Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Wiley v. Glassman (No. 07-1581)
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Suprem™ Court, U.S.
ILED
pn
a © 971581 dUN 10 2008
No.
OFFICE OF THE CLEA! ERK
IN THE William K. Suter, Clerk
Supreme Court of the United States
VERLA M. WILEY, PETITIONER
Vv.
JAMES K. GLASSMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE
BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
LESLIE D. ALDERMAN III
Counsel of Record
Alderman, Devorsetz &
Hora PLLC
1025 Connecticut Ave., NW
Suite 615
Washington, DC 20036
202-969-8220
Attorney for Petitioner
CURRY & TAYLOR @ (202) 393-4141
1)
2)
3)
1
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether Burlington Northern v. White, 548 U.S.
53 (2006) overruled the standard for retaliation
used in F’orkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127 (D.C. Cir.
2002). If not, must retaliation — in order to be
actionable -— now both “affect the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment or future
employment opportunities such that a reasonable
trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm
(Forkkio, 306 F.3d at 1131) and have the effect of
dissuad[ing] a reasonable worker from making or
supporting charge of discrimination.” Burlington
Northern, 548 U.S. at 67-68. See Wiley v.
Glassman, 511 F.3d at 161. .
Whether, under either the Civil Rights Act of 1991
or Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
(1989), a retaliation claim should be permitted to
survive summary judgment when the employee
demonstrates direct evidence of retaliation.
Whether summary judgment in the employer’s
favor is appropriate when the record demonstrates
the employer’s alleged nondiscriminatory
justifications to be false. See Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149
(2000)(“because a prima facie case and sufficient
evidence to reject the employer's explanation may
permit a finding of liability, the Court of Appeals
erred in proceeding from the premise that a
plaintiff must always introduce additional,
independent evidence of discrimination.’’); S¢.
Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S 502, 511
(1993) (“The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons
4)
a
put forward by the defendant (particularly if
disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of
mendacity) may, together with the elements of the
prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination.”); Aka v. Washington Hospital
Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1290, 92 (D.C. Cir.
1998)(cited with approval in Reeves, 530 U.S. at
149)(“we ... reject any reading of Hicks under
which employment discrimination plaintiffs would
be routinely required to submit evidence over and
above rebutting the employer's stated explanation
in order to avoid summary judgment”).
Whether a court can grant all reasonable
inferences to the non-moving party, and refrain
from making impermissible credibility
determinations when it fails to consider the record
as a whole. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986)(“the evidence of the non-
movant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor” and
“Credibility determinations... are jury
functions”); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 580 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) (courts
must review “the record as a whole” on summary
judgment); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (same).
itt
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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RELEVANT PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..........c-:ccsccececesesseesescecseeess J
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION..........-scccscsccesesesesees 12
RNIN ss sissrosisoosssseskaaiesuascosiha Secsesiccdiateaptnainas neacavencaasbiacoaiiuournaia 36
APPENDIX
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District Court Memorandum Opinion ...c0..cccccsccseccersereeeeee 19a
Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc... .47a
Order Denying Petition for Panel Rehearing .............0.+. 48a
Magistrate Report & Recommendation...........c0..0.cs000c000e 49a
SR I iss iia Fe 100a
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
AKA V. WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER, 156 F.3D
TR, Ft eI. EIR, LD cies ikicincccstscnise psceseceocs secs: ii, 24
ANDERSON V. LIBERTY LOBBY, INC., 477 U.S. 242,
NENT RRR ND OG NS ARAN IT ORE SON UO ERE passim
BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V. TWOMBLY, 127S.CT. 1955,
5g RENTER ARRAS SRA SRR Rit dah ee PR ee DOL ee SP Ra RR AOSD ED 18
BURLINGTON NORTHERN V. WHITE, 548 U.S. 53, 67
atte Maced dcs rasa bck aebibiisatiteakntiniauceuciaccacs dei desecbweues i, 35, 36
DESERT PALACE, INC. V. COSTA, 539 U.S. 90, 94
| SRSIS SNES ER GS baer aie ye WR SO Bel uate ve SERS Re 17
EZELL V. POTTER, 400 F.3D 1041, 1051 (7TH CIR.
ERASE eT SRS US ion RESO ROA rE Ne Re eae 19
FARAGHER V. BOCA RATON, 524 U.S. 775, 787-788
gf __ RRPSPR AIRCON TRS ZTE oir a EBON NLU ane ee ORS aE 32
FORESTER V. RAULAND-BORG CORP., 453 F.3D 416,
re i i es 25
FORKKIO V. POWELL, 306 F.3D 1127 (D.C. CIR. 2002)...i, 34, 36
GRIFFITH V. CITY OF DES MOINES 387 F.3D 733, 736
CBT COUR, BIO) nn soc csiccesccccercocese OPA ER ORE ae ERS 19
KING V. HARDESTY, 517 F.3D 1049, 1058 (8TH CIR.
| RRR ECP EE AAT pene er ss ng ne sea RE 18
MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUS. LTD. V. ZENITH RADIO
CO FF es BE SE COD vveivincaceceneiccvtticccnsesenessns li, 32, 34
MELENDEZ-ARROYO V. CUTLER-HAMMER DE P.R.
Co., INC., 273 F.3D 30, 35-6 (1ST CIR. 2001)... eee 19
PRICE WATERHOUSE.-V. HOPKINS, 490 U.S. 228, 277
GE iiasibdikdeindic hs sciadinccunicasscaboaaccsieoutaticacubndesccbainonccdics i, 15,17, 18
REEVES V. SANDERSON PLUMBING SUPPLY Co. 530
cI I I oii oat ced teiu cia a ae ee ea a passim
SEIERKIEWICZ V. SOREMA N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511
(ERLE ie oD Ewe SRP ange CRSA ASE oem 16
ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER V. HICKS, 509 U.S. 502,
PS NR ics anuntiucicbikcdsaupnciadematadcmeicceiedaaueiabaliconsinwaliens i, 23, 24
STARCESKI V. WESTINGHOUSE ELEC. CORP., 54 F.3D
ie ee NI csisbi ice cetisbcnintiaeenechtnta dns tteinsttntinnd 19
THOMAS V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 995 F.2D 274,
iii ciakiniasscatknekaessuesahedaidnndiaetensenesersctccarecens 30
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES V. THURSTON, 469 U.S.
MR TREN PRESRFEC EAC RE ERRV ELE LR Eye EE Cnn 16
VESPERINI V. SHAW CONTRACT F'LOORING
SERVICES, INC., 315 F.3D 37, 41 (AST CIR. 2002).....00000.0.... 19
WILBURN V. ROBINSON, 480 F.3D 1140, 1143 (D.C.
1 SERIA SRR ORNS TIS CRESS PRE sR 18
WILEY V. GLASSMAN, 511 F.3D 151 (2007)........0000.... passim
WOODRUFF V. PETERS, 482 F.3D 521, 527 (D.C. CIR.
Sine FERS BRS SA RPE TE 8 PORE Cie REN aR 30
WRIGHT V. MURRAY GUARD, INC. 455 F.3D 702, 711
RN III iii asin uhciscd a eaeaineegtaliv hielo taeeescaoncs eee 18
STATUTES
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SERRE a ane na een meneame ty. a 12
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roe 8) Sameera Nae ere See 2
a a cc pacica dngeh babe ampanianeines 2
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RULES
Ce ES Ey Sa eer On omAe Caan er A 2
OTHER AUTHORITIES
\
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, A DISTORTED MIRROR: THE
SUPREME COURT’S SHIMMERING VIEW OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, DIRECTED VERDICT, AND THE
ADJUDICATION PROCESS, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 162-70
2 RARER ore en he Ra ene SPN PEC Re Se. SS RE NCR 13
JOHN BRONSEEN, AGAINST SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 540-543 (2007) .0.......ecececeeeeceseeeeeeeeee 13
v1
PAUL W. MOLLICA, FEDERAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AT HIGH TIDE, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141, 181—205 (2000) ........... 13
STEWART SCHWAB, How EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION PLAINTIFFS FARE IN FEDERAL
COURT, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. VOL. 1, No. 2,
TE) eS ET Te
1
OPINIONS BELOW
The District of Columbia Circuit decision
affirming summary judgment is reported at Wiley v.
Glassman, 511 F.3d 151 (2007).
The District Court opinions granting summary
judgment are not published.
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals issued its decision on
December 14, 2007. The order denying rehearing issued
on March 12, 2008. This Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
RELEVANT PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Fifth Amend. Const.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
F.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(c)
The judgment sought should be rendered if the
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials
on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin[.]
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees or applicants for employment, for an
employment agency, or joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining, including on-the-job
training programs, to discriminate against any
individual, or for a labor organization to
discriminate against any member thereof or
applicant for membership, because he has
opposed any practice made an_ unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted,
3
or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.
STATEMENT
Ms. Wiley is an African-American woman whose
career with the Voice of America began as a GS-2 clerk
typist in 1966. In 1983,Ms. Wiley, the first U.S.-born
African American female International Radio
Broadcaster in English to Africa, was promoted to a
GS-12 International Radio Broadcaster. Throughout
the 1980’s Ms. Wiley acted as Managing Editor for the
show, Nightline Africa. Ms. Wiley has been the
coordinator and host of the Americana section of Africa
World Tonight since 1992. As tne Americana
coordinator, Ms. Wiley is responsible for the music,
American culture, science, and development features
found in Africa World Tonight's back half. She was
responsible for, inter alia, voicing the shows, gathering
material for her show, organizing and assembling the
show’s content, developing themes, editing taped
stories, developing stories and working with reporters.
Barry Maughan became the Chief of English to
Africa in 1995. Throughout his tenure as the Chief,
Maughan made frequent sexist comments and referred
to himself as “Bwana” (A Swahili term commonly
interpreted to mean “Master”) and even had a plaque
bearing the moniker “Bwana Barry” on his desk. Under
Maughan’s supervision, International Radio
Broadcasters held both GS-12 and GS-13 positions. In
fact, at the time of the events relevant to the present
dispute, six of the non-supervisory International Radio
Broadcasters were GS-13s.
4
On April 17, 1997, Ms. Wiley (along with two
other female Broadcasters whose cases have since
settled), met with Maughan to discuss discrimination in
the workplace. During this meeting, Ms. Wiley asked
Maughan for Managing Editor training and to be
allowed to act as Managing Editor.
In July 1997, after Maughan failed to address
these problems, Ms. Wiley wrote a letter to Evelyn
Lieberman (Director, Voice of America), explaining the
white-male-dominated nature and culture of English to
Africa,’ disparate treatment of women, discriminatory
evaluations, the lack of women in supervisory roles,
lack of training for women in management roles,
discriminatory assignments, and a glass ceiling at the
GS-12 level, under Barry Maughan. In addition, Ms.
Wiley raised the fact that Maughan had denied her a
promotion to GS-13.
The Africa Division Director (Maughan’s first-
level supervisor), Steven Lucas, made Maughan aware
of the complaint to Ms. Lieberman. In September 1997,
Ms. Wiley again asked Maughan for a promotion, and
again he denied the request. Maughan subsequently
denied Ms. Wiley’s request to be promoted in early
1998.
Maughan told Ms. Wiley that she did not merit a
promotion because she did not have supervisory
duties. During his deposition, Maughan explained that
to be promoted to GS-13, an employee needed “to be
able to carry out the functions of a managing
editor and senior editor’’ (emphasis added).
' Mr. Lucas, the Africa Division Director, and Barry Maughan’s
first-line supervisor, acknowledged in his sworn deposition that
there was “male cronyism” in the Agency under his tenure.
2 Maughan additionally believed that “outstanding” evaluations
were necessary for promotion. As a result, he pressured Ms.
5
Despite Maughan’s explanations, Maughan
promoted Joseph DeCapua, a white male with no
supervisory duties from GS-12 to GS-13 a year prior
to Ms. Wiley’s request for a similar promotion.
Maughan explained that DeCapua’s promotion was the
result, not of increased duties or a successful desk
audit, but of a “back-room deal” he made with
Personnel.
Respondent argued below that in order to act
as managing or senior editor, the employee already
had to be in a GS-13 position.
Despite the initiation of EEO action in October
1997, Ms. Wiley’s colleagues and supervisors pressured
her to abandon her claims against Maughan by, among
other things, disparaging Ms. Wiley to management
and the union, and threatening a mass exodus from
English to Africa.? This pressure eventually caused the
Wiley’s rating officer, Senior Editor Frederica Depew, into
withholding an “Outstanding” performance rating for her in 1995,
Ms. Depew wrote: “I could easily write an Outstanding for Verla
and would have preferred to if you hadn't said you couldn't support
it. It’s just that I think she is so reliable ... works so hard ... gives
herself so unstintingly.”
% As examples of this behavior, on November 3, 1997, Todd
Leventhal wrote the VOA ombudsman, the Personnel Director,
and the Division Chief, threatening that, “If [Maughan] were to
leave ... for any reason [it] would lead to a wholesale exodus of the
most productive people in the service .. . The service ... would
surely be destroyed.” On the same day, November 3, 1997, Mr.
Leventhal wrote to Alan Heil, the Program Director, warning: “a
tremendous amount is at stake here. I sincerely hope, for
everyone's sake, that those making the decisions on this issue have
enough courage and sense to do the right thing.”
On November 4, 1997, a petition supporting Maughan
signed by several employees, including Senior Editor Frederica
Depew, was provided to VOA management, which read, "We want
to show support for Barry, to counter the current rash of EEO
6
Respondent to replace the first EEO investigator with
an investigator who was friendlier to the Respondent.
Maughan knew of these efforts to retaliate
against Ms. Wiley and to pressure her into dropping
her claims of discrimination. In addition to Maughan,
moreover, the Defendant’s highest-level managers,
including VOA Director Evelyn Lieberman, VOA
Program Manager Alan Heil, the Africa Division
Director, Steven Lucas, and the Ombudsman Bob
Henry, were also aware of these activities. Instead of
discouraging this intimidating behavior, however, the
Defendant’s managers permitted and endorsed it.
Maughan even lauded his subordinates’ efforts in a
November 18, 1997 memorandum to Division Director
Lucas, writing: “I can ... tell you that I have been
touched by the heart-warming outpouring for me and
my leadership by the many staffers.”
In the same November 18, 1997 memorandum,
entitled, “My Continued Tenure as Chief of English to
Africa.” Maughan demanded:
actions against him ... we feel this problem needs to be dealt with
and resolved immediately by management so a_ productive
atmosphere can once again prevail.”
On November 6, 1997, the same employees wrote a letter
to the Ms. Wiley’s union, accusing her of filing claims as a result of
her own career frustrations and to harass Maughan out of his
position. The letter concluded by asking the union to “take the
appropriate action.”
On November 16, 1997, Ms. Wiley’s colleague, Bill Eagle
wrote to Maughan, Depew, and DeCapua, advising Maughan to
treat the situation like “a football game, a war or a chess game...
something that takes LONG TERM strategic planning where you
study your opponents weaknesses rather than something with a
quick, clean solution.”
7
After all the disruption caused in the Branch by
Verla Wiley [and her former co-plaintiffs], -— and
after all the personal and professional indignities
and cruelties I’ve had to endure at their hands -
they should all be summarily dismissed. You
know it. I know it. But you and I also know this
organization doesn’t seem to be able to do the
right and proper thing. However a clear and
unmistakable message has to be sent that
this sort of behavior will not go unpunished.
I would like you to make sure that signal is
sent.
In a perfect and just world, Verla Wiley and
Kemi Southey-Cole should go ... It’s been
decided that won’t happen. [I’m reluctantly
willing to live with that decision.
(emphasis added).
Maughan used that memo to announce a rotating
Managing Editor position. Only men, some of whom
were GS-12 employees, were appointed to the
rotation. Maughan also discussed making training
available to Ms. Wiley in the memorandum; but he
insisted, “This training cannot be managerial in
nature, [unless] she shows a willingness to become
a team player.” (emphasis added).
