Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Wiley v. Glassman (No. 07-1581)

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Suprem™ Court, U.S.

ILED

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a © 971581 dUN 10 2008

No.

OFFICE OF THE CLEA! ERK

IN THE William K. Suter, Clerk

Supreme Court of the United States

VERLA M. WILEY, PETITIONER

Vv.

JAMES K. GLASSMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE

BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LESLIE D. ALDERMAN III

Counsel of Record

Alderman, Devorsetz &

Hora PLLC

1025 Connecticut Ave., NW

Suite 615

Washington, DC 20036

202-969-8220

Attorney for Petitioner

CURRY & TAYLOR @ (202) 393-4141

1)

2)

3)

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether Burlington Northern v. White, 548 U.S.

53 (2006) overruled the standard for retaliation

used in F’orkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127 (D.C. Cir.

2002). If not, must retaliation — in order to be

actionable -— now both “affect the terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment or future

employment opportunities such that a reasonable

trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm

(Forkkio, 306 F.3d at 1131) and have the effect of

dissuad[ing] a reasonable worker from making or

supporting charge of discrimination.” Burlington

Northern, 548 U.S. at 67-68. See Wiley v.

Glassman, 511 F.3d at 161. .

Whether, under either the Civil Rights Act of 1991

or Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,

(1989), a retaliation claim should be permitted to

survive summary judgment when the employee

demonstrates direct evidence of retaliation.

Whether summary judgment in the employer’s

favor is appropriate when the record demonstrates

the employer’s alleged nondiscriminatory

justifications to be false. See Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149

(2000)(“because a prima facie case and sufficient

evidence to reject the employer's explanation may

permit a finding of liability, the Court of Appeals

erred in proceeding from the premise that a

plaintiff must always introduce additional,

independent evidence of discrimination.’’); S¢.

Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S 502, 511

(1993) (“The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons

4)

a

put forward by the defendant (particularly if

disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of

mendacity) may, together with the elements of the

prima facie case, suffice to show intentional

discrimination.”); Aka v. Washington Hospital

Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1290, 92 (D.C. Cir.

1998)(cited with approval in Reeves, 530 U.S. at

149)(“we ... reject any reading of Hicks under

which employment discrimination plaintiffs would

be routinely required to submit evidence over and

above rebutting the employer's stated explanation

in order to avoid summary judgment”).

Whether a court can grant all reasonable

inferences to the non-moving party, and refrain

from making impermissible credibility

determinations when it fails to consider the record

as a whole. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 255 (1986)(“the evidence of the non-

movant is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in his favor” and

“Credibility determinations... are jury

functions”); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 580 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) (courts

must review “the record as a whole” on summary

judgment); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Ltd. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (same).

itt

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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RELEVANT PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..........c-:ccsccececesesseesescecseeess J

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION..........-scccscsccesesesesees 12

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APPENDIX

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District Court Memorandum Opinion ...c0..cccccsccseccersereeeeee 19a

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc... .47a

Order Denying Petition for Panel Rehearing .............0.+. 48a

Magistrate Report & Recommendation...........c0..0.cs000c000e 49a

SR I iss iia Fe 100a

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

AKA V. WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER, 156 F.3D

TR, Ft eI. EIR, LD cies ikicincccstscnise psceseceocs secs: ii, 24

ANDERSON V. LIBERTY LOBBY, INC., 477 U.S. 242,

NENT RRR ND OG NS ARAN IT ORE SON UO ERE passim

BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V. TWOMBLY, 127S.CT. 1955,

5g RENTER ARRAS SRA SRR Rit dah ee PR ee DOL ee SP Ra RR AOSD ED 18

BURLINGTON NORTHERN V. WHITE, 548 U.S. 53, 67

atte Maced dcs rasa bck aebibiisatiteakntiniauceuciaccacs dei desecbweues i, 35, 36

DESERT PALACE, INC. V. COSTA, 539 U.S. 90, 94

| SRSIS SNES ER GS baer aie ye WR SO Bel uate ve SERS Re 17

EZELL V. POTTER, 400 F.3D 1041, 1051 (7TH CIR.

ERASE eT SRS US ion RESO ROA rE Ne Re eae 19

FARAGHER V. BOCA RATON, 524 U.S. 775, 787-788

gf __ RRPSPR AIRCON TRS ZTE oir a EBON NLU ane ee ORS aE 32

FORESTER V. RAULAND-BORG CORP., 453 F.3D 416,

re i i es 25

FORKKIO V. POWELL, 306 F.3D 1127 (D.C. CIR. 2002)...i, 34, 36

GRIFFITH V. CITY OF DES MOINES 387 F.3D 733, 736

CBT COUR, BIO) nn soc csiccesccccercocese OPA ER ORE ae ERS 19

KING V. HARDESTY, 517 F.3D 1049, 1058 (8TH CIR.

| RRR ECP EE AAT pene er ss ng ne sea RE 18

MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUS. LTD. V. ZENITH RADIO

CO FF es BE SE COD vveivincaceceneiccvtticccnsesenessns li, 32, 34

MELENDEZ-ARROYO V. CUTLER-HAMMER DE P.R.

Co., INC., 273 F.3D 30, 35-6 (1ST CIR. 2001)... eee 19

PRICE WATERHOUSE.-V. HOPKINS, 490 U.S. 228, 277

GE iiasibdikdeindic hs sciadinccunicasscaboaaccsieoutaticacubndesccbainonccdics i, 15,17, 18

REEVES V. SANDERSON PLUMBING SUPPLY Co. 530

cI I I oii oat ced teiu cia a ae ee ea a passim

SEIERKIEWICZ V. SOREMA N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511

(ERLE ie oD Ewe SRP ange CRSA ASE oem 16

ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER V. HICKS, 509 U.S. 502,

PS NR ics anuntiucicbikcdsaupnciadematadcmeicceiedaaueiabaliconsinwaliens i, 23, 24

STARCESKI V. WESTINGHOUSE ELEC. CORP., 54 F.3D

ie ee NI csisbi ice cetisbcnintiaeenechtnta dns tteinsttntinnd 19

THOMAS V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 995 F.2D 274,

iii ciakiniasscatknekaessuesahedaidnndiaetensenesersctccarecens 30

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES V. THURSTON, 469 U.S.

MR TREN PRESRFEC EAC RE ERRV ELE LR Eye EE Cnn 16

VESPERINI V. SHAW CONTRACT F'LOORING

SERVICES, INC., 315 F.3D 37, 41 (AST CIR. 2002).....00000.0.... 19

WILBURN V. ROBINSON, 480 F.3D 1140, 1143 (D.C.

1 SERIA SRR ORNS TIS CRESS PRE sR 18

WILEY V. GLASSMAN, 511 F.3D 151 (2007)........0000.... passim

WOODRUFF V. PETERS, 482 F.3D 521, 527 (D.C. CIR.

Sine FERS BRS SA RPE TE 8 PORE Cie REN aR 30

WRIGHT V. MURRAY GUARD, INC. 455 F.3D 702, 711

RN III iii asin uhciscd a eaeaineegtaliv hielo taeeescaoncs eee 18

STATUTES

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SERRE a ane na een meneame ty. a 12

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roe 8) Sameera Nae ere See 2

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RULES

Ce ES Ey Sa eer On omAe Caan er A 2

OTHER AUTHORITIES

\

JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, A DISTORTED MIRROR: THE

SUPREME COURT’S SHIMMERING VIEW OF SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, DIRECTED VERDICT, AND THE

ADJUDICATION PROCESS, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 162-70

2 RARER ore en he Ra ene SPN PEC Re Se. SS RE NCR 13

JOHN BRONSEEN, AGAINST SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 75

GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 540-543 (2007) .0.......ecececeeeeceseeeeeeeeee 13

v1

PAUL W. MOLLICA, FEDERAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AT HIGH TIDE, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141, 181—205 (2000) ........... 13

STEWART SCHWAB, How EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION PLAINTIFFS FARE IN FEDERAL

COURT, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. VOL. 1, No. 2,

TE) eS ET Te

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The District of Columbia Circuit decision

affirming summary judgment is reported at Wiley v.

Glassman, 511 F.3d 151 (2007).

The District Court opinions granting summary

judgment are not published.

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals issued its decision on

December 14, 2007. The order denying rehearing issued

on March 12, 2008. This Court has jurisdiction over this

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

RELEVANT PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Fifth Amend. Const.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital,

or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a

presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,

except in cases arising in the land or naval

forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in

time of War or public danger; nor shall any

person be subject for the same offense to be

twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law; nor shall

private property be taken for public use, without

just compensation.

F.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(c)

The judgment sought should be rendered if the

pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials

on file, and any affidavits show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for

an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to

discharge any individual, or otherwise to

discriminate against any individual with respect

to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such

individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin[.]

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for

an employer to discriminate against any of his

employees or applicants for employment, for an

employment agency, or joint labor-management

committee controlling apprenticeship or other

training or retraining, including on-the-job

training programs, to discriminate against any

individual, or for a labor organization to

discriminate against any member thereof or

applicant for membership, because he has

opposed any practice made an_ unlawful

employment practice by this subchapter, or

because he has made a charge, testified, assisted,

3

or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this

subchapter.

STATEMENT

Ms. Wiley is an African-American woman whose

career with the Voice of America began as a GS-2 clerk

typist in 1966. In 1983,Ms. Wiley, the first U.S.-born

African American female International Radio

Broadcaster in English to Africa, was promoted to a

GS-12 International Radio Broadcaster. Throughout

the 1980’s Ms. Wiley acted as Managing Editor for the

show, Nightline Africa. Ms. Wiley has been the

coordinator and host of the Americana section of Africa

World Tonight since 1992. As tne Americana

coordinator, Ms. Wiley is responsible for the music,

American culture, science, and development features

found in Africa World Tonight's back half. She was

responsible for, inter alia, voicing the shows, gathering

material for her show, organizing and assembling the

show’s content, developing themes, editing taped

stories, developing stories and working with reporters.

Barry Maughan became the Chief of English to

Africa in 1995. Throughout his tenure as the Chief,

Maughan made frequent sexist comments and referred

to himself as “Bwana” (A Swahili term commonly

interpreted to mean “Master”) and even had a plaque

bearing the moniker “Bwana Barry” on his desk. Under

Maughan’s supervision, International Radio

Broadcasters held both GS-12 and GS-13 positions. In

fact, at the time of the events relevant to the present

dispute, six of the non-supervisory International Radio

Broadcasters were GS-13s.

4

On April 17, 1997, Ms. Wiley (along with two

other female Broadcasters whose cases have since

settled), met with Maughan to discuss discrimination in

the workplace. During this meeting, Ms. Wiley asked

Maughan for Managing Editor training and to be

allowed to act as Managing Editor.

In July 1997, after Maughan failed to address

these problems, Ms. Wiley wrote a letter to Evelyn

Lieberman (Director, Voice of America), explaining the

white-male-dominated nature and culture of English to

Africa,’ disparate treatment of women, discriminatory

evaluations, the lack of women in supervisory roles,

lack of training for women in management roles,

discriminatory assignments, and a glass ceiling at the

GS-12 level, under Barry Maughan. In addition, Ms.

Wiley raised the fact that Maughan had denied her a

promotion to GS-13.

The Africa Division Director (Maughan’s first-

level supervisor), Steven Lucas, made Maughan aware

of the complaint to Ms. Lieberman. In September 1997,

Ms. Wiley again asked Maughan for a promotion, and

again he denied the request. Maughan subsequently

denied Ms. Wiley’s request to be promoted in early

1998.

Maughan told Ms. Wiley that she did not merit a

promotion because she did not have supervisory

duties. During his deposition, Maughan explained that

to be promoted to GS-13, an employee needed “to be

able to carry out the functions of a managing

editor and senior editor’’ (emphasis added).

' Mr. Lucas, the Africa Division Director, and Barry Maughan’s

first-line supervisor, acknowledged in his sworn deposition that

there was “male cronyism” in the Agency under his tenure.

2 Maughan additionally believed that “outstanding” evaluations

were necessary for promotion. As a result, he pressured Ms.

5

Despite Maughan’s explanations, Maughan

promoted Joseph DeCapua, a white male with no

supervisory duties from GS-12 to GS-13 a year prior

to Ms. Wiley’s request for a similar promotion.

Maughan explained that DeCapua’s promotion was the

result, not of increased duties or a successful desk

audit, but of a “back-room deal” he made with

Personnel.

Respondent argued below that in order to act

as managing or senior editor, the employee already

had to be in a GS-13 position.

Despite the initiation of EEO action in October

1997, Ms. Wiley’s colleagues and supervisors pressured

her to abandon her claims against Maughan by, among

other things, disparaging Ms. Wiley to management

and the union, and threatening a mass exodus from

English to Africa.? This pressure eventually caused the

Wiley’s rating officer, Senior Editor Frederica Depew, into

withholding an “Outstanding” performance rating for her in 1995,

Ms. Depew wrote: “I could easily write an Outstanding for Verla

and would have preferred to if you hadn't said you couldn't support

it. It’s just that I think she is so reliable ... works so hard ... gives

herself so unstintingly.”

% As examples of this behavior, on November 3, 1997, Todd

Leventhal wrote the VOA ombudsman, the Personnel Director,

and the Division Chief, threatening that, “If [Maughan] were to

leave ... for any reason [it] would lead to a wholesale exodus of the

most productive people in the service .. . The service ... would

surely be destroyed.” On the same day, November 3, 1997, Mr.

Leventhal wrote to Alan Heil, the Program Director, warning: “a

tremendous amount is at stake here. I sincerely hope, for

everyone's sake, that those making the decisions on this issue have

enough courage and sense to do the right thing.”

On November 4, 1997, a petition supporting Maughan

signed by several employees, including Senior Editor Frederica

Depew, was provided to VOA management, which read, "We want

to show support for Barry, to counter the current rash of EEO

6

Respondent to replace the first EEO investigator with

an investigator who was friendlier to the Respondent.

Maughan knew of these efforts to retaliate

against Ms. Wiley and to pressure her into dropping

her claims of discrimination. In addition to Maughan,

moreover, the Defendant’s highest-level managers,

including VOA Director Evelyn Lieberman, VOA

Program Manager Alan Heil, the Africa Division

Director, Steven Lucas, and the Ombudsman Bob

Henry, were also aware of these activities. Instead of

discouraging this intimidating behavior, however, the

Defendant’s managers permitted and endorsed it.

Maughan even lauded his subordinates’ efforts in a

November 18, 1997 memorandum to Division Director

Lucas, writing: “I can ... tell you that I have been

touched by the heart-warming outpouring for me and

my leadership by the many staffers.”

In the same November 18, 1997 memorandum,

entitled, “My Continued Tenure as Chief of English to

Africa.” Maughan demanded:

actions against him ... we feel this problem needs to be dealt with

and resolved immediately by management so a_ productive

atmosphere can once again prevail.”

On November 6, 1997, the same employees wrote a letter

to the Ms. Wiley’s union, accusing her of filing claims as a result of

her own career frustrations and to harass Maughan out of his

position. The letter concluded by asking the union to “take the

appropriate action.”

On November 16, 1997, Ms. Wiley’s colleague, Bill Eagle

wrote to Maughan, Depew, and DeCapua, advising Maughan to

treat the situation like “a football game, a war or a chess game...

something that takes LONG TERM strategic planning where you

study your opponents weaknesses rather than something with a

quick, clean solution.”

7

After all the disruption caused in the Branch by

Verla Wiley [and her former co-plaintiffs], -— and

after all the personal and professional indignities

and cruelties I’ve had to endure at their hands -

they should all be summarily dismissed. You

know it. I know it. But you and I also know this

organization doesn’t seem to be able to do the

right and proper thing. However a clear and

unmistakable message has to be sent that

this sort of behavior will not go unpunished.

I would like you to make sure that signal is

sent.

In a perfect and just world, Verla Wiley and

Kemi Southey-Cole should go ... It’s been

decided that won’t happen. [I’m reluctantly

willing to live with that decision.

(emphasis added).

Maughan used that memo to announce a rotating

Managing Editor position. Only men, some of whom

were GS-12 employees, were appointed to the

rotation. Maughan also discussed making training

available to Ms. Wiley in the memorandum; but he

insisted, “This training cannot be managerial in

nature, [unless] she shows a willingness to become

a team player.” (emphasis added).

