Opposition Brief — Regier, Secretary, Florida Department of Children & Families v. Does 1-13

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No. 03-1445 MAY 19 2004

HF CLERK

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In The

Supreme Court of the Anited States

ry

v

JERRY REGIER, et al.,

Petitioners,

V.

DOES 1-13, et al.,

Respondents.

,

v

On Petiticn For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Eleventh Circuit

>

vw

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

,

v

STEVEN M. WEINGER, ESQUIRE*

HELENA M. TETZELI, ESQUIRE

KURZBAN KURZBAN WEINGER &

TETZELI, P.A.

2650 SW 27th Avenue, 2nd Floor

Miami, Florida 33133

(305) 444-0060

Attorneys for Respondent

*Counsel of Record

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit followed the decisions of this Court and

does not conflict with decisions of other Circuit Courts

when it affirmed the District Court’s award of attorney’s

fees in favor of Plaintiffs in their Section 1983 Civil Rights

Class Action in which they represented a class of several

thousand developmentally disabled individuals eligible for

and in need of specialized Medicaid services who had *»..1

deprived of services by Defendants for :naay years.

OBJECTIONS TO PETITIONERS’

“QUESTIONS PRESENTED”

Petitioners ignore the well-established standards for

certiorari review by this Court. This Court does “not grant

a certiorari to review evidence and discuss the specific

facts.” United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 221 (1925).

In this case the competent substantial evidence amply

supports the opinions below.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The parties to this proceeding are:

Petitioners-Defendants: The Petitioners/Defendants are

Jerry Regier, Secretary of the Florida Department of Chil-

dren and Families; Mary Ellen McDonald, District 11

Administrator, Florida Department of Children and

Families; Michelle Brantley, Assistant Secretary, Florida

Department of Children and Families; and Robert Sharpe,

Medicaid Director, Florida Agency for Health Care Ad-

ministration.

Respondents-Plaintiffs: The Respondents are eleven

named Plaintiffs who represent a class of several thousand

developmentally disabled individuals who were eligible for

and in need of specialized Medicaid Services in ICF/DDs.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EFI ree PIII EUOED vissiniissscicecsstesstenccvasssceniscaces i

OBJECTIONS TO PETITIONERS’ “QUESTIONS

TEI voncsons aah cecnsestibantnonssstinncsonskatsuneraorenienk i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS .....................088. ii

Re COE PT BM ED csscesnirisiveasicesscctesertinssctsnsinns ili

TRL OF ALTO 8 EG scsevscinsestssscesesrscesecsayeresses Vv

I SIN gains coccnsncdssnvctaceneesecsacnavssessebeaenses 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ........scscscovsccessvessenseeeees 1

STATEMENT OF THE FPACTS.....0.sccsscscoscsscccscessnecees 2

Bi, RAGE FID GD once sth cnsidxiecnsscrsecsncssdnvseciverscs 2

B. The Fee Award Is Supported By Uncontro-

I Be osiccsncetiircissicssesstcassastens 3

1. Reasonableness of the Hours Expended... 4

i Se SID iis ducvicannvinceincs crn csctainensaceusonss 5

3. The Case Was Rare And Exceptional And

Plaintiffs Obtained Exceptional Results.... 6

a. Defendants’ Admissions as to the

Magnitude of the Case.................:0.666 9

b. 2001 Status Report of National Asso-

ciation of State Directors of Develop-

mental Disabilities Services, Inc ........ 10

c. Defendants’ Conduct and Other Cir-

cumstances Made This Litigation Ex-

ceptionally Challenging...................... 11

eT Te Be aaa ick cvcs cnsdnvacccvixccacsens’ 15

lV

TABLE OF CONTENTS -— Continued

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ............ 15

I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AWARDED

PLAINTIFFS AN UPWARD ADJUSTMENT OF

THE LODESTAR BASED ON FINDINGS THAT

THIS WAS A RARE AND EXCEPTIONAL CASE;

“EXCEPTIONAL SUCCESS” AND “GROUND-

BREAKING RESULTS” ACHIEVED BY PLAIN-

Eseries nadine 16

II. NEITHER THE PER CURIAM AFFIR-

MANCE NOR THE UNPUBLISHED DIS-

TRICT COURT OPINION CONFLICT WITH

PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT OR

ANY OTHER COURTS OF APPEAL.............. 19

A. The Decision Follows All Prior Decisions

ne re 20

B. The Decision Does Not Conflict with the

Decisions of Any Other Circuit Court....... 23

C. No Lack of Uniformity Exists in the Cir-

Cit Court DIOCISIOIE ...cccccceccsccsccscsscesccseesss 27

III. DEFENDANTS’ CRITICISM OF THE FAC-

TORS ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT

FOR THE DETERMINATION OF A REA-

SONABLE FEE ARE MERITLESS ................ 29

ee ais ves aztnasisdsrcinoniscsdeeaanieediiglcociectonsesiin 30

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Amico v. Newcastle County, 654 F. Supp. 982 (D.

A_POST RO PORNO a Eee SONA RE aE I TR Ten 17

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984)... Dacaastokenapniceal passim

Cerva v. EBR Enterprises, 740 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D.

Pe SG sas oistiisecs ccc eunicadaetabacesucirieisisnnatbaiaasaaenvadbeeteieaie 18

City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 657 (1992)....... 23, 24

Cooper v. Pentecost, 77 F.3d 829 (5th Cir. 1996)............... 26

Davis v. Locke, 936 F.2d 1208 (11th Cir. 1991)................. 17

Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 1998)..........000... 2, 10

Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998).............. passim

Formby v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 904 F.2d

ee i BN iiisicsnicdendodpcalaauseidgdieenenebaddauanteieebiatevs 17

Guam Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v.

ADA, 100 F.3d GOi (GE Cir, 1906) .....cccccrsssseccsessecscssees 24

Hendrickson v. Branstad, 934 F.2d 158 (8th Cir.

RRR RIRRRE SI EE cc erneh MaKe oem tN SS EC EE 26

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).................. 20, 22

Hyatt v. Apfel, 195 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 1999)... eee 27

In re Baldwin-United Corp., 79 BR 321 (Bkrtcy.

Be By I I ie inasaincsiiascnskescsuceninsnsisiskirexacstnesinetiniverees 18

In re Miniscribe Corp., 309 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir.

REE CARED ace ba eas RAIS FeO Ee EO 28

Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public

Welfare, 568 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1983)................4. 17

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d

ee I I sass ci sissadindccaisunvvccoenisiieuessanunnktanisténie 22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Missouri v. Jenkins, 497. U.S. 274 (1989)...........cccccceeeeeees 17

Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery,

SOG F.Be LIE CLIC Git, TRG sccseresccssisssscscessescceseassecess 17

Odima v. Western Tucson Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484 (9th

Ei AUNTIE scciudutbidaeseateasaninianenmunasesenatilegebbanniatneaeaies 25

Paschal v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 297 F.3d 431 (6th

SII sui cisshscud cobasiavenscecuaalcacana\ansuucedsendeaiesecintnaeaceaes 28, 29

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council

For Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986)...............008 20, 22, 23

Planned Parenthood of Central and Northern

California v. Arizona, 789 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.

