Appendix — Policastro v. Kontogiannis (No. 07-1341)

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 06-1471

[Filed January 24, 2008]

ANDREW POLICASTRO,

Appellant

Vs

DR. THEODORA P. KONTOGIANNIS,

Principal Tenafly High School;

TENAFLY BOARD OF EDUCATION

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-1219

(Honorable Joel A. Pisano)

Before SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FUENTES and

CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Chief Judge.

2a

Appellant Andrew Policastro, a teacher at Tenafly

High School, sued the school’s principal, Dr. Theodora

Kontogiannis, and the Tenafly Board of Education for

violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of

speech. Following a bench trial, the District Court

dismissed Policastro’s claims and entered judgment in

favor of both Kontogiannis and the school board. We

will affirm the judgment in part and dismiss in part.’

I.

Policastro is a science teacher at Tenafly High

School. On March 13, 2002, at 8:15 am. a

memorandum was distributed to all Tenafly High

School staff members through the _ teachers’

school-provided mailboxes. The memorandum involved

a labor dispute between teachers and their union over

negotiations of a proposed collective bargaining

contract. A ratification vote on the proposal was

scheduled that same afternoon. Policastro was one of

thirteen teachers who signed the memorandum.

In the words of the District Court, the

memorandum was “plain vanilla,” containing no

vulgarities or obscenities. Yet the memorandum

prompted complaints to Dr. Theodora Kontogiannis,

principal of Tenafly High School. One complaint

reported a “commotion in the library” over the

memorandum, and another reported arguments among

teachers. Kontogiannis, deciding the memorandum

was unacceptably disrupting school activities, removed

'' The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

1343, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

3a

all remaining copies from the teachers’ mailboxes.

Immediately thereafter, a teacher reinserted copies in

the. mailboxes. Kontogiannis again ordered the

memorandum removed and the mailroom door locked

for the remainder of the school day.

Based on these events, Policastro filed suit against

Kontogiannis and the school board. He alleged that

Kontogiannis’s removal of the memorandum violated

his First Amendment right to free speech, and he

challenged as unconstitutional a Tenafly School Board

policy restricting the use of teacher mailboxes.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim. The District Court granted the motion,

and Policastro appealed. We vacated the dismissal

and remanded to the District Court for further

proceedings. See Policastro v. Kontogiannis, No.

04-2883, 2005 WL 1005131 (3d Cir. Jan. 12, 2005).

The District Court conducted a bench trial at which

Policastro appeared pro se. At the conclusion of both

sides’ testimony, the District Court adjudicated

Policastro’s claims and found in favor of both

Kontogiannis and the school board and against

Policastro.? This appeal followed.

? Keen to the need for exigency in this matter, the District Court

issued an oral decision from the bench. The judgment employed

the term “dismissal,” but on review of the transcript it appears

plain the court was adjudicating Policastro’s claims. Any

confusion in wording may have been due to our prior decision

vacating the original dismissal for failure to state a claim and

remanding for fact finding. But the record reveals Policastro’s

claims were adjudicated following a bench trial that included

testimony from al] relevant parties and witnesses.

The Tenafly School Board has a written policy on

using teacher mailboxes (“Mailbox Policy”), which

provides:

Mailboxes are the property of the Tenafly Board

of Education and should be used for school

business. Any staff member wishing to

distribute flyers/announcements etc. (via the

mailboxes) must have prior approval from the

principal or vice-principal.

Policastro claims this policy is unconstitutional on its

face. The District Court characterized this claim as an

overbreadth challenge, stating it would try the issue of

whether the policy “impermissibly extends [to] .. .

speech that cannot be constitutionally restricted.” (Tr.

at 5:20-22). Policastro did not object.?

3 The amici curiae contend the Mailbox Policy is also

unconstitutionally vague. But there was ne testimony during the

bench trial about the risk of discriminatory application of the

Mailbox Policy or whether school officials were endowed with

undue discretion under the policy. These questions would be

central to a vagueness challenge. See, e.g., Kreimer v. Bureau of

Police for Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1266 (3d Cir. 1992).

Accordingly, we will only address overbreadth. See Gass v. Virgin

Islands Tel. Corp., 311 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is well

established that failure to raise an issue in the district court

constitutes a waiver of the argument. ... We only depart from this

rule when manifest injustice would result from a failure to

5a

A regulation is unconstitutionally overbroad where

there is “a likelihood that [it]s very existence will

inhibit free expression’ by ‘inhibiting the speech of

third parties who are not before the Court.” Saxe v.

State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir.

2001) (quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers

for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799 (1984)). “[A]voidance of

this chilling effect is at the heart of the overbreadth

doctrine.” Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311, 317 (3d

Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). But a regulation’s

inhibiting nature must be “not only real but

substantial in relation to [it]s plainly legitimate

sweep” to be held unconstitutional. Saxe, 240 F.3d at

214 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,

615 (1973)). “Because the overbreadth doctrine is

‘strong medicine,’ it is to be used sparingly, where the

demonstrated overbreadth is considerable.” Kreimer,

958 F.2d at 1265 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.

747, 769 (1982)) (some internal quotation marks

omitted).

Here, the District Court held the Mailbox Policy

had no actual or potential chilling effect. The court

found that Tenafly teachers, including Policastro, had

distributed personal documents through the teachers’

mailboxes both before and after the subject

memorandum was confiscated. The court also found,

and all parties agreed, that Tenafly High School

administrators had never denied prior approval of a

mass distribution, and that—with the exception of the

subject memorandum here—nothing had ever been

consider a novel issue.”) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

6a

removed from the mailboxes. Furthermore, in terms of

the Mailbox Policy’s “legitimate sweep,” the court

credited Kontogiannis’s testimony that the purpose of |

the policy was to ensure that the mailboxes did not

become overstuffed to the point where documents

involving school business would be missed or lost.

Based on these facts, the court concluded that any

inhibiting impact of the Mailbox Policy was

insubstantial relative to its legitimate scope.

We agree that the record fails to show that the

Mailbox Policy has had an actual or potential chilling

effect on teacher speech. Policastro admits that “[s]ince

the removal of the memo .. . use of the mailboxes by

teachers for personal messages (memos, notes, cards,

etc.) has continued as usual, without prior approval.”

Policastro Brief at 5. Accordingly, we will affirm the

District Court’s denial of Policastro’s overbreadth

challenge.

B.

Policastro also claims the Mailbox Policy is

unconstitutional as it was applied to him. But

Kontogiannis testified at trial that she removed the

memorandum because of a disruption among the

teachers that threatened to disrupt the school’s

program. There is no evidence in the _ record

demonstrating the Mailbox Policy was the cause of the

memorandum’s removal. Accordingly, Policastro has

not shown he suffered any injury under the policy or

that the policy has ever in fact been applied to him. We

will affirm the District Court’s denial of Policastro’s

“as applied” challenge to the Mailbox Policy.

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Ill.

Policastro also claims his First Amendment right to

free speech was violated whether or not Kontogiannis

removed the subject memorandum under the Mailbox

Policy.‘ He did not seek damages. He seeks declaratory

and injunctive relief only, which, for the reasons set

forth below, are forms of relief we have no authority to

provide on the facts here. Therefore, we will dismiss

this claim as non-justiciable, because even if

meritorious, we could not redress it.

To bring and maintain a lawsuit through

adjudication, Policastro must have standing. E.g.,

Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1246 (3d

Cir. 1996). “The three elements necessary to establish

the irreducible constituiicnal minimum of standing

are: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in

fact-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is

(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal

connection between the injury and the conduct

complained of; and (3) it must be likely, as opposed to

merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by

a favorable decision.” Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning

* Policastro’s pro se complaint has been liberally construed to

include a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the school’s actions in

removing the memorandum infringed on his First Amendment

right to free speech. See Policastro v. Kontogiannis, No. 04-2883,

2005 WL 1005131 (3d Cir. 2005). This claim is distinct from his

“as applied” challenge to the Mailbox Policy, because he alleges

his speech was unconstitutionally silenced by the school’s actions

even if those actions were motivated by something other than the

Mailbox Policy.

8a

Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United

States v. Hayes, 515 U.S. 737, 742-43 (1995)).

a |

In our prior opinion vacating the District Court’s

dismissal for failure to state a claim, we acted without

the benefit of fact-finding. Here, we have discovery and

a trial record. On prior review, Policastro’s standing

was not in question. Policastro’s pro se complaint,

construed liberally, alleged Kontogiannis removed the

offending memorandum from teacher mailboxes under

the school’s Mailbox Policy. Had this been proven,

equitable relief might have been proper if the policy

were unconstitutional, facially and/or as applied. But

the trial testimony unequivocally shows the subject

memorandum was removed because of the perceived

disturbance it caused, not because of the Mailbox

Policy. Because the school’s action in removing the

memorandum was an isolated occurrence wholly

unrelated to the Mailbox Policy, the facts present no

ongoing harm or controversy for us to remedy.

