pleading practice. The Court of Appeal subjected the

allegations of injury as set forth in the Amended Complaint

to a standard of scrutiny not applicable to notice pleading.

Construing the Amended Complaint in light most favorable

26.

to Local Union No. 98 and Local Union No. 654, the

Amended Complaint has alleged injury with sufficient

particularity to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the petitioners respectfully

i pray that this Honorable Court exercise its broad power to

minister justice and grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

MARINO & ASSOCIATES, PC

301 Wharton Street -

Philadelphia, Pa 19147

Telephone: 4215) 462-3200 ;

A

By: Va — :

EAR SR ki SARE a RA Na TAG GRRE ae RR ARIEL cet ad Sa oR Sa Sei PALER EELS LE A RENE Phe

at a F, Maino, quire

éy for Petyffoners

Att

- App. 1 -

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 03-1713

BONAVITACOLA ELECTRIC CONTRACTOR, INC.;

LOCAL UNION NO. 654 INTERNATIONAL

BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS; LOCAL

UNION NO. 98 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF

ELECTRICAL WORKERS; CURTIS BELL

¥.

BORO DEVELOPERS, INC; FREDERICK J. SHAPIRO;

BRUCE H. SHAPIRO

Bonavitacola Electric Contractor;

Local Union No. 98, International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,

Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 01-cv-05508)

District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 (a)

October 30, 2003

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge,

NYGAARD and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

+ ea, EOS «

AR BY DG atid

- App. 2 -

(Opinion filed December 8, 2003)

OPINION

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

Bonavitacola Electric Contractor appeals the District

Court's order dismissing its amended complaint for failing to

state a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C §§ 1961-68 ("RICO"). Because

we conclude that the amended complaint fails to allege

sufficiently that the defendant committed a pattern of

racketeering activity as required under RICO and that the

plaintiffs suffered direct injury as a result, we affirm the

judgment of the District Court.

I

Facts and Procedural Posture

On — October 31,2001, Bonavitacola Elcctric

Contractor, along with two labor unions and one individual,’

filed a 27-count complaint against a competitor electric

' For convenience we will use "Bonavitacola" as a collective

reference to the four plaintiff-appellants: Bonavitacola Electric

Contractor; Local Union No. 654, International Brotherhood of Electric

Workers; Local Union No. 98, International Brotherhood of Electric

Workers; and Curtis Bell, an employee of Boro Developers, Inc.

- App. 3 -

contractor, Boro Developers, Inc., and two of Boro's

officers-employees, Frank and Bruce Shapiro.” Bonavitacola

alleged that, over a period of ten years, Boro submitted

competitive bids to perform electrical work on_ public

projects by the Ridley School District, the Neshaminy

School - District, and the United States Department of the

Navy. Bonavitacola alleges that each of these three bids

contained Boro's "fraudulent" promise to comply with

prevailing wage law (the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act,

43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 165-1, and the federal Davis-Bacon Act,

40 U.S.C. §§ 276 et seq.), and as a result Boro was awarded

each of the three contracts over Bonavitacola, the second .

highest bidder. Bonavitacola further alleges that, in

connection with each of the three projects, Boro submitted

numerous certified payroll reports (requirements under

prevailing wage law)-that fraudulently misclassified certain

employees’ activity as "labor" rather than "electrical."

Bonavitacola generally alleges that Boro's conduct involved

"repeated" (but unspecified) instances of mail fraud and wire

fraud, which constitute a predicate act under RICO.

Bonavitacola and the labor unions brought 24 counts against

Boro and the Shapiros under §§ 1962(a), 1962(c), and

P) e . e

“ For convenience we will use "Boro" as a collective reference to the

defendants-appellees.

Le

EA APL DT OO PR ae,

eS a

- App. 4 -

1962(d)° of RICO as well as two counts under state law. In

addition, co-plaintiff Curtis Bell brought one count against

Boro and the Shapiros under state prevailing wage law.

In October 2002, Judge Baylson of the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

granted Boro's motion to dismiss Bonavitacola's complaint.

See Bonavitacola Elec. Contractor, Inc. v. Boro Developers,

Inc., No. CIV.A.01-5508, 2002 WL 31388806 (E.D. Pa. Oct.

23, 2002) ("Bonavitacola F'). Specifically, the District Court

found that the complaint did not state a claim under RICO

because it (1) did not contain any specific allegation of acts

of mail or wire fraud, (2) failed to explain how any of the

alleged acts by the defendants furthered the scheme to

defraud or was incident to an essential part of that scheme,

and (3) contained insufficient evidence as to enterprise,

relatedness, and continuity. /d. *4. But the District Court also

granted Bonavitacola leave to amend the complaint, and, in

the form of a detailed requirements for including a "RICO

Case Statement," instructed Bonavitacola on filing a

sufficient RICO complaint. /d. *5.

Bonavitacola filed an Amended Complaint on

November 11, 2002, but made very few substantive changes

from the original complaint. It added numerous

' Eight counts alleging violations of § 1962(d) of RICO were

subsequently withdrawn on July 1, 2002.

- App. 5 -

subparagraphs specifically identifying each of the various

certified payroll reports that allegedly misclassified the

activities of either Curtis Bell or an "unnamed black male

employee" as "labor" rather than "electrical." See Amended

Complaint, {/f| 42A(2) (a)-(aaaa),

42B(2)(a)-(y) and 42C(2)(a)-(p) (App. at AI9-A44).

Bonavitacola also added a brief discussion of supplemental

jurisdiction, removed the § 1962(d) Counts (XVI-XXIV) that

the parties had previously agreed to strike, and added an

allegation (4 109) to Curtis Bell's state law claim (Count

XVIII). But Bonavitacola did not include the RICO Case

Statement as the District Court had required.

In February 2003, the District Court granted Boro's

‘motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6). See Bonavitacola Elec.

Contractor, Inc. v. Boro Developers, Inc., No. CIV.A.01-

5508, 2003 WL 329145 (B.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2003)

("Bonavitacola II). The District Court found that the

Amended Complaint sufficiently pled the element of

"enterprise" required of a RICO complaint, but that it failed

to plead the predicate acts of mail and .wire fraud with

requisite particularity, failed to plead that predicate acts

formed a "pattern of racketeering activity," and failed to

plead that Bonavitacola was injured as a direct result. The

District Court also held that Bonavitacola could not base its

- App. 6 -

RICO claims on alleged violations of the Davis-Bacon Act

because it does not provide a private right of action. The

District Court dismissed the Amended Complaint's RICO

counts with prejudice and dismissed the state law counts

without prejudice. Bonavitacola appeals the District Court's

finding that the Amended Complaint failed to plead

predicate acts, pattern of racketeering activity, and injury.

Il

Standard of Review

Our review of the order dismissing the Amended

Complaint for failing to state a claim under RICO is plenary

Bald Eagle Area Sch. Dist. v. Keystone Financial, Inc., 189

F.3d 321,327 (3d Cir. 1999). In applying the same standard

as the District Court, we will construe the complaint

liberally, take all material allegations as admitted, and draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. /d. "We

will not affirm the dismissal unless the plaintiffs could prove

no set of facts that would entitle them to relief." /d. (citing

Univ. of Maryland at Baltimore v. Peat, Marwick, Main &

Co., 996 F.2d 1534, 1537-38 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Ill

RICO Pleading Requirements

- App. 7 -

RICO provides a private civil action to recover treble

damages for injuries resulting “%:2 a defendant's

"racketeering activities" in violation of RICO's substantive

provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Under one such substantive

provision, it is unlawful to conduct an enterprise through a

pattern of racketeering activities. /d. § 1962(c). Under

another, it is unlawful to invest income derived from a

pattern of racketeering activities. /d. § 1962(a). To allege

successfuily a violation under either of these subsections, a

plaintiff must allege "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3)

through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity" as well as an

injury resulting from the conduct constituting a violation.

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).

"Racketeering activity" means one of the various predicate

acts identified in the statute, including acts "indictable"

under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes. 18 U.S.C. §

1961(1). When fraud is the predicate act, the heightened

pleading requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)

applies. Warden v. McLelland, 288 F.3d 105,114 & n.6 (3d

Cir. 2002). A "pattern of racketeering activity means" at

least two predicate acts that "are related and that amount to

or pose a threat of continued criminal activity." HJ, Inc. v.

Northwestern Bell Tete. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).

- App. 8 -

IV

Analysis of the Amended Complaint

The District Court dismissed the Amended

Complaint for failing to state a claim under § 1962(a) and §

1962(c) of RICO. We agree with the District Court that the

Amended Complaint did not plead the predicate acts of mail

and wire fraud with particularity and did not adequately

allege a "pattern of racketeering activity" that directly

resulted in Bonavitacola's direct injury.

A. Predicate Act

Bonavitacola attempts to plead that Boro committed

mail or wire fraud as a predicate act to violations of R/CO.

Mail or wire fraud consists of (1) a scheme to defraud, (2)

use of the mail or interstate wires to further that scheme, arid

(3) fraudulent intent. United States v. Pharis, 298 F.3d

228,233 (3d Cir. 2002). When mail or wire fraud is the

predicate act to a RJCO violation, the plaintiff must allege

that mailings are related to the underlying fraudulent scheme,

even though mailings need not be an esseitial element of the

scheme and need not’ themselves’ contain § any

misrepresentations. Jabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1294 & n.

18 (3d Cir. 1995); Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fide/cor, Inc., 926

Fold 1406, 1413 (3d Cir. 1991). Under Federal Rule of Civil

- App. 9 -

Procedure 9(b), the circumstances constituting fraud must be

pleaded with particularity, though fraudulent intent may be

generally alleged. In the context of R/CO mail fraud

allegations, this means that the complaint must "identify the

purpose of the mailing within the defendant's fraudulent

scheme and specify the fraudulent statement, the time, place,

and speaker and content of the alleged misrepresentation."

Annulli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 2001 n.10 (3d Cir. 1999).

Put another way, the "who, what, when and where details of

the alleged fraud" are required. Allen Neurosurgical Assoc.,

Inc. v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, No. CIV-A-99-4653,

2001 WL 41143 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2001).

The Amended Complaint alleges that "the defendant

Boro Developers, Inc. knowingly and repeatedly used the

United States mails and/or interstate wire transmissions in

violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 and § 1343." Amended

Complaint ¢ 41. The Amended Complaint also alleges that

each of the three bids contained a fraudulent promise to

comply with prevailing wage law and that Boro falsified

over one hu: tired certified payroll reports in connection with

the three contracts. But the Amended Complaint does not

identify any particular mail or wire transmissions or allege

how any mail or wire transmissions are connected to a

fraudulent scheme.

- App. 10 -

Even if Bonavitacola had alleged in the Amended

Complaint that the certified payroll reports were the

underlying U.S. mail or interstate wire transmissions, it is

not at all clear from the Amended Complaint how they relate

to an underlying fraudulent scheme. Bonavitacola alleges

that the intent of the fraudulent scheme was "to obtain the

award of electrical contracts from the Ridley and Neshaminy

School Districts and the Department of the Navy." Amended

Complaint § 41. :%ut the Amended Complaint contains no

alleged facts connecting the certified payroll reports, which

Boro submitted after being awarded the contract, to the

alleged purpose of the fraudulent scheme, which was to

obtain the award of the contracts.

B. Pattern of Racketeering

To plead sufficiently the requisite "pattern of

racketeering activity," a R/CO plaintiff must allege predicate

acts that are related and amount to or pose a threat of

continued criminal activity. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239.

1. Relatedness

Predicate acts are related if they "have the same or

similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of

commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing

characteristics and are not isolated events." H./. Inc., 492

- App. 11 -

U.S. at 240; Tabas, 47 F.3d at 1292. In Kehr Packages, we

observed that relatedness "will nearly always be satisfied in

cases alleging at least two acts of mail fraud stemming from

the same fraudulent transaction." 926 F.2d at 1414; see also

Banks v. Walk, 918 F.2d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 1990)

(unspecified acts of mai! and wire fraud all related to a single

real estate transaction satisfied relatedness requirement).