Petitioner filed her civil action in 1999, and
discovery continued in the case well into the next two
years. During 2001, Ms. Wiley attended depositions of
witnesses and co-plaintiffs in her case, pursuant to her
understanding that she could do so under the
Respondent’s practice of permitting the use of
administrative leave to attend depositions related to
one’s pending civil action.
8
Prior to October 5, 2001, when it issued its
Deposition Leave Policy, Respondent permitted
employees to attend depositions using administrative
leave in court cases. In a February 15, 2001 email, the
Respondent’s Deputy General Counsel, Mr. William
Ohlhausen, informed the then General Counsel, Carol
Booker, that the Office of Civil Rights had a “liberal
interpretation” of the rule regarding the use of leave
for attending depositions.
In February 2001, based on the advice of Mr.
Ohlhausen, Ms. McMenamin (the new Chief of English
to Africa) informed Ms. Wiley that she could take the
leave but that she would, “wait until the matter was
checked out further before making a final decision on
leave.” Ms. Wiley subsequently used 72.4 hours of
official time to attend depositions in her case.
Ohlhausen circulated a draft of the leave policy
on April 23, 2001, five months before the final policy
was announced. According to the Respondent, the April
2001 draft remained “virtually unchanged” after it was
reviewed by the Office of Personnel and the Office of
Civil Rights. Respondent never provided a copy of the
draft policy to the Petitioner in discovery, and instead
provided a copy to the trial court, in camera. The trial
court never issued a decision with regard to why it did
not share the draft with the Petitioner.
Despite the fact that the policy on official time
remained unchanged after April 23, 2001, and that the
impetus behind drafting the policy was Ms. Wiley’s
question to Mr. Ohlhausen, the Respondent never
informed Ms. Wiley that its policy would prohibit her
from attending depositions using official time. In the
meantime, Ms. Wiley attended additional depositions in
her civil action.
9
In early summer of 2001, before the new policy
was published and despite the fact that no one had ever
been disciplined for doing so, Personnel Specialist,
Donna Grace, requisitioned Ms. Wiley’s time and
attendance records in order to discipline her for
violating the Respondent’s leave policy.
Eight months after Ms. Wiley set things in
motion by asking the question about leave, in October
2001, the Respondent promulgated the new leave
policy. The October 2001 policy included new provisions
that had never been contained in any previous policy or
agreement and provisions that were specifically
tailored to the Plaintiff's civil action, namely paragraph
(f}, which reads: “If there are muitiple plaintiffs in the
lawsuit, an employee/plaintiff is entitled to official time
to attend only his or her own deposition, but not those
of the other plaintiffs or of non-party witnesses.”
After’ learning that the new policy would be
applied retroactively, Delia Johnson, the Director of
Civil Rights, explained to General Counsel Carol
Booker that the policy was new and should not be
applied to Petitioner retroactively. Specifically, she
stated: “If this was existing policy why did we not
proceed with appropriate actions before the OCR policy
was disseminated ... It is apparent from _ the
circumstances that neither management nor the
complainants were made aware that the existing policy
was applicable.”
In an attempt to convince Mr. Welch (the
Personnel Director) that taking Ms. Wiley’s leave was
legitimate, Personne! Specialist Donna Grace informed
Welch that OCR Director Johnson had always agreed
that the new leave policy was consistent with the
Respondent’s prior practice and policies.
10
Welch and James Hagan, Labor-Relations Chief,
also believed the policy was new, and Mr. Welch’s
conversations with Respondent’s counsel reveal that
even General Counsel Booker did not believe a policy
existed prior to October 2001. In an October 5, 2001
email Hagan wrote, “Jack — This sounds like new
policy.” ‘A contemporaneous hand-written note from
Welch to Hagan reads “my conversation with C. West
[Assistant General Counsel] left me with the
impression that Carol [Booker, the General Counsel]
didn’t think there was a policy in VOA.”
On October 15, 2001 Booker instructed
McMenamin to charge Petitioner with annual leave for
attending depositions. McMenamin’s October 16, 2001
“memo to file,” however, states that she “called Verla
and told her that I received a note from [OCR Director]
Delia [Johnson] telling me to go ahead with making the
T&A adjustments.”
Ms. Wiley’s protected activities,t and the
Agency’s retaliation against her -ontinued, even after
Maughan’s departure.° That etaliation included a
significant reduction in responsibilities. In May 2002,
McMenamin moved an editorial segment into Ms.
Wiley’s half of the Africa World Tonight Broadcasts.
The imposition of the editorials reduced Petitioner’s
airtime by twenty-five percent (25%).
After a 39-year career at the Voice of America,
Ms. Wiley retired from her position as an International
Radio Broadcaster, largely due to the stress of
‘ For example, Ms. Wiley filed an EEO complaint to challenge the
Respondent’s above-referenced retroactive taking of leave, in
December 2001.
® Ms. Wiley regularly represented other employees in civil rights
complaints against the Respondent after Maughan retired.
1]
remaining in a hostile and retaliatory working
environment. The stress Respondent had placed on her
resulted in, among other things, physical and
neurological manifestations of emotional distress. Ms.
Wiley continues in her role as Union Vice President,
but she is now required to have an escort wherever she
goes, even to the restroom.
The Respondent has a historical practice of
discrimination against U.S.-born African Americans.
Petitioner began her career at the Voice of America in
1966 and has worked in the English to Africa branch
since 1977. She has first-hand knowledge of the pattern
and practice of discrimination not only in the unit, but
also throughout the Respondent. It is common
knowledge that in its 44-year history, the branch has
had one U.S.-born African Amsriean Chief (GS-14) and
only three U.S.-born African American International
Radio Broadcasters at the GS-13 level. In the landmark
case of Hartman v. Albright (no. 77-cv-02019), Voice of
America was found to have engaged in systematic
discriminatory hiring practices against women.
Ms. Wiley has been fighting for a jury trial for
ten years. As a result of the lower courts’ failure to
abide by this Court’s precedent with respect to
retaliation and the summary judgment standards, Ms.
Wiley has thus far been stymied in her exhausting
efforts, despite the presence of direct evidence of
retaliation and compelling, material facts about which
there is genuine dispute.
The United States District Court for the District
of Columbia had jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s civil
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964), as amended.
The D.-. Circuit Ceurt of Appeals had
jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s Appeal pursuant to 28
12
U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court’s Memorandum Order
dated October 2, 2006 constituted a “final decision,”
which, together with the its May 6, 2005 Order adopting
the Magistrate Judge’s Report, disposed of all of the
Petitioner’s claims against the Respondent.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
Introduction
Petitioner seeks Certiorari to clarify the
standard for actionable retaliation claims and to
substantively reiterate the correct standards -and
considerations for deciding summary judgment
motions.
Employment discrimination victims appear to
be, inexplicably, disproportionately on the losing end of
summary judgment battles. Petitioner believes that
this is due to the fact that the courts are merely paying
homage to the words of the summary judgment
standards, without actually applying those standards as
required by this Court’s precedent.
For example, in Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial
Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our
Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments? 78 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 982, 1098 (2003), Miller discusses the fact that
courts have “ignored the restraining passages in the
Court’s [decisions in Anderson, Celotex and
Matsushita] and overstepped the boundaries set by the
trilogy itself, transforming summary judgment from a
limited purpose procedural tool designed to screen out
cases not worthy of trial to the ‘trial on affidavits that
the Court itself warned against.” Jd. 1062-1063. Miller
also addresses the confusion created by the Court’s
13
failure to specify the “standard by which the moving
party discharges its burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact” and the tension between
the prohibition against judges weighing evidence and
their obligation to both draw reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party and to evaluate the
nonmovant’s evidence in light of the entire record. Td.
at 1063-1064. He also focuses on the courts’ propensity
for encroaching on the factfinder’s role in deciding Rule
56 motions. Jd. at 1064.
Similar critics of the application of the summary
judgment standards can be found in: Kevin Clermont
and Stewart Schwab, How Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J.
Empirical Legal Stud. Vol. 1, No. 2, 429-458 (July 2004)
(a statistical study comparing civil rights litigants to all
other civil litigants); John Bronseen, Against Summary
Judgment, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 522, 540-543 (2007)
(discussing the artificial pressure on courts to grant
summary judgment motions); Paul W. Mollica, Federal
Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 Marq. L. Rev.
141, 181-205 (2000) (criticizing applications of summary
judgment that “press against tolerable constitutional
limits”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The
Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary
Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication
Process, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 95, 162—70 (1988).
Petitioner’s case exemplifies how the summary
judgment system and standards are used to prevent
good civil rights cases from reaching a jury. For
example, the D.C. Circuit ruled in Ms. Wiley’s favor on
nearly all of the legal arguments she presented, it then
however, ruled against her on all counts based its
failure to consider the record as a whole, to grant
14
inferences in Ms. Wiley’s favor and to abstain from
making credibility determinations.
1. The Court of Appeals Ignored Direct Evidence
of Discrimination
Following Ms. Wiley’s initial complaint to the
Respondent’s Office of Civil Rights, filed on October 6,
1997, Barry Maughan, Complainant’s Supervisor, wrote
to the Director of the Africa Division a memorandum
entitled “My Continued Tenure as Chief of English To
Africa.” The memo, dated November 18, 1997,
announced, among other things:
1) “After all the disruption caused in the Branch by
Verla Wiley [and her former co-plaintiffs in the
district court action] ... — and after all the
personal and _ professional indignities and
cruelties I’ve had to endure ... they should all
be summarily dismissed.”
2) “A clear and unmistakable message has to be
sent that this sort of behavior will not go
unpunished. I would like you to make sure
that signal is sent.
3) “In a perfect and just world, Verla Wiley and
Kemi Southey-Cole should go ... It’s been
decided that won’t happen. I’m reluctantly
willing to live with that decision.”
4) With respect to affording Ms. Wiley any training
that she had requested, Maughan insisted, “This
training cannot be managerial in nature, but
that certainly cannot be ruled out in the
future if she shows a willingness to become
a Team Player.”
15
(emphasis added).
In the same communication, Maughan announced
a rotating Managing Editor position. Only men, some
of who were GS-12 employees and others of whom
were GS-13 employees, appointed to the Managing
Editor and emergency back-up rotation.
Despite the strength of this direct evidence of
reprisal, neither the District Court nor the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals even mentioned it in any decision.
This Court has not defined what constitutes
direct evidence of discrimination. The most often cited
definition is Justice O’Conner’s discussion in her
concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (superseded on other grounds by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991):
[S]tray remarks in the workplace ... cannot
justify requiring the employer to prove that its
hiring or promotion decisions were based on
legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by
nondecisionmakers, or statements by
decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional
process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiff's
burden in this regard.
'Petitioner’s direct evidence suffers from none of
the deficiencies about which Justice O’Conner warned.
Maughan’s diatribe is no stray remark: as_ the
memorandums title (“My Continued Tenure as Chief’)
suggests, this was Maughan’s statement of the
conditions under which he agreed to remain as Branch
Chief. Second, the memorandum comes from the
decisionmaker himself, the person who made, and
denied, the appointments at issue in the complaint.
Lastly, the statements appear in the same document
16
that announces the very rotating Managing Editor
appointment at issue in this litigation. Therefore, the
statements of Maughan’s retaliatory animus are not
unrelated to the decisionmaking process. Maughan’s
words are not only related to the decisionmaking
process, they are contemporaneous explanations of
his actions.
Despite the direct evidence of retaliation, the
D.C. Circuit analyzed this case in accordance with the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting regime. The D.C.
Circuit required the Petitioner to demonstrate, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the Respondent’s
excuse was false and a pretext for discrimination,
pursuant to Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Supply Co.
530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit
held: “appellee offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for appellant’s nonparticipation in the managing
editor rotation and appellant failed to prove that
this reason was merely a pretext for discrimination
or retaliation proscribed by Title VII.” Wiley, 511 F.3d
151, 158. (emphasis added).
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting regime
was developed for the benefit of employees who do not
have direct evidence of discrimination and _ is
inapplicable to cases with direct evidence. See Trans
World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 US. 111,
121)(1985)(“the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable
where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination ... the shifting burdens of proof set forth
in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the
plaintiff has his day in court despite the unavailability
of direct evidence.”)(emphasis added); Seierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002)(quoting the cited
excerpt from Trans World Airlines).
17
Applied to a case where direct evidence is in
play, the McDonnell Douglas system imposes an
additional obstacle on an employee at the summary
judgment level. This is because, in direct evidence
cases, the plaintiff has already demonstrated what
McDonnell Douglas was designed to elicit — that
unlawful discrimination played a role in the decision at
issue. When direct evidence is in play, the question of
whether discrimination is present has already been
answered.
Therefore, in direct evidence cases, the only
issue to be decided is whether an affirmative defense
exists and, if so, what effect the affirmative defense
would have. This result would be the same under
either 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)* or Price Waterhouse," if —
on remand — the District Court determines that Price
Waterhouse remains the law for retaliation claims:*
6 Under 42 U.S.C. 2000c-5(g), when the employee “proves a
violation under section 2000e-2(m) ... and a _ respondent
demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same
action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the
court” may still issue relief, although that relief is limited in
nature.
7 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989), the
Court held that “Once a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that
{unlawful discrimination] played a motivating part in an
employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of
liability only by proving that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not allowed [discrimination] to play
such a role.” (emphasis added).
8 Courts have recognized that the Civil Rights Act of 1991
superseded Price Waterhouse, at least with respect to
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003).
18
[A]n employer may not meet its burden in [a
mixed motive] case by merely showing that at
the time of the decision it was motivated only in
part by a legitimate reason. The very premise of
a mixed-motives case is that a legitimate reason
was present, .... The employer instead must
show that its legitimate reason, standing
alone, would have induced it to make the
same decision.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added).
This question, whether the employer has met its
burden to demonstrate that it would have taken the
same action despite the existence of discrimination is
for a jury to decide. And as such, the case should be
remanded to the District Court for trial. Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1987 (2007) (Stevens,
dissenting) (“In discrimination cases, our precedents
require a plaintiff at the summary judgment stage to
produce either direct evidence of discrimination or, if
the claim is based primarily on circumstantial evidence,
to meet the shifting evidentiary burdens imposed under
the framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas’);
King v. Hardesty, 517 F.3d 1049, 1058 (8 Cir. 2008)(“At
the summary judgment stage, the issue is whether the
plaintiff has _ sufficient evidence that unlawful
discrimination was a motivating factor in_ the
defendant's adverse employment action. If so, the
presence of additional legitimate motives will not
entitle the defendant to summary judgment.”); Wilburn
v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1148 (D.C. Cir.
2007)(“‘direct evidence of retaliation ... precluded
summary judgment”); Wright v. Murray Guard, Ine.
455 F.3d 702, 711 (6 Cir. 2006)(“If the plaintiff makes
[the showing required by 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(m)], she is
19
entitled to relief.”); Ezell v. Potter, 400 F.3d 1041,
1051 (7 Cir. 2005) (“[employer’s} statement that [it]
had a plan to get rid of older workers and replace them
with younger, faster workers is direct evidence of
discriminatory intent and is sufficient evidence to allow
[employee] to take his case to trial.”); Griffith v. City of
Des Moines 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8 Cir. 2004)(“We have
long recognized ... that a plaintiff may survive the
defendant's motion for summary judgment in one of
two ways. The first is by proof of ‘direct evidence’ of
discrimination.”); Vesperini v. Shaw Contract Flooring
Services, Inc., 315 F.3d 37, 41 (1** Cir. 2002) (“When an
employee presents direct evidence of age
discrimination, the employer must then either deny the
validity or the sufficiency of the employee's evidence,
and have the jury decide whether the employee has
proved discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence, or prove that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the protected
characteristic into account.”)(emphasis added);
Melendez-Arroyo v. Cutler-Hammer de P.R. Co., Inc.,
273 F.3d 30, 35-6 (1* Cir. 2001) (“At [the summary
judgment] stage, ... the question is whether the
evidence, taken as a whole, creates a factual issue as to
whether the demotion was’ motivated by
age.”)(emphasis added); Starceski v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, FN4 (8d Cir. 1995) (“direct
proof of discriminatory animus leaves the employer
only an affirmative defense on the question of ‘but for’
cause or cause in fact.”).