Petitioner filed her civil action in 1999, and

discovery continued in the case well into the next two

years. During 2001, Ms. Wiley attended depositions of

witnesses and co-plaintiffs in her case, pursuant to her

understanding that she could do so under the

Respondent’s practice of permitting the use of

administrative leave to attend depositions related to

one’s pending civil action.

8

Prior to October 5, 2001, when it issued its

Deposition Leave Policy, Respondent permitted

employees to attend depositions using administrative

leave in court cases. In a February 15, 2001 email, the

Respondent’s Deputy General Counsel, Mr. William

Ohlhausen, informed the then General Counsel, Carol

Booker, that the Office of Civil Rights had a “liberal

interpretation” of the rule regarding the use of leave

for attending depositions.

In February 2001, based on the advice of Mr.

Ohlhausen, Ms. McMenamin (the new Chief of English

to Africa) informed Ms. Wiley that she could take the

leave but that she would, “wait until the matter was

checked out further before making a final decision on

leave.” Ms. Wiley subsequently used 72.4 hours of

official time to attend depositions in her case.

Ohlhausen circulated a draft of the leave policy

on April 23, 2001, five months before the final policy

was announced. According to the Respondent, the April

2001 draft remained “virtually unchanged” after it was

reviewed by the Office of Personnel and the Office of

Civil Rights. Respondent never provided a copy of the

draft policy to the Petitioner in discovery, and instead

provided a copy to the trial court, in camera. The trial

court never issued a decision with regard to why it did

not share the draft with the Petitioner.

Despite the fact that the policy on official time

remained unchanged after April 23, 2001, and that the

impetus behind drafting the policy was Ms. Wiley’s

question to Mr. Ohlhausen, the Respondent never

informed Ms. Wiley that its policy would prohibit her

from attending depositions using official time. In the

meantime, Ms. Wiley attended additional depositions in

her civil action.

9

In early summer of 2001, before the new policy

was published and despite the fact that no one had ever

been disciplined for doing so, Personnel Specialist,

Donna Grace, requisitioned Ms. Wiley’s time and

attendance records in order to discipline her for

violating the Respondent’s leave policy.

Eight months after Ms. Wiley set things in

motion by asking the question about leave, in October

2001, the Respondent promulgated the new leave

policy. The October 2001 policy included new provisions

that had never been contained in any previous policy or

agreement and provisions that were specifically

tailored to the Plaintiff's civil action, namely paragraph

(f}, which reads: “If there are muitiple plaintiffs in the

lawsuit, an employee/plaintiff is entitled to official time

to attend only his or her own deposition, but not those

of the other plaintiffs or of non-party witnesses.”

After’ learning that the new policy would be

applied retroactively, Delia Johnson, the Director of

Civil Rights, explained to General Counsel Carol

Booker that the policy was new and should not be

applied to Petitioner retroactively. Specifically, she

stated: “If this was existing policy why did we not

proceed with appropriate actions before the OCR policy

was disseminated ... It is apparent from _ the

circumstances that neither management nor the

complainants were made aware that the existing policy

was applicable.”

In an attempt to convince Mr. Welch (the

Personnel Director) that taking Ms. Wiley’s leave was

legitimate, Personne! Specialist Donna Grace informed

Welch that OCR Director Johnson had always agreed

that the new leave policy was consistent with the

Respondent’s prior practice and policies.

10

Welch and James Hagan, Labor-Relations Chief,

also believed the policy was new, and Mr. Welch’s

conversations with Respondent’s counsel reveal that

even General Counsel Booker did not believe a policy

existed prior to October 2001. In an October 5, 2001

email Hagan wrote, “Jack — This sounds like new

policy.” ‘A contemporaneous hand-written note from

Welch to Hagan reads “my conversation with C. West

[Assistant General Counsel] left me with the

impression that Carol [Booker, the General Counsel]

didn’t think there was a policy in VOA.”

On October 15, 2001 Booker instructed

McMenamin to charge Petitioner with annual leave for

attending depositions. McMenamin’s October 16, 2001

“memo to file,” however, states that she “called Verla

and told her that I received a note from [OCR Director]

Delia [Johnson] telling me to go ahead with making the

T&A adjustments.”

Ms. Wiley’s protected activities,t and the

Agency’s retaliation against her -ontinued, even after

Maughan’s departure.° That etaliation included a

significant reduction in responsibilities. In May 2002,

McMenamin moved an editorial segment into Ms.

Wiley’s half of the Africa World Tonight Broadcasts.

The imposition of the editorials reduced Petitioner’s

airtime by twenty-five percent (25%).

After a 39-year career at the Voice of America,

Ms. Wiley retired from her position as an International

Radio Broadcaster, largely due to the stress of

‘ For example, Ms. Wiley filed an EEO complaint to challenge the

Respondent’s above-referenced retroactive taking of leave, in

December 2001.

® Ms. Wiley regularly represented other employees in civil rights

complaints against the Respondent after Maughan retired.

1]

remaining in a hostile and retaliatory working

environment. The stress Respondent had placed on her

resulted in, among other things, physical and

neurological manifestations of emotional distress. Ms.

Wiley continues in her role as Union Vice President,

but she is now required to have an escort wherever she

goes, even to the restroom.

The Respondent has a historical practice of

discrimination against U.S.-born African Americans.

Petitioner began her career at the Voice of America in

1966 and has worked in the English to Africa branch

since 1977. She has first-hand knowledge of the pattern

and practice of discrimination not only in the unit, but

also throughout the Respondent. It is common

knowledge that in its 44-year history, the branch has

had one U.S.-born African Amsriean Chief (GS-14) and

only three U.S.-born African American International

Radio Broadcasters at the GS-13 level. In the landmark

case of Hartman v. Albright (no. 77-cv-02019), Voice of

America was found to have engaged in systematic

discriminatory hiring practices against women.

Ms. Wiley has been fighting for a jury trial for

ten years. As a result of the lower courts’ failure to

abide by this Court’s precedent with respect to

retaliation and the summary judgment standards, Ms.

Wiley has thus far been stymied in her exhausting

efforts, despite the presence of direct evidence of

retaliation and compelling, material facts about which

there is genuine dispute.

The United States District Court for the District

of Columbia had jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s civil

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964), as amended.

The D.-. Circuit Ceurt of Appeals had

jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s Appeal pursuant to 28

12

U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court’s Memorandum Order

dated October 2, 2006 constituted a “final decision,”

which, together with the its May 6, 2005 Order adopting

the Magistrate Judge’s Report, disposed of all of the

Petitioner’s claims against the Respondent.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Introduction

Petitioner seeks Certiorari to clarify the

standard for actionable retaliation claims and to

substantively reiterate the correct standards -and

considerations for deciding summary judgment

motions.

Employment discrimination victims appear to

be, inexplicably, disproportionately on the losing end of

summary judgment battles. Petitioner believes that

this is due to the fact that the courts are merely paying

homage to the words of the summary judgment

standards, without actually applying those standards as

required by this Court’s precedent.

For example, in Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial

Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”

“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our

Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments? 78 N.Y.U.

L. Rev. 982, 1098 (2003), Miller discusses the fact that

courts have “ignored the restraining passages in the

Court’s [decisions in Anderson, Celotex and

Matsushita] and overstepped the boundaries set by the

trilogy itself, transforming summary judgment from a

limited purpose procedural tool designed to screen out

cases not worthy of trial to the ‘trial on affidavits that

the Court itself warned against.” Jd. 1062-1063. Miller

also addresses the confusion created by the Court’s

13

failure to specify the “standard by which the moving

party discharges its burden of showing the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact” and the tension between

the prohibition against judges weighing evidence and

their obligation to both draw reasonable inferences in

favor of the nonmoving party and to evaluate the

nonmovant’s evidence in light of the entire record. Td.

at 1063-1064. He also focuses on the courts’ propensity

for encroaching on the factfinder’s role in deciding Rule

56 motions. Jd. at 1064.

Similar critics of the application of the summary

judgment standards can be found in: Kevin Clermont

and Stewart Schwab, How Employment

Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J.

Empirical Legal Stud. Vol. 1, No. 2, 429-458 (July 2004)

(a statistical study comparing civil rights litigants to all

other civil litigants); John Bronseen, Against Summary

Judgment, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 522, 540-543 (2007)

(discussing the artificial pressure on courts to grant

summary judgment motions); Paul W. Mollica, Federal

Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 Marq. L. Rev.

141, 181-205 (2000) (criticizing applications of summary

judgment that “press against tolerable constitutional

limits”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The

Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary

Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication

Process, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 95, 162—70 (1988).

Petitioner’s case exemplifies how the summary

judgment system and standards are used to prevent

good civil rights cases from reaching a jury. For

example, the D.C. Circuit ruled in Ms. Wiley’s favor on

nearly all of the legal arguments she presented, it then

however, ruled against her on all counts based its

failure to consider the record as a whole, to grant

14

inferences in Ms. Wiley’s favor and to abstain from

making credibility determinations.

1. The Court of Appeals Ignored Direct Evidence

of Discrimination

Following Ms. Wiley’s initial complaint to the

Respondent’s Office of Civil Rights, filed on October 6,

1997, Barry Maughan, Complainant’s Supervisor, wrote

to the Director of the Africa Division a memorandum

entitled “My Continued Tenure as Chief of English To

Africa.” The memo, dated November 18, 1997,

announced, among other things:

1) “After all the disruption caused in the Branch by

Verla Wiley [and her former co-plaintiffs in the

district court action] ... — and after all the

personal and _ professional indignities and

cruelties I’ve had to endure ... they should all

be summarily dismissed.”

2) “A clear and unmistakable message has to be

sent that this sort of behavior will not go

unpunished. I would like you to make sure

that signal is sent.

3) “In a perfect and just world, Verla Wiley and

Kemi Southey-Cole should go ... It’s been

decided that won’t happen. I’m reluctantly

willing to live with that decision.”

4) With respect to affording Ms. Wiley any training

that she had requested, Maughan insisted, “This

training cannot be managerial in nature, but

that certainly cannot be ruled out in the

future if she shows a willingness to become

a Team Player.”

15

(emphasis added).

In the same communication, Maughan announced

a rotating Managing Editor position. Only men, some

of who were GS-12 employees and others of whom

were GS-13 employees, appointed to the Managing

Editor and emergency back-up rotation.

Despite the strength of this direct evidence of

reprisal, neither the District Court nor the D.C. Circuit

Court of Appeals even mentioned it in any decision.

This Court has not defined what constitutes

direct evidence of discrimination. The most often cited

definition is Justice O’Conner’s discussion in her

concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490

U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (superseded on other grounds by

the Civil Rights Act of 1991):

[S]tray remarks in the workplace ... cannot

justify requiring the employer to prove that its

hiring or promotion decisions were based on

legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by

nondecisionmakers, or statements by

decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional

process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiff's

burden in this regard.

'Petitioner’s direct evidence suffers from none of

the deficiencies about which Justice O’Conner warned.

Maughan’s diatribe is no stray remark: as_ the

memorandums title (“My Continued Tenure as Chief’)

suggests, this was Maughan’s statement of the

conditions under which he agreed to remain as Branch

Chief. Second, the memorandum comes from the

decisionmaker himself, the person who made, and

denied, the appointments at issue in the complaint.

Lastly, the statements appear in the same document

16

that announces the very rotating Managing Editor

appointment at issue in this litigation. Therefore, the

statements of Maughan’s retaliatory animus are not

unrelated to the decisionmaking process. Maughan’s

words are not only related to the decisionmaking

process, they are contemporaneous explanations of

his actions.

Despite the direct evidence of retaliation, the

D.C. Circuit analyzed this case in accordance with the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting regime. The D.C.

Circuit required the Petitioner to demonstrate, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the Respondent’s

excuse was false and a pretext for discrimination,

pursuant to Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Supply Co.

530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit

held: “appellee offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for appellant’s nonparticipation in the managing

editor rotation and appellant failed to prove that

this reason was merely a pretext for discrimination

or retaliation proscribed by Title VII.” Wiley, 511 F.3d

151, 158. (emphasis added).

The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting regime

was developed for the benefit of employees who do not

have direct evidence of discrimination and _ is

inapplicable to cases with direct evidence. See Trans

World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 US. 111,

121)(1985)(“the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable

where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of

discrimination ... the shifting burdens of proof set forth

in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the

plaintiff has his day in court despite the unavailability

of direct evidence.”)(emphasis added); Seierkiewicz v.

Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002)(quoting the cited

excerpt from Trans World Airlines).

17

Applied to a case where direct evidence is in

play, the McDonnell Douglas system imposes an

additional obstacle on an employee at the summary

judgment level. This is because, in direct evidence

cases, the plaintiff has already demonstrated what

McDonnell Douglas was designed to elicit — that

unlawful discrimination played a role in the decision at

issue. When direct evidence is in play, the question of

whether discrimination is present has already been

answered.

Therefore, in direct evidence cases, the only

issue to be decided is whether an affirmative defense

exists and, if so, what effect the affirmative defense

would have. This result would be the same under

either 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)* or Price Waterhouse," if —

on remand — the District Court determines that Price

Waterhouse remains the law for retaliation claims:*

6 Under 42 U.S.C. 2000c-5(g), when the employee “proves a

violation under section 2000e-2(m) ... and a _ respondent

demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same

action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the

court” may still issue relief, although that relief is limited in

nature.

7 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989), the

Court held that “Once a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that

{unlawful discrimination] played a motivating part in an

employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of

liability only by proving that it would have made the same

decision even if it had not allowed [discrimination] to play

such a role.” (emphasis added).

8 Courts have recognized that the Civil Rights Act of 1991

superseded Price Waterhouse, at least with respect to

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003).

18

[A]n employer may not meet its burden in [a

mixed motive] case by merely showing that at

the time of the decision it was motivated only in

part by a legitimate reason. The very premise of

a mixed-motives case is that a legitimate reason

was present, .... The employer instead must

show that its legitimate reason, standing

alone, would have induced it to make the

same decision.

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added).

This question, whether the employer has met its

burden to demonstrate that it would have taken the

same action despite the existence of discrimination is

for a jury to decide. And as such, the case should be

remanded to the District Court for trial. Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1987 (2007) (Stevens,

dissenting) (“In discrimination cases, our precedents

require a plaintiff at the summary judgment stage to

produce either direct evidence of discrimination or, if

the claim is based primarily on circumstantial evidence,

to meet the shifting evidentiary burdens imposed under

the framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas’);

King v. Hardesty, 517 F.3d 1049, 1058 (8 Cir. 2008)(“At

the summary judgment stage, the issue is whether the

plaintiff has _ sufficient evidence that unlawful

discrimination was a motivating factor in_ the

defendant's adverse employment action. If so, the

presence of additional legitimate motives will not

entitle the defendant to summary judgment.”); Wilburn

v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1148 (D.C. Cir.

2007)(“‘direct evidence of retaliation ... precluded

summary judgment”); Wright v. Murray Guard, Ine.

455 F.3d 702, 711 (6 Cir. 2006)(“If the plaintiff makes

[the showing required by 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(m)], she is

19

entitled to relief.”); Ezell v. Potter, 400 F.3d 1041,

1051 (7 Cir. 2005) (“[employer’s} statement that [it]

had a plan to get rid of older workers and replace them

with younger, faster workers is direct evidence of

discriminatory intent and is sufficient evidence to allow

[employee] to take his case to trial.”); Griffith v. City of

Des Moines 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8 Cir. 2004)(“We have

long recognized ... that a plaintiff may survive the

defendant's motion for summary judgment in one of

two ways. The first is by proof of ‘direct evidence’ of

discrimination.”); Vesperini v. Shaw Contract Flooring

Services, Inc., 315 F.3d 37, 41 (1** Cir. 2002) (“When an

employee presents direct evidence of age

discrimination, the employer must then either deny the

validity or the sufficiency of the employee's evidence,

and have the jury decide whether the employee has

proved discrimination by a preponderance of the

evidence, or prove that it would have made the same

decision even if it had not taken the protected

characteristic into account.”)(emphasis added);

Melendez-Arroyo v. Cutler-Hammer de P.R. Co., Inc.,

273 F.3d 30, 35-6 (1* Cir. 2001) (“At [the summary

judgment] stage, ... the question is whether the

evidence, taken as a whole, creates a factual issue as to

whether the demotion was’ motivated by

age.”)(emphasis added); Starceski v. Westinghouse

Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, FN4 (8d Cir. 1995) (“direct

proof of discriminatory animus leaves the employer

only an affirmative defense on the question of ‘but for’

cause or cause in fact.”).

