Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Roberts v. Maine Department of Health and Human Services (No. 07-1502)

Suprattie Court, US.

ar 071502 MAY 19 2008

No. QO. OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the Anited States

DAVID A. ROBERTS,

Petitioner,

V.

MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Lisa A. HANSON

Counsel of Record

651 East 4TH STREFT, STE. 100

CHATTANOOGA, TN 37403

(423) 553-1324

(423) 563-1391 Fax

STANLEY CHARLES THORNE

3440 BELL STREET, STE. 320-332

AMARILLO, TX 79109

(713) 444-9658

May 19, 2008 Counsel for Petitioner

Becker Gallagher - Cincinnati, OH - Washington, D.C. - 800.890.5001

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

After a child support obligation was established by

a Maine state court in 1981, the Maine initiating court

asked a Maryland court to act under URESA, and the

Maryland responding court entered judgments in 1983,

1984, and 2001 that each became final without appeal.

(1) Under what circumstances is the judgment of a

URESA responding state court given Full Faith

and Credit, when that judgment prospectively

modifies the prior judgment of the initiating state

court?

After a wrongful lawsuit by Maine Department of

Health and Human Services (“Maine DHS”) to collect

from Roberts on the 1981 Maine judgment was

dismissed with prejudice by the Maryland responding

court in 2001, Maine DHS engaged in predatory and

unlawful collection practices that led Roberts to file a

civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Maine DHS, et. al.

(2) Under what circumstances may a District Court

properly dismiss with prejudice such a 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)?

(3) Does the Rooker-Feldman doctrine protect only

federal court Defendants, or both Plaintiffs and

Defendants, from a federal District Court issuing

an order that would have the effect of overturning

a final state court judgment?

il

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The sole Petitioner is David A. Roberts, a natural

person.

The eight Respondents are as follows:

Maine Department of Health & Human Services

(“Maine DHS”)

John Nicholas. individually and in his official

capacity as Commissioner of Maine Department of

Health and Human Services

Peter Walsh, individually and in his official capacity

as Commissioner of Maine Department of Health and

Human Services

Kevin W. Concannon, individually and in his official

capacity as Commissioner (former) of Maine

Department of Health and Human Services

Mark O. Van Valkenburgh, individually and in his

official capacity as agent for Maine Department of

Health and Human Services

Ingrid B. Lapointe, individually and in her official!

capacity as agent for the Maine Department of Health

and Human Services

Anne-marie Johnson, individually and in her official

capacity as agent for the Maine Department of Health

and Human Services

ill

Loretta Dumond, individually and in her official

capacity as agent for Maine Department of Health and

Human Services

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

David A. Roberts is a natural person.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTORY PRAYER

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF TITE CASE

A. Background Facts and Issues ........... 5

B. The Scope of the Problems Faced by Child

Support Obligors Like Roberts

. Roberts’ Case is the Quintessence of Many

Other Cases

. An Overview of what Roberts has Suffered

from Maine DHS

Vv

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .. 19

A. The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of

Support Act

. State URESA Statutes vs. The Full Faith and

Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution .... 21

. Sullivan v. Sullivan — Harmonizing URESA

law with the Full Faith and Credit Clause . 24

. Weidner v. Weidner — An Improper Basis for

a 12(b)(6) Dismissal in the Instant Case .. 29

. The Fourth Circuit's Affirmation of the

District Court’s Dismissal Allows for

Continued Confusion Amongst States in

Child Support Collection Actions ........ 32

. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is also

implicated in Roberts’ case ............. 37

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

Appendix A: February 19, 2008 Fourth Circuit

Order Denying Rehearing

Appendix B: January 9, 2008 Fourth Circuit

Opinion and Judgment

Appendix C: April 23, 2007 District Court Order

and Memorandum Opinion

vl

Appendix D: January 26, 2007 District Court

Order and Memorandum Opinion

Appendix FE: May 24, 2006 Fourth Circuit Order

and Opinion

Appendix F: January 19, 2005 District Court

Appendix G: December 17, 2004 District Court

Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order 40a

Appendix H: July 1, 2004 Complaint

Appendix I: Constitutional and Statutory

cau Va ewe cee kw howe se <v ae

Vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Allen v. McCurry,

449 U.S. 90; 101 S.Ct. 411;

66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980)

Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41; 78 S.Ct. 99;

2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)

D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303,

75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983)

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp..,

544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517,

SL Ee OOO ove cre cccencvnns 1

Johnson v. Mueller,

415 F.2d 354 (4th Cir.1969)

Lance v. Dennis,

546 U.S. 459, 126 S.Ct. 1198,

163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006)

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149,

68 L.Ed. 362 (1923)

Vill

San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San

Francisce, Cal.,

545 U.S. 323; 125 S.Ct. 2491;

162 L.Ed.2d 315 (2005)

Sullivan v. Sullivan,

98 Ill. App.3d 928, ,

424 N.E.2é 957 (1981) 24, 27, 28

Weidner v. Weidner,

553 A.2d 263 (Md. App. 1989) . 23, 28, 29, 30, 31

CONSTITUTION

United States Constitution,

Article IV, § 1

STATUTES

18 U.S.C

28 U.S.C

28 U.S.C. §

28 U.S.C. §

28 U.S.C. § 1738B passim

42 U.S.C. § 1983 passim

19 M.R.S.A. § 409 (1981)

Md. FAMILY LAW Code Ann. §§ 10-328 (1984) ... 4

RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) passim

Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 and 13.3

OTHER

UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF

SUPPORT ACT (URESA), AS AMENDED IN

passim

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,

The Office of Child Support Enforcement

Annual Statistical Report for Fiscal Years 1999

and 2000 (visited May 17, 2008)

<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/20

02/reports/datareport/>

1

INTRODUCTORY PRAYER

Petitioner respectfully requests that a writ of

certiorari be granted to review the February 19, 2008

order denying rehearing of the judgment and opinion

of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit entered on January 9, 2008, which summarily

affirmed the District Court dismissal of Roberts’ case

with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6), by memorandum opinion and order

dated January 26, 2007 and the District Court denial

of reconsideration by memorandum opinion and order

dated April 23, 2007.

OPINIONS BELOW

This Petition stems from the second of two

dismissals of Petitioner’s Complaint, a civil rights

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Maine DHS, et.

al. The first dismissal in 2004, under the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine, was reversed by the Fourth Circuit

and remanded to the District Court in 2006,

subsequent to this Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.’ In 2007 the

second dismissal, for failure to state a claim under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), was affirmed by the Fourth

Circuit, leading to this Petition.

' See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d

1059 (2006) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)).