20
2. Whether summary judgment in_ the
employer’s favor is appropriate when the
record demonstrates the employer’s alleged
nondiscriminatory justifications to be false.
The Respondent provided numerous false
justifications for its treatment of Ms. Wiley. The
following examples stand out and should have
permitted her to survive summary judgment.
a. Denied Promotion
The Respondent’s first excuse for failing to
promote Ms. Wiley to a GS-13 position was that she did
not have any supervisory duties associated with her
position. This explanation was false. The Respondent
has admitted that its GS 18 positions may be
supervisory or nonsupervisory. Moreover, despite
Maughan’s explanation that having supervisory duties
meant both acting as the Managing Editor and Senior
Editor, Maughan promoted a white, male colleague
with no prior EEO activity to a GS-13 position even
though (conceded by Maughan in his deposition) that
the employee lacked of supervisory duties prior to his
promotion. In addition, the Respondent argued before
the D.C. Circuit that only GS-13s were eligible to act as
either Managing Editor or Senior Editor, additionally
contradicting Maughan’s explanation an employee had
to have either Managing Editor or Senior Editor duties
before being eligible for a promotion to GS-13.
The Respondent’s second excuse for failing to
promote Ms. Wiley — and the reason on which the D.C.
Circuit focused —- was that she refused to undergo a
desk audit, which was (according to the Respondent)
the only manner for an employee to be promoted
21
noncompetitively. The Respondent provided no facts in
support of this allegation, however. The Respondent’s
citations to the record were devoid of any evidence that
any person was required to undergo a formal desk audit
prior to receiving their accretion of duties promotion.
In fact, Ms. Wiley who has received numerous accretion
of duties promotions in her rise from a GS-2 Clerk
Typist to GS-12 International Radio Broadcaster, has
never been required to undergo a formal desk audit.
To additionally contradict the Agency’s excuse,
Ms. Wiley demonstrated that the desk audit idea came
months after Maughan denied her promotion,
illustrating that there was no causal nexus between the
denied promotion and Ms. Wiley’s decision not to sit for
a formal desk audit. She also presented evidence that
‘Maughan had referred (in his sworn deposition
testimony) to Mr. DeCapua’s promotion as having been
the result of a “backroom deal.” Additionally, the
Petitioner demonstrated that Maughan’s supervisor
’ {the Director of the Africa Division) had testified that
Maughan had the authority to promote employees
subject to advice by Mr. Lucas and a review by
Personnel for availability.
b. Managing Editor Rotation
The Respondent’s first explanation for denying
Ms. Wiley a role as Managing Editor was that only GS-
13 employees were eligible to act as Managing Editor.
Ms. Wiley earned no credit for demonstrating this
reason to be false and demonstrating that two of the
male employees that Maughan appointed to the rotation
were GS-12s.
The second explanation was that Ms. Wiley’s
union duties took up so much of her time that she would
22,
not have been able to maintain her obligations under
the rotation. This excuse is simply untrue. Ms. Wiley’s
rating officer, Senior Editor Frederica Depew, wrote in
a 1995 email to Maughan:
Barry —- this is in response to your query about
Verla’s schedule, union activities, partnership
meetings, etc. and how they affect the office: ...
The short answer is — not at all. They have no
affect on the amount of work she does or it’s
quality. ... ’ve known many people who took
their jobs and their responsibility seriously,
but I’ve never known anyone who does so to
the extent that Verla does. For years now I’ve
received scripts sent in the computer late at
night or over the weekend indicating that she’s
been working on her own time. And yet never
has she asked for comp time, even in days past
when comp time wasn’t hard to come by. ... If
Verla followed the letter of the law, we would be
filling in for her all the time — again, not just
because of her union work, but also because of
sick leave and annual leave. We're by far the
winners in this arrangement.
(emphasis added).
The inclusion of false explanations for the
Respondent’s failure to promote Ms. Wiley and failure
to include her in the Managing Editor rotation creates
genuine issues of material fact sufficient to survive a
motion for summary judgment. Even if the
Respondent provided additional reasons that were not
demonstrated to be false, the fact that false excuses
were asserted in the first place begs the obvious
23
question: if there were legitimate reasons, why would
the Respondent dissemble?
This Court held, in Reeves 530 U.S. at 147-148:
In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact
can reasonably infer from the falsity of the
explanation that the employer is dissembling to
cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an
inference is consistent with the general principle
of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to
consider a party's dishonesty about a material
fact as affirmative evidence of guilt. Moreover,
once the employer's justification has been
eliminated, discrimination may well be the most
likely alternative explanation, especially since
the employer is in the best position to put forth
the actual reason for its decision.
Similarly, in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) this Court held:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put
forward by the defendant (particularly if
disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of
mendacity) may, together with the elements of
the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's
proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to
infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was
correct when it noted that, upon such rejection,
“(njo additional proof of discrimination is
required[.}”
24
Likewise, in Aka v. Washington Hospital
Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1290, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1998)(a
decision endorsed and cited with approval in Reeves,
530 U.S. at 148), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the belief that “employment-discrimination
plaintiffs must as a routine matter do more than
discredit the employer's explanation in order to avoid
summary judgment” is incorrect and “inconsistent with
Hicks, which makes clear that ‘no additional proof of
discrimination is required’ as a matter of course once a
plaintiff has shown that a jury could reject the
employer's proffered explanation.” Jd. at 264 (quoting
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511).
Thus, under Reeves, the combination of a prima
facie case and evidence that the employer’s asserted
justification is false, while “not always” adequate to
avoid summary judgment, is sufficient to “permit the
trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully
discriminated.” Reeves 530 U.S. at 148. The Reeves
Court only envisaged cases where “the record
conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff
created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the
employer's reason was untrue and there was
abundant and uncontroverted independent
evidence that no discrimination had occurred,” as
still being amenable to summary judgment.” /d.
(emphasis added).
Permitting an employee to avoid summary
judgment when the employer asserts false justifications
for its action is also consistent with Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)(“the evidence of
the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”). This is
because, when the employer dissembles about the
Bass
25
reason for its actions, it is a justifiable inference that it
is doing so to cover up its guilt. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at
147 (“the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the
falsity of the explanation that the employer is
dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such
an inference is consistent with the general principle of
evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a
party's dishonesty about a material fact as affirmative
evidence of guilt.”).
Relying on Reeves and this line of reasoning,
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
opined, in Forester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d
416, 417 (7" Cir. 2006):
As we have said countless times, the question in
a discrimination case is not whether the
employer's stated nondiscriminatory ground for
the action of which the plaintiff is complaining is
correct but whether it is the true ground of the
employer's action rather than being a pretext for
a decision based on some other, undisclosed
ground. ... If it is not the true ground, the
employer may still be innocent of discrimination;
he may for example have lied to conceal a reason
that was discreditable but not discriminatory.
But the case could not be resolved on
summary judgment, because a trier of fact
(judge or jury) would be entitled to infer a
discriminatory motive from the pretextual
character of the employer's ground.
(emphasis added).
The Petitioner respectfully requests that this
Court accept Certiorari to clarify that in Title VII
cases, while an employee is not entitled to judgment as
26
a matter of law when it demonstrates the employer’s
justifications to be false, the employee does establish
genuine issues of material fact necessitating trial by
doing so, unless the employer can provide “conclusive,”
“abundant” and “uncontroverted independent evidence
that no discrimination had occurred.” Reeves, 530 U.S.
at 148.
3. Whether a court can grant all reasonable
inferences to the non-moving party, and
refrain from making impermissible
credibility determinations, when it fails to
consider pertinent record evidence provided
by the non-movant.
a. Managing Editor Rotation
The D.C. Circuit concluded that Ms. Wiley’s
union activities would have prevented her from
participating in the Managing Editor rotation and that
she would not have accepted the assignment had it been
offered to her. The Circuit Court opined: “{A]ppellant
does not really contest Respondent’s contention that
she was too busy with her union duties to serve as
managing editor. We therefore hold that Respondent
offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
Appellant’s nonparticipation in the managing editor
rotation.” Wiley, 511 F.3d at 158.
The evidence before the D.C. Circuit, taking the
entire record into consideration — as required by
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151 (Courts must review “the
record as a whole” on summary judgment) — was that
although: 1) in 1997, Ms. Wiley was the Union Vice
President; and 2) in 1989, she gave up Managing Editor
type duties for the show Nightline Africa because she
27
was newly appointed and specific events required her
to devote a significant amount of time to her union
duties; 3) Ms. Wiley made numerous requests in 1997
for Managing Editor duties; 4) she was never asked if
she would be able to maintain both Managing Editor
and Union Vice President duties in the 1997 period; 5)
the Senior Editor believed that Wiley had never
permitted her union obligations to get in the way of
work performance; 6) the Managing Editor position was
a rotating one, making it easier to accommodate her
union responsibilities; and 7) in his November 1997
memorandum (in which the Managing Editor rotation
was announced), Maughan provided direct evidence of
retaliation against Ms. Wiley and indicated that she
could only receive training that was managerial in
nature if she showed she could be a “team player.”
Instead of believing the evidence of the non-
movant and granting the reasonable inferences from
these facts (i.e., (1) that since Ms. Wiley’s request for
Managing Editor duties was legitimate and; (2) that she
would have accepted the assignment if it had been
offered to her), the D.C. Circuit weighed the evidence
before it and made the credibility determination that
Ms. Wiley’s requests for Managing Editor duties was
really a sham. This was in clear violation of Anderson,
477 US. at 255 (“Credibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of
a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary
judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the
non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”’).
The D.C. Circuit achieved this decision by
violating another tenet of summary judgment law,
which is that the court is required to consider the
28
record, as a whole, before granting a motion for
summary judgment. See, 530 U.S. at 150 (“under Rule
56, we have stated that the court must review the
record ‘taken as a whole.”’); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255
(“the appropriate summary judgment question will be
whether the evidence in the record could support a
reasonable jury finding ...”); and Matsushita, 475 U.S.
at 587 (“Where the record taken as a whole ...”’).
For example, the D.C. Circuit never once
acknowledged: 1) Maughan’s November 1997
memorandum, which includes the direct evidence of
retaliatory animus); 2) Ms. Wiley’s explanation that
specific circumstances led her to give up her Managing
Editor duties in 1989; 3) that Ms. Wiley had asked
repeatedly for Managing Editor duties in 1996 and
1997; 4) that Maughan testified that he never asked Ms.
Wiley if She could perform the duties while acting as
Union Vice President; and 5) that the Senior Editor
confirmed that Ms. Wiley never let her union
obligations interfere with her broadcasting work.
It would be, and is, easy for a court to grant
summary judgment if it can ignore the evidence that
favors the non-moving party, and the lower courts must
be reminded of their obligation to consider all of the
evidence in the record before granting summary
judgment.
b. Denied Promotion
The D.C. Circuit likewise disregarded important
evidence of record with respect to Petitioner’s denied
promotion claim.
The Court dispatched Ms. Wiley’s denied
promotion claim, concluding: “Appellant never proved
that the duties and responsibilities of her job had
29
increased so as to warrant an accretion of duty
promotion.” Wiley, 511 F.3d at 157. This holding
presumes that the Agency’s policy required the Agency
to verify, by way of a desk audit, that the employee’s
responsibilities had increased sufficiently to merit an
accretion of duties promotion.
This conclusion, while appearing to be tied up
with a bow, is absolutely bereft of any supporting facts
and actually contradicts the evidence in the record.
Among other ignored facts, it disregards the following:
1) Maughan denied Ms. Wiley a promotion long before
the desk audit option was offered to her, and therefore
there was no nexus between the initial denied
promotion and the rejected desk audit; 2) there is no
evidence in the record demonstrating that any
employees in English to Africa were required to go
through a desk audit; 3) Maughan explained that
DeCapua (about whom the D.C. Circuit concluded,
[t]here is clear evidence in the record to indicate that
DeCapua's job responsibilities had grown over time”’)
did not have supervisory duties at the time of his
promotion, which Maughan indicated was necessary for
promotion; 4) Maughan indicated that DeCapua’s
promotion was the result of a “back-room deal” not a
desk audit;? and 5) the Africa Division Chief, Steven
Lucas, testified that Maughan had the authority to
make promotions, subject only to advice by Mr. Lucas
and a review by Personnel for availability, and not for
verification of additional duties.
The D.C. Circuit managed to make its erroneous
ruling by disregarding the record facts that support Ms.
Wiley’s claim. Doing so, while making it fairly easy to
® Had a desk audit been conducted, there would have been no need
for any back-room deal.
30
avoid granting summary judgment on the denied
promotion claim, violated one of the basic tenets of this
Court’s summary judgment precedent, that the courts
consider the record as a whole before granting
summary judgment. See Reeves 530 U.S. at 150 (“under
Rule 56, we have stated that the court must review the
record ‘taken as a whole.””); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255
(“the appropriate summary judgment question will be
whether the evidence in the record could support a
reasonable jury finding ...”); and Matsushita, 475 USS.
at 587.
Moreover, with respect to the denied promotion,
Respondent failed to move for summary judgment on
the issue of Ms. Wiley’s retaliatory non-promotion.
Notwithstanding this both the District and Circuit
Courts granted summary judgment on all claims
related to the denied promotion without analyzing the
retaliation claim.
The VOA has waived any argument it has — by
way of summary judgment — concerning Ms. Wiley’s
claim for retaliatory non-promotion. An Appellee
cannot raise a new issue — never before heard at the
District Court level — in an appeal. See Woodruff v.
Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Kattan by
Thomas v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 277 (D.C.
Cir. 1993)(issue not raised before the District Court — a
pro se litigant’s right to attorney’s fees —- was waived on
appeal).
c. Retroactive Taking of Leave
The D.C. Circuit approached Ms. Wiley’s claim
for retroactive taking of leave with a similarly impaired
view of the evidence in the recorc
31
The Cireuit Court determined that Ms. Wiley
was not entitled to administrative leave to attend
depositions in her case and that, as a result, she
suffered no adverse action when she was retroactively
charged with leave. This determination presupposed
that — at the time she took the leave — the Respondent
had a practice or policy of denying the use of
administrative leave for a District Court litigant to
attend depositions in her case.
The court held that Ms. Wiley “can hardly claim
retaliation when she has not shown that she was
entitled to paid leave. The October 2001 guidelines may
have clarified the situation, but they did not cause
appellant to lose anything to which she was entitled
before the guidelines were issued.” Wiley, 511 F.3d at
159.
Here again, however, the Panel failed to consider
the record as a whole and failed to decide all reasonable
inferences in Ms. Wiley’s favor. According to Ms. Wiley,
it was common practice for employees to use
administrative leave to attend depositions in their civil
actions. But Ms. Wiley’ case was not built on her
testimony alone. The record contained numerous
contemporaneous notes and correspondence from the
Director of Personnel, the Employee/Labor Relations
Branch Chief, the Deputy General Counsel and the
Director of Civil Rights, all of whom indicated that the
policy requiring an employee to take annual leave to
attend depositions in his or her court case was a new
one and that the old policy had been interpreted
“liberally,” consistent with Ms. Wiley’s understanding.
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Wiley was entitled
to the justifiable inference that the Respondent’s prior
policy permitted her to use administrative leave and
that she was charged with annual leave, retroactively
32
after the new October 2001 policy was _ published.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (“the evidence of the non-
movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences
are to be drawn in his favor’ and “Credibility
determinations ... are jury functions”).
The D.C. Circuit’ again achieved the decision
against Ms. Wiley by simply ignoring the evidence that
was in her favor. The Circuit Court’s decision bears not
one mention of the correspondence that demonstrates
the internal debate - among the Respondent’s
Personnel Director, its Chief of the Employee and
Labor Relations Branch, its General Counsel and its
Office of Civil Rights —- as to whether the October 2001
policy was new or not. By failing to consider the whole
record and grant this inference to Ms. Wiley, the
Panel’s decision conflicts with Reeves, 530 U.S. 138,
Matsushita 475 U.S. 574, and Anderson, 477 U.S. 242.
d. Retaliatory Harassment
The D.C. Circuit held that, since Ms. Wiley
conceded her hostile work environment claim, she must
also have conceded her retaliatory harassment claim.
