Opposition Brief — Regier, Secretary, Florida Department of Children & Families v. Does 1-13
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No. 03-1445 MAY 19 2004
HF CLERK
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In The
Supreme Court of the Anited States
ry
v
JERRY REGIER, et al.,
Petitioners,
V.
DOES 1-13, et al.,
Respondents.
,
v
On Petiticn For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eleventh Circuit
>
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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
,
v
STEVEN M. WEINGER, ESQUIRE*
HELENA M. TETZELI, ESQUIRE
KURZBAN KURZBAN WEINGER &
TETZELI, P.A.
2650 SW 27th Avenue, 2nd Floor
Miami, Florida 33133
(305) 444-0060
Attorneys for Respondent
*Counsel of Record
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit followed the decisions of this Court and
does not conflict with decisions of other Circuit Courts
when it affirmed the District Court’s award of attorney’s
fees in favor of Plaintiffs in their Section 1983 Civil Rights
Class Action in which they represented a class of several
thousand developmentally disabled individuals eligible for
and in need of specialized Medicaid services who had *»..1
deprived of services by Defendants for :naay years.
OBJECTIONS TO PETITIONERS’
“QUESTIONS PRESENTED”
Petitioners ignore the well-established standards for
certiorari review by this Court. This Court does “not grant
a certiorari to review evidence and discuss the specific
facts.” United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 221 (1925).
In this case the competent substantial evidence amply
supports the opinions below.
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The parties to this proceeding are:
Petitioners-Defendants: The Petitioners/Defendants are
Jerry Regier, Secretary of the Florida Department of Chil-
dren and Families; Mary Ellen McDonald, District 11
Administrator, Florida Department of Children and
Families; Michelle Brantley, Assistant Secretary, Florida
Department of Children and Families; and Robert Sharpe,
Medicaid Director, Florida Agency for Health Care Ad-
ministration.
Respondents-Plaintiffs: The Respondents are eleven
named Plaintiffs who represent a class of several thousand
developmentally disabled individuals who were eligible for
and in need of specialized Medicaid Services in ICF/DDs.
ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
EFI ree PIII EUOED vissiniissscicecsstesstenccvasssceniscaces i
OBJECTIONS TO PETITIONERS’ “QUESTIONS
TEI voncsons aah cecnsestibantnonssstinncsonskatsuneraorenienk i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS .....................088. ii
Re COE PT BM ED csscesnirisiveasicesscctesertinssctsnsinns ili
TRL OF ALTO 8 EG scsevscinsestssscesesrscesecsayeresses Vv
I SIN gains coccnsncdssnvctaceneesecsacnavssessebeaenses 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ........scscscovsccessvessenseeeees 1
STATEMENT OF THE FPACTS.....0.sccsscscoscsscccscessnecees 2
Bi, RAGE FID GD once sth cnsidxiecnsscrsecsncssdnvseciverscs 2
B. The Fee Award Is Supported By Uncontro-
I Be osiccsncetiircissicssesstcassastens 3
1. Reasonableness of the Hours Expended... 4
i Se SID iis ducvicannvinceincs crn csctainensaceusonss 5
3. The Case Was Rare And Exceptional And
Plaintiffs Obtained Exceptional Results.... 6
a. Defendants’ Admissions as to the
Magnitude of the Case.................:0.666 9
b. 2001 Status Report of National Asso-
ciation of State Directors of Develop-
mental Disabilities Services, Inc ........ 10
c. Defendants’ Conduct and Other Cir-
cumstances Made This Litigation Ex-
ceptionally Challenging...................... 11
eT Te Be aaa ick cvcs cnsdnvacccvixccacsens’ 15
lV
TABLE OF CONTENTS -— Continued
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ............ 15
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AWARDED
PLAINTIFFS AN UPWARD ADJUSTMENT OF
THE LODESTAR BASED ON FINDINGS THAT
THIS WAS A RARE AND EXCEPTIONAL CASE;
“EXCEPTIONAL SUCCESS” AND “GROUND-
BREAKING RESULTS” ACHIEVED BY PLAIN-
Eseries nadine 16
II. NEITHER THE PER CURIAM AFFIR-
MANCE NOR THE UNPUBLISHED DIS-
TRICT COURT OPINION CONFLICT WITH
PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT OR
ANY OTHER COURTS OF APPEAL.............. 19
A. The Decision Follows All Prior Decisions
ne re 20
B. The Decision Does Not Conflict with the
Decisions of Any Other Circuit Court....... 23
C. No Lack of Uniformity Exists in the Cir-
Cit Court DIOCISIOIE ...cccccceccsccsccscsscesccseesss 27
III. DEFENDANTS’ CRITICISM OF THE FAC-
TORS ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT
FOR THE DETERMINATION OF A REA-
SONABLE FEE ARE MERITLESS ................ 29
ee ais ves aztnasisdsrcinoniscsdeeaanieediiglcociectonsesiin 30
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Amico v. Newcastle County, 654 F. Supp. 982 (D.
A_POST RO PORNO a Eee SONA RE aE I TR Ten 17
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984)... Dacaastokenapniceal passim
Cerva v. EBR Enterprises, 740 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D.
Pe SG sas oistiisecs ccc eunicadaetabacesucirieisisnnatbaiaasaaenvadbeeteieaie 18
City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 657 (1992)....... 23, 24
Cooper v. Pentecost, 77 F.3d 829 (5th Cir. 1996)............... 26
Davis v. Locke, 936 F.2d 1208 (11th Cir. 1991)................. 17
Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 1998)..........000... 2, 10
Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998).............. passim
Formby v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 904 F.2d
ee i BN iiisicsnicdendodpcalaauseidgdieenenebaddauanteieebiatevs 17
Guam Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v.
ADA, 100 F.3d GOi (GE Cir, 1906) .....cccccrsssseccsessecscssees 24
Hendrickson v. Branstad, 934 F.2d 158 (8th Cir.
RRR RIRRRE SI EE cc erneh MaKe oem tN SS EC EE 26
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).................. 20, 22
Hyatt v. Apfel, 195 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 1999)... eee 27
In re Baldwin-United Corp., 79 BR 321 (Bkrtcy.
Be By I I ie inasaincsiiascnskescsuceninsnsisiskirexacstnesinetiniverees 18
In re Miniscribe Corp., 309 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir.
REE CARED ace ba eas RAIS FeO Ee EO 28
Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public
Welfare, 568 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1983)................4. 17
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d
ee I I sass ci sissadindccaisunvvccoenisiieuessanunnktanisténie 22
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
Missouri v. Jenkins, 497. U.S. 274 (1989)...........cccccceeeeeees 17
Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery,
SOG F.Be LIE CLIC Git, TRG sccseresccssisssscscessescceseassecess 17
Odima v. Western Tucson Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484 (9th
Ei AUNTIE scciudutbidaeseateasaninianenmunasesenatilegebbanniatneaeaies 25
Paschal v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 297 F.3d 431 (6th
SII sui cisshscud cobasiavenscecuaalcacana\ansuucedsendeaiesecintnaeaceaes 28, 29
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council
For Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986)...............008 20, 22, 23
Planned Parenthood of Central and Northern
California v. Arizona, 789 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.