Accordingly, whether or not Policastro had standing

prior to remand, his claims are now moot.

A mootness inquiry asks whether a claimant’s

standing continues throughout the litigation. “A case

is moot when the issues presented are no longer live or

the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the

outcome.” Donovan ex. rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney

Area School Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 216 (3d Cir. 2003)

(citation omitted). “The court’s ability to grant effective

relief lies at the heart of the mootness doctrine.” Jd.

“That is, if developments occur during the course of

adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff's personal stake

in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being

able to grant the requested relief, the case must be

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dismissed as moot.” Id.; see also Green v. Branson, 108

F.3d 1296, 1299 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The touchstone of

the mootness inquiry is whether the controversy

continues to touch the legal relations of parties having

adverse legal interests in the outcome of the case.”)

(citation omitted). “The crucial question is whether

‘granting a present determination of the issues offered

. will have some effect in the real world.” Utah

Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371

F.3d 1248, 1256 (10th Cir. 2004) (alterations in

original) (citations omitted).

At this juncture, no available remedy would redress

Policastro’s suit. He has not sought damages.°

° Policastro’s suit would likely survive a justiciability challenge if

he had sought damages. See, e.g., Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S.

264 (1982) (holding the transfer tv anvther prison did not moot a

prisoner's claim for damages arising from placement in solitary

confienement); Donovan, 336 F.3d at 218 (holding claims for

damages and attorneys fees continued to present a live

controversy even though claims for declaratory and injunctive

relief were moot); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. New Jersey,

772 F.2d 35, 41 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[T]he availability of damages or

other monetary relief almost always avoids mootness. . . .”); Blau

v. Fort Thomas Public School Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 387 (6th Cir.

2005) (noting the existence of a damages claim “ensures that [a]

dispute is a live one over which Article III gives us continuing

authority.”) (multiple citations omitted). But Policastro chose not

to assert a claim for damages. A request for damages will

gencrally save a case from becoming moot when equitable relief no

longer provides an effective remedy, but courts will not read a

claim for damages into a complaint that contains no such request.

See Seven Words LLC v. Network Solutions, 260 F.3d 1089, 1097

(9th Cir. 2001) (holding claims moot where appellant sought only

injunctive and declaratory relief but failed to request damages).

10a

Injunctive relief would be unavailable for Policastro at

this time, and declaratory relief would amount to no

more than an advisory opinion regarding the

“wrongfulness” of past conduct. See, e.g., Green v.

Branson, 108 F.3d at 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[A

party’s] ‘legal interest’ must be more than simply the

satisfaction of a declaration that a person was

wronged.”) (citing Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 755, 761

(1987)). The Supreme Court has consistently held “a

federal court has neither the power to render advisory

opinions nor to decide questions that cannot affect the

rights of litigants in the case before them.” Preiser v.

Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (quotation omitted).

The Court has provided further guidance on this point:

“In all civil litigation, the judicial decree is not

the end but the means. At the end of the

rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or

cessation of action) by the defendant that the

judgment produces—the payment of damages, or

some specific performance, or the termination of

some conduct. Redress is sought through the

court, but from the defendant. This is no less

true of a declaratory judgment suit than of any

action. The real value of the judicial

pronouncement—what makes it a proper judicial

resolution of a ‘case or controversy’ rather than

an advisory opinion—is in the settling of some

dispute which affects the behavior of the

defendant towards the plaintiff.”

Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1988) (quoting

Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987)) (emphases

in original).

lla

Accordingly, where Policastro has not sought

damages, and we are unable to afford him meaningful

alternative relief, his claim that Kontogiannis’s

removal of the subject memorandum from teacher

mailboxes violated his First Amendment right to free

speech is moot.®

© We note that the “capable of repetition yet evading review”

exception to mootness, e.g., Brody ex. rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957

F.2d 1108, 1113-15 (3d Cir. 1992), does not apply here. “This

extremely narrow exception to the mootness doctrine is applicable

only where: 1) the challenged action is too short in duration to be

fully litigated before the case will become moot; and 2) there is a

reasonabie expectation that the compiaining party wiii be

subjected to the same action again.” Donovan, 336 F.3d at 217

(citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) (per curiam)).

The prospect of a similar memorandum being removed from

teacher mailboxes under the facts here is too speculative to

warrant invocation of this narrow exception. See, e.g., Preiser v.

Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 403 (1975) (“Any subjective fear [Plaintiff]

might entertain of being again [subjected to] circumstances

similar to those alleged in the complaint . . . is indeed remote and

speculative and hardly casts [a] ‘continuing and brooding

presence’ over him ... .”) (citation omitted). Even looking beyond

the unique circumstances of the union negotiations at the heart

this case, the record demonstrates, and Policastro himself asserts,

that no other item—among the many hundreds of items inserted

in teacher mailboxes—has been removed from teacher mailboxes,

either prior to or subsequent to the removal of his memorandum.

Moreover, because of email and other technologies, the teacher

mailboxes no longer serve as the primary means of communication

between the school and its teachers.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the

District Court’s denial of Policastro’s facial and as

applied challenges to the school’s Mailbox Policy. We

will also dismiss as non-justiciable Policastro’s claim

that his First Amendment right to free speech was

violated.

13a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR TSE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 06-1471

[Filed January 24, 2008]

ANDREW POLICASTRO,

Appellant

¥.

DR. THEODORA P. KONTOGIANNIS,

Principal Tenafly High School;

TENAFLY BOARD OF EDUCATION.

i a ee a ee ee

On Appea! from the United States District Court

tor the District of New Jersey

D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-1219

(Honorable Joel A. Pisano)

Argued January 23, 2007

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FUENTES and

CHAGARES, Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT

This cause came to be heard on the recrod from the

United States District Court for the District of New

Jersey and was argued by counsel on January 23,

2007. On consideration whereof, it is now hereby

l4a

ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this Court that the

judgment of the District Court entered January 11,

2006, be, and the same is hereby affirmed in part and

appeilant’s claim that his First Amendment right to

free speech was violated is dismissed as non-

justiciable. Costs taxed against appellant. All of the

above in accordance with the opnion of this Court.

ATTEST:

/s/ Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk

DATED: January 24, 2008

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CIVIL NO. 04-1219

[Dated January 11, 2006}

ANDREW POLICASTRO,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

DR. THEODORA KONTOGIANNIS,

TENAFLY BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Defendants.

Nem me ee ee ee ee ee “eee”

Newark, New Jersey

January 11, 2006

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE JOEL A. PISANO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

THE COURT: Back on Policastro. I have, since the

recess yesterday, considered all of the issues at some

length. I’ve also had the benefit of reading the

16a

transcript of the entire proceedings so I’m prepared to

rule on this.

Is there anything else anybody would like to argue,

Mr. Policastro, Mr. Thibault, anything you would like

to argue?

MR. THIBAULT: No, I think we argued everything

on the motion and partial summary judgment.

THE COURT: Mr. Policastro, do you have

anything else you would like to say about this?

MR. POLICASTRO: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

I’m going to do this from the bench without writing

a formal opinion for a couple of reasons. The first

being that this case has been pending for long enough,

I think for everybody’s purposes, having now occupied

the resources of five federal judges and their staff.

Based upon the experience in trying the case

yesterday, we had the participation of a significant

number of faculty of Tenafly High School, which has

been, from what I gather, not only explicitly from the

record but reading between the lines, been embroiled

in whatever this dispute came from since 2002.

I think the parties are interested in a speedy

resolution and so is the Court.

The second reason I’m not going to submit this to

formal writing is that, as I indicated yesterday, there

17a

doesn’t seem to be much of a dispute either as to the

law or the facts of this case. I don’t think it would

serve anybody’s purpose to add to the literature by

publishing or filing yet another opinion discussing the

legal landscape pertaining to the type of expression

which is in this case.

We've got a number of cases speaking about the

subject matter and we'll be citing to some of them.

They’re already in the briefs and they’re already in the

opinions, but taking as the law of the case the opinion

from the Third Circuit in this matter, there is a recital

of the legal landscape which is entirely consistent with

this Court’s legal discussion on the -- in the opinion in

which the Court dismissed the complaint originally.

The Third Circuit did not in any way change this

Court’s view of the law, but rather concluded that the

Court was improvident in dismissing this case without

making some findings of fact. That is to say, the Third

Circuit found that this was not an appropriate

dismissal based upon the allegations in the complaint,

but rather needed to develop a record as stated in the

slip opinion at page six; in order to require Tenafly to

put forth facts which might reasonably have led school

authorities to forecast a specific and significant fear of

disruption, not just some remote apprehension of

disturbance.