See also D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86,

103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust

Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923).

2

First appeal — reversed and remanded by the

Fourth Circuit

The order of the United States District Court for

the District of Maryland, Northern Division -

Baltimore dated December 17, 2004, dismissing

Petitioner's Complaint under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, is unpublished. (App. 40a). The District

Court’s memorandum opinion is unpublished. (App.

42a).

The order of the United States District Court for

the District of Maryland, Northern Division

Baltimore dated January 19, 2005, denying

Petitioner’s Motion for Keconsideration, is

unpublished. (App. 38a).

The per curiain opinion of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dated May 24, 2006,

reversing and remanding the District Court dismissal

of Petitioner’s Complaint under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, is unpublished, but unofficially reported at

182 Fed. Appx. 201 (4 Cir. 2006). (App. 34a). The

Fourth Circuit judgment dated May 24, 2006,

reversing the District Court is unpublished. (App.

32a).

Second appeal leading to this Petition

The order of the United States District Court for

the District of Maryland, Northern Division —

Baltimore dated January 26, 2007, dismissing

Petitioner's Complaint for failure to state a claim

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), is unpublished. (App.

18a). The District Court’s memorandum opinion dated

3

January 26, 2007 is unpublished, but unofficially

reported at 2007 WL 5145353 (D. Md. Jan. 26, 2007).

(App. 20a).

The order of the United States District Court for

the District of Maryland, Northern Division -

Baltimore dated April 20, 2007, denying Petitioner’s

Motion for Reconsideration, is unpublished. (App. 8a).

The District Court memorandum opinion is

unpublished, but unofficially reported at 2007 WL

5145354 (D. Md. April 20, 2007). (App. 10a).

The per curiam opinion of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dated January 9,

2008, summarily affirming the District Court

dismissal of Petitioner’s Complaint for failure t state

a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), is unpublished,

but unofficially reported at 2008 WL 110916 (4" Cir.

Jan. 9, 2008). (App. 3a). The Fourth Circuit judgment

dated January 9, 2008 affirming the District Court is

unpublished. (App. 6a).

The Order of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit dated February 19, 2008, denying

Petitioner's Request for Rehearing is unpublished

(App. la).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered

on January 9, 2008. A timely Request for Rehearing

was denied on February 19, 2008. This Petition is

timely filed according to Supreme Court Rules 13.1

and 13.3. The Court derives jurisdiction from 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

Cs es cr a

4

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The below-referenced Constitutional and Statutory

Provisions are set forth in Appendix I, p. 81a.

United States Constitution

The Full Faith and Credit clause of United States

Constitution, Article IV, § 1.

Federal Statutes

State anc Territorial statutes and _ judicial

proceedings; full faith and credit, 28 U.S.C. § 1738.

The Full Faith and Credit of Child Support Orders

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B.

STATE LAWS ADOPTED FROM THE UNIFORM

RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT

(URESA), AS AMENDED IN 1968

Maryland Statute

Md. FAMILY LAW Code Ann. §§ 10-328 (1984)

Maine Statute

19 M.R.S.A. § 409 (1981).

+)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Background Facts and Issues

The civil rights case of Petitioner, David A. Roberts

(“Roberts”), which arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

stems from the predatory and unlawful actions by

Maine Department of Health and Human Services

(“Maine DHS”) to collect money from Roberts, despite

that Roberts had paid in full all child support due

under an original 1981 Maine judgment, a 1983

Maryland judgment, a 1984 Maryland judgment, and

that a Maine DHS collection lawsuit against Roberts

in a Maryland state court had been dismissed with

prejudice in 2001.

The legal issue presented here — whether the

District Court properly dismissed Petitioner’s 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b\(6) — turns upon a definitive answer as to the

proper and lawful interpretation of Section 31 of the

Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act

(URESA). Section 31 contains uniform statutory

language that has been adopted by all 50 states.

Interpretation of Section 31 of URESA is an issue that

has been litigated in many states throughout the

nation, with different outcomes. In some cases,

including this one, application of an erroneous

statutory construction of URESA Section 31 to the

facts results in an outcome that eviscerates the Full

Faith and Credit required by the United States

Constitution, Article IV, § 1, and federal law, including

the Full Faith and Credit of Child Support Orders Act,

28 U.S.C. § 1738B.

6

Part of the problem giving rise to this issue is the

continual change and evolution to which child support

law has been subjected over the past four decades. It

continues in a flux. As a result, child support law is a

patch-work of state and federal statutes and case law

that many learned judges and attorneys do not fully

understand. Incomplete understanding by the bench

and bar in a dynamic environment of constant change

is responsible for producing contradictory — and

sometimes chaotic — results, leaving millions of people

unable to bring the order to their lives that can only

come from a predictable framework of law, consistent

with common sense.

A seamless majesty of law consistent with common

sense brings stability to the lives of citizens, and

society, and is the highest calling of the legal

profession. Such a noble concept of law can only be

achieved by reconciling apparently contradictory and

chaotic tendencies in law, as they arise in individual

cases. This objective was lost wher the District Court

did not properly reconcile th. .<omplex interplay of

facts and law and dismissed Roberts’ case.

This case illuminates the need for decisive guidance

from this Court to the state and federal courts about

how to harmonize:

Section 31 of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement

of Support Act (URESA), as codified in state

statutes;

the legal effect of the 1981 Maine judgment that

initially established the child support obligation of

Petitioner;

7

the legal effect of the 1983, 1984, and 2001 final

judgments of the Marylaiad responding court;

the legal effect upon these three judgments of the

Full Faith and Credit clause of United States

Constitution, Article IV, clause 1, and the Full

Faith and Credit of Child Support Orders Act, 28

USC § 1738B;

the conduct of Maine DHS, et. al., that denies full

faith and credit to those three judgments and led to

Petitioner’s civil rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against Maine DHS, et. al.; and

the District Court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s well-

pled Complaint for failure to state a claim under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(bX6), on a legal conclusion that

denies full faith and credit to the 1983, 1984, and

2001 final judgments of the Maryland responding

court.

Thus, it is imperative that this Petition be granted

for this Court to give much needed direction in an area

of law that has a direct, personal impact upon not only

Petitioner, but also several hundred thousand other

citizens, each and every year.

8

B. The Scope of the Problems Faced by Child

Support Obligors Like Roberts

According to a study by the American Coalition for

Fathers and Children’ in November 2000, in 7.5% of

cases child support agencies commit the type of error

that happened in Roberts’ case, namely “failure of the

child support agency to correctly update an order with

a downward or upward modification or later court

ruling.”