20

2. Whether summary judgment in_ the

employer’s favor is appropriate when the

record demonstrates the employer’s alleged

nondiscriminatory justifications to be false.

The Respondent provided numerous false

justifications for its treatment of Ms. Wiley. The

following examples stand out and should have

permitted her to survive summary judgment.

a. Denied Promotion

The Respondent’s first excuse for failing to

promote Ms. Wiley to a GS-13 position was that she did

not have any supervisory duties associated with her

position. This explanation was false. The Respondent

has admitted that its GS 18 positions may be

supervisory or nonsupervisory. Moreover, despite

Maughan’s explanation that having supervisory duties

meant both acting as the Managing Editor and Senior

Editor, Maughan promoted a white, male colleague

with no prior EEO activity to a GS-13 position even

though (conceded by Maughan in his deposition) that

the employee lacked of supervisory duties prior to his

promotion. In addition, the Respondent argued before

the D.C. Circuit that only GS-13s were eligible to act as

either Managing Editor or Senior Editor, additionally

contradicting Maughan’s explanation an employee had

to have either Managing Editor or Senior Editor duties

before being eligible for a promotion to GS-13.

The Respondent’s second excuse for failing to

promote Ms. Wiley — and the reason on which the D.C.

Circuit focused —- was that she refused to undergo a

desk audit, which was (according to the Respondent)

the only manner for an employee to be promoted

21

noncompetitively. The Respondent provided no facts in

support of this allegation, however. The Respondent’s

citations to the record were devoid of any evidence that

any person was required to undergo a formal desk audit

prior to receiving their accretion of duties promotion.

In fact, Ms. Wiley who has received numerous accretion

of duties promotions in her rise from a GS-2 Clerk

Typist to GS-12 International Radio Broadcaster, has

never been required to undergo a formal desk audit.

To additionally contradict the Agency’s excuse,

Ms. Wiley demonstrated that the desk audit idea came

months after Maughan denied her promotion,

illustrating that there was no causal nexus between the

denied promotion and Ms. Wiley’s decision not to sit for

a formal desk audit. She also presented evidence that

‘Maughan had referred (in his sworn deposition

testimony) to Mr. DeCapua’s promotion as having been

the result of a “backroom deal.” Additionally, the

Petitioner demonstrated that Maughan’s supervisor

’ {the Director of the Africa Division) had testified that

Maughan had the authority to promote employees

subject to advice by Mr. Lucas and a review by

Personnel for availability.

b. Managing Editor Rotation

The Respondent’s first explanation for denying

Ms. Wiley a role as Managing Editor was that only GS-

13 employees were eligible to act as Managing Editor.

Ms. Wiley earned no credit for demonstrating this

reason to be false and demonstrating that two of the

male employees that Maughan appointed to the rotation

were GS-12s.

The second explanation was that Ms. Wiley’s

union duties took up so much of her time that she would

22,

not have been able to maintain her obligations under

the rotation. This excuse is simply untrue. Ms. Wiley’s

rating officer, Senior Editor Frederica Depew, wrote in

a 1995 email to Maughan:

Barry —- this is in response to your query about

Verla’s schedule, union activities, partnership

meetings, etc. and how they affect the office: ...

The short answer is — not at all. They have no

affect on the amount of work she does or it’s

quality. ... ’ve known many people who took

their jobs and their responsibility seriously,

but I’ve never known anyone who does so to

the extent that Verla does. For years now I’ve

received scripts sent in the computer late at

night or over the weekend indicating that she’s

been working on her own time. And yet never

has she asked for comp time, even in days past

when comp time wasn’t hard to come by. ... If

Verla followed the letter of the law, we would be

filling in for her all the time — again, not just

because of her union work, but also because of

sick leave and annual leave. We're by far the

winners in this arrangement.

(emphasis added).

The inclusion of false explanations for the

Respondent’s failure to promote Ms. Wiley and failure

to include her in the Managing Editor rotation creates

genuine issues of material fact sufficient to survive a

motion for summary judgment. Even if the

Respondent provided additional reasons that were not

demonstrated to be false, the fact that false excuses

were asserted in the first place begs the obvious

23

question: if there were legitimate reasons, why would

the Respondent dissemble?

This Court held, in Reeves 530 U.S. at 147-148:

In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact

can reasonably infer from the falsity of the

explanation that the employer is dissembling to

cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an

inference is consistent with the general principle

of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to

consider a party's dishonesty about a material

fact as affirmative evidence of guilt. Moreover,

once the employer's justification has been

eliminated, discrimination may well be the most

likely alternative explanation, especially since

the employer is in the best position to put forth

the actual reason for its decision.

Similarly, in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) this Court held:

The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put

forward by the defendant (particularly if

disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of

mendacity) may, together with the elements of

the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional

discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's

proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to

infer the ultimate fact of intentional

discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was

correct when it noted that, upon such rejection,

“(njo additional proof of discrimination is

required[.}”

24

Likewise, in Aka v. Washington Hospital

Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1290, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1998)(a

decision endorsed and cited with approval in Reeves,

530 U.S. at 148), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held

that the belief that “employment-discrimination

plaintiffs must as a routine matter do more than

discredit the employer's explanation in order to avoid

summary judgment” is incorrect and “inconsistent with

Hicks, which makes clear that ‘no additional proof of

discrimination is required’ as a matter of course once a

plaintiff has shown that a jury could reject the

employer's proffered explanation.” Jd. at 264 (quoting

Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511).

Thus, under Reeves, the combination of a prima

facie case and evidence that the employer’s asserted

justification is false, while “not always” adequate to

avoid summary judgment, is sufficient to “permit the

trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully

discriminated.” Reeves 530 U.S. at 148. The Reeves

Court only envisaged cases where “the record

conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory

reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff

created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the

employer's reason was untrue and there was

abundant and uncontroverted independent

evidence that no discrimination had occurred,” as

still being amenable to summary judgment.” /d.

(emphasis added).

Permitting an employee to avoid summary

judgment when the employer asserts false justifications

for its action is also consistent with Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)(“the evidence of

the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”). This is

because, when the employer dissembles about the

Bass

25

reason for its actions, it is a justifiable inference that it

is doing so to cover up its guilt. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at

147 (“the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the

falsity of the explanation that the employer is

dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such

an inference is consistent with the general principle of

evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a

party's dishonesty about a material fact as affirmative

evidence of guilt.”).

Relying on Reeves and this line of reasoning,

Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

opined, in Forester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d

416, 417 (7" Cir. 2006):

As we have said countless times, the question in

a discrimination case is not whether the

employer's stated nondiscriminatory ground for

the action of which the plaintiff is complaining is

correct but whether it is the true ground of the

employer's action rather than being a pretext for

a decision based on some other, undisclosed

ground. ... If it is not the true ground, the

employer may still be innocent of discrimination;

he may for example have lied to conceal a reason

that was discreditable but not discriminatory.

But the case could not be resolved on

summary judgment, because a trier of fact

(judge or jury) would be entitled to infer a

discriminatory motive from the pretextual

character of the employer's ground.

(emphasis added).

The Petitioner respectfully requests that this

Court accept Certiorari to clarify that in Title VII

cases, while an employee is not entitled to judgment as

26

a matter of law when it demonstrates the employer’s

justifications to be false, the employee does establish

genuine issues of material fact necessitating trial by

doing so, unless the employer can provide “conclusive,”

“abundant” and “uncontroverted independent evidence

that no discrimination had occurred.” Reeves, 530 U.S.

at 148.

3. Whether a court can grant all reasonable

inferences to the non-moving party, and

refrain from making impermissible

credibility determinations, when it fails to

consider pertinent record evidence provided

by the non-movant.

a. Managing Editor Rotation

The D.C. Circuit concluded that Ms. Wiley’s

union activities would have prevented her from

participating in the Managing Editor rotation and that

she would not have accepted the assignment had it been

offered to her. The Circuit Court opined: “{A]ppellant

does not really contest Respondent’s contention that

she was too busy with her union duties to serve as

managing editor. We therefore hold that Respondent

offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

Appellant’s nonparticipation in the managing editor

rotation.” Wiley, 511 F.3d at 158.

The evidence before the D.C. Circuit, taking the

entire record into consideration — as required by

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151 (Courts must review “the

record as a whole” on summary judgment) — was that

although: 1) in 1997, Ms. Wiley was the Union Vice

President; and 2) in 1989, she gave up Managing Editor

type duties for the show Nightline Africa because she

27

was newly appointed and specific events required her

to devote a significant amount of time to her union

duties; 3) Ms. Wiley made numerous requests in 1997

for Managing Editor duties; 4) she was never asked if

she would be able to maintain both Managing Editor

and Union Vice President duties in the 1997 period; 5)

the Senior Editor believed that Wiley had never

permitted her union obligations to get in the way of

work performance; 6) the Managing Editor position was

a rotating one, making it easier to accommodate her

union responsibilities; and 7) in his November 1997

memorandum (in which the Managing Editor rotation

was announced), Maughan provided direct evidence of

retaliation against Ms. Wiley and indicated that she

could only receive training that was managerial in

nature if she showed she could be a “team player.”

Instead of believing the evidence of the non-

movant and granting the reasonable inferences from

these facts (i.e., (1) that since Ms. Wiley’s request for

Managing Editor duties was legitimate and; (2) that she

would have accepted the assignment if it had been

offered to her), the D.C. Circuit weighed the evidence

before it and made the credibility determination that

Ms. Wiley’s requests for Managing Editor duties was

really a sham. This was in clear violation of Anderson,

477 US. at 255 (“Credibility determinations, the

weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate

inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of

a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary

judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the

non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”’).

The D.C. Circuit achieved this decision by

violating another tenet of summary judgment law,

which is that the court is required to consider the

28

record, as a whole, before granting a motion for

summary judgment. See, 530 U.S. at 150 (“under Rule

56, we have stated that the court must review the

record ‘taken as a whole.”’); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255

(“the appropriate summary judgment question will be

whether the evidence in the record could support a

reasonable jury finding ...”); and Matsushita, 475 U.S.

at 587 (“Where the record taken as a whole ...”’).

For example, the D.C. Circuit never once

acknowledged: 1) Maughan’s November 1997

memorandum, which includes the direct evidence of

retaliatory animus); 2) Ms. Wiley’s explanation that

specific circumstances led her to give up her Managing

Editor duties in 1989; 3) that Ms. Wiley had asked

repeatedly for Managing Editor duties in 1996 and

1997; 4) that Maughan testified that he never asked Ms.

Wiley if She could perform the duties while acting as

Union Vice President; and 5) that the Senior Editor

confirmed that Ms. Wiley never let her union

obligations interfere with her broadcasting work.

It would be, and is, easy for a court to grant

summary judgment if it can ignore the evidence that

favors the non-moving party, and the lower courts must

be reminded of their obligation to consider all of the

evidence in the record before granting summary

judgment.

b. Denied Promotion

The D.C. Circuit likewise disregarded important

evidence of record with respect to Petitioner’s denied

promotion claim.

The Court dispatched Ms. Wiley’s denied

promotion claim, concluding: “Appellant never proved

that the duties and responsibilities of her job had

29

increased so as to warrant an accretion of duty

promotion.” Wiley, 511 F.3d at 157. This holding

presumes that the Agency’s policy required the Agency

to verify, by way of a desk audit, that the employee’s

responsibilities had increased sufficiently to merit an

accretion of duties promotion.

This conclusion, while appearing to be tied up

with a bow, is absolutely bereft of any supporting facts

and actually contradicts the evidence in the record.

Among other ignored facts, it disregards the following:

1) Maughan denied Ms. Wiley a promotion long before

the desk audit option was offered to her, and therefore

there was no nexus between the initial denied

promotion and the rejected desk audit; 2) there is no

evidence in the record demonstrating that any

employees in English to Africa were required to go

through a desk audit; 3) Maughan explained that

DeCapua (about whom the D.C. Circuit concluded,

[t]here is clear evidence in the record to indicate that

DeCapua's job responsibilities had grown over time”’)

did not have supervisory duties at the time of his

promotion, which Maughan indicated was necessary for

promotion; 4) Maughan indicated that DeCapua’s

promotion was the result of a “back-room deal” not a

desk audit;? and 5) the Africa Division Chief, Steven

Lucas, testified that Maughan had the authority to

make promotions, subject only to advice by Mr. Lucas

and a review by Personnel for availability, and not for

verification of additional duties.

The D.C. Circuit managed to make its erroneous

ruling by disregarding the record facts that support Ms.

Wiley’s claim. Doing so, while making it fairly easy to

® Had a desk audit been conducted, there would have been no need

for any back-room deal.

30

avoid granting summary judgment on the denied

promotion claim, violated one of the basic tenets of this

Court’s summary judgment precedent, that the courts

consider the record as a whole before granting

summary judgment. See Reeves 530 U.S. at 150 (“under

Rule 56, we have stated that the court must review the

record ‘taken as a whole.””); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255

(“the appropriate summary judgment question will be

whether the evidence in the record could support a

reasonable jury finding ...”); and Matsushita, 475 USS.

at 587.

Moreover, with respect to the denied promotion,

Respondent failed to move for summary judgment on

the issue of Ms. Wiley’s retaliatory non-promotion.

Notwithstanding this both the District and Circuit

Courts granted summary judgment on all claims

related to the denied promotion without analyzing the

retaliation claim.

The VOA has waived any argument it has — by

way of summary judgment — concerning Ms. Wiley’s

claim for retaliatory non-promotion. An Appellee

cannot raise a new issue — never before heard at the

District Court level — in an appeal. See Woodruff v.

Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Kattan by

Thomas v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 277 (D.C.

Cir. 1993)(issue not raised before the District Court — a

pro se litigant’s right to attorney’s fees —- was waived on

appeal).

c. Retroactive Taking of Leave

The D.C. Circuit approached Ms. Wiley’s claim

for retroactive taking of leave with a similarly impaired

view of the evidence in the recorc

31

The Cireuit Court determined that Ms. Wiley

was not entitled to administrative leave to attend

depositions in her case and that, as a result, she

suffered no adverse action when she was retroactively

charged with leave. This determination presupposed

that — at the time she took the leave — the Respondent

had a practice or policy of denying the use of

administrative leave for a District Court litigant to

attend depositions in her case.

The court held that Ms. Wiley “can hardly claim

retaliation when she has not shown that she was

entitled to paid leave. The October 2001 guidelines may

have clarified the situation, but they did not cause

appellant to lose anything to which she was entitled

before the guidelines were issued.” Wiley, 511 F.3d at

159.

Here again, however, the Panel failed to consider

the record as a whole and failed to decide all reasonable

inferences in Ms. Wiley’s favor. According to Ms. Wiley,

it was common practice for employees to use

administrative leave to attend depositions in their civil

actions. But Ms. Wiley’ case was not built on her

testimony alone. The record contained numerous

contemporaneous notes and correspondence from the

Director of Personnel, the Employee/Labor Relations

Branch Chief, the Deputy General Counsel and the

Director of Civil Rights, all of whom indicated that the

policy requiring an employee to take annual leave to

attend depositions in his or her court case was a new

one and that the old policy had been interpreted

“liberally,” consistent with Ms. Wiley’s understanding.

Based on the foregoing, Ms. Wiley was entitled

to the justifiable inference that the Respondent’s prior

policy permitted her to use administrative leave and

that she was charged with annual leave, retroactively

32

after the new October 2001 policy was _ published.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (“the evidence of the non-

movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences

are to be drawn in his favor’ and “Credibility

determinations ... are jury functions”).

The D.C. Circuit’ again achieved the decision

against Ms. Wiley by simply ignoring the evidence that

was in her favor. The Circuit Court’s decision bears not

one mention of the correspondence that demonstrates

the internal debate - among the Respondent’s

Personnel Director, its Chief of the Employee and

Labor Relations Branch, its General Counsel and its

Office of Civil Rights —- as to whether the October 2001

policy was new or not. By failing to consider the whole

record and grant this inference to Ms. Wiley, the

Panel’s decision conflicts with Reeves, 530 U.S. 138,

Matsushita 475 U.S. 574, and Anderson, 477 U.S. 242.

d. Retaliatory Harassment

The D.C. Circuit held that, since Ms. Wiley

conceded her hostile work environment claim, she must

also have conceded her retaliatory harassment claim.

