Supplemental Appendix — Hedrick v. Western Reserve Care System

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N°. ___031653 may 57 2008

OFFICE OF THE OLHRK

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Supreme Court of the Gnited States

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JOANNE HEDRICK,

Petitioner,

Vv

WESTERN RESERVE CARE SYSTEM;

FORUM HEALTH,

Respondent.

¥

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court of

Appeals For The Sixth Circuit

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SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

4

*IRA J. MIRKIN

Barry R. Laine

GREEN HAINES SGAMBATI CoO., L.P.A.

National City Bank Building

16 Wick Avenue, Suite 400

P.O. Box 849

Youngstown, OH 44501-0849

330-743-5101

Attorneys for Petitioner

*Counsel of Record

June, 2004

\

LEGAL ADVANTAGE @ 432 Walnut Street © Cincinnati, OH 45202

(800) 581-2252

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

Memorandum of Opinion and Order Granting

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and

Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary

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SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division

Case No. 4:99 CV 630

Filed June 27, 2002

Pages Supp. App. | through 47

Supp. App. |

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JOANNE HEDRICK _ ) CASE NO. 4:99 CV 00630

)

Plaintiff ) JUDGE LESLEY WELLS

)

- VS - ) MEMORANDUM OF

) OPINION AND ORDER

WESTERN RESERVE ) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

CARE SYSTEM, et al. ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY

) JUDGMENT & DENYING

Defendants ) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

) PARTIAL SUMMARY

) JUDGMENT

This case is currently before the Court on Defendants

Western Reserve Care System (WRCS) and Forum Health’s

motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff Joanne Hedrick’s

motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow,

defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted, and

plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is denied.

On 17 March 1999, Joanne Hedrick filed a complaint

- against defendants alleging that they discriminated against her

on the basis of her disability, in violation of the Americans

with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12102 (ADA) and Ohio

Revised Code (ORC) §4112 and her age, in violation of the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §621 et

Supp. App. 2

ee ee ee

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seq (ADEA).' On | May 2000, defendants filed a motion for

summary judgment (doc. no. 20) and Plaintiff Hedrick filed

a motion for partial summary judgment against WRCS (doc.

no. 24). The parties filed responses and reply briefs and the

cross-motions for summary judgment were referred to

Magistrate Judge Nancy A. Vecchiarelli for a Report and

Recommendation (R&R). The Magistrate Judge filed her

R&R recommending that defendants’ motion for summary

judgment be granted and that plaintiff's motion for partial

summary judgment be denied.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

The relevant background facts are set forth in the R&R as

follows:

In 1973, Hedrick began working for WRCS and

its predecessors as a general duty staff nurse. As a

staff nurse, Hedrick performed typical bedside nursing

functions. During the 1980s, Hedrick was diagnosed

with osteoarthritis in her left knee. Since that time,

Dr. L. Kevin Nash, her primary care physician, and

Dr. Raymond Duffett, an orthopedic surgéon, have

treated her for arthritis in both knees.

On December 1, 1995, Hedrick fractured her

femur. While recuperating, she was unable to work

and took a leave of absence from work. She

' Hedrick filed an amended complaint on 14 January 2000.

(Doc. no. 16).

Supp. App. 3

recovered from the fracture, and Dr. Duffett released

her return to work as of June 1, 1996. Dr. Duffett did

not place any restrictions on Hedrick and advised her

to walk a lot.

On May 3, 1996, Hedrick went to see Dr. Nash

and told him she did not think she could return to

work and perform her duties because her arthritis

worsened after the fracture. Dr. Nash indicated in his

notes:

[Hedrick] has made good progress in the past

month. Dr. R. Duffett has told her that she

can return to work 6/1 — she is scared [ | to

consider this, but this may actually be a

reasonable goal...

(Nash Dep., Exh. D, attached to Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment).

On July 1, 1996, Dr. Nash reported to Sue Yoder, the

Director of Nursing, that:

Ms. Joanne Hedrick has been making a very

slow recovery after her devastating fracture of

the left femur. Joanne has shared with me that

she does not believe that she is going to be

able to return to bedside nursing, and frankly

I share her reservations.

(Nash Depo., Ex. J).

On July 16, 1996, Hedrick underwent a Functional

Cz pacity Evaluation to determine her limitation and

Supp. App. 4

ability to work. The evaluation indicated that Hedrick

“would not be able to return to her previous level of

function as a staff nurse at Western Reserve Care

System secondary to limitations in bending, lifting,

and pain in knees.” (Steen Depo., Ex. 13, p. 14,

attached to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary

Judgment). On August 7, 1996, Dr. Nash wrote a

letter to Jon Steen, the Human Resource Director,

stating:

Hedrick has been recuperating from a

complicated fracture of her left femur.

Recently, she underwent a functional perfor-

mance evaluation which indicated that she is

not going to be able to return to work in her

previous position as a general staff nurse at

Western Reserve Care System. Accordingly,

I recommend that she be considered for other

positions within the organizations.

(Steen Depo., Ex, 13, p. 16). Ina follow-up letter, Dr.

Nash described Hedrick’s limitations as:

1. Daily activities for short intervals

2. Able to walk for short distances

3. Able to stand for short periods of time

4. Able to [do] desk work (i.e. type, computer

skills, filing) for short periods of time due to

difficulty in maintaining a persistently flexed or

extended aspect with her left leg.

Supp. App. 5

5. Able to drive a care for short periods of time.

(Steen Depo., Ex. D, p. 18).

In July or August, 1996, Hedrick requested to be

placed on a list of employees claiming to have

permanent work restrictions, referred to as the “ADA

list.” Once placed on the list, WRCS attempted to

find suitable employment for employees who could no

longer perform their regular jobs. Once Hedrick was

placed on the list, WRCS began to identify vacancies

which would correspond with her restrictions.

In September 1996, WRCS informed Hedrick of

an opening for a Referral Center scheduler. Hedrick

interviewed for the position. Hedrick claims that

during the interview, she was asked about her ability

to walk and get in and out »f a chair. She told the

interviewers that she would not have any problem

with those tasks. However, upon learning the salary,

Hedrick indicated that she was not interested in the

job because it was too low. Hedrick testified during

her deposition that she believed she could have had

the job had she wanted it, but that she rejected the

position because she was overqualified and the salary

was too low. (Hedrick Depo., p. 36-7).

In late September 1996, WRCS informed Hedrick

of a Quality Assurance position which was opening.

In November 1996, Hedrick interviewed for the job.

Hedrick recalls telling the interviewer that although

Supp. App. 6

she would not have a problem walking, she might

walk slower than someone else. She also recalls

telling the interviewer that she would be able to carry

things. Hedrick claims that she asked for permission

to park in the physicians’ parking lot, which was

closer to the hospital. Hedrick was not offered the

position. Instead, Dan Donatelli was selected to fill

the vacancy.