As discussed above, the Amended Complaint fails to

allege predicate acts of mail or wire fraud. At best, the

Amended Complaint alleges three separate fraudulent

transactions: the Ridley School District bid, the Neshaminy

School Distict bid, and the U. S. Navy bid, each of which

contained the allegedly false promise to comply with

prevailing wage law. Each of those bids is related to the

various, allegedly falsified certified payroll reports prepared

for the same project. See Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1415.

However, the Amended Complaint does not allege

that the three fraudulent transactions are related to each

other. Bonavitacola ignored the District Court's clear

instructions in Bonavitacola I to state in the Amended

Complaint "how the alleged predicate acts relate to each

other as part of a common plan." Bonavitacola I, at * 5.

| Rather, Bonavitacola retained the initial complaint's vague

and conclusory allegations that predicate acts of fraud were

related by their similar purpose of procuring electrical

SS RRR ETS ns Es ees AMBP hi eccairnet

Keres

Fe Dinara il

- App. 12 -

construction contracts. This is not an allegation of common

plan, and without more-such as allegations detailing the

transactions’ similar results, participants, victims, manner of

commission, or other characteristics-will not satisfy the

relatedness requirement. H.J Inc., 492 U.S. at 240.

2. Continuity

Continuity is "both a closed- and open-ended

concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated

conduct or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the

future with a threat of repetition." H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 241.

For closed-ended continuity, a RICO plaintiff must allege "a

series of related predicates lasting a ‘substantial period of

time." Hughes v. Consol-Penn. Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594,609

(3d Cir. 1991) (citing HU.,Jnc., 492 U.S. at 242). For open-

ended continuity, the plaintiff must allege a "threat of

continuity" that "exists when the predicate acts are a part of

defendant's 'regular way of doing business.'" Hughes, 945

F.2d at 609-10 (citing H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 242).

Finding no relatedness between the three separate

transactions, we cannot measure continuity by collectively

considering the numerous alleged acts of deceit associated

with all three bids, which spanned eight years. Thus the

Amended Complaint lacks predicate acts occurring over a

"substantial period of time" necessary for a proper allegation

- App. 13 -

of closed-ended continuity.

Additionally, nothing in the Amended Complaint

suggests that Boro's alleged fraudulent transactions are its

regular way of doing business. There is no allegation that

Boro submitted other bids in which they falsely promised to

comply with prevailing wage law in order to get that

business. As the District Court properly noted, "[i]f, for

example, over these eight years, Defendants had 1 00-

different contracts, the fact that they may have committed

fraud as to three of them (Ridley School District, Neshaminy

School District, and the Department of Navy) would be

plainly insufficient to support a scheme under RICO." See

Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1418 (with "no indication that

[defendants] made otner false statements or treated other

customers in a similar manner," the complaint did not

indicate that fraud was a regular way of doing business).

Thus, the Amended Complaint did not allege fraud

that was related or continuous so as to plead sufficiently the

"pattern of racketeering activity" element of a RICO claim.

C. Injury

To have standing, a RICO plaintiff must also show

that the alleged RICO violations proximately caused injury

to the plaintiffs business property. 18 D.S.C. § 1964(c);

Holmes v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268

a Rena EEE > TA ea

Bat MEAL LAS ADEM BIS SPEER IN

RL RS a TS ee ee eae

- App. [4-

(1992). An indirect injury remotely caused by the RICO

violation will not satisfy proximate cause requirement.

Bonavitacola's alleged injury is that, as a result of

Boro's false promise to comply with the prevailing wage law,

Bonavitacola was denied the opportunity to compete with

Boro "on a fair and honest basis," and consequently lost

income and profits that it would have earned if it had been

awarded the Ridley School District* contract.

The Amended Complaint does not allege how Boro' s

promise to comply with prevailing wage law influenced

Ridley School District's decision to award its contract to

Boro and not Bonavitacola. For example, the Amended

Complaint does not indicate the extent to which Boro's bid

was lower than Bonavitacola's bid or whether Boro's bid had

lower labor costs than Bonavitacola's bid. Nor does it allege

that Boro's bid incorporated any misclassified wages, or that

the amount by which Boro underbid Bonavitacola was.

attributable to misclassified wages. In contrast, the Second

Circuit's decision in Commercial Cleaning Services, LLC v.

Colin Service Systems, Inc. (which Bonavitacola cites in

support of its direct-injury argument) illustrates proper

allegations of competitor-injury in a RICO complaint: "The

* Bonavitacola does not explain why only the Ridley School District

bid formed the basis for its damages allegations.

- App. 15 -

complaint asserts that Pratt & Whitney chose Colin because

Colin submitted ‘significantly lower’ bids in a ‘highly

competitive’ price sensitive market. According to the

complaint, Colin was able to underbid its competitors

because its scheme to hire illegal immigrant workers

permitted it to pay well below the prevailing wage for legal

workers." 271 F.3d 374,382 (2d Cir. 2001). A similar

description does not apply to Bonavitacola's complaint.

Furthermore, judging by the facts in the Amended

Complaint, Boro' s promise to comply with prevailing wage

law did not become a false promise until sometime after

Boro had been awarded the bid, when it began to submit

(allegedly) false certified payroll reports. As Bonavitacola

had already lost the bid, it is not at all obvious what its injury

could have been. Nor is any explanation provided in the

Amended Complaint.

The labor unions' alleged injury is even more remote

than Bonavitacola's. The unions state that they would have

received additional contributions to their multi-employer

benefit plans for employees if Bonavitacola had been

awarded the contract. The District Court correctly noted that

the Amended Complaint "does not state the requisite

allegations to show how the contract revenues following to

Plaintiff Bonavitacola, assuming it had been awarded any

contract, would have resulted in benefit to the plaintiff labor

th TOES BL GRE ANITA Stes

pti hE Ak Scots BRL Sg eR SEE char

- App. 16 -

unions." Bonavitacola IJ, at *12. Nor does the Amended

Complaint allege that the labor unions have standing to sue

for "these types of damages which, presumably are for the

benefit of the union members." /d.

For these reasons, we conclude that neither

Bonavitacola nor the labor unions have alleged the direct

injury required for standing under RICO.

¥

Conclusion

We conclude that Bonavitacola did not allege

predicate acts of fraud with the requisite particularity, did not

allege a "pattern of racketeering activity" and did not allege

direct injury required for standing under RICO. Thus we

affirm the judgment of the District Court.

TO THE CLERK:

Please file the foregoing Opinion.

By the Court,

/s/ Thomas L. Ambro Circuit

Judge

- App. 17 -

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 03-1713

BONAVITACOLA ELECTRIC CONTRACTOR, INC.;

LOCAL UNION NO. 654 INTERNATIONAL

BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS; LOCAL

- UNION NO. 98 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF

ELECTRICAL WORKERS; CURTIS BELL

BORO DEVELOPERS, INC; FREDERICK J. SHAPIRO;

BRUCE H. SHAPIRO

Bonavitacola Electric Contractor;

Local Union No. 98, International

Brotherheod of Electrical Workers,

Appellants

Appeal trom the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 01-cv-05508)

District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 (a)

October 30, 2003

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge,

NY GAARD and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

- App. 18 -

JUDGMENT

tr AR ar

[his cause came on to be heard on the record before the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

a i

Pennsylvania and was submitted pursuant to Third Circuit

LAR 34.1(a) on October 30, 2003.

On consideration whereof, IT IS ORDERED AND

ADJUDGED by this Court that the judgment of the District

Court dated February 13, 2003, is hereby affirmed. Costs

taxed against appellants. All of the above in accordance with

ee eee es BOS A ete ee cal al <->

the opinion of this Court.

ATTEST:

“/s/ Marcio M. Wilson”

Clerk

ee

Dated: December 8, 2003

- App. 19 -

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BONAVITACOLA ELECTRIC

CONTRACTOR, INC., et.al. 3 CIVIL ACTION

Plaintitts,

. Vv.

BORO DEVELOPERS, INC., et al., | NO. 01-5508

Detendants.

MEMORANDUM

Baylson, J. February i2, 2003

The issue presented is whether Plaintiffs’ RICO

Compiaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. The Plaintiffs in the instant

action are: (1) Bonavitacola Eclectic Contractor, Inc.

("Bonavitacola'), a contractor that provides electrical

services to governmental agencies and commercial and

industrial accounts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey; (2) two

labor unions, Local Umon No. 654, International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and Local Union No. 98,

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, which

provide labor to electrical contractors such as Bonavitacola;

Oe ee Ee ee ee

- App. 20 -

and (3) Curtis Bell, an individual who 1s identified as an

employee, agent, servant or representative of one of the

Defendants, Boro Developers, Inc. (collectively,

"Plaintiffs").

The Defendants are identified as Boro Developers,

Inc. ("Boro"), a corporation engaged in the business of

providing electrical services to governmental and private

accounts, and two individuals, Frederick J, Shapiro and

Bruce J, Shapiro, both alleged to be officers and employees

of Defendant Boro, as Chief Executive Officer and Chief

Operating Officer of Boro, respectively, (collectively

Defendants”).

Plaintiffs brought their original Complaint under the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18

U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 ("RICO") (24 Counts), and state law

claims (interference with prospective contractual relations,

unjust enrichment and under 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 260 (3

Counts)) In Bonavitacola Elec. Contractor. Inc. v. Boro

Developers. Inc., No. CIV.A.O]-5508, 2002 WL 31388806

(E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2002) ("Bonavitacola I"), this Court

granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint,

but granted leave to amend. This Court found that the

Complaint was "woefully short of the ... RICO

* The parties agreed to withdraw Counts XVI though XXIV of the

Complaint, which allege violations of § 1962(d) of RICO, on July, 2002.

- App. 21 -

requirements" because the Complaint; (1) did not contain

any specific allegation of acts of mail or wire fraud; (2)

failed to explain how any of the alleged acts by Defendants

furthered the scheme to defraud or was incident to an

essential part of that scheme; and (3) contained insufficient

allegations as to enterprise, relatedness and continuity. Id. at

*4. Although this Court believed that it would have been

justified in dismissing the Complaint -with prejudice, the

Court allowed Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint and set

forth specific guidelines for Plaintiffs to follow in amending

their Complaint, including a requirement that the Amended

Complaint, include or be accompanied by a "RICO Case

Statement," as described in Bonavitacola I. Id.'

Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint on

November 11, 2002, and-Defendants filed their Motion to

Dismiss Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) on December 3,2002. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

I. Legal Standard on Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

When deciding a. motion to dismiss pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6), the court may

look only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its

attachments. See, Lordan v.Fox, Rothschild. O'Bnen &

Frankel: 20 F.3d 1251. 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). The court must

- App. 22 -

accept as true all well pleaded allegations in the complaint

and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See Angelastro_v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc.; 764 F.2d

939,944 (3d Cir. 1985). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be

granted only when it is certain that no relief could be granted

under any set of facts that could be proved by the plaintiff.

See Ransom v. MalDIzzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1988).

Il. Allegations of the Amended Complaint

As in its original Complaint, Plaintiff Bonavitacola

alleges it is a competito.: of Boro, and that, over a period of

years. Defendant Boro has solicited and received business

through competitive bids to various public entities located in

this district, and also the U.S. Department of Navy. A

requirement of the bids is that the contractor comply with the

Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act, 43 PA, STAT. ANN. §

165-1 et_seq., and the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276 et

seg. The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants, in

submitting bids on behalf of Defendant Boro, certified that

Boro would comply with the aforesaid Pennsylvania and

federal statutes, but knowingly and willfully submitted false

and fraudulently made bids, and Defendants engaged in a

fraudulent practice of falsifying Certified Payroll Reports

and other certifications, which were required to be submited

to the awarding agencies. (Am. Comp. §j 34.) The Amended

- App. 23 -

Complaint alleges that Defendant Boro received these

awards based upon the false certifications.