That, of course, is language that comes directly

from the Tinker case, which has been cited here more

times than we need to mention, and is also entirely

consistent with " : has been

se

published on the subject, particularly including the

18a

opinion in Saxe v. State College Area School District,

Third Circuit opinion, 240 F.3d at page 200.

The Saxe case is pretty interesting because it does

contain a very clear review of the Tinker standards

and then goes further into some discussion of some

other cases involving school law, retaliation,

employment decisions, of course which are not

implicated here, for example, from Hazelwood and

some other cases that we’re familiar with.

The other thing that’s interesting about the Saxe

opinion is that it also included a discussion of a

challenge, a facial challenge to a regulation which was

designed to restrict and control expression within the

school.

So all of that being said, it appears to me that

there, as I indicate, is not much of a dispute as to what

the law in this case is. Generally speaking, quoting

from Sexe, referring to Tinker, page 211, “regulations

of student speech is generally permissible only when

the speech would substantially disrupt or interfere

with the work of the school or the rights of other

students.” Again, Saxe is talking about student

speech, not factually pertinent here, but the speech,

the regulation of the speech is subject to the same

legal standards.

And as oddly enough Judge Alito goes on, on page

211, “As subsequent cases have made clear, Tinker

requires a specific and significant fear of disruption,

not just some remote apprehension of the disturbance.”

19a

That’s an interesting quote because I believe it

serves as a basis to analyze both types of claims in this

case. We have in this case a challenge to the act of Dr.

Kontogiannis in removing from the teachers’ mailboxes

the exhibit P-1 that we have in evidence and closing

the teacher mailboxes thereafter; and, secondly, we

have a challenge to the regulations maintained by the

Tenafly High School and Board of Ed, which would

require prior approval if a teacher or staff member

wanted to make a mass distribution, either of written

materials in the teachers’ mailboxes or in the

electronic form in the e-mails.

I say that this quote which I'll read again, “Tinker

requires a specific and significant fear of disruption,

not just some remote apprehension of disturbance,”

that statement can be applied and can be analyzed in

the face of both types of claims in this case.

Now, the facts of the case again are really not much

in dispute. They were pretty much fleshed out in the

briefs before this Court on the motion to dismiss,

except for the fact that we didn’t have the benefit of

the testimony of some of the individuals who shed

some light on the ultimate question as framed by the

Third Circuit, which is whether Tenafly can come

forward with facts to demonstrate that there was a

substantial -- that there was a fear of significant

disruption or disturbance in school affairs.

The case appears to arise out of some sort of

internal Tenafly teacher union controversy. There

hasn’t been any direct testimony on the subject, but we

had the benefit of the testimony of a number of

teachers, including Mr. Policastro, who was a teacher,

20a

and still is from what I gather, a teacher at Tenafly

High School. We had the testimony of James Vere,

Douglas Golde, Anne Lander, Felice Loffredo, James

Sutera, Diane Kratz, Adam Rendell, April Celli,

Kenneth Berman and the secretary to the director of

athletics, Chloie Biscaldi. We also have had the

testimony from Dr. Kontogiannis, who was and is the

principal and who took the action here both to remove

the memorandum, exhibit P-1, and also shed light on

the purpose and theory of the regulation for prior

approval.

We also had the testimony of Howard Glaser who

was not a teacher at Tenafly High School, but rather

was in a position of leadership in the teachers’ union

and became aware of the facts that were ongoing on

the date in question of March 13, 2002.

In any event, the facts are, and I find as facts that

there was some sort of an internal, internecine

squabble among the rank and file of the Tenafly

Teachers’ Union; that on the day in question there was

to be a ratification vote as to a proposed contract which

had been negotiated by the teachers’ union on behalf

of its members; that on March 13, 2002, someone

created the document, P-1, which was ultimately

signed by 13 individuals, including Mr. Policastro, the

plaintiff here; Mr. Policastro did not author the

document nor did he distribute the document which I

also find to be an interesting ironic addition to this

factual scenario.

We have a plaintiff who neither authored nor

distributed the document that is in question, yet he is

2la

the one who is asserting some afront to his First

Amendment freedom of expression.

Be that as it may, he adopts the content of the

memo and we will assume, and there is no issue, that

his expression and rights to expression are in issue in

the case as a result, at least it hasn’t been challenged

on that basis.

Now, the language in the memorandum consists of

five questions as they are stated which were at least

hypothetically being directed to the negotiating team

who had arrived at whatever the deal was ultimately

going to be presented to the rank and file of the

teachers’ union. There is nothing in the record to

indicate whether or not these five questions or issues

had been raised previously in the negotiating process

or whether anybody who signed P-1 was even on the

negotiating team, but be that as it may, the document

appears to contain five questions directed toward the

negotiating team.

There is testimony that Douglas Golde, on the day

in question, is the individual who placed P-1 in each of

the teachers’ mailboxes in Tenafly High School and he

said that he remembered doing it somewhere about

8:30 in the morning. The facts are that he was told

sometime later that morning that they were gone, so

he went back into the mail room and replaced in every

teacher’s mailbox another copy of P-1.

There is no testimony as to how the document was

created, whether it was copied on school copy machine

utilizing public supplies, we don’t know where he got

it from, it doesn’t really matter. In any event, at

22a

sometime following Mr. Golde’s placement and

distribution of these two copies of the memo, P-1, it is

a fact that has been adduced not only through the

testimony of Dr. Kontogiannis but through the

testimony of some of the individuals who testified,

including Mr. DiGregorio, by the way, whom I left out

I believe of the statement of witnesses that I set forth.

It is clear from the testimony of the witnesses and

it is in the record that the memorandum, P-1, did

result in controversy within the Tenafly High School

building. That is testimony that came from Mrs.

Kratz, it is testimony that came from Miss Biscaldi, it

is testimony that came from Miss Loffredo and it is

testimony that came from Mr. DiGregorio and from Dr.

Kontogiannis herself. It was characterized somewhat

differently depending upon the frame of reference of

each individual who knew about it, but suffice it to

say, Dr. Kontogiannis summarized the scenario as

being one of disruption, confusion, there was

controversy, teachers were out of their classrooms

discussing the contents of the memo in the hallways,

in the library and she concluded that there was a

significant disruption in the operation of the school

such that she took it upon herself, first of all, to

remove P-1 from the mailboxes in the first instance

and then when she learned that they had been

replaced, to physically close the mail room in order to

restore order to the school community.

That testimony is corroborated, at least in

substance, by the testimony of the other individuals

who were aware of the controversy. Most significantly

her testimony, that is the testimony of the principal,

was corroborated significantly by Mr. DiGregorio, who

23a

was the library monitor, who testified that there was,

in fact, a significant disruption involving teachers who

were present in the library and who were not acting in

a way, to use the pedagogical term, on task. It is also

corroborated by the testimony of Miss Biscaldi, it is

corroborated by the testimony of Mrs. Kratz and it is

corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Glaser, who was

at the time, I believe he still is, a special education

teacher at the middle school in a different building,

but in his capacity as a member of the personal rights

committee of the Tenafly Teachers’ Union, he received

notice of the problem and was asked to come over and

he did come over and speak to Dr. Kontogiannis about

the incident.

I find the foregoing to be facts that are supported in

this record.

Now, Mr. Poiicastro, as plaintiff, makes a claim

that his freedom of expression was violated and

restricted unconstitutionally, first of all, by the

conduct of Dr. Kontogiannis in removing the memo, P-

1, from the teacher mailboxes and subsequently

closing the mail room and secondly, that their exists in

the Tenafly High School a regulation promulgated by

the Board of Education which requires prior approval

in the event of a distribution on a wholesale basis of

any memos through the mailboxes or electronic

communications over the e-mail system.

Now, putting aside for the moment as we get to

that second claim, putting aside for the moment that

it appears to the Court that at least with respect to the

e-mail regulation, that it is utterly unenforceable.

Putting that aside for the moment, nevertheless, we

24a

need to determine whether, and this is interestingly,

as I say, discussed in the Saxe opinion, it is necessary

to determine whether there can be a facial challenge

that would succeed on a constitutional basis to that

regulation.

Mr. Policastro has testified, and the Court accepts

as facts, with respect to the second claim, that is the

challenge to the prior approval regulation, that as a

result of its very existence, Mr. Policastro has

refrained from making any attempt to distribute

wholesale any written communications in the

mailboxes at Tenafly High School.

Of course we cannot lose sight, and I find as a fact,

that James Sutera did make a wholesale distribution

of written material in the mailboxes without receiving

prior approval and he did so in November of 2003, and

I find as a fact that.Mr. Policastro himself chose to

make a wholesale distribution of written material

without prior approval in placing the exhibit P-18 in

the mailboxes on a date subsequent to March 13, 2002.