The D.C. Circuit again failed to consider the entire

record in making this ruling.

Ms. Wiley’s Complaint included a gender-based

hostile environment claim. Because the gender-based

conduct consisted of, albeit extremely distasteful and

demonstrative of Maughan’s discriminatory attitude

toward women, isolated incidents that did not amount

to severe or pervasive conduct under Faragher v. Boca

Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-788 (1998), Ms. Wiley conceded

the gender-based hostile environment claim and instead

argued that all of the incidents about which she had

complained in her complaint (not merely the events

33

that supported the gender-based harassment claim),

considered together, constituted a hostile environment

based on retaliation.

The D.C. Circuit held that the Respondent was

on notice of the retaliatory harassment claim and

reversed the District Court, which had stricken the

claim, only to dismiss the retaliatory harassment claim,

holding: “Because there is no claim here that the

District Court erred in granting summary judgment on

appellant’s hostile environment claim, appellant’s

retaliatory harassment claim necessarily fails as well.”

Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d at 160.

Had the D.C. Circuit considered “the record as a

whole,” it would have been forced to acknowledge that

the retaliatory harassment claim included many actions

that were not encompassed in the gender-based hostile

environment claim. These included: 1) The Denied

Promotion to GS-13; 2) Maughan’s refusal to allow Ms.

Wiley to act as Managing Editor; 3) Maughan’s refusal

to provide Ms. Wiley with On the Job Training for the

Managing Editor position; 4) the retroactive taking of

leave; 5) the reduction of Ms. Wiley’s air-time

responsibilities; 6) petitions that were encouraged by

Maughan and written and distributed by coworkers to

higher-level management; 7) attacks on the Petitioner

submitted to her union management; 8) letters and

speeches encouraged by Maughan and made to upper

level management; 9) contributing to a slanderous

newspaper article; 10) an assault on Ms. Wiley’s former

co-plaintiff, Kemi Southey-Cole; 11) hiring an attorney

to investigate Ms. Wiley’s activities; and 12) and the

Respondent’s’ cancellation of an _ independent

discrimination investigation.

The Circuit Court’s conclusion that the fate of

Ms. Wiley’s retaliatory harassment was necessarily tied

34

to her gender-based retaliation claim is another result

of the D.C. Circuit’s failure to consider the record as a

whole as required by Reeves, 530 U.S. 183 and

Matsushita 475 U.S. 574 (1986) and Anderson, 477 U.S.

242 (1986).

4. The Panel Relied on an Overruled Standard

for Determining Actionable Retaliation

The last question presented relates to the

Respondent’s retaliatory reduction of Ms. Wiley’s

airtime by approximately twenty-five percent. After

reversing the District Court’s dismissal of this claim,

the D.C. Circuit granted summary judgment in the

Respondent’s favor in reliance on an _ overruled

standard for analyzing retaliation claims.

' The Panel invoked the D.C. Circuit’s decision in

Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2002) and

held that “an employee suffers an adverse employment

action if he experiences materially adverse

consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment or future employment

opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact

could find objectively tangible harm.” Wiley v.

Glassman, 511 F.3d at 161. (emphasis added). Relying

on this characterization of the law, the Panel held:

“Appellant’s claim lacks merit because she failed to

establish that a reduction in airtime responsibilities

constituted a materially adverse action for the purpose

of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.

Appellant offered nothing to the District Court or to

this court establishing that the reduction in her airtime

production ... could affect her compensation, grade or

opportunity for future advancement.” /d (emphasis

added).

35

The Panel then concluded that Ms. Wiley “failed

Le 1

to establish that. a reasonable employee would have

found the challenged action materially adverse, which

in this context means it well might have dissuaded a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge

of discrimination.” Jd. (quoting Burlington Northern v.

White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006)).

The D.C. Circuit’s discussion of “tangible harm,”

in reliance on Forkkio —- is inappropriate and

contradictory to this Court’s opinion in Burlington

Northern v. White, and the “materially adverse”

standard described therein.

Ms. Wiley’s show and on-air time was reduced by

twenty-five percent. It should go without saying that a

broadcaster would think twice before filing a complaint

of discrimination if doing so would result in his or her

show or air-time being reduced by twenty-five percent.

Moreover, Ms. Wiley explained that, because of time

constraints, she was prohibited from treating her

subjects with the depth that they require, and that she

was forced to cut portions from her broadcast, resulting

in a choppy, largely superficial program.

The Panel disregarded this impact, and more

importantly neglected the “context counts” provisions

in Burlington Northern v. White:

(T]he significance of any given act of retaliation

will often depend upon the particular

circumstances. Context matters .. A

supervisor's refusal to invite an employee to

lunch is normally trivial, a nonactionable petty

sight. But to retaliate by excluding an

employee from a weekly training lunch that,

contributes significantly to the employee's |

professional advancement might well deter a

36

reasonable employee from complaining about

discrimination.

Id. at 69. (emphasis added).

Instead of recognizing that Burlington Northern

v. White overruled the “tangible harm” standard found

in Forkkio, the Wiley v. Glassman decision, which

reads Burlington Northern v. White and Forkkio to be

consistent with each other, stands for the proposition

that retaliation is not actionable unless it, both, is

tangible (affecting a term and condition of employment)

under Forkkio 306 F.3d 1131 and has the effect of

“dissuading a reasonable worker from making or

supporting charge of discrimination.” Burlington

Northern v. White, 548 U.S. at 67. See Wiley v.

Glassnvan 511 F.3d at 161.

CONCLUSION

The D.C Cireuit’s opinion, in addition to being

contrary to Burlington Northern v. White, is

emblematic of the errors courts make when applying

this Court’s summary judgment precedent’ to

employment discrimination cases. The heart of that

problem is the courts’ failure to consider the record as a

whole, and specifically the evidence that supported the

Petitioner, in violation of Reeves, 530 U.S. 133, 150

(2000)(“under Rule 56, we have stated that the court

must review the .record ‘taken as a whole.””); Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255 (“the appropriate summary judgment

question will be whether the evidence in the record

could sport a reasonable jury finding ...”); and

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (“Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

37

for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.””)

The D.C. Court of Appeals failed to acknowledge

the direct evidence of retaliation and to adjust it

analysis accordingly.

The D.C. Circuit also neglected to consider all of

the record evidence put forward by the Petitioner,

making it impossible for her to gain the advantage of

the inferences that were owed to her. Additionally, the

court disregarded evidence that the Respondent

forwarded false justifications for its actions, which in

turn permitted the court to ignore the genuine issues of

material fact created by those false explanations. The

court’s failure to consider the entire record also caused

it to miss the disputed facts with respect to the

Petitioner’s willirgness to accept the Managing Editor

rotation and the court’s mistaken judgment that the

Petitioner had waived her retaliatory harassment

claim.

WHEREFORE, the Petitioner respectfully

prays that this Court grant her Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Leslie D. Alderman III

ALDERMAN, DEVORSETZ & HORA

PLLC

1025 Connecticut Ave., NW

Suite 615

Washington, DC 20036

202-969-8220 (Tel.)

202-969-8224 (Fax)

lalderman@adhlawfirm.com

Attorney for the Petitioner

la

(any foctnotes trail end of each document)

No. 06-5402

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

VERLA M. WILEY,

APPELLANT

v.

JAMES K. GLASSMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE

BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS,

APPELLEE

November 16, 2007, Argued

December 14, 2007, Decided

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia. (No. 99ev00975).

COUNSEL: Leslie D. Alderman, III argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Diane M. Sullivan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey

A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Michacl J. Ryan,

Assistant U.S. Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant

U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

JUDGES: Before: BROWN and GRIFFITH, Circuit

Judges, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

OPINION

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

2a

Per Curiam: Appellant Verla Wiley, an African-

American woman, worked at the United States

Information Agency ("USIA") from 1966 until her

retirement in May 2005. In October 1999, USIA was

abolished and certain sections reconstituted as the

Broadcasting Boar? of Governors ("BBG"). See 22

U.S.C. $§ 6531-6553. (For the remainder of this opinion,

appellee will be referred to as "BBG.")

During the time periods that are relevant to issues in

this appeal, appellant worked as an International Radio

Broadeaster in the English-to-Africa Branch of the

Africa Division at Voice of America, formerly a division

of USIA. In April 1999, Ms. Wiley and two other

plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in District Court against USIA,

alleging violations cf Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

The plaintiffs claimed that they had been discriminated

against on the basis of their race and/or sex, subjected

to a hostile work environment, and retaliated against

for engaging in activities that were protected by Title

VII. As of 2004, Ms. Wiley was the only remaining

plaintiff in the litigation before the District Court.

The facts of this case have been described at length by

the District Court, see Kemi Southey-Cole v. Kenneth

Y. Tomlinson, Civ. A. No. 99-00975 (D.D.C. Oct. 2,

2006) (mem. op.); Kemi Southey-Cole v Kenneth Y.

Tomlinson, Civ. A. No. 99-00975 (D.D.C. May 6, 2005)

(District Court judge's order adopting magistrate

judge's report and recommendation in full); Kemi

Southey-Cole v. Mare B. Nathanson, Civ. A. No. 99-

00975 (D.D.C. May 26, 2004) (magistrate judge's report

and recommendation), so appellant's allegations need

not be recounted in detail here. On May 6, 2005, the

See

Pema ee ee ME ee Bee RR ee ee RS ee Oe ee SR ee ee er DR a ns SE ee ek eee

3a

District Court granted appellee's motion te strike Ms.

Wiley's retaliatery harassment claim, as well as her

claim of retaliation based on a reduction in the amount

of airtime that she was responsible for producing.

Striking appellant's claims effectively dismissed them,

and we treat the District Court's decision with respect

to these two claims as if it had granted a motion

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The District Court also granted appellee's motion for

summary judgment on all but one of appellant's

remaining claims. Subsequently, on October 2, 2006, the

District Court granted summary judgment to appellee

on Ms. Wiley's remaining claim that she suffered illegal

retaliation when BBG forced her to use annual leave for

the time that she took to attend depositions related to

this lawsuit.

In this appeal, appellant claims that

1. she suffered discrimination and retaliation

when appeliee failed to promote her to a GS-

13 pay grade;

2. she suffered discrimination and retaliation

when appellee refused to allow her to

participate in the managing editor rotation;

3. she suffered retaliation when appellee

retroactively charged her annual leave for

the time that she-tock to attend depositions

related to this lawsuit;

4. the District Court erred in granting

appellee's motion to strike her retaliatory

harassment claim; and

5. the District Court erred in granting

appellee's motion to strike her retaliation

claim stemming from the reduction in the

4a

number of minutes of airtime that she was

assigned to produce.

We affirm the District Court's grant of summary

judgment to appellee on appellant's first three claims.

We reverse the District Court's decision to strike

appellant's last two claims, but grant summary

judgment to appellee on both. .

Standard of Review and Legal Standard

for Title VII Claims

We review the District Court's grant of summary

judgment de novo. Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,

371 U.S. App. D.C. 68, 447 F.3d 843, 849 (D.C. Cir.

2006). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is

"no genuine issue as to any material fact and .. . the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law." FED. R.CIV.P.56(c). "The inquiry performed is

the threshold inquiry of determining whether . . . there

are any genuine factual issues that properly can be

resolved only by a finder of fact because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party."

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106

S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). In determining

whether there are genuine factual issues in dispute, we

must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party. /d. at 255. Insofar as we are treating

the District Court's decisions to strike two of

appellant's claims as dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6),

"[ojur standard of review under Federal Rules 12(b)(6)

and 56 is the same: de novo." Wilson v. Pena, 316 U.S.

App. D:C. 352, 79 F.3d 154, 160 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

5a

Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 US.

792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), Title VII

discrimination claims are assessed pursuant to a simple

three-step framework:

First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by

the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie

case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff

succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the

burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate

some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

the [action in question]." Third, should the

defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must

then have an opportunity to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that’ the

legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were

not its true reasons, but were a pretext for

discrimination.

Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

252-53, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981) (quoting

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). To establish a

prima facie case of discrimination, a claimant must show

that "(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she

suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the

unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of

discrimination." Brown v. Brody, 339 U.S. App. D.C.

233, 199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1999). To establish a

prima facie case of retaliation, a claimant must show

that (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity;

(2) she suffered a materially adverse action by her

employer; and (3) a causal connection existed between

the two. /d.; see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.

v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414-15, 165 L.

Ed. 2d 345 (2006) (finding that Title VII's anti-

BN ea BONN Fay Eee ER eta De ee gt ay a ee aN ney he Stee Ne eae we ae CAP RNC Ee eT lp Ee nesta Pees Ree MeL ong we eee hee eta

6a

retaliation provision prohibits all materially adverse

actions, not merely those harms that are specifically

employment-related). In either situation, as the

Supreme Court has made clear, “[t]he burden of

establishing a prima facie case ... is not onerous."

Burdine, 459 U.S. at 253.

Indeed, just two years after Burdine was decided, the

Court emphasized, in strikingly clear terms, that

.t]he prima facie case method established in

McDonnell Douglas was never intended to be

rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. .. . Where the

defendant has done everything that would be

required of him if the plaintiff had properly made

out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff

really did so is no longer relevant. The district

court has before it all the evidence it needs to

decide whether the defendant intentionally

discriminated against the plaintiff.

United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v.

Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 108 S. Ct. 1478, 75 L. Ed. 2d

403 (1988) (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted). In this case, the District Court had before it

hundreds of pages of documents, testimony from

various witnesses that was provided during the

investigation of appellant's claims by BBG's Office of

Civil Rights, and depositions taken after the lawsuit

was filed. So there is no doubt here that appellee aimed

to “articulate[] legitimate reasons for [the allegedly

discriminatory or retaliatory actions] and proffered

evidence in support of those reasons." George v. Leavitt,

366 U.S. App. D.C. 11, 407 F.3d 405, 411 (D.C. Cir.

2005). Given this record, we “need not address the

7a

Government's contentions that [appellant] failed to

make out a prima facie case." /d. Rather, following the

Court's direction in Aikens, we will "proceed to the

ultimate question of discrimination vel non." Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

First Claim: Failure to Promoie to GS-13

Appellant claims that her failure to obtain a promotion

to the GS-18 level in 1997 and 1998 was the result of

discrimination based on her race and sex or retaliation

for her complaints to the BBG's Office of Civil Rights.

The District Court held, in part, that appellant failed to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination, because

she could not prove "that anyone similarly situated was

promoted when she was not." Kemi Southey-Cole v.

Marc B. Nathanson, Civ. A. No. 99-00975 at 22 (D.D.C.

May 26, 2004). The District Court applied an erroneous

legal standard in reaching this conclusion. Although

appellant certainly could have offered evidence of

"similarly situated" employees in support of her claim,

she was not required to offer such evidence in order to

make out a prima facie case. See Mastro, 447 F.3d at

850-51; Stetla v. Mineta, 350 U.S. App. D.C. 300, 284

F.3d 135, 145-46 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Nevertheless, because we review the District Court's

decision de novo, we conduct an independent evaluation

of the record to determine whether appellant offered

sufficient evidence to prove discrimination vel non. We

hold that she did not. The undisputed evidence in the

record establishes that there were only two ways for an

employee in appellant's situation to obtain a

noncompetitive promotion (other than career ladder

promotions) at BBG: (1) an impact promotion, which is

8a

based on "exceptional ability exhibited by the

employee"; and (2) an accretion of duty promotion,

pursuant to which a position is reclassified at a higher

grade "because the duties and responsibilities of the

position have increased over a_ period of time."

Supplemental Declaration of Donna 8S. Grace, Joint

Appendix ("J.A.") 236. Only the second -- "accretion of

duty promotion" -- is at issue in this case.

Appellant offered virtually nothing to establish what

her original duties as a GS-12 International Radio

Broadcaster had been, what duties she was performing

when she was denied a promotion, and what

responsibilities the GS-13 position commonly entailed.