The first nine Counts of the Amended Complaint

charge a violation of § 1962(a) of RICO. In the first Count,

which is the most deta:led, Plaintiff Bonavitacola alleges that

Defendant Boro submitted false certifications to the Ridley

School District, the U.S. Department of Navy and the

Neshaminy School District. In Bonavitacola I, the Court

found that, although the Complaint alleged conclusory terms

that Defendants committed mail or wire fraud there were no

specifics of dates of mailings or wire transmissions, and the

Complaint was completely conclusory, ignoring well settled

requirements for RICO pleadings in many cases previously

decided in this district. Bonavitacola I, 2002 WL 31388806,

“i.

The remaining eight Counts under § 1962(a) make

claims for each of the Plaintiffs (except Curtis Bell) against

the three Defendants, charged individually.

Counts X through XV (either specifically or by

incorporating previous paragraphs by reference) charge

violations of § 1962(c) of RICO by the Plaintiffs (except

Curtis Bell) against each Defendant individually, and allege

in each Count that the individual Defendant "conducted or

participated in the conduct of the affairs of Boro through a

pattern of racketeering as aforementioned." In the Amended

- App. 24 -

Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Boro constituted

an "enterprise" (Am. Comp. § 39) and that Boro, Frederick

Shapiro, and Bruce Shapiro, are each a “person capable of

holding a. beneficial interest in property within the meaning

of 18 USCA § 1961(3).” Id. 4] 40, 47, 54.

Count XVI is brought by Plaintiff Bonavitacola

against all Defendants for interference with prospective

contractual relations; Count XVII is brought by Plaintiff

Bonavitacola against all Defendants for unjust enrichment;

and Count XVIII is brought by Plaintiff Curtis Bell against

all Defendants charging a violation of 43 PA. STAT. ANN, §

260.

Ill. Changes Made in the Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs made very few substantive changes from

the original to the Amended Complaint, and failed to include

a RICO case statement, despite this Court’s clear mandate

that they do so. Although Plaintiffs restructured the

allegations under “Jurisdiction and Venue,” the only

substantive change is the inclusion of a brief discussion on

supplemental jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs added subparagraphs (a)-(aaaa) under

paragraph 42(A)(2), subparagraphs (a)-(y) under paragraph

42(B)(2), and subparagraphs (a)-(p) under paragraph

42(C)(2). Although most, but not all, of the new

- App. 25 -

subparagraphs itemize specific Certified Payroll Reports and

dates, Plaintiffs do not set forth any details on the

requirements of RICQ, as specified in Bonavitacola 1.

The final changes made in the Amended Complaint

are that Counts XVI-XXIV of the original Complaint, which

alleged violations of § 1962(d) of RICO, are not included in

the Amended Complaint. Also, Plaintiffs added paragraph

109 in Count XVIII of the Amended Complaint alleging that

Defendants "agreed to pay Curtis Bell those wages and

muiti-employer benefits due to him as a result of his

performance of electrical constructed" at some job sites.

IV. Sufficiency of the Amended Complaint

As noted above, Plaintiffs® now assert RICO

violations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) and (c), which

state in relevant part:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has

received any income derived, directly or indirectly,

from a pattern of racketeering activity or though

collection of an unlawful debt in which such person

has participated as a principal within the meaning of

§ 2, Title 18, United States Code, to use or invest,

' Only Plaintiffs Bonavitacola, Local Union No. 654, and Local Union

No. 98 assert RICO claims. Plaintiff Curtis Bell only asserts a violation

of 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 260 by all Defendants.

- App. 26 -

directly or indirectly, any part of such income or the

proceeds of such income in acquisition of any interest

in or the establishment or operation of any enterprise

which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,

interstate or foreign commerce.

(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by

or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the

activities of which affect, interstate or foreign

commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or

indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs

through a pattern of racketeering activity or

collection of unlawful debt.

18 U.S.C. § 1962. To successfully plead a civil RICO

violation under these subsections, a plaintiff must allege

either "a pattern of racketeering activity" or the "collection of

an unlawful debt." H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tele. Co.

492 U.S. 229, 232, 109 S. Ct. 2893, 106 L. Ed. 2d 195

(1989); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Dilff & Assoc..

Inc.. 483 U.S. 143; 154, 107 S. Ct. 2759. 97 L. Ed. 2d 121

(1987) ("[t]he heart of any RICO complaint is the allegation

of a pattern of racketeering.").

To be successful in a complaint relying on a pattern

of racketeering activity, a plaintiff must allege the details

required in the court's description of a RICO case statement

(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) or

- App. 27 -

racketeering activity. Warden v. McLelland, 288 F.3d 105,

114 (3d Cir. 2002).

A. Enterprise

1. Section 1962(c)

Under § 1962(c), RICO liability requires conduct by

a "person employed by or associated with any enterprise." 18

U.S.C. § 1962(c). "Person" includes "any individual or entity

capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."

18 D.S.C. § 1961(3). "Enterprise" includes "any individual,

partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,

and any union or group of individuals associated in fact

although not a legal entity," 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (4). In order

to allege a RICO enterprise, the Third Circuit has identified

three elements: (1) that there be an ongoing organization; (2)

that the associates function as an ongoing unit; and (3) that

the enterprise is an entity separate and apart from the pattern

of activity in which it engages. Curtin v. Tillev Fire

Equipment Co., No, Crv,A.99-2373. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

19467) at *10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 1999) (citing U.S. v

Console. 13 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub

nom., Curcio v. U.S., 511 U.S, 1076, 114 S. Ct. 1660, 128:L.

Ed.. 20. 377 (1994) and Markoff v.U.S., 513 U.S. 812. 115

S. Ct. 64, 1301. Ed. 2d 21 (1994)).

The leading case in the Third Circuit on the

- App. 28 -

distinctness requirement under § 1962(c) is Jaguar Cars. Inc.

v. Roval Oaks Motor Car Co., Inc.. 46 F3d 258 (3d Cir.

1995). In that case, the Third Circuit held that the defendant

"persons" must be separate and distinct from the named

enterprise. However, the Third Circuit in Jaguar Cars stated:

[W]e conclude that when officers and/or employees

‘operate and manage a legitimate corporation, and use

it to conduct, through interstate commerce, a pattern

of racketeering activity those defenck"1.1 At persons

are properly liable under § 1962(c).

Jaguar Cars, 46 F.3d at 269. In the Amended

Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that individual Defendants —

Frederick Shapiro and Bruce Shapiro are officers of Boro,

which is alleged to be in the business of providing electrical

services (Am. Comp. § 9) and is both the "enterprise" (Am.

Comp.{ 39) and also a Defendant as to the claim made under

§ 1962(a) (Am. Comp, { 9). The issue is whether Plaintiffs’

allegations satisfy Jaguar Cars.

In Cedric Kushner Promotions Ltd. V. King, 533

U.S.: 158, 121 S. Ct. 2087,150 L. Ed. 2d 198 (2001). The

Supreme Court upheld the Third Circuit’s interpretation of §

1902(c) in Jaguar Cars, and rejected the views of other

circuit courts requiring much more distinctness than a mere

Separation of a corporation and its officers. | While

acknowledging the split among the circuit courts concerning

- App. 29 -

how much distinctness was sufficient, the Supreme Court

held that it found nothing in the statute that required more

separateness than the formal legal distinction between a

person and a corporation. The Court ruled that § 1962(c)

"requires no more than the formal legal distinction between

‘person’ and 'enterprise' (namely, incorporation) that is

present here." King, 533 U.S. at 165, because a corporate

owner or employee was a natural person, the Court found

that he or she was distinct from the corporation itself, which

constituted a legally different entity with different rights and

responsibilities. The Court added, "a _ corporation

owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the

corporation itself, a legally different entity with different

rights and responsibilities due to its different legal status," Id.

at 163.

Applying this principle, the Supreme Court found

that King, as all individual person, was legally distinct from

his corporation. Thus, the Court held that the distinctness

requirement was met when a corporate employee unlawfully

conducted the affairs of the corporation of which he was the

sole owner, regardless of whether he conducted those affairs

within, or beyond, the scope of corporate authority.

In their § 1962(c) claims against the Defendants

Frederick Shapiro and Bruce Shapiro, Plaintiffs allege that

Defendant Boro constituted an 'enterprise" through which

- App. 30 -

"persons," Boro, Frederick Shapiro, and Bruce Shapiro,

acted. ’ Because Defendants Frederick Shapiro and Bruce

Shapiro are alleged to be employees and corporate officers of

Boro, the alleged enterprise, Plaintiff may bring § 1962(c)

claims against them. The Court, therefore, finds that

Plaintiffs’ have adequately pled "enterprise" under § 1962(c),

as to Defendants Frederick J. Shapiro and Bruce H. Shapiro.

2. Section 1962(a)

Although § 1962(c) requires a distinction between a.

person and an enterprise, there is no_ distinctiveness

requirement under § 1962(a). Leonard A. Feinberg, Inc. v.

Central Asia Capital Com., 974 F. Supp. 822, 850 (E.D. Pa.

1997) (citations omitted). "[A)n entity can be both an

enterprise and a defendant for purposes of § 1962(a): Kehr

Packages v. Fidelcor, Inc.. 926 F.2d 1406. 1411 (3d Cir.

1991), cert denied, 501 U.S. 1222, 111 S. Ct. 2839, 115 L.

Ed. 2d 1007 (1991).

Therefore, Boro can be both a defendant and the

’ Plaintiffs have not carefully pleaded the allegations as to Boro. Plaintiff

do not indicate Boro as a defendant in their introductory headings as to

Counts X-XV; which allege violations of § 1962(c). As noted above,

Plaintiffs assert BORO is the enterprise as to § 1962(c). However, also

indicating that Boro is a "person" under § 1962(c) is somewhat

contradictory. Further by the wholesale incorporation of the § 1962(a)

Counts (where Boro is a defendant) into the § 1962(c) Counts, Plaintiffs

have, by their literal allegations, named Boro as a defendant under §

- App. 31 -

enterprise under § 1962(a), and the Court finds that Plaintiffs

that Plaintiffs have adequately "enterprise" under § 1962(a)

against all Defendants.

Thus, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded an

"enterprise," but as the following discussion shows, Plaintiff

has not satisfied the other pleading requirements of RICO.

B. Pattern of Racketeering Activity

Bonavitacola | summarized the legal requirements of

pleading a pattern of racketeering activity, and required

Plaintiffs to allege:

b. As to the racketeering activity alleged under each

RICO Count,

include the following:

i. List each predicate act which the Plaintiffs allege

constitutes the RICO violation, including such specifics

as names, dates and types of communications or acts.

ii. Describe how each predicate act is fraudulent and/or

part of a pattern of racketeering activity,

ili. State how the alleged predicate acts relate to each

other as part of a common plan.

Bonavitacola I, 2002 WL 31388806. at *5.

i. Predicate Acts

1962(c). If Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint was otherwise sufficient, the

Court would overlook these pleading defects.

- App. 32 -

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants committed various

unspecified predicate acts of mail fraud and wire fraud.

(A.m. Compl. 4 41, 48, 55,) The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1341, applies only where the defendant uses the U.S. mails

as “part of the execution: of the fraudulent scheme. Schmuck

v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710, 109 S. Ct. 1443, 1031.

Ed. 2d 734 (1989). The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343,

"is identical to the mail fraud statute except it speaks of

communications transmitted by wire," i.e. telephone, radio,

or television, and does not apply to _ intrastate

communications. United States v. Frev, 42 F.3d 795, 797 (3d

Cir. 1994). The Court of Appeals has noted that "cases

construing the mail fraud statute are applicable to the wire

fraud statute as well." Id. at 797 //.2 (quoting United States

v. Tarnopol., 561 F-2d 466,475 (3d Cir. 1977).

The requisite elements of mail or wire fraud are: (1)

a scheme to defraud; (2) use of the transmissions to further

that scheme; and (3) fraudulent intent. Werther v. Rosen, No.

CIV.AO2.3589, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22262. at *7 (E.D.