SEINE suisse sciccmalecdunnebbiadeutssueieadsnaubuness seseesnuniesseasdatanuiats 23, 24

Tufaro v. Willie, 756 F. Supp. 556 (S.D. Fla. 1991)........... 17

U.S. v. Aisenberg, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (N.D. Fla.

SUI ssncetc asi cundi-cobuieacedsshasicaueiecabomaasamnubeninssausesanevuutauine’s 18

United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925)................ 30

UNR Industries v. Schwartz, Cooper, Kolb &

Gaynor Charter, 986 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983) .............. 25

Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mutual Life Company,

214 F.3d 1041 (Oth Cir, 2O00).......crcossccrsevcsssssorrcessees 24, 25

Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1998).................. 26

Weiss v. York Hospital, 628 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Pa.

IRR IRY Reece ate NEN O na Re, ee 17

Williams v. Marriott Corp., 669 F. Supp. 2 (D.C.

NIT asus shcanccarusiscadsaicale eebineanladdhndtiesakenenansevekdanneniceniasiictienbiinbiaieiie 18

Vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

OTHER

Bee es SIUIET vocchikuauiensbscoesclaciauuaainlaiacumantandistonisestiaeaniiees 25

Oe As Se iasinnsipiideiccaiasatinurennnseciennanigiacenietniconaiiial 20

I Fe hs SII vikheuscissntectsvinsskenctasscusuenokebidaessesceseueuancias 25

ee 19

1

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

The Plaintiffs/Respondents, John/Jane Does 1-13,

respectfully file this Brief in Opposition to the Petition for

Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Eleventh Circuit filed by the Defendants/Petitioners.

*

OPINIONS BELOW

The Court of Appeals’ per curiam affirmance is unre-

ported. The District Court’s Order awarding attorney's

fees is unreported. Both the Court of Appeals’ affirmance

without opinion and the District Court’s opinion are

reproduced in Petitioners’ Appendix.

+

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On March 13, 1992, Plaintiffs/Respondents (“Respon-

dents”) filed their Class Action Complaint. R.1. Final

Judgment was entered four years later on August 28, 1996.

R. 449. Defendants/Petitioners (“Defendants”) appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Final Judgment

and remanded the case with instructions to the District

Court to assess attorney’s fees against Defendants. Id.;

R. 488 (Mandate). Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir.

1998).

After entry of the Final Judgment, Defendants took

the position that they were merely required to place

language in the State Medicaid Plan setting a reasonable

waiting period but not required to actually provide ser-

vices with reasonable promptness. Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d

1037, 1047 (11th Cir. 1998). The Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals found Defendants’ position “untenable”. Jd. at

1047.

The District Court heard argument on the Plaintiffs’

Motion for Attorney’s Fees but entered an Order denying

the motion until all post-judgment proceedings were

completed and entered the final fee award on March 15,

2003, over eleven years after the lawsuit was commenced.

Pet. App.5-11. Defendants appealed the District Court

Order to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the fourth

appeal in this case. On January 16, 2004 the Eleventh

Circuit entered its per curiam affirmance of the District

Court’s decision. Pet. App.1-4.

4

4

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

A. Nature of the Case

Plaintiffs are a class of several thousand developmen-

tally disabled individuals who were eligible for and in need

of specialized Medicaid services in the Intermediate Care

Facility for the Mentally Retarded/Developmentally

Disabled (“ICF/MR” or “ICF/DD”) program. Defendants

failed to provide ICF/DD services to Plaintiffs, relegating

them to years on waiting lists.

The ICF/DD program and the traumas suffered by the

severely disabled class members who were deprived of life-

preserving services for decades were documented by the

Eleventh Circuit in affirming the Final Judgment. Doe v.

Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998). “[T]he record ‘reveals

3

a plethora of facts showing the harm caused to developmen-

tally disabled persons by the State of Florida’s current

procedure which allows eligible Medicaid recipients who

have been determined to be in need of ICF/DD Services to be

placed on indefinite waiting lists.’” Doe v. Chiles, supra at

713, n.7. Indeed, two of the thirteen named Plaintiffs died

as the result of lack of essential services between the time

the Complaint was filed and the entry of the Final Judg-

ment. R. 627; 499, Tab 8 (1996 Whitaker Affidavit at 73).

Even after entry of the Final Judgment, Defendants

repeatedly sought to avoid compliance. Upon remand,

Defendants took the position that relief had only been

ordered for the one dozen named class representatives and

that Defendants were not required to provide any services

to the other 2,000 individuals on the State of Florida

waiting list who were eligible and awaiting services for

many years. R. 579, at 1-9.

Prior to relief in this case, Florida ranked 49th among

the states in providing for individuals with developmental

disabilities and approximately 45th in providing ICF/DD

beds per capita. R. 453, deposition of Donna Allen at 132;

R. 453, Ex. 5, letter of Governor Lawton Chiles to the

President of The Florida Senate at 1.

B. The Fee Award Is Supported By Uncontro-

verted Evidence

Through uncontroverted evidence, Plaintiffs estab-

lished all the facts necessary to support the fee awarded

by the District Court. The District Court credited this

evidence, addressed and rejected the Defendant’s objec-

tions, independently evaluated the file, and awarded the

fee justified by the evidence. Pet. App.5-12. First the

4

District Court determined the lodestar. After determining

the lodestar, the District Court determined that the

lodestar should be adjusted as to hours expended in the

District Court in accordance with established legal prece-

dent. Pet. /np.7-10. No adjustment of the lodestar was

made for the fee award for work performed on the appeal

to the Eleventh Circuit. Pet. App.11.

In adjusting the lodestar, the District Court made

specific factual findings. Pet. App.8-11. All of the factual

findings are based upon uncontroverted evidence and the

District Court’s personal observations during the course of

the proceedings. Jd. Defendants did not present any

conflicting evidence as to any of the factual findings of the

District Court used to upwardly adjust, or enhance, the

lodestar before the Court of Appeals.

Some of the evidence omitted from Defendants’

Statement of Facts is presented below.

1. Reasonableness of the Hours Expended

The Defendants claimed that the hours were unrea-

sonable even though the hours claimed were minuscule

compared to the hours expended by the Defendants’

lawyers. One minor defense lawyer (Colodny, Fass and

Talenfeld, P.A.) alone was paid for 400% more hours than

the hours claimed by Plaintiffs’ counsel. R. 462, 464, 465.