Moreover, when BBG attempted to arrange a desk

audit, in which a job classification specialist would have

evaluated Ms. Wiley's work responsibilities, Ms. Wiley

refused. Deposition of Veria M. Wiley (5/24/01), J.A.

842-43; Note to the Record of Janet Davis (1/26/98), J.A.

1371. Rather, when asked why she believed that she

deserved a GS-13 promotion, appellant testified, "I

thought [ was doing a great job .... I just felt |

deserved a 13." Deposition of Verla M. Wiley (5/24/01),

J.A. 846. Although appellant attempts to compare

herself to Joseph DeCapua, another English-to-Africa

employee who was promoted to a GS-13 International

Radio Broadcaster position, her argument falls far

short. There is clear evidence in the record to indicate

that DeCapua's job responsibilities had grown over

time and that he _ had = significantly greater

responsibilities than appellant did at the time of his

promotion. See, e.g., Declaration of Fredrica B. Depew

(11/9/01), J.A. 218; Deposition of Barry Maughan

(4/18/01), J.A. 1077-78; Deposition of Joseph Anthony

DeCapua (3/5/01), J.A. 916-18.

9a

In sum, appellant failed to establish that she was denied

a promotion as a result of illegal discrimination or

retaliation. Appellant never proved that the duties and

responsibilities of her job had increased so as to

warrant an accretion of duty promotion. Without such

evidence, appeliant cannot prove that the failed

promotion was a pretext for either discrimination or

retaliation.

Second Claim: Nonparticipation in the Managing

Editor Rotation

During the time when Barry Maughan was Chief of the

English-to-Africa Division, he rotated the individuals

who were assigned to serve in the managing editor

position. Appellant claims she was denied the

opportunity to participate in this rotation because of

illegal discrimination and retaliation.

The District Court erroneously found that appellant

suffered no adverse employment action as a result of

her exclusion from the managing editor rotation and,

therefore, failed to make out a prima facie case on this

claim. An employment action may be sufficient to

support a claim of discrimination if it results in

"materially adverse consequences affecting . . . future

employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier

of fact could find objectively tangible harm." Forkkio v.

Powell, 353 U.S. App. D.C. 301, 306 F.3d 1127, 1131

(D.C. Cir. 2002). Exclusion from the managing editor

rotation surely qualifies as an adverse employment

action.

Maughan, who was appellant's manager, testified that

he did not support appellant's request for a GS-13

10a

promotion in part because she did not have any

"supervisory duties" in her current job. Deposition of

Barry Maughan (4/18/01), J.A. 1088-89. And Maughan

acknowledged that the required "supervisory duties"

included "be[ing] able to carry out the functions of a

managing editor and senior editor." /d., J.A. 1078. He

also testified that, "outside of being a senior editor,

[managing editor is] the most important function in the

shop." /d. Given this testimony from appellant's

manager, it can hardly be said that Ms. Wiley suffered

no adverse employment action when she was barred

from participating in the managing editor rotation.

Even though appellant may have suffered an adverse

employment action, this, without more, is not proof of

illegal discrimination or retaliation. On the record here,

it is obvious and undisputed that the responsibilities of

managing editor were time-consuming. See Declaration

of Barry H. Maughan, J.A. 499-502. It is equally clear

that, during the time period in question, appellant, who

was serving as Vice President of the American

Federation of Government Employees, Local 1812, was

very busy with union work. See Deposition of Verla

Wiley (6/6/01}, J.A. 879-80; Deposition of Verla M.

Wiley (5/24/01), J.A. 817-20; Deposition of Barry

Maughan (4/18/01), J.A. 1079, 1087-89. Appellant herself

stated that she served in a managing editor-type

position at BBG in the 1980s for a show called

. "Nightline Africa," but had to stop after she became

Vice President of Local 1812 in 1990. Deposition of

Verla M. Wiley (5/24/01), J.A. 817-18. She responded in

the affirmative when asked, “And because you had

more responsibilities as vice president of the union, you

couldn't do that and be managing editor, too?" /d. at

818. Appellant continued to hold the position of Vice

lla

President of Local 1812 in 1996 and 1997, when she

sought to be included in the managing editor rotation.

Appellant does not claim that she was illegally

discriminated against on the basis of her union

activities, nor would such a claim be cognizable under

Title VII. What is noteworthy here is that appellant

does not really contest appellee's contention that she

was too busy with her union duties to serve as

managing editor. We therefore hold that appellee

offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

appellant's nonparticipation in the managing editor

rotation and appellant failed to prove that this reason

was merely a pretext for discrimination or retaliation

proscribed by Title VII.

Third Ciaim: Retroactive Application of Annual Leave

; Policy

Appellant contends that she _ suffered unlawful

retaliation when she was retroactively charged annual

leave for attending witness depositions related to this

lawsuit. In February 2001, Ms. Wiley approached her

then-supervisor, Rebecca McMenamin, about taking

"administrative leave” -- paid leave that is not charged

against an employee's allotted annual leave -- to attend

witness depositions. McMenamin responded via email,

indicating that administrative leave was unavailable in

such circumstances. Email from Rebecca McMenamin

to Verla Wiley et al. (2/14/01), J.A. 2077. That same day,

appellant discussed the administrative leave issue with

William Ohlhausen, Deputy General Counsel for BBG.

Ohlhausen sent an email the following day indicating

that he was unable to reach a conclusion as to whether

administrative leave was authorized in Wiley's

12a

circumstances, and needed to research the issue

further. Email from William Ohlhausen to Verla Wiley

et al. (2/15/01), J.A. 61. Appellant continued attending

depositions.

On October 5, 2001, guidelines applicable to all Voice of

America employees were issued, delineating when

employees could use administrative leave in connection

with Title VII matters. Memorandum, J.A. 2113-14.

These guidelines prohibited employees from taking

official time to attend depositions other than their own.

After this policy issued, McMenamin emailed appellant

to inform her that she would be charged annual leave

for the depositions she had previously attended;

McMenamin's email noted that "[t]his policy indicates

there is no change from the guidance I first sent you on

February 14th, 2001." Email from Rebecca McMenamin

to Verla Wiley e¢ al. (10/9/01), J.A. 2125. Appellant was

subsequently charged 56 hours of annual leave for time

she spent attending depositions other than her own.

Appellant claims that BBG's decision to retroactively

charge her annual leave was unlawful retaliation. As

the District Court found, however, appellant cannot

overcome the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

BBG's decision to charge her annual leave: No statute,

regulation, or policy authorized administrative leave for

an employee in appellant's circumstances. In fact,

during the time period at issue here, neither BBG's

internal Manual of Operations nor the Negotiated

Labor Management Agreement between Local 1812

and BBG _ authorized administrative leave for

employees in appellant’s situation. BBG Manual of

Operations, J.A. 1765-68; Negotiated Labor

Management Agreement, J.A. 1764. Appellant can

13a

hardly claim retaliation when she has not shown that

she was entitled to paid leave. The October 2001

guidelines may have clarified the situation, but they did

not cause appellant to lose anything to which she was

entitled before the guidelines were issued.

Furthermore, McMenamin's February 14, 2001 email to

Ms. Wiley provided appellant with more than adequate

notice that an attempt to take such leave would likely

be unsuccessful. Appellant's decision to continue

attending depositions after receiving Ohlhausen's email

was, in the words of the District Court, "a caleulated

risk." Kemi Southey-Cole v. Kenneth Y. Tomlinson,

Civ. A. No. 99-00975 at 16 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2006). "[N]o

reasonable jury could infer retaliation from the

agency's decision to comply with existing law and

agency agreements." Id. at 22.

Fourth Claim: Retaliatory Harassment

The District Court granted appellee's motion to strike

appellant's claim for retaliatory harassment, primarily

on the grounds that it was raised for the first time in

appellant's opposition to appellee's motion for summary

judgment. This was error. The factual basis for

appellant's "new" claim was substantially similar to the

hostile work environment claim that appellant had

alleged in her original complaint, and BBG did not

demonstrate that allowing appellant's claim would

cause undue prejudice. Therefore, this claim should not

have been struck.

The real issue . . . is not whether legal theories

may be pleaded but whether the original theory

may be discarded or augmented and recovery

had on some other theory. The federal rules, and

l4a

the decisions construing them, evince a belief

that wher a party has a valid claim, he should

recover om it regardless of his counsel's failure to

perceive the true basis of the claim at the

pleading stage, provided always that a late shift

in the thrust of the case will not prejudice tne

other party in maintaining a defense upon the

merits.

5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

§ 1219 at 281-83 (8d ed. 2004) (footnote omitted); see

also Alley v. Resolution Trust Corp., 299 U.S. App.

D.C. 363, 984 F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(allowing plaintiffs to add an ERISA claim after

motions for summary judgment had been filed because

there was no prejudice to the defendant).

The District Court granted summary judgment to

appellee on appellant's hostile work environment claim,

and that judgment has not been appealed. In addition to

granting the motion to strike appellant's retaliatory

harassment claim, the District Court held, in the

alternative, that insofar as appellant's retaliatory

harassment claim was merely a variation of her prior

hostile environment claim, it lacked merit for the same

reasons that the hostile environment claim had failed.

During oral argument, appellant's counsel conceded

that Ms. Wiley could not prevail on her retaliatory

harassment claim unless she could establish that the

alleged harassment resulted in a hostile environment.

See Hussain v. Nicholson, 369 U.S. App. D.C. 247, 435

F.3d 359, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that “[iJn this

circuit, a hostile work environment can amount to

retaliatior under Title VII"). Because there is no claim

15a

here that the District Court erred in granting summary

judgment on appellant's hostile environment claim,

appellant's retaliatory harassment claim necessarily

fails as well. We therefore grant summary judgment for

appellee cn this claim.

Fifth Claim: Reduced Airtime

The District Court granted appellee's motion to strike

appellant's final claim, 2.e., that she suffered retaliation

when McMenamin reduced her airtime production from

17 minutes to 18 minutes. The District Court struck this

claim on the grounds that appellant failed to exhaust

her administrative remedies. Appellant filed an

informal complaint of discrimination, withdrew it on

August 2/, 2002, and never filed a formal complaint

specifically listing her airtime claim.

The District Court erred in striking appellant's claim,

because the reduced airtime allegation "could have

reasonably been expected to grow out of [appellant's]

earlier ccmplaint." Weber v. Battista, 377 U.S. App.

D.C. 347, 494 F.3d 179, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Hattie Baldwin, the Director

of the USIA's Office of Civil Rights, wrote to appellant

confirming that her complaints of discrimination and

retaliation had been received, acknowledged, and

consolidated. Letter from Hattie P. Baldwin to Verla

M. Wiley (5/14/98), J.A. 407-08. The complaints that

were accepted for processing included the denial of

"training for supervisory/managerial roles within the

Branch,” the denial of Wiley's "input" on "programming

and policy with regard to office procedures and

broadcasts,’ and the denial of "career advancement and

promotioral opportunities." /d. at 408. The record thus

16a

makes it clear that the airtime claim was "like or

related" to the claims of discrimination and retaliation

raised in appellant's original complaint. Weber, 494 F.3d

at 184. "Therefore, we conclude [appellant] gave [BBG]

an opportunity to resolve her claim administratively

before she filed her complaint in district court." Id. The

claim was properly before the District Court and should

not have been struck.

Although it cannot be said that appellant failed to

exhaust her administrative remedies, we nonetheless

grant judgment to appellee. The District Court

effectively dismissed appellant's claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)

states that, if, on a motion to dismiss, "matters outside

the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the

court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary

judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and

all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to

present all material made pertinent to such a motion by

Rule 56." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).! In this case, the

District Court considered "matters outside the

pleading" in granting the agency's motion to strike, and

both parties had a "reasonable opportunity to present

all material made pertinent" to the motion. The District

Court, however, did not convert what was ostensibly a

12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment.

Nonetheless, in these circumstances, this court is free

to characterize the District Court’s Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal as a grant of summary judgment under Rule

56 and affirm, so long as we are assured that both sides

had a reasonable opportunity to present evidence and

there are no genuine issues of material fact. See, e.g.,

Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety

Admin., 371 U.S. App. D.C. 422, 452 F.3d 798, 805 (D.C.

17a

Cir. 2006). Finding no merit in appellant's claim, we will

grant summary judgment to appellee.

Appellant's claim lacks merit because she failed to

establish that a reduction in airtime responsibilities

constituted a materially adverse action for the purpose

of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. As

noted above, "an employee suffers an adverse

employment action if he experiences materially adverse

consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment or future employment

opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could

find objectively tangible harm." Forkkio, 306 F.3d at

1131. Appellant offered nothing to the District Court or

to this court establishing that the reduction in her

airtime production -- from 17 minutes to 13 minutes --

couid affect her compensation, grade, or opportunity for

future advancement.

Appellant has also failed to establish that “a reasonable

employee would have found the challenged action

materially adverse, which in this context means it well

might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making

or supporting a charge of discrimination." Burlington,

126 S. Ct. at 2415 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Without such proof, there can be no finding of unlawful

retaliation. Actionable retaliation claims are limited to

those where an employer causes " material adversity,"

not "trivial harms." /d. Appellant has failed to show that

the disputed reduction in airtime production was

anything other than a trivial harm, if that.

18a

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's grant of

summary judgment to appellee with respect to

appellant's first three claims is affirmed. The District

Court's decision to strike appellant's last two claims is

reversed, and summary judgment is granted to

appellee on those claims as well.

Footnote

1Rule 12(d), which went into effect on December 1, 2007

and is titled "Result of Presenting Matters Outside the

Pleadings," states that “[iJf, on a motion under Rule

12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are

presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion

must be treated as one for summary judgment under

Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable

opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent

to the motion."

19a

10/2/2006

Civ. No. 99-975 (TFH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KEMI SOUTHEY-COLE, et al.

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

KENNETH Y. TOMLINSON, Chairman, Broadcasting

Board of Governors,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is defendant Kenneth Y.

Tomlinson's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding

plaintiff Vera Wiley's claim that the Broadcasting

Board of Governors (the "agency") retaliated against

her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 by charging her annual leave for time she spent

attending witness depositions while preparing her

employment discrimination case. The defendant argues

that judgment in the agency's favor is warranted on the

grounds that (1) the plaintiff is unable to establish a

prima facie case of retaliation because she cannot show

that she was subjected to a material injury or harm that

would dissuade a reasonable employee from making a

charge of retaliation, and (2) even if the plaintiff could

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the agency

articulated a non-retaliatory reason for its action that

the plaintiff failed to show was pretext. The Court

holds that, because the agency complied with existing

law and agency agreements when it charged the

plaintiff annual leave to attend witness depositions, the

plaintiff was not subjected to a material injury or harm

20a

and, as a result, is unable to establish all the required

elements of a retaliation claim.

Likewise, the plaintiff is unable to show that the

agency's compliance with existing law and agreements

was mere pretext for retaliation. Accordingly, the

Court will grant the defendant's motion.

BACKGROUND

The undisputed facts reveal that the plaintiff is an

African-American female who was employed as an

International Radio Broadcaster for the English to

Africa Branch of Voice of America, which is one of

several international broadeasters that comprise the

International Broadcasting Bureau, which in turn is

part of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No

Genuine Issue Par. 1, 3 [hereinafter "Undisputed Facts

Par. _”];! Wiley Dep. 5:21-23. The Broadcasting Board

of Governors is an independent federal agency

responsible for all non-military international

broadcasting sponsored by the United States

government. About the BBG, http://www.bbg.gov/bbg

aboutus.cfm. At the time of the events at issue, the

plaintiff had an employment discrimination case

pending against the agency in this court.

During all times relevant here, the agency was subject

to compliance with a Negotiated Labor Management

Agreement between the United States Information

Agency and the American Federation of Government

Employees, Local 1812 (AFL-CIO). The plaintiff was

the Vice President for Voice of America union members

and acted as a union representative for employees

Z2la

engaged in proceedings at the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Wiley Dep. 7:10-

18:16. Article 24 of the Negotiated Labor Management

Agreement contained provisions relating to leave. Pl.'s

Mem. In Opp'n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 26B,

Negotiated Labor Management Agreement Art. 24

[hereinafter "Pl.'s Opp'n Br. "|. Section 8 of that

Article addressed "court leave' and stated that such

leave was available when an employee was summoned

to appear as a witness or juror on behalf of the federal

government. Id. § 8. That section expressly stated,

however, that "[c] ourt leave is not available when the

service is strictly on behalf of a private party - it must

be on behalf of a government." Id. Furthermore,

Section 8 mandated that an employee submit a copy of

the summons in advance to his or her superviscr. Id. In

addition, Section 10 of Article 24 authorized excused

absences, also referred to as administrative leave, but

directed that an excused absence "must be approved by

the supervisor" and cited blood donation, voting, and

unavoidable absences not to exceed one hour as

examples of "common excused absences." Id. § 10.