Pa. Oct. 30,2002) (citing U.S. 'V. Pharis. 298 F. 3d 228, 233

(3d Cir. 2.002)). "A scheme or artifice to defraud need not be

fraudulent on its face, but must involve some sort of

fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions reasonably

calculated to deceive persons—of ordinary prudence and

comprehension." Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1415 (quoting

- App. 33 -

United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531: .535 (3d Cir.

1978)). Further, “when alleging mail and wire fraud as

predicate acts in a RICO claim, plaintiff's pleadings must

identify the purpose of the mailing within the defendant's

fraudulent scheme and specify the fraudulent statement, the

time, place, and speaker and content of the alleged

misrepresentation." Werther, 2002 U.S. Dist.. LEXIS 22262,

at *7 8 (citing Annulli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 201 n.10

(3d Cir. 1999)).

In Allen Neurosurgical Assoc., Inc. v. Lehigh Valley

Health Network, No. CIV.A.99-4653.2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

84 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2001), Judge O'Neill set forth the

principles under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which

provides that "in all averments of fraud and mistake, the

circumstances constituting fraud and mistake shall be stated

with particularity." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). When the predicate

acts in a RICO complaint sound in fraud, Rule 9(b) applies.

Id. at *8 (citing Rose v. Bartle, 871 F..2d 331, 357 (3d Cir.

1989»). "Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs to plead with

particularity the 'circumstances' of the alleged fraud in order

to place defendants on notice of the precise misconduct with

which they are charged, and to safeguard against spurious

charges of immoral and fraudulent behavior." Id. (quoting

Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corn., 742

F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211,

- App. 34 -

105 S. Ct. 1179,841. Ed. 2d 327 (1985)). This generally

requires the plaintiff to plead the "Who, what, when, and

where details of the alleged fraud," Id. (quoting U.S. ex rel.

Waris v. StatfBuilders, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-1969, 1999 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 2998, at *4 (B.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 1999). While a

complaint need. not set out "precise words.;' it should

adequately describe the nature and subject of an alleged

misrepresentation. Id. (citing Seville, 742 F.2d at 791).

Nonetheless, courts should not focus too narrowly"

on the particularity language of Rule 9(b) and should take

into. account the "general simplicity and flexibility

contemplated by the rules." Id. In applying the principles of

Rule 9(b) in Allen Neurosurgical Assoc., Inc., Judge O'Neill

stated, in relevant part:

[Most of the petential predicate acts listed in the

RICO Case Statement are not pled with the

particularity required by Rule 9(b). Plaintiff does not

plead the "date, place or time" of the alleged

misrepresentations, which, though not an absolute

requirement under Rule 9('0), would "inject precision

and some measure of substantiation" into the

allegations. See Seville, 742 F.2d at 791. Nor does

plaintiff plead “who made the representations" at

issue. See Satporito v. Combustion Engg’g, 843 F .2d

66, 675 (3d Cir. 1988) cert. granted and judgment

- App. 35 -

vacated on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1049 (1989) ...

Similarly, plaintiff does not plead "who received the

allegedly fraudulent information." Id,; Smith v. Berg,

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18298, No. 99-2133, 1999

WL 1081065, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1999)...

Finally, plaintiff pleads nothing of the content of each

alleged misrepresentation. Saporito, 843 F.2d at 675

(allegations should include "the general content of the

representations"); Rolo V. City Investin Co.

Liquidating Trust 155 F.3d 644, 658 (3d Cir. 1998)

(allegations of mail fraud should contain the "precise

content of each particular mailing"); Smith, 1999 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 18298, 1999 WL 1081065, at *5 (same).

In short, plaintiff is not pleading "acts" of mail and

wire fraud. .. . Where the Rule 9(b) standard applies,

plaintiff is not entitled to the inference that the essential

elements of mail and wire fraud occurred; plaintiff must

plead those essential elements with particularity.

Allen Neurosurgical Assoc.. Inc.. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

284, at *9-12.

In the present case, because Plaintiffs allege that

Defendants "knowingly and repeatedly used the United

States Mail and/or interstate wire transmissions in violation

of 18 U.S.C.A. §1341 and § 1343" to "effect the fraudulent

- App. 36 -

scheme" (Am. Compl. § 41, 48, 55), Rule 9(b) applies to the

Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint does not

contain any details of predicate acts, as required under Rule

9(b) and also required by Bonavitacola I, as stated above.

There are no specific allegations of (1) the purpose of

the mailing within the defendants fraudulent scheme, (2) the

content of the fraudulent statement, (3) how the statement or

any other communications was false or misleading, (3) the

time, place, and speaker and content of the alleged

misrepresentation, (4) how the fraudulent statement

contributed to the alleged fraudulent scheme, (5) 'who made

the fraudulent statement at issue, or (6) who received the

fraudulent statement. Bonavitacola I, clearly set forth that

such detail would be required in the Amended Complaint

The allegations that Plaintiffs have added (the subparagraphs

in § 42) do not add the requisite information. These

subparagraphs only allege that certain Certified Payroll

Reports were false. There is no ailegation that these

allegedly false reports were sent by mail or wire, or by

whom or to whom they were sent. The Court, therefore, finds

that Plaintiffs have failed to plead mail and wire fraud as

predicate acts with particularity as required.

ya Relatedness

The "relatedness" prong requires that the predicate

- App. 37 -

acts "have the same or similar purposes, results, participants.

victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are

interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not

isolated events." H.J" Inc., 492 U.S. at 240 (quoting

Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C § 3575 et

seq, (partially repealed; Tabas v.Tabas, 47 F3d 1280, 1292

(3d Cir. 1995). The Third Circuit has applied a six factor test

to assess the sufficiency of continuity and relatedness to

form a pattern under RICO. Curtin, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

19467, at *13. These factors are: (1) number of unlawful

acts; (2) length of time over. which the acts were committed;

(3) similarity of the acts; (4) number of victims; (5) number

of perpetrators; and (6) character of the unlawful activity. rd.

at '" 13-14 (citation omitted) .

In holding that the plaintiff failed to establish

relatedness and, thus did not sufficiently plead a pattern of

racketeering activity in Gintowt v. TL Ventures, 226 F.

Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Pa. 2002), (although allowing leave to

amend) this Court stated:

Nor does the pleading, as written, satisfactorily tie

each Defendant's alleged individual or joint conduct

to "ftaudi.llent miusrepresentations or omissions

reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary

prudence and comprehension." Kehr Packages, 926 F

2d at 1415. This Court is mindful that, in this RICO

- App. 38

case, as In an antitrust case, the character and effect

of a conspiracy are not to be judged by dismembering

it and viewing its separate parts, but only by looking

at it as a whole." Continental Ore Co. v. Union

Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699, 82 S.

Ct. 1404, 8 L. Ed. 2d. 777 (1962). Yet, even viewing

together the many "dots" of fraud alleged, Plaintiffs

Complaint... fails to connect those dots in the

language and particulars of RICO.

Gintowt, 226 F, Supp. 2d at 678.

The Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to

sufficiently plead any details of the alleged mail and wire

fraud as predicate acts in the Amended Complaint almost

inevitably leads to a conclusion mat the relatedness

requirement is similarly missing. Even assuming that the

Amended Complaint adequately alleges two or more

predicate acts, however, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails

to allege the requisite relatedness! even though Bonavitacola

| clearly required that the RICO case statement "state how

the alleged predicate acts related to each other as part of a

common plan." The Amended Complaint does not set forth

any details about the purposes, results, participants, victims,

or methods of commission of the alleged predicate acts, or

prove that the alleged predicate acts are otherwise

- App. 39 -

interrelated. Plaintiffs give no reason for ignoring the Court's

clear instructions in Bonavitacola I.

In Plaintiffs' brief in opposition to 'the Motion to

Dismiss, the Plaintiffs assert that J 31, 41 and 42 of the

Amended Complaint adequately allege the required elements

of relatedness (and also continuity, as discussed below.

(Mem. Opp’n Mot Dismiss at 10.) It is relevant to note that

Plaintiffs do not cite any cases whatsoever in support of the

sufficiency of their RICO allegations. Nor does Plaintiffs’

brief at any time refer to the RICO case statement required in

Bonavitacola I Rather, Plaintiffs' brief only argues that 4 31,

41 and 42 of the Amended Complaint "demonstrates [sic]

that the alleged predicate acts of racketeering were ‘related’

in that the actions described had the same purpose of

procuring electrical construction contracts and subverting the

Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act and/or the Davis-Bacon

Act," and that these paragraphs demonstrate that the

relationship requirement is met because "the actions

described have a similar method of commission" and "were;

not isolated acts but part of a scheme to defraud," (Mem.

Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at 9-10.) These arguments in Plaintiffs’

brief are merely repetitive of the concusory allegations, but

the allegations themselves do not have the requisite details.

In fact, the Amended Complaint does not have any

discussion whatsoever of what Defendants’ "method of

- App. 40 -

commission" was nor does it describe in any detail what was

Detendants' "scheme to defraud."

Plaintiffs conclude, on page 10 of their brief, "the

totality of the allegations set forth in the Complaint suggest

that the defendants routinely do business through the use of

the predicate acts or that there is real threat that the

defendants will do so in the future." This statement does not

accurately summarize any of the allegations ill the Amended

Complaint, which should have compiled with the RICO case

statement. If Plaintiffs had the ability, and had taken the

trouble, to comply, they would have met the pleading

requisites for a RICO case. As noted above, Plaintiffs do not

at any time cite to the Court's RICO case statement, object to

it, argue that it is improper or purport to have complied.

Although it was designed to be helpful to Plaintiffs, it has

simply been ignored. There is no basis in the Amended

Complaint to conclude that Defendants routinely do business

in the manner in which Plaintiffs allege, there are no details

as to how or why the Certified Payroll Reports are false,

there are no details that this was a broad scheme to defraud

but merely, because it is existed in several years between

1993 and 2001, that it will continue into the future.

The Court therefore, finds that Plaintiffs’ Amended

Complaint fails to adequately allege relatedness as to all

Defendants.

- App. 41 -

a Continuity

The "continuity" prong refers either to IID "open-

ended scheme," consisting of past conduct that by its nature

projects into the future with a threat of repetition, or to a

"closed ended scheme consisting of a closed period of

repeated conduct. Curtin,1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19467, at

*15-16 (quoting H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241). Plaintiffs do not

discuss this concept in their Amended Complaint or brief. A

short-term fraudulent scheme posing no treat of future

criminal conduct cannot satisfy the continuity requirement.

Kehr Packages. 926 F.2d at 1412. A plaintiff must prove a

regular way of doing business in an "open-ended scheme’ or

a series of related acts lasting a "substantial period of time"

in a. "closed-ended scheme." Id. at * 16 (citations omitted).

With respect to a "closed-ended scheme," the Third Circuit

has developed a durational requirement of at least twelve

months, which time period is measured between the first and

last predicate acts alleged. Plater-Zyberk v. Abraham, No.

CIV.A.97-3322, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1736, at *23-24

(B.D, Pa. Feb. 18, 1998) (citing Tabas, 47 F.3d at 1293).

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint fails to allege the

requisite continuity. The Amended Complaint fails to

adequately plead "open-ended" continuity because it does

not expressly allege, or provide a basis from which the court

could reasonably infer, that Defendants’ alleged misconduct

ne en pan ne ee

- App. 42 -

poses a threat of future criminal activity. See Lubart v, Riley

& Fanelli P.C., No. CIV.A.97-6392, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

0109, at *33. (E.D, Pa. June 22, 1998) (finding that the

proposed complaint failed to adequately plead open-ended

continuity where the fraudulent conduct did not extend

beyond the life of the matter before the court and where there

were no allegations suggesting a future threat). Although the

original Complaint was filed on October 31, 2001, the

Amended Complaint was not filed until November 11, 2002.

Plaintiffs omit any allegations of events in the intervening

twelve months.

The Amended Complaint also fails to adequately

plead "closed ended" continuity. Although the time period

between the first allegedly false Certified Payroll Report

(February 26, 1993) and the last Report (June 29, 2001)

alleged is over eight years, there are no allegations of false

reports for the years 1994, 1995, 1998 - which omission in

and of itself dispels any notion of continuity. Plaintiffs have

failed to establish that the predicate acts are related,® which

is required for "closed-ended" continuity. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S.

at 242. The Court, therefore, finds that Plaintiff:' Amended

Complaint fails to adequately allege continuity with respect

to all Defendants.