This, that is to say the distributions made by

Sutera and Policastro, in my view, undercut the

plaintiffs claim because there is further testimony in

the record, and I find as a fact, corroborated by Dr.

Kontogiannis, that approval, prior approval to make a

wholesale distribution had never been refused prior to

March 13, 2002, nor has it ever been refused

subsequent to March 13, 2002.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Policastro, in my view,

cannot be heard to complain that this regulation has

chilled his rights to expression simply because he has

25a

chosen not to pursue whatever it is he wanted to

communicate and his testimony was something about

running for president of the state NJEA, the education

association and that he made wholesale distributions

of materials to teachers in other buildings, but chose

to eliminate his own out of fear of enforcement,

selective enforcement of this regulation, which I find

as a fact was not going to happen.

So the question becomes, with respect to the second

type of claim, that directed toward the prior approval

regulation, whether that prior approval regulation

itself recognized a legitimate pedagogical concern of

the administration that there could be a substantial

disruption generated.

Now, what is the testimony on that? The testimony

as to the meaning and purpose of this prior approval

regulation comes from Dr. Kontogiannis and she

testified very forthrightly that the purpose for the

regulation was to make sure that if there was going to

be some wholesale distribution of non-school related

communication or material, that is to say something

less than a particular communication to some teachers

and not others, that she would have a legitimate

concern that other communications that are necessary

during the school day might be lost in the shuffle. This

isn’t, in my view, in any way unreasonable. It isn’t in

any way unreasonable and I must say, Mr. Policastro,

this complaint of yours with respect to that regulation

is a mystery to me.

So the Third Circuit’s opinion in this case raised

the question for its ultimate determination whether

Tenafly could put forth facts which might reasonably

26a

have led Dr. Kontogiannis to forecast a specific and

significant fear of disruption. Well, I have found and

I do conclude that Dr. Kontogiannis’ testimony is

entirely credible, it is corroborated by other witnesses

that I have just recounted, but her testimony is

entirely credible and believable; that there was

following the distribution of the memo, P-1, a

substantial disruption in the school.

It is beside the point, in my view, that the language

in the memorandum, P-1, was not lude, vulgar,

obscene or inflammatory, but it is only relevant to the

Court that the distribution of that memo resulted in

her mind a conclusion that there was a substantial

disruption, and she then set about to exercise her

discretion as principal in order to restore order to the

Tenafly High School.

I find her testimony to be credible, I find her

conduct to have been reasonable under all of the

circumstances and, indeed, as an aside, had she not

acted in the way she did, I *think. she could

significantly be criticized for permitting a situation of

chaos te continue where it certainly didn’t belong.

As a result, I conclude as a matter of law that there

has been demonstrated by Tenafly a specific -- there

has been demonstrated by Tenafly that a significant

disruption did occur and consequently as we move to

the second claim, that subsequent to March 138, 2002,

Mr. Policastro’s First Amendment rights had been

unconstitutionally chilled, it would seem to me that

the events of March 13, 2002, entirely justify the

existence of the prior approval regulation because in

the mind of Dr. Kontogiannis, if a memorandum,

27a

however plain vanilla, could cause a disruptive

situation on March 13, 2002, then why not some other

communication subsequently? This, of course, is again

in the context of there never having been the refusal to

make a wholesale distribution, nor did it prevent both

Mr. Policastro and Mr. Sutera and people that we

might not even knov about because they didn’t testify,

who may have made wholesale distributions of written

materials themselves.

So whether you look at it from the point of view

that the regulation is reasonable, that it has a

demonstrable reasonable basis from an educational

standpoint or whether you look at in connection with

and in addition to the events of March 13, it is entirely

reasonable for the principal to conclude that there

might be an occasion when she should exercise her

discretion and refuse to permit a wholesale mass

distribution of material.

While we're on the subject, having read the

language of this prior approval regulation, it is clear to

me from the first paragraph of it that there is

absolutely no preclusion from teachers making

communications through the use of mailboxes and, in

fact, the first paragraph of this regulation, in my view,

should be read to be encouraging communication

among teachers through the use of mailboxes.

The sentence in dispute, as testified to by Mr.

Policastro, relates only to the one part of the last

sentence in the second paragraph which requires prior

approval in the event of what I conclude is only a

wholesale mass distribution of materials and I think

the regulation is self-evident to make that distinction.

28a

Having said that and made those conclusions, the

same conclusions in my view apply to the e-mail

communications, although we know in the mvudern

world, we know as a practical matter that that

regulation is probably beyond enforcement and,

frankly, I don’t know what the Tenafly High School is

going to do about that. We have the exhibits which are

numerous of jokes, personal communications, frivolous

material back and forth, all to the utter waste of time,

effort and resources of the public entity.

On that subject, a little bit more. I would be remiss,

I think, if I did not recognize what I consider to be an

utterly inordinate expense of public resources, Mr.

Policastro, represented by this case. This case has

been pending in this court, in the Court of Appeals for

going on two years. You have a right of access to the

courts. Your right of access to the courts has been

honored.

I do not have a complaint personally or officially

with the fact that you filed this complaint, I do not

have any argument with you. You’re entitled to do it,

you're entitled to be heard fully and I believe you have

been fully heard, but taking into account the factual

scenario of this case, it is beyond my personal

comprehension, Mr. Policastro, first of all, why this

was so upsetting to you, but what is upsetting to me

and what I do take issue with is the fact that you

subpoenaed, while you didn’t subpoena them, the

Board of Education accommodated you, they indulged

your request, to require to be present in this

courthouse a large number of staff members of the

Tenafly Board of Education.

29a

You have a right to file this lawsuit, you have a

right to pursue your rights, I have no quarrel with it,

but this represents to me, for whatever your personal

motive may have been in pursuing this crusade, this

represents to me a tragic waste of public resources.

So for the reasons that I have expressed,

notwithstanding my most recent criticism, but for the

reasons that I have expressed based upon my fact

findings and conclusions of law, I am satisfied that this

complaint must be and is hereby dismissed in its

entirety and a judgment will be entered in favor of the

defendants and against the plaintiff.

Thank you for comin2.

Mr. Policastro, I suggest you go back to work.

MR. POLICASTRO: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there any application for costs?

MR. THIBAULT: Your Honor, I think the Tenafly

Board of Education at this point will be happy that the

complaint is just dismissed.

THE COURT: All right.

The case is dismissed without costs.

(Trial concluded.)

30a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civil 04-1219 (JAP)

[Filed January 11, 2006]

Andrew Policastro,

Plaintiff,

_ys-

DR.Kontogiannis, et al.,

Defendant.

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JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

This action came before the Court fora NON JURY

TRIAL. The issues were tried and the Court rendered

its decision:

By its decision, the Court established that a

judgment of NO CAUSE FOR ACTION be entered in

favor of all the defendants, and against the plaintiff,

with prejudice and without costs. Ordered case

dismissed.

DATE January 11, 2006

S/ JOEL A. PISANO, U.S.D.J.

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 04-2883

[Filed January 12, 2005]

Andrew POLICASTRO,

Appellant

¥.

Theodora P. KONTOGIANNIS,

Principal Tenafly High School;

Tenafly Board of Education

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

Jan. 5, 2005

Decided Jan. 12, 2005

Order Denying Rehearing April 12, 2005

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 04-CV-01219)

District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano

Andrew Policastro, Tenafly, NJ, pro se.

Arthur R. Thibault, Jr., Apruzzese, McDermott,

Mastro & Murphy, Liberty Corner, NJ, for Appellees.

32a

Before: NYGAARD, VAN ANTWERPEN AND

ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.

BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER,

NYGAARD, ALITO, ROTH, MCKEE, RENDELL,

BARRY, AMBRO, SMITH, FUENTES, FISHER, VAN

ANTWERPEN, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.’

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Andrew Policastro, a teacher at Tenafly High

School in New Jersey, filed a pro se civil rights suit in

the District Court for the District of New Jersey,

alleging violation of his First Amendment right of

freedom of speech by the principal of Tenafly High

School, Theodora Kontogiannis, and the Tenafly Board

of Education, collectively “Tenafly.” Tenafly filed a

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim. The District Court

granted the motion, and Policastro appeals. We will

vacate and remand.

I.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1331 and we have appellate jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Our review of the District Court’s grant of a motion

to dismiss is plenary. Green v. America Online, 318

* Judge Aldisert’s vote is limited to panel rehearing only.

33a

F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 540 U.S. 877, 124

S.Ct. 200, 157 L.Ed.2d 140 (2003). We accept as true

the factual allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Id.

We will affirm only if no relief can be granted under

any set of facts the plaintiff could prove. Id.

Il.