The agency also had in place a Manual of Operations

and Administration ("MOA") that contained similar

provisions relating to "court leave," which was

available to employees summoned to appear in a

judicial proceeding on behalf of the federal government,

when testifying in an official capacity, when appearing

as a witness in a judicial proceeding involving the

federal government as a party, when appearing as a

juror, or when appearing to qualify for jury service.

Pl.'s Opp'n Br. Ex. 26B, MOA § 671. Similar to the

Negotiated Labor Management Agreement, the MOA

also required employees to submit a copy of the

22a

summons before court leave may be granted. Id. § 675.

The agency also was subject to compliance with Title V

of the United States Code, Section 6322 of which

governs leave for jury or witness service. 5 U.S.C. §

6322 (2001).: That statute permits employees to take

leave without loss of pay or annual leave when

summoned to serve as a juror or as a witness in a

judicial proceeding for which the federal government is

a party, amony other authorized occasions not relevant

here. Id.

In February 2001, the plaintiff approached her

supervisor, Rebecca McMenamin, and stated that it was

her understanding that she was permitted to take

administrative leave to attend witness depositions in

her employment discrimination case. Undisputed Facts

Par. 7; McMenamin Dep. 22:13-23:5. McMenamin told

the plaintiff that she would look into the matter.

Undisputed Facts Par. 7; McMenamin Dep. 22:13-23:5.

On February 14, 2001, McMenamin sent an e-mail to

Donna Grace, a Labor Relation Specialist in the Office

of Personnel, seeking guidance about whether the

plaintiff was authorized to take administrative leave to

attend witness depositions. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 4 Par. 2;

Undisputed Facts Par. 7; McMenamin Dep. 23:3-5;

Grace Dep. 15:5-9. Grace responded to McMenamin's

inquiry that same day and advised her that:

There is such a thing as "court leave," which is a

form of admin leave and would not be charged

against an employee. However, it cannot be used

to work on one's own court case. Court leave is

for when you are required to serve jury duty or

when you are summoned to testify for an Agency

in an official capacity. If Verla ... [is] working on

23a

[her] own case, it's personal business and must

be charged as annual leave, scheduled in

advance, and approved by the supervisor for a

time when it does not interfere with work. It

most definitely is nul court leave or any other

form of administrative leave.

Pl.'s Opp'n Br. Ex. 7 (E-mail from Grace to McMenamin

of 2/14/01).2 Twenty minutes after receiving Grace's

response, McMenamin sent the following e-mail to the

plaintiff and two other individuals explaining that

administrative leave was not authorized to attend

witness depositions:

I understand there is some confusion about what

qualifies as administrative leave, regarding time

needed to pursue legal business. As explained to

me by the Personnel Office today:

There is such a thing as "court leave," which is a

form of admin leave and would not be charged

against an employee. However, it cannot be used

to work on one's own court case. Court leave is

for when you are required to serve jury duty or

when you are summoned to testify for an Agency

in an official capacity.

If you are working on your own court case, then

it is viewed as personal business and must be

charged as annual leave, scheduled in advance,

and does not interfere with work [sic].

Id. at Ex. 8 (E-mail from McMenamin to Abedje,

Southey-Cole and Wiley of 2/14/01). The plaintiff

acknowledged in an affidavit that "[m]y supervisor,

24a

after consulting with Labor Relations Specialist Donna

Grace, informed me on February 14 _~ that

[administrative] leave was not authorized." Def.'’s Br.

Ex. 1(A2).

That same day, the plaintiff attended a witness

deposition at which Deputy General Counsel William

Ohlhausen was present. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 4 Par. 3; Wiley

Dep. 26:15; Ohlhausen Dep. 7:4-15; Undisputed Facts

Par. 11. The plaintiff asked Ohlhausen whether she was.

allowed to take administrative leave to attend witness

depositions in her case. PI's Opp'n Br. 4 Par. 3; Wiley

Dep. 27:3-17; Undisputed Facts Par. 15. The parties

dispute what Ohlhausen told the plaintiff. During a

deposition, Ohlhausen testified that he told the plaintiff

he was uncertain about whether administrative leave

was authorized for the purpose of attending witness

depositions and would research the issue. Ohlhausen

Dep. 7:21-8:2; Undisputed Facts Par. 12. The plaintiff

claims that Ohlhausen told her "she could take official

time to attend the depositions." Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 4 Par. 3;

Wiley Dep. 28:21-22. Regardless of what Ohlhausen told

the plaintiff at the deposition, it is undisputed that the

very next day he made clear his uncertainty about

whether administrative leave was authorized to attend

witness depositions when he sent the plaintiff and

several other agency officials an e-mail stating:

Ms. Wiley asked me about the taking of official

leave to take part in EEOC proceedings,

specifically the attendance at depositions. I did a

little research yesterday and I am forwarding to

all of you the EEOC's regulation on this

subject.... The regulation ... does not specifically

address the issue of complainants attending

25a

depositions and document productions. | am

sending this email to Delia Johnson to see if her

office has issued any policy statements on this.

After I have an opportunity to discuss this

further with Delia and do more research on the

question, I wili get back to all of you with a more

definitive opinion.

Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 5 Par. 4 ("Mr. Ohlhausen followed up on

Ms. Wiley's query regarding the use of official time for

attending depositions with an e-mail dated February

15, 2001 wherein he indicated that he needed to do more

research and that he would provide additional guidance

after doing so."), Ex. 11 (E-mail from Ohlhausen to

Wiley, Southey-Cole, Johnson, Dillard and

McMenamin); Wiley Dep. 36:16-21 (indicating that she

notified McMenamin about Ohlhausen's uncertainty

regarding the administrative leave policy); Undisputed

_Facts Par. 13. Indeed, during her own deposition the

plaintiff acknowledged that Ohlhausen was uncertain

about the issue and said that "he'll get back to us on

this." Wiley Dep. 36:22-23.

After receiving both McMenamin's and Qhlhausen's e-

mails, the plaintiff had another conversation with

McMenamin during which she’ expressed her

disagreement with McMenamin's position that she was

not entitled to take administrative leave to attend

witness depositions. Wiley Dep. 36:15-21; Undisputed

Facts Par. 14; McMenamin Dep. 25:17-21. The plaintiff

referred McMenamin to Ohlhausen's e-mail and noted

that Ohlhausen planned to offer his analysis of the issue

at a later date. Wiley Dep. 36:22-23 (stating that she let

McMenamin "know that he is saying he'll get back to us

on this"). According to the plaintiff, McMenamin agreed

26a

making a final decision about whether the plaintiff was

entitled to take administrative leave to attend witness

depositions. Wiley Dep. 36:23-24. The plaintiff engaged

in no further discussions with her supervisor about

whether administrative leave was authorized for

witness depositions, which she continued to attend.

Wiley Dep. 38:8-11; Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 6 Par. 7. Instead, the

plaintiff simply waited for Ohlhausen's decision. Wiley

Dep. 3 8:6-7.

At some point before October 5, 2001, however, the

plaintiff met with Jack Welch, who at that time was the

Director of Human Resources. Wiley Dep. 39:6-40:6;

Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 5 (Welch Decl. Par. 1).

According to the plaintiff, when she asked Welch about

the leave issue he told her that he was "sure" she would

be charged annual leave for the time she spent

attending witness depositions. Wiley Dep. 39:9-11.

On October 5, 2001, the agency's Office of Civil Rights

forwarded a memorandum addressed to all employees

that was titled "Guidelines for Complainants and

Managers Regarding Use of Official Time to Participate

in Proceedings Before the OCR, the EEOC or the

Federal Courts." Pl's Opp'n Br. Ex. 1. The

memorandum's stated purpose was to "provide

guidance to employees concerning existing agency

policy regarding the use of official time (also referred to

as Official leave' or ‘administrative leave’) in

proceedings alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act, the Equal Pay Act, or the Rehabilitation Act." Id.

The memorandum distinguished between cases pending

before the agency's Office of Civil Rights or the EEOC

27a

With regard to cases pending before federal district

courts, the memorandum stated that:

An employee who is a plaintiff in the lawsuit q

shall be granted official leave when being a

deposed by the agency. If there are multiple yy

plaintiffs in the lawsuit, an employee/plaintiff is E

entitled to official leave to attend only his or her a

own deposition, but not those of the other a

plaintiffs or of non-party witnesses. 4

Id. Although the memorandum was addressed from the

Office of Civil Rights, it is uncontested that it was

drafted by Chlhausen. Undisputed Facts Par. 17.

Four days after the memorandum was circulated,

McMenamin sent an e-mail to the plaintiff notifying the

plaintiff that she would be charged annual leave for the

time she spent attending witness depositions. PI.'s

Opp'n Br. Ex. 16. McMenamin's e-mail stated:

The Office of Civil Rights has issued a statement

clarifying agency policy regarding the use of

leave in retaliation to legal matters. This policy

indicates there is no change from the guidance I

first sent you on February 14, 2001. In brief, it

reiterates that, if you are working on your own

court case, it is personal business and must be

charged as annual leave, scheduled in advance,

and approved by the supervisor for a time when

it does not interfere with work. The only

exception to the use of annual leave is when an

employee is being deposed. In that case, the

employee would be given administrative leave to

28a

attand tho danacitinan

We now must correct your time and attendance

record to reflect the times you were out of the

office. I will drop off for you a list detailing the

days that you attended depositions. Please

review the days/times listed to ensure they are

correct. I also will pass a copy of the list on to

Nikki so t at she may make the proper

adjustments.

Id.

In the ensuing days, several communications were

exchanged between agency officials relating to whether

Delia Johnson, the Director of the Office of Civil Rights,

thought that the memorandum circulated on October 5,

2001, constituted a new policy. Pl's Opp'n Br. 9 at Pars.

1719, 25, 33, Exs. 3-5,11,17, 20-21. Johnson stated

during a November 8, 2005, deposition that she

considered the memorandum to be a new policy

because, at that time, her office did not have a written

internal policy dealing with employment discrimination

cases pending in a federal district court.‘ Pl.'s Opp'n Br.

Ex. 15 (Johnson Dep. 13:3-12 (11/8/05)). Johnson

attributed the lack of an internal written policy to the

fact that the Office of Civil Rights "[was] responsible

for cases doing the administrative procedures and not

once they got to the court level." Id. During a

subsequent deposition on January 25, 2006, Johnson

further confirmed that she had no "jurisdiction" over

employment discrimination cases pending in a federal

district court; therefore, "[aJny decisions made at that

time are made through either the Office of General

Counsel, the HR office, and not with - not through my

29a

office." JIhnson Dep. 34: 9-14 (1/25/06). An October 12,

2001, e-mail trom Uohnson to General Counsé! Carol

Booker and Office of Personnel Director Jack Welch

indicates that she was concerned that "management

and/or [the General Counsel] should have given notice

to the cormplainants that the leave usage was not

permissible." Pl.'s Opp'n Br. Ex. 4. Later, however,

after receiving an e-mail from Booker explaining the

chronology of events and the fact that McMenamin told

the plaintiff on February 14, 2001, that she could not

take administrative leave to attend witness depositions,

Johnson acknowledged that if McMenamin "gave

appropriate notice regarding the leave policy, she

should proceed to handle the matter as advised by [the

Office of General Counsel]." Pl.'s Opp'n Br. Ex. 17.

Johnson nevertheless expressed her concern that the

agency should have been charging the plaintiff leave

beginning in February, when the plaintiff's supervisor

first notified the plaintiff that administrative leave was

not authorized to attend witness depositions. Id. After

further explanation in an October 16, 2001, e-mail in

which Booker stated that "[t]he affected employees are

not losing anything they would otherwise have a right

to, as it turns out that there is no Title VII exception to

the policy in the MOA, which we would gladly have

reported had we found one," Johnson responded "Great!

I am happy that we can move on and [McMenamin] is

able to proceed with the advice from your office." E-

mail from Johnson to Booker with copies to West,

Ohlhausen, Welch and McMenamin of 10/16/01.

On October 24, 2001, the plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a

Notification of Additional Acts of Reprisal or Related

Occurrences in which she first asserted that the agency

was retaliating against her by charging her annual

Sig

30a

leave for the time she spent attending witness

depositions. ‘That allegation subsequently was

consolidated into her employment discrimination

lawsuit pending before this Court, for which she has

‘legal representation. On May 31, 2006, the defendant

filed the Motion for Summary Judgment that is now at

issue.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

"Summary judgment is appropriate only if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to _ interrogatories,

admissions, and affidavits filed pursuant to discovery

show that, first, ‘there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact’ and, second, ‘the moving party is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law.”’ Holcomb v. Powell,

433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Rule 56(c) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)). When

determining whether a genuine issue of material fact

exists, the Court must consider the evidence in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party without

deciding its weight or credibility; however, the Court

need not give credence to the nonmoving party's

conclusory allegations that lack factual support in the

record. Id.; District Intown Props. Ltd. v. District of

Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 878 (D.C. Cir.1999) ("In

deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material

fact, the court must assume the truth of all statements

proffered by the non-movant except for conclusory

allegations lacking any factual basis in the record.").

Moreover, to defeat summary judgment, it is

insufficient for the nonmoving party to point out

sla

disputed facts that are immaterial or fail to raise

genuine issues. Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895. As the D.C.

Circuit has explained:

"The mere existence of some alleged factual

dispute between the parties" will not defeat

summary judgment; "the requirement is that

there be no genuine issue of material fact." A fact

is "material” if a dispute over it might affect the

outcome of a suit under governing law; factual

disputes that are "irrelevant or unnecessary" do

not affect the summary judgment determination.

An issue is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party." If there are no genuine issues

of material fact, the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law if the nonmoving

party "fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to

that party's case, and one on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial."

Id. Gnternal citations omitted). "Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to

find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue

for trial."' Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted).

II. Whether the Plaintiff Established a Prima Facie

Case of Retaliation

The legal question in this case is whether the agency's

decision to charge the plaintiff annual leave for time she

spent attending witness depositions rises to the level of

actionable retaliation. Both parties agree that a

32a

retaliation claim is subject to the same burden-shifting

standard as employment discrimination claims. Mem. of

P. & A. In Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 9

("Evaluation of a Title VII retaliation claims follows the

same burden-shifting template as a discrimination

claim.") {hereinafter "Def.'s Br. "J; Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 15-

16 ("Evaluation of Title VII retaliation claims follows

the same burden-shifting template as discrimination

claims."); see also Cones v. Shalala,199 F.3d 512, 520

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that the "burden-

shifting mechanism" applies to a court's evaluation of a

retaliation claim). Both parties therefore agree that the

analysis of the issue must proceed according to the

following scheme:

(1) The plaintiff must first establish a prima

facie case of retaliation.

(2) If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie

case of retaliation, then the burden of production

shifts to the agency to proffer evidence of a

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions.

(3) If the agency articulates a legitimate, non-

retaliatory reason for its actions, the burden of

production shifts back to the plaintiff to proffer

evidence that the agency's non-retaliatory

reason for its actions is pretext.

Def.'s Br. 9; Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 16; Cones, 199 F.3d at 520.

To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, the

plaintiff must establish that she engaged in a

statutorily protected activity, the employer took an

adverse employment action, and a causal connection

existed between the two. Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d

1127,1131(D.C. Cir. 2002). The government concedes

that the plaintiff was engaged in a statutorily protected

33a

activity at the time she was charged annual leave for

attending witness depositions. Def.'s Br. 9 (Here,

plaintiff was engaged in protected activity at the time

of the alleged retaliatory action."). The government

argues, however, that the plaintiff is unable to meet her

burden of showing that the agency took an adverse

employment action against her. Id. at 10.