In January 1997, WRCS also informed Hedrick of

four Case Manager vacancies in tle Department of

Medicine. Hedrick met the minimum qualifications

for the positions and was referred to Dr. Bunn, the

chairman of the Department of Medicine, for an

interview. Hedrick claims that during the interview,

Dr. Bunn asked her about her physical limitations and

she responded that she would have no problems. Dr.

Bunn selected four other applicants to fil! the

positions.

In March 1997, WRCS informed Hedrick of

another Quality Assurance position which was

opening. She was told that she would be considered

for the position, but that it was unnecessary to

interview because she had recently interviewed for the

other similar position. Another applicant was selected

to fill that position.

In August 1997, WRCS contacted Hedrick

regarding a temporary assignment as an Admission

Supp. App. 7

Nurse. Hedrick accepted the assignment, returned to

work for WRCS on August 25, 1997, and continues to

work as an Admission Nurse for WRCS. Since

accepting that assignment, Hedrick has not inter-

viewed for any other Quality Assurance or Case

Manager positions that have become available.

Hedrick now claims that WRCS discriminated

against her on the basis of her disability and her age

because they did not assign her to the Quality

Assurance and Case Manager positions and instead

filled the vacancies with younger people who were not

disabled.

In their Motion for Summary Judgment,

Defendants argue that (1) Hedrick never worked for

Forum Health, which is merely a parent holding

company that cannot be liable for discrimination, and,

therefore must be dismissed; (2) Hedrick was not

disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) Hedrick

was offered a reasonable accommodation, but she

refused the assignment; and (4) Hedrick was not

entitled to reassignment to the Quality Assurance and

Case Manager positions as [ ] an accommodation,

because those positions were not comparable to her

position as a staff nurse.

R&R pp.2-6.

In her motion for partial summary judgment, Hedrick

seeks summary judgment on two issues: (1) whether she was

Supp. App. 8

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disabled within the meaning of ADA and O.R.C. §4112 at the

time WRCS denied her the vacant positions; and (2) whether

WRCS failed to reasonably accommodate her by refusing to

place her in the vacant positions for which she applied and

was qualified.

II. PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)

(C), the Court reviews de novo the portion of the Magistrate

Judge’s R&R to which specific objection was made.

Hedrick objected to the following conclusions in the

R&R:

(1) that Hedrick provided no direct evidence of

discrimination based on disability;

(2) that Hedrick failed to establish that (a) she was

substantially limited in a major life activity; (b) there

was a record of her disability; or (c) she was

“regarded as” disabled within the meaning of the

ADA by WRCS;

? Defendant argues that Hedrick has waived her objections to

some or all of the R&R because her objections are not

specific. Although the Court agrees that many of Hedrick’s

objections are general in nature, she does cite to specific

pages in her previous briefs for her arguments in support of

her objections. The Court, therefore, will consider her

objections “specific”.

Supp. App. 9

(3) that she failed to establish that she was a qualified

individual with a disability because she did not show

that she proposed, and was denied, a reasonable

accommodation;

(4) that she had not established a prima facie case of

disability discrimination;

(5) that WRCS asserted a legitimate reason for refusing

to assign Hedrick to the available Quality Assurance

and Case Manager positions for which she was

qualified;

(6) that she failed to produce any evidence showing that

WRCS’s reason for not assigning her to the vacant

positions she desired and for which she was qualified

was pretextual;

(7) recommending that Hedrick’s motion for partial

summary judgment be denied; and

(8) that defendants were entitled to summary judgment

dismissing her age discriminativn claim.’

> Hedrick has not objected to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation that defendants be granted summary

judgment on Hedrick’s claim against Forum Health because

she did not exhaust her administrative remedies with regard

to the claims against Forum Health and failed to show that

WRCS and Forum Health should be treated as a single

employer. She also does not object to the conclusion that by

failing to argue that obesity was a disability in her motion for

partial summary judgment or in her response to defendants’

motion for summary judgment, she waived this argument.

Supp. App. 10

Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW

~ Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, summary judgment is

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appropriate if the evidence in the record shows that there is no

genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The Supreme Court has further explained:

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates

the entry of summary judgment, after adequate

time for discovery and upon motion, against a

party who fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element

| essential to that party’s case and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In

such a situation, there can be “no genuine

“issue as to material fact,” since a complete

failure of proof concerning an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett_, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof in the

case, the initial burden on the moving party under Rule 56

“may be met by pointing out to the court that the respondent,

_ having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no

evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.”

Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass’n, 78 F.3d 1079, 1087 (6"

Cir. 1996).

Supp. App. 11

“When a motion for summary judgment is made and

supported as provided in [Rule 56], an adverse party may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse

party’s pleading, but... must set forth specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of

the [nonmovant]’s position will be insufficient; there must be

evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the

[nonmovant].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 252 (1986). In considering a motion for summary

judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the party opposing the motion, Matsushita Elec.

Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. _, 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986), but “conclusory allegations standing alone will not

defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.”

White v. York Int’ Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 363 (10" Cir. 1995).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. ADA.

The crux of Hedrick’s dispute with WRCS is that WRCS

discriminated against her by denying her employment in the

Quality Assurance or Case Manager positions as a reasonable

accommodation to her disability that rendered her unaole to

continue in her previous position of staff nurse.

The ADA provides that a covered employer may not

“discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability

because of the disability of such individual in regard to job

application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge

of employees, employee compensation, job training, and any

Supp. App. 12

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other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42

U.S.C. §12112(a). More particularly for purposes of these

motions, the Act provides that the term “discriminate”

includes “denying employment opportunities to a job

applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified

individual with a disability if such denial is based on the need

of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to

the physical or mental impairments of the employee or

applicant.” 42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(5)(B).

To recover on a claim of employment discrimination

based on a disability under the ADA and Ohio law, ‘ the

plaintiff must show that he or she: (1) is disabled within the

meaning of the Act; (2) is otherwise qualified for the job, with

or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) suffered an

adverse employment decision because of his or her disability.

Monette v. Electronic Data Systems, 90 F.3d 1173, 1178 (6"

Cir. 1996). An individual seeking redress for alleged discri-

mination under the ADA can proceed by presenting direct

evidence of discrimination, or by introducing indirect or

circumstantial evidence of discrimination, sufficient to

establish a prima facie case 0. presumption of discrimination.

* Because the essential elements of an ADA claim and a claim

under the Ohio handicap discrimination statute are the same,

the analysis under of Hedrick’s ADA claim also resolves her

handicap discrimination claims under Ohio law. Wohler v.

Toledo Stamping & Mfg. Co., 125 F.3d 856, **2 n. 1 (6" Cir.

1997); Hoffman vy. Fidelity Brokerage Servs., Inc., 959

F.Supp. 452, 457 n. 1 (W.D. Ohio 1997).