At about the same time, the federal Office of Child

Support Enforcement FY 2000 Preliminary Data

Report’ stated the nationwide child support caseload

was 17.4 million cases. Applying the 7.5% error rate

to the nationwide caseload of 17.4 million cases reveals

1.3 million cases nationwide in FY 2000 in which the

child support agency failed to correctly update an

order with a downward or upward modification or later

court ruling.

C. Roberts’ Case is the Quintessence of Many

Other Cases

The essence of the Maine DHS position, that they

may ignore with impunity the legal effect of three final

* The American Coalition for Fathers and Children is a nationally

recognized Washington D.C. based, non-profit advocacy

organization dedicated to family law education and reform.

* U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, The Office of

Child Support Enforcement Annual Statistical Report for Fiscal

Years 1999 and 2000 (visited May 17, 2008) <http://www.acf.bhs.

gov/programs/cse/pubs/2002/reports/datareport/>

9

judgments of a Maryland court, is not just an academic

exercise. It has a huge personal impact on the lives of

real people. like Roberts, who deeply resent the

profound injustice manifest in the blatantly lawless

bureaucratic money-grab by state agencies all over

America like Maine’s DHS. A close look at Roberts’

case illuminates the real suffering Maine DHS causes

in the name of the law, even as they operate on a

policy that ignores elemental precepts of American law

such as full faith and credit, merger, bar estoppel, and

res judicata. When state bureaucracies across the

nation like Maine DHS do to others as Maine DHS has

done to Roberts - simply refuse to obey the law to

collect money that is not rightfully owed — they cause

serious financial problems for hundreds of thousands,

and possibly millions, of otherwise law-abiding

American citizens. And the state agency position is

delivered with an “in your face”, “we do as we please”

arrogance that insults the intelligence of the people

they coerce who are simply overpowered by the

bureaucratic machine. Might does not make right.

It is janportant to note that URESA collection cases

such =.s Roberts’ are almost always litigated in the

state courts, because the architecture of URESA and

its successors is designed that way. Appeals of these

issues through the state courts to this Court will occur

only rarely, if ever. So the federal courts are unlikely

to ever address these problems, unless cases like

Roberts’ civil rights action are allowed to progress

through the federal appellate process to this Court.

The Roberts case offers this Court a unique

opportunity to address these important issues.

10

In light of the number of support cases outlined

above, the scope of the problem is enormous. And it is

having a deeply destructive, corrosive effect on the

faith average Americans have in their justice system.

Americans deserve better from those who administer

their system of justice. Granting Roberts’ petition

gives this Court an opportunity to address the

systemic injustice being foisted on hundreds of

thousands of Americans by state bureaucrats who

otherwise conduct themselves as personally and

collectively above the law.

D. An Overview of what Roberts has Suffered

from Maine DHS

On January 22, 1981, Roberts was divorced from

his former wife, Rosemary H. Petke (“Petke”) by

judicial decree (“the 1981 Maine divorce judgment”)

from a Maine state court, Aroostook District Court,

District No. n, Division of Southern Aroostook, Maine.

This 1981 Maine divorce judgment incorporated the

terms of a Property Settlement Agreement

(“Agreement”) entered into by Roberts and Petke. The

Agreement specified terms and conditions of property

division, child support, child custody, child visitation,

and alimony. The Agreement specified Roberts would

pay Petke a total of $360.00 per month as child

support. Thus the 1981 Maine divorce judgment also

operated as “the 1981 Maine support order.”

At the time of entry of the 1981 Maine support

order on January 22, 1981, Roberts was a resident of

the State of Maine. During the recession of 1981,

Robertg closed his machine tool business in Maine and

11

relocated his residence to his former home state of

Maryland in an effort to find work.

On or about February 23, 1981 Petke applied for

government financial assistance by requesting, among

other things, aid for dependent children though the

Maine Department of Health and Human Services

(“Maine DHS”). Upon information and belief, Petke

assigned her rigats to child support to Maine DHS;

thereafter, Maine DHS (acting as Petke’s subrogee)

handled all child support issues with Roberts, while

Petke herself continued to handle matters other than

child support with Roberts.

On or about March 24, 1982, Maine DHS initiated

an action in a Maryland state court seeking

modification of child support pursuant to the then-

governing interstate child support collection and

enforcement regime, the Uniform Reciproca!

Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), Title 19 Maine

Revised Statutes Ann., §331, et seq.

The Aroostook County Superior Court Clerk’s

Office in Maine (per Julia P. Nelson, Special Deputy

Clerk of the Supreme Judicial and Superior Courts,

Houlton, Maine), forwarded to Maryland a certified

copy of a Petition dated March 17, 1982, filed in that

Maine court by Maine DHS against Roberts, along

with testimony taken in the State of Maine, a

certification from the State of Maine, and a copy of the

version of URESA Maine had adopted.

As URESA then existed in Maine, the filing of these

documents by the Maine court in the Maryland court

was required in order to give the responding state,

12

Maryland, authority to modify the 1981 Maine order of

support. In so doing, the Maine state court

relinquished modification and enforcement jurisdiction

over Roberts’ child support obligations to the

Commonwealth of Maryland, pursuant to the

authority of URESA, also adopted by Maryland.

Six months prior to the URESA filing, Petke asked

the Maine state court for modification of the 1981

Maine divorce judgment as it related to visitation and

other items not related to child support, resulting in

Maine state court orders regarding matters other than

child support on July 8, 1982 and May 17, 1984.

Under these circumstances, Roberts (living in

Maryland) was under the jurisdiction of the Maine

court as to matters other than child support, and at

the same time, under the jurisdiction of the Maryland

court on the URESA action Maine DHS had filed in

Maryland. So, acting at the behest of its sister court in

Aroostook, Maine, the Circuit Court for Wicomico

County, Maryland, accepted the Maine’s interstate

petition for filing on April 14, 1982. The Maryland

court then proceeded to exercise subject matter

jurisdiction over child support issues and personal

jurisdiction over both Maine DHS and Roberts to

undertake review and modification of the controlling

Maine child support order, exactly as Maine DHS had

asked the Maryland court to do.

On January 7, 1983, the Circuit Court for Wicomico

County, Maryland, acted upon the Maine DHS petition

and entered a judgment prospectively modifying

Roberts’ child support obligation by suspending

payments until Roberts was out of college. Neither

13

Maine DHS nor Roberts appealed this 1983 Maryland

judgment, and it became final (“the 1983 Maryland

judgment”).

Back in Maine, on February 9, 1984, Petke asked

the Maine state court for further modification of terms

of the Maine visitation order by filing a Petition in the

Maine state court.