Policastro’s complaint alleges that on the morning

of March 13, 2002, a memo entitled “Questions for the

Tenafly Negotiation Team” (hereinafter the “Memo”)

and signed by 13 teachers including himself was

placed in the internal mail boxes of the Tenafly High

School teachers. A35. The Memo was subsequently

removed by or at the authority of Principal

Kontogiannis. Jd. The Memo was again placed in the

mail boxes, and again removed by or at the authority

of Principal Kontogiannis. /d. The mail room was then

locked for the remainder of the day. Id. The

ratification vote for the teacher’s contract was held

later that day after school. Jd. Policastro also claims

that the internal mail boxes are used for “personal

messages, holiday cards, birthday cards, gifts, fliers

from local merchants, memos from teachers, notes

from teachers, notes from parents, notes from

students, U.S. tiail, union information and

administrative concerns.” Jd. Policastro sought as

relief (1) a declaration that the administrative policy

requiring prior approval of items placed in the mail

boxes is unconstitutional; (2) the removal of any

reference to the prior approval policy from the

administrative manual, teacher contracts, etc.; (3) a

declaration that the removal from the mail boxes of

any communication between Tenafly public school

34a

teachers is unconstitutional; (4) permission for Tenafly

public school teachers to use the school email system

for internal and external email between Tenafly

teachers; and (5) permission for Tenafly public school

teachers to use the school media facilities. Jd.

Construing this pro se complaint liberally, see

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30

L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), Policastro essentially claims that

his First Amendment rights are being violated by: (1)

the removal of the Memo from the teachers’ mail

boxes; (2) the policies and/or directives requiring the

teachers to obtain prior approval before placing

material in the mail boxes; and (3) the prohibition on

using the school’s email and other media facilities for

communications between Tenafly teachers. The prior

approval policy, documented in the Administrative

Manual for Teachers, states:

Mailboxes are the property of the Tenaily Board

of Education and should be used for school

business. Any staff member wishing to

distribute flyers/announcements, etc. (via the

mailboxes) must have prior approval from the

principal or vice-principal.

A36-37.’

' Although a court considering a motion to dismiss generally may

not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a court may

consider a “document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the

complaint.” Jn re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d

1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).

It is well established that teachers do not “shed

their constitutional rights to freedom of speech .. . at

the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.

Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21

L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). However, school officials may

still, “consistent with fundamental constitutional

safeguards, . . . prescribe and control conduct in the

schools.” Jd. Thus, a school may categorically prohibit

lewd, vulgar or profane language. Saxe v. State Coll.

Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 106

S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986)). A school may also

regulate school-sponsored speech on the basis of any

lecitimate nedagogical concern. /d. (citing Hazelwood

Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 108S.Ct. 562, 98

L.Ed.2d 592 (1988)). School-sponsored speech occurs

when the school “aims ‘to convey its own message”;

whereas private speech occurs when the school

“facilitates the expression of ‘a diversity of views from

private speakers’.” Child Evangelism Fellowship v.

Stafford Township Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 524 (3d

Cir. 2004) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors

of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34, 115 S.Ct. 2510,

132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995)). Any speech falling outside of

these two categories is subject to the general rule of

Tinker that the specch may be regulated “only if it

would substantially disrupt school operations or

interfere with the right of others.” Saxe, 240 F.3d at

214; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; Sypniewski v.

Warren Hills Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 254 (3d

Cir. 2002) (applying Tinker to school policy that

36a

prohibited students from wearing an expressive

t-shirt).

When, as in this case, the forum for the speech is a

school internal mail box, the forum is considered

non-public. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’

Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794

(1983). Accordingly, any regulation of the forum must

be “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the

forum” and must be “viewpoint neutral.” Child

Evangelism, 386 F.3d at 526 (quoting Lamb’s Chapel

v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,

392-93, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993)); see

also Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.°

B.

The Memo contained five questions regarding the

negotiation of the Tenafly teachers’ contract. See A10.

The Memo does not contain lewd or vulgar statements.

Tenafly appears to argue that any speech conducted

through the mailboxes is school-sponsored because the

mailboxes are the property of Tenafly. Brief on Behalf

of Appellees at 13-14 (arguing that Tenafly is not

required to promote speech through use of the

mailboxes, as opposed to tolerating speech as in

* Policastro argues that the internal mail boxes are a limited

public forum as to the teachers, and that Perry is distinguishable

because it involved non-school employce use of the mail boxes.

Informal Brief at 15-18. We need not reach this issue because, as

recognized by the District Court, a limited public forum is

governed by the same reasonableness and viewpoint neutral

standard as a non-public forum.Child Evangelism, 386 F.3d at

526

37a

Tinker). However, in light of Policastro’s allegations

that other personal materials are distributed in the

mailboxes, a reasonable inference can be made that he

is alleging that the Memo can not be viewed as

school-sponsored. Thus, the speech would fall under

the Tinker rule, whereby Tenafly can only regulate the

speech if it would “substantially disrupt school

operations or interfere with the right of others.” Saxe,

240 F.3d at 214.

The Tinker rule requires Tenafly to put forth facts

which might reasonably have led school authorities to

forecast “a specific and significant fear of disruption,

not just some remote apprehension of disturbance.” Jd.

at 211; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. Whether or not

Tenafly can satisfy this burden involves factual issues

that are not appropriate for resolution at this stage of

the proceedings.’ See Asociacion de Educacion Privada

de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Echevarria-Vargas, 385 F.3d 81,

86 (1* Cir. 2004) (finding 12(b)(6) dismissal erroneous

where facts needed to be developed to determine

strength of state’s justification for regulation that

allegedly restricted First Amendment rights).

Accordingly, making all reasonable inferences in

Policastro’s favor, we find that the complaint

adequately states a claim that the Memo was not

within the scope of speech that could be

* Tenafly asserts in its motion to dismiss that the prior approval

policy is necessary because otherwise the mailboxes would

“become inundated with .. . non-school business related

documents,” and that “[w]ithout some control over what is placed

in the teacher mailboxes, important announcements from

administration officials could go unnoticed or be discarded by

teachers as simply junk mail.” Motion Dismiss Brief at 16.

38a

constitutionally restricted. For the same reasons, we

find that the complaint states a claim that the prior

approval policy also impermissibly extends to speech

that can not be constitutionally restricted.

The complaint also alleges that the mailboxes were

being used for other personal communications. Thus,

even if the Memo, specifically, and the mailboxes, in

general, could be constitutionally prescribed, we find

that the complaint also states a claim that the removal

of the Memo and/or the implementation of the prior

approval policy was not reasonable and not viewpoint

neutral. Child Evangelism, supra.

C.

As to the internal email system and other media

facilities,* it may be reasonably inferred that

Policastro is alleging that there are certain unspecified

restrictions on the use of these facilities, despite the

facilities being otherwise available for personal

communications. Policastro’s failure to identify any

specific restrictions and/or prohibited communications

makes this claim a much closer call. Nonetheless,

consistent with the notice pleading requirements of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), we find

Policastro’s allegations sufficient to state a claim that

Tenafly’s policy regarding email and media facility use

* Policastro’s use of the term ‘media facilities’ apparently

encompasses the teachers mailboxes as well as teacher billboards.

Informal Reply Brief at 1-2. Because we have previously

addressed the mailboxes, this discussion is limited to the teachers’

billboards.

39a

is unconstitutionally restrained. See Swierkiewicz uv.

Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152

L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (plaintiffs complaint need only “give

the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim

is and the grounds upon which it is based”).

D.

Lastly, on appeal Policastro argues that the

removal of the Memo violated the letters of the carrier

exception to the Postal Service’s restrictions on the

carrying of letters. See 39 C.F.R. § 310.3(b); Informal

Brief at 32-34. This claim was not presented in

Policastro’s complaint or otherwise raised in the

District Court. Accordingly, we decline to consider it on

appeal. Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC., 369 F.3d 263, 272-73

(3d Cir. 2004).

IV.

In conclusion, Policastro’s complaint adequately

states claims for violation of his First Amendment

right to free speech. Accordingly, we will vacate the

dismissal of the complaint, and remand for further

proceedings.

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

NYGAARD, J.

The Petition for rehearing filed by the Appellees in

the above-entitled matter having been submitted to

the judges who participated in the decision of this

court and to all other available circuit judges in

regular active service, and no judge who concurred in

40a

the decision having asked for rehearing, and a

majority of the circuit judges in regular active service

not having voted for rehearing by this court en banc,

the Petition for Rehearing is hereby DENIED.

It ‘s so ordered.

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

No. 04-1219 (JAP)

[Filed June 8, 2004]

ANDREW POLICASTRO

v.

DR. THEODORA P. KONTOGIANNIS

and TENAFLY BOARD OF EDUCATION

PISANO, District Judge:

Defendants Dr. Theodora P. Kontogiannis

(“Kontogiannis”) and Tenafly Board of Education (the

“Board”) (collectively “Defendants”) move to dismiss

the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff Andrew Policastro

(“Policastro”) opposes this motion. The Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331, and resolves this

motion without oral argument, as permitted under

Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For

the reasons set forth below, the Court grants

Defendants’ motion and dismisses the complaint with

prejudice.