Supp. App. 13

Where, as here, a plaintiff uses the indirect method of

proof by establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the

burden shifts to the employer to produce evidence of a

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employ-

ment decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (4973); Monette, 90 F.3d at 1185-86. Under the burden

shifting approach of the McDonnell Douglas formula, if the

employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the employment action, the burden shifts back to the

plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason is

pretextual by providing evidence from which a jury could

determine that the adverse action was based solely on the

employee’s disability. Monette, 90 F.3d at 1185-86. Where

the plaintiff chooses the direct method of proof, the burden

does not shift to the employer to articulate a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.

Id. at 1180. Instead, the employee must show that the adverse

action was based solely on his or her disability. Id.

1. Direct Evidence. |

Hedrick’s first objection is to the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusion that she provided no direct evidence that WRCS

discriminated against her by not transferring her to the vacant

Quality Assessment and/or Case Manager positions as a

reasonable accommodation for her disability. Specifically,

Hedrick argues that the statement made by Lorraine Nelson to

Dr. Nash, in which Nelson “expressed concern to me that she

Supp. App. 14

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felt that JoAnn’s [sic] medical condition would prohibit her

from being able to perform this job as a case manager” (Nash

depo, p. 68), is evidence of a discriminatory animus.

The direct evidence standard essentially requires an

admission by the employer, or othe: direct evidence, that it

relied solely on the disability in making the adverse

employment decision. Monette, 90 F.3d at 1178. Lorraine

Nelson’s comment to Dr. Nash regarding her concern about

Hedrick’s medical condition and the ability to perform the

Case Manager position is not sufficient to raise a genuine

issue of material fact that WRCS relied solely on Hedrick’s

alleged disability in making its decision not to place her in the

Quality Assessment or Case Manager positions. As set forth

below, without more, this isolated comment does not

establish direct evidence of discrimination.

Hedrick cites Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701

(6" Cir. 2001) in her citation of supplemental authority in

support of her objection to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion

that she has not provided direct evidence. Ross, however, is

distinguishable. In Ross, the Sixth Circuit found that a memo

referring to the plaintiff as a “back case” and inquiring when

this “problem person” could be brought to “termination

status” was direct evidence of discrimination. Id. at 704, 706-

707. Although the district court had determined that this

“isolated reference” was insufficient to constitute direct

evidence of a discriminatory animus, the Sixth Circuit

disagreed. Id. It found that the memo was not an isolated

Supp. App. 15

reference but occurred in the context of events reflecting on

Ross’s back condition and his ultimate termination from

Campbell Soup Company, “including the invitation for Ross

to retire and the proffered resume assistance, the creation of

a memo tracking Ross’s injury-related absences from work, :

Ross’s receipt of a letter detailing his ability to COBRA his

health benefits, and the comment made to Ross that ‘we can’t

have any more of this back thing.”” Id. at 707. For the Sixth

Circuit, these events taken together demonstrated the

prominence of Ross’s back condition in Campbell’s decisions

regarding his employment. Id.

In this case, however, Ms. Nelson’s alleged concern about

Hedrick’s ability to perform the required duties of the Case

Manager position is an isolated comment. There is no series

of comments or reports from WRCS indicating that Hedrick’s

osteoarthritis figured prominently in its decision to hire others

instead of her for the Qualified Assessment and Case

Manager positions. Hedrick argues that this “concern”

combined with other factors constitutes direct evidence.

However, the fact that WRCS agreed with Hedrick’s

assessment that she could not continue in her previous

position of staff nurse, tried to accommodate her physical

impairment by finding her another position in the hospital,

and asked her about her physical ability to perform the

specific functions of the positions for which she interviewed,

do not constitute direct evidence — even when taken in the

context of Ms. Nelson’s “concern” — that WRCS denied her

Supp. App. 16

the positions she sought solely based on her physical

impairment.

Therefore, the Court concludes that the evidence

presented by Hedrick is not direct evidence of discrimination.

2. Indirect Evidence.

To survive defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

Hedrick must rely on indirect evidence by establishing a

prima facie case, or presumption of discrimination, under the

McDonnell! Douglas formula as adapted to ADA claims.

A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disability

‘discrimination by showing that: (1) he or she is disabled; (2)

he or she is otherwise qualified for the position, with or

without reasonable accommodation; (3) he or she suffered an

adverse employment decision; (4) the employer knew or had

reason to know of the plaintiff's disability, and (5) the

position remained open while the employer sought other

applicants or the disabled-individual was replaced. Monette,

90 F.3d at 1186. The parties dispute only the first two

elements of Hedrick’s prima facie case: whether she was

disabled within the meaning of the ADA and, if so, whether

WRCS provided her with a reasonable accommodation under

the Act, when it offered_her the position of Referral Center

Scheduler position.

a. Definition of Disability Under the ADA.

In her second objection to the R&R, Hedrick objects to

the Magistrate Judge’s determination that she does not meet

the definition of “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA.

Supp. App. 17

The parties do not dispute that Hedrick’s osteoarthritis is

a physical impairment. They do, however, disagree on

whether this physical impairment meets the definition of

“disability” under the ADA. The Act defines “disability” as

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits

one or more major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a

record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having

such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §12102(2). Hedrick asserts

that she has presented evidence under each of the Act’s three

methods of establishing disability sufficient to defeat

defendant’s motion for summary judgment and to establish

disability under her motion for partial summary judgment.

I. Physical Impairment that Substantially Limits a Major

Life Activity: 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A).

Hedrick claims that the osteoarthritis in both her knees

constitutes a disability under the ADA because it is a physical

impairment that substantially limits her major life activities.

Because the parties agree that Hedrick’s osteoarthritis is a

physical impairment, the disputed issue is whether her

osteoarthritis “substantially limits one or more major life

activities.” 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(A).

Hedrick does not provide the Court with a clear statement

of the “major life activities” she claims are substantially

limited by her osteoarthritis. However, in her objections to

the R&R, she relies on several pieces of evidence to support

her claim.

Supp. App. 18

—

First, Hedrick relies on a Functional Capacity Evaluation

that defendants performed on Hedrick in July of 1996:

Position Work Tolerance/Limitations: Client had

limitations with most nonmaterial handling activities.

Ina seated position, client reports being able to sit for

a few hours but with knee in a nonbent position

secondary to increase knee pressure. Standing was

limited to a few minutes. Walking was limited to

approximately 30 minutes continuously. Stair climb-

ing was limited to 2 flights maximum x 22 steps.

Crawling, kneeling and squatting were not assessed

secondary to knee pain...

* * *

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Nursing skills limited to activities avoiding

bending, squatting, patient transfers, and excessive

walking.”

(Steen depo., Ex. 13, pp. 14-15.)

Next, Hedrick points to her own deposition in which she

explains:

I can no longer have activities like bowling, walking.