The D.C. Circuit again failed to consider the entire
record in making this ruling.
Ms. Wiley’s Complaint included a gender-based
hostile environment claim. Because the gender-based
conduct consisted of, albeit extremely distasteful and
demonstrative of Maughan’s discriminatory attitude
toward women, isolated incidents that did not amount
to severe or pervasive conduct under Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-788 (1998), Ms. Wiley conceded
the gender-based hostile environment claim and instead
argued that all of the incidents about which she had
complained in her complaint (not merely the events
33
that supported the gender-based harassment claim),
considered together, constituted a hostile environment
based on retaliation.
The D.C. Circuit held that the Respondent was
on notice of the retaliatory harassment claim and
reversed the District Court, which had stricken the
claim, only to dismiss the retaliatory harassment claim,
holding: “Because there is no claim here that the
District Court erred in granting summary judgment on
appellant’s hostile environment claim, appellant’s
retaliatory harassment claim necessarily fails as well.”
Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d at 160.
Had the D.C. Circuit considered “the record as a
whole,” it would have been forced to acknowledge that
the retaliatory harassment claim included many actions
that were not encompassed in the gender-based hostile
environment claim. These included: 1) The Denied
Promotion to GS-13; 2) Maughan’s refusal to allow Ms.
Wiley to act as Managing Editor; 3) Maughan’s refusal
to provide Ms. Wiley with On the Job Training for the
Managing Editor position; 4) the retroactive taking of
leave; 5) the reduction of Ms. Wiley’s air-time
responsibilities; 6) petitions that were encouraged by
Maughan and written and distributed by coworkers to
higher-level management; 7) attacks on the Petitioner
submitted to her union management; 8) letters and
speeches encouraged by Maughan and made to upper
level management; 9) contributing to a slanderous
newspaper article; 10) an assault on Ms. Wiley’s former
co-plaintiff, Kemi Southey-Cole; 11) hiring an attorney
to investigate Ms. Wiley’s activities; and 12) and the
Respondent’s’ cancellation of an _ independent
discrimination investigation.
The Circuit Court’s conclusion that the fate of
Ms. Wiley’s retaliatory harassment was necessarily tied
34
to her gender-based retaliation claim is another result
of the D.C. Circuit’s failure to consider the record as a
whole as required by Reeves, 530 U.S. 183 and
Matsushita 475 U.S. 574 (1986) and Anderson, 477 U.S.
242 (1986).
4. The Panel Relied on an Overruled Standard
for Determining Actionable Retaliation
The last question presented relates to the
Respondent’s retaliatory reduction of Ms. Wiley’s
airtime by approximately twenty-five percent. After
reversing the District Court’s dismissal of this claim,
the D.C. Circuit granted summary judgment in the
Respondent’s favor in reliance on an _ overruled
standard for analyzing retaliation claims.
' The Panel invoked the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2002) and
held that “an employee suffers an adverse employment
action if he experiences materially adverse
consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment or future employment
opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find objectively tangible harm.” Wiley v.
Glassman, 511 F.3d at 161. (emphasis added). Relying
on this characterization of the law, the Panel held:
“Appellant’s claim lacks merit because she failed to
establish that a reduction in airtime responsibilities
constituted a materially adverse action for the purpose
of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.
Appellant offered nothing to the District Court or to
this court establishing that the reduction in her airtime
production ... could affect her compensation, grade or
opportunity for future advancement.” /d (emphasis
added).
35
The Panel then concluded that Ms. Wiley “failed
Le 1
to establish that. a reasonable employee would have
found the challenged action materially adverse, which
in this context means it well might have dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination.” Jd. (quoting Burlington Northern v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006)).
The D.C. Circuit’s discussion of “tangible harm,”
in reliance on Forkkio —- is inappropriate and
contradictory to this Court’s opinion in Burlington
Northern v. White, and the “materially adverse”
standard described therein.
Ms. Wiley’s show and on-air time was reduced by
twenty-five percent. It should go without saying that a
broadcaster would think twice before filing a complaint
of discrimination if doing so would result in his or her
show or air-time being reduced by twenty-five percent.
Moreover, Ms. Wiley explained that, because of time
constraints, she was prohibited from treating her
subjects with the depth that they require, and that she
was forced to cut portions from her broadcast, resulting
in a choppy, largely superficial program.
The Panel disregarded this impact, and more
importantly neglected the “context counts” provisions
in Burlington Northern v. White:
(T]he significance of any given act of retaliation
will often depend upon the particular
circumstances. Context matters .. A
supervisor's refusal to invite an employee to
lunch is normally trivial, a nonactionable petty
sight. But to retaliate by excluding an
employee from a weekly training lunch that,
contributes significantly to the employee's |
professional advancement might well deter a
36
reasonable employee from complaining about
discrimination.
Id. at 69. (emphasis added).
Instead of recognizing that Burlington Northern
v. White overruled the “tangible harm” standard found
in Forkkio, the Wiley v. Glassman decision, which
reads Burlington Northern v. White and Forkkio to be
consistent with each other, stands for the proposition
that retaliation is not actionable unless it, both, is
tangible (affecting a term and condition of employment)
under Forkkio 306 F.3d 1131 and has the effect of
“dissuading a reasonable worker from making or
supporting charge of discrimination.” Burlington
Northern v. White, 548 U.S. at 67. See Wiley v.
Glassnvan 511 F.3d at 161.
CONCLUSION
The D.C Cireuit’s opinion, in addition to being
contrary to Burlington Northern v. White, is
emblematic of the errors courts make when applying
this Court’s summary judgment precedent’ to
employment discrimination cases. The heart of that
problem is the courts’ failure to consider the record as a
whole, and specifically the evidence that supported the
Petitioner, in violation of Reeves, 530 U.S. 133, 150
(2000)(“under Rule 56, we have stated that the court
must review the .record ‘taken as a whole.””); Anderson,
477 U.S. at 255 (“the appropriate summary judgment
question will be whether the evidence in the record
could sport a reasonable jury finding ...”); and
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (“Where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
37
for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for
trial.””)
The D.C. Court of Appeals failed to acknowledge
the direct evidence of retaliation and to adjust it
analysis accordingly.
The D.C. Circuit also neglected to consider all of
the record evidence put forward by the Petitioner,
making it impossible for her to gain the advantage of
the inferences that were owed to her. Additionally, the
court disregarded evidence that the Respondent
forwarded false justifications for its actions, which in
turn permitted the court to ignore the genuine issues of
material fact created by those false explanations. The
court’s failure to consider the entire record also caused
it to miss the disputed facts with respect to the
Petitioner’s willirgness to accept the Managing Editor
rotation and the court’s mistaken judgment that the
Petitioner had waived her retaliatory harassment
claim.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner respectfully
prays that this Court grant her Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
Leslie D. Alderman III
ALDERMAN, DEVORSETZ & HORA
PLLC
1025 Connecticut Ave., NW
Suite 615
Washington, DC 20036
202-969-8220 (Tel.)
202-969-8224 (Fax)
lalderman@adhlawfirm.com
Attorney for the Petitioner
la
(any foctnotes trail end of each document)
No. 06-5402
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
VERLA M. WILEY,
APPELLANT
v.
JAMES K. GLASSMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE
BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS,
APPELLEE
November 16, 2007, Argued
December 14, 2007, Decided
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. (No. 99ev00975).
COUNSEL: Leslie D. Alderman, III argued the cause
and filed the briefs for appellant.
Diane M. Sullivan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey
A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Michacl J. Ryan,
Assistant U.S. Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant
U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.
JUDGES: Before: BROWN and GRIFFITH, Circuit
Judges, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.
OPINION
Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.
2a
Per Curiam: Appellant Verla Wiley, an African-
American woman, worked at the United States
Information Agency ("USIA") from 1966 until her
retirement in May 2005. In October 1999, USIA was
abolished and certain sections reconstituted as the
Broadcasting Boar? of Governors ("BBG"). See 22
U.S.C. $§ 6531-6553. (For the remainder of this opinion,
appellee will be referred to as "BBG.")
During the time periods that are relevant to issues in
this appeal, appellant worked as an International Radio
Broadeaster in the English-to-Africa Branch of the
Africa Division at Voice of America, formerly a division
of USIA. In April 1999, Ms. Wiley and two other
plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in District Court against USIA,
alleging violations cf Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
The plaintiffs claimed that they had been discriminated
against on the basis of their race and/or sex, subjected
to a hostile work environment, and retaliated against
for engaging in activities that were protected by Title
VII. As of 2004, Ms. Wiley was the only remaining
plaintiff in the litigation before the District Court.
The facts of this case have been described at length by
the District Court, see Kemi Southey-Cole v. Kenneth
Y. Tomlinson, Civ. A. No. 99-00975 (D.D.C. Oct. 2,
2006) (mem. op.); Kemi Southey-Cole v Kenneth Y.
Tomlinson, Civ. A. No. 99-00975 (D.D.C. May 6, 2005)
(District Court judge's order adopting magistrate
judge's report and recommendation in full); Kemi
Southey-Cole v. Mare B. Nathanson, Civ. A. No. 99-
00975 (D.D.C. May 26, 2004) (magistrate judge's report
and recommendation), so appellant's allegations need
not be recounted in detail here. On May 6, 2005, the
See
Pema ee ee ME ee Bee RR ee ee RS ee Oe ee SR ee ee er DR a ns SE ee ek eee
3a
District Court granted appellee's motion te strike Ms.
Wiley's retaliatery harassment claim, as well as her
claim of retaliation based on a reduction in the amount
of airtime that she was responsible for producing.
Striking appellant's claims effectively dismissed them,
and we treat the District Court's decision with respect
to these two claims as if it had granted a motion
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The District Court also granted appellee's motion for
summary judgment on all but one of appellant's
remaining claims. Subsequently, on October 2, 2006, the
District Court granted summary judgment to appellee
on Ms. Wiley's remaining claim that she suffered illegal
retaliation when BBG forced her to use annual leave for
the time that she took to attend depositions related to
this lawsuit.
In this appeal, appellant claims that
1. she suffered discrimination and retaliation
when appeliee failed to promote her to a GS-
13 pay grade;
2. she suffered discrimination and retaliation
when appellee refused to allow her to
participate in the managing editor rotation;
3. she suffered retaliation when appellee
retroactively charged her annual leave for
the time that she-tock to attend depositions
related to this lawsuit;
4. the District Court erred in granting
appellee's motion to strike her retaliatory
harassment claim; and
5. the District Court erred in granting
appellee's motion to strike her retaliation
claim stemming from the reduction in the
4a
number of minutes of airtime that she was
assigned to produce.
We affirm the District Court's grant of summary
judgment to appellee on appellant's first three claims.
We reverse the District Court's decision to strike
appellant's last two claims, but grant summary
judgment to appellee on both. .
Standard of Review and Legal Standard
for Title VII Claims
We review the District Court's grant of summary
judgment de novo. Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
371 U.S. App. D.C. 68, 447 F.3d 843, 849 (D.C. Cir.
2006). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is
"no genuine issue as to any material fact and .. . the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." FED. R.CIV.P.56(c). "The inquiry performed is
the threshold inquiry of determining whether . . . there
are any genuine factual issues that properly can be
resolved only by a finder of fact because they may
reasonably be resolved in favor of either party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106
S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). In determining
whether there are genuine factual issues in dispute, we
must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. /d. at 255. Insofar as we are treating
the District Court's decisions to strike two of
appellant's claims as dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6),
"[ojur standard of review under Federal Rules 12(b)(6)
and 56 is the same: de novo." Wilson v. Pena, 316 U.S.
App. D:C. 352, 79 F.3d 154, 160 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
5a
Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 US.
792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), Title VII
discrimination claims are assessed pursuant to a simple
three-step framework:
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by
the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie
case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff
succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the [action in question]." Third, should the
defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must
then have an opportunity to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that’ the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were
not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.
Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
252-53, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981) (quoting
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). To establish a
prima facie case of discrimination, a claimant must show
that "(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the
unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of
discrimination." Brown v. Brody, 339 U.S. App. D.C.
233, 199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1999). To establish a
prima facie case of retaliation, a claimant must show
that (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity;
(2) she suffered a materially adverse action by her
employer; and (3) a causal connection existed between
the two. /d.; see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414-15, 165 L.
Ed. 2d 345 (2006) (finding that Title VII's anti-
BN ea BONN Fay Eee ER eta De ee gt ay a ee aN ney he Stee Ne eae we ae CAP RNC Ee eT lp Ee nesta Pees Ree MeL ong we eee hee eta
6a
retaliation provision prohibits all materially adverse
actions, not merely those harms that are specifically
employment-related). In either situation, as the
Supreme Court has made clear, “[t]he burden of
establishing a prima facie case ... is not onerous."
Burdine, 459 U.S. at 253.
Indeed, just two years after Burdine was decided, the
Court emphasized, in strikingly clear terms, that
.t]he prima facie case method established in
McDonnell Douglas was never intended to be
rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. .. . Where the
defendant has done everything that would be
required of him if the plaintiff had properly made
out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff
really did so is no longer relevant. The district
court has before it all the evidence it needs to
decide whether the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff.
United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 108 S. Ct. 1478, 75 L. Ed. 2d
403 (1988) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). In this case, the District Court had before it
hundreds of pages of documents, testimony from
various witnesses that was provided during the
investigation of appellant's claims by BBG's Office of
Civil Rights, and depositions taken after the lawsuit
was filed. So there is no doubt here that appellee aimed
to “articulate[] legitimate reasons for [the allegedly
discriminatory or retaliatory actions] and proffered
evidence in support of those reasons." George v. Leavitt,
366 U.S. App. D.C. 11, 407 F.3d 405, 411 (D.C. Cir.
2005). Given this record, we “need not address the
7a
Government's contentions that [appellant] failed to
make out a prima facie case." /d. Rather, following the
Court's direction in Aikens, we will "proceed to the
ultimate question of discrimination vel non." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
First Claim: Failure to Promoie to GS-13
Appellant claims that her failure to obtain a promotion
to the GS-18 level in 1997 and 1998 was the result of
discrimination based on her race and sex or retaliation
for her complaints to the BBG's Office of Civil Rights.
The District Court held, in part, that appellant failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, because
she could not prove "that anyone similarly situated was
promoted when she was not." Kemi Southey-Cole v.
Marc B. Nathanson, Civ. A. No. 99-00975 at 22 (D.D.C.
May 26, 2004). The District Court applied an erroneous
legal standard in reaching this conclusion. Although
appellant certainly could have offered evidence of
"similarly situated" employees in support of her claim,
she was not required to offer such evidence in order to
make out a prima facie case. See Mastro, 447 F.3d at
850-51; Stetla v. Mineta, 350 U.S. App. D.C. 300, 284
F.3d 135, 145-46 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Nevertheless, because we review the District Court's
decision de novo, we conduct an independent evaluation
of the record to determine whether appellant offered
sufficient evidence to prove discrimination vel non. We
hold that she did not. The undisputed evidence in the
record establishes that there were only two ways for an
employee in appellant's situation to obtain a
noncompetitive promotion (other than career ladder
promotions) at BBG: (1) an impact promotion, which is
8a
based on "exceptional ability exhibited by the
employee"; and (2) an accretion of duty promotion,
pursuant to which a position is reclassified at a higher
grade "because the duties and responsibilities of the
position have increased over a_ period of time."
Supplemental Declaration of Donna 8S. Grace, Joint
Appendix ("J.A.") 236. Only the second -- "accretion of
duty promotion" -- is at issue in this case.
Appellant offered virtually nothing to establish what
her original duties as a GS-12 International Radio
Broadcaster had been, what duties she was performing
when she was denied a promotion, and what
responsibilities the GS-13 position commonly entailed.
Moreover, when BBG attempted to arrange a desk
audit, in which a job classification specialist would have
evaluated Ms. Wiley's work responsibilities, Ms. Wiley
refused. Deposition of Veria M. Wiley (5/24/01), J.A.