On April 12, 1984, Maine DHS again initiated a

URESA request in the Maryland state court, asking

the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, Maryland to

modify Roberts’ child support obligation, so while

Maine DHS asked the Maryland court to modify the

Maine child support order, the Maine court still

exercised personal jurisdiction over Roberts regarding

visitation.

On April 27, 1984 the Circuit Court for Wicomico

County, Maryland again entered its 1984 Maryland

judgment based upon the request of Maine DHS,

prospectively setting Roberts’ child support at $180 per

month (up from the $0 amount in the 1983 Maryland

judgment, but down from the $360.00 per month in the

1981 Maine support judgment). Neither Maine DHS

nor Roberts appealed this 1984 Maryland judgment,

and it became final (“the 1984 Maryland judgment”).

Over the years following the 1984 Maryland

judgment as Roberts’ three children grew up, Roberts

remained a resident of Maryland and fully complied

with the 1984 Maryland judgment, by paying in full all

of the child support owed in accordance with 1984

Maryland judgment. Roberts paid all child support

obligations under the 1984 Maryland judgment

14

through the Wicomico County Family Support Division

in Maryland, who forwarded the payments to Maine

DHS, as specified in the 1984 final judgment, until

Roberts’ youngest child reached the age 18 on

November 12, 1996.

Between the final 1984 judgment of the Maryland

court and 1996, the Maryland state court continued to

exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Roberts’ child

support obligation and personal jurisdiction over

Roberts, through various court actions in Maryland,

including motion practice and entry of Earnings

Withholding Orders. To Roberts’, knowledge,

information and belief, no court has ever entered a

judgment against him for past due child or spousal

support.

Upon information and belief, on March 31, 1997

Maine DHS caused a federal tax lien to be placed upon

Roberts’ federal tax refund. The lien was filed with the

Clerk of the Circuit Court for Dorchester, Maryland as

Maine DHS asserted its position, under the color of

state law, that the interstate URESA actions Maine

DHS initiated and pursued through the Maryland

courts to final judgments in 1983 and 1984 had no

effect upon the 1981 Maine support order.

On November 20, 2000 Maine DHS, under the color

of state law, filed in the Maryland state court a

Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”)

action to register, enforce, and collect alleged

arrearages from Roberts under the 1981 Maine

support order. As filed, Maine DHS, misrepresented

the action as an “Initial Request” and did not inform

the Maryland court of the prior procedural history and

15

posture of the case, or even mention the final

Maryland judgments from 1983 and 1984.

Having been the initiating party to the Maryland

court judgments in 1983 and 1984, Maine DHS knew,

or should have known in November 2000, that it could

not act under the authority of the 1981 Maine divorce

judgment. At the very least, Maine DHS should have

disclosed to the Maryland court the existence of the

1983 and 1984 Maryland court judgments obtained

through Maine DHS’s own petitions.

In support of the November 2000 UIFSA petition,

Defendant Valkenburgh executed an affidavit under

penalty of perjury that Roberts owed $25,790 in past

due child support, which Valkenburgh knew or should

have known was false and misleading, because Maine

DHS had received all of Roberts’ child support

payments due under the 1983 and 1984 Maryland

judgments. And Roberts’ evidence would show he

actually had paid Petke more than she was due under

the terms of the 1981 Maine support judgment.

Because of Maine DHS’ bad faith claim Roberts

owed child support arrearage under the 1981 divorce

judgment Maine insisted was still operational (after 20

years), on April 18, 2001, the Commonwealth’s

Attorney for Wicomico County, Maryland filed a

Motion to Dismiss the Maine DHS UIFSA action with

prejudice, claiming that Maryland had an order with

the parties and Maryland had closed its case.

On May 14, 2001 the Maine DHS complaint was

dismissed WITH PREJUDICE (emphasis included in

original), per Order of the Circuit Court for Wicomico

16

County, Maryland. Neither Maine DHS nor Roberts

appealed this 2001 order of the Circuit Court for

Wicomico County, Maryland, and it became final (“the

2001 Maryland judgment”).

Despite the 2001 Maryland judgment that

dismissed Maine DHS’ collection case against Roberts

with prejudice, Maine DHS began groundless

collection actions. In so doing, Maine DHS violated,

and continues to violate Roberts’ civil rights under the

Fourth Amendment, the Full Faith and Credit Clause

of the United States Constitution, the due process

clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution, and the requirements

of the Full Faith and Credit of Child Support Orders

Act, 28 USC § 1738B, by continued collection efforts,

the filing of the federal tax lien, the filing ofa

fraudulent “Initial Request” for child support and

continued harassment, including threats of

prosecution under the federal non-support act, 18

U.S.C. § 228.

Maine DHS has reported false, adverse information

about Roberts’ alleged arrears to various national

credit bureaus. Maine DHS’ unconscionable actions

and conscious disregard for the civil rights of Roberts,

his family, and others similarly situated, are pursued

by Maine DHS to fraudulently obtain U. S. federal

financial subsidies and incentives offered to the States

for the collection of legitimate child support owed.

In an attempt to collect money from Roberts for a

child support obligation he had already paid in full in

accordance with the 1981 Maine support judgment and

the 1983 and 1984 Maryland judgments, Maine DHS

17

acted with malice toward Roberts and contempt of the

Maryland state court’s final judgments. Maine DHS

has continued collection actions against Roberts while

utterly ignoring the res judicata legal effect of the 1983

and i984 final Maryland court judgments. Maine DHS

has caused Roberts irreparable harm and significant

actual damages by submitting false and adverse credit

information to various credit reporting agencies; by

reporting and requesting a federal tax lien on Roberts’

federal income taxes with the U.S. Internal Revenue

Service; by invading his privacy, in the form of a

barrage of dunning letters with written threats of

arrest and imprisonment, harassment and attempted

intimidation on a repeated basis.

In an effort to put a stop to the repeated,

systematic, and wrongful deprivation of Robert’s civil

rights by Maine DHS acting under color of law, on July

1, 2004, Roberts filed his Complaint for damages and

injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal

District Court in Baltimore, Maryland.

Despite that Roberts’ complaint properly invoked

the jurisdiction of the District Court under 28 U.S.C.

$1331 and 42 U.S.C. $1983, on December 17, 2004

(over 5 months from the date Roberts filed the

Complaint on July 1, 2004) the Honorable William D.

Quarles, Jr., District Judge, ordered Roberts’ entire

complaint dismissed on the sole ground the District

Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (App. 40a).