I can’t bend at the knees. I can’t kneel. I can’t stand

for long periods of time. What used to take me an

hour to two hours to do to clean, I can’t do it because

I have to take rests between because of the knees.

(Hedrick depo, p. 91), Although not specifically relied on by

Hedrick, the Court also notes Hedrick’s deposition in.which

Supp. App. 19

she testified that when asked during her interviews for the

Referral Center Scheduler and Quality Assurance positions if

she would have trouble walking, she stated that she would

not, that she “may not walk as fast as others but [ ] can get

from point A to point B”, and that her physician had only

advised that she not walk “long distances”. (Hedrick depo,

pp. 33, 40-41, 45).

Finally, Hedrick submits evidence trom Dr. Nash, her

primary treating physician. Specifically she relies on Dr.

Nash’s affidavit, dated 6 April 2000, in which he opines:

Based on my treatment of Joanne Hedrick, my review

of her medical records [ ], my knowledge of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, and my professional

education, training and experience, it is my opinion to

a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Joanne

Hedrick’s osteoarthritis to both knees has caused her

to be disabled within the meaning of the [ADA] prior

to and continuously since July of 1996.”

(Nash Aff. 95.) She also relies on a letter attached to the

affidavit from Dr. Nash to plaintiff's counsel dated 14 March

2000, in which he states that “Ms. Hedrick’s osteoarthritis is

a physical impairment constituting a disability that

substantially limits her ability to walk and perform her

activities of daily living”, and that she is “significantly limited

with respect to her ability to stand in place, remain in a seated

position, climb stairs, crawl, kneel and squat.” (Nash Aff. Ex.

C.) Finally, she submits testimony from Dr. Nash’s

Supp. App. 20

deposition that she is unable to perform a number of nursing

functions such as walking for long periods of time, lifting

patients, working in an operating room and responding to

emergency situations. (Nash depo., pp. 89-93).

The Court has independently reviewed Hedrick’s medical

records (dating from 1993 to 2000) attached to Dr. Nash’s

affidavit. Although not relied on by Hedrick, the Court finds

a series of letters between Dr. Nash and Jon Steen, WRCS

Human Resource Director, to be relevant in determining

whether Hedrick’s osteoarthritis was a disability under the

Act. On 7 August 1996, Dr. Nash wrote to Jon Steen

informing him that the functional capacity evaluation of

Hedrick “indicated that she is not going to be able to return to

work in her previous position as a general staff nurse” and

recommending that “she be considered for other positions

within the organization.” (Nash Aff., Ex. E, doc. no. M336.)

In his reply dated 16 September 1996, Steen asks Nash to

“provide [him] with a listing of [Hedrick’s] limitations so the

[WRCS] can evaluate her for other vacancies as they occur.”

(Nash Aff., Ex. E, doc. no. M337.) On 24 September 1996,

Dr. Nash responded to Steen’s request by attaching a copy of

the Functional Capacity Evaluation and stating that he agreed

with the evaluation and it recommendations. He summarized

Hedrick’s limitations at that time as follows:

1. Daily activities for short intervals

2. Able to walk short distances

3. Able to stand for short periods of time

Supp. App. 21

4. Able to [ ] desk work (i.e. type, computer skills,

filing) for short periods of time due to difficulty in

maintaining a persistently flexed or extended aspect

with her left leg

5. Able to drive a car for short periods of time.

(Nash Aff., Ex. E, doc. no. M357).°

Although the Act does not define the terms “major life

activity” or “substantially limits”, agency regulations provide

guidance as to their meaning.° HEW Regulations define

“major life activities” as “functions such as caring for oneself,

performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,

breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(1). The

term “substantially limits” means “unable to perform a major

‘ There is a similar letter from Dr. Nash t« Jon Steen dated 23

September 1996. However, the letter is unsigned and appears

to be a draft. (Nash Aff., Ex. E, doc. no. M338.)

° There are two potential sources of regulatory guidance for

interpreting ADA provisions: regulations issued by the

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)

interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.

§706(8)(B) and the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) guidelines interpreting the ADA.

Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 122 S.Ct. 681, 689

(2002). The persuasive authority of the HEW Rehabilitation

Act guidelines has been recognized. Id. However, the

persuasiveness of the EEOC regulations is less clear, as

Congress has not authorized any agency to issue regulations

interpreting the ADA. Id.

Supp. App. 22

life activity that the average person in the general population

can perform; or [ ] significantly restricted as to the condition,

manner or duration under which an individual can perform a

particular major life activity as compared to the condition,

manner, or duration under which the average person in the

general population can perform that same major life activity.”

29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j).

The United States Supreme Court has recently examined

the terms “major life activities” and “substantially limited” as

used in the ADA, and determined they must be strictly

interpreted to create a demanding standard for qualifying as

disabled under the ADA. Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v.

Williams, 122 S.Ct. 681, 691 (2002). According to the Court

in Williams, major life activities refer to “those activities that

are of central importance to daily life.” Id. Furthermore,

individuals attempting to prove disability status under this test

must do more than submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of

an impairment. “Instead the ADA requires those ‘claiming

the Act’s protection... to provide a disability by offering

evidence that the extent of the limitation [caused by their

impairment] in terms of their own experience... is

substantial.” Id. at 691-92 (quoting Albertson’s, Inc. v.

Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999)). Whether or not a

plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the Act requires an

individualized inquiry. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527

U.S. 471, 483 (1999); Cotter v. Ajilon Services, Inc., 287

F.3d 593, 598 (6" Cir. 2002). An individualized assessment

Supp. App. 23

of the effect ot an impairment is particularly important where

the symptoms of that impairment vary widely between

individuals. Williams, 122 S.Ct. at 692.

(A) Walking, sitting, standing and climbing

stairs as major life activities

Hedrick’s evidence must show that her impairment

prevents or severely restricts her from doing activities that are

of central importance to most people’s daily lives. Williams

122 S.Ct. at 691. From the evidence Hedrick submitted,

walking, sitting, standing and climbing stairs qualify as

activities that are central to most people’s lives — and are,

therefore, major life activities. Bowling, crawling, kneeling

and squatting are not major life activities. -

As her primary treating physician, Dr. Nash’s testimony

and records regarding Hedrick’s impairment are relevant.

Under Williams, however, his conclusory opinion that her

osteoarthritis has caused her to be disabled under the Act does

nothing to further her claim, because it provides no evidence

of how her impairment affects her activities. 122 S.Ct. at

691. Likewise, his conclusion that she is “significantly

limited with respect to her ability to stand in place, remain in

a seated position, climb stairs”, etc. does little to inform the

Court about how Hedrick’s limited ability to perform these

activities compares to the “condition, manner, or duration

under which the average person in the general population can

perform these activities.” See 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j). More to

the point, Dr. Nash’s 2 ‘ September 1996 letter to Jon Steen

Supp. App. 24

provides the type of evidence the Court requires to determine

whether Hedrick is disabled under the ADA because he

describes the activities in which Hedrick is limited and the

extent of her ‘imitation. In particular, he states that she is able

to walk short distances, and to stand, do desk work, drive a

car and perform unspecified “daily activities” for short

periods of time. He also states that he agrees with the

Functional Capacity Evaluation and its recommendations.