SEINE suisse sciccmalecdunnebbiadeutssueieadsnaubuness seseesnuniesseasdatanuiats 23, 24
Tufaro v. Willie, 756 F. Supp. 556 (S.D. Fla. 1991)........... 17
U.S. v. Aisenberg, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (N.D. Fla.
SUI ssncetc asi cundi-cobuieacedsshasicaueiecabomaasamnubeninssausesanevuutauine’s 18
United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925)................ 30
UNR Industries v. Schwartz, Cooper, Kolb &
Gaynor Charter, 986 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983) .............. 25
Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mutual Life Company,
214 F.3d 1041 (Oth Cir, 2O00).......crcossccrsevcsssssorrcessees 24, 25
Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1998).................. 26
Weiss v. York Hospital, 628 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Pa.
IRR IRY Reece ate NEN O na Re, ee 17
Williams v. Marriott Corp., 669 F. Supp. 2 (D.C.
NIT asus shcanccarusiscadsaicale eebineanladdhndtiesakenenansevekdanneniceniasiictienbiinbiaieiie 18
Vil
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
OTHER
Bee es SIUIET vocchikuauiensbscoesclaciauuaainlaiacumantandistonisestiaeaniiees 25
Oe As Se iasinnsipiideiccaiasatinurennnseciennanigiacenietniconaiiial 20
I Fe hs SII vikheuscissntectsvinsskenctasscusuenokebidaessesceseueuancias 25
ee 19
1
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
The Plaintiffs/Respondents, John/Jane Does 1-13,
respectfully file this Brief in Opposition to the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit filed by the Defendants/Petitioners.
*
OPINIONS BELOW
The Court of Appeals’ per curiam affirmance is unre-
ported. The District Court’s Order awarding attorney's
fees is unreported. Both the Court of Appeals’ affirmance
without opinion and the District Court’s opinion are
reproduced in Petitioners’ Appendix.
+
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 13, 1992, Plaintiffs/Respondents (“Respon-
dents”) filed their Class Action Complaint. R.1. Final
Judgment was entered four years later on August 28, 1996.
R. 449. Defendants/Petitioners (“Defendants”) appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Final Judgment
and remanded the case with instructions to the District
Court to assess attorney’s fees against Defendants. Id.;
R. 488 (Mandate). Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir.
1998).
After entry of the Final Judgment, Defendants took
the position that they were merely required to place
language in the State Medicaid Plan setting a reasonable
waiting period but not required to actually provide ser-
vices with reasonable promptness. Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d
1037, 1047 (11th Cir. 1998). The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found Defendants’ position “untenable”. Jd. at
1047.
The District Court heard argument on the Plaintiffs’
Motion for Attorney’s Fees but entered an Order denying
the motion until all post-judgment proceedings were
completed and entered the final fee award on March 15,
2003, over eleven years after the lawsuit was commenced.
Pet. App.5-11. Defendants appealed the District Court
Order to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the fourth
appeal in this case. On January 16, 2004 the Eleventh
Circuit entered its per curiam affirmance of the District
Court’s decision. Pet. App.1-4.
4
4
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A. Nature of the Case
Plaintiffs are a class of several thousand developmen-
tally disabled individuals who were eligible for and in need
of specialized Medicaid services in the Intermediate Care
Facility for the Mentally Retarded/Developmentally
Disabled (“ICF/MR” or “ICF/DD”) program. Defendants
failed to provide ICF/DD services to Plaintiffs, relegating
them to years on waiting lists.
The ICF/DD program and the traumas suffered by the
severely disabled class members who were deprived of life-
preserving services for decades were documented by the
Eleventh Circuit in affirming the Final Judgment. Doe v.
Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998). “[T]he record ‘reveals
3
a plethora of facts showing the harm caused to developmen-
tally disabled persons by the State of Florida’s current
procedure which allows eligible Medicaid recipients who
have been determined to be in need of ICF/DD Services to be
placed on indefinite waiting lists.’” Doe v. Chiles, supra at
713, n.7. Indeed, two of the thirteen named Plaintiffs died
as the result of lack of essential services between the time
the Complaint was filed and the entry of the Final Judg-
ment. R. 627; 499, Tab 8 (1996 Whitaker Affidavit at 73).
Even after entry of the Final Judgment, Defendants
repeatedly sought to avoid compliance. Upon remand,
Defendants took the position that relief had only been
ordered for the one dozen named class representatives and
that Defendants were not required to provide any services
to the other 2,000 individuals on the State of Florida
waiting list who were eligible and awaiting services for
many years. R. 579, at 1-9.
Prior to relief in this case, Florida ranked 49th among
the states in providing for individuals with developmental
disabilities and approximately 45th in providing ICF/DD
beds per capita. R. 453, deposition of Donna Allen at 132;
R. 453, Ex. 5, letter of Governor Lawton Chiles to the
President of The Florida Senate at 1.
B. The Fee Award Is Supported By Uncontro-
verted Evidence
Through uncontroverted evidence, Plaintiffs estab-
lished all the facts necessary to support the fee awarded
by the District Court. The District Court credited this
evidence, addressed and rejected the Defendant’s objec-
tions, independently evaluated the file, and awarded the
fee justified by the evidence. Pet. App.5-12. First the
4
District Court determined the lodestar. After determining
the lodestar, the District Court determined that the
lodestar should be adjusted as to hours expended in the
District Court in accordance with established legal prece-
dent. Pet. /np.7-10. No adjustment of the lodestar was
made for the fee award for work performed on the appeal
to the Eleventh Circuit. Pet. App.11.
In adjusting the lodestar, the District Court made
specific factual findings. Pet. App.8-11. All of the factual
findings are based upon uncontroverted evidence and the
District Court’s personal observations during the course of
the proceedings. Jd. Defendants did not present any
conflicting evidence as to any of the factual findings of the
District Court used to upwardly adjust, or enhance, the
lodestar before the Court of Appeals.
Some of the evidence omitted from Defendants’
Statement of Facts is presented below.
1. Reasonableness of the Hours Expended
The Defendants claimed that the hours were unrea-
sonable even though the hours claimed were minuscule
compared to the hours expended by the Defendants’
lawyers. One minor defense lawyer (Colodny, Fass and
Talenfeld, P.A.) alone was paid for 400% more hours than
the hours claimed by Plaintiffs’ counsel. R. 462, 464, 465.