842-43; Note to the Record of Janet Davis (1/26/98), J.A.
1371. Rather, when asked why she believed that she
deserved a GS-13 promotion, appellant testified, "I
thought [ was doing a great job .... I just felt |
deserved a 13." Deposition of Verla M. Wiley (5/24/01),
J.A. 846. Although appellant attempts to compare
herself to Joseph DeCapua, another English-to-Africa
employee who was promoted to a GS-13 International
Radio Broadcaster position, her argument falls far
short. There is clear evidence in the record to indicate
that DeCapua's job responsibilities had grown over
time and that he _ had = significantly greater
responsibilities than appellant did at the time of his
promotion. See, e.g., Declaration of Fredrica B. Depew
(11/9/01), J.A. 218; Deposition of Barry Maughan
(4/18/01), J.A. 1077-78; Deposition of Joseph Anthony
DeCapua (3/5/01), J.A. 916-18.
9a
In sum, appellant failed to establish that she was denied
a promotion as a result of illegal discrimination or
retaliation. Appellant never proved that the duties and
responsibilities of her job had increased so as to
warrant an accretion of duty promotion. Without such
evidence, appeliant cannot prove that the failed
promotion was a pretext for either discrimination or
retaliation.
Second Claim: Nonparticipation in the Managing
Editor Rotation
During the time when Barry Maughan was Chief of the
English-to-Africa Division, he rotated the individuals
who were assigned to serve in the managing editor
position. Appellant claims she was denied the
opportunity to participate in this rotation because of
illegal discrimination and retaliation.
The District Court erroneously found that appellant
suffered no adverse employment action as a result of
her exclusion from the managing editor rotation and,
therefore, failed to make out a prima facie case on this
claim. An employment action may be sufficient to
support a claim of discrimination if it results in
"materially adverse consequences affecting . . . future
employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier
of fact could find objectively tangible harm." Forkkio v.
Powell, 353 U.S. App. D.C. 301, 306 F.3d 1127, 1131
(D.C. Cir. 2002). Exclusion from the managing editor
rotation surely qualifies as an adverse employment
action.
Maughan, who was appellant's manager, testified that
he did not support appellant's request for a GS-13
10a
promotion in part because she did not have any
"supervisory duties" in her current job. Deposition of
Barry Maughan (4/18/01), J.A. 1088-89. And Maughan
acknowledged that the required "supervisory duties"
included "be[ing] able to carry out the functions of a
managing editor and senior editor." /d., J.A. 1078. He
also testified that, "outside of being a senior editor,
[managing editor is] the most important function in the
shop." /d. Given this testimony from appellant's
manager, it can hardly be said that Ms. Wiley suffered
no adverse employment action when she was barred
from participating in the managing editor rotation.
Even though appellant may have suffered an adverse
employment action, this, without more, is not proof of
illegal discrimination or retaliation. On the record here,
it is obvious and undisputed that the responsibilities of
managing editor were time-consuming. See Declaration
of Barry H. Maughan, J.A. 499-502. It is equally clear
that, during the time period in question, appellant, who
was serving as Vice President of the American
Federation of Government Employees, Local 1812, was
very busy with union work. See Deposition of Verla
Wiley (6/6/01}, J.A. 879-80; Deposition of Verla M.
Wiley (5/24/01), J.A. 817-20; Deposition of Barry
Maughan (4/18/01), J.A. 1079, 1087-89. Appellant herself
stated that she served in a managing editor-type
position at BBG in the 1980s for a show called
. "Nightline Africa," but had to stop after she became
Vice President of Local 1812 in 1990. Deposition of
Verla M. Wiley (5/24/01), J.A. 817-18. She responded in
the affirmative when asked, “And because you had
more responsibilities as vice president of the union, you
couldn't do that and be managing editor, too?" /d. at
818. Appellant continued to hold the position of Vice
lla
President of Local 1812 in 1996 and 1997, when she
sought to be included in the managing editor rotation.
Appellant does not claim that she was illegally
discriminated against on the basis of her union
activities, nor would such a claim be cognizable under
Title VII. What is noteworthy here is that appellant
does not really contest appellee's contention that she
was too busy with her union duties to serve as
managing editor. We therefore hold that appellee
offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
appellant's nonparticipation in the managing editor
rotation and appellant failed to prove that this reason
was merely a pretext for discrimination or retaliation
proscribed by Title VII.
Third Ciaim: Retroactive Application of Annual Leave
; Policy
Appellant contends that she _ suffered unlawful
retaliation when she was retroactively charged annual
leave for attending witness depositions related to this
lawsuit. In February 2001, Ms. Wiley approached her
then-supervisor, Rebecca McMenamin, about taking
"administrative leave” -- paid leave that is not charged
against an employee's allotted annual leave -- to attend
witness depositions. McMenamin responded via email,
indicating that administrative leave was unavailable in
such circumstances. Email from Rebecca McMenamin
to Verla Wiley et al. (2/14/01), J.A. 2077. That same day,
appellant discussed the administrative leave issue with
William Ohlhausen, Deputy General Counsel for BBG.
Ohlhausen sent an email the following day indicating
that he was unable to reach a conclusion as to whether
administrative leave was authorized in Wiley's
12a
circumstances, and needed to research the issue
further. Email from William Ohlhausen to Verla Wiley
et al. (2/15/01), J.A. 61. Appellant continued attending
depositions.
On October 5, 2001, guidelines applicable to all Voice of
America employees were issued, delineating when
employees could use administrative leave in connection
with Title VII matters. Memorandum, J.A. 2113-14.
These guidelines prohibited employees from taking
official time to attend depositions other than their own.
After this policy issued, McMenamin emailed appellant
to inform her that she would be charged annual leave
for the depositions she had previously attended;
McMenamin's email noted that "[t]his policy indicates
there is no change from the guidance I first sent you on
February 14th, 2001." Email from Rebecca McMenamin
to Verla Wiley e¢ al. (10/9/01), J.A. 2125. Appellant was
subsequently charged 56 hours of annual leave for time
she spent attending depositions other than her own.
Appellant claims that BBG's decision to retroactively
charge her annual leave was unlawful retaliation. As
the District Court found, however, appellant cannot
overcome the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
BBG's decision to charge her annual leave: No statute,
regulation, or policy authorized administrative leave for
an employee in appellant's circumstances. In fact,
during the time period at issue here, neither BBG's
internal Manual of Operations nor the Negotiated
Labor Management Agreement between Local 1812
and BBG _ authorized administrative leave for
employees in appellant’s situation. BBG Manual of
Operations, J.A. 1765-68; Negotiated Labor
Management Agreement, J.A. 1764. Appellant can
13a
hardly claim retaliation when she has not shown that
she was entitled to paid leave. The October 2001
guidelines may have clarified the situation, but they did
not cause appellant to lose anything to which she was
entitled before the guidelines were issued.
Furthermore, McMenamin's February 14, 2001 email to
Ms. Wiley provided appellant with more than adequate
notice that an attempt to take such leave would likely
be unsuccessful. Appellant's decision to continue
attending depositions after receiving Ohlhausen's email
was, in the words of the District Court, "a caleulated
risk." Kemi Southey-Cole v. Kenneth Y. Tomlinson,
Civ. A. No. 99-00975 at 16 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2006). "[N]o
reasonable jury could infer retaliation from the
agency's decision to comply with existing law and
agency agreements." Id. at 22.
Fourth Claim: Retaliatory Harassment
The District Court granted appellee's motion to strike
appellant's claim for retaliatory harassment, primarily
on the grounds that it was raised for the first time in
appellant's opposition to appellee's motion for summary
judgment. This was error. The factual basis for
appellant's "new" claim was substantially similar to the
hostile work environment claim that appellant had
alleged in her original complaint, and BBG did not
demonstrate that allowing appellant's claim would
cause undue prejudice. Therefore, this claim should not
have been struck.
The real issue . . . is not whether legal theories
may be pleaded but whether the original theory
may be discarded or augmented and recovery
had on some other theory. The federal rules, and
l4a
the decisions construing them, evince a belief
that wher a party has a valid claim, he should
recover om it regardless of his counsel's failure to
perceive the true basis of the claim at the
pleading stage, provided always that a late shift
in the thrust of the case will not prejudice tne
other party in maintaining a defense upon the
merits.
5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 1219 at 281-83 (8d ed. 2004) (footnote omitted); see
also Alley v. Resolution Trust Corp., 299 U.S. App.
D.C. 363, 984 F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(allowing plaintiffs to add an ERISA claim after
motions for summary judgment had been filed because
there was no prejudice to the defendant).
The District Court granted summary judgment to
appellee on appellant's hostile work environment claim,
and that judgment has not been appealed. In addition to
granting the motion to strike appellant's retaliatory
harassment claim, the District Court held, in the
alternative, that insofar as appellant's retaliatory
harassment claim was merely a variation of her prior
hostile environment claim, it lacked merit for the same
reasons that the hostile environment claim had failed.
During oral argument, appellant's counsel conceded
that Ms. Wiley could not prevail on her retaliatory
harassment claim unless she could establish that the
alleged harassment resulted in a hostile environment.
See Hussain v. Nicholson, 369 U.S. App. D.C. 247, 435
F.3d 359, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that “[iJn this
circuit, a hostile work environment can amount to
retaliatior under Title VII"). Because there is no claim
15a
here that the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment on appellant's hostile environment claim,
appellant's retaliatory harassment claim necessarily
fails as well. We therefore grant summary judgment for
appellee cn this claim.
Fifth Claim: Reduced Airtime
The District Court granted appellee's motion to strike
appellant's final claim, 2.e., that she suffered retaliation
when McMenamin reduced her airtime production from
17 minutes to 18 minutes. The District Court struck this
claim on the grounds that appellant failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies. Appellant filed an
informal complaint of discrimination, withdrew it on
August 2/, 2002, and never filed a formal complaint
specifically listing her airtime claim.
The District Court erred in striking appellant's claim,
because the reduced airtime allegation "could have
reasonably been expected to grow out of [appellant's]
earlier ccmplaint." Weber v. Battista, 377 U.S. App.
D.C. 347, 494 F.3d 179, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Hattie Baldwin, the Director
of the USIA's Office of Civil Rights, wrote to appellant
confirming that her complaints of discrimination and
retaliation had been received, acknowledged, and
consolidated. Letter from Hattie P. Baldwin to Verla
M. Wiley (5/14/98), J.A. 407-08. The complaints that
were accepted for processing included the denial of
"training for supervisory/managerial roles within the
Branch,” the denial of Wiley's "input" on "programming
and policy with regard to office procedures and
broadcasts,’ and the denial of "career advancement and
promotioral opportunities." /d. at 408. The record thus
16a
makes it clear that the airtime claim was "like or
related" to the claims of discrimination and retaliation
raised in appellant's original complaint. Weber, 494 F.3d
at 184. "Therefore, we conclude [appellant] gave [BBG]
an opportunity to resolve her claim administratively
before she filed her complaint in district court." Id. The
claim was properly before the District Court and should
not have been struck.
Although it cannot be said that appellant failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies, we nonetheless
grant judgment to appellee. The District Court
effectively dismissed appellant's claim pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)
states that, if, on a motion to dismiss, "matters outside
the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).! In this case, the
District Court considered "matters outside the
pleading" in granting the agency's motion to strike, and
both parties had a "reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent" to the motion. The District
Court, however, did not convert what was ostensibly a
12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment.
Nonetheless, in these circumstances, this court is free
to characterize the District Court’s Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal as a grant of summary judgment under Rule
56 and affirm, so long as we are assured that both sides
had a reasonable opportunity to present evidence and
there are no genuine issues of material fact. See, e.g.,
Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., 371 U.S. App. D.C. 422, 452 F.3d 798, 805 (D.C.
17a
Cir. 2006). Finding no merit in appellant's claim, we will
grant summary judgment to appellee.
Appellant's claim lacks merit because she failed to
establish that a reduction in airtime responsibilities
constituted a materially adverse action for the purpose
of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. As
noted above, "an employee suffers an adverse
employment action if he experiences materially adverse
consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment or future employment
opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could
find objectively tangible harm." Forkkio, 306 F.3d at
1131. Appellant offered nothing to the District Court or
to this court establishing that the reduction in her
airtime production -- from 17 minutes to 13 minutes --
couid affect her compensation, grade, or opportunity for
future advancement.
Appellant has also failed to establish that “a reasonable
employee would have found the challenged action
materially adverse, which in this context means it well
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making
or supporting a charge of discrimination." Burlington,
126 S. Ct. at 2415 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Without such proof, there can be no finding of unlawful
retaliation. Actionable retaliation claims are limited to
those where an employer causes " material adversity,"
not "trivial harms." /d. Appellant has failed to show that
the disputed reduction in airtime production was
anything other than a trivial harm, if that.
18a
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's grant of
summary judgment to appellee with respect to
appellant's first three claims is affirmed. The District
Court's decision to strike appellant's last two claims is
reversed, and summary judgment is granted to
appellee on those claims as well.
Footnote
1Rule 12(d), which went into effect on December 1, 2007
and is titled "Result of Presenting Matters Outside the
Pleadings," states that “[iJf, on a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
must be treated as one for summary judgment under
Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable
opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent
to the motion."
19a
10/2/2006
Civ. No. 99-975 (TFH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
KEMI SOUTHEY-COLE, et al.
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
KENNETH Y. TOMLINSON, Chairman, Broadcasting
Board of Governors,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is defendant Kenneth Y.
Tomlinson's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding
plaintiff Vera Wiley's claim that the Broadcasting
Board of Governors (the "agency") retaliated against
her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 by charging her annual leave for time she spent
attending witness depositions while preparing her
employment discrimination case. The defendant argues
that judgment in the agency's favor is warranted on the
grounds that (1) the plaintiff is unable to establish a
prima facie case of retaliation because she cannot show
that she was subjected to a material injury or harm that
would dissuade a reasonable employee from making a
charge of retaliation, and (2) even if the plaintiff could
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the agency
articulated a non-retaliatory reason for its action that
the plaintiff failed to show was pretext. The Court
holds that, because the agency complied with existing
law and agency agreements when it charged the
plaintiff annual leave to attend witness depositions, the
plaintiff was not subjected to a material injury or harm
20a
and, as a result, is unable to establish all the required
elements of a retaliation claim.
Likewise, the plaintiff is unable to show that the
agency's compliance with existing law and agreements
was mere pretext for retaliation. Accordingly, the
Court will grant the defendant's motion.
BACKGROUND
The undisputed facts reveal that the plaintiff is an
African-American female who was employed as an
International Radio Broadcaster for the English to
Africa Branch of Voice of America, which is one of
several international broadeasters that comprise the
International Broadcasting Bureau, which in turn is
part of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No
Genuine Issue Par. 1, 3 [hereinafter "Undisputed Facts
Par. _”];! Wiley Dep. 5:21-23. The Broadcasting Board
of Governors is an independent federal agency
responsible for all non-military international
broadcasting sponsored by the United States
government. About the BBG, http://www.bbg.gov/bbg
aboutus.cfm. At the time of the events at issue, the
plaintiff had an employment discrimination case
pending against the agency in this court.
During all times relevant here, the agency was subject
to compliance with a Negotiated Labor Management
Agreement between the United States Information
Agency and the American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1812 (AFL-CIO). The plaintiff was
the Vice President for Voice of America union members
and acted as a union representative for employees
Z2la
engaged in proceedings at the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Wiley Dep. 7:10-
18:16. Article 24 of the Negotiated Labor Management
Agreement contained provisions relating to leave. Pl.'s
Mem. In Opp'n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 26B,
Negotiated Labor Management Agreement Art. 24
[hereinafter "Pl.'s Opp'n Br. "|. Section 8 of that
Article addressed "court leave' and stated that such
leave was available when an employee was summoned
to appear as a witness or juror on behalf of the federal
government. Id. § 8. That section expressly stated,
however, that "[c] ourt leave is not available when the
service is strictly on behalf of a private party - it must
be on behalf of a government." Id. Furthermore,
Section 8 mandated that an employee submit a copy of
the summons in advance to his or her superviscr. Id. In
addition, Section 10 of Article 24 authorized excused
absences, also referred to as administrative leave, but
directed that an excused absence "must be approved by
the supervisor" and cited blood donation, voting, and
unavoidable absences not to exceed one hour as
examples of "common excused absences." Id. § 10.