42a

In this matter, Policastro appears pro se and, as

such, this Court must construe his pleadings liberally.

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Mindful

of this obligation, the Court reviews this motion by

taking as true all factual allegations in the complaint

and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from

them to determine whether Policastro may have a

viable cause of action. Higgens v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683,

688 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63,

65 (3d Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, the facts recited below

are taken from Plaintiffs Complaint, and do not

represent this Court’s factual findings.

Policastro is a teacher at Tenafly High School.

Defendant Kontogiannis is the principal of Tenafly

High School. Plaintiff alleges that during the morning

of March 13, 2002, a memo, signed by thirteen

teachers, was placed in the teachers’ mailboxes and

was subsequently removed by or under the authority

of Kontogiannis. (Compl. J 6). The memo was again

placed back in the mailboxes and was again removed

by or under the authority of Kontogiannis. (Id. { 7).

March 13, 2002 was ratification day for the teachers’

contract, and the memo posed questions about the

proposed contract. (Id. ¥ 8; Affidavit of Arthur R.

Thibault, Jr. (hereinafter “Thibault Aff.”), Ex. B).

Plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment rights were

violated by Kontogiannis’ actions, and further alleges

that the teacher mailboxes are used for personal

messages, holiday cards, birthday cards, gifts, fliers

from local merchants, memos from teachers, notes

from teachers, notes from parents, notes from

students, U.S. mail, union information and

administrative concerns. (Compl. { 10).

43a

In Plaintiffs demand for relief, he requests that

this Court deem unconstitutional and remove any

language in any administrative manual for teachers,

teacher manual, teacher contract, school policy, board

policy, or administrative directive that requires

administrative permission or prior approval of items

placed in the teachers’ mailboxes. (Id. J 11). Plaintiff

also requests that this Court deem unconstitutional

the removal of memos or other communications

between teachers from teachers’ mailboxes. (Id. J 13).

Finally, Plaintiff requests that the teachers be allowed

use of the school email system as well as other media

facilities for personal messages. (Id. {J 14, 15).

The Administrative Manual (the “Manual”) for

teachers at Tenafly High School explains that the

teachers’ mailboxes in the high school “are the

property of the Tenafly Board of Education and should

be used for school business.” The Manual further

states that “any staff member wishing to distribute

flyers/announcements, etc. (via the mailboxes) must

have prior approval from the principal or vice-

principal.” (Thibault Aff., Ex. C).

The use of the teachers’ mailboxes is also addressed

in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”)

between the Tenafly Board of Education and the

Tenafly Education Association. The CBA provides that

“the Association shall have the right to make

reasonable use of the inter-school mail system for

distribution of Association materials provided this does

not interfere with school operations. The building

Principal shall be made aware of such use.” (Id., Ex.

D).

44a

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a

court may dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” In

considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court accepts as

true all of the factual allegations within the complaint

and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from

them. Hayes v. Gross, 982 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir.

1992). Claims will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)

only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 4546 (1957).

Accordingly, a district court reviewing the

sufficiency of a complaint has a limited role. In

performing that role, the court determines not

“whether the plaintiffs will ultimately prevail,” but

“whether they are entitled to offer evidence to support

their claims.” Langford v. Atlantic City, 235 F.3d 845,

847 (3d Cir. 2000); see also In re Burlington Coat

Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997);

Syncsort Inc. v. Sequential Software, Inc., 50 F. Supp.

2d 318, 325 (D.N.J. 1999); In re Mobile Media Sec.

Litig., 28 F. Supp. 2d 901, 922 (D.N.J. 1998).

Generally, the court’s task requires it to disregard any

material beyond the pleadings. Burlington Coat, 114

F.3d at 1426; Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White

Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). A

district court may, however, consider the factual

allegations within other documents, including those

described or identified in the complaint and matters of

public record, if the plaintiffs claims are based upon

those documents. Burlington Coat, 114 F.3d at 1426;

In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 707 (3d

Cir. 1996); In re Donald J. Trump Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d

45a

357, 368 n.9 (38d Cir. 1993); Pension Benefit Guar.

Corp., 998 F.2d at 1196. References to documents

attached to the complaint do not convert a motion to

dismiss into a summary judgment motion. Burlington

Coat, 114 F.3d at 1426.

Plaintiffs Complaint challenges the policy of the

Board that requires teachers who wish to utilize the

teacher mailboxes to obtain permission from the school

principal. Plaintiff alleges that the policy violates his

rights under the First Amendment.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized

that “teachers [do not] shed their constitutional rights

to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse

gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,

506 (1969). First Amendment protection extends to

many places, including a teacher’s mailbox. Perry

Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S.

37, 44 (1983). However the Supreme Court has never

suggested “that students, teachers, or anyone else has

an absolute constitutional right to use all parts of a

school building or its immediate environs. . . for

unlimited expressive purposes.” Id. (quoting Grayned

v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 11718 (1972)).

Instead, the right to freedom of speech depends upon

the character of the property or forum at issue. Perry,

460 US. at 44.

In Perry, the Supreme Court distinguished between

three types of government property and _ the

government’s ability to limit speech on each type of

property. First, the Court discussed the traditional

public forum. Id. at 45. The traditional public forum is

comprised of streets and parks which “have

46a

immemorially been held in trust for the use of the

public, and, time out of mind, have been used for

purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts

between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Id.

(quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). For

the government to enforce a content-based exclusion in

the traditional public forum, the regulation must serve

a compelling state interest and must be narrowly

drawn to achieve that interest. Id. at 45.

The second type of public property “consists of

public property which the state has opened for use by

the public as a place for expressive activity.” Id.

Examples of this type of forum include university

meeting facilities, school board meetings, and

municipal theaters. Id. Although reasonable time,

place, and manner restrictions are permitted, any

content-based prohibition can only be effectuated when

there is a compelling state interest. Id: at 46.

The third type of government property is the non-

public forum. Id.’ In addition to time, place, and

manner regulations, the state may place a content-

based prohibition “as long as the regulation on speech

is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression

‘The courts have recently defined a fourth category of government

property called the limited public forum. A limited public forum

“is one that the government opens to particular type of

communicative activity, on the basis of subject matter and

speaker identity.” Child Evangelism of N.dJ., Inc. v. Stafford

Township Sch. Dist., 233 F.Supp. 2d. 647, 657 (D.N.J. 2002)

(citing Milford, 533 U.S. at 107). The government’s right to

restrict access to a limited public forum is subject to the same

level of scrutiny as the non-public forum.

47a

merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s

view.” Id.

The Supreme Court held that the school mail

facility in Perry fell under the third category. Id. The

Court noted that the mailboxer are not open to the

general public, and instead, permission to use the

system must be given by the building principal. Id.

The Court concluded that the school district’s policy

restricting access to the mailboxes was reasonable. Id.

The policy preserved the property for its intended

purpose, communication with teachers, while

preventing the mail system “from becoming a

battlefield for inter-union squabbles.” Id. at 52.

In this case, as in Perry, the teacher’s mailboxes fall

under the category of a non-public forum.” Therefore,

the Court must determine whether the District’s policy

regarding the mailboxes is reasonabie in iight of the

purpose served by the forum, Cornelius v. NAACP

Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985),

and is not discriminate based on viewpoint. Good News

Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).

The Administrative Manual for teachers at Tenafly

High School sets forth that the mailboxes are the

property of the Tenafly Board of Education and should

be used for school business. (Thibault Aff., Ex. C).

The Manual further states that “any staff member

wishing to distribute flyer/announcements, etc. (via

* Although Plaintiff claims that the mailboxes are a limited public

forum, limited public forums and non-public forums are subject to

the same level of scrutiny.

48a

the mailboxes) must have prior approval from the

principal or vice-principal.” (Id.).

The Court finds that this policy is reasonable in

light of the purpose of the mailboxes, that is to allow

the administration to communicate with the teachers.

Moreover, the policy is necessary in order to make sure

the teacher’ mailboxes do not become inundated with

flyers and announcements not related to school

business that could interfere with the teachers’ ability

to receive important announcements from the school

administration. Finally, the policy is viewpoint

neutral.