In addition, Defendants utilized the services of two other
law firms. Most significantly, a large team of lawyers from
the Office of the Attorney General was lead counsel for the
Defendants. Defendants’ legal team spent perhaps 10
times as many hours as Plaintiffs’ counsel in this case.
5
The Colodny firm was employed as private counsel for
the Secretary of the Department of Children and Families
and was paid by the Defendant State of Florida officials
for its work. Colodny represented the Secretary in these
proceedings up until the entry of the Final Judgment.
R. 462, 464, 465. As can be seen from the record, this
attorney did virtually no original work as the Office of the
Attorney General took the lead as counse! for all Defen-
dants.
Colodny billed and was paid for over 4,000 hours of
work for its minor role in this case.’ During that same
time, Plaintiffs’ counsel logged and was awarded only
1,193.5 hours by the District Court. Remarkably, the
Defendants approved payment for these minor attorneys
for over 4,000 hours while objecting to the hours of Plain-
tiffs’ counsel who spent only 25% as many hours actually
litigating the entire case and prevailing in obtaining relief.
R. 464 at 7, 2.10.
2. Hourly Rates
Just as Defendants frivolously and litigiously chal-
lenged the reasonable number of hours expended, Defen-
dants challenged the hourly rate without a good faith
basis. Near the inception of the lawsuit, in 1992, Defen-
dants’ outside counsel, Hinshaw & Culbertson, in another
matter against the same Defendants advised Defendants
that:
* Colodny Fass and Talenfeld represented a single, individual
capacity Defendant and were paid $328,789.50 by the Defendant State
officials. R. 464 at 7, n.10.
6
We have little doubt that a court would award
Mr. Weinger, based upon his experience, his
usual fee of $250.00 per hour. Second, since this
case was filed before Wilder was decided, Mr.
Weinger may also be entitled to a multiplier.
R. 453, Ex. 1.
Remarkably, ten years later, Defendants argued to the
District Court that the hourly rate of $125.00 per hour was
the reasonable hourly rate for Plaintiffs’ lead counsel, Mr.
Weinger. R. 492 at 14, R. 627 at 3. Needless to say, the
District Court’s determination that the reasonable hourly
rate of lead counsel was $250.00 per hour is amply justi-
fied by the evidence in the record. R. 627 at 3.
3. The Case Was Rare and Exceptional And
Plaintiffs Obtained i'xceptional Results
Aside from the evidence presented by Margulies’,
* Margulies Declaration - Professor Margulies, a respected
lawyer experienced in federal court litigation provided evidence on the
factors which the District Court was required to consider in setting a
fee. Professor Margulies explained that the hours requested in the
charts attached to the Motion for attorney’s fees were “reasonable and
necessary”, that the case was “handled extremely efficiently”, that the
“results obtained were exceptional”; that he knew “from personal
knowledge that the individuals who benefit from this ruling had been
unsuccessful in finding any advocacy group or attorney ... willing to
perform the task of representing these individuals but for the agree-
ment of Steven M. Weinger, Esquire, to represent them in this case”;
“that the case was extremely complex and required a thorough knowl-
edge of highly specialized areas of law such as Federal Medicaid
Statutes and Regulations, the inner workings of the Florida Medicaid
Plan, and a comprehensive knowledge of general civil rights law”, that
“at the time the claim was brought the claim was unique and novel”,
and that “without Steven M. Weinger, Esq.’s creativity and broad legal
(Continued on following page)
7
Rossman* and Weinger‘, the District Court had ample
evidence from which to conclude that the Plaintiffs had
knewledge, I do not believe this case would have been brought to a
successful conclusion.” R. 454, 499 at Tab 3, paragraphs 4-8, R. 624, Tab 4,
14-8.
Finally, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s acceptance of this case adversely affected his
reputation and/or that of his law firm. Margulies attested, “as a result of the
litigation, Steven M. Weinger, Esquire’s reputation among elected officials
and state executive branch officials has been severely hurt. Although I
know that Steven M. Weinger, Esquire, has engaged in the highest form of
advocacy for the individuals he served, the hard fought battle to win benefits
for these individuals has due to the unpopularity of this cause, and the
unpopularity of providing additional funds for individuals with develop-
mental disabilities, made the balance of his practice more difficult.” R. 454,
499 at Tab 3, R. 624, Tab 4, Margulies Declaration at 79.
* Rossman Affidavit - Jonathan Rossman, Esq. represented
individuals with disabilities in private practice after serving as the
Executive Director of the Medicaid funded Florida Advocacy Center for
Persons with Disabilities for 15 years. R.499, Tab 4, 9/2.
Mr. Rossman explained that Plaintiff’s counsel has “an exceptional
range of skills all of which are needed in this case, including significaiut
healthcare experience, significant personal experience with develop-
mentally disabled individuals and direct personal experience in
successfully litigating a massive, multi-party case against the Depart-
ment of Health & Rehabilitative Services to obtain a preliminary
injunction under the very same statute which is the basis for Doe uv.
Chiles, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a). Id. at 19.
Mr. Rossman testified that he was professionally familiar with Plain-
tiff’s lead counsel,,and met with him on numerous occasions from
“1990 through the present in regard to matters affecting developmen-
tally disabled individuals. I have personal knowledge of Mr. Weinger’s
work and I have reviewed portions of some of the filings prepared by
Mr. Weinger in the lawsuit entitled John/Jane Does No.’s 1-13, et al. v.
Lawton Chiles, et al.” R. 453, Rossman Affidavit at 74. Mr. Rossman
further attested in his Affidavit that “both Mr. Weinger and his law
firm have established extremely positive reputations for their legal
talents and public service, particularly for their work in complex
Federal Court litigation” Rossman Affidavit at 8.
* Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Affidavit - Plaintiffs’ lead counsel was
uniquely qualified to represent these Plaintiffs. Plaintiff is a 1978
(Continued on following page)
graduate of the University of Chicago Law School, who was also an
instructor at the University of Miami School of Law and who taught
courses in Section 1983 litigation. Mr. Weinger was also involved in
preparation of a case book on Section 1983 litigation. R. 453, 499, Ex. 2
Affidavit of Steven M. Weinger, Tab 2, JJ 1, 3 and 4.
In addition to his educational background, membership in relevant
professional associations and national recognition (R. 453), he has
substantial relevant legal experience. For over 20 years, his practice
has been devoted almost exclusively to litigation, largely in Federal
Court and more often then not involving complex litigation. R. 453.
Plaintiffs’ lead counsel has a significant experience in class actions and
was first recognized as having substantial experience in representing
Plaintiffs in class actions by former Chief Judge for the Southern
District of Florida, The Honorable James Lawrence King in 1982.