The agency also had in place a Manual of Operations
and Administration ("MOA") that contained similar
provisions relating to "court leave," which was
available to employees summoned to appear in a
judicial proceeding on behalf of the federal government,
when testifying in an official capacity, when appearing
as a witness in a judicial proceeding involving the
federal government as a party, when appearing as a
juror, or when appearing to qualify for jury service.
Pl.'s Opp'n Br. Ex. 26B, MOA § 671. Similar to the
Negotiated Labor Management Agreement, the MOA
also required employees to submit a copy of the
22a
summons before court leave may be granted. Id. § 675.
The agency also was subject to compliance with Title V
of the United States Code, Section 6322 of which
governs leave for jury or witness service. 5 U.S.C. §
6322 (2001).: That statute permits employees to take
leave without loss of pay or annual leave when
summoned to serve as a juror or as a witness in a
judicial proceeding for which the federal government is
a party, amony other authorized occasions not relevant
here. Id.
In February 2001, the plaintiff approached her
supervisor, Rebecca McMenamin, and stated that it was
her understanding that she was permitted to take
administrative leave to attend witness depositions in
her employment discrimination case. Undisputed Facts
Par. 7; McMenamin Dep. 22:13-23:5. McMenamin told
the plaintiff that she would look into the matter.
Undisputed Facts Par. 7; McMenamin Dep. 22:13-23:5.
On February 14, 2001, McMenamin sent an e-mail to
Donna Grace, a Labor Relation Specialist in the Office
of Personnel, seeking guidance about whether the
plaintiff was authorized to take administrative leave to
attend witness depositions. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 4 Par. 2;
Undisputed Facts Par. 7; McMenamin Dep. 23:3-5;
Grace Dep. 15:5-9. Grace responded to McMenamin's
inquiry that same day and advised her that:
There is such a thing as "court leave," which is a
form of admin leave and would not be charged
against an employee. However, it cannot be used
to work on one's own court case. Court leave is
for when you are required to serve jury duty or
when you are summoned to testify for an Agency
in an official capacity. If Verla ... [is] working on
23a
[her] own case, it's personal business and must
be charged as annual leave, scheduled in
advance, and approved by the supervisor for a
time when it does not interfere with work. It
most definitely is nul court leave or any other
form of administrative leave.
Pl.'s Opp'n Br. Ex. 7 (E-mail from Grace to McMenamin
of 2/14/01).2 Twenty minutes after receiving Grace's
response, McMenamin sent the following e-mail to the
plaintiff and two other individuals explaining that
administrative leave was not authorized to attend
witness depositions:
I understand there is some confusion about what
qualifies as administrative leave, regarding time
needed to pursue legal business. As explained to
me by the Personnel Office today:
There is such a thing as "court leave," which is a
form of admin leave and would not be charged
against an employee. However, it cannot be used
to work on one's own court case. Court leave is
for when you are required to serve jury duty or
when you are summoned to testify for an Agency
in an official capacity.
If you are working on your own court case, then
it is viewed as personal business and must be
charged as annual leave, scheduled in advance,
and does not interfere with work [sic].
Id. at Ex. 8 (E-mail from McMenamin to Abedje,
Southey-Cole and Wiley of 2/14/01). The plaintiff
acknowledged in an affidavit that "[m]y supervisor,
24a
after consulting with Labor Relations Specialist Donna
Grace, informed me on February 14 _~ that
[administrative] leave was not authorized." Def.'’s Br.
Ex. 1(A2).
That same day, the plaintiff attended a witness
deposition at which Deputy General Counsel William
Ohlhausen was present. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 4 Par. 3; Wiley
Dep. 26:15; Ohlhausen Dep. 7:4-15; Undisputed Facts
Par. 11. The plaintiff asked Ohlhausen whether she was.
allowed to take administrative leave to attend witness
depositions in her case. PI's Opp'n Br. 4 Par. 3; Wiley
Dep. 27:3-17; Undisputed Facts Par. 15. The parties
dispute what Ohlhausen told the plaintiff. During a
deposition, Ohlhausen testified that he told the plaintiff
he was uncertain about whether administrative leave
was authorized for the purpose of attending witness
depositions and would research the issue. Ohlhausen
Dep. 7:21-8:2; Undisputed Facts Par. 12. The plaintiff
claims that Ohlhausen told her "she could take official
time to attend the depositions." Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 4 Par. 3;
Wiley Dep. 28:21-22. Regardless of what Ohlhausen told
the plaintiff at the deposition, it is undisputed that the
very next day he made clear his uncertainty about
whether administrative leave was authorized to attend
witness depositions when he sent the plaintiff and
several other agency officials an e-mail stating:
Ms. Wiley asked me about the taking of official
leave to take part in EEOC proceedings,
specifically the attendance at depositions. I did a
little research yesterday and I am forwarding to
all of you the EEOC's regulation on this
subject.... The regulation ... does not specifically
address the issue of complainants attending
25a
depositions and document productions. | am
sending this email to Delia Johnson to see if her
office has issued any policy statements on this.
After I have an opportunity to discuss this
further with Delia and do more research on the
question, I wili get back to all of you with a more
definitive opinion.
Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 5 Par. 4 ("Mr. Ohlhausen followed up on
Ms. Wiley's query regarding the use of official time for
attending depositions with an e-mail dated February
15, 2001 wherein he indicated that he needed to do more
research and that he would provide additional guidance
after doing so."), Ex. 11 (E-mail from Ohlhausen to
Wiley, Southey-Cole, Johnson, Dillard and
McMenamin); Wiley Dep. 36:16-21 (indicating that she
notified McMenamin about Ohlhausen's uncertainty
regarding the administrative leave policy); Undisputed
_Facts Par. 13. Indeed, during her own deposition the
plaintiff acknowledged that Ohlhausen was uncertain
about the issue and said that "he'll get back to us on
this." Wiley Dep. 36:22-23.
After receiving both McMenamin's and Qhlhausen's e-
mails, the plaintiff had another conversation with
McMenamin during which she’ expressed her
disagreement with McMenamin's position that she was
not entitled to take administrative leave to attend
witness depositions. Wiley Dep. 36:15-21; Undisputed
Facts Par. 14; McMenamin Dep. 25:17-21. The plaintiff
referred McMenamin to Ohlhausen's e-mail and noted
that Ohlhausen planned to offer his analysis of the issue
at a later date. Wiley Dep. 36:22-23 (stating that she let
McMenamin "know that he is saying he'll get back to us
on this"). According to the plaintiff, McMenamin agreed
26a
making a final decision about whether the plaintiff was
entitled to take administrative leave to attend witness
depositions. Wiley Dep. 36:23-24. The plaintiff engaged
in no further discussions with her supervisor about
whether administrative leave was authorized for
witness depositions, which she continued to attend.
Wiley Dep. 38:8-11; Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 6 Par. 7. Instead, the
plaintiff simply waited for Ohlhausen's decision. Wiley
Dep. 3 8:6-7.
At some point before October 5, 2001, however, the
plaintiff met with Jack Welch, who at that time was the
Director of Human Resources. Wiley Dep. 39:6-40:6;
Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 5 (Welch Decl. Par. 1).
According to the plaintiff, when she asked Welch about
the leave issue he told her that he was "sure" she would
be charged annual leave for the time she spent
attending witness depositions. Wiley Dep. 39:9-11.
On October 5, 2001, the agency's Office of Civil Rights
forwarded a memorandum addressed to all employees
that was titled "Guidelines for Complainants and
Managers Regarding Use of Official Time to Participate
in Proceedings Before the OCR, the EEOC or the
Federal Courts." Pl's Opp'n Br. Ex. 1. The
memorandum's stated purpose was to "provide
guidance to employees concerning existing agency
policy regarding the use of official time (also referred to
as Official leave' or ‘administrative leave’) in
proceedings alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, the Equal Pay Act, or the Rehabilitation Act." Id.
The memorandum distinguished between cases pending
before the agency's Office of Civil Rights or the EEOC
27a
With regard to cases pending before federal district
courts, the memorandum stated that:
An employee who is a plaintiff in the lawsuit q
shall be granted official leave when being a
deposed by the agency. If there are multiple yy
plaintiffs in the lawsuit, an employee/plaintiff is E
entitled to official leave to attend only his or her a
own deposition, but not those of the other a
plaintiffs or of non-party witnesses. 4
Id. Although the memorandum was addressed from the
Office of Civil Rights, it is uncontested that it was
drafted by Chlhausen. Undisputed Facts Par. 17.
Four days after the memorandum was circulated,
McMenamin sent an e-mail to the plaintiff notifying the
plaintiff that she would be charged annual leave for the
time she spent attending witness depositions. PI.'s
Opp'n Br. Ex. 16. McMenamin's e-mail stated:
The Office of Civil Rights has issued a statement
clarifying agency policy regarding the use of
leave in retaliation to legal matters. This policy
indicates there is no change from the guidance I
first sent you on February 14, 2001. In brief, it
reiterates that, if you are working on your own
court case, it is personal business and must be
charged as annual leave, scheduled in advance,
and approved by the supervisor for a time when
it does not interfere with work. The only
exception to the use of annual leave is when an
employee is being deposed. In that case, the
employee would be given administrative leave to
28a
attand tho danacitinan
We now must correct your time and attendance
record to reflect the times you were out of the
office. I will drop off for you a list detailing the
days that you attended depositions. Please
review the days/times listed to ensure they are
correct. I also will pass a copy of the list on to
Nikki so t at she may make the proper
adjustments.
Id.
In the ensuing days, several communications were
exchanged between agency officials relating to whether
Delia Johnson, the Director of the Office of Civil Rights,
thought that the memorandum circulated on October 5,
2001, constituted a new policy. Pl's Opp'n Br. 9 at Pars.
1719, 25, 33, Exs. 3-5,11,17, 20-21. Johnson stated
during a November 8, 2005, deposition that she
considered the memorandum to be a new policy
because, at that time, her office did not have a written
internal policy dealing with employment discrimination
cases pending in a federal district court.‘ Pl.'s Opp'n Br.
Ex. 15 (Johnson Dep. 13:3-12 (11/8/05)). Johnson
attributed the lack of an internal written policy to the
fact that the Office of Civil Rights "[was] responsible
for cases doing the administrative procedures and not
once they got to the court level." Id. During a
subsequent deposition on January 25, 2006, Johnson
further confirmed that she had no "jurisdiction" over
employment discrimination cases pending in a federal
district court; therefore, "[aJny decisions made at that
time are made through either the Office of General
Counsel, the HR office, and not with - not through my
29a
office." JIhnson Dep. 34: 9-14 (1/25/06). An October 12,
2001, e-mail trom Uohnson to General Counsé! Carol
Booker and Office of Personnel Director Jack Welch
indicates that she was concerned that "management
and/or [the General Counsel] should have given notice
to the cormplainants that the leave usage was not
permissible." Pl.'s Opp'n Br. Ex. 4. Later, however,
after receiving an e-mail from Booker explaining the
chronology of events and the fact that McMenamin told
the plaintiff on February 14, 2001, that she could not
take administrative leave to attend witness depositions,
Johnson acknowledged that if McMenamin "gave
appropriate notice regarding the leave policy, she
should proceed to handle the matter as advised by [the
Office of General Counsel]." Pl.'s Opp'n Br. Ex. 17.
Johnson nevertheless expressed her concern that the
agency should have been charging the plaintiff leave
beginning in February, when the plaintiff's supervisor
first notified the plaintiff that administrative leave was
not authorized to attend witness depositions. Id. After
further explanation in an October 16, 2001, e-mail in
which Booker stated that "[t]he affected employees are
not losing anything they would otherwise have a right
to, as it turns out that there is no Title VII exception to
the policy in the MOA, which we would gladly have
reported had we found one," Johnson responded "Great!
I am happy that we can move on and [McMenamin] is
able to proceed with the advice from your office." E-
mail from Johnson to Booker with copies to West,
Ohlhausen, Welch and McMenamin of 10/16/01.
On October 24, 2001, the plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a
Notification of Additional Acts of Reprisal or Related
Occurrences in which she first asserted that the agency
was retaliating against her by charging her annual
Sig
30a
leave for the time she spent attending witness
depositions. ‘That allegation subsequently was
consolidated into her employment discrimination
lawsuit pending before this Court, for which she has
‘legal representation. On May 31, 2006, the defendant
filed the Motion for Summary Judgment that is now at
issue.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Standard
"Summary judgment is appropriate only if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to _ interrogatories,
admissions, and affidavits filed pursuant to discovery
show that, first, ‘there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact’ and, second, ‘the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.”’ Holcomb v. Powell,
433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Rule 56(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)). When
determining whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists, the Court must consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party without
deciding its weight or credibility; however, the Court
need not give credence to the nonmoving party's
conclusory allegations that lack factual support in the
record. Id.; District Intown Props. Ltd. v. District of
Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 878 (D.C. Cir.1999) ("In
deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material
fact, the court must assume the truth of all statements
proffered by the non-movant except for conclusory
allegations lacking any factual basis in the record.").
Moreover, to defeat summary judgment, it is
insufficient for the nonmoving party to point out
sla
disputed facts that are immaterial or fail to raise
genuine issues. Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895. As the D.C.
Circuit has explained:
"The mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties" will not defeat
summary judgment; "the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of material fact." A fact
is "material” if a dispute over it might affect the
outcome of a suit under governing law; factual
disputes that are "irrelevant or unnecessary" do
not affect the summary judgment determination.
An issue is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party." If there are no genuine issues
of material fact, the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law if the nonmoving
party "fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to
that party's case, and one on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial."
Id. Gnternal citations omitted). "Where the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue
for trial."' Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted).
II. Whether the Plaintiff Established a Prima Facie
Case of Retaliation
The legal question in this case is whether the agency's
decision to charge the plaintiff annual leave for time she
spent attending witness depositions rises to the level of
actionable retaliation. Both parties agree that a
32a
retaliation claim is subject to the same burden-shifting
standard as employment discrimination claims. Mem. of
P. & A. In Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 9
("Evaluation of a Title VII retaliation claims follows the
same burden-shifting template as a discrimination
claim.") {hereinafter "Def.'s Br. "J; Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 15-
16 ("Evaluation of Title VII retaliation claims follows
the same burden-shifting template as discrimination
claims."); see also Cones v. Shalala,199 F.3d 512, 520
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that the "burden-
shifting mechanism" applies to a court's evaluation of a
retaliation claim). Both parties therefore agree that the
analysis of the issue must proceed according to the
following scheme:
(1) The plaintiff must first establish a prima
facie case of retaliation.
(2) If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case of retaliation, then the burden of production
shifts to the agency to proffer evidence of a
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions.
(3) If the agency articulates a legitimate, non-
retaliatory reason for its actions, the burden of
production shifts back to the plaintiff to proffer
evidence that the agency's non-retaliatory
reason for its actions is pretext.
Def.'s Br. 9; Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 16; Cones, 199 F.3d at 520.
To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, the
plaintiff must establish that she engaged in a
statutorily protected activity, the employer took an
adverse employment action, and a causal connection
existed between the two. Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d
1127,1131(D.C. Cir. 2002). The government concedes
that the plaintiff was engaged in a statutorily protected
33a
activity at the time she was charged annual leave for
attending witness depositions. Def.'s Br. 9 (Here,
plaintiff was engaged in protected activity at the time
of the alleged retaliatory action."). The government
argues, however, that the plaintiff is unable to meet her
burden of showing that the agency took an adverse
employment action against her. Id. at 10.