Pursuant to the contract between the Tenafly

Board of Education and the Tenafly Education

Association (the “union”), the union has “the right to

make reasonable use of the interschool mail system for

distribution of Association material provided that this

does not interfere with school operations. The building

Principal shall be made aware of such use.” (Thibault

Aff., Ex. D). The contract permits the union to

communicate with their members as long as the school

principal is on notice of such use. However, Policastro

is not the union, he is a teacher. In order to use the

mailboxes, he was required to secure permission from

the school principal. Furthermore, Policastro could

have used other means of communication such as U.S.

mail, in person, via telephone, etc. to communicate

with the other teachers. The fact that the teacher

mailboxes may have been the most effective means of

communication does not mean that unrestricted access

is required by the First Amendment. See Cornelius,

473 US. at 809.

49a

Accepting ali of Policastro’s facts as true, he cannot

establish a violation of his First Amendment rights.

The teachers’ mailboxes are non-public forums, and

use can be regulated or restricted as long as it is

viewpoint neutral and reasonably related to the forum.

In this case, the policy requiring teachers to obtain

permission from the school principal before using the

mailboxes is both reasonable and viewpoint neutral.

Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the Court

grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for

failure to state a claim. An appropriate order follows.

Dated: June 8, 2004

/S/ JOEL A. PISANO, U.S.D.J

50a

APPENDIX E

Questions for the Tenafly Negotiation Team 3/8/02’

Tenafly Schools boasts high levels of success for its

student populations, as indicated by all statistical

review of State and National testing results as well as

other educational markers. We, the staff of the Tenafly

Schools, have much to do with this success.

The efforts of the negotiations team are much

appreciated. Still, we feel the following questions must

be addressed:

1. Why haven’t staff members been given salary

guides of other districts as a basis of comparison? We

feel this is crucial, given the steady decline in our

salaries over the past three contracts. Do we not

deserve parity with neighboring and/or comparable

districts?

2. Why have there been virtually no informational

meetings or other feedback (written correspondence)

pertaining to the status of negotiations?

3. Why are we being given only one (1) day to

review the proposed salary guide before ratifying the

contract? At a meeting with TEA negotiation members

' The memo, dated 3/8/02, was placed in the teacher mailboxes on

3/13/02.

5la

in February, a teacher asked for at least two (2) weeks

to review the proposed guide. There were no objections

to this from anyone in attendance, yet we get one day

to study our possible salaries. Why?

4. Why were no other contractual issues except

salary brought to the negotiations table? Building

representatives asked members for their contractual

concerns and suggestions. These concerns seem to

have been ignored. Why?

5. What was the negotiating team’s original

proposal to the Board?

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Andrew Policastro and 12 other

Tenafly High School teachers.

APPENDIX F

TENAFLY HIGH SCHOOL

TENAFLY, NEW JERSEY

MEMORANDUM

DATE: March 25, 2002

TO: Mr. Howard Glaser, TEA

FROM: Dr. Dora P. Kontogiannis

As per our conversation on March 14, 2002, we

discussed two issues that addressed the teachers’

mailroom. It was brought to my attention on

Wednesday, March 13 that a flyer was placed in the

teachers’ mailboxes without administrative

permission.

The administration removed the flyers from the

teachers’ mailboxes. Within ten minutes, I was, once

again, informed that the flyers were placed in the

teachers’ mailboxes. At that time a decision was made

to close and lock the mailroom to prevent further

disruption in the building.

Please be reminded, in the future, anyone wishing

to place information in teachers’ mailboxes must first

obtain administrative permission.

DPK:aq

APPENDIX G

From: Art Thibault [xxxx@xxxx]?

Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2005 9:58 AM

To: ‘Andrew Policastro’

Subject: RE: Local Rule 8.1

Mr. Policastro,

I acknowledge receipt of your statement of damages

and will accept same as compliance with Local Rule

8.1.

Arthur R. Thibault Jr., Esq.

APRUZZESE, McDERMOTT,

MASTRO & MURFHY, F.C.

25 Independence Blvd.

P.O. Box 112

Liberty Corner, New Jersey 07938

(xxx) XXX-XXKX

(xxx) xxx-xxxx (fax)

XXxXx@xxxx

From: Andrew Policastro

{mailto:apolicastro@optonline.net]

Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2005 4:11 PM

'T intentionally blocked Mr. Thibault’s email address and phone

number for his privacy.

54a

To: xxxx@xxxx

Ce: apolicastro@optonline.net

Subject: Local Rule 8.1

Mr. Thibault,

‘Would your please reply back to this email if accepting

that I have comphed with your “Demand for Statement

of Damages”.

Besides all demands asked for in my original

complaint, demands 11-15, I ask for $10,000,000 (Ten

million dollars) as the amount of damages claimed in

this action.

Andrew Policastro

APPENDIX H

Excerpt of June 30, 2005 Hearing

before Judge Pisano

Asking for Ten Million Dollars in Damages

* * *

THE COURT: I understand all of that. You’ll have

a chance to raise all of that.

Is there any claim for damages here? Are you

making any claim for monetary damages? What is the

relief you seek?

MR. POLICASTRO: In the compiaint i have none.

Tenafly responded with, I forget what the letter

said, and I asked for ten million back for my --

THE COURT: You asked for what?

MR. POLICASTRO: Ten million.

THE COURT: $10 million?

MR. POLICASTRO: I asked for that so the lawsuit

wouldn’t stop.’

‘J did not know how to ask for one dollar in nominal damages. I

thought that if I asked for $1 and Tenafly sent me a check for $1

56a

THE COURT: Is that in the complaint?

MR. POLICASTRO: No. I’m asking for nothing in

the complaint.

THE COURT: All you want is injunctive relief?

MR. POLICASTRO: That’s correct.

* ok OK

the lawsuit would be over. That is why I asked for Ten million.

The excerpt is from pages 11-12 of the transcript.

APPENDIX I

From: Larry Tribe [xxxx@xxxx]’

Sent: Friday, August 12, 2005 1:37 PM

To: apolicastro@optonline.net

Ce: ‘Amy Porter’; Kathy McGillicuddy’

Subject: Policastro v. Principal of Tenafly High

School and Tenafly Board of Education

Attachments: JANCASE.pdf; POLICASTRO TRIAL

BRIEF. pdf

Mr. Andrew Policastro

Tenafly High School

Dear Mr. Policastro:

I have read the Third Circuit opinion reversing the

district court’s decision to dismiss your complaint;

holding that you had indeed stated a cause of action

for a violation of your First Amendment rights under

the Tinker standard; essentially accepting the analysis

put forward quite ably in your trial brief, which I have

also read; and accordingly remanding the case for trial

under the appropriate constitutional standard.

Given the interlocutory posture of the proceedings,

there is clearly no plausible basis for the defendants to

seek further judicial review at this point, either in the

] intentionally blocked Prof. Tribe’s email address, address and

phone number for his privacy.

58a

Third Circuit en banc or in the U.S. Supreme Court,

much as they might wish to avoid a trial altogether.

And there is of course no reason you could possibly

want to complain of your own victory in the Third

Circuit. So you must be sceking not appellate

assistance, which is the only kind of assistance I ever

provide (and then usually only in the U.S. Supreme

Court), but assistance in conducting the trial against

the school principal and the board of education, which

is completely beyond the reach of my practice.

With best wishes,

Laurence Tribe

Laurence H. Tribe

Carl M. Loeb University Professor

Harvard University

XXXX |

Cambridge, Massachusetts xxxxx

Office: xxx-xxx-Xxxx

APPENDIX J

From: Eugene Gressman {xxxx@xxxx]!

Sent: Friday, September 09, 2605 12:28 PM

To: apolicastro@optonline.net

Subject: Teacher Tinker case

I am shocked to think that neither the ACLU nor the

techers union would offer you any help in your case.

And I must say you did a bang-up job in writing your

trial court brief. Are you sure you are not a lawyer?

Anyway, since you are facing a trial on the merits, I

find two critical factors that should be added to your

case.

1. Acopy of the memo, signed by 13 teachers, that

was placed in the teacher mailboxes and then reraoved

by the principal.

2. Some description, either through your testimony

or by some written paper, telling us what inspired your

memo. Was there some scheduled meeting of the

authorities to consider or ratify a new contract for the

teachers, including whatever inspired your memo?

Had there been other papers in the mailboxes telling

the teachers about some upcoming meeting of the

authorities and inviting any teacher comments? Was

' | intentionally blocked Prof. Gressman’s email address for his

privacy.

60a

this a meeting of the school board in which the

interests of the teachers would be expressed by the

teacher’s union? Were increased salaries an item to be

discussed at this meeting? Did the principal say that

he would represent all the interests of the teachers,

and did he invite any teacher comments about the

prospective meeting? You say that the meeting was

called to “ratify” the new contract, but had the

teachers been heard from in the earlier stages of

developing the contract? :

In short, build a record as to what this meeting was

about and whether you teachers were expected to, or

forbidden to, express any views. Or were you bound or

limited by what the teachers union proposed to say at

this meeting about ratification? What was it that the

principal feared might happen if your memo went

forward through the mailboxes to the teachers only?