After Roberts’ Motion to Reconsider was denied by

the District Court, Roberts appealed pro se to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

18

from the order and judgment of dismissal by the

District Court (Roberts’ first appeal to the Fourth

Circuit). (App. 38a). On May 24, 2006 the Fourth

Circuit decided Roberts’ first appeal with a written

opinion and judgment that vacated the judgment of the

District Court and remanded the case to the District

Court for further proceedings. (App. 32a).

After the mandate of the Fourth Circuit issued on

June 19, 2006 and Roberts’ case was docketed back in

the District Court, Maine DHS renewed their Motion

to Dismiss restating the remaining substance of their

first Motion to Disiniss back in 2004. Almost 2 %

years from the date Roberts filed the Complaint on

July 1, 2004, on January 26, 2007 the Honorable Judge

William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge, again ordered

Roberts’ entire complaint dismissed with prejudice for .

failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (a

ground that was in Maine DHS’ 2004 Motion to

Dismiss). (App. 18a). And Maine DHS has yet to file

an Answer to Roberts’ Complaint.

After Roberts’ Motion to Reconsider was denied by

the District Court, on May 18, 2007 Roberts filed

Notice of his second appeal to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit from the order and

judgment of the District Court dismissing his case.

On January 9, 2008 the Fourth Circuit decided

Roberts’ second appeal with a written opinion and

judgment that sustained the judgment of the District

Court without explanation. (App. 3a).

19

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Roberts respectfully submits there are compelling

reasons why this Court should grant his petition for

writ of certiorari and review the Fourth Circuit’s

decision.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision sustained the District

Court’s dismissal with prejudice that hinged upon

important questions of constitutional and federal law

that has not been, but should be settled by the

Supreme Court.

A. The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of

Support Act

The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support

Act (URESA) was enacted to facilitate interstate

enforcement of child support obligations. URESA or

similar legislation was adopted in all of the United

States. It was approved by the National Conference of

Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in September

1950, and was adopted by Maryland on June 1, 1951

and by Maine on August 8, 1953.‘ The Act stated that

its purposes were to improve, by reciprocal legislation,

the enforcement of the duties of support, and to make

uniform the law with respect thereto. The goal of

improved interstate enforcement of child support

obligations had been accomplished, but the law with

respect thereto is anything but uniform. The lack of

*“URESA was superseded by the enactment of UIFSA in Maryland

on January 1, 1997 and in Maine on July 1, 1995. At all times

relevant to this case, URESA was in effect and applicable.

20

uniformity is due, in part, to the fact that state courts

have taken different views on how to properly construe

various critical sections of the Act. Germane to this

case is Section 31 of the Act.

A URESA proceeding is commenced when a person

to whom a duty of support is owed (a support obligee)

files a petition in a court of the initiating state, the

state in which the obligee resides. After determining

that a duty of support may exist, the court in the

initiating state forwards the petition to a court of the

responding state, the state where the parent allegedly

owing a duty of support resides (the support obligor).

Having obtained subject matter jurisdiction, the court

of the responding state must obtain personal

jurisdiction over the support obligor, hold a hearing,

and determine whether a duty of support exists, and if

so, the extent of that duty going forward in time.

Section 31 of URESA states that “a support order

made by a court of this state [i.e. the responding state]

pursuant to this Act does not nullify and is not

nullified by a support order made by a court of

substantially similar Act or any other law, regardless

of priority or issuance, unless otherwise specifically

provided by the court. Amounts paid for a particular

period pursuant to any support order made by the

court of another state shall be credited against the

amounts accruing or accrued for the same period

under any support order made by a the court of this

state.”

21

B. State URESA Statutes vs. The Full Faith

and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution

In construing section 31 of the Act, several states

have taken the view that a court acting as a

responding court in a URESA proceeding may enter a

child support order different from that previously

ordered in the initiating state. However, some of those

states have also found that section 31 of the Act

provides that the initiating state is not bound by the

terms of a support order of a responding state when

the responding state considers a subsequent petition

for modification, or calculates arrearages due under

the original divorce decree. To reach this conclusion,

courts have reasoned that support orders entered

pursuant to URESA are not judgments entitled to Full

Faith and Credit. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

affirmed the District Court decision in this case that

dismissing Petitioner’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, citing

a case construing the Act as just described herein.

Petitioner submits that an interpretation of the Act

allowing a court to ignore essential precepts of law

pertaining to full faith and credit, res judicata, and

merger is incorrect, improper, and unconstitutional.

As stated in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County

of San Francisco, Cal., “[t}here is simply ‘no principle

of law or equity which sanctions the rejection by a

federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata.”

545 U.S. 323, 401; 125 S.Ct. 2491; 162 L.Ed.2d 315

(2005) (quoting Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733,

66 S.Ct. 853, 90 L.Ed. 970 (1946)). The lower courts’

decisions in this case upholding an unconstitutional

interpretation of the Act results in a manifest injustice

for a multitude of Americans subject to this law.

22

Article IV, § 1, of the United States Constitution

demands that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in

each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial

Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress

may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which

such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,

and the Effect thereof.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738, provides

that “judicial proceedings ... shall have the same full

faith and credit in every court within the United

States and its Territories and Possessions as they have

by law or usage in the courts of such State ....” his

statute has long been understood to encompass the

doctrines of res judicata, or “claim preclusion,” and

collateral estoppel, or “issue preclusion.” See Allen v.

McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-96; 101 S.Ct. 411; 66 L.Ed.2d

308 (1980). The general rule implemented by the full

faith and credit statute is that parties should not be

permitted to relitigate issues that have been resolved

by courts of competent jurisdiction. San Remo Hotel,

L.P., 545 U.S. 323.

In the instant case, after Roberts’ child support

obligation was created in the 1981 Maine support

judgment, Roberts’ ex-wife assigned her interest in

Roberts’ child support obligation under the 1981 Maine

support judgment to Maine DHS. Maine DHS then

initiated an action in Maine under URESA, followed

URESA requirements to transfer jurisdiction to the

Maryland courts, actively participated as a party in

the Maryland court (by proxy, through their

counterparts from the Maryland child support agency),

were represented by counsel who litigated the child

support issue with Roberts present, accepted the 1983

judgment of the Maryland court that suspended

Roberts’ child support payments until he finished

23

college, and let the 1983 Maryland judgmenit oecome

final without any appeal.

And it happened the same way again in 1984.

Maine DHS initiated an action in Maine under

URESA, followed URESA requirements to transfer

jurisdiction to the Maryland courts, actively

participated as a party in the Maryland court (by

proxy, through their counterparts from the Maryland

child support agency), were represented by counsel

who litigated the child support issue with Roberts

present, accepted the 1984 judgment of the Maryland

court that Roberts’ prospective child support payments

be $180.00 per month, and let the 1984 Maryland

judgment become final without any appeal.