R. 453, Ex. 2. R. 499 Tab 2 J11(a). Thus, Mr. Weinger had substantial
experience in litigating complex class action cases in federal court prior
to filing the instant case in 1992. R. 499 Tab 2 at 911(b).
In addition to experience in complex class action litigation, Mr. Weinger
was uniquely well-suited to represent the Plaintiffs in the instant case
due to his expertise in the area of health law. See R. 453, Ex. 2, 499 911
documenting his experience in federal litigation against state officials
who were Defendants in this case, or their predecessors, for violation of
the Medicaid Act, and experience in administrative iitigation against
the State and Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
Mr. Weinger’s law firm “was the only firm, sole practitioner or legal
advocacy group willing to undertake legal representation of the
Plaintiffs against the State of Florida in the instant matter.” R. 453, Ex.
2, R. 499, Tab 3 Affidavit 2.
“As a result of this litigation, Plaintiffs’ counsel has been criticized by
Florida officials and has, as a result lost potential clientele who have
determined that their interests would be better served by engaging an
attorney who is not actively litigating such a controversial case against
state officials.” R.499 Tab 3 at 96. “Numerous facets of this lawsuit
constituted priority work which required substantial expenditures of time
and effort within a relatively short period of time. This summer in
particular, I was precluded from accepting other employment due to my
commitment to this case.” Weinger also verified that “all of the factual
assertions in the Memorandum of Law are true and correct to the best of
my knowledge,” and that “our law firm expended 1,193 hours as
described in detail in time records attached hereto.” R. 453, Ex. 2,
R. 499 Tab 3 78 and 9.
9
obtained exceptional results and that the case itself was
exceptional.
a. Defendants’ Admissions as to the Magni-
tude of the Case
In support of their Motion for Stay of the Final Judg-
ment, Defendants argued that compliance with the Judg-
ment would cost hundreds of millions of dollars and take
years to accomplish. R. 461. Defendants took the same
position befoie the Eleventh Circuit in their Emergency
Motion for Stay, arguing that compliance would require
expenditure of an “astronomical amount.” See Appellants’
Emergency Motion for Stay of January 17, 1997 at 3.
Defendants asserted to the District Court that the cost of
providing prompt treatment to class members would be
between $750,000,000 to one billion dollars. R. 490-491,
R. 599, Transcript of November 4, 1998 hearing at 49
where Defendants’ counsel stated, “Moreover, I think
despite the fact that Mr. Weinger was accurate, not only I,
but my clients have made public in record statements that
in order to comply with this Court’s final judgment would
cost the state between somewhere between 750 (sic) to a
billion dollars annually. I think the accurate number is
now the one that is being discussed currently, which is
possibly two thousand people total, but six hundred here
who are in immediate need.”
It should be noted that after losing the appeal on the
merits, Defendants refused to comply with the Judgment,
claiming that the offer of an ICF/DD placement to the
surviving 12 named Plaintiffs at minimal cost was complete
compliance. R. 579 at 5-9. As the Eleventh Circuit explained
in the second appeal, “the defendants themselves have
10
always understood that the relief granted in the final
judgment was intended to be system-wide, and not just
limited to the named Plaintiffs.” Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d
1037, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001). As a result, the litigation has
benefited the 2000 eligible individuals as well as the
hundreds or thousands of newly eligible developmentally
disabled individuals who have entered the system since
the Plaintiffs prevailed.
b. 2001 Status Report of National Associa-
tion of State Directors of Developmen-
tal Disabilities Services, Inc.
Plaintiff also filed the 2001 Status Report of the
National Association of State Directors of Developmental
Disability Services, Inc., a “trade” association of State
Directors administering Medicaid programs in the 50
states. R. 624, Tab 6. That report specifically referred to
the instant case as follows:
In March of 1998, the Eleventh U.S. [Court] of
Appeals handed down a watershed decision in the
Florida Does v. Chiles (now Doe v. Bush) litigation
that made it clear that federal Medicaid law does
not permit a state to ‘wait list’ individuals for
ICF/MR services indefinitely. The Court ruled
that ICF/MR services were no different than any
other non-waiver Medicaid service, namely such
services must be furnished with reasonable
promptness to eligible applicants. Most waiting
list lawsuits elsewhere have been filed on the
heels of this decision ... While the decision ap-
plies to states in the Eleventh Circuit, it has been
frequently cited as the basis of lawsuits filed in
other Federal circuits. R. 624, Tab 6, Status Re-
port at 5 (emphasis added).
11
The Status Report went on to note that “as of March
2001, waiting list lawsuits have been filed in 15 states.”
R. 624, Tab 6, Status Report at 6.
Moreover, and as a result of this case, Florida’s “fund-
ing for developmental services has increased by approxi-
mately $360,000,000 over the past two years.” R. 624, Tab
6, Status Report at 7. Thus, in the opinion of the Associa-
tion for State Developmental Disability Directors, i.e.,
counter-parts of the Defendants in the other 49 states, this
was “a watershed” decision with a significant and far
reaching impact on the lives of developmentally disabled
individuals throughout the country. R. 624, Tab 6.
The remarkable impact of this case is also seen in the
remarkable increase in funding for services for individuals
with developmental disabilities in Florida and the re-
peated citations to Doe v. Chiles throughout the country in
support of successful litigation to expand available health-
care services. The decision has also been cited in dozens of
law review articles, treatises and cases.
In terms of making services available to individuals
with developmental disabilities, no other case in the
country has had as significant an impact as Doe v. Chiles.
Defendants in this case valued the impact at hundreds of
millions of dollars in additional services annually. Nation-
ally, the impact is in the billions of dollars in new services
for eligible individuals.
c. Defendants’ Conduct and Other Circum-
stances Made This Litigation Excep-
tionally Challenging
Against all odds, without legal precedent, ignoring the
Defendants’ threats, without help from lawyers who
12
receive federal and state funds to advocate and litigate for
individuals with disabilities, Plaintiffs’ counsel success-
fully litigated this case for over a decade. R. 1-628. Thir-
teen years later, after 628 docket entries in the District
Court and four appeals to the Eleventh Circuit, Defen-
dants argued unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeals that
the maximum total allowable fee is $91,896.75. This
proposed figure includes over $27,000 in costs and all legal
work in the trial Court and in the Court of Appeals on the
appeal on the merits. Petitioner’s Brief to Eleventh Circuit
at 44. Defendants’ proposed figure works out to $47.00
(Forty-Seven Dollars) per hour for the hours found reason-
able and necessary by the District Court and by all of the
experts. Defendants’ position on attorney’s fees is a power-
ful reminder of their litigation strategy from the inception
of this case.
As a consequence of this case, Florida increased
funding of services to its Medicaid eligible and develop-
mentally disabled citizens by Three Hundred Sixty Million
Dollars ($360,000,000.00) annually. See R. 624, Tab 6, at 7.