In addition, Defendants utilized the services of two other

law firms. Most significantly, a large team of lawyers from

the Office of the Attorney General was lead counsel for the

Defendants. Defendants’ legal team spent perhaps 10

times as many hours as Plaintiffs’ counsel in this case.

5

The Colodny firm was employed as private counsel for

the Secretary of the Department of Children and Families

and was paid by the Defendant State of Florida officials

for its work. Colodny represented the Secretary in these

proceedings up until the entry of the Final Judgment.

R. 462, 464, 465. As can be seen from the record, this

attorney did virtually no original work as the Office of the

Attorney General took the lead as counse! for all Defen-

dants.

Colodny billed and was paid for over 4,000 hours of

work for its minor role in this case.’ During that same

time, Plaintiffs’ counsel logged and was awarded only

1,193.5 hours by the District Court. Remarkably, the

Defendants approved payment for these minor attorneys

for over 4,000 hours while objecting to the hours of Plain-

tiffs’ counsel who spent only 25% as many hours actually

litigating the entire case and prevailing in obtaining relief.

R. 464 at 7, 2.10.

2. Hourly Rates

Just as Defendants frivolously and litigiously chal-

lenged the reasonable number of hours expended, Defen-

dants challenged the hourly rate without a good faith

basis. Near the inception of the lawsuit, in 1992, Defen-

dants’ outside counsel, Hinshaw & Culbertson, in another

matter against the same Defendants advised Defendants

that:

* Colodny Fass and Talenfeld represented a single, individual

capacity Defendant and were paid $328,789.50 by the Defendant State

officials. R. 464 at 7, n.10.

6

We have little doubt that a court would award

Mr. Weinger, based upon his experience, his

usual fee of $250.00 per hour. Second, since this

case was filed before Wilder was decided, Mr.

Weinger may also be entitled to a multiplier.

R. 453, Ex. 1.

Remarkably, ten years later, Defendants argued to the

District Court that the hourly rate of $125.00 per hour was

the reasonable hourly rate for Plaintiffs’ lead counsel, Mr.

Weinger. R. 492 at 14, R. 627 at 3. Needless to say, the

District Court’s determination that the reasonable hourly

rate of lead counsel was $250.00 per hour is amply justi-

fied by the evidence in the record. R. 627 at 3.

3. The Case Was Rare and Exceptional And

Plaintiffs Obtained i'xceptional Results

Aside from the evidence presented by Margulies’,

* Margulies Declaration - Professor Margulies, a respected

lawyer experienced in federal court litigation provided evidence on the

factors which the District Court was required to consider in setting a

fee. Professor Margulies explained that the hours requested in the

charts attached to the Motion for attorney’s fees were “reasonable and

necessary”, that the case was “handled extremely efficiently”, that the

“results obtained were exceptional”; that he knew “from personal

knowledge that the individuals who benefit from this ruling had been

unsuccessful in finding any advocacy group or attorney ... willing to

perform the task of representing these individuals but for the agree-

ment of Steven M. Weinger, Esquire, to represent them in this case”;

“that the case was extremely complex and required a thorough knowl-

edge of highly specialized areas of law such as Federal Medicaid

Statutes and Regulations, the inner workings of the Florida Medicaid

Plan, and a comprehensive knowledge of general civil rights law”, that

“at the time the claim was brought the claim was unique and novel”,

and that “without Steven M. Weinger, Esq.’s creativity and broad legal

(Continued on following page)

7

Rossman* and Weinger‘, the District Court had ample

evidence from which to conclude that the Plaintiffs had

knewledge, I do not believe this case would have been brought to a

successful conclusion.” R. 454, 499 at Tab 3, paragraphs 4-8, R. 624, Tab 4,

14-8.

Finally, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s acceptance of this case adversely affected his

reputation and/or that of his law firm. Margulies attested, “as a result of the

litigation, Steven M. Weinger, Esquire’s reputation among elected officials

and state executive branch officials has been severely hurt. Although I

know that Steven M. Weinger, Esquire, has engaged in the highest form of

advocacy for the individuals he served, the hard fought battle to win benefits

for these individuals has due to the unpopularity of this cause, and the

unpopularity of providing additional funds for individuals with develop-

mental disabilities, made the balance of his practice more difficult.” R. 454,

499 at Tab 3, R. 624, Tab 4, Margulies Declaration at 79.

* Rossman Affidavit - Jonathan Rossman, Esq. represented

individuals with disabilities in private practice after serving as the

Executive Director of the Medicaid funded Florida Advocacy Center for

Persons with Disabilities for 15 years. R.499, Tab 4, 9/2.

Mr. Rossman explained that Plaintiff’s counsel has “an exceptional

range of skills all of which are needed in this case, including significaiut

healthcare experience, significant personal experience with develop-

mentally disabled individuals and direct personal experience in

successfully litigating a massive, multi-party case against the Depart-

ment of Health & Rehabilitative Services to obtain a preliminary

injunction under the very same statute which is the basis for Doe uv.

Chiles, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a). Id. at 19.

Mr. Rossman testified that he was professionally familiar with Plain-

tiff’s lead counsel,,and met with him on numerous occasions from

“1990 through the present in regard to matters affecting developmen-

tally disabled individuals. I have personal knowledge of Mr. Weinger’s

work and I have reviewed portions of some of the filings prepared by

Mr. Weinger in the lawsuit entitled John/Jane Does No.’s 1-13, et al. v.

Lawton Chiles, et al.” R. 453, Rossman Affidavit at 74. Mr. Rossman

further attested in his Affidavit that “both Mr. Weinger and his law

firm have established extremely positive reputations for their legal

talents and public service, particularly for their work in complex

Federal Court litigation” Rossman Affidavit at 8.

* Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Affidavit - Plaintiffs’ lead counsel was

uniquely qualified to represent these Plaintiffs. Plaintiff is a 1978

(Continued on following page)

graduate of the University of Chicago Law School, who was also an

instructor at the University of Miami School of Law and who taught

courses in Section 1983 litigation. Mr. Weinger was also involved in

preparation of a case book on Section 1983 litigation. R. 453, 499, Ex. 2

Affidavit of Steven M. Weinger, Tab 2, JJ 1, 3 and 4.

In addition to his educational background, membership in relevant

professional associations and national recognition (R. 453), he has

substantial relevant legal experience. For over 20 years, his practice

has been devoted almost exclusively to litigation, largely in Federal

Court and more often then not involving complex litigation. R. 453.

Plaintiffs’ lead counsel has a significant experience in class actions and

was first recognized as having substantial experience in representing

Plaintiffs in class actions by former Chief Judge for the Southern

District of Florida, The Honorable James Lawrence King in 1982.

R. 453, Ex. 2. R. 499 Tab 2 J11(a). Thus, Mr. Weinger had substantial

experience in litigating complex class action cases in federal court prior

to filing the instant case in 1992. R. 499 Tab 2 at 911(b).