In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to allege what many

- App. 43 -

courts have required for a RICO complaint - a scheme to

defraud, with a pattern of related, continuing criminal

activity. There is no allegation of any collection of the

allegedly false reports submitted to the Ridley School

District, the Neshaminy School District, and the Department

of Navy. There is no allegation as to what other business the

Defendants engaged in and whether they used false payroll

reports in order to get that other business. If. for example.

over these eight years, Defendants’ had 100 different

contracts, the fact that they may have committed fraud as to .

three of them (Ridley School District, Neshaminy School

District and the Department of Navy) would be plainly

insufficient to constitute a scheme under RICO. If these

contracts were the only contracts, or a majority of the total

number of contracts, then a RICO scheme may Exist. There

is no way to tell from the Amended Complaint.

C. Injury

To prevail in a civil action for damages under RICO,

a plaintiff must establish a violation of § 1962, allege an

injury to his or her business property "by reason of"" the

alleged violation of § 1962, and plead the requisite causal

connection between the injury and the violation of § 1962

. See discussion supra Part IV. B. 2.

- App. 44 -

Tri-County Concerned Citizens Assn. v. Carr, No. Crv.A.98-

4184, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14933, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Sept.

18, 2001). The Supreme Court has determined that the

phrase "by reason of' in § 1964(c) requires a plaintiff to show

the alleged RICO violations proximately caused the

plaintiff's injury, meaning that the violation cannot be too

remote from the injury.’ Id. (citing Holmes v. Securities

Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268, 112 S. Ct.

1311, 117 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1992)).

There are three factors to consider in a proximate

cause analysis in a RICO claim:

(1) the directness of the injury - "the more indirect

the injury, 'the more’ difficult it becomes to ascertain

the amount of a plaintiffs damages attributable to

(defendant's ...,wrongdoing], as distinct from other,

independent factors; '" (2) the difficulty of

apportioning damages among potential plaintiffs -

"allowing recovery by indirectly injured parties

would require complicated rues for apportioning

damages;" and (3) the possibility of other plaintiffs

” The proximate cause requirement the Supreme Court imposes of civil

RICO claims is an aspect of standing rather than an element of a

plaintiffs civil RICO prima facie case. Carr, 200t U.S. Dist. LEXIS

14933, at 18 n. 4 (citations omitted).

- App. 45 -

vindicating the goals of RICO - “direct victims could

generally be counted on to vindicate the policies

underlying” RICO in a better manner than indirect

victims.

Id. at *18-19 (quoting Allegeny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris,

Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 443 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citations

omitted)).

A threshold question is whether Plaintiffs have

alleged facts, which, if taken as true, sufficiently establish

proximate causation. Id. At * 19. The following are Plaintiffs

allegations of injury and proximate cause as set forth in the

Amended Complaint:

a. Plaintiff Bonavitacola's Alleged Injury by All

Defendants

In Counts I-III, Plaintiff Bonavitacola alleges that

Defendants "received income derived from the pattern of

racketeering activity. . . and used or invested such income in

the establishment or operation of [Defendant Boro]." (Am.

Comp. {| 43, 50, 57.) Plaintiff Bonavitacola further alleges

that "[but for [Defendants'] investment of the income derived

from the pattern of racketeering. . . into the establishment Of

operation of [Defendant Boro], Plaintiff Bonavitacola would

have been able to compete with [Defendant Boro] on a fair

and honest basis and [would have been] awarded the

- App. 46 -

Contract for public work by the Ridley School District to

provide electrical construction in connection with the. .

Ridley High School project" Id. , 4] 44, 51,58. Finally,

Plaintiff Bonavitacola alleges that "[a]s a proximate result of

{Detendant’s'] violation of 18 U.S.CA. § 1962(a), [Plaintiff

Bonavitacola] has suffered damages in the way of a loss of

income and revenue," Id. #9 45, 52, 59.

b. Plaintiff Local Union 6541:5 and Plaintiff

Local Union 98's Alleged Injury by Ail

Defendants

In Counts IV-IX; Plaintiffs Local Union 654 and

Local Union 98 allege that "[but for [Defendants] investment

income derived from the pattern of racketeering....into, the

establishment or operation of [Defendant Boro]. [Plaintiffs

Local Union 654 and Local Union 98] could have received

contributions to multi-employer benefit plans for employees

in connection with the . . . public work project awarded by

the Ridley School District." Id. 94 61, 64, 67, 70, 73, 76.

Plaintiffs Local Union 654 and Local Union 98 further

allege that “[as a proximate result of [Defendants'] violation

of 18 U.S.GA. § 1962(a) [Plaintiffs Local Union 6:54 and

Local Union 98 have] suffered damages in way of a loss of

income and revenue." Id. 4] 62, 65, 68, 71, 74, 77.

ee

- App. 47 -

c. Plaintiff Bonavitacola’s Alleged Injury by

Defendants Frederick Shapiro and Bruce

Shapiro

In Counts X and XI, Plaintiff Bonavitacola alleges

that "[but for [Defendant Frederick Shapiro's and Defendant

Bruce Shapiro's] falsifications and conduct alleged herein

(plaintiff Bonavitacola] would have been able to compete

with [Defendant Boro] on a fair and honest basis and [would

have been] awarded the contract for public work by the

Ridley School District to provide electrical construction on

the. . . Ridley High School project.” Id. 4] 80, 84. Plaintiff

Bonavitacola further alleges that "[a]s a proximate result of

(Defendants Frederick Shapiro’s and Defendant Bruce

Shapiro's] violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c), [Plaintiff

Bonavitacola] has suffered damages in the way of loss of

income and. revenue," Id. J 81,85.

d. Plaintiff Local Union 654's and Plaintiff Local

Union 98's Alleged Injury by Defendants

Frederick Shapiro and Bruce Shapiro

In Counts XII-XV, Plaintiffs Local Union 654 and

Local Union 98 allege that '[b]ut for [Defendant Frederick

Shapiro's and Defendant Bruce § apiro's] falsifications and

conduct alleged therein [Plaintiffs Local Union 654 and

~ Local Union 98] would have received contributions to multi-

- App. 48 -

employer benefit plans for employees in connection with

the...public work project awarded by the Ridley School

District." Id 4] 87, 90, 93, 96. Plaintiffs Local Union 654

and Local Union 98 further allege that “[a]s a proximate

result of [Defendants Frederick Shapiro's and Detendant

Bruce Shapiro's] violation of 18 U.S.C.A § 1962(c),

[Plaintiffs Local Union 654 and Local Union 98 have]

suffered damages in way of a loss of income and revenue."

Id. $9] 88, 91, 94, 97.

Plaintiffs’ chain oflogic is that Defendants submitted

false payroll records which did not comply with

Pennsylvania’s Prevailing Wage Act and federal law, thus

allowing Defendant Boro to submit lower bids which

resulted in Defendant Boro, instead of Plaintiff Bonavitacola,

being awarded the three public -ontracts.

There are several gaps in Plaintiffs' logic as

represented by the allegations which, once again; could have

been cured by Plaintiffs' complying with the RICO case

statement described in Bonavitacola_I. First, although

Plaintiff Bonavitacola alleges that it was the second lowest

bidder as to the Ridley School District (33); it does not

make a similar allegation as to the Neshaminy School

District and the Department of the Navy. Even as to Ridley

School District, it does not necessarily follow that Plaintiff

Bonavitacola would have been awarded the contract if

- App. 49 -

Defendant Boro had not bid, or-had not been the low bidder,

just because it was the next lower bidder. See Northland

Equities, Inc. v. Gateway Center Corp., 411 F.Supp. 259,

264 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding that it was not certain that the

award would have been made to the plaintiff, an

unsuccessful bidder, even as low bidder, because other

factors can go into the award of a contract in addition to the

requirement that the contract be awarded to the low bidder).

However, assuming arguendo that Plaintiff

Bonavitacola has satisfied the requirements of pleading

proximate cause under RICO, there still remains

substantial questions as to whether the other Plaintiffs, the

two labor unions, have sufficiently alleged direct injury. As

noted above, the Plaintiff labor unions assert that they would

have received additional contributions to their multi-

employer benefit plans for employees if Plaintiff

Bonavitacola had been awarded the contracts. The Court

finds that this is an indirect injury because the Complaint

does not state the requisite allegations to show how the

contract revenues following to Plaintiff Bonavitacola,

assuming it had been awarded any contract, would have

resulted in benefit to the Plaintiff labor unions. In addition,

Plaintiff labor unions do not allege that they themselves have

standing to sue for these types of damages, which

presumably are for the benefit of the Union members. The

- App. 50 -

Amended Complaint is completely silent on this issue.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have

failed to sufficiently plead proximate cause injury and,

therefore, lack standing to bring this civil RICO action.

D. Davis-Bacon Act

In its initial Motion to Dismiss, one of Defendants'

grounds in moving to dismiss was that there is no private

right of action under the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 3142

et _seq., or the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act, 43 PA.

STAT. ANN. § 165-1 et_seq.

The Court reserved judgment on this issue until it had

the opportunity to determine whether the requisites of RICO

were satisfied in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.

The Davis-Bacon Act is designed to protect laborers

and mechanics employed on government projects from being

paid at less that the locally prevailing wage rate. Universities

Rescarch Assoc., Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771,101 S. Ct.

1451, 67 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1981). The Davis-Bacon Act sets

forth a detailed administrative scheme to enforce violations

of its provisions, and provides that if the contractor fails to

pay the prevailing wages specified in the contract, the

government contracting officer may withhold so much of the

accrued payments as may be considered necessary to pay the

laborers and mechanics the difference between the contract

- App. 51 -

wages and those actually paid. 40 U.S.C. § 3144(a)(1). In

the event that these funds are insufficient to reimburse the

employees, the laborers, and mechanics may have the "right

to bring a civil action and intervene against the contractor

and the contractor's sureties." 40 US.C. § 3 1 44{a) (2).

Courts have held that plaintiffs cannot base their

RICO claims on alleged violations of the Davis-Bacon Act.

Livingston v. Shore Slurry Seal Inc.. 98 F. Supp. 2d 594,600

(D.N.J. 2000). Because the Davis-Bacon Act is the exclusive

remedy for the alleged underpayment of wages for work

performed on federal construction projects, there is no

private right of action pursuant to the Davis-Bacon Act. Id. at

600-01; see also Miccoli_ v. Rav Communications, Inc.,

CIV,A.99-3825, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10048, at *6 (E.D.

Pa. July 21, 2000.) (stating that no private right of action

exists under the Davis-Bacon Act) (citing Weber v. Heat

Control CQ., 728 f.2d 599 (3d Cir, 1984)).

Plaintiffs do not dispute the abstract correctness of

the proposition that there is no private nght of action under

the Davis-Bacon Ac., which is well settled in the law.

Plaintiffs asserted that the cases relied upon by the

Defendants involved instances where the plaintiffs were

employees of contractors/subcontractors, alleging that they

had been paid at a wage rate below the contract rate for work

performed, but that Plaintiffs’ allegations in this case are

aR Ser ain ae oe Yeu e ner tiriW Seen IMane wo ido ac Sec twn) Weak rh cv a. et te ar Venton

Lob allt

ah a hat

- App. 52 -

different. Plaintiffs themselves do not allege that they have

not been paid a prevailing wage, but rather, that they have

lost business because the Defendants have made fraudulent

misrepresentations as to the Defendants salary and wage

payments, and have used these fraudulent statements to gain

business at the expense of Plaintiffs.

The Davis-Bacon Act only provides a cause of action

for laborers and mechanics employed on government

projects. Plaintiffs have not set forth, and the Court has not

found, any caselaw supporting a cause of action for parties

who are not laborers and mechanics employed on

government projects, but, who have alleged damages as a

result of violations of the Davis-Bacon Act. Moreover, the

Court finds that the cases holding that there is no private

right of action under the Davis-Bacon Act are applicable in

the present case. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs cannot

base their RICO claims on alleged violations of the Davis-

Bacon Act.