Petitioner ful!y complied with the 1984 Maryland

judgment and pa:d all child support in full as he had

been ordered to do under the 1981 Maine judgment,

and the 1983 Maryland judgment. When Maine

sought to wrongfully enforce the 1981 Maine judgment

in bad faith the 2001 Maryland judgment dismissed

Maine DHS’ collection action with prejudice.

In 2007, when Maine DHS moved for dismissal of

Roberts’ Complaint, the District Court, Honorable

William D. Quarles presiding, erroneously dismissed

Petitioner’s complaint for failure to state a claim under

Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). In so doing the District

Court gave no res judicata effect, as a matter of law, to

the 1983, 1984 and 2001 Maryland judgment. In

support of the dismissal, the court relied on Weidner v.

Weidner, 553 A.2d 263 (Md. App. 1989). The Weidner

case is fully analyzed below in subsection D. However,

before addressing Weidner and the problems it

24

presents, it is important to analyze a case that is

factually on point with the instant case and was

decided close in time to Roberts’ divorce and his

subsequent support proceedings.

C. Sullivan v. Sullivan -Harmonizing URESA

law with the Full Faith and Credit Clause

In 1981, an Illinois appellate court properly

addressed the distinction between a_ collateral

enforcement action for a support order and an action

for prospective modification of support. Sullivan v.

Sullivan, 98 Ill.App.3d 928, 424 N.E.2d 957 (1981). In

Sullivan, the parties were divorced in New York in

1968. Pursuant to the separation agreement entered

into, the husband was to pay $655 per month for child

support. Subsequent to the entry of the divorce decree,

the wife moved to Illinois and the husband then moved

to Ohio. In 1978, an Illinois court increased the

father’s support obligation to $1,000 per month.

Apparently, both parties were present at that hearing

in Illinois. In an attempt to collect on the increased

support order, the wife then commenced proceedings

under URESA in Illinois. The complaint was then

forwarded to Ohio, the responding state. However,

when the hearing on that complaint took place in Ohio,

both the husband and wife were present. At the

conclusion of that hearing, the Ohio URESA court

lowered the husband's obligation to $600 per month.

In 1980, the wife filed a petition for a rule to show

cause in Illinois, which alleged arrearages under the

1978 Illinois order. Nevertheless, after a hearing, the

trial court ruled that the responding URESA court,

Ohio, had jurisdiction to prospectively modify the prior

25

Illinois support order. On appeal, that ruling was

confirmed. In affirming that judgment the Illinois

appellate court stated:

We find no error in the circuit court’s

decision to recognize the Ohio order over the

previous Illinois order. Following the 1978

Illinois order, Mary properly entered that order

in Ohio one month later by means of an URESA

complaint. With both parties present, the Ohio

court concurred in the finding that Daryl was

obligated to pay support but it fixed a different

amount of prospective support from that set by

the initiating court. The law is generally settled

that, under URESA, a responding court may

enter a new decree for a different amount of

prospective child support from that of the

initiating court. [Citations omitted.]

Specifically, the Ohio court prospectively

reduced Daryl’s obligation from $1,000 to $600

per month because, contrary to Illinois law, that

State refused to recognize inflation and

maturation as reasons for increasing support.

We do note, however, that Ohio may well

have denied the 1978 Iilinois order full faith

and credit. It is generally established that one

State must recognize a sister State’s judgment

to the degree that it is nonmodifiable. [Citations

omitted.] The law is equally well settled that

the second forum must apply to the first forum’s

law to determine the extent of modification.

[Citations omitted.| Accordingly, then, to

determine the degree to which the 1978 Illinois

decree was modifiable, the Ohio court should

26

have referred to Section 510 of the Illinois

Marriage and Marriage Dissolution Act

(Il).Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 40, par. 510). That section

dictates that a judgment of maintenance or

support may not be modified retroactively and

may be modified prospectively only upon a

showing of changed circumstances. Moreover,

courts of Illinois have consistently held that

those facts which were the basis of the original

decree become res judicata and that changed

circumstances justifying modification of support

must occur since the date of the decree.

[Citations omitted.] In the case at bar, however,

the Ohio court modified the Illinois decree

within one or two months of the Illinois decree

and based its ruling upon the same set of

circumstances that the Illinois court had used

and which had become res judicata.

Furthermore, from our examination of the

record, there was no indication of changed

circumstances to justify the 1978 Ohio

modification. Thus, although URESA may

authorize a responding court to modify the

initiating State’s decree, the second forum must

nonetheless give full faith and credit to the first

judgment to the extent that it is nonmodifiable.

By refusing to recognize our rules regarding

modification, the court modified a judgment

which was not subject to modification in

Illinois.” [98 Il. App.3d 928, 931-32; 424 N.E.2d

957 (Lil. App. 1981) (Emphasis added).]

The Illinois appellate court then held that it was

required to give full faith and credit to Ohio’s

judgment even though the Ohio court may have failed

27

to give the 1978 Illinois judgment full faith and credit.

The court pointed out that any objections the wife had

concerning the Ohio modification should have been

directly appealed in Ohio and not collaterally attacked

in Illinois. The court then stated: “The United States

Supreme Court has long held that ‘the full faith and

credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry

into the merits of the cause of action, the logic or

consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal

principles on which the judgment is based.’ (Milliken

v. Meyer (1940), 311 U.S. 457, 462, 85 L.Ed. 278, 282-

83, 618.Ct. 339, 342.).” Sullivan, 98 Ill. App. 932; 424

N.E.2d 957.

The Sullivan opinion is factually similar to the

present matter since the obligor in Sullivan was

present in the URESA court when the alleged

modification of support took place. In the present

situation, Maine officials were represented in the

Maryland court room. Maine officials had expressly

asked the Maryland court to determine a reasonable

amount of support and order Roberts to pay it.

The presence of both the obligor and the obligee in

the URESA court is a fact that was crucial to the

court’s decision in Sullivan. The Sullivan court

pointed out specifically that the obligor was present at

the time the support payment was prospectively

modified. It is evident that the court based its decision

on the fact that the obligee had voluntarily subjected

herself to the jurisdiction of the responding court by

appearing at the Ohio hearing. This conclusion is

further supported by the fact that the Sullivan court

stated that the wife should have directly appealed the

reduction in the support order in Ohio rather than an

28

attempted collateral attack in Illinois. That both

parties had the right to direct appeal of the responding

court’s judgment was a crucial factor in the Sullivan

opinion that is also present in Roberts’ case.