Was this meeting open to the public, including

newspaper reporters? Finally, do you know why the

union and the ACLU refused to represent you in this

legal proceeding?

In short, I think it critical to your case that you

explain or submit a copy of the excluded memo. Good

luck.

Prof. Emeritus Eugene Gressman

APPENDIX K

From: Policastro, Andrew

Sent: Monday, October 01, 2007 11:08 AM

To: Sherman, Morton; Mackay Staff; Maugham Staff;

Smith Staff; Stillman Staff; Middle School Staff; High

School Staff; Central Office Staff

Ce: ‘Don Kaplan’; ‘Janice Jacobs’; ‘Jon Teall’; ‘Julie

Segal’; ‘Mark Aronson’; ‘Phyllis Kesslen’; ‘Richard

Press’; ‘Rick Fooshee’; ‘Virginia Pirie’

Subject: RE: student management system

Dr. Sherman,

You email states, “So, how do we move ahead? We are

now involved with a management system that is

making many folks unhappy as it is perceived to not

meet our needs, is cumbersome, and some have said a

step back for us.”

I suggest that we move ahead by asking an outside

group or the Bergen County Commissioner of

Education to investigate the Cimple fiasco.

You wrote briefly about the 1999 appeal to the NY

Commissioner of Education (Decision No. 14, 274 —

December 21, 1999) and that the appeal was denied.

The following powerful quotes from the appeal, which

I am sure you read before Tenafly approved their

Cimple contract, reinforce the need for an outside

inquiry-

62a

“Although I am constrained to dismiss the Cimple

contract claim as untimely, I am deeply disturbed that

a contract in excess of one-half million dollars was

signed without review by the district’s attorney and

apparently without formal authorization by the board,

that the district contracted to pay a pre-performance

installment of $195,000, approximately 35% of the

entire contract, with no justification for such advance

payment provided in the record, and that such fiscal

practices were justified by the board on the basis of a

purported need to put these services in place as soon

as possible.

Although respondents assert that Dr. Sherman was

authorized to “sign” the contract on the board’s behalf,

respondents provide no evidence of such authority or

the means by which such authority was delegated to

Dr. Sherman.

Respondents also provide no proof that the board

actually performed its duty to evaluate the three

proposals and determined that the Cimple proposal

would be in the taxpayers’ best interests, as required

by General Municipal Law §104-b, prior to execution

of the contract. Respondents similarly provide no

evidence that the board or superintendent conducted

sufficient inquiry to assure that Cimple was capable of

performing the contract (Appeal of Brau Bus

Corporation, 22 Ed Dept Rep 76, Decision No. 10,886).”

The appeal also states, “Cimple breached its

obligations under the contract, and on February 11,

1998 the district terminated the contract and

demanded the return of $97,500, plus an additional

$48,750 for inadequate performance. The record

63a

indicates that Cimple had not repaid any of the money,

and the district was contemplating suit against

Cimple, as of the date of respondents’ answer.”

Frank Romano, our former Technology Director is now

Assistant Superintendent in Milburn. You have now

appointed Dr. Kontogiannis chair of the of the Cimple

Task force. Mr. Romano and Dr. Kontogiannis are

personal friends, she was also on his dissertation

committee. Out of the over 600 school districts in NJ,

Dr. Kontogiannis’ daughter just got her first teaching

position in Milburn.

I have no doubt that Dr. Kontogiannis can lead the

task force to investigate Cimple, but this appointment

does not pass the “smell test”.

We need an outside group to investigate.

Andrew Policastro

From: Sherman, Morton

Sent: Friday, September 28, 2007 12:58 PM

To: Mackay Staff; Maugham Staff; Smith Staff;

Stillman Staff; Middle School Staff; High School Staff;

Central Office Staff

Ce: Don Kaplan; Janice Jacobs; Jon Teall; Julie Segal;

Mark Aronson; Phyllis Kesslen; Richard Press; Rick

Fooshee; Virginia Pirie

Subject: student management system

To: All Tenafly Staff

From: Mort Sherman

Re: New Student Management System

64a

Date: September 28, 2007

Most of you know that we implemented a new student

management system, Cimple, during the summer.

All of us had hoped that the transition to the new

system would be easy, seamless, and quick. This has

not been the case so far.

The history of how we came to this point is clear. The

question of what we do now is not so easily answered.

During the 2006-07 school year, we were advised that

SASI, our student management system in place at that

time, was not going to be continued to be supported or

upgraded at some point down the line. In a proactive

and positive manner, our previous Asst. to the Supt for

Curriculum, Instruction, Assessment, and Technology

began looking at systems which would support our

scheduling, attendance, discipline, progress and report

cards, transcripts, and other student management

needs, as well as include a data management system

that could be tied into the student records. Our

previous system did not have that connection.

The intent was a very good one. We wanted to be

proactive as we offered connected, easy to use, and

professional systems to all of our staff. Our goals

continue as they were last winter and spring.

The process in reviewing available management

systems included administrators and_ staff

members. As early as last February and March, our

Asst. to the Supt for Curriculum, I, A,.and Technology

met with administrators and offered opportunities

65a

through them to staff to review what was being

proposed as a new student management system.

Recent concerns have indicated that the process should

have been more inclusive and should have looked

deeper at the systems.

However, now that we have had some experience with

Cimple, substantive questions have been raised which

must be addressed.

One of the questions is whether we can go back to the

old system. As we do research on this, we find that

SASI is still in the same place it was last year... being

phased out.

Another question is whether we must keep the present

system long term or can we begin a search for a new

student management system. The Cimple contract we

L. a 4nd 4hn pamnmanmese eves!) wmmant tha

slave Bua AALLOCO tliat vAic v-vVilipaily Wiss 21ACCU Usac

unique needs of our district or will give a 100% refund

at the end of the year.

A third question which has recently come up is about

my prior involvement with Cimple. There was an

appeal to the NY Commissioner’s office in 1999 (appeal

denied) two years after I left S. Orangetown, NY, as

superintendent. The claim was that the

business procedures did not follow standard practices |

in creating a contract with Cimple. The conclusion

was that there was little or no basis for the claims,

although the business manager of that district did not

stay. Because the system was implemented as I was

leaving, I had no direct experience with the

performance of Cimple in that district. When asked

last year about the N.Y.S. Ccommissioner’s appeal, my

66a

answer was then as it would be now: let’s find the best

system for our district. I thought about not allowing

consideration of Cimple; however, the review of the

product was very positive.

So, how do we move ahead? We are now involved with

a management system that is making many folks

unhappy as it is perceived to not meet our needs, is

cumbersome, and some have said a step back for us.

There are also some positives. One suggestion which

has been made is that we explore other systems

options... another suggestion is to work the best we can

through this year and then make a decision about the

present system under the contract which guarantees

success and satisfaction. If we think of this in a way

similar to the Lemon Laws protecting owners of cars,

we know that certain procedures and timetables have

to be followed. However, as we are follewing those

procedures and timetables, we are also looking at

other options and talking to other districts.

Perhaps the best course for us right now is to create

a task force of teachers, secretaries, and

administrators who will work with Michael Ulshoefer

(our new ‘Technology Coordinator) and Wayne

Demikoff (Business Administrator) to combine

both suggestions from above: look at other systems as

we continue through this year to make a final

determination under the existing contract.

The task force will be chaired by Dr. Dora

Kontogiannis, our high school principal. It is most

important that those who actually use the systems be

part of these reviews and final recommendations. I

would like to convene this task force within the next

67a

several weeks. The task force will meet regularly

throughout the year (the schedule can be determined

by the members) until recommendations are made. If

you are interested in being part of this task force,

please let Dora, Michael, or me know.

Thank you for your patience and professionalism.

Mort Sherman

APPENDIX L

Mr. Andrew Policastro October 4, 2007

59 Day Avenue

Tenafly, NJ 07670

Dear Mr. Policastro:

Effective immediately, Iam suspending your use of the

Tenafly network privileges in accordance with Policy

6142.10 “Acceptable Use of Educational Technology.”

Your broadcast use of our email system on Monday,

October 1, 2007, violated at least two provisions of this

policy:

-“...computer networked services are provided

exclusively for ...those purposes that relate to job

performances.”

-“The broadcasting of any message without first

seeking authorization from a building or district

administrator is not permitted.”

The suspension of your privileges or any use of the

Tenafly email system or any other parts of our

network is until further notice. Student record keeping

and other communication needs will be addressed by

you in cooperation with your immediate supervisor

and other members of the high school administration.

69a

Based on your violation of board policies, I am officially

reprimanding you for your conduct. Further violation

of board policies may lead to additional disciplinary

action.

Sincerely,

/s/

Morton Sherman, Ed.D.

Superintendent of Schools

C: Members, Board of Education

Dr. Dora Kontogiannis

Personnel File

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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