Since entry of the Final Judgment literally billons of
dollars in additional services have been provided.
Preparing and litigating this lawsuit was particularly
challenging because:
1. The Defendants promised that they would
litigate every possible issue and appeal every
single Order (R. 453, Affidavit 2 of Weinger
at 73) and they kept their promise as re-
flected in the docket sheet showing over 600
entries to date
13
2. The stakes could not be higher. Prompt place-
ment was a matter of life and death for many of
the class members.’ The cost of the services or-
dered by the District Court and affirmed by this
Court was determined by the Defendants to be
Seven Hundred Million Dollars ($700,000,000)
to $1,000,000,000 (One Billion Dollars). E.g.
453, St. Petersburg Times Article; R. 599 at 49
(transcript of 11/4/98 hearing at which Defen-
dants’ counsel specifically admitted that De-
fendants and their counsel had made public
statements that compliance with the Final
Judgment would cost the state somewhere “be-
tween $750 million to a billion dollars annu-
ally.”) Research discloses that State of Florida
Officials have never been sued in a case that
the State determined would have this signifi-
cant a financial impact other than the litiga-
tion to clean up the Everglades.
3. The clients could not be more difficult to repre-
sent. These individuals are the lowest function-
ing developmentally disabled individuals. Many
are non-verbal. Many are non-ambulatory. Many
are fragile with severe medical problems. Many
have extraordinarily difficult behaviors. R. 453,
Tab 8. The Plaintiffs were unable to be gainfully
employed because of their severe disabilities
| * In her affidavit filed in 1996 in the case, federally recognized
Qualified Mental Retarded Professional (“QMRP”) Kathryn Whitaker
advised that John Doe 3 died in an non-ICF/DD group home in the
summer of 1993 during a “seizure- status-epileptics.” Ms. Whitaker
noted that “the group home did not have any nurses on staff or staff
trained in the manner which meets the requirements of the training of
staff at an ICF/DD facility and by the time the home finally dialed 911
John Doe 3 was deceased.” R. 453 Whitaker Affidavit, Ex. 8.
14
and were therefore indigent and Medicaid eligi-
ble.
4. The Defendants promised retribution against
the Plaintiff’s counsel, caused the loss of
business from paying healthcare clients seek-
ing to resolve differences with the Defen-
dants’ offices (Defendants were the heads of
the Agency for Health Care Administration,
which operates the entire Florida Medicaid
Program and all health care licensing, and
the Department of Children and Families)
R. 453, Ex. 3, Affidavit 2 of Weinger at 43;
R. 454, 499 Margulies Declaration at 49.
5. No advocacy groups or public interest law-
yers were willing or competent to gather the
facts, learn the law, and take on the tremen-
dous burden of this litigation. R. 454, 499,
Margulies Declaration at 6.
Defendants repeatedly misrepresented the facts in the record
and took frivolous positions. Defendants denied many of the
allegations of the Complaint and then failed to present any
evidence supporting the denial of these allegations during
the course of the litigation and raised numerous affirmative
defenses, none of which had a legal or factual basis. Indeed,
on their appeal on the merits, the Eleventh Circuit described
Defendants’ factual argument that class members were not
being harmed by the Defendants’ delay in providing services
as “meritless” and “frivolous” and described Defendants’
argument on the alleged lack of standing based on the lack of
harm as “unworthy of further discourse.” Doe v. Chiles,
supra at 713, n.7.
15
C. The Total Fee Award
In 2003, based on the foregoing analysis, the District
Court awarded Plaintiffs fees of $649,869.50. Order, R. 627
at 7. This sum includes fees for both the work performed
in the District Court since the inception of the case which
was filed in 1992, through March 2003 and the fees for the
successful appellate work before the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.
+
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
The Defendants’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari should
be denied because the decision of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals is not inconsistent with the decisions of
this Court; does not conflict with the decisions of any other
Court of Appeals; does not decide a federal question in a
way that conflicts with a decision of a state court of last
resort; does not call for this Court’s exercise of its supervi-
sory powers; and does not decide an important issue of
federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by
this Court. In sum, the decisions below properly apply
existing precedent to the facts presented.
16
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AWARDED
PLAINTIFFS AN UPWARD ADJUSTMENT OF
THE LODESTAR BASED ON FINDINGS THAT
THIS WAS A RARE AND EXCEPTIONAL CASE;
“EXCEPTIONAL SUCCESS” AND “GROUND
BREAKING RESULTS” ACHIEVED BY PLAIN-
TIFFS
The District Court’s Order explained that it was:
enhancing the lodestar fees for both the motion
for attorneys’ fees and the supplemental claim for
attorneys’ fees by a multiplier of 2.0 because this
is a rare and exceptional case where upward ad-
justment of the lodestar is appropriate due to ex-
ceptional success. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
898-99 (1984) (recognizing an enhanced award of
attorneys’ fees in cases of exceptional success);
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)
“in some cases of exceptional success an en-
hanced award may be justified”); Loranger v.
Stierheim, 10 at F.3d 776, 783 (1994) (declining
to decide whether the case was a “rare and ex-
ceptional case where an award went upward ad-
justment of the lodestar is called for because of
exceptional success”); Allen v. Freeman, 694
F. Supp. 1554, 1556 (1988) (court found enhance-
ment of the lodestar amount apnropriate because
the results of the litigation were exceptional.) Pet.
App.8.
The District Court went on to state it:
also considered the exceptional success and
groundbreaking results achieved by the plaintiffs
in this case. In 1996, a judgment was entered for
the Plaintiffs ordering state officials to provide
institutional care for eligible applicants, some of
whom have been waiting for many years without
17
proper care. That judgment was affirmed on ap-
peal by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
an opinion which painstakingly established the
law to govern this case and several related cases
which followed. See, Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709
(11th Circuit 1998). Pet. App.9.
The District Court’s findings were amply supported by
the record.® As set forth in the Margulies and Weinger
* Apart from an enhancement because of the rare and exceptional
nature of this case, Plaintiffs in this eleven year old case are entitled to
an upward adjustment of the fee based upon the seven year delay in the
receipt of payment since entry of the Final Judgment in 1996. In
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 283 (1989), this Court approved the
enhancement of fees to compensate attorneys for delay in payment. As
this Court explained:
[C]ases have repeatedly stressed that attorneys fees
awarded under this statute [§1988] are to be based on mar-
ket rates for services rendered. Clearly, compensation re-
ceived several years after the services were rendered — as they
frequently are in complex civil rights litigation — is not equiva-
lent to the same dollar amount received reasonably and
promptly as legal services are performed, as would normally
be the case with private billings. We agree, therefore, that
an appropriate adjustment for delay in payment — whether
by the application of current rather than historic hourly
rates or otherwise — is within the contemplation of the
statute. Jd. at 283-284 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
See also, Norman v. Housing Authority of City Montgomery, 836 F.2d
1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 1988) [“In this Circuit, where there is a delay the
court should take into account the time value of money and the effects
of inflation and generally award compensation at current rate: rather
than at historic rates”]; Davis v. Locke, 936 F.2d 1208 (11th Cir. 1991),
(multiplier for delay and difficulty obtaining counsel and risk); Formby
uv. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 904 F.2d 627, 633-34 (11th Cir. 1990)
(1.33 multiplier for delay); Tufaro v. Willie, 756 F. Supp. 556, 563 (S.D.
