Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Stoller v. Pure Fishing, Inc. (No. 08-494)
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Suprem
p rf Court US.
Ge.
_ OPFICE OF THE CLERK
AUG 24 2008
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
LEO STOLLER,
Vv.
PURE FISHING, INC.,
FISHING SPIRIT, INC.,
FISHUSA, INC.,
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Leo Stoller
7115 W. North Avenue #272
Oak Park, Illinois 60302
(312) 545-4554
QUESTION PRESENTED
: Whether Circuit Rule 50 applies to rulings
on FRCP 60(b) motions.
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner, Leo Stoller, 62, is a nationally known
trademark expert, and a resident of the State of Illinois,
County of Cook, 7115 W. North Avenue, #272, Oak Park,
Illinois, 60302, (312) 545-4554; email:
ldms4@hotmail.com.
Respondents are Pure Fishing, Inc.., an Iowa
corporation, with its principal place of business in Spirit
Lake, Iowa, 1900 19 Street, Spirit Lake, Iowa, 51360,
d/b/a Berkley; Fishing Spirit, Inc., a Wisconsin
corporation, with its principal place of business in Spirit
Lake, lowa, 1900 18" Street, Spirit Lake, Iowa; Fish
USA, Inc., d/b/a FishUSA.com, with its principal place of
business at 901 W. 12" Avenue, Erie, Pennsylvania,
16501.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ec lysus sie scndavhadacoeyee ove bins 1
NT ane esse siceassecnccscvnncesesss ove 2
CONSTITUTIONAL &
STATUTORY PROVISIONS .................... 2
ores iihigtiouevanseescovevesectess 3
REASONS FOR REVIEW ....................... 26
eri ehidiveiensesvaesiscsecsevisessees 27
I esl llihdacishphevhavcinaaresesescees 27
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............ 28
ii
' ‘TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Case: Page(s)
Cooter & Gell v. Hartman Corp.,
496 U.S. 384, 399-400, 110 S. Ct. 2447,
110 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1990) ...................000. 6
National Hockey League v.
Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.,
427 U.S. 639, 96 5. Ct. 2778,
me ef 6
Pretzel & Stouffer v. Imperial Adjusters, Inc.,
28 IR3d 42, 45 (7th Cir. 1994) ................ 6
Momnzaerts v. Hartford Life &
Accident Insurance Co.,
No. 06-2952, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 322
ty eS: A 7
United States v. McLaughlin,
470 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2006)................. 7
Western States Inc. Co. v.
Wisconsin Wholesale Tire, Inc.,
148 F. 3d 756, 758 (7 Cir. 1998)
IE icco stich cn edbeasepuavenessses 23, 24
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Pasquino v. Prather,
13 F. 3d 1049, 1051 (7™ Cir. 1994) ............ 24
Sims v. Lucas, 9 F. 3d 1293, 1294
(7” Cir, 1903) (per curiam) ........................ 23
Hagner v. US., 285 U.S. 427 (1932) ............ 20
Rose Baker Parons v. City of Aurora, et al.,
1172, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7” Circuit),
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16237 ...................... 23
Dunphy v. McKee
134 F. 3d 1297, 1302 (7 Cir. 1998) ........... 24
Rose Baker Parons v. City of Aurora, et al.,
1172, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7”
Circuit, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16237......... 24
LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban,
54 F. 3d 387, 393 (7™ Cir. 1995) ............... 24
Pasquino, 13 F. 3d at 1050 ..................... 24
In re Shell Oil Co.,
a. Oe Uy OMEIPTOD cde ccc cecceccosccccees 24
lv.
IN ‘THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES
No.
LEO STOLLER,
v.
PURE FISHING, INC.,
FISHING SPIRIT, INC.,
FISHUSA, INC.,
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of
certiorari issue to review the judgment below.
(1)
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion dated October 4, 2006 of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
at Appendix A-1 is unpublished. This opinion granted a
default judgment against Petitioner for $96,751.81, and
cancelled 35 STEALTH federal trademark registrations.