V. Pendent Jurisdiction

Because the Court will dismiss the RICO claims,

there will be no federal anchor claim upon which original

subject matter jurisdiction may be based. Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) the Court will dismiss the pendent state

law claims in Counts XVI-XVIII without prejudice. See

- App. 53 -

Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co,) 906 F.2d 100, 106 (3d

Cir. 1990) (the rule within this Circuit is that once all claims

with an independent basis of federal jurisdiction have been

dismissed the case no longer belongs in federal court’) (citing

Lovell Mtg. Corp v. Export-Import Bank of the United

States, 843 F.2d 725, 734 (3d Cir. 1988)). Plaintiffs may

refile their state law claims in state court.

An appropriate Order follows.

re

RARE CAA TP LB LORI San A ANI AS AMRIT Ctl nels Sd

eee Oe adh Lis 0 tabi nah

elias

oe ad

Tete abe *e

- App. 54 -

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BONIVITACOLA ELECTRIC

CONTRACTOR, INC. et al.,

CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiffs,

V.

BORO DEVELOPERS, INC. etal. : NO. 01 5508

Defendants.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 12th day of February, 2003, upon

cciailaleibiiie of Detendants, Motion to Dismiss Amended

Complaint (Docket No. 12) and Plaintiffs’ Response thereto

(Docket No.15), it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint is GRANTED with

prejudice as to Counts I-XV, and that Counts XVI-XV,

based on state law claims, are dismissed without prejudice.

BY THE COURT:

“isi MICHAEL M. BAYLSON, U.S.D.J.”

- App. 55 -

18 U.S.C.A. § 1962

United States Code Annotated

Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure

§ 1962. Prohibited activities

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who-has received any

income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of

racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful

debt in which such person has participated as a principal

within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code,

to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such

income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of

any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any

enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which

affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A _ purchase of

securities cn the open market for purposes of investment,

and without the intention of controlling or participating in

the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so,

shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of

the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his

immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern

or racketeeing activity or the collection of an unlawful debt

after such ourchase do not amount in the aggregate to one

percent of he outstanding securities of any one class, and do

ESSE T A RNASE LIRR, LIGA Lite sicer Sie 5 rel RNAs attain co a cai. ava edt ecctamal

- App. 56 -

not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or

more directors of the issuer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of

_ racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful

debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any

interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in,

or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign

commerce.

(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or

associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of

which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or.

participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such

enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity

or collection of unlawful debt.

(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate

any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this

section.

CREDIT(S)

(Added Pub.L. 91-452, Title IX, § 901(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84

Stat. 942, and amended Pub.L. 100-690. Title VI. § 7033,

Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4398.)

- App. 57 -

40 U.S.C.A. § 3141

Formerly cited as 40 USCA § 276a

United States Code Annotated

Title 40. Public Buildings, Property, and Works

Subtitle Hl. Public Buildings and Works

§ 3141. Definitions

In this subchapter, the following definitions apply:

(1) Federal $Government.--The term "Federal

Government" has the same meaning that the term "United

States" had in the Act of March 3, 1931 (ch. 411, 46 Stat.

1494 (known as the Davis-Bacon Act).

(2) Wages, scale of wages, wage rates, minimum wages,

and prevailing wages.-- The terms "wages", "scale of

wages", "wage rates", "minimum wages", and "prevailing

wages" include--

(A) the basic hourly rate of pay; and

(B) for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement

or death, compensation for injuries or illness resulting

from occupational activity, or insurance to provide any of

the forgoing, for unemployment benefits, life insurance,

disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance,

for vacation and holiday pay, for defraying the costs of

apprenticeship or other similar programs, or for other

- App. 58 -

bona fide fringe benefits, but only where the contractor

or subcontractor is not required by other federal, state, or

local law to provide any of those benefits, the amount of-

(i) the rate of contribution irrevocably made by a

contractor or subcontractor to a trustee or to a third

person under a fund, plan, or program; and

(ii) the rate of costs to the contractor or subcontractor

that may be reasonably anticipated in providing

; benefits to laborers and mechanics pursuant to an

enforceable commitment to carry out a financially

responsible plan or program which was communicated

ete bart

in writing to the laborers and mechanics affected.

Kab bo IIE tia othe

CREDIT(S)

(Pub.L. 107-217, § 1, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1150.)

- App. 59 -

40 U.S.C.A. § 3144

Formerly cited as 40 USCA § 276a-2

United States Code Annotated

Title 40. Public Buildings, Property, and Works

Subtitle II. Public Buildings and Works

Part A. General

§ 3144. Authority of Comptroller General to

pay wages and list contractors violating

contracts

(a) Payment of wages.--

(1) In general.--The Comptroller General shall pay

directly to laborers and mechanics from any accrued

payments withheld under the terms of a contract any wages

found to be due laborers and mechanics under this

subchapter.

(2) Right of action.--If the accrued payments withheld

under the terms of the contract are insufficient to reimburse

all the laborers and mechanics who have not been paid the

wages required under this subchapter, the laborers and

mechanics have the same night to bring a civil action and

intervene against the contractor and the contractor's

sureties as is conferred by law on persons furnishing labor

or materials. In those proceedings it is not a defense that

- App. 60 -

the laborers and mechanics accepted or agreed to accept

less than the required rate of wages or voluntarily made

refunds.

(b) List of contractors violating contracts.--

(1) In general.--The Comptroller General shall distribute

to all departments of the Federal Government a list of the

names of persons whom the Comptroller General has

found to have disregarded their obligations to employees

and subcontractors.

(2) Restriction on awarding contracts.--No contract shall

be awarded to persons appearing on the list or to any firm,

corporation, partnership, or association in which the

persons have an interest until three years have elapsed

from the date of publication of the list.

CREDIT(S)

—

(Pub.L. 107-217, § 1, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1152.)

- App. 61 -

40 U.S.C.A. § 3146

Formerly cited as 40 USCA § 276a-3

United States Code Annotated

Title 40. Public Buildings, Property, and Works

Subtitle II. Public Buildings and Works

Part A. General

§ 3146. Effect on other federal laws

This subchapter does not supersede or impair any authority

otherwise granted by federal law to provide for the

establishment of specific wage rates.

CREDIT(S)

(Pub.L. 107-217, § 1, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1152.)

- App. 62 -

40 U.S.C.A. § 3147

Formerly cited as 40 USCA § 276a-5

United States Code Annotated

Title 40. Public Buildings, Property, and Works

Subtitle I]. Public Buildings and Works

Part A. General

§ 3147. Suspension of this subchapter during a

national emergency

The President may suspend the provisions of this subchapter

during a national emergency.

CREDIT(S)

(Pub.L. 107-217, § 1, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1153.)

- App. 63 -

40 U.S.C.A. § 3148

Formerly cited as 40 USCA § 276a-7

United States Code Annotated

Title 40. Public Buildings, Property, and Works

Subtitle IJ. Public Buildings and Works

§ 3148. Application of this subchapter to

‘certain contracts

This subchapter applies to a contract authorized by law that

is made without regard to section 3709 of the Revised

Statutes (41 U.S.C. 5), or on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis or

otherwise without advertising for proposals, if -this

subchapter otherwise would apply to the contract.

(Pub.L. 107-217, § 1, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1153.)

- App. 64 -

43 P.S.§ 165-1

Purdon's -Pennsylvania Statutes and Consolidated Statutes

Annotated

Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated

Title 43. Labor

§ 165-1. Short title

This act shall be known and may be cited as the

"Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act".

CREDIT(S)

1961, Aug. 15, P.L. 987, § 1.

- App. 65 -

43 P.S. § 165-6

Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes and Consolidated Statutes

Annotated

Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated

Title 43. Labor

§ 165-6. Duty of contractor

Every contractor and subcontractor shall keep an accurate

record showing the name, craft and the actual hourly rate of

wage paid to each workman employed by him in connection

with public work, and such record shall be preserved for two

years from date of payment. The record shall be open at all

reasonable hours to the inspection of the public body

‘ awarding the contract and to the secretary.

CREDIT(S)

1961, Aug. 15, P.L. 987, § 6.

- App. 66 -

43 P.S.§ 165-13

Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes and Consolidated Statutes

Annotated

Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated

Title 43. Labor

§ 165-13. Workmen's rights

Any workmen paid less than the rates specified in the

contract shall have a mght of action for the difference

between the wage so paid and the wages stipulated in the

contract, which right of action shall be instituted within six

months from the occurrence of the event creating such nght.

CREDIT(S)

1961, Aug. 15, P.L. 987, § 13.

- App. 67 -

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12

United States Code Annotated

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States

District Courts

Rule 12. Defenses and Objections--When and How

Presented--By Pleading or Motion--Motion for

Judgment on Pleadings

(a) When Presented.

(1) Unless a different time is prescribed in a statute of the

United States, a defendant shall serve an answer

(A) within 20 days after being served with the summons

and complaint, or

(B) if service of the summons has been timely waived on

request under Rule 4(d), within 60 days after the date

when the request for waiver was sent, or within 90 days

after that date if the defendant was addressed outside any

judicial district of the United States.

(2) A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim

against that party shall serve an answer thereto within 20

days after being served. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to

a counterclaim in the answer within 20 days after service

of the answer, or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within

20 days after service of the arder, unless the order

ical teas

- App. 68 -

otherwise directs.

(3)(A) The United States, an agency of the United States,

or an officer or employee of the United States sued in an

official capacity, shall serve an answer to the complaint or

cross-claim-- or a reply to a counterclaim--within 60 days

after the United States attorney is served with the pleading

asserting the claim.

(B) An officer or employee of the United States sued in an

individual capacity for acts or omissions occurring in

connection with the performance of duties on behalf of the

United States shall serve an answer to the complaint or

cross- claim--or a reply to a counterclaim--within 60 days

after service on the officer or employee, or service on the

United States attorney, whichever is later.

(4) Unless a different time is fixed by court order, the

service of a motion permitted under this rule alters these

periods of time as follows:

(A) if the court denies the motion or postpones its

disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive

pleading shall be served within 10 days after notice of

the court's action; or |

.B) if the court grants a motion for a more definite

statement, the responsive pleading shall be served within

10 days after the service of the more definite statement.

- App. 69 -

(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim

for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim,

cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the

responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the

following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made

by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,

(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue,

(4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of

process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19. A motion

making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading

if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is

waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or

objections in a responsive pleading or motion. If a pleading

sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not

required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party

may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim

for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6)

to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are

presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall

be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as

provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable

opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such

motion by Rule 56.

- App. 70 - 7

(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the

pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the

trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If,

on a2 motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside

the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,

the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and

disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be

given reasonable opportunity to present all material made

pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

(d) Preliminary Hearings. The defenses specifically

enumerated (1)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether

made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for

judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be

heard and determined before trial on application of any

party, unless the court orders that the hearing and

determination thereof be deferred until the trial. ;

(e) Motion for More Definite Statement. If a pleading to

which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or

ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required ~to

frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more

definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading.

The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the

details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the

court is not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the order or

within such other time as the court may fix, the court may

- App. 71 -

strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make

such order as it deems just.

(f) Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a party before

responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is

permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party

within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon the

party or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court

may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter.

(zg) Consolidation of Defenses in Motion. A party who

makes a motion under this rule may join with it any other

motions herein provided for and then available to the party.

If a party makes a motion under this rule but omits there

from any defense or objection then available to the party

which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall

not thereafter make a motion based on the defense or

objection so omitted, except a motion as provided in

subdivision (h)(2) hereof on any of the grounds there stated.

(h) Waiver or Preservation of Certain Defenses.

(1) A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person,

improper venue, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency

of service of process is waived (A) if omitted from a

motion in the circumstances described in subdivision (g),

or (B) if it is neither made by motion under this rule nor

- App. 72 -

included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof

permitted by Rule 15(a) to be made as a matter of course.