The Supreme Court recently considered the contours of
the legal standard to establish an adverse employment
action in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
548 U.S. ,126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006). In Burlington, the
Supreme Court considered (1) "whether Title VII's
antiretaliation provision forbids only those employer
actions and resuiting harms that are related to
employment or the workplace” and (2) "how harmful an
act of retaliatory discrimination must be in order to fall
within the provision's scope." Burlington, 126 S.Ct. at
2411. After first determining that "the scope of the anti-
retaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related
or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm,” the
Supreme Court went on to observe that "[t]he anti-
retaliation provision protects an individual not from all
retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury
or harm." Id. at 2414. The Supreme Court ultimately
held that, to be an actionable injury or harm, the
plaintiff "must show that a reasonable employee would
have found the challenged action materially adverse,
which in this context means it well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 2415
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The
Supreme Court explained:
We speak of material adversity because we
34a
believe it is important to separate significant
from trivial harms. Title VII, we have said, does
not set forth "a general civility code for the
American workplace." An employee's decision to
report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize
that employee from those petty slights or minor
annoyances that often take place at work and
that all employees experience." The anti-
retaliation provision seeks to prevent employer
interference with “unfettered access" to Title
VIPs remedial mechanisms. It does so by
prohibiting employer actions that are likely "to
deter victims of discrimination from complaining
to the EEOC,” the courts, and their employers.
And normally petty slights, minor annoyances,
and simple lack of good manners will not create
such deterrence.
Id. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court further
stated that "the significance of any given act of
retaliation will often depend upon the particular
circumstances." Id. As the Supreme Court emphasized:
"Context matters." Id.
Accordingly, the question is whether the plaintiff can
meet her burden of showing that the agency took a
materially adverse employment action against her, as
measured by whether the agency's decision to charge
her annual leave for time she spent attending witness
depositions might have dissuaded a_ reasonable
employee from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination. Even when viewed in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, who is the nonmoving party,
the Court is unpersuaded that the evidence shows the
plaintiff was subjected to a materially adverse action.
35a
The crux of the plaintiff's retaliation claim is that, after
Deputy General Counsel William Ohlhausen told the
plaintiff that she could take administrative leave, the
agency engaged in an effort to develop a new policy
over a period of several months that retroactively
stripped the plaintiff of the right to use such leave
notwithstanding the fact that agency officials knew the
plaintiff was taking administrative leave to attend
witness depositions and failed to notify her that she
would be charged annua! leave for that time. Pl.'s Opp'n
Br. |. The problem with the plaintiff's argument is that
its viability depends on the fact finder ignoring the
undisputed evidence that the plaintiffs supervisor told
her on February 14, 2001, that “[iJf you are working on
your own court case, then it is viewed as personal
business and must be charged as annual leave,
scheduled in advance, and approved by the supervisor
for a time when it does not interfere with work." Pl.'s
Opp'n Br. Ex. 8. Thus, on February 14, 2001, the
plaintiff's request to take administrative leave was
denied by her supervisor. The fact that the plaintiff
disputed that determination or was not apprised of the
actual legal basis for it does not eviscerate its effect of
putting her on notice that she would be charged annual
leave for time spent attending witness depositions. »
Moreover, it is immaterial whether, that same day,
Ohlhausen in fact told the plaintiff that she could take
administrative leave. Ohlhausen was not the plaintiff's
supervisor and it is undisputed that the very next day
he sent the plaintiff an e-mail making it clear that he
was uncertain whether administrative leave was
authorized and planned to research the issue further.
Id. at Ex. 11(e-mail from Ohlhausen to Wiley and
Southey-Cole with copies to Johnson, Dillard and
36a
McMenamin of 2/15/01); Wiley Dep. 36:15-24. As a
result, at that point, the plaintiff was notified that
whatever Ohlhausen told her the previous day might
have been in error and should not be relied upon.”
After receiving Ohlhausen's e-mail stating that he
would research whether the plaintiff was entitled to
take administrative leave to attend witness depositions,
the plaintiff contends that she discussed the matter
further with McMenamin and McMenamin “agreed that
she would wait until [Ohlhausen] got back for the final
decision on the leave issue." Wiley Dep. 36:23-24. There
is no evidence that McMenamin's decision to wait
several months before charging the plaintiff annual
leave for the time she spent attending depositions was
anything other than an accommodation to the plaintiff
in response to the plaintiffs contention that the
decision to deny administrative leave was incorrect and
any final decision should await Ohlhausen's analysis.
Pl.'s Opp'n Br. Ex. 14 (McMenamin declaring that she
"did not want to appear to be harassing anyone about a
matter over which [she] was in some doubt" so she
"agreed to wait until the matter was checked out
further before making a final decision on leave"); Wiley
Dep. 36:15-24. The plaintiff took a calculated risk when
she continued to attend witness depositions in the
hopes that Ohlhausen's legal analysis would confirm her
assertion that McMenamin's. decision denying
administrative leave was incorrect.
Significantly, the plaintiff has never disputed that, at
the time she first requested administrative leave from
her supervisor on February 14, 2001, no such leave was
authorized by the applicable law, rules or agency
agreements, namely 5 U.S.C. § 6322, the Negotiated
37a
Labor Management Agreement, or the MOA. It is
notable that the Negotiated Labor Management
Agreement, with which the plaintiff likely was familiar
as a union representative, explicitly prohibited the use
of court leave “when the service is strictly on behalf of a
private party" and not on behalf of the government, as
was the case when the plaintiff attended witness
depositions in her pending employment discriminaticn
case. Negotiated Labor Management Agreement, Art.
24 § 8. That Agreement also made clear that
administrative leave “must be approved by the
supervisor." Id. at Art. 24 § 10.
Similarly, the MOA permitted court leave only for
certain specified activities that did not include
attending witness depositions on behalf of a private
party. Consequently, the plaintiffs supervisor acted
entirely consistent with the Negotiated Labor
Agreement and MOA when she followed the Office of
Personnel's guidance and advised the plaintiff that she
was not entitled to administrative leave so any time
spent attending witness depositions "must be charged
as annual leave, scheduled in advance...." Pl.'s Opp'n Br.
Ex. 8 (E-mail from McMenamin to Abedje, Southey-
Cole and Wiley of 2/14/01).
From this vantage point, which is one the plaintiff
entirely overlooks in favor of looking backward from
the date the October memorandum was circulated, the
facts of this case appear to be similar to those in Moore
v. Summers, 113 F. Supp.2d 5, 28-29 (D.D.C. 2000), in
which our colleague on this court rejected Secret
Service agents’ claims that they were retaliated against
when they were "denied paid administrative leave to
attend the deposition of the Secret Service agency
FE eR INO ae a
Tok 00 ek ea
38a
designee" in a federal employment discrimination case.
In that case, the court noted that "[als courts within
this Circuit and elsewhere have recognized, ‘there is no
express provision in Title VII or its regulations
granting an employee the right to administrative leave
for judicial proceedings."' Id. (citing Shelhorne v.
Runyon, No. 95-0641,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13583, at
*51(D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1997)). The court went on to state
that “[aldherence to an established agency policy
regarding administrative leave also goes a long way in
rebutting any inference of discrimination or retaliation
that might otherwise be drawn from the denial of paid
leave." Id. at 29. Here, McMenamin's original
determination denying the plaintiffs request for
administrative leave complied with the existing
Negotiated Labor Management Agreement and MOA.
The plaintiff, therefore, was unharmed by her
supervisor's decision to deny administivative leave
given that the plaintiff was not entitled to such leave
and no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise based
on the applicable law and agency agreements.
Notwithstanding the plaintiffs characterization of the
October 5, 2001, memorandum as a “new" policy, the
fact of the matter is that when the memorandum was
circulated by the Office of Civil Rights it summarized
existing law and agency agreements and was consistent
with McMenamin's original determination that the
plaintiff was not entitled to administrative leave and
should be charged annual leave for attending witness
depositions. Hence, after the October 5, 2001,
memorandum was circulated, McMenamin sent the
plaintiff an e-mail stating that the memorandum
"indicates there is no change from the guidance I first
sent to you on February 14, 2001." Pl.'s Opp'n Br. Ex.
h
3
“ss
.
U
a
:
3"
‘4
%
39a
16 (E-mail from McMenamin to Wiley with copies to
Dillard and McMenamin of 10/9/01). Although the
plaintiff takes issue with the fact that the agency
waited until after the October memorandum was
circulated to actually charge her annual leave,‘ that was
a gamble the plaintiff took when she elected to continue
attending witness depositions knowing that her
supervisor had denied her request for administrative
leave and was simply waiting for verification from
Ohlhausen that her decision was correct. The gamble
might have paid off if Ohlhausen's research ultimately
revealed legal authority to grant an employee
administrative leave to attend witness depositions. In
the final analysis, however, it did not.
The plaintiff makes much of what she describes as the
“eruption" of a "significant debate" about whether the
October 5, 2001, memorandum constituted "new" policy
that was being applied to the plaintiff retroactively.
Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 2, 24-25. Even viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff, the so-called
"debate" really involved a single official, Delia Johnson,
who was the Director of the Office oi Civil Rights and
whose confusion appears to be the result of (1) her lack
of knowledge about the fact that the plaintiff's
supervisor denied the plaintiffs request for
administrative leave to attend witness depositions from
the outset and (2) her lack of knowledge about the
existing law and provisions of the Negotiated Labor
Management Agreement that applied once a complaint
was filed in a federal] district court, at which point
Johnson no longer had "jurisdiction" over the matter.
Ms. Johnson's confusion in either circumstance does not
change the fact that 5 U.S.C. § 6322, the Negotiated
Labor Management Agreement, and the MOA were in
40a
place at the time the plaintiff originally requested
administrative leave and her supervisor's decision to
deny the requested leave complied with that law and
agreement - as did the October 5, 2001, memorandum.
Having considered the facts in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, this Court is of the view that there are
no materia] facts in dispute’ and the evidence supports
the conclusion that no reasonable jury would find the
decision to charge the plaintiff annual leave for time she
spent attending witness depositions to be materially
adverse. The existing law, rules and agreements made
clear that administrative leave was not available for the
purpose the plaintiff sought, and the October 5, 2001,
memorandum did not change that fact. There also is no
evidence that any other employee was ever granted
administrative leave - or not charged annual leave -
under similar circumstances. Consequently, because no
employee was authorized to take administrative leave
to attend witness depositions in an employment
discrimination case pending before a federal district
court, no employee would have been injured or harmed
by the agency's refusal to grant administrative leave
and the corollary decision to charge annual leave for
such time. Thus, the agency's decision to deny
administrative leave in this case would not dissuade a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination. Because the decision to charge the
plaintiff annual leave for the time she spent attending
witness depositions complied with existing law, rules
and agreements, the plaintiff suffered no injury or harm
that rose to the level of a materially adverse
employment action. As a result, the plaintiff is unable to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
dla
IIl. Whether the Plaintiff Rebutted the Agency's
Legitimate, Non-retaliatory Reason for Denying
Administrative Leave
For essentially the same reasons the plaintiff is unable
to show that she was subjected to a materially adverse
employment action, she also is unable to show that the
agency's nonretaliatory reason for charging her annual
leave for the time she spent attending witness
depositions was pretext. The agency has argued, and
the undisputed evidence shows, that when the
plaintiffs supervisor originally denied the plaintiff's
request to take administrative leave to attend witness
depositions, she did so in compliance with 5 U.S.C. §
6322, the Negotiated Labor Management Agreement,
and the MOA. Likewise, the agency's October 5, 2001,
memorandum confirming that administrative leave was
not authorized to attend witness depositions complied
with the same law and agreement. Thus, the agency
satisfied its burden of producing evidence of a
legitimate nondiscrimonatory reason for charging the
plaintiff annual leave for attending witness depositions.
Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
256 (1981) (stating that an employer meets its burden
by explaining what it did or producing evidence of
legitimate non-retaliatory reasons).
The plaintiff, however, proffered no evidence indicating
that the agency's reason was pretext, such as evidence
that 5 U.S.C. § 6322, the Negotiated Labor
Management Agreement, and the MOA were not in
existence at the time the plaintiff was attending
witness depositions, that some other law or agreements
affirmatively granted employees the right to
administrative leave to attend witness depositions, or
42a
that other employees were granted administrative
leave or not charged annual leave in like circumstances.
Instead, the plaintiff simply put forth the argument
that Ohlhausen initially "instructed" her to take
administrative leave, a fact that is in dispute but
immaterial in light of Ohlhausen's February 15, 2001, e-
mail; a conclusory argument that “no specific policy
governing the use of official time to attend depositions
of witnesses and co-parties existed as of February
2001," which is contradicted by 5 U.S.C. $ 6322, the
Negotiated Labor Management Agreement, and the
MOA; and the plaintiffs assertion that the agency
attempted to conceal discovery documents relating to
an internal debate among agency officials about the
import of the October 5, 2001, memorandum, which she
believes is "persuasive circumstantial evidence that the
true reason behind the Agency's actions was retaliatory
animus." Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 21-25. None of the plaintiffs
arguments “suffice[s] to establish a dispute substantial
enough to withstand the motion for summary
judgment." Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532
U.S. 268, 274 (2001). Because the undisputed evidence
in the record conclusively reveals a non-retaliatory
reason for the agency's decision to charge the plaintiff
annual leave for attending witness depositions, namely
that it did so in compliance with existing law and
agency agreements, and the plaintiff has failed to
present sufficient evidence to discredit the agency's
non-retaliatory reason, no reasonable jury could infer
retaliation from the agency's decision to comply with
existing law and agency agreements. See Samii v.
Billington,195 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Once an
employer articulates a legitimate, [non-retaliatory]
reason for the challenged employment decision, the
employer prevails unless the employee succeeds in
43a
discrediting the employer's explanation.").
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will grant
the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. An
appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum
Opinion.
Thomas F. Hogan Chief Judge
October 2, 2006
Footnotes
1Pursuant to Rule 7(h) of the Civil Rules of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, the
defendant filed a Statement of Material Facts as to
Which There is No Genuine Issue. The plaintiff filed no
objéctions to the defendant's Statement of Material
Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue, so the
Court will deem those facts to be conceded by both
parties. In accordance with the same rule, the plaintiff
incorporated a Statement of Genuine Issues of Material
Facts in Dispute into her legal brief filed in opposition
to the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, to
which the defendant objected.
2Throughout the pleadings and documentary evidence
the term “administrative leave" is referred to
interchangeably with the terms “official leave" and
“court leave." Accordingly, when the Court refers to
"adtministrative lea" in this opinion, that term should
be Understood to mean paid leave that is not charged to
an employee's annual leave and encompasses both
“official leave" and “court leave.”
44a
3Grace later stated that her e-mail to McMenamin
"provided ... the substance of the provisions in the
Manual of Administration (MOA) and the Negotiated
LaborManagement Agreement which specified the
circumstances when administrative leave is authorized."
Def.'s Br. Ex. I (F2).
4There is evidence in the record indicating that some
agency officials were confused about, or unaware of, the
differences between the rules and regulations that
apply to employment discrimination cases pending at
the administrative level before the agency's Office of
Civil Rights or the EEOC, versus employment
discrimination cases pending in a federal district court.
See McMenamin Dep. 27:17-28:12; Grace Dep. 34:6-
35:10; Johnson Dep. 13:38-2.
SIt also is noteworthy that the plaintiff claimed that,
after reportedly being told by Ohlhausen that she could
take administrative leave, she "felt [she] had complied
with the rules set out in EEOC MD 110 Chapter 6,
Section 15 paragraph c (1), which states that the
complainant and the Agency should arrive at a mutual
understanding as to the amount of official time to be
used prior to the complainant's use of time." Def.'s
Mem. Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 1 (Rebuttal
Statement of Verla Wiley). Setting aside the fact that
Ohlhausen fairly immediately apprised the plaintiff that
he was unsure whether she was entitled to
administrative leave and would research the issue
further, the Court observes that the record is devoid of
any evidence whatsoever that the plaintiff ever actually
arrived at a "mutual understanding” with any agency
official, including Ohlhausen, about "the amount of
official time to be used." To the contrary, the evidence
1g Bela na Satan
Me
45a
shows that the plaintiff left the office at will to attend
witness depositions without any agreement with
agency officials about the number of hours of leave, of
any kind, she was permitted to take to attend such
depositions.