The Supreme Court recently considered the contours of

the legal standard to establish an adverse employment

action in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,

548 U.S. ,126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006). In Burlington, the

Supreme Court considered (1) "whether Title VII's

antiretaliation provision forbids only those employer

actions and resuiting harms that are related to

employment or the workplace” and (2) "how harmful an

act of retaliatory discrimination must be in order to fall

within the provision's scope." Burlington, 126 S.Ct. at

2411. After first determining that "the scope of the anti-

retaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related

or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm,” the

Supreme Court went on to observe that "[t]he anti-

retaliation provision protects an individual not from all

retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury

or harm." Id. at 2414. The Supreme Court ultimately

held that, to be an actionable injury or harm, the

plaintiff "must show that a reasonable employee would

have found the challenged action materially adverse,

which in this context means it well might have

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or

supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 2415

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The

Supreme Court explained:

We speak of material adversity because we

34a

believe it is important to separate significant

from trivial harms. Title VII, we have said, does

not set forth "a general civility code for the

American workplace." An employee's decision to

report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize

that employee from those petty slights or minor

annoyances that often take place at work and

that all employees experience." The anti-

retaliation provision seeks to prevent employer

interference with “unfettered access" to Title

VIPs remedial mechanisms. It does so by

prohibiting employer actions that are likely "to

deter victims of discrimination from complaining

to the EEOC,” the courts, and their employers.

And normally petty slights, minor annoyances,

and simple lack of good manners will not create

such deterrence.

Id. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court further

stated that "the significance of any given act of

retaliation will often depend upon the particular

circumstances." Id. As the Supreme Court emphasized:

"Context matters." Id.

Accordingly, the question is whether the plaintiff can

meet her burden of showing that the agency took a

materially adverse employment action against her, as

measured by whether the agency's decision to charge

her annual leave for time she spent attending witness

depositions might have dissuaded a_ reasonable

employee from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination. Even when viewed in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff, who is the nonmoving party,

the Court is unpersuaded that the evidence shows the

plaintiff was subjected to a materially adverse action.

35a

The crux of the plaintiff's retaliation claim is that, after

Deputy General Counsel William Ohlhausen told the

plaintiff that she could take administrative leave, the

agency engaged in an effort to develop a new policy

over a period of several months that retroactively

stripped the plaintiff of the right to use such leave

notwithstanding the fact that agency officials knew the

plaintiff was taking administrative leave to attend

witness depositions and failed to notify her that she

would be charged annua! leave for that time. Pl.'s Opp'n

Br. |. The problem with the plaintiff's argument is that

its viability depends on the fact finder ignoring the

undisputed evidence that the plaintiffs supervisor told

her on February 14, 2001, that “[iJf you are working on

your own court case, then it is viewed as personal

business and must be charged as annual leave,

scheduled in advance, and approved by the supervisor

for a time when it does not interfere with work." Pl.'s

Opp'n Br. Ex. 8. Thus, on February 14, 2001, the

plaintiff's request to take administrative leave was

denied by her supervisor. The fact that the plaintiff

disputed that determination or was not apprised of the

actual legal basis for it does not eviscerate its effect of

putting her on notice that she would be charged annual

leave for time spent attending witness depositions. »

Moreover, it is immaterial whether, that same day,

Ohlhausen in fact told the plaintiff that she could take

administrative leave. Ohlhausen was not the plaintiff's

supervisor and it is undisputed that the very next day

he sent the plaintiff an e-mail making it clear that he

was uncertain whether administrative leave was

authorized and planned to research the issue further.

Id. at Ex. 11(e-mail from Ohlhausen to Wiley and

Southey-Cole with copies to Johnson, Dillard and

36a

McMenamin of 2/15/01); Wiley Dep. 36:15-24. As a

result, at that point, the plaintiff was notified that

whatever Ohlhausen told her the previous day might

have been in error and should not be relied upon.”

After receiving Ohlhausen's e-mail stating that he

would research whether the plaintiff was entitled to

take administrative leave to attend witness depositions,

the plaintiff contends that she discussed the matter

further with McMenamin and McMenamin “agreed that

she would wait until [Ohlhausen] got back for the final

decision on the leave issue." Wiley Dep. 36:23-24. There

is no evidence that McMenamin's decision to wait

several months before charging the plaintiff annual

leave for the time she spent attending depositions was

anything other than an accommodation to the plaintiff

in response to the plaintiffs contention that the

decision to deny administrative leave was incorrect and

any final decision should await Ohlhausen's analysis.

Pl.'s Opp'n Br. Ex. 14 (McMenamin declaring that she

"did not want to appear to be harassing anyone about a

matter over which [she] was in some doubt" so she

"agreed to wait until the matter was checked out

further before making a final decision on leave"); Wiley

Dep. 36:15-24. The plaintiff took a calculated risk when

she continued to attend witness depositions in the

hopes that Ohlhausen's legal analysis would confirm her

assertion that McMenamin's. decision denying

administrative leave was incorrect.

Significantly, the plaintiff has never disputed that, at

the time she first requested administrative leave from

her supervisor on February 14, 2001, no such leave was

authorized by the applicable law, rules or agency

agreements, namely 5 U.S.C. § 6322, the Negotiated

37a

Labor Management Agreement, or the MOA. It is

notable that the Negotiated Labor Management

Agreement, with which the plaintiff likely was familiar

as a union representative, explicitly prohibited the use

of court leave “when the service is strictly on behalf of a

private party" and not on behalf of the government, as

was the case when the plaintiff attended witness

depositions in her pending employment discriminaticn

case. Negotiated Labor Management Agreement, Art.

24 § 8. That Agreement also made clear that

administrative leave “must be approved by the

supervisor." Id. at Art. 24 § 10.

Similarly, the MOA permitted court leave only for

certain specified activities that did not include

attending witness depositions on behalf of a private

party. Consequently, the plaintiffs supervisor acted

entirely consistent with the Negotiated Labor

Agreement and MOA when she followed the Office of

Personnel's guidance and advised the plaintiff that she

was not entitled to administrative leave so any time

spent attending witness depositions "must be charged

as annual leave, scheduled in advance...." Pl.'s Opp'n Br.

Ex. 8 (E-mail from McMenamin to Abedje, Southey-

Cole and Wiley of 2/14/01).

From this vantage point, which is one the plaintiff

entirely overlooks in favor of looking backward from

the date the October memorandum was circulated, the

facts of this case appear to be similar to those in Moore

v. Summers, 113 F. Supp.2d 5, 28-29 (D.D.C. 2000), in

which our colleague on this court rejected Secret

Service agents’ claims that they were retaliated against

when they were "denied paid administrative leave to

attend the deposition of the Secret Service agency

FE eR INO ae a

Tok 00 ek ea

38a

designee" in a federal employment discrimination case.

In that case, the court noted that "[als courts within

this Circuit and elsewhere have recognized, ‘there is no

express provision in Title VII or its regulations

granting an employee the right to administrative leave

for judicial proceedings."' Id. (citing Shelhorne v.

Runyon, No. 95-0641,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13583, at

*51(D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1997)). The court went on to state

that “[aldherence to an established agency policy

regarding administrative leave also goes a long way in

rebutting any inference of discrimination or retaliation

that might otherwise be drawn from the denial of paid

leave." Id. at 29. Here, McMenamin's original

determination denying the plaintiffs request for

administrative leave complied with the existing

Negotiated Labor Management Agreement and MOA.

The plaintiff, therefore, was unharmed by her

supervisor's decision to deny administivative leave

given that the plaintiff was not entitled to such leave

and no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise based

on the applicable law and agency agreements.

Notwithstanding the plaintiffs characterization of the

October 5, 2001, memorandum as a “new" policy, the

fact of the matter is that when the memorandum was

circulated by the Office of Civil Rights it summarized

existing law and agency agreements and was consistent

with McMenamin's original determination that the

plaintiff was not entitled to administrative leave and

should be charged annual leave for attending witness

depositions. Hence, after the October 5, 2001,

memorandum was circulated, McMenamin sent the

plaintiff an e-mail stating that the memorandum

"indicates there is no change from the guidance I first

sent to you on February 14, 2001." Pl.'s Opp'n Br. Ex.

h

3

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.

U

a

:

3"

‘4

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39a

16 (E-mail from McMenamin to Wiley with copies to

Dillard and McMenamin of 10/9/01). Although the

plaintiff takes issue with the fact that the agency

waited until after the October memorandum was

circulated to actually charge her annual leave,‘ that was

a gamble the plaintiff took when she elected to continue

attending witness depositions knowing that her

supervisor had denied her request for administrative

leave and was simply waiting for verification from

Ohlhausen that her decision was correct. The gamble

might have paid off if Ohlhausen's research ultimately

revealed legal authority to grant an employee

administrative leave to attend witness depositions. In

the final analysis, however, it did not.

The plaintiff makes much of what she describes as the

“eruption" of a "significant debate" about whether the

October 5, 2001, memorandum constituted "new" policy

that was being applied to the plaintiff retroactively.

Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 2, 24-25. Even viewing the evidence in a

light most favorable to the plaintiff, the so-called

"debate" really involved a single official, Delia Johnson,

who was the Director of the Office oi Civil Rights and

whose confusion appears to be the result of (1) her lack

of knowledge about the fact that the plaintiff's

supervisor denied the plaintiffs request for

administrative leave to attend witness depositions from

the outset and (2) her lack of knowledge about the

existing law and provisions of the Negotiated Labor

Management Agreement that applied once a complaint

was filed in a federal] district court, at which point

Johnson no longer had "jurisdiction" over the matter.

Ms. Johnson's confusion in either circumstance does not

change the fact that 5 U.S.C. § 6322, the Negotiated

Labor Management Agreement, and the MOA were in

40a

place at the time the plaintiff originally requested

administrative leave and her supervisor's decision to

deny the requested leave complied with that law and

agreement - as did the October 5, 2001, memorandum.

Having considered the facts in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff, this Court is of the view that there are

no materia] facts in dispute’ and the evidence supports

the conclusion that no reasonable jury would find the

decision to charge the plaintiff annual leave for time she

spent attending witness depositions to be materially

adverse. The existing law, rules and agreements made

clear that administrative leave was not available for the

purpose the plaintiff sought, and the October 5, 2001,

memorandum did not change that fact. There also is no

evidence that any other employee was ever granted

administrative leave - or not charged annual leave -

under similar circumstances. Consequently, because no

employee was authorized to take administrative leave

to attend witness depositions in an employment

discrimination case pending before a federal district

court, no employee would have been injured or harmed

by the agency's refusal to grant administrative leave

and the corollary decision to charge annual leave for

such time. Thus, the agency's decision to deny

administrative leave in this case would not dissuade a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge

of discrimination. Because the decision to charge the

plaintiff annual leave for the time she spent attending

witness depositions complied with existing law, rules

and agreements, the plaintiff suffered no injury or harm

that rose to the level of a materially adverse

employment action. As a result, the plaintiff is unable to

establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

dla

IIl. Whether the Plaintiff Rebutted the Agency's

Legitimate, Non-retaliatory Reason for Denying

Administrative Leave

For essentially the same reasons the plaintiff is unable

to show that she was subjected to a materially adverse

employment action, she also is unable to show that the

agency's nonretaliatory reason for charging her annual

leave for the time she spent attending witness

depositions was pretext. The agency has argued, and

the undisputed evidence shows, that when the

plaintiffs supervisor originally denied the plaintiff's

request to take administrative leave to attend witness

depositions, she did so in compliance with 5 U.S.C. §

6322, the Negotiated Labor Management Agreement,

and the MOA. Likewise, the agency's October 5, 2001,

memorandum confirming that administrative leave was

not authorized to attend witness depositions complied

with the same law and agreement. Thus, the agency

satisfied its burden of producing evidence of a

legitimate nondiscrimonatory reason for charging the

plaintiff annual leave for attending witness depositions.

Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

256 (1981) (stating that an employer meets its burden

by explaining what it did or producing evidence of

legitimate non-retaliatory reasons).

The plaintiff, however, proffered no evidence indicating

that the agency's reason was pretext, such as evidence

that 5 U.S.C. § 6322, the Negotiated Labor

Management Agreement, and the MOA were not in

existence at the time the plaintiff was attending

witness depositions, that some other law or agreements

affirmatively granted employees the right to

administrative leave to attend witness depositions, or

42a

that other employees were granted administrative

leave or not charged annual leave in like circumstances.

Instead, the plaintiff simply put forth the argument

that Ohlhausen initially "instructed" her to take

administrative leave, a fact that is in dispute but

immaterial in light of Ohlhausen's February 15, 2001, e-

mail; a conclusory argument that “no specific policy

governing the use of official time to attend depositions

of witnesses and co-parties existed as of February

2001," which is contradicted by 5 U.S.C. $ 6322, the

Negotiated Labor Management Agreement, and the

MOA; and the plaintiffs assertion that the agency

attempted to conceal discovery documents relating to

an internal debate among agency officials about the

import of the October 5, 2001, memorandum, which she

believes is "persuasive circumstantial evidence that the

true reason behind the Agency's actions was retaliatory

animus." Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 21-25. None of the plaintiffs

arguments “suffice[s] to establish a dispute substantial

enough to withstand the motion for summary

judgment." Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532

U.S. 268, 274 (2001). Because the undisputed evidence

in the record conclusively reveals a non-retaliatory

reason for the agency's decision to charge the plaintiff

annual leave for attending witness depositions, namely

that it did so in compliance with existing law and

agency agreements, and the plaintiff has failed to

present sufficient evidence to discredit the agency's

non-retaliatory reason, no reasonable jury could infer

retaliation from the agency's decision to comply with

existing law and agency agreements. See Samii v.

Billington,195 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Once an

employer articulates a legitimate, [non-retaliatory]

reason for the challenged employment decision, the

employer prevails unless the employee succeeds in

43a

discrediting the employer's explanation.").

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court will grant

the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. An

appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum

Opinion.

Thomas F. Hogan Chief Judge

October 2, 2006

Footnotes

1Pursuant to Rule 7(h) of the Civil Rules of the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia, the

defendant filed a Statement of Material Facts as to

Which There is No Genuine Issue. The plaintiff filed no

objéctions to the defendant's Statement of Material

Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue, so the

Court will deem those facts to be conceded by both

parties. In accordance with the same rule, the plaintiff

incorporated a Statement of Genuine Issues of Material

Facts in Dispute into her legal brief filed in opposition

to the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, to

which the defendant objected.

2Throughout the pleadings and documentary evidence

the term “administrative leave" is referred to

interchangeably with the terms “official leave" and

“court leave." Accordingly, when the Court refers to

"adtministrative lea" in this opinion, that term should

be Understood to mean paid leave that is not charged to

an employee's annual leave and encompasses both

“official leave" and “court leave.”

44a

3Grace later stated that her e-mail to McMenamin

"provided ... the substance of the provisions in the

Manual of Administration (MOA) and the Negotiated

LaborManagement Agreement which specified the

circumstances when administrative leave is authorized."

Def.'s Br. Ex. I (F2).

4There is evidence in the record indicating that some

agency officials were confused about, or unaware of, the

differences between the rules and regulations that

apply to employment discrimination cases pending at

the administrative level before the agency's Office of

Civil Rights or the EEOC, versus employment

discrimination cases pending in a federal district court.

See McMenamin Dep. 27:17-28:12; Grace Dep. 34:6-

35:10; Johnson Dep. 13:38-2.

SIt also is noteworthy that the plaintiff claimed that,

after reportedly being told by Ohlhausen that she could

take administrative leave, she "felt [she] had complied

with the rules set out in EEOC MD 110 Chapter 6,

Section 15 paragraph c (1), which states that the

complainant and the Agency should arrive at a mutual

understanding as to the amount of official time to be

used prior to the complainant's use of time." Def.'s

Mem. Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 1 (Rebuttal

Statement of Verla Wiley). Setting aside the fact that

Ohlhausen fairly immediately apprised the plaintiff that

he was unsure whether she was entitled to

administrative leave and would research the issue

further, the Court observes that the record is devoid of

any evidence whatsoever that the plaintiff ever actually

arrived at a "mutual understanding” with any agency

official, including Ohlhausen, about "the amount of

official time to be used." To the contrary, the evidence

1g Bela na Satan

Me

45a

shows that the plaintiff left the office at will to attend

witness depositions without any agreement with

agency officials about the number of hours of leave, of

any kind, she was permitted to take to attend such

depositions.