In addition to experience in complex class action litigation, Mr. Weinger

was uniquely well-suited to represent the Plaintiffs in the instant case

due to his expertise in the area of health law. See R. 453, Ex. 2, 499 911

documenting his experience in federal litigation against state officials

who were Defendants in this case, or their predecessors, for violation of

the Medicaid Act, and experience in administrative iitigation against

the State and Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.

Mr. Weinger’s law firm “was the only firm, sole practitioner or legal

advocacy group willing to undertake legal representation of the

Plaintiffs against the State of Florida in the instant matter.” R. 453, Ex.

2, R. 499, Tab 3 Affidavit 2.

“As a result of this litigation, Plaintiffs’ counsel has been criticized by

Florida officials and has, as a result lost potential clientele who have

determined that their interests would be better served by engaging an

attorney who is not actively litigating such a controversial case against

state officials.” R.499 Tab 3 at 96. “Numerous facets of this lawsuit

constituted priority work which required substantial expenditures of time

and effort within a relatively short period of time. This summer in

particular, I was precluded from accepting other employment due to my

commitment to this case.” Weinger also verified that “all of the factual

assertions in the Memorandum of Law are true and correct to the best of

my knowledge,” and that “our law firm expended 1,193 hours as

described in detail in time records attached hereto.” R. 453, Ex. 2,

R. 499 Tab 3 78 and 9.

9

obtained exceptional results and that the case itself was

exceptional.

a. Defendants’ Admissions as to the Magni-

tude of the Case

In support of their Motion for Stay of the Final Judg-

ment, Defendants argued that compliance with the Judg-

ment would cost hundreds of millions of dollars and take

years to accomplish. R. 461. Defendants took the same

position befoie the Eleventh Circuit in their Emergency

Motion for Stay, arguing that compliance would require

expenditure of an “astronomical amount.” See Appellants’

Emergency Motion for Stay of January 17, 1997 at 3.

Defendants asserted to the District Court that the cost of

providing prompt treatment to class members would be

between $750,000,000 to one billion dollars. R. 490-491,

R. 599, Transcript of November 4, 1998 hearing at 49

where Defendants’ counsel stated, “Moreover, I think

despite the fact that Mr. Weinger was accurate, not only I,

but my clients have made public in record statements that

in order to comply with this Court’s final judgment would

cost the state between somewhere between 750 (sic) to a

billion dollars annually. I think the accurate number is

now the one that is being discussed currently, which is

possibly two thousand people total, but six hundred here

who are in immediate need.”

It should be noted that after losing the appeal on the

merits, Defendants refused to comply with the Judgment,

claiming that the offer of an ICF/DD placement to the

surviving 12 named Plaintiffs at minimal cost was complete

compliance. R. 579 at 5-9. As the Eleventh Circuit explained

in the second appeal, “the defendants themselves have

10

always understood that the relief granted in the final

judgment was intended to be system-wide, and not just

limited to the named Plaintiffs.” Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d

1037, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001). As a result, the litigation has

benefited the 2000 eligible individuals as well as the

hundreds or thousands of newly eligible developmentally

disabled individuals who have entered the system since

the Plaintiffs prevailed.

b. 2001 Status Report of National Associa-

tion of State Directors of Developmen-

tal Disabilities Services, Inc.

Plaintiff also filed the 2001 Status Report of the

National Association of State Directors of Developmental

Disability Services, Inc., a “trade” association of State

Directors administering Medicaid programs in the 50

states. R. 624, Tab 6. That report specifically referred to

the instant case as follows:

In March of 1998, the Eleventh U.S. [Court] of

Appeals handed down a watershed decision in the

Florida Does v. Chiles (now Doe v. Bush) litigation

that made it clear that federal Medicaid law does

not permit a state to ‘wait list’ individuals for

ICF/MR services indefinitely. The Court ruled

that ICF/MR services were no different than any

other non-waiver Medicaid service, namely such

services must be furnished with reasonable

promptness to eligible applicants. Most waiting

list lawsuits elsewhere have been filed on the

heels of this decision ... While the decision ap-

plies to states in the Eleventh Circuit, it has been

frequently cited as the basis of lawsuits filed in

other Federal circuits. R. 624, Tab 6, Status Re-

port at 5 (emphasis added).

11

The Status Report went on to note that “as of March

2001, waiting list lawsuits have been filed in 15 states.”

R. 624, Tab 6, Status Report at 6.

Moreover, and as a result of this case, Florida’s “fund-

ing for developmental services has increased by approxi-

mately $360,000,000 over the past two years.” R. 624, Tab

6, Status Report at 7. Thus, in the opinion of the Associa-

tion for State Developmental Disability Directors, i.e.,

counter-parts of the Defendants in the other 49 states, this

was “a watershed” decision with a significant and far

reaching impact on the lives of developmentally disabled

individuals throughout the country. R. 624, Tab 6.

The remarkable impact of this case is also seen in the

remarkable increase in funding for services for individuals

with developmental disabilities in Florida and the re-

peated citations to Doe v. Chiles throughout the country in

support of successful litigation to expand available health-

care services. The decision has also been cited in dozens of

law review articles, treatises and cases.

In terms of making services available to individuals

with developmental disabilities, no other case in the

country has had as significant an impact as Doe v. Chiles.

Defendants in this case valued the impact at hundreds of

millions of dollars in additional services annually. Nation-

ally, the impact is in the billions of dollars in new services

for eligible individuals.

c. Defendants’ Conduct and Other Circum-

stances Made This Litigation Excep-

tionally Challenging

Against all odds, without legal precedent, ignoring the

Defendants’ threats, without help from lawyers who

12

receive federal and state funds to advocate and litigate for

individuals with disabilities, Plaintiffs’ counsel success-

fully litigated this case for over a decade. R. 1-628. Thir-

teen years later, after 628 docket entries in the District

Court and four appeals to the Eleventh Circuit, Defen-

dants argued unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeals that

the maximum total allowable fee is $91,896.75. This

proposed figure includes over $27,000 in costs and all legal

work in the trial Court and in the Court of Appeals on the

appeal on the merits. Petitioner’s Brief to Eleventh Circuit

at 44. Defendants’ proposed figure works out to $47.00

(Forty-Seven Dollars) per hour for the hours found reason-

able and necessary by the District Court and by all of the

experts. Defendants’ position on attorney’s fees is a power-

ful reminder of their litigation strategy from the inception

of this case.

As a consequence of this case, Florida increased

funding of services to its Medicaid eligible and develop-

mentally disabled citizens by Three Hundred Sixty Million

Dollars ($360,000,000.00) annually. See R. 624, Tab 6, at 7.

Since entry of the Final Judgment literally billons of

dollars in additional services have been provided.