Fla. 1991); Amico v. Newcastle County, 654 F. Supp. 982, 1008 (D. Del.
1987); Weiss v. York Hospital, 628 F. Supp. 1392, 1414-15 (N.D. Pa.
1986); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, 568
(Continued on following page)
18
Affidavits, this was a complex case presenting novel
issues. R. 624 at Tab 4 and 5 especially Margulies Affida-
vit at 97 noting “the case is extremely complex and will
require a thorough knowledge of highly specialized areas
of law such as the Federal Medicaid Statutes and Regula-
tions, the inner-workings of the Florida Medicaid Plan and
comprehensive knowledge of the Federal Civil Rights Law.
At the time the case was brought, the claim was unique
and novel.” See also R. 624, Tab 6, Status Report by
National Association of State Directors of Developmentally
Disability Services, Inc., at 5, describing this case as a
“watershed” and groundbreaking case, noting the decision
has “been frequently cited as the basis of lawsuits filed in
other federal circuits”, and that “most waiting list lawsuits
elsewhere have been filed on the heels of this decision.”
Moreover, as documented in filings for the District
Court, this cause was an unpopular one and adversely
affected Plaintiffs’ counsel’s law firm. No other attorneys,
even those working with advocacy groups, were willing to
accept this case. R. 454. “As a result of litigation” lead
counsel’s “reputation among elected officials in the state
and executive branch has been severely hurt ... and the
hard fought battle to win benefits for these individuals
has, due to the unpopularity of this cause, and the un-
popularity of providing additional funds to individuals
with developmental disabilities, made the balance of his
F. Supp. 1020, 1033 (E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 79 BR
321, 346-350 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1987); Cerva v. EBR Enterprises, 740
F. Supp. 1099, 1106-1109 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Williams v. Marriott Corp.,
669 F. Supp. 2, 6 (D.C. 1987); U.S. v. Aisenberg, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1272
(N.D. Fla. 2003) (1.5 multiplier based on five year delay).
19
practice more difficult.” R. 454 at 79. As a result, Plaintiffs’
counsel's practice suffered. R. 453, Ex. 3, Weinger Affidavit,
explaining that potential clients determined their interests
would be better served by using another attorney without
such an adversarial relationship with state officials.
II. NEITHER THE PER CURIAM AFFIRMANCE
NOR THE UNPUBLISHED DISTRICT COURT
OPINION CONFLICT WITH PRIOR DECISIONS
OF THIS COURT OR ANY OTHER COURTS OF
APPEAL
In their Petition to this court, the Defendants fail to
set forth any decision that conflicts with the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeal’s affirmance in this case or with
the District Court’s opinion. This is not surprising as the
decision of the Eleventh Circuit does not cite any cases,
but is instead a per curiam affirmance without opinion,
citing to Eleventh Circuit Rule 36.1. Eleventh Circuit Rule
36.1 provides in pertinent part:
When the court determines that any of the fol-
lowing circumstances exist:
(a) judgment of the district court is
based on findings of fact that are
not clearly erroneous; .. .
(e) judgment has been entered without
a reversible error of law; and opin-
ion would have no precedential
value, the judgment or order may
be affirmed without opinion.
The Court of Appeals and the District Court both
applied relevant law. There is no conflict between this case
20
and the cases cited by the Defendants. Thus, no conflict
exists justifying a grant of certiorari in this case.
A. The Decisions Follow All Prior Decisions
of This Court
This Court has made clear that attorney’s fee cases
are determined by their respective facts, and the District
Court is given substantial discretion in determining the
appropriate fee. See e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 430, 437 (1983) noting “the amount of the fee, of
course, must be determined on the facts of each case”; and
emphasizing “the district court’s superior understanding of
the litigation and the desiiability of avoiding frequent
appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.”
Upward enhancements of a lodestar are authorized by
this Court in Hensley and its progeny. See e.g. Blum uv.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984); Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens’ Council For Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986).
Thus, as this Court held in Hensley, “the product of the
reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the
inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the
District Court to adjust the fee upward or downward, includ-
ing the important factor of the results obtained.” Hensley,
supra at 434. Hensley involved a §1983 claim for fees where
Plaintiffs had not succeeded on all their claims and did not
involve an upward adjustment to the lodestar. This Court
remanded the case for the District Court to consider the
relationship between Plaintiffs’ success in the litigation and
the fee award, which is exactly what the District Court did in
this case. Hensley, therefore, does not conflict with the
District Court’s decision in this case, as Defendants do not
challenge the lodestar in their Petition, and as it expressly
— r j
21
recognizes that the District Court is authorized to adjust
the fee up or down, based on its superior knowledge of the
litigation and based on relevant considerations.
Defendants also rely on Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886
(1984). There is no conflict between Blum and this case. In
Blum, this Court reaffirmed that “a District Court is author-
ized, in its discretion, to allow a prevailing party an upward
adjustment in attorney’s fees in cases of exceptional success.”
Blum, supra at 896. This Court in Blum rejected the Defen-
dants’ argument that “upward adjustments are never reason-
able” but reversed the fee award because the District Court’s
award of an enhancement in that case was based partially on
a contingency risk factor. This was not a basis for the multi-
plier awarded in this case. Moreover, unlike the Plaintiffs in
this case, the plaintiff in Blum failed to carry her burden of
proving that an upward adjustment was justified.
In Blum, this Court explained that, “the record before us
contains no evidence supporting an upward adjustment of
fees calculated under the basic standard of reasonable rates
times reasonable hours. The affidavits of Respondent’s
attorneys do not claim, or even mention, entitlement to a
bonus or upward revision.” Blum, supra at 896. In contrast,
the issue of a multiplier in this case was extensively sup-
ported by competent, substantial, uncontroverted evidence
and this issue was litigated by the parties before the District
Court and the Court of Appeals. The District Court made
specific findings upon which it based enhancement of the
lodestar including “the groundbreaking results achieved by
the Plaintiff in this case” and the Eleventh Circuit’s affir-
mance which it described as “an opinion which painstakingly
established the law to govern this case as well as several
related cases which followed.” Pet. App.9. Moreover, the
Plaintiffs in this case, as set forth in the affidavits and
~
22
other record evidence, established the exceptional and
indeed seminal nature of this litigation. See e.g. R. 490-91,
R. 599, R. 624, Tabs 1-7. As set forth in the record before
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the decision has
been described as “watershed” and led to the filing of
similar cases on behalf of developmentally disabled indi-
viduals in at least 15 other states. R. 624, Tab 6.