In the case at bar, after Petke assigned her interest

in Roberts’ child support obligation to Maine DHS in

1981, Maine DHS initiated the action in the Maryland

court and participated as a party after following

procedures to transfer jurisdiction from the Maine

court to the Maryland court. With both Maine DHS

and Roberts present as active participants, the

Maryland ‘court acted exactly as Maine DHS

requested, finding that Petitioner was obligated to pay

child support, but fixing a different, lesser amount of

prospective support from that set by the initiating

court in Maine. The finding of a reduced amount of

support was based upon the fact that Roberts’

employment changed between the 1981 date of the

initial divorce decree in Maine and the 1983

modification in Maryland.

The Maryland action was not a distinct collateral

enforcement action for past due installments, as was

the situation in Weidner, infra. In the instant case, the

Maryland state court prospectively modified the Maine

support order after it was properly presented to the

Maryland court when Maine DHS filed their action in

the Maryland court. The Maryland court did not

nullify the Maine order as it applied to any past due

support installments. Most importantly, Maine never

appealed the decision of the Maryland court, and thus

— whether right or wrong — the Maryland state court

judgment decision became final, and subject to Full

Faith and Credit recognition by the Maine court and

29

Maine DHS, and res judicata as to the amount of

prospective child support Roberts owed going forward

from both the 1983 and 1984 final Maryland court

judgments.

D. Weidner v. Weidner- An Improper Basis for

a 12(b)(6) Dismissal in the Instant Case

The Maryland Court of Appeals case erroncously

cited by the District Court as the basis for dismissal of

Roberts’ case is inapplicable and factually

distinguishable. See Weidner v. Weidner, 553 A.2d 263

(Md. App. 1989). In Weidner, the parties were

divorced in Maryland in 1965. The divorce decree

ordered the husband to pay to pay $10.00 per week in

child support for his dependent son, and $20.00 per

week as alimony. Soon thereafter, the husband

established his domicile in Florida and stopped

making payments for child support and alimony. The

wife sought the assistance of the State’s Attorney of

Baltimore City where she then resided. A petition was

filed on behalf of the wife in the Circuit Court for

Baltimore City and a certified copy thereof was

transmitted to the Circuit Court for the Ninth Judicial!

Circuit of Florida, in and for Orange County. Invoking

Maryland’s version of URESA, Maryland sought to

enforce the husband’s duty to pay child support and

alimony. On July 27, 1965, the Circuit Court for

Orange County ordered the appellant to pay $20.00

per week as support for “his Dependents, Barbara A.

Weidner and Albert Harry Weidner, Jr.” without

allocating that payment between alimony and child

support.

30

On March 29, 1968, the husband filed a petition, in

the same Florida court, for a reduction of his support

obligation to $10.00 per week on the ground that his

earnings had decreased. Notwithstanding the limited

relief sought by the husband in his petition for

reduction of his support obligation, the Florida court,

without holding a hearing, entered an order modifying

support payments owed by the husband. The record of

the Florida court proceedings does not reflect that the

wife received a copy of the husband’s petition for

reduction or a copy of the order. It did, however, show

that a copy of that order was mailed to the Clerk of the

Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland. AURESA

proceeding to enforce unpaid alimony support was

commenced 19 years later.

The Maryland Appellate court cited the Florida

statute which contained the language from Section 31

of URESA and held as follows: “[Wjhatever the intent

of the Florida court with regard to [|husband’s] duty to

pay spousal support when it entered its somewhat

ambiguous orders of July 27, 1965 and April 16, 1968,

we hold that the judgment entered by the Circuit

Court for Anne Arundel County [Maryland] on April

12, 1965 was not superseded or nullified. Judge

Cawood correctly ruled that [the wife] was entitled to

enforce that judgment by seeking a lien on the Social

Security benefits due appellant.” Weidner v. Weidner,

553 A.2d at 267. The Court rejected the husband’s

argument that the hearing court violated the Full

Faith and Credit Clause of Article [V of the United

States Constitution by “ignoring” the Florida decree.

The Maryland court reasoned that “Florida’s version of

the URESA antisupersession statute, on its face,

states that the entry of an order of support by a

3]

Florida court in a URESA proceeding, when Florida is

the responding state under the Act, does not supersede

the original support order of the initiating state under

the Act.” Id.

Legal research into the value of the Weidner case as

precedent indicates that a majority of states follow an

analysis similar to that in Weidner, but the analysis

must be qualified. The possibility that Weidner

reflects a majority view may be misleading because the

holding in Weidner is overbroad. As such, the Weidner

opinion easily lends itself to citation as authority in

cases to which it should not be applied.

There is no doubt Weidner is distinguishable from

the facts in Roberts’ case. In Weidner, the child

support obligee did not appear at a modification

hearing. In fact, there was no hearing. The child

support obligee did not submit to the jurisdiction of the

responding state. The child support obligee simply

received notice in Maryland of the Florida judgment

after the fact, i.e. at some point after the Florida court

had already acted to alger the amount of the original

obligations. Under these facts, it is proper to still

enforce the original Maryland decree ordering support

payments. And Petitioner does not challenge the

application of Section 31 of the Act when under the

Weidner facts, but those are far different from the facts

in Roberts’ case.

The distinction that courts, including the Maryland

court in Weidner, have failed to make is when both

parties appear before the responding court, and the

obligor seeks modification based on a change in

circumstances (such as reduced income from job loss),

32

the issues are litigated with both the obligor and

obligee actively participating, a judgment is entered

that prospectively alters the amount of support

obligation consistent with the _ obligee’s new

employment and income circumstances, and both

parties allow the judgment to become final without

appeal.

E. The Fourth Circuit’s Affirmation of the

District Court’s Dismissal Allows for

Continued Confusion Amongst States in

Child Support Collection Actions

Petitioner has not been permitted to advance his 42

U.S.C. § 1983 case against Maine DHS in response to

their bad faith collection efforts on the original 1981

Maine support order. Maine has not even been

required to answer Petitioner's Complain’. The

District Court judge has been presented with two

motions to dismiss and on each occasion has granted

the motion. The second District Court dismissal was

based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

A rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted only in

very limited circumstances. This Honorable Court has

explained that “(t]he Federal Rules reject the approach

that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep

by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept

the principle that the purpose of pleading is to

facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Conley uv.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48; 78 S.Ct. 99; 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80

(1957). The Fourth Circuit, which summarily affirmed

the dismissal of Roberts’ case, has long held “that a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief

should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty

33

that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under

any state of facts which could be proved in support of

his claim.” Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th

Cir.1969) (citation omitted).