Preparing and litigating this lawsuit was particularly

challenging because:

1. The Defendants promised that they would

litigate every possible issue and appeal every

single Order (R. 453, Affidavit 2 of Weinger

at 73) and they kept their promise as re-

flected in the docket sheet showing over 600

entries to date

13

2. The stakes could not be higher. Prompt place-

ment was a matter of life and death for many of

the class members.’ The cost of the services or-

dered by the District Court and affirmed by this

Court was determined by the Defendants to be

Seven Hundred Million Dollars ($700,000,000)

to $1,000,000,000 (One Billion Dollars). E.g.

453, St. Petersburg Times Article; R. 599 at 49

(transcript of 11/4/98 hearing at which Defen-

dants’ counsel specifically admitted that De-

fendants and their counsel had made public

statements that compliance with the Final

Judgment would cost the state somewhere “be-

tween $750 million to a billion dollars annu-

ally.”) Research discloses that State of Florida

Officials have never been sued in a case that

the State determined would have this signifi-

cant a financial impact other than the litiga-

tion to clean up the Everglades.

3. The clients could not be more difficult to repre-

sent. These individuals are the lowest function-

ing developmentally disabled individuals. Many

are non-verbal. Many are non-ambulatory. Many

are fragile with severe medical problems. Many

have extraordinarily difficult behaviors. R. 453,

Tab 8. The Plaintiffs were unable to be gainfully

employed because of their severe disabilities

| * In her affidavit filed in 1996 in the case, federally recognized

Qualified Mental Retarded Professional (“QMRP”) Kathryn Whitaker

advised that John Doe 3 died in an non-ICF/DD group home in the

summer of 1993 during a “seizure- status-epileptics.” Ms. Whitaker

noted that “the group home did not have any nurses on staff or staff

trained in the manner which meets the requirements of the training of

staff at an ICF/DD facility and by the time the home finally dialed 911

John Doe 3 was deceased.” R. 453 Whitaker Affidavit, Ex. 8.

14

and were therefore indigent and Medicaid eligi-

ble.

4. The Defendants promised retribution against

the Plaintiff’s counsel, caused the loss of

business from paying healthcare clients seek-

ing to resolve differences with the Defen-

dants’ offices (Defendants were the heads of

the Agency for Health Care Administration,

which operates the entire Florida Medicaid

Program and all health care licensing, and

the Department of Children and Families)

R. 453, Ex. 3, Affidavit 2 of Weinger at 43;

R. 454, 499 Margulies Declaration at 49.

5. No advocacy groups or public interest law-

yers were willing or competent to gather the

facts, learn the law, and take on the tremen-

dous burden of this litigation. R. 454, 499,

Margulies Declaration at 6.

Defendants repeatedly misrepresented the facts in the record

and took frivolous positions. Defendants denied many of the

allegations of the Complaint and then failed to present any

evidence supporting the denial of these allegations during

the course of the litigation and raised numerous affirmative

defenses, none of which had a legal or factual basis. Indeed,

on their appeal on the merits, the Eleventh Circuit described

Defendants’ factual argument that class members were not

being harmed by the Defendants’ delay in providing services

as “meritless” and “frivolous” and described Defendants’

argument on the alleged lack of standing based on the lack of

harm as “unworthy of further discourse.” Doe v. Chiles,

supra at 713, n.7.

15

C. The Total Fee Award

In 2003, based on the foregoing analysis, the District

Court awarded Plaintiffs fees of $649,869.50. Order, R. 627

at 7. This sum includes fees for both the work performed

in the District Court since the inception of the case which

was filed in 1992, through March 2003 and the fees for the

successful appellate work before the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals.

+

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

The Defendants’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari should

be denied because the decision of the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals is not inconsistent with the decisions of

this Court; does not conflict with the decisions of any other

Court of Appeals; does not decide a federal question in a

way that conflicts with a decision of a state court of last

resort; does not call for this Court’s exercise of its supervi-

sory powers; and does not decide an important issue of

federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by

this Court. In sum, the decisions below properly apply

existing precedent to the facts presented.

16

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AWARDED

PLAINTIFFS AN UPWARD ADJUSTMENT OF

THE LODESTAR BASED ON FINDINGS THAT

THIS WAS A RARE AND EXCEPTIONAL CASE;

“EXCEPTIONAL SUCCESS” AND “GROUND

BREAKING RESULTS” ACHIEVED BY PLAIN-

TIFFS

The District Court’s Order explained that it was:

enhancing the lodestar fees for both the motion

for attorneys’ fees and the supplemental claim for

attorneys’ fees by a multiplier of 2.0 because this

is a rare and exceptional case where upward ad-

justment of the lodestar is appropriate due to ex-

ceptional success. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

898-99 (1984) (recognizing an enhanced award of

attorneys’ fees in cases of exceptional success);

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)

“in some cases of exceptional success an en-

hanced award may be justified”); Loranger v.

Stierheim, 10 at F.3d 776, 783 (1994) (declining

to decide whether the case was a “rare and ex-

ceptional case where an award went upward ad-

justment of the lodestar is called for because of

exceptional success”); Allen v. Freeman, 694

F. Supp. 1554, 1556 (1988) (court found enhance-

ment of the lodestar amount apnropriate because

the results of the litigation were exceptional.) Pet.

App.8.

The District Court went on to state it:

also considered the exceptional success and

groundbreaking results achieved by the plaintiffs

in this case. In 1996, a judgment was entered for

the Plaintiffs ordering state officials to provide

institutional care for eligible applicants, some of

whom have been waiting for many years without

17

proper care. That judgment was affirmed on ap-

peal by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in

an opinion which painstakingly established the

law to govern this case and several related cases

which followed. See, Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709

(11th Circuit 1998). Pet. App.9.

The District Court’s findings were amply supported by

the record.® As set forth in the Margulies and Weinger

* Apart from an enhancement because of the rare and exceptional

nature of this case, Plaintiffs in this eleven year old case are entitled to

an upward adjustment of the fee based upon the seven year delay in the

receipt of payment since entry of the Final Judgment in 1996. In

Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 283 (1989), this Court approved the

enhancement of fees to compensate attorneys for delay in payment. As

this Court explained:

[C]ases have repeatedly stressed that attorneys fees

awarded under this statute [§1988] are to be based on mar-

ket rates for services rendered. Clearly, compensation re-

ceived several years after the services were rendered — as they

frequently are in complex civil rights litigation — is not equiva-

lent to the same dollar amount received reasonably and

promptly as legal services are performed, as would normally

be the case with private billings. We agree, therefore, that

an appropriate adjustment for delay in payment — whether

by the application of current rather than historic hourly

rates or otherwise — is within the contemplation of the

statute. Jd. at 283-284 (citations omitted) (emphasis

added).