6During the hearing held by the Court on August 25,
2006, the plaintiff argued that she was not necessarily
disputing that she might not be _ entitled to
administrative leave under the existing Negotiated
Labor Management Agreement or MOA, but
nevertheless challenged the agency's retroactive
deduction from her annual leave time she spent
attending witness depositions. The Court does not
follow the plaintiff's logic, however. If the agency failed
to charge her annual leave for the time she spent
attending witness depositions, that would have been
tantamount to granting her request for administrative
leave since the result would have been the same - she
would have been paid for the time spent attending
witness depositions without an adverse impact to her
annual leave. As the Court previously observed,
however, the Negotiated Labor Management
Agreement mandated that such leave "must be
approved by the supervisor," which did not happen
here.
The record also shows that, despite the plaintiff's claim
that Ohlhausen "instructed" (PI.'s Br. 6 at Par. 7) her to
take administrative leave to attend witness depositions,
and she reportedly did take such leave (id. at Par. 7 ),
she did not document the leave as such on her time
records or sign-out sheets. Grace Dep. 46:6-48:14; Def.'s
Br. Exs. 1(F2) (Grace Aff. ), 1 (G2) (time records
reflecting how the plaintiffs time was recorded during
46a
the period at issue), 4 (Booker Decl. Par. 9), 4B (E-mail
from Booker to Welch of 10/26/01). This evidence was
never challenged by the plaintiff; however, the plaintiff
asserts that it is a disputed question of fact whether
agency employees were required to document
administrative leave, or did so as a matter of practice.
Pl.'s Br. Pars. 34-35. The Court does not find this
disputed fact to be material because it goes to the
question of the plaintiffs credibility, which the Court
will not consider for the purpose of resolving the
pending motion. See District Intown Props. Ltd., 198
F.3d at 878.
7The plaintiff identified a number of facts that she
argues are material and in dispute. Pl.'s Br. 3-14. Many
of the purportedly disputed facts, however, actually
appear to be in agreement between the parties. See
Response to PI.'s State. of Genuine Issues. Of the
remaining facts, to the extent not otherwise discussed
in this Memorandum Opinion, the Court found the facts
to be immaterial and inconsequential to the
determination of whether the plaintiff was retaliated
against when the agency charged her annual leave for
attending witness depositions.
47a
No. 06-5402
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
VERLA M. WILEY,
APPELLANT
v.
JAMES K. GLASSMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE
BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS,
APPELLEE
March 12, 2008, Filed
JUDGES: BEFORE: Sentelle, Chief Judge, and
Ginsburg, Henderson, Randolph, Rogers, Tatel,
Garland, Brown, Griffith, and Kavanaugh, Circuit
Judges, and Edwards, Senior Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Upon consideration of appellant's petition for rehearing
en banc, and the absence of a request by any member of
the court for a vote, it is"
ORDERED that the petition be denied.
Per Curiam ae
IRE GENT RTOS ES ee RR
Se EE PRS Nn PO od SER ey. PS OR ee ES Cy Se ee nas SmeIE EET eS he AAS ee Me eT ee RO Pn BEET pe ae aed ect a Ge aR Re ee
a te a ght ~ Nee ha Na Pe RE NM eee MANA E pa Puerta Der a fe ee Ce
48a
No. 06-5402
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
VERLAM WILEY,
APPE! LANT
v.
JAMES K. GLASSMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE
BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS,
APPELLEE
JUDGES: BEFORE: Brown and Griffith, Circuit
Judges, and Edwards, Senior Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Upon consideration of appellant's petition for rehearing
filed January 28, 2008, and the response thereto, it is
ORDERED that the petition be denied.
Per Curiam
PRE TNR Re Bi. a So a Nae sale ky tii a eeu ae
49a
Filed 52/6/04
Civ. No. 99-975 (TFH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
KEMI SOUTHEY-COLE, et al.
Plaintiffs,
3 Vv.
KENNETH Y. TOMLINSON, Chairman, Broadcasting
Board of Governors,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This above-captioned case was referred to the
undersigned by the trial court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.3(a) for a Report and
Recommendation on Defendant's Partial Motion to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment ("Motion") [70];
Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs
Opposition ("Motion to Strike") [ 131 ]; and Defendant's
Motion to Strike Some Exhibits ("Motion to Strike
Exhibits") [132]. The undersigned held a hearing on all
three motions on October 23, 2003.'
Plaintiff, Verla Wiley ("Wiley" or "Plaintiff
initiated this action on April 16, 1999, alleging that her
employer, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (the
"Agency" or "Defendant") discriminated against her in
terms of training, evaluations, and promotion
opportunities because of her gender and race.’ Plaintiff
claims that her’ supervisor, Barry Maughan
("Maughan”), "denied Ms. Wiley's several requests for
promotion to the GS-13 level in late 1997 and early
1998; he denied her on the job training for the managing
editor position in 1997; and he saw to it that Ms. Wiley
Sag SRR RR IL Oe
RRC e
SO EES etre ORE EPEC e: See es Oe Rie opel Soy re ae. 35)
Ps ~~ ee Se OTR ee te ee eo
AGE PTA PRA figs ET ES ETT POE FRO MERE PS BTS PIRI | SE a NER Tere
ae
Bik caciat ne Vee rea oe
50a
was consistently evaluated below her male
counterparts.” Opposition to Motion ("Opposition") at 1.
Wiley also claims that the Agency retaliated against
her for engaging in the Equal Employment
Opportunity ("EEO") process, in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Wiley
alleges that Defendant denied her subsequent requests
for promotion, denied her a chance to act as Managing
Editor, retroactively took leave from her, and
significantly reduced her on-air responsibilities.
Opposition at 1. Wiley additionally claims she was
subjected to a hostile work environment based on her
gender.
Defendant moves for a partial dismissal and for
summary judgment on grounds that Plaintiff's race and
gender discrimination and retaliation claims fail to
establish a prima facie case, and furthermore, Plaintiffs
retaliatory harassment claims must be dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and/or
failure to establish a prima facie case.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff, Verla Wiley, an African-American
female, was originally hired by the United States
Information Agency ("USIA") as a GS-2 clerk typist in
1966.5 Defendant's Memorandum of Points § and
Authorities in support of Motion ("Defendant's Points
and Authorities") at 8. In 1977, she became a Trainee
Radio Writer in the English-to-Africa Branch of the
Africa Division of Voice of America ("VOA"). Id. She
was promoted in 1978 to the GS-7 position of Radio
Writer, and she received a promotion to GS-9 in 1980.
Id. In 1982, she reached the GS-11 level, which was
a
5la
then the full-performance level of that position, and in
1983, Wiley's position title was changed to
International Radio Broadcaster ("IRB"), and the top
grade for that position was raised from GS-11 to GS-12.
Defendant's Points and Authorities at 9. Wiley was
subsequently promoted to a GS-12, step 1, by way of an
accretion of duties promotion. Id. at 9. The full
performance level of the IRB position was and remains
GS-12. See Supplemental Declaration of Donna Grace
("Grace Declaration")‘, Par. 79; see also Defendant's
Exhibit 20 (Standard Form 50). Since 1983, Wiley has
received all within grade increases for which she was
eligible and she is currently a GS-12, step 9. Grace
Declaration, Par. 79.
Throughout the 1980's, Wiley acted as
managing editor for the show Nightline Africa. See
Wiley May 24, 2001 Deposition ("First Wiley
Deposition"), Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, at 32-33; Defendant's
Statement of Material Facts as to which there is No
Genuine Issue ("Defendant's Material Facts") at 105.
Wiley has been the coordinator and host of the
Americana section of Africa World Tonight since 1992.
Opposition at 3, citing Defendant's Points and
Authorities at 8. As the Americana coordinator, Wiley
is responsible for the music, Americana, science and
development features in Africa World Tonight's “back
half of the show.’ Defendant's Material Facts at 122.
Wiley gathers material for the show, organizes and
assembles the show's content, develops themes, edits
taped stories and develops original stories and interacts
with reporters. Opposition at 3, citing Wiley Deposition
at 106.
Barry Maughan was the Chief of English-to-
Africa ("EA") Branch from 1995 through 1998.
Defendant's Points and Authorities at 4. During his
52a
tenure, the EA Branch staff included approximately
twenty full-time employees, one part-time employee
and several Purchase Order Vendors. Id., see Maughan
Declaration Par. 8. In general, EA Branch employees
are classified into either IRBs or Radio Production
Specialists ("RPS" or "producers"). Maughan
Declaration, Par. 8. IRBs provide original material for
EA programming, including conducting interviews,
writing stories, and hosting programs. Maughan
Declaration, Par. 9. IRBs who broadcast in English are
generally classified as GS-9,11, or 12 employees. Id. The
principal difference between GS-9/11 and GS-12 level
IRB employees is that the GS-12 employees initiate
more original work, produce more programming
material and require less supervision than GS-9 and 11
level employees. Id.; McMenamim Declaration, Par. 12.°
During Maughan's tenure, the EA Branch
employed ten GS-12 IRB employees, in addition to the
three Plaintiffs, and eight GS-13 IRB employees.’
Grace Declaration, Par. 47; Defendant's Exhibit 18 (list
of employees). During the time that Maughan was
Chief of the EA Branch, six radio programs, including
Africa World Tonight ("AWT"), were under his
supervision. Maughan Declaration, Par. 5. AWT, airing
live in Africa in the evening, Monday through Friday,
was broadcast in three separate editions. McMenammn
Declaration, Par. 6. The first edition aired at 12:30 p.m.
EST and was one-half hour long. Id. The second and
third ed’tions were each one-hour in length and aired at
2:00 p.m. EST and 4:00 p.m. EST, respectively. Id.
B. Procedural] History
Plaintiff filed complaints of discrimination with
the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") on February 3, 1998,
a eT eee” Bee
53a.
and on March 2, 1998. See Delia L. Johnson Declaration,
Pars. 4, 42, and Exhibits 28 and 30 thereto.’ On May 14,
1998, OCR sent a letter to Plaintiff setting forth the
allegations accepted for processing with respect to her
two complaints (hereinafter "OCR-9815"). See Johnson
Declaration, Par. 47, and Exhibit 32 attached thereto.
On July 18, 1998, the complaints were assigned to an
independent contractor, C. Sukari Hardnett of H & H
Associates, for investigation. Johnson Declaration, Par.
18. Hattie Baldwin, the former OCR Director,
subsequently became concerned with the manner in
which the investigation was being conducted and she
consequently terrninated OCR's contract with H & H
Associates. See Defendant's Memorandum of Points
and Authorities at 9, citing Deposition of Delia L.
Johnson at 34. On November 20, 1998, prior to the
completion of any report of the investigation, and
consistent with its authority, OCR made the
independent determination to reassign the
investigations to two different independent contractors,
Richard T. Qualters and James Gee. Johnson
Declaration, Par. 18.
Wiley's EEO complaint spans the period of four
years during which Maughan was Chief of the EA
Branch, and it names Maughan and Steve Lucas
("Lucas"), then Chief of the African Division, as
individuals who discriminated and retaliated against
her and created a hostile work environment .”
In her Amended Complaint and Opposition to
Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss and _ for
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff presents an array of
allegations alleging discriminatory and _ retaliatory
actions by Defendant. For completeness of the record,
the undersigned will address each asserted claim of
54a
discrimination and retaliation in the Report and
Recommendation.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss
Under Fed. R. Civ.12(b)(6), if a plaintiff fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court
may grant a defendant's motion to dismiss. Hishon v.
King & Spaulding, 467 U. S. 69, 78 (1984); Sparrow v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. 3d 1111,1114 (D.C. Cir.
2000). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court must
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and give the plaintiff the "benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged."
Schuler v. United States, 617 F. 2d 605, 608 (D.C.
Cir.1979); see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974).- "However, legal conclusions, deductions or
opinions couched as factual allegations are not given a
presumption of truthfulness." Wiggins v. Hitchens, 853
F. Supp. 505, 508 n.1(D.D.C.1994) (citation omitted);
Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F. 2d 1245, 1254 (D.C.
Cir.1987).
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test
the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Scheuer, 416 U.S.
at 235. If the allegations contained in the complaint,
when taken as true, fail to state a claim for which relief
may be granted, or otherwise establish that the
complaint faces "some insuperable bar to relief,” the
motion should be granted. Franklin Asaph Limited
Partnership v. FDIC, 794 F. Supp. 402, 404 (D.D.C.
1992).
B. Summary Judgment
A court should grant summary judgment if the
55a
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
affidavits demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of
material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986);
Tao v. Freeh, 27 F. 3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Although a court should draw all reasonable inferences
from the records submitted by the nonmoving party the
mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is
insufficient to bar summary judgment. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The
adverse party's pleading must demonstrate the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. To
be genuine, the issue must be supported by sufficiently
admissible evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find for the nonmoving party. In determining
materiality, the factual assertion must be capable of
affecting the substantive outcome of the litigation. See
id.; see also Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F. 2d 1236,
1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Mere allegations or denials in the adverse
party's pleadings are insufficient to defeat an otherwise
proper motion for summary judgment. The nonmoving
party bears the affirmative duty to present, by
affidavits or other means, specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248-49. The adverse party must do more that simply
"show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts." Matsushita Electric Industries Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
In the context of discrimination cases,
summary judgment should be approached with caution
because of the difficulty of proving discriminatory
intent and disparate treatment. See Morgan v. Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 98, 104
56a
(D.D.C. 2001)C'While summary judgment must be
approached with special caution in discrimination cases,
a plaintiff is not relieved of [his] obligation to support
[his] allegations by affidavits or other competent
evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.") (citation omitted). This does not however
‘eliminate the use of summary judgment in
discrimination cases. See, e.g., Clark County School
District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271(2001) (finding the
District Court's, grant of summary judgment was
proper, therefore overturning the decision by the Court
of Appeals); Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F. 3d 1127, 1132
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding grant of summary judgment
for defendant in Title VII case alleging racial
discrimination and retaliation); Brown v. Brody,199 F.
3d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir.1999) (upholding summary
judgment in favor of defendant in a Title VII suit
alleging racial and gender discrimination and
retaliation).
In Celotex, the Supreme Court instructed that
the ‘[slummary judgment procedure is_ properly
regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but
rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a
whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action."' 477
U.S. at 327, quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
1. Title VII Claims
In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), the Supreme Court established a _ burden-
shifting framework that governs the analysis of racial
discrimination and retaliation claims. See, e.g., Aka v.
Washington Hospital Center, 156 F. 3d 1284,1288-89
(D.C. Cir. 1998); McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F. 2d
57a
783, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Richard v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,
165 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 2001); Hastie v.
Henderson,121 F. Supp. 2d 72, 78 (D.D.C. 2000). The
plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving a prima
facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The
burden then shifts to the defendant "to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the action. Id.
The defendant's burden is one of production, not
of proof. See Aka, 156 F. 3d at 1289 ("[I]n producing
nondiscriminatory reasons for its challenged action, the
employer is not obligated to support these reasons with
objective evidence sufficient to satisfy the
preponderance of the evidence standard.") (quotation
and citation omitted). Therefore, defendant's burden is
satisfied if it simply explains what it has done or
produces evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons. St. May's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993).
If the defendant meets this burden, the
presumption of discrimination is rebutted and drops
from the case. St. May's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 508.
The plaintiff must then show that the articulated
reason was a pretext and the actual reason was
discriminatory. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
The ultimate burden of persuasion always remains with
the plaintiff to prove that he or she was subjected to
discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at
507-08. A plaintiff cannot create a factual issue of
pretext based merely on personal speculation of
discriminatory intent. Greene v. Dalton, 164 F. 3d 671,
675 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (claims cannot rest "entirely upon a
conciusory representation" by plaintiff); Handing v.
Gray, 9 F. 3d 150, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (unsupported
speculation is not enough to defeat a summary
58a
judgment motion; the existence of specific material
evidentiary facts must be shown). "The non-moving
party's opposition ... must consist of more than mere
unsupported allegations or denials and must be
supported by affidavits or other competent e
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