In general, URESA only sought to provide a

mechanism whereby the orders of one state could be

enforced in another state. But URESA did not address

the issue of one state “modifying” the orders of another

state, which state courts certainly had the power to do

under the general equitable powers of state courts, and

unusual as it may have been, is certainly what

happened under any reasonable interpretation of the

facts of this case. Because URESA led to a certain

amount of confusion because of different orders in

different states, UIFSA and federal laws such as 28

U.S.C. § 1738B tried to clarify this situation and create

a “one-order world.”

Congress sought to resolve the confusion regarding

application of Full Faith and Credit with respect to

modification of interstate support orders with

enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1738B in 1994, many years

after the 1983 and 1984 final judgments of the

Maryland court. Robert’s Complaint cited 28 U.S.C.

§ 1738B as the relevant statute to apply here, and the

District Court’s Memorandum Opinion does not fully

address this issue. The relevant portion of The Full

Faith and Credit of Child Support Orders Act states:

(e) Authority To Modify Orders. - A court of

a State may modify a child support order issued

by a court of another State if -

34

(B) each individual contestant has filed

written consent with the State of continuing,

exclusive jurisdiction for a court of another

State to modify the order and assume

continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the

order.

28 U.S.C. § 1738B(e)(2)(B).

By the plain meaning of the words of the prayer in the

Maine DHS Petition of March 17, 1982, Maine DHS

consented, in writing, to the Maryland responding

court setting a “fair and reasonable” amount of support

based upon Roberts’ employment and income

circuinstances at the time of the Petition. Their

obvious consent is also manifest in that Maine DHS

participated, without objection, as a party litigant

wnen the Maryland responding court modified the

initial 19§1 Maine judgment in 1983 and again in 1984

on the Petition of Maine DHS, did not appeal either

the 1983 or 1984 Maryland judgments, and accepted

Roberts’ subsequent child support payments that fully

complied with the terms of the 1983 and 1984

Maryland judgments that Maine DHS themselves had

requested.

As far as consent in writing by Roberts, if Roberts

had had a crystal ball in 1983 and 1984, and had

known exactly what Congress would say on this

subject in 1994, he would have been willing to provide

such consent in writing, but like Maine DHS, Roberts’

consent is manifest in that he participated, without

objectioa, as a party litigant when the Maryland

responding court modified the initial 1981 Maine

judgment in 1983 and again in 1984, did not appeal

35

either the 1983 or 1984 Maryland judgments, and fully

complied with both the 1983 and 1984 Maryland

judgments according to their terms.

Petitioner believes that this controversy would

have been resolved with common sense many years

ago, if not for the corrupting effects sf misguided

federal subsidy and incentive programs, and the dollar

signs that one can see in the eyes of certain

bureaucrats and some lawyers who expect to gain by

legalistic sophistry what they cannot gain »y due

process of law.

Nothing in 28 U.S.C. § 1738B or the Constitution

prevents 28 U.S.C. § 1738B from being applied

prospectively once Congress clarified Full Faith and

Credit issues insofar as they apply to a case such as

this. There can be no reasonable doubt that Maine

DHS did consent, in writing, to the Maryland court

setting “fair and reasonable” support, and according to

the plain words of 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, at least since

1994 Maine DHS has been compelled to grant Full

Faith and Credit to the 1983, 1984, and 2001

Maryland judgments. There is no good excuse for

Maine DHS not to have done so after Congress

clarified those issues in 1994. The District Court’s

Dismissal with prejudice frustrates the clear intent of

Congress as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, insofar as

it applies to the facts of this case.

In light of the mandate for Full Faith and Credit

unequivucally expressed in the Full Faith and Credit

clause of the United States Constitution, Maine DHS

is without excuse for ignoring the 1983, 1984, and 2001

36

Maryland judgments, even in the absence of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1738B.

The central issue of this case is the intent of the

Maine court in forwarding the Petition of Maine DHS

dated March 17, 1982 to the Maryland responding

court. Petitioner has truthfully alleged that the intent

of Maine DHS and the Maine court was that the

Maryland court assume modification jurisdiction

(Complaint, ppg. 24, 25, and elsewhere), whereas

Maine DHS has repeatedly, falsely responded that “the

Maine Department of Health and Human Services

commenced a proceeding in Maryland state court to

enforce the Maine order.” Maine DHS has yet to

dispute Roberts Complaint with an Answer.

In any event, the best-evidence of the intent of the

Maine DHS Petition, and of the Maryland court acting

in response thereto, is in the prayer for relief, which

requests inter alia:

1. Respondent be ordered to pay such sums per

child per month as would be deemed fair and

reasonable for the support of the named minor

dependants.

ee

4. Such further relief be granted as this Court.

deems just and proper.

Also significant on this point is the evidence that,

although jurisdiction for child support clearly was

transferred from Maine to Maryland, jurisdiction for

visitation continued in Maine as late as 1984, and

Maine DHS could easily have still sought enforcement

of the initial 1981 Maine judgment in the Maine court,

37

if they did not agree that the 1983 and 1984 Maryland

judgments had modified the 1981 Maine judgment. It

was only years later when bureaucrats who were not

in the Maine and Maryland courtrooms in 1981, 1983

and 1984, and did not know or understand what had

happened, initiated the current controversy, which

continues to this day.

F. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is also

implicated in Roberts’ case

The District Court 12(b)(6) dismissal judgment

has the effect of directly reversing not one, but

three, final and dispositive judgments of the

Maryland state court. This dismissal directly

contradicts the core principle of the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine, i.e. that District Courts cannot

act as appeliate courts and undo final state court

judgments. Given recent decisions of this Court on

Rooker-Feldman, it is necessary for this Court to

clarify the operation of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine in this case of first impression.

CONCLUSION

A writ of certiorari should be issued to review the

judgment and opinion of the Fourth Circuit Court of

Appeals. If certiorari is not granted, the Court runs

the risk of perpetuating ongoing confusion and

disparate application of a uniform law adopted in all

fifty states. The Court would also run the risk of

tacitly endorsing an unconstitutional construction of

this law that, as applied, disregards the Full Faith and

Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.

38

Respectfully submitted,

Lisa A. Hanson

Counsel of Record

651 East 4th Street, Suite 100

Chattanooga, TN 37403

(423) 553-1324

Stanley Charles Thorne

3440 Bell Street, Suite 320-332

Amarillo, TX 79109

(713) 444-9658

Counsel for Petitioner