The Functional Capacity Evaluation is more precise in

describing the extent to which her osteoarthritis limits

Hedrick’s activities. According to the Functional Capacity

Evaluation, Hedrick’s walking was limited to 30 minutes,

stair climbing was limited to two flights, and sitting was

limited to a few hours. i"edrick also testified that although

she might be slower than another person, she couid walk

“from point A to point B”, and did not consider the walking

involved in the Referral Center Scheduler or Quality

Assurance positions to be a problem. As for standing,

Hedrick’s testimony is that she cannot stand for long periods

of time.

Although her ability to perform these activities is limited,

it is not “significantly restricted” compared to the condition,

manner or duration under which the average person in the

general population can perform those same major life

activities. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j). There is no showing that the

average person in the general population -walks more than 30

Supp. App. 25

minutes consecutively, climbs more than two flights of steps

at a time, sits for more than a few hours at a time or stands for

long periods of time. Hedrick has not shown, therefore, that

these limitations, are “substantial” within the meaning of

ADA, or that she is significantly restricted in the “condition,

manner or duration” that she can perform these activities

compared to the average person in the general population.

(B) Working as a major life activity.

As for the testimony of Dr. Nash that she is unable to

perform a number of nursing functions such as walking for

long periods of time, lifting patients, responding to emergency

situations, and working in an operating room (Nash depo., pp.

89-93), it is unclear from the briefs filed if Hedrick submits

this evidence in support of a claim that her physical

impairment substantially limits her in the maior life activity

of working. Nevertheless, the Court will assume that she

does claim that she is substantially limited in the major life

activity of working anc examine her evidence accordingly.’

’ To the extent Dr. Nash’s testimony may be intended to

bolster her claim that she is substantially limited in the major

life activities of walking, sitting, standing and climbing stairs,

her limited ability to perform certain fairly rigorous nursing

functions, such as responding to emergency situations, lifting

patients and working in an operating room, does not

demonstrate that she is significantly restricted in the

“condition, manner or duration” that she can walk, sit, stand

or climb stairs, compared to the condition, manner or duration

Supp. App. 26

Regarding the major life activity of working, the Supreme

Court has held that a claimant is required to show an inability

to work in a “broad range of jobs,” rather than a specific job.

Williams, 122 S.Ct. at 693; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999). As the Court inSutton explained:

To be substantially limited in the major life activity of

working... one must be precluded from more than one

type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of

choice. If jobs utilizing an individual’s skills (but

perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available,

one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs.

Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are

available, one is not precluded from a broad range of

jobs.

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. Considering the broad range of

nursing jobs, the evidence shows that while there may be

certain rigorous nursing functions that Hedrick can no longer

perform, such as walking for long periods of time, lifting

patients, responding to emergency situations, and working in

an operating room (Nash depo., pp. 89-93), there are nursing

jobs she can perform that utilize Hedrick’s nursing skills,

including the Referral Center Scheduler, Quality Assurance,

Case Manager and Admission Nurse positions. Under the

standards articulated in Sutton, therefore, Hedrick is not

under which the average person in the general population

performs the same activities.

Supp. App. 27

—_—

precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Id. The fact that

she is no longer able to perform the functions required by the

position of staff nurse, or other rigorous nursing functions, is

insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding

a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

In conclusion, therefore, the evidence presented is

insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact from

which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Hedrick’s

impairment of osteoarthritis in the knees substantially limits

her in the major life activities of walking, standing, sitting or

climbing stairs or in the major life activity of working.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that her impairment does

not constitute a disability within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.

§12102(2)(A).

ii. Record of a Disability: 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(B).

Hedrick also objects to the R&R’s conclusion that she has

not shown that WRCS’s records establish her disability under

42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(B) of the Act. She claims that her

physicians’ letters to the hospital regarding her injury, her

leave of absence, the Functional Capacity Evaluation, and her

placement on WRCS’s “ADA List” establish a record of her

disability under the ADA. However, these records merely

indicate that WRCS had a record of Hedrick’s physical

impairment that limited her in certain activities — in particular

that she was unable to continue in her position of staff nurse.

Hedrick has not provided records showing that she was

substantially limited in a major life activity as required by the

Supp. App. 28

ADA. Therefore, the records do not raise a genuine issue of

material fact that WRCS had a record of a physical

impairment that substantially limits her in a major life

activity. See 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(B).

iii. Regarded As Disabled: 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(c).

Finally, Hedrick objects to the Magistrate Judge's

conclusion that WRCS did not regard her as having a

disability that substantially impairs a major life activity.

To be “regarded as” disabled under the ADA, the

Supreme Court has provided as follows:

There are two apparent ways in which individuals

may fall within this statutory definition: (1) a covered

entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical

impairment that substantially limits one or more

major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly

believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment

substantially limits one or more major life activities.

In both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity

entertain misperception is about the individual — it

must believe either that one has a substantially

limiting impairment that one does not have or that one

has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact,

the impairment is not so limiting. These mis-

perceptions often “resul[t] from stereotypic assump-

tions not truly indicative of... individual ability.”

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 (citing 42 U.S.C. §12101(7) and

School Bd. of Nassau Cty. V. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284

Supp. App. 29

(1987)). Therefore, to meet the “regarded as” definition of

disabled under the Act, Hedrick must show that defendants

mistakenly regarded her osteoarthritis as “substantially

limiting” a “major life activity” within the meaning of the

ADA. To avoid summary judgment, she must raise a genuine

issue of material fact on this issue.

In support of her claim, Hedrick first points to the fact that

WRCS “was advised and agreed” that she could not resume

her staff nurse position and relied on the Functional Capacity

Evaluation and letters from her physicians that she would not

be able to return to her previous positions. The Court has

addressed why these facts do not create a genuine issue of

material fact that Hedrick is actually disabled under the ADA.

For the same reasons, these facts, without evidence of any

misperception, cannot create a genuine issue of material fact

that WRCS regarded her as “substantially limited” in a “major

life activity.”

Next, Hedrick argues that WRCS’s placement of her on

the so-called “ADA list” establishes that defendant regarded

her as disabled, or at least creates a genuine issue of material

fact on that issue. This is a closer question. The fact that

defendant had a list, which was sometimes referred to as the

“ADA list”, raises a legitimate question as to whether a jury

could find that WRCS regarded Hedrick as disabled within

the meaning of ADA. On examination, however the Court

concludes for the following reasons that placement on the so-

called “ADA list” does not create a genuine issue of material

Supp. App. 30

sceianasiticas

fact of whether WRCS regarded her as substantially limited

in a major life activity.