(2) A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, a defense of failure to join a party

indispensable under Rule 19, and an objection of fai’ure to

state a legal defense to a claim may be made in any

pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a), or by

motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the

merits.

(3) Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or -

otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject

matter, the court shall dismiss the action.

CREDIT(S)

(As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Jan. 21,

1963, eff. July 1,-1963; Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966;

Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1,

1993; Apr. 17, 2000, eff. Dec. 1, 2000.)

- App. 73 -

43 P.S.§ 260.1

Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes and Consolidated Statutes

Annotated

Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated

Title 43. Labor

§ 260.1. Short title

This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Wage

Payment and Collection Law."

CREDIT(S)

1961, July 14, P.L. 637, § 1, effective in 30 days.

- App. 74 -

43 P.S.§ 260.9a

Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes and Consolidated Statutes

Annotated

Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated

Title 43. Labor

§ 260.9a. Civil remedies and penalties

(a) Any employee or group of employees, labor organization

or party to whom any type of wages is payable may institute

actions provided under this act.

(b) Actions by an employee, labor organization, or party to

whom any type of wages is payable to recover unpaid wages

and liquidated damages may be maintained in any court of

competent jurisdiction, by such labor organization, party to

whom any type of wages is payable or any one or more

employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and

other employees similarly situated, or such employee or

employees may designate an agent or representative to

maintain such action or on behalf of all employees similarly

situated. Any such employee, labor organization, party, or

his representative shall have the power to settle or adjust his

claim for unpaid wages.

- App. 75 -

(c) The employee or group of employees, labor organization

or party to whom any type of wages is payable may, in the

alternative, inform the secretary of the wage claim against an

employer or former employer, and the secretary shall, unless

the claim appears to be frivolous, immediately notify the

employer or former employer of such claim by certified

mail. If the employer or former employer fails to pay the

claim or make satisfactory explanation to the secretary of his

failure to do so within ten days after receipt of such certified

notification, thereafter, the employer or former employer

shall be liable for a penalty of ten percent (10%) of that

portion of the claim found to be justly due. A good faith

dispute or contest as to the amount of wages due or the good

faith assertion of a right of set-off or counter-claim shall be

deemed a satisfactory explanation for nonpayment of such

amount in dispute or claimed as a set-off or counter-claim.

The secretary shall have a cause of action against the

employer or former employer for recovery of such penalty

and the same may be included in any subsequent action by

the secretary on said wage claim or may be exercised

separately after adjustment of such wage claim without court

action.

(d) In any civil action brought under the provisions of this

act, the Secretary of Labor and Industry may require the

employer to post bond or security to secure payment of the

- App. 76 -

entire claim of the employee with credit in the amount of any

good faith assertion of a right of set-off or counter-claim.

Such bond or security shall be posted in the court where the

civil action is brought. The request for bond or security shall

be signed by the secretary and shall provide that such bond

or security in the amount stated shall be posted within 30

days of service thereof on the employer. If such bond or

security is not posted within the 30-day period, the employer

will be deemed to have admitted his liability and execution

may immediately ensue.

(e) If the secretary determines that wages due have not been

paid and that such unpaid wages constitute an enforceable

claim, the secretary shall, upon the request of the employee,

labor organization or party to whom any type of wages is

payable, take an assignment in trust, from the requesting

party of such claim for wages without being bound by any of

the technical rules respecting the validity of any such

assignments and may bring any legal action necessary to

collect such claim, subject to the right by the employer to

set-off or counter-claim against the assigning party. Upon

any such assignment, the secretary shall have the power to

settle and adjust any such claim to the same extent as might

the assigning party.

(f) The court in any action brought under this section shall,

in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or

- App. 77 -

plaintiffs, allow costs for reasonable attorneys’ fees of any

nature to be paid by the defendant.

(g) No administrative proceedings or legal action shall be

instituted under the provisions of this act for the collection of

unpaid wages or liquidated damages more than three years

after the day on which such wages were due and payable as

provided in sections 3 and 5.

CREDIT(S)

1961, July 14, P.L. 637, § 9.1, added 1977, July 14, P.L. 82,

No. 30, § 6, imd. effective. As affected 1980, Oct. 5, P.L.

693, No. 142, § 302, effective in 60 days.

- App. 78 -

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN

DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BONAVITACOLA ELECTRIC

CONTRACTOR, INC. ;

1467 County Line Road : NO.

Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006 > 01 CV 5508

and

LOCAL UNION NO. 654

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF :

ELECTRICAL WORKERS

600 Turner Industrial Way

Ashton, PA 19014

and

LOCAL UNION NO. 98

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF :

ELECTRICAL WORKERS

1701 Spring Garden Street

Philadelphia, PA 19130

and

CURTIS BELL

26 Elm Street

Trenton, NJ 08611

Plaintiffs

- App. 79 -

BORO DEVELOPERS, INC.

400 Feheley Drive

King of Prussia, PA

and

FREDERICK J. SHAPIRO

400 Feheley Drive

King of Prussia, PA

and

BRUCE H. SHAPIRO

400 Feheley Drive

King of Prussia, PA

Defendants

CIVIL ACTION - COMPLAINT

The plaintiffs by and through their attorneys, Marino

& Associates, PC demand a trial jury and in support thereof

allege the following:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

i. This action is brought pursuant to 18

U.S.C.A. §1964(c) [relating to the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§1961-1968] and

pendent state claims.

a This Court maintains original jurisdiction

over the instant claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 asa

result of the claims arising under the laws of United States.

- App. 80 -

J This Court ~=maintains —_ supplemental

jurisdiction over claims arising under state law pursuant to

28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a), Rule 18(a) of the Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure and the principles of pendent jurisdiction as

a result of the claims arising under state law being so related

to the claims in the action within which original jurisdiction

is found that they form a part of the same case or

controversy.

4. Many of the acts alleged herein occurred

within this District. Defendants have, directly, or indirectly,

made use of the means of interstate commerce and of the

United States Postal service in connection with the acts,

practices and transactions as alleged herein.

PARTIES AND OTHER ENTITIES

5. Plaintiff Bonavitacola Electric Contractor,

Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Bonavitacola Electric) is a

corporation for profit incorporated in the State of

Pennsylvania with its principal place of business 1467

County Line Road, Huntingdon Valley, PA and registered

office for process of service located P.O. Box 39

Southampton, PA 18966. At all relevant times material

hereto, plaintiff Bonavitacola Electric was engaged in the

business of providing electrical services to local, state and

federal government, city authorities, school districts, and

- App. 81 -

commercial and industrial accounts in Pennsylvania and

New Jersey. At all relevant times material hereto plaintiff

Bonavitacola Electric acted by and through its duly

authorized employees, agents, workers and/or representatives

acting within the scope of their employment.

6. Plaintiff Local Union No. 654, International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (hereinafter referred to as

"Local Union 654") is an unincorporated association

commonly known as a labor union having its principal place

of business located 600 Turner Industrial Way, Ashton, PA

19014. At all relevant times material hereto plaintiff Local

Union 654 was engaged in the service of providing a labor

source of electrical workers to electrical contractors who

provided electrical services to the public, local, state and

federal government, city authorities, school districts, and

commercial and industrial accounts in Pennsylvania and

New Jersey.

7 Plaintiff Local Union No. 98, International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (hereinafter referred to as

"Local Union 98") is an unincorporated association

commonly known as a labor union having its principal place

of business located 1701 Spring Garden Street, Philadelphia,

PA 19130. At all relevant times material hereto Local Union

98 was engaged in the service of providing a labor source of

electrical workers to electrical contractors who provided

a Snieitt

- App. 82 -

electrical services to the public, local, state and federal

government, city authorities, school districts, and

commercial and industrial accounts in Pennsylvania and

New Jersey.

8. Plaintiff Curtis Bell is an adult individual

residing 26 Elm Street, Trenton, NJ 08611. At all relevant

times material hereto plaintiff Curtis Bell was an employee,

agent, servant or representative of defendant Boro

Developers, Inc.

9. Defendant Boro Developers, Inc. is a

corporation for profit incorporated in the State of

Pennsylvania with its principal place of business and

registered office for process of service located 400 Feheley

Drive, King of Prussia, PA. At all relevant times material

hereto, defendant Boro Developers, Inc. was engaged in the

business of providing electrical service’ ‘5 local, state and —

federal government, city authorities, school districts, and

commercial and industrial accounts in the Pennsylvania and

New Jersey.

10. | Defendant Frederick J. Shapiro is an adult

individual and at all relevant times material hereto was the

agent, servant, and employee of defendant Boro Developers,

Inc. At all relevant times material hereto defendant

Frederick J. Shapiro occupied the position of Chief

Executive Officer of defendant Boro Developers, Inc. At all

- App. 83 -

relevant times material hereto defendant Frederick J. Shapiro

acted within the course and scope of his employment. In

addition, defendant Frederick J. Shapiro, authorized, directed

and participated in all of the acts which plaintiffs allege

herein.

11. Defendant Bruce H. Shapiro is an adult

individual and at all relevant times material hereto was the

agent, servant, and employee of defendant Boro Developers,

Inc. At all relevant times material hereto defendant Bruce H.

Shapiro occupied the position of Chief Operating Officer of

defendant Boro Developers, Inc. At all relevant times

material hereto defendant Bruce H. Shapiro acted within the

course and scope of his employment. In addition, defendant

Bruce H. Shapiro, authorized, directed and participated in

all of the acts which plaintiffs allege herein. ,

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

12. The plaintiffs incorporate by reference the

previous paragraphs of the Complaint as if set forth fully

herein.

“BB. At all relevant times material hereto, plaintiff

Bonavitacola Electric and defendant Boro Developers, Inc.

competed with each other for the receipt of various electrical

construction, service and maintenance contracts awarded by

local, state and federal government, city authorities, school

- App. 84 -

districts, and commercial and industrial accounts in the

Pennsylvania and New Jersey territories.

14. On or about April 28, 1999, and relevant

times thereafter plaintiff Local Union 654 supplied electrical

workers to plaintiff Bonavitacola Electric and received an

income flow from plaintiff Bonavitacola Electric in the form

of contributions to multi-employer benefit plans for

employees employed on public work projects as a direct

result thereof.

15. On or about April 28, 1999, and relevant

times thereafter plaintiff Local Union 98 supplied electrical

workers to plaintiff Bonavitacola Electric and received an

income flow from plaintiff Bonavitacola Electric in the form

of contributions to multi-employer benefit plans for

employees employed on public work projects as a direct

result thereof.

16. To procure electrical service, maintenance

and construction pursuant to the Pennsylvania School Code,

24 P.S. §7-751, Ridley School District, located Folsom, PA,

solicits competitive bids and awards the contract to the

lowest responsible bidder.

17. | To procure electrical service, maintenance

and construction pursuant to the Pennsylvania School Code,

24 P.S. §7-751, the Neshaminy School District, located

- App. 85 -

Langhorne, PA, solicits competitive bids and awards the

contract to the lowest responsible bidder. |

18. To procure electrical service, maintenance

and construction the Department of the Navy, located 10

Industrial Highway, Lester, PA, solicits competitive bids and

awards the contract to the lowest responsible bidder.

19. It is the policy and procedure of the Ridley

School District to publish the bid specifications of a contract

for public work.

| 20. It is the policy and procedure of the

Neshaminy School to publish the bid specifications of a

contract for public work.

21. It is the policy and procedure of the

Department of the Navy to publish the bid specifications of a

contract for public work.

22. ‘The bid specifications of a contract for public

work projects issued by the Ridley School District contains

provisions requiring that the prevailing wage must be paid to

the workers employed in the performance of the contract.

23. The bid specifications of a contract for public

work projects issued by the Neshaminy School District

contains provisions requiring that the prevailing wage must

be paid to the workers employed in the performance of the

contract.

- App. 86 -

24. ‘The bid specifications of a contract for public

work projects issued by the Department of the Navy contains

provisions requiring that the prevailing wage must be paid to

the workers employed in the performance of the contract.