See also, Norman v. Housing Authority of City Montgomery, 836 F.2d

1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 1988) [“In this Circuit, where there is a delay the

court should take into account the time value of money and the effects

of inflation and generally award compensation at current rate: rather

than at historic rates”]; Davis v. Locke, 936 F.2d 1208 (11th Cir. 1991),

(multiplier for delay and difficulty obtaining counsel and risk); Formby

uv. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 904 F.2d 627, 633-34 (11th Cir. 1990)

(1.33 multiplier for delay); Tufaro v. Willie, 756 F. Supp. 556, 563 (S.D.

Fla. 1991); Amico v. Newcastle County, 654 F. Supp. 982, 1008 (D. Del.

1987); Weiss v. York Hospital, 628 F. Supp. 1392, 1414-15 (N.D. Pa.

1986); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, 568

(Continued on following page)

18

Affidavits, this was a complex case presenting novel

issues. R. 624 at Tab 4 and 5 especially Margulies Affida-

vit at 97 noting “the case is extremely complex and will

require a thorough knowledge of highly specialized areas

of law such as the Federal Medicaid Statutes and Regula-

tions, the inner-workings of the Florida Medicaid Plan and

comprehensive knowledge of the Federal Civil Rights Law.

At the time the case was brought, the claim was unique

and novel.” See also R. 624, Tab 6, Status Report by

National Association of State Directors of Developmentally

Disability Services, Inc., at 5, describing this case as a

“watershed” and groundbreaking case, noting the decision

has “been frequently cited as the basis of lawsuits filed in

other federal circuits”, and that “most waiting list lawsuits

elsewhere have been filed on the heels of this decision.”

Moreover, as documented in filings for the District

Court, this cause was an unpopular one and adversely

affected Plaintiffs’ counsel’s law firm. No other attorneys,

even those working with advocacy groups, were willing to

accept this case. R. 454. “As a result of litigation” lead

counsel’s “reputation among elected officials in the state

and executive branch has been severely hurt ... and the

hard fought battle to win benefits for these individuals

has, due to the unpopularity of this cause, and the un-

popularity of providing additional funds to individuals

with developmental disabilities, made the balance of his

F. Supp. 1020, 1033 (E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 79 BR

321, 346-350 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1987); Cerva v. EBR Enterprises, 740

F. Supp. 1099, 1106-1109 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Williams v. Marriott Corp.,

669 F. Supp. 2, 6 (D.C. 1987); U.S. v. Aisenberg, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1272

(N.D. Fla. 2003) (1.5 multiplier based on five year delay).

19

practice more difficult.” R. 454 at 79. As a result, Plaintiffs’

counsel's practice suffered. R. 453, Ex. 3, Weinger Affidavit,

explaining that potential clients determined their interests

would be better served by using another attorney without

such an adversarial relationship with state officials.

II. NEITHER THE PER CURIAM AFFIRMANCE

NOR THE UNPUBLISHED DISTRICT COURT

OPINION CONFLICT WITH PRIOR DECISIONS

OF THIS COURT OR ANY OTHER COURTS OF

APPEAL

In their Petition to this court, the Defendants fail to

set forth any decision that conflicts with the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeal’s affirmance in this case or with

the District Court’s opinion. This is not surprising as the

decision of the Eleventh Circuit does not cite any cases,

but is instead a per curiam affirmance without opinion,

citing to Eleventh Circuit Rule 36.1. Eleventh Circuit Rule

36.1 provides in pertinent part:

When the court determines that any of the fol-

lowing circumstances exist:

(a) judgment of the district court is

based on findings of fact that are

not clearly erroneous; .. .

(e) judgment has been entered without

a reversible error of law; and opin-

ion would have no precedential

value, the judgment or order may

be affirmed without opinion.

The Court of Appeals and the District Court both

applied relevant law. There is no conflict between this case

20

and the cases cited by the Defendants. Thus, no conflict

exists justifying a grant of certiorari in this case.

A. The Decisions Follow All Prior Decisions

of This Court

This Court has made clear that attorney’s fee cases

are determined by their respective facts, and the District

Court is given substantial discretion in determining the

appropriate fee. See e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424, 430, 437 (1983) noting “the amount of the fee, of

course, must be determined on the facts of each case”; and

emphasizing “the district court’s superior understanding of

the litigation and the desiiability of avoiding frequent

appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.”

Upward enhancements of a lodestar are authorized by

this Court in Hensley and its progeny. See e.g. Blum uv.

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984); Pennsylvania v. Delaware

Valley Citizens’ Council For Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986).

Thus, as this Court held in Hensley, “the product of the

reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the

inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the

District Court to adjust the fee upward or downward, includ-

ing the important factor of the results obtained.” Hensley,

supra at 434. Hensley involved a §1983 claim for fees where

Plaintiffs had not succeeded on all their claims and did not

involve an upward adjustment to the lodestar. This Court

remanded the case for the District Court to consider the

relationship between Plaintiffs’ success in the litigation and

the fee award, which is exactly what the District Court did in

this case. Hensley, therefore, does not conflict with the

District Court’s decision in this case, as Defendants do not

challenge the lodestar in their Petition, and as it expressly

— r j

21

recognizes that the District Court is authorized to adjust

the fee up or down, based on its superior knowledge of the

litigation and based on relevant considerations.

Defendants also rely on Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886

(1984). There is no conflict between Blum and this case. In

Blum, this Court reaffirmed that “a District Court is author-

ized, in its discretion, to allow a prevailing party an upward

adjustment in attorney’s fees in cases of exceptional success.”

Blum, supra at 896. This Court in Blum rejected the Defen-

dants’ argument that “upward adjustments are never reason-

able” but reversed the fee award because the District Court’s

award of an enhancement in that case was based partially on

a contingency risk factor. This was not a basis for the multi-

plier awarded in this case. Moreover, unlike the Plaintiffs in

this case, the plaintiff in Blum failed to carry her burden of

proving that an upward adjustment was justified.

In Blum, this Court explained that, “the record before us

contains no evidence supporting an upward adjustment of

fees calculated under the basic standard of reasonable rates

times reasonable hours. The affidavits of Respondent’s

attorneys do not claim, or even mention, entitlement to a

bonus or upward revision.” Blum, supra at 896. In contrast,

the issue of a multiplier in this case was extensively sup-

ported by competent, substantial, uncontroverted evidence

and this issue was litigated by the parties before the District

Court and the Court of Appeals. The District Court made

specific findings upon which it based enhancement of the

lodestar including “the groundbreaking results achieved by

the Plaintiff in this case” and the Eleventh Circuit’s affir-

mance which it described as “an opinion which painstakingly

established the law to govern this case as well as several

related cases which followed.” Pet. App.9. Moreover, the

Plaintiffs in this case, as set forth in the affidavits and

~

22

other record evidence, established the exceptional and

indeed seminal nature of this litigation. See e.g. R. 490-91,

R. 599, R. 624, Tabs 1-7. As set forth in the record before

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the decision has

been described as “watershed” and led to the filing of

similar cases on behalf of developmentally disabled indi-

viduals in at least 15 other states. R. 624, Tab 6.