Although Hedrick relies on the deposition of Jon Steen,

the Human Resource Director for WRCS, to support her

claim that by placing her on the “ADA list” WRCS

considered her disabled, Mr. Steen’s deposition does not

support her claim. According to Steen, the list was created

around the time the ADA was enacted as a way to implement

its preexisting practice of trying to accommodate employees

with permanent, physical restrictions by placing them in

positions that better suited their limitations. Steen testified

that an employee is placed on the list by requesting an

accommodation, and only after WRCS verifies that the

employee has a permanent restriction. Employees on the list

can either no longer perform the functions of their previous

position or have difficulty doing so. (Steen Depo.., pp. 16-26).

There is no evidence that WRCS made any attempt to

determine whether the individuals who are placed on the list

are “substantially limited” in a “major life activity”. As

discussed while analyzing Hedrick’s claim that she is actually

disabled, a determination of disability under the ADA

requires a separate analysis of the individual’s impairment,

the activities the impairment restricts and the extent to which

those activities are restricted. Here WRCS simply determined

that employees placed on the list have a physical impairment

that makes performing their former job difficult or

impossible. The fact that WRCS attempted to accommodate

employees with permanent physical restrictions, who might

Supp. App. 31

not be able to perform the functions of their former positions,

is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that

WRCS mistakenly concluded that Hedrick’s osteoarthritis

“substantially limits” her in a “major life activity”.

Finally, Hedrick claims that WRCS regarded her as

“disabled” because, when she interviewed for positions after

being placed on the ADA list, WRCS officials asked her

questions evidencing that they were conscious of, and

concerned about, her limited ability to walk. This is further

demonstrated, she claims, by the fact that she asked for and

was told that if she was offered the position she could have a

parking space close to the building to accommodate her need —

to cut down on long-distance walking.

This is not evidence that defendant entertained any

misperceptions about Hedrick being disabled. Hedrick had

informed WRCS that she could no longer continue in her

previous position of staff nurse, in part because she could not

walk long distances. The fact that WRCS officials questioned

her about her physical restrictions in the context of

performing the duties of the job for which she was

interviewing shows that they recognized that she had a

physical restriction and supports the premise that they were

trying to accommodate her. The ADA was enacted, not to

accommodate every American with a physical or mental

impairment, but only those whose impairments substantially

limit a major life activity. See oyota M v.

Williams, 122 S. Ct. 681, 691 (2002). Standing along, the

Supp. App. 32

fact that an employer attempts to accommodate an employee

with a physical impairment, who is not actually disabled

within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(A), cannot then

be used to demonstrate that the employee was “regarded as”

disabled under 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(C).

Hedrick has not submitted evidence sufficient to raise a

genuine issue of material fact that WRCS “regarded” her as

having an impairment that substantially limited a major life

activity.

In conclusion, ‘fedrick has failed to establish that she is a

member of the ADA’s protected class. She has not presented

sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact

that she (1) has a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits a major life activity; (2) has a record of

such an impairment; or (3) was “regarded as” having such an

impairment by WRCS. Therefore, WRCS is entitled to

summary judgment on Hedrick’s disability claims.

b. ified Individual With a Disability.

Even assuming Hedrick could show that she is “disabled”

and within the ADA’s protected class, to establish a prima

facie case of discrimination she must also show that she is a

“qualified individual with a disability”. The regulations

define a “qualified individual with a disability” as “an

individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill,

experience, education and other job-related requirements of

the employment position such individual holds or desires, and

who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform

Supp. App. 33

the essential function of such position.” 29 C.F.R. §1630.2

(m). See alsoBurns v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., 222 F.3d

247, 257 (6" Cir. 2000).

Discrimination under the ADA includes not making

reasonable accommodations to an employee who is an

otherwise qualified individual with a disability, unless the

employer can show that the accommodation would impose an

undue hardship. Hoskins v. Oakland Cty, Sheriff's Dept., 227

F.3d 719, 724 (6" Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

$1211(b)(S5)(A)). In this case, Hedrick claims that WRCS

discriminated against her by denying her employment in the

Quality Assurance or Case Manager positions she desired as

a reasonable accommodation for her alleged disability. To be

a qualified individual with a disability, therefore, Hedrick

must show that she satisfies the requirements of these

positions and can perform the job related functions with or

without an accommodation.

A disabled employee who claims to be otherwise qualified

with a reasonable accommodation bears the initial burden of

proposing an accommodation and showing that the

accommodation is objectively reasonable. Cassidy v. Detroit

Edison Company, 138 F.3d 629, 633-34 (6" Cir. 1998);

Monette, 90 F.3d at 1183. A disabled employee cannot

* An employer then has the burden of persuasion to shown

that an accommodation would impose an undue hardship.

Cassidy, 138 F.3d at 634. In this case, WRCS does not argue

that any of the alleged reasonable accommodations are an

undue hardship.

Supp. App. 34

demand that the employer provide her with a particular

accommodation when another reasonable accommodation is

made available to her. Hankins v. The Gap, 84 F.3d 797,

800-01 (6 Cir. 1996) (citing Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.

Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986)); Hoskins, 227 F.3d at

728 n.3. The regulations also provide that an individual who

is disabled under the ADA is not required to accept a

particular accommodation offered by the employer. However,

if the disabled individual rejects a proposed “reasonable

accommodation” that enables the individual to perform the

position’s essential functions that they cannot perform

without an accommodation, the individual will no longer be

considered a “qualified individual with a disability” under the

ADA. 29 C.F.R. §1630.9(d).

The Act and the regulations provided that “reasonable

accommodation” may include reassignment to a vacant

position. 42 U.S.C. §12111(9)(B); 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(0)(2)

(ii). Generally, reassignment to another position is considered

only where accommodation in the employee’s prior position

is not possible. Cassidy, 138 F.3d at 634. Under Sixth

Circuit law, when a disabled employee can no longer perform

the functions of his or her previous position, even with

accommodation, an employer has a duty under the ADA to

consider transferring the employee to another position for

which that employee is otherwise qualified. Burns, 222 F.3d

at 257. However, an employer need only reassign adisabled

employee to a vacant position. Id. “Employers are not

Supp. App. 35

required to create new jobs, displace existing employees from

their positions, or violate other employees’ rights under a

collective bargaining agreement or other non-discriminatory

policy in order to accommodate a disabled individual.” Id. at

257-258, (quoting Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc.,

141 F.3d 667, 678 (7" Cir. 1998)). Furthermore, an employer

is under no obligation to keep an employee on unpaid leave

indefinitely until a suitable position becomes available.

Monette, 90 F.3d at 1187.