6During the hearing held by the Court on August 25,

2006, the plaintiff argued that she was not necessarily

disputing that she might not be _ entitled to

administrative leave under the existing Negotiated

Labor Management Agreement or MOA, but

nevertheless challenged the agency's retroactive

deduction from her annual leave time she spent

attending witness depositions. The Court does not

follow the plaintiff's logic, however. If the agency failed

to charge her annual leave for the time she spent

attending witness depositions, that would have been

tantamount to granting her request for administrative

leave since the result would have been the same - she

would have been paid for the time spent attending

witness depositions without an adverse impact to her

annual leave. As the Court previously observed,

however, the Negotiated Labor Management

Agreement mandated that such leave "must be

approved by the supervisor," which did not happen

here.

The record also shows that, despite the plaintiff's claim

that Ohlhausen "instructed" (PI.'s Br. 6 at Par. 7) her to

take administrative leave to attend witness depositions,

and she reportedly did take such leave (id. at Par. 7 ),

she did not document the leave as such on her time

records or sign-out sheets. Grace Dep. 46:6-48:14; Def.'s

Br. Exs. 1(F2) (Grace Aff. ), 1 (G2) (time records

reflecting how the plaintiffs time was recorded during

46a

the period at issue), 4 (Booker Decl. Par. 9), 4B (E-mail

from Booker to Welch of 10/26/01). This evidence was

never challenged by the plaintiff; however, the plaintiff

asserts that it is a disputed question of fact whether

agency employees were required to document

administrative leave, or did so as a matter of practice.

Pl.'s Br. Pars. 34-35. The Court does not find this

disputed fact to be material because it goes to the

question of the plaintiffs credibility, which the Court

will not consider for the purpose of resolving the

pending motion. See District Intown Props. Ltd., 198

F.3d at 878.

7The plaintiff identified a number of facts that she

argues are material and in dispute. Pl.'s Br. 3-14. Many

of the purportedly disputed facts, however, actually

appear to be in agreement between the parties. See

Response to PI.'s State. of Genuine Issues. Of the

remaining facts, to the extent not otherwise discussed

in this Memorandum Opinion, the Court found the facts

to be immaterial and inconsequential to the

determination of whether the plaintiff was retaliated

against when the agency charged her annual leave for

attending witness depositions.

47a

No. 06-5402

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

VERLA M. WILEY,

APPELLANT

v.

JAMES K. GLASSMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE

BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS,

APPELLEE

March 12, 2008, Filed

JUDGES: BEFORE: Sentelle, Chief Judge, and

Ginsburg, Henderson, Randolph, Rogers, Tatel,

Garland, Brown, Griffith, and Kavanaugh, Circuit

Judges, and Edwards, Senior Circuit Judge.

ORDER

Upon consideration of appellant's petition for rehearing

en banc, and the absence of a request by any member of

the court for a vote, it is"

ORDERED that the petition be denied.

Per Curiam ae

IRE GENT RTOS ES ee RR

Se EE PRS Nn PO od SER ey. PS OR ee ES Cy Se ee nas SmeIE EET eS he AAS ee Me eT ee RO Pn BEET pe ae aed ect a Ge aR Re ee

a te a ght ~ Nee ha Na Pe RE NM eee MANA E pa Puerta Der a fe ee Ce

48a

No. 06-5402

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

VERLAM WILEY,

APPE! LANT

v.

JAMES K. GLASSMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE

BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS,

APPELLEE

JUDGES: BEFORE: Brown and Griffith, Circuit

Judges, and Edwards, Senior Circuit Judge.

ORDER

Upon consideration of appellant's petition for rehearing

filed January 28, 2008, and the response thereto, it is

ORDERED that the petition be denied.

Per Curiam

PRE TNR Re Bi. a So a Nae sale ky tii a eeu ae

49a

Filed 52/6/04

Civ. No. 99-975 (TFH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KEMI SOUTHEY-COLE, et al.

Plaintiffs,

3 Vv.

KENNETH Y. TOMLINSON, Chairman, Broadcasting

Board of Governors,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This above-captioned case was referred to the

undersigned by the trial court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.3(a) for a Report and

Recommendation on Defendant's Partial Motion to

Dismiss or for Summary Judgment ("Motion") [70];

Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs

Opposition ("Motion to Strike") [ 131 ]; and Defendant's

Motion to Strike Some Exhibits ("Motion to Strike

Exhibits") [132]. The undersigned held a hearing on all

three motions on October 23, 2003.'

Plaintiff, Verla Wiley ("Wiley" or "Plaintiff

initiated this action on April 16, 1999, alleging that her

employer, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (the

"Agency" or "Defendant") discriminated against her in

terms of training, evaluations, and promotion

opportunities because of her gender and race.’ Plaintiff

claims that her’ supervisor, Barry Maughan

("Maughan”), "denied Ms. Wiley's several requests for

promotion to the GS-13 level in late 1997 and early

1998; he denied her on the job training for the managing

editor position in 1997; and he saw to it that Ms. Wiley

Sag SRR RR IL Oe

RRC e

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Ps ~~ ee Se OTR ee te ee eo

AGE PTA PRA figs ET ES ETT POE FRO MERE PS BTS PIRI | SE a NER Tere

ae

Bik caciat ne Vee rea oe

50a

was consistently evaluated below her male

counterparts.” Opposition to Motion ("Opposition") at 1.

Wiley also claims that the Agency retaliated against

her for engaging in the Equal Employment

Opportunity ("EEO") process, in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Wiley

alleges that Defendant denied her subsequent requests

for promotion, denied her a chance to act as Managing

Editor, retroactively took leave from her, and

significantly reduced her on-air responsibilities.

Opposition at 1. Wiley additionally claims she was

subjected to a hostile work environment based on her

gender.

Defendant moves for a partial dismissal and for

summary judgment on grounds that Plaintiff's race and

gender discrimination and retaliation claims fail to

establish a prima facie case, and furthermore, Plaintiffs

retaliatory harassment claims must be dismissed for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies and/or

failure to establish a prima facie case.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff, Verla Wiley, an African-American

female, was originally hired by the United States

Information Agency ("USIA") as a GS-2 clerk typist in

1966.5 Defendant's Memorandum of Points § and

Authorities in support of Motion ("Defendant's Points

and Authorities") at 8. In 1977, she became a Trainee

Radio Writer in the English-to-Africa Branch of the

Africa Division of Voice of America ("VOA"). Id. She

was promoted in 1978 to the GS-7 position of Radio

Writer, and she received a promotion to GS-9 in 1980.

Id. In 1982, she reached the GS-11 level, which was

a

5la

then the full-performance level of that position, and in

1983, Wiley's position title was changed to

International Radio Broadcaster ("IRB"), and the top

grade for that position was raised from GS-11 to GS-12.

Defendant's Points and Authorities at 9. Wiley was

subsequently promoted to a GS-12, step 1, by way of an

accretion of duties promotion. Id. at 9. The full

performance level of the IRB position was and remains

GS-12. See Supplemental Declaration of Donna Grace

("Grace Declaration")‘, Par. 79; see also Defendant's

Exhibit 20 (Standard Form 50). Since 1983, Wiley has

received all within grade increases for which she was

eligible and she is currently a GS-12, step 9. Grace

Declaration, Par. 79.

Throughout the 1980's, Wiley acted as

managing editor for the show Nightline Africa. See

Wiley May 24, 2001 Deposition ("First Wiley

Deposition"), Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, at 32-33; Defendant's

Statement of Material Facts as to which there is No

Genuine Issue ("Defendant's Material Facts") at 105.

Wiley has been the coordinator and host of the

Americana section of Africa World Tonight since 1992.

Opposition at 3, citing Defendant's Points and

Authorities at 8. As the Americana coordinator, Wiley

is responsible for the music, Americana, science and

development features in Africa World Tonight's “back

half of the show.’ Defendant's Material Facts at 122.

Wiley gathers material for the show, organizes and

assembles the show's content, develops themes, edits

taped stories and develops original stories and interacts

with reporters. Opposition at 3, citing Wiley Deposition

at 106.

Barry Maughan was the Chief of English-to-

Africa ("EA") Branch from 1995 through 1998.

Defendant's Points and Authorities at 4. During his

52a

tenure, the EA Branch staff included approximately

twenty full-time employees, one part-time employee

and several Purchase Order Vendors. Id., see Maughan

Declaration Par. 8. In general, EA Branch employees

are classified into either IRBs or Radio Production

Specialists ("RPS" or "producers"). Maughan

Declaration, Par. 8. IRBs provide original material for

EA programming, including conducting interviews,

writing stories, and hosting programs. Maughan

Declaration, Par. 9. IRBs who broadcast in English are

generally classified as GS-9,11, or 12 employees. Id. The

principal difference between GS-9/11 and GS-12 level

IRB employees is that the GS-12 employees initiate

more original work, produce more programming

material and require less supervision than GS-9 and 11

level employees. Id.; McMenamim Declaration, Par. 12.°

During Maughan's tenure, the EA Branch

employed ten GS-12 IRB employees, in addition to the

three Plaintiffs, and eight GS-13 IRB employees.’

Grace Declaration, Par. 47; Defendant's Exhibit 18 (list

of employees). During the time that Maughan was

Chief of the EA Branch, six radio programs, including

Africa World Tonight ("AWT"), were under his

supervision. Maughan Declaration, Par. 5. AWT, airing

live in Africa in the evening, Monday through Friday,

was broadcast in three separate editions. McMenammn

Declaration, Par. 6. The first edition aired at 12:30 p.m.

EST and was one-half hour long. Id. The second and

third ed’tions were each one-hour in length and aired at

2:00 p.m. EST and 4:00 p.m. EST, respectively. Id.

B. Procedural] History

Plaintiff filed complaints of discrimination with

the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") on February 3, 1998,

a eT eee” Bee

53a.

and on March 2, 1998. See Delia L. Johnson Declaration,

Pars. 4, 42, and Exhibits 28 and 30 thereto.’ On May 14,

1998, OCR sent a letter to Plaintiff setting forth the

allegations accepted for processing with respect to her

two complaints (hereinafter "OCR-9815"). See Johnson

Declaration, Par. 47, and Exhibit 32 attached thereto.

On July 18, 1998, the complaints were assigned to an

independent contractor, C. Sukari Hardnett of H & H

Associates, for investigation. Johnson Declaration, Par.

18. Hattie Baldwin, the former OCR Director,

subsequently became concerned with the manner in

which the investigation was being conducted and she

consequently terrninated OCR's contract with H & H

Associates. See Defendant's Memorandum of Points

and Authorities at 9, citing Deposition of Delia L.

Johnson at 34. On November 20, 1998, prior to the

completion of any report of the investigation, and

consistent with its authority, OCR made the

independent determination to reassign the

investigations to two different independent contractors,

Richard T. Qualters and James Gee. Johnson

Declaration, Par. 18.

Wiley's EEO complaint spans the period of four

years during which Maughan was Chief of the EA

Branch, and it names Maughan and Steve Lucas

("Lucas"), then Chief of the African Division, as

individuals who discriminated and retaliated against

her and created a hostile work environment .”

In her Amended Complaint and Opposition to

Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss and _ for

Summary Judgment, Plaintiff presents an array of

allegations alleging discriminatory and _ retaliatory

actions by Defendant. For completeness of the record,

the undersigned will address each asserted claim of

54a

discrimination and retaliation in the Report and

Recommendation.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

Under Fed. R. Civ.12(b)(6), if a plaintiff fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court

may grant a defendant's motion to dismiss. Hishon v.

King & Spaulding, 467 U. S. 69, 78 (1984); Sparrow v.

United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. 3d 1111,1114 (D.C. Cir.

2000). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court must

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff and give the plaintiff the "benefit of all

inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged."

Schuler v. United States, 617 F. 2d 605, 608 (D.C.

Cir.1979); see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

(1974).- "However, legal conclusions, deductions or

opinions couched as factual allegations are not given a

presumption of truthfulness." Wiggins v. Hitchens, 853

F. Supp. 505, 508 n.1(D.D.C.1994) (citation omitted);

Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F. 2d 1245, 1254 (D.C.

Cir.1987).

The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test

the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Scheuer, 416 U.S.

at 235. If the allegations contained in the complaint,

when taken as true, fail to state a claim for which relief

may be granted, or otherwise establish that the

complaint faces "some insuperable bar to relief,” the

motion should be granted. Franklin Asaph Limited

Partnership v. FDIC, 794 F. Supp. 402, 404 (D.D.C.

1992).

B. Summary Judgment

A court should grant summary judgment if the

55a

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

affidavits demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of

material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986);

Tao v. Freeh, 27 F. 3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Although a court should draw all reasonable inferences

from the records submitted by the nonmoving party the

mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is

insufficient to bar summary judgment. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The

adverse party's pleading must demonstrate the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. To

be genuine, the issue must be supported by sufficiently

admissible evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact

could find for the nonmoving party. In determining

materiality, the factual assertion must be capable of

affecting the substantive outcome of the litigation. See

id.; see also Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F. 2d 1236,

1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Mere allegations or denials in the adverse

party's pleadings are insufficient to defeat an otherwise

proper motion for summary judgment. The nonmoving

party bears the affirmative duty to present, by

affidavits or other means, specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248-49. The adverse party must do more that simply

"show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts." Matsushita Electric Industries Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

In the context of discrimination cases,

summary judgment should be approached with caution

because of the difficulty of proving discriminatory

intent and disparate treatment. See Morgan v. Federal

Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 98, 104

56a

(D.D.C. 2001)C'While summary judgment must be

approached with special caution in discrimination cases,

a plaintiff is not relieved of [his] obligation to support

[his] allegations by affidavits or other competent

evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.") (citation omitted). This does not however

‘eliminate the use of summary judgment in

discrimination cases. See, e.g., Clark County School

District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271(2001) (finding the

District Court's, grant of summary judgment was

proper, therefore overturning the decision by the Court

of Appeals); Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F. 3d 1127, 1132

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding grant of summary judgment

for defendant in Title VII case alleging racial

discrimination and retaliation); Brown v. Brody,199 F.

3d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir.1999) (upholding summary

judgment in favor of defendant in a Title VII suit

alleging racial and gender discrimination and

retaliation).

In Celotex, the Supreme Court instructed that

the ‘[slummary judgment procedure is_ properly

regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but

rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a

whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy

and inexpensive determination of every action."' 477

U.S. at 327, quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.

1. Title VII Claims

In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973), the Supreme Court established a _ burden-

shifting framework that governs the analysis of racial

discrimination and retaliation claims. See, e.g., Aka v.

Washington Hospital Center, 156 F. 3d 1284,1288-89

(D.C. Cir. 1998); McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F. 2d

57a

783, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Richard v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,

165 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 2001); Hastie v.

Henderson,121 F. Supp. 2d 72, 78 (D.D.C. 2000). The

plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving a prima

facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the

evidence. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The

burden then shifts to the defendant "to articulate some

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the action. Id.

The defendant's burden is one of production, not

of proof. See Aka, 156 F. 3d at 1289 ("[I]n producing

nondiscriminatory reasons for its challenged action, the

employer is not obligated to support these reasons with

objective evidence sufficient to satisfy the

preponderance of the evidence standard.") (quotation

and citation omitted). Therefore, defendant's burden is

satisfied if it simply explains what it has done or

produces evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons. St. May's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993).

If the defendant meets this burden, the

presumption of discrimination is rebutted and drops

from the case. St. May's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 508.

The plaintiff must then show that the articulated

reason was a pretext and the actual reason was

discriminatory. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.

The ultimate burden of persuasion always remains with

the plaintiff to prove that he or she was subjected to

discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at

507-08. A plaintiff cannot create a factual issue of

pretext based merely on personal speculation of

discriminatory intent. Greene v. Dalton, 164 F. 3d 671,

675 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (claims cannot rest "entirely upon a

conciusory representation" by plaintiff); Handing v.

Gray, 9 F. 3d 150, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (unsupported

speculation is not enough to defeat a summary

58a

judgment motion; the existence of specific material

evidentiary facts must be shown). "The non-moving

party's opposition ... must consist of more than mere

unsupported allegations or denials and must be

supported by affidavits or other competent e

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