25. In accordance with state, county, and federal

policy the Ridley and Neshaminy School Districts and the

Department of the Navy required that certain contracts for

electrical service, repair, maintenance and construction be

awarded to those contractors who asserted in good faith or

otherwise comply with the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage

Act, 43 P.S. §165-1 et. seq. and the Davis-Bacon Act, 40

U.S.C.A. §276 et seq.

26. On or about April 28, 1999, defendant Boro

Developers, Inc. submitted a timely competitive bid to the

Ridley School District to procure the award of a public

contract to supply electrical construction to Ridley High

School in connection with contract No. 9778-329 and was

awarded the contract.

af, On or before November |, 1996, defendant

Boro Developers, Inc. submitted a timely competitive bid to

the Department of the Navy to procure the award of a public

contract to supply electrical construction to the D.L.A.I.C.P

in connection with contract Nos. N62472-96-C-0002 and

N62472-94-C-0012 and was awarded the contract.

- App. 87 -

28. On or before February 26, 1993, defendant

Boro Developers, Inc. submitted a timeiy competitive bid to

the Neshaminy School District to procure the award of a

public contract to supply electrical construction to the Maple

Point Middle School and was awarded the contract.

29. To procure contract from the Ridley and

Neshaminy School Districts and the Department of the Navy

defendant Frederick J Shapiro stated, promised, attested, or

otherwise certified on behalf of defendant Boro Developers,

Inc. that it would comply with the Pennsylvania Prevailing

Wage Act, 43 P.S. §§165-1 et. seq. and/or the Davis-Bacon

Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §276 et seq.

30. To procure the contract from the Ridley and

Neshaminy School Districts and the Department of the Navy

defendant Bruce H. Shapiro stated, promised, attested, or

otherwise certified that on behalf of defendant Boro

Developers, Inc. that it would comply with the Pennsylvania

Prevailing Wage Act, 43 P.S. §165-1 et. seq. and/or the

Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §276 et seq.

ahs Defendants Frederick J Shapiro and Bruce H.

Shapiro's statement, promise, attestation, or certification to

the Ridley and Neshaminy School Districts and the

Department of the Navy that they on behalf of defendant

Boro Developers would comply with the Pennsylvania

Prevailing Wage Act, 43 P.S. §§165-1 et. seq. and/or the

- App. 88 -

Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §§276 et seq. were

knowingly and willfully false and fraudulently made to

deceive the Ridley and Neshaminy School Districts and the

Department of the Navy, and plaintiff Bonavitacola Electric

by making it appear that defendant Boro Developers, Inc.

was a responsible and qualified contractor.

32. On or about April 28, 1999, plaintiff

Bonavitacola Electric submitted a timely competitive bid to

the Ridley School District to procure the award of a public

contract to supply electrical construction in connection with

Ridley High School, contract No. 9778-329.

33. Plaintiff Bonavitacola Electric was the second

lowest bidder and not awarded the public contract by the

Ridley School District to provide electrical construction in

connection with Ridley High School, contract No. 9778-329.

34. On or about February 20, 2001, plaintiff

Bonavitacola Electric became aware that defendants engaged

in the fraudulent practice of falsifying certified payroll

records and other certifications which were required to be

submitted to the awarding agencies, the Ridley and

Neshaminy School Districts, the Department of the Navy and

others yet named.

35. On or about February 20, 2001, plaintiff

Loca! Union 654 became aware that defendants engaged in

the fraudulent practice of falsifying certified payroll records

ee ee

| . - App. 89 -

and other certifications which were required to be submitted

to the awarding agencies, the Ridley and Neshaminy School

Districts, the Department of the Navy and others yet named.

36. | Onor about February 20, 2001, plaintiff

Local Union 98 became aware that defendants engaged in

the fraudulent practice of falsifying certified payroll records

and other certifications which were required to be submitted

to the awarding agencies, the Ridley and Neshaminy School

Districts, the Department of the Navy and others yet named.

37. Onor about February 20, 2001, plaintiff

Curtis Bell became aware that defendants engaged in the

fraudulent practice of falsifying certified payroll records and

other certifications which were required to be submitted to

the awarding agencies, the Ridley and Neshaminy School

Districts, the Department of the Navy, and others yet named

and failed to pay him an applicable wage rate for hours

during which he performed electrical construction.

COUNT I

[Violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act]

[§1962(a)|

(Bonavitacola Electric v Boro Developers, Inc.)

ee ee a ee ee

- App. 90 -

38. The plaintiff Bonavitacola Electric

incorporates by reference the previous paragraphs of the

Complaint as if set forth fully herein.

39, At all relevant times hereto defendant Boro

Developers, Inc. constituted an "enterprise" within the

meaning of 18 U.S.C.A. §1961(4). The enterprise was

engaged in and the activities of that enterprise affected

interstate commerce.

40. _—_ Atall relevant time hereto defendant Boro

Developers, Inc. constituted a "person" capable of holding a

legal or beneficial interest in property within the meaning of

18 U.S.C.A. §1961(3).

41. Defendant Boro Developers, Inc. engaged in a

course of conduct designed to obtain the award of electrical

contracts from the Ridley and Neshaminy School Districts

and the Department of the Navy by fraudulently subverting

the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act and/or the Davis

Bacon Act. To effect the fraudulent scheme and carry out

the contracted duties, defendant Boro Developers, Inc.

knowingly and repeatedly used the United States Mails

and/or interstate wire transmissions in violation of 18

U.S.C.A. §1341 and §1343. Defendant’s repeated violations

of 18 U.S.C.A. §1341 and §1343 constitute a pattern of

racketeering activity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.A.

§§1961(1)(B) and (5).

- App. 91 -

42. Boro Developers, Inc. by or through its agents

or representatives engaged in the fraudulent practices in

furtherance of a fraudulent scheme to subvert the

Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act and/or the Davis-Bacon

Act as set forth below:

A. Ridley School District

(1) Caused to be submitted to authorities of the

Ridles School District a competitive bid to procure the

award of a public contract to supply electrical construction in

connection with Ridley High School located Folsom, PA,

and falsely pledged to comply with the Pennsylvania

Prevailing Wage Act, 43 P.S. §§165-1 et seq. and/or the

Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §§276 et seq.

(2) Caused to falsify Certified Payroll Reports for

Public Work Projects as they relate to a public contract to

provide electrical construction in connection with the

aforementioned Ridley High School project in the following,

but not limited ways:

a. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#24 commencing December 25, 1999 and ending December

31, 1999 that employee classified as black male bad

performed labor related work duties despite that the

employee had performed electrical construction;

b. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#25 commencing January 1, 2000 and ending January 7,

- App. 92 -

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

e. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#26 commencing January 8, 2000 and ending January 14,

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical corstruction;

d. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#27 commencing January 15, 2000 and ending January 21,

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

c. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#28 commencing January 22, 2000 and ending January 28.

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

f. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#29 commencing January 29, 2000 and ending F ebruary 4,

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

g. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#30 commencing February 5, 2000 and ending F ebruary

- App. 93 -

11, 2000 that employee classified as black male had

performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

h. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#31 commencing February 12, 2000 and ending February

18, 2000 that employee classified as black male had

performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical constr’ -ton;

i. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#32 commencing February 19, 2000 and ending February

25, 2000 that employee classified as black male had

performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

j. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#33 commencing February 26, 2000 and ending March 3,

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

k. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#34 commencing March 4, 2000 and ending March 10,

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

l. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#35 commencing March 11, 2000 and ending March 17,

- App. 94 -

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

m. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#36 commencing March 18, 2000 and ending March 24,

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

n. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#37 commencing March 25, 2000 and ending March 31,

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

O. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#38 commencing April 1, 2000 and ending April 7, 2000

that employee classified as black male had performed labor

related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

p. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#39 commencing April 8, 2000 and ending April 14,

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

q. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#40 commencing April 15, 2000 and ending April 21,

- App. 95 -

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report =

41 commencing April 22, 2000 and ending April 28,

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

S. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#42 commencing April 29, 2000 and ending May 5, 2000

that employee classified as black male had performed labor

related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

:. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#43 commencing May 6, 2000 and ending May 12, 2000

that employee classified as black male had performed labor

related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

u. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#44 commencing May13, 2000 and ending May 19, 2000

that employee classified as black male had performed labor

related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

V. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#45 commencing May 20, 2000 and ending May 26, 2000

- App. 96 -

that employee classified as black male had performed labor

related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

w. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#46 commencing May 27, 2000 and ending June 2, 2000

that employee classified as black male had performed labor

related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

X. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#47 commencing June 3, 2000 and ending June 9, 2000

that employee classified as black male had performed labor

related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

y. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#48 commencing June 10, 2000 and ending June 16, 2000

that employee classified as black male had performed labor

related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

Z. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report

#49 commencing June 17, 2000 and ending June 23, 2000

that employee classified as black male had performed labor

related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

aa. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Renort #

50 commencing June 24, 2000 and ending June 30, 2000

- App. 97 -

that employee classified as black male had performed labor

related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

bb. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

51 commencing July 1, 2000 and ending July 7, 2000 that

employee classified as black male had performed labor

related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

ce. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

52 commencing July 8, 2000 and ending July 14, 2000

that employee classified as black male had performed labor

related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

dd. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

53 commencing July 15, 2000 and ending July 21, 2000

that employee classified as black male had performed labor

related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

ee. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

54 commencing July 22, 2000 and ending July 28, 2000

that employee classified as black male had performed labor

related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

ff. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

55 commencing July 29, 2000 and ending August 4, 2000

- App. 98 -

that employee classified as black male had performed labor

related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

gg. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

56 commencing August 5, 2000 and ending August 11,

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

hh. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

57 commencing August 12, 2000 and ending August 18,

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

ll. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

58 commencing August 19, 2000 and ending August 25,

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

jJ- falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

59 commencing August 26, 2000 and ending September 1,

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

kk. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

60 commencing September 2, 2000 and ending September

- App. 99 -

8, 2000 that employee classified as black male had

performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

ll. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

61 commencing September 9, 2000 and ending September

15, 2000 that employee classified as black male had

performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

mm. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

62 commencing September 16, 2000 and ending

September 22, 2000 that employee classified as black male

had performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

nn. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

63 commencing September 23, 2000 and ending

September 29, 2000 that employee classified as black male

had performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

00. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

64 commencing September 30, 2000 and ending October

6, 2000 that employee classified as black male had

performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

pp. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report B

65 commencing October 7, 2000 and ending October 13,

- App. 100 -

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

qq. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

66 commencing October 14, 2000 and ending October 20,

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

IT. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

67 commencing October 21, 2000 and ending October 27,

2000 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

SS. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

68 commencing October 28, 2000 and ending November

3, 2000 that employee classified as black male had

performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

tt. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

69 commencing November 4, 2000 and ending November

10, 2000 that employee classified as black male had

performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

uu. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

70 commencing November 11, 2000 and ending

- App. 101 -

November 17, 2000 that employee classified as black male

had performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

VV. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

71 commencing November 18, 2000 and ending

November 24, 2000 that employee classified as black male

had performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

ww. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

72 commencing November 25, 2000 and ending

December 1, 2000 that employee classified as black male

had performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

xx. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

73 commencing December 2, 2000 and ending December

8, 2000 that employee classified as black male had —

performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

yy. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

75 commencing December 16, 2000 and ending

December 22, 2000 that employee classified as black male

had performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

ZZ. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

76 commencing December 23, 2000 and ending

- App. 102 -

December 29, 2000 that employee classified as black male

had performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

aaa. _ falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

77 commencing December 30, 2000 and ending January

5, 2001 that employee classified as black male had

performed labor related work duties despite that the

employees had performed electrical construction;

bbb. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

78 commencing January 6, 2001 and ending January 12,

2001 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

ccc. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

79 commencing January 13, 2001 and ending January 19,

2001 that employee classified as black male had performed

labor related work duties despite that the employees had

performed electrical construction;

ddd. falsely reported in Certified Payroll Report #

80 commencing January 20, 2001

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