Generally, an employer is only required to transfer an

employee to a position comparable to the employee’s prior

position as a reasonable accommodation under the Act. See

Hoskins, 227 F.3d at 728 n.3. The Act does not require an

employer to offer an employee a promotion as a reasonable

accommodation. Cassidy, 138 F.3d at 634. However, where

a comparable position is not vacant, an employer’s obligation

to reassign an employee under the ADA may include

assignment to a position with a lower grade of pay if the

employee meets the jobs qualifications. Cassidy, 138 F.2d at

634.

The employer must first identify the full range of

alternative positions for which the individual satisfies

the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory pre-

requisites, and then determine whether the employee’s

own knowledge, skills, and abilities would enable her

to perform the essential functions of any of those

alternative positions, with or without reasonable

Supp. App. 36

3

accommodations. The employer’s duty to accommo-

date requires it to consider transferring the employee

to any of these other jobs, including those that would

represent a demotion. .

Burns, 222 F.3d at 257 (quoting Dalton, 141 F.2d at 677).

The parties agree that Hedrick could no longer perform

her job as staff nurse and that no reasonable accommodation

could be made for Hedrick in that position. They also agree

that Hedrick requested a reasonable accommodation when she

j contacted WRCS and requested to b> placed on the “ADA

list” so that another position, for which she was qualified,

might be found.

The issue in dispute, therefore, is whether there was a

“reasonable accommodation” of Hedrick under the Act.

WRCS claims that the position of Referral Center Scheduler

_was a reasonable accommodation. Hedrick was offered the

position but turned it down, claiming that the Referral Center

Scheduler position was not a reasonable accommodation

] because she was overqualified for the position.

The evidence shows that in July of 1996 Hedrick

| requested an accommodation because she could no longer

perform the functions of a staff nurse. Even assuming

Hedrick was disabled within the meaning of the Act, which

this Court has found she was not, Hedrick’s request for a

reasonable accommodation placed a duty on WRCS to

ascertain whether it had an available position that Hedrick

: would be able to perform. Burns, 222 F.3d at 257.

Supp. App. 37

According to Hedrick’s deposition testimony, after placement

on the list sometime in July of 1996, Hedrick requested to

return to work in August of 1996. Pursuant to WRCS’s

instructions, Hedrick periodically contacted Anne Martz

Ondo, WRCS’s Employment Coordinator, to determine what

positions WRCS might have available for her. She was

informed of the Referral Center Scheduler position and

interviewed for that position sometime in September of 1996.

During the interview, Hedrick informed Lorraine Nelson that

she was not interested in the position because she felt she was

overqualified and it was a “drastic” cut in pay from her

previous position of staff nurse. (Hedrick depo. p. 36).

Although the parties dispute whether WRCS made a formal

offer of the position to Hedrick before she told them she was

not interested, the facts are undisputed that Hedrick

understood that the job was hers if she wanted it.

At this point in time, WRCS absolved itself of its duty

under the ADA to make an further reasonable accommodation

for Hedrick’s alleged disability. Hedrick was qualified for the

position and the position accommodated her physical

limitations that made performance of the staff nurse position

no longer possible. Although Hedrick claims that she was

overqualified for the position, Sixth Circuit law obligated

WRCS to offer her a vacant position for which she was

qualified — even a demotion if a comparable position was not

available — as a reasonable accommodation when she

Supp. App. 38

requested a transfer to another position.” Burns, 222 F.3d at

257; Cassidy, 138 F. 3d at 634.

Even though Hedrick turned down WRCS’s offer of the

Referral Center Scheduler position as a_ reasonable

accommodation, WRCS did not terminate Hedrick. See

Monette, 90 F.3d at 1187 (employer is under no obligation to

keep employees on unpaid leave indefinitely until a

comparable position becomes available). Instead, WRCS

continued to inform her of positions for which she was

eligible to apply until ultimately Hedrick was placed in her

current admission nurse assignment in August of 1997. At

this point, however, Hedrick could no longer be considered a

“qualified individual with a disability” because she had

°If no vacant position exists for which the disabled employee

is qualified, but the employer knows that a comparable

position for which the applicant is qualified will become

vacant in a short period of time, the employer may be required

to offer the position to the employee. Monette, 90 F.3d at

1187 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 407-08); Hoskins, 227

F.3d at 728 n.3 (citing Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp.,

196 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 1999)) (reassigning an employee to

a position that includes a significant decrease in pay, benefits

or seniority, is not “reasonable” under the ADA, where a

comparable position for which the employee is qualified is

available at the same time). However, Hedrick has made no

showing that the Quality Assurance and Case Manager

positions were comparable to her staff nurse position, or that

WRCS knew these positions were about to become available

when it offered her the Referral Center Scheduler position.

Supp. App. 39

already turned down a reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R.

§1630.9(d). Particularly where a transfe to another position

is involved, a disabled employee cannot demand that the

employer provide her with a particular accommodation when

another reasonable accommodation is made available to her.

Hankins, 84 F.3d at 800-01.

The Case Manager and Quality Assurance positions, to

which Hedrick claims she was entitled as a reasonable

accommodation did not become available until after she

turned down the Referral Center Scheduler position — at

which point she was no longer “otherwise qualified”.

Moreover, these positions were non-bargaining unit, salaried

positions as opposed to her prior position as an hourly paid

bargaining unit staff nurse and Hedrick has not shown that

they were comparabie to her prior position.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Hedrick failed to

raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the second

requirement of her prima facie case — that she was a qualified

individual with a disability. WRCS is therefore entitled to

summary judgment on this issue.

c. Prima Facie Case of Disability Discrimination.

Although Hedrick objects to the R&R’s conclusion that

she has failed to establish a prima facie case of disability

discrimination under the ADA, as demonstrated above,

Hedrick has not raised an genuine issue of material fact

regarding the disputed elements of her prima facie case. She

has not shown that she was disabled within the meaning of

Supp. App. 40

4

a

the Act or that she was an otherwise qualified individual, with

or without accommodation. '°

Because she has failed to establish a prima facie case,

WRCS is entitled to summary judgment on Hedrick’s claim

of discrimination under the ADA and Ohio law.

d. Legitimate Reason for Employment Action.

Although Hedrick has not established a prima facie case

of disability discrimination, the Court will address her

remaining objections to the R&R. Assuming Hedrick had

presented a prima facie case of disability discrimination under

the ADA, the employer must then offer a legitimate

explanation for its action. Monette, 90 F.3d at 1185-86.

Hedrick objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that

WRCS had asserted a legitimate reason for refusing to assign

Hedrick to the Quality Assurance and Case Manager

positions. Although WRCS asserts that Hedrick was not

chosen for these positions because she was not the most

qualified candidate, Hedrick claims that defendant’s reason is

\Hedrick’s objection is limited to her claim that she raised a

genuine issue of material fact that she is disabled within the

meaning of the Act and is, therefore, a member of the ADA’s

protected class. The Court has already reviewed, and

addressed, the evidence which she argues supports her claim

that she is actually substantially impaired in a major life

activity, has a record of such impairment and/or is regarded as

having such an impairment. Having previously concluded

that Hedrick did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on

these issues, the Court will not revisit them.