Defendants also refer to this Court’s decision in
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council For
Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986). Again, the facts of that
case are inapposite to the facts of this case and the opinion
of the District Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in this case are wholly consistent with this
Court’s opinion in Delaware Valley. First, the enhancement
that was reversed in the Delaware Valley case was based
partially on a contingency risk multiplier. Delaware Valley,
supra at 555-556. This factor did not form any part of the
analysis of the District Court in this case. Moreover, in
Delaware Valley this Court reaffirmed its holding in
Hensley reiterating that “the product of reasonable hour
times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry. There
remain other considerations that may lead the District
Court to adjust the fee upward or downward ....” Dela-
ware Valley at 564, citations to Hensley v. Eckerhart.
This Court then reiterated that in Hensley it “took a
more expansive view of what those ‘other considerations’
might be,” noting that “the District Court also may con-
sider the factors identified in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). Delaware
Valley, supra at 564.
Finally this Court in Delaware Valley held that up-
ward adjustments in “rare” and “exceptional” cases are
23
allowed when supported by specific evidence on the record
and findings by the lower court. Delaware Valley, supra at
064. As in Blum, this Court in Delaware Valley reversed
the fee award because the Plaintiff in that case “presented
no specific evidence as to what made the results it ob-
tained .. . ‘so outstanding’.” Delaware Valley, supra at 567-
568. Indeed, this Court in Delaware Valley based its
decision in part on the District Court’s “elimination of a
large number of hours on the grounds that they were
unnecessary, unreasonable, or unproductive” as this was
“not supportive of the [District] Court’s later conclusion
that the remaining hours represented work o' ‘superior
quality’.” Delaware Valley, supra at 568. In contrast, the
District Court in the case at bar did not make any findings
inconsistent with superior quality work and Plaintiffs in
this case presented substantial, uncontroverted evidence
of the rare and exceptional nature of this case.
The only other Supreme Court decision cited by Defen-
dants is City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
Defendants seem to admit in their petition that Dague is
distinguishable from this case as it stands solely for the
proposition that an enhancement for contingency of an
attorney’s fees award to a prevailing party is not permitted.
Thus, there is no conflict with Dague as Plaintiffs in this case
were not awarded a multiplier based on contingency.
B. The Decision Does Not Conflict with the
Decisions of Any Other Circuit Court
None of the circuit court decisions cited by Defendants
present a conflict with this case. Planned Parenthood of
Central and Northern California v. Arizona, 789 F.2d 1348
(9th Cir. 1986) predates the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
24
Guam Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Ada,
100 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 1996), a section 1983 action against
state officials where the Court of Appeals affirmed a
multiplier of two times the lodestar amount because of the
“visible and controversial nature of the case.” This case is
wholly consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s more recent
decision in the Guam case, cited by Plaintiffs in their
Motions for Attorney’s Fees filed with the District Court,
and in their brief to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Further, there is no inconsistency between this case
and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Planned Parenthood.
The Pianned Parenthood case involved a request for a
multiplier based in part on the contingency aspect of the
case and was decided six years before this Court directly
addressed this issue in City of Burlington v. Dague, 505
U.S. 557 (1992). Moreover, the Plaintiffs in Planned
Parenthood failed to provide any evidence “that the repre-
sentation actually posed a substantial risk to the law
firm’s business or that any risk presented was not ade-
quately taken into consideration in setting the hourly
rate.” Pianned Parenthood, supra at 1354. In contrast,
Plaintiffs in the case at bar made a compelling and uncon-
troverted showing that the law firm was shunned by
paying healthcare clients as a result of this suit against
state healthcare officials, that the life or death nature of
this case adversely affected Plaintiffs’ counsel’s law firm
and also established other factors supporting an enhance-
ment including the groundbreaking and beneficial results
of this litigation. R. 490-91; 590; 626.
Defendants suggest that this case conflicts with Van
Gerwen v. Guarantee Mutual Life Company, 214 F.3d 1041
(9th Cir. 2000). In Van Gerwen, an ERISA case, the Ninth
Circuit reversed an award of a multiplier where there was
25
no evidence the case was rare and unusual and where the
Plaintiffs’ attorney's work was inferior. Indeed, as the
Ninth Circuit noted in that case, the District Court had
reduced the award by applying a “downward multiplier” of
.75 based on the “poor quality of the attorney’s work.” Van
Gerwen, supra at 1044. (emphasis added). The Appeals
Court in Van Gerwen reversed, holding that the District
Court could not reduce the rates based on the poor quality
of representation without making findings of fact. Van
Gerwen, supra at 1049. Van Gerwen is therefore patently
distinguishable from the case at bar where the opposite
was true as the District Court specifically found that the
Plaintiffs’ counsel did a superior job.
Defendants’ reliance on Odima v. Western Tucson Hotel,
53 F.3d 1484 (9th Cir. 1994) is also meritless. In Odima, a
partial success case, the Circuit Court found that the Plain-
tiff had failed to demonstrate that an enhancement to the
lodestar was justified. The Ninth Circuit in Odima simply
remanded the case as the District Court did not set forth
sufficient information supportive of the enhancement.
Odima, supra at 1500. There is therefore no conflict between
Odima and this case when the record here is replete with
evidence supporting lodestar adjustment.
UNR Industries v. Schwartz, Cooper, Kolb & Gaynor
Charter, 986 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983) also does not conflict
with the case at bar. In UNR, a bankruptcy case, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals simply affirmed the
District Court’s decision that the bankruptcy judge’s
denial of a multiplier under 11 U.S.C. §330 was not clearly
erroneous. UNR, supra at 211. UNR did not involve 42
U.S.C. §1988 or any fee shifting statute. Most importantly,
the discussion and analysis of fee enhancement in UNR is
entirely consistent with the decisions in this case.
26
In Cooper v. Pentecost, 77 F.3d 829 (5th Cir. 1996), a
1985 class action brought on behalf of prisoners against a
County jail, the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court’s
Order awarding attorney’s fees and denying a multiplier.
Again, unlike this case, the District Court in Cooper found
that the Plaintiff submitted duplicative, repetitive and
excessive hours. Cooper, supra at 832. Such is not the case
here. Moreover, directly contrary to the record in this case,
the record in Cooper showed no “oppressive, unpleasant or
intimidating conditions” affecting Plaintiffs’ counsel which
would support an enhancement. Cooper, supra at 834.
In Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1993) the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the virtually
axiomatic legal principle that a District Court has “broad
discretion in setting reasonable attorney’s fees” and con-
cluded the District Court “did not abuse its discretion” by
refusing to either enhance or reduce the lodestar in a Voting
Rights Act case. Watkins, supra at 460. There is therefore no
conflict between Fordice and the decisions in this case.
Finally, Defendants rely on Hendrickson v. Branstad,
934 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1991). Hendrickson is also cistin-
guishable from the case at bar az.d is not inconsistent with
this case. Hendrickson, unlike this case, is a case where the
Plaintiff was only partially successful in his claims. Hen-
drickson, supra at 161. As the Court in Hendrickson noted
the enhancement was based in part on a contingency risk
multiplier, not a factor here. Hendrickson, supra at 163.
Moreover, the District Court in Hendrickson found
that counsel was awarded a large amount of billable hours
in the case and the Court of Appeals found therefore that
the lodestar was reasonable. Hendrickson, supra at 164. In
27
contrast, Plaintiffs in this case billed a “relatively low
number” of hours, as found by District Court. Pet. App.8.
C. No Lack of Uniformity Exists in the Cir-
cuit Court Decisions
Defendants suggest that certiorari in this case is re-
quired due to lack of “uniformity” and “caprice” in Circuit
Court decisions on this issue. Petition at 15. Defendants cite
to Hyatt v. Apfel, 195 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 1999). Defendants
state that the Fourth Circuit in Hyatt “ignored or skirted the
requirement for specific facts in the record to justify an
enhancement.” Petition at 14. This allegation is simply
wrong and even a cursory review of the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in Hyatt establishes the inaccuracy of this state-
ment, As the Fourth Circuit explained in its well reasoned
opinion, the litigation in that case was over a decade old and
had been the subject of “four published opinions of this court,
a remand by the United States Supreme Court, and numer-
ous District Court decisions leading up to the appeals.”
Hyatt, supra at 189-90.
In its lengthy opinion, the Fourth Circuit quoted the
District Court’s findings supporting an enhancement in
that case. The District Court’s findings were detailed and
specific. Hyatt supra at 191-93. As a portion of the District
Court’s decision reproduced in the Fourth Circuit opinion
noted, “the success achieved by Plaintiff is properly char-
acterized as exceptional. Plaintiffs have succeeded in
bringing about fundamental change to a recalcitrant
agency which brought all of the power of the federal
government to bear on Plaintiffs and their counsel while it
resisted Plaintiffs’ efforts to enforce the orders of this
Court and the Fourth Circuit each step of the way.” Hyatt,
supra at 191-193.
—
28
Defendants also again overreach when they describe
the Miniscribe Corp. decision also as having “ignored or
skirted the requirements for specific facts in the record to
justify an enhancement.” Jn re Miniscribe Corp., 309 F.3d
1234 (10th Cir. 2002), a bankruptcy case, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in a detailed opinion exhaustively de-
scribed the proceedings below which involved a claim for
attorney’s fees by a trustee. The Tenth Circuit found that
the lodestar test is the appropriate method of calculating
reasonable compensation for a Chapter 7 trustee. The
Court reduced the hourly rate of $500 per hour, and
affirmed the 2.57 lodestar multiplier awarded by the
bankruptcy court, “given the strong findings by the bank-
ruptcy court in support of its determination that the result
achieved was sufficiently extraordinary to justify a multi-
plier, and the reasoning of the District Court flowing from
these findings, we cannot conclude, based on our standard
of review, that the District Court erred by applying a 2.57
multiplier.” Miniscribe, supra at 1245.
The Defendants’ characterization of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals’ decision in Paschal v. Flagstar Bank, FSB,
297 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2002) is simply wrong. Defendants’
statement that the “circuit court approved a 50% enhance-
ment where the District Court concluded only that the
hourly rate awarded was ‘modest’” is not accurate. Petition
at 15 (emphasis added). In fact, the Sixth Circuit in Paschal
noted that in addition to the relatively low hourly rate
awarded, the District Court’s decision to enhance the attor-
ney’s fee award was also expressly based on the “excellent job
the attorneys did at trial, the fact that the case involved
claims that were difficult to prove, and the fact that the
marshalling of evidence was an arduous and time consuming
task.” Paschal, supra at 435-37. The Sixth Circuit found that
29
based on the relevant law, the record and those findings, the
District Court did not abuse its discretion. Paschal, supra at
436.
III. DEFENDANTS’ CRITICISM OF THE FAC.-
TORS ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT FOR
THE DETERMINATION OF A REASONABLE
FEE ARE MERITLESS
Defendants complain that this Court’s intervention is
necessary for the uniform application of these standards.
Defendants’ petition fails to provide any convincing reason
for further clarification or formulation of standards govern-
ing attorney's fee awards in general or as to public bodies in
particular. The Defendants’ suggestion that this Court
eliminate one of the factors relevant to determination of a
reasonable fee award, i.e., that other counsel were not
available and that the Plaintiffs were unpopular because of
differences as to those facts is meritless. Trial courts are
well-suited for weighing facts and applying the law. As this
Court has indicated these cases are fact specific. Changing
the law as requested by Defendants would not produce
predictability of decisions or uniformity among courts.
Significantly, there was no difference of opinion between the
District Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
this case, nor among the members of the panel that affirmed
this decision.
Defendants are understandably unhappy with the
results of this litigation and of the attorney's fee award.
However, Defendants failed to rebut substantial evidence
submitted by the Plaintiffs establishing the existence of all
the factors relevant to the fees ultimately awarded by the
District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in this
case. Thus while the Defendants hypothize that “improperly
30
imposed fee enhancements” “threaten the financial stability of
public programs and services and could result in diminished
public services for all” (Plaintiffs’ Petition at 16), in the case at
bar the end result was quite predictable and could have been
avoided by Defendants. Defendants moreover failed to contro-
vert, rebut or address this evidence, including affidavits and
other evidence expressly establishing the appropriateness of a
fee enhancement. See, e.g., R. 490-91, 599, 624.
Defendants’ intent in requesting this Court to change
the law and disturb well-established precedent is no doubt
motiy <d by their dissatisfaction with the factual findings
upon which the legal conclusions of the District Court and
the Eleventh Circuit rest in this case. However, this Court
does not normally grant certiorari in such cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 221 (1925) “we do
not grant a certiorari to review evidence and discuss the
specific facts.”
¢
CONCLUSION
The Petition for Certiorari should be denied since the
lower Courts correctly applied the standard.
Respectfully submitted,
STEVEN M. WEINGER, ESQUIRE*
HELENA M. TETZELI, ESQUIRE
KURZBAN KURZBAN WEINGER &
TETZELI, P.A.
2650 SW 27th Avenue, 2nd Floor
Miami, Florida 33133
(305) 444-0060
Attorneys for Respondent
*Counsel of Record
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