Defendants also refer to this Court’s decision in

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council For

Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986). Again, the facts of that

case are inapposite to the facts of this case and the opinion

of the District Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals in this case are wholly consistent with this

Court’s opinion in Delaware Valley. First, the enhancement

that was reversed in the Delaware Valley case was based

partially on a contingency risk multiplier. Delaware Valley,

supra at 555-556. This factor did not form any part of the

analysis of the District Court in this case. Moreover, in

Delaware Valley this Court reaffirmed its holding in

Hensley reiterating that “the product of reasonable hour

times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry. There

remain other considerations that may lead the District

Court to adjust the fee upward or downward ....” Dela-

ware Valley at 564, citations to Hensley v. Eckerhart.

This Court then reiterated that in Hensley it “took a

more expansive view of what those ‘other considerations’

might be,” noting that “the District Court also may con-

sider the factors identified in Johnson v. Georgia Highway

Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). Delaware

Valley, supra at 564.

Finally this Court in Delaware Valley held that up-

ward adjustments in “rare” and “exceptional” cases are

23

allowed when supported by specific evidence on the record

and findings by the lower court. Delaware Valley, supra at

064. As in Blum, this Court in Delaware Valley reversed

the fee award because the Plaintiff in that case “presented

no specific evidence as to what made the results it ob-

tained .. . ‘so outstanding’.” Delaware Valley, supra at 567-

568. Indeed, this Court in Delaware Valley based its

decision in part on the District Court’s “elimination of a

large number of hours on the grounds that they were

unnecessary, unreasonable, or unproductive” as this was

“not supportive of the [District] Court’s later conclusion

that the remaining hours represented work o' ‘superior

quality’.” Delaware Valley, supra at 568. In contrast, the

District Court in the case at bar did not make any findings

inconsistent with superior quality work and Plaintiffs in

this case presented substantial, uncontroverted evidence

of the rare and exceptional nature of this case.

The only other Supreme Court decision cited by Defen-

dants is City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).

Defendants seem to admit in their petition that Dague is

distinguishable from this case as it stands solely for the

proposition that an enhancement for contingency of an

attorney’s fees award to a prevailing party is not permitted.

Thus, there is no conflict with Dague as Plaintiffs in this case

were not awarded a multiplier based on contingency.

B. The Decision Does Not Conflict with the

Decisions of Any Other Circuit Court

None of the circuit court decisions cited by Defendants

present a conflict with this case. Planned Parenthood of

Central and Northern California v. Arizona, 789 F.2d 1348

(9th Cir. 1986) predates the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

24

Guam Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Ada,

100 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 1996), a section 1983 action against

state officials where the Court of Appeals affirmed a

multiplier of two times the lodestar amount because of the

“visible and controversial nature of the case.” This case is

wholly consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s more recent

decision in the Guam case, cited by Plaintiffs in their

Motions for Attorney’s Fees filed with the District Court,

and in their brief to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Further, there is no inconsistency between this case

and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Planned Parenthood.

The Pianned Parenthood case involved a request for a

multiplier based in part on the contingency aspect of the

case and was decided six years before this Court directly

addressed this issue in City of Burlington v. Dague, 505

U.S. 557 (1992). Moreover, the Plaintiffs in Planned

Parenthood failed to provide any evidence “that the repre-

sentation actually posed a substantial risk to the law

firm’s business or that any risk presented was not ade-

quately taken into consideration in setting the hourly

rate.” Pianned Parenthood, supra at 1354. In contrast,

Plaintiffs in the case at bar made a compelling and uncon-

troverted showing that the law firm was shunned by

paying healthcare clients as a result of this suit against

state healthcare officials, that the life or death nature of

this case adversely affected Plaintiffs’ counsel’s law firm

and also established other factors supporting an enhance-

ment including the groundbreaking and beneficial results

of this litigation. R. 490-91; 590; 626.

Defendants suggest that this case conflicts with Van

Gerwen v. Guarantee Mutual Life Company, 214 F.3d 1041

(9th Cir. 2000). In Van Gerwen, an ERISA case, the Ninth

Circuit reversed an award of a multiplier where there was

25

no evidence the case was rare and unusual and where the

Plaintiffs’ attorney's work was inferior. Indeed, as the

Ninth Circuit noted in that case, the District Court had

reduced the award by applying a “downward multiplier” of

.75 based on the “poor quality of the attorney’s work.” Van

Gerwen, supra at 1044. (emphasis added). The Appeals

Court in Van Gerwen reversed, holding that the District

Court could not reduce the rates based on the poor quality

of representation without making findings of fact. Van

Gerwen, supra at 1049. Van Gerwen is therefore patently

distinguishable from the case at bar where the opposite

was true as the District Court specifically found that the

Plaintiffs’ counsel did a superior job.

Defendants’ reliance on Odima v. Western Tucson Hotel,

53 F.3d 1484 (9th Cir. 1994) is also meritless. In Odima, a

partial success case, the Circuit Court found that the Plain-

tiff had failed to demonstrate that an enhancement to the

lodestar was justified. The Ninth Circuit in Odima simply

remanded the case as the District Court did not set forth

sufficient information supportive of the enhancement.

Odima, supra at 1500. There is therefore no conflict between

Odima and this case when the record here is replete with

evidence supporting lodestar adjustment.

UNR Industries v. Schwartz, Cooper, Kolb & Gaynor

Charter, 986 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983) also does not conflict

with the case at bar. In UNR, a bankruptcy case, the

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals simply affirmed the

District Court’s decision that the bankruptcy judge’s

denial of a multiplier under 11 U.S.C. §330 was not clearly

erroneous. UNR, supra at 211. UNR did not involve 42

U.S.C. §1988 or any fee shifting statute. Most importantly,

the discussion and analysis of fee enhancement in UNR is

entirely consistent with the decisions in this case.

26

In Cooper v. Pentecost, 77 F.3d 829 (5th Cir. 1996), a

1985 class action brought on behalf of prisoners against a

County jail, the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court’s

Order awarding attorney’s fees and denying a multiplier.

Again, unlike this case, the District Court in Cooper found

that the Plaintiff submitted duplicative, repetitive and

excessive hours. Cooper, supra at 832. Such is not the case

here. Moreover, directly contrary to the record in this case,

the record in Cooper showed no “oppressive, unpleasant or

intimidating conditions” affecting Plaintiffs’ counsel which

would support an enhancement. Cooper, supra at 834.

In Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1993) the

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the virtually

axiomatic legal principle that a District Court has “broad

discretion in setting reasonable attorney’s fees” and con-

cluded the District Court “did not abuse its discretion” by

refusing to either enhance or reduce the lodestar in a Voting

Rights Act case. Watkins, supra at 460. There is therefore no

conflict between Fordice and the decisions in this case.

Finally, Defendants rely on Hendrickson v. Branstad,

934 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1991). Hendrickson is also cistin-

guishable from the case at bar az.d is not inconsistent with

this case. Hendrickson, unlike this case, is a case where the

Plaintiff was only partially successful in his claims. Hen-

drickson, supra at 161. As the Court in Hendrickson noted

the enhancement was based in part on a contingency risk

multiplier, not a factor here. Hendrickson, supra at 163.

Moreover, the District Court in Hendrickson found

that counsel was awarded a large amount of billable hours

in the case and the Court of Appeals found therefore that

the lodestar was reasonable. Hendrickson, supra at 164. In

27

contrast, Plaintiffs in this case billed a “relatively low

number” of hours, as found by District Court. Pet. App.8.

C. No Lack of Uniformity Exists in the Cir-

cuit Court Decisions

Defendants suggest that certiorari in this case is re-

quired due to lack of “uniformity” and “caprice” in Circuit

Court decisions on this issue. Petition at 15. Defendants cite

to Hyatt v. Apfel, 195 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 1999). Defendants

state that the Fourth Circuit in Hyatt “ignored or skirted the

requirement for specific facts in the record to justify an

enhancement.” Petition at 14. This allegation is simply

wrong and even a cursory review of the Fourth Circuit’s

decision in Hyatt establishes the inaccuracy of this state-

ment, As the Fourth Circuit explained in its well reasoned

opinion, the litigation in that case was over a decade old and

had been the subject of “four published opinions of this court,

a remand by the United States Supreme Court, and numer-

ous District Court decisions leading up to the appeals.”

Hyatt, supra at 189-90.

In its lengthy opinion, the Fourth Circuit quoted the

District Court’s findings supporting an enhancement in

that case. The District Court’s findings were detailed and

specific. Hyatt supra at 191-93. As a portion of the District

Court’s decision reproduced in the Fourth Circuit opinion

noted, “the success achieved by Plaintiff is properly char-

acterized as exceptional. Plaintiffs have succeeded in

bringing about fundamental change to a recalcitrant

agency which brought all of the power of the federal

government to bear on Plaintiffs and their counsel while it

resisted Plaintiffs’ efforts to enforce the orders of this

Court and the Fourth Circuit each step of the way.” Hyatt,

supra at 191-193.

—

28

Defendants also again overreach when they describe

the Miniscribe Corp. decision also as having “ignored or

skirted the requirements for specific facts in the record to

justify an enhancement.” Jn re Miniscribe Corp., 309 F.3d

1234 (10th Cir. 2002), a bankruptcy case, the Tenth Circuit

Court of Appeals in a detailed opinion exhaustively de-

scribed the proceedings below which involved a claim for

attorney’s fees by a trustee. The Tenth Circuit found that

the lodestar test is the appropriate method of calculating

reasonable compensation for a Chapter 7 trustee. The

Court reduced the hourly rate of $500 per hour, and

affirmed the 2.57 lodestar multiplier awarded by the

bankruptcy court, “given the strong findings by the bank-

ruptcy court in support of its determination that the result

achieved was sufficiently extraordinary to justify a multi-

plier, and the reasoning of the District Court flowing from

these findings, we cannot conclude, based on our standard

of review, that the District Court erred by applying a 2.57

multiplier.” Miniscribe, supra at 1245.

The Defendants’ characterization of the Sixth Circuit

Court of Appeals’ decision in Paschal v. Flagstar Bank, FSB,

297 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2002) is simply wrong. Defendants’

statement that the “circuit court approved a 50% enhance-

ment where the District Court concluded only that the

hourly rate awarded was ‘modest’” is not accurate. Petition

at 15 (emphasis added). In fact, the Sixth Circuit in Paschal

noted that in addition to the relatively low hourly rate

awarded, the District Court’s decision to enhance the attor-

ney’s fee award was also expressly based on the “excellent job

the attorneys did at trial, the fact that the case involved

claims that were difficult to prove, and the fact that the

marshalling of evidence was an arduous and time consuming

task.” Paschal, supra at 435-37. The Sixth Circuit found that

29

based on the relevant law, the record and those findings, the

District Court did not abuse its discretion. Paschal, supra at

436.

III. DEFENDANTS’ CRITICISM OF THE FAC.-

TORS ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT FOR

THE DETERMINATION OF A REASONABLE

FEE ARE MERITLESS

Defendants complain that this Court’s intervention is

necessary for the uniform application of these standards.

Defendants’ petition fails to provide any convincing reason

for further clarification or formulation of standards govern-

ing attorney's fee awards in general or as to public bodies in

particular. The Defendants’ suggestion that this Court

eliminate one of the factors relevant to determination of a

reasonable fee award, i.e., that other counsel were not

available and that the Plaintiffs were unpopular because of

differences as to those facts is meritless. Trial courts are

well-suited for weighing facts and applying the law. As this

Court has indicated these cases are fact specific. Changing

the law as requested by Defendants would not produce

predictability of decisions or uniformity among courts.

Significantly, there was no difference of opinion between the

District Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in

this case, nor among the members of the panel that affirmed

this decision.

Defendants are understandably unhappy with the

results of this litigation and of the attorney's fee award.

However, Defendants failed to rebut substantial evidence

submitted by the Plaintiffs establishing the existence of all

the factors relevant to the fees ultimately awarded by the

District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in this

case. Thus while the Defendants hypothize that “improperly

30

imposed fee enhancements” “threaten the financial stability of

public programs and services and could result in diminished

public services for all” (Plaintiffs’ Petition at 16), in the case at

bar the end result was quite predictable and could have been

avoided by Defendants. Defendants moreover failed to contro-

vert, rebut or address this evidence, including affidavits and

other evidence expressly establishing the appropriateness of a

fee enhancement. See, e.g., R. 490-91, 599, 624.

Defendants’ intent in requesting this Court to change

the law and disturb well-established precedent is no doubt

motiy <d by their dissatisfaction with the factual findings

upon which the legal conclusions of the District Court and

the Eleventh Circuit rest in this case. However, this Court

does not normally grant certiorari in such cases. See, e.g.,

United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 221 (1925) “we do

not grant a certiorari to review evidence and discuss the

specific facts.”

¢

CONCLUSION

The Petition for Certiorari should be denied since the

lower Courts correctly applied the standard.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN M. WEINGER, ESQUIRE*

HELENA M. TETZELI, ESQUIRE

KURZBAN KURZBAN WEINGER &

TETZELI, P.A.

2650 SW 27th Avenue, 2nd Floor

Miami, Florida 33133

(305) 444-0060

Attorneys for Respondent

*Counsel of Record

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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