Supp. App. 41

conclusory and, therefore, inadequate to discharge its duty

under McDonnell Douglas to provide a specific reason for its

actions.

The adverse employment action Hedrick claims is

WRCS’s failure to place her in the Quality Assurance and

Case Manager positions as a reasonable accommodation to

her alleged disability. Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-

shifting test, the employer need only offer or articulate a

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.

Articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions is a

burden of production, not persuasion, and does not involve a

credibility assessment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod.,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). WRCS has produced such a

reason. Asserting that it chose the most qualified candidate

for each position (which was not Hedrick) is a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged adverse employment

action.

e. Pretext.

Under the McDonnell Douglas burden test, assuming the

plaintiff had established a prima facie case and the defendant

had articulated a legitimate reason for the adverse employ-

ment action, the burden returns to the plaintiff to establish

that defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for

unlawful discrimination. Monette, 90 F.3d at 1185-86.

Hedrick might demonstrate that WRCS’s proffered reason

was pretextual by showing that it had no basis in fact, was not

the actual reason or was insufficient to explain the decision.

Supp. App. 42

Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 882 (6" Cir.

1996).

Although a plaintiff may show pretext through indirect

evidence, the ultimate question remains whether the

defendant intentionally and illegally discriminated against the

plaintiff. “Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy

of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that

is probative of intentional discrimination.” Reeves, 530 U.S.

at 146. Establishing that the defendant’s proffered nondis-

criminatory reason for the adverse employment action is

unpersuasive or even contrived does not necessarily compel

a finding that the plaintiffs claim of discrimination is correct.

Id. “For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment

as a matter of law if... the plaintiff created only a weak issue

of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and

there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence

that no discrimination had occurred.” Id. at 148.

In support of her argument that defendant’s proffered

reason is pretextual, Hedrick submits her own testimony that

she was the most qualified candidate for the vacant Quality

Assurance and Case Manager positions. She also argues that

there was conflicting testimony among defendant’s officials

as to who had the ultimate hiring authority for the vacant

Quality Assurance and Case Manager positions, and that

some officials had sketchy memories of the hiring decision

events and the particular qualifications of the candidates.

These facts are insufficient for a jury to conclude that

Supp. App. 43

WRCS’s articulated reason that Hedrick was not the most

qualified for the positions is false — and also insufficient for

a jury to infer that WRCS’s real reason for not placing her in

those positions was discrimination based on her disability.

Moreover, even if Hedrick’s submitted evidence were

sufficient to cast doubt on the defendant’s judgment in hiring

for these available positions, a court will not second-guess the

business judgment of the employer where the employer

chooses from equally qualified candidates for a position.

Simms v. Oklahoma, 165 F.3d 1321, 1330 (10" Cir. 1999).

Therefore, the Court concludes that Hedrick has not

submitted evidence from which a jury could conclude that

WRCS’s decision not to place her in the vacant Quality

Assurance and Case Manager positions was a pretext for

disability discrimination.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that

WRCS is entitled to summary judgment on Hedrick’s claim

of disability discrimination under the ADA and Ohio law.

3. Denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment.

Hedrick objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommen-

dation that her motion for partial summary judgment be

denied. Hedrick moved for summary judgment declaring that

(1) she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA and

under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112; and that (2) WRCS

failed to reasonably accommodate her by refusing to place her

in the vacant positions for which she applied and was

qualified, thereby violating the ADA and Ohio law.

Supp. App. 44

SEE —— eee eer —_——— — oo

For the reasons discussed above, Hedrick’s motion for

partial summary judgment is denied.

B. Age Discrimination.

Hedrick claims that WRCS discriminated against her on

the basis of her age ir violation ot the ADEA when it failed

to appoint her to the available Quality Assurance and Case

Manager positions. Hedrick has not offered direct evidence

of age discrimination. To state a claim, therefore, she must

prove age discrimination by the McDonnell Douglas method

of establishing a prima facie case showing that (1) she is a

member of the protected class; (2) she was qualified for the

positions she sought; (3) she suffered an adverse employment

action; and (4) a younger person was selected for the position

she desires. Godfredson v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 173 F.3d 365,

371 (6" Cir. 1999).

The parties do not dispute, and the Magistrate Judge

agreed, that Hedrick established her prima facie case. The

evidence shows that she (1) is within the protected class

because she is over the age of 40, (2) met the minimum

qualifications for the positions she desired, (3) suffered an

adverse employment action when she failed to get any of the

positions she desired, and (4) five of the six successful

candidates were younger than she was. Having established

her prima facie case, the burden shifts to WRCS to articular

a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not appointing her

to the Quality Assurance and Case Manager positions. Id.,

Monette, 90 F.3d at 1186-86.

Supp. App. 45

As in the disability discrimination claim, WRCS has

asserted that better qualified candidates were chosen to fill the

vacant positions instead of Hedrick -— a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Therefore, the burden

shifts back to Hedrick to show that WRCS’s reasons were

pretextual. Godfredson, 173 F.3d at 371; Monette, 90 F.3d at

1185-86. Pretext can be demonstrated by showing that the

proffered reason has no basis in fact, was not the actual reason

for the decision or is insufficient to explain the decision.

Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 882 (6" Cir.

1996).

As in her disability discrimination claim, Hedrick argues

that WRCS’s proffered reason is pretextual regarding age

discrimination because of her own testimony that she was the

most qualified candidate. She argues that a genuine issue of

material fact is shown by conflicting testimony among

defendant’s officials as to who had the ultimate hiring

authority for the vacant positions and sketchy memories of the

events surrounding the hiring decisions and the qualifications

of candidates. As in her claim of disability discrimination,

these facts are insufficient for a jury to conclude that WRCS’s

proffered reason — that the successful candidates were better

qualified than Hedrick — is false. A court will not second-

guess the business judgment of an employer who chooses

from equally qualified candidates for a position. Simms, 165

F.3d 1321, 1330 (10" Cir. 1999).

Furthermore, under Reeves, Hedrick must provide

sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that age

Supp. App. 46

discrimination was motivating factor in not hiring Hedrick to

fill these positions. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). Even if WRCS’s

proffered reason were disbelieved, the evidence Hedrick

presents does not support an inference that age discrimination

was the motivating factor in WRCS’s hiring decision.

Accordingly, defendant’s are entitled to summary judgment

on Hedrick’s age discrimination claim.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies

Hedrick’s motion for partial summary judgment and grants

defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Lesley Wells

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Supp. App. 47

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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