The opinion dated April 12, 2007 of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ilinois
at Appendix A-2 is unpublished. This opinion denied
Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment.
The opinion dated May 29, 2008 of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit at
Appendix A-3. This opinion affirmed the decision of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois which is the subject of this appeal.
2
JURISDICTION
The date on which the United States Court of
Appeals decided my case was May 29, 2008. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §
1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
The Petitioner's Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of due process and equal protection.
STATEMENT
This is an action for trademark infringement
arising out of an alleged violation of the Lanham Act and
violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Trade Practices Act. The trial court entered a default
judgment against the plaintiffs/counter-defendants as a
sanction for Leo Stoller signing a pleading with the
permission of his attorney, Peter Woods.
3
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, Leo Stoller, as an
individual and doing business as Central Mfg. Co., doing
business as S Industries, Inc., doing business as
Terminator, doing business as Stealth, doing business as —
Rentamark, doing business as Rentamark.com, doing
business as Stealth Sports and Marine, doing business as
Association Network Management, doing business as
USA Sports Co., Inc., doing business as Stealth
Industries, Inc., doing business as Central Mfg. Inc.,
doing business as S Industries, doing business as Sentra
Industries, Inc.
Leo Stoller sought relief from final “arbitrary and
capricious” judgments and orders entered by the District
Court, Judge George Lindberg, on November 16, 2005,
September 15, 2006, October 4, 2006, November 13, 2006
order granting motion for filing of bond to secure costs
on appeal; December 12, 2006, and April 12, 2007. After
Stoller's initial appeal was denied by the Seventh Circuit,
when the Seventh Circuit denied Stoller's first request
for an extension of time to file his initial appeal brief,
Stoller then filed a FRCP Rule €0(b) motion before
District Court Judge George Lindberg.
4
According to FRCP Rule 60(b), defendants may
seek relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
within a reasonable time, and not more than one year
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken, for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misinterpretation,
or other misconduct of an adverse party.
Defendants will also show infra that:
(4) the judgment is void; and,
(5) other reasons justify relief from the
operation of the judgment (see Rule 60 (b)
+)
The District Court’s above orders and judgments
make a number of plain and prejudicial errors as listed in
subparagraphs (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) above.
Leo Stoller operates a trademark licensing
business promoting the federal registration STEALTH.
Lee Stoller held rights to 35 STEALTH federal
trademark registrations, including Federal Trademark
Registration No. 1,766,806, which registered on April 20,
1993, for the following goods: fishing tackle floats
(bobbers). Leo Stoller licensed Lindy-Little Joe, a fishing
tackle company, for over 10 years to use the mark
STEALTH on a line of fishing tackle sold through the
major retailers such as K-Mart and Walmart, etc. In
2005, Leo Stolier learned that Pure Fishing, Inc. and
Fishing Spirit, Inc. commenced used of the name
Spiderwire Stealth on fishing line. Pure Fishing, Inc.
filed a trademark apolication, Serial No. 78-546,457 for
the mark SPIDERWIRE STEALTH on January 12, 2005
for the use on fishing lines in International Class 28.
6
On August 16, 2005, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office’s examining attorney Jill I. Prater
issued Section 2(d) -
Likelihood of Confusion Refusal to the
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs, Pure Fishing, Inc. and
Spirit Fishing, Inc.
Order Dated November 16, 2005
On November 16, 2005, the District Court
dismissed Petitioner's underlying case, with prejudice,
and entered a default judgment against each of the
counter-defendants on the grounds that Leo Stoller
signed a pleading with the permission of Peter Woods,
Esq. Leo Stoller asserts that the sanction imposed on
November 16, 2005 was excessive and disproportionate
to the alleged offense and conduct of Leo Stoller and
Peter Woods. See transcript of hearing before Judge
Lindberg. A default judgment is a sanction for
misconduct during the litigation. Appellate review of
decisions to impose, or withhold sanctions is deferential.
See e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartman Corp., 496 U.S. 384,
399-400, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1990);
National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club,
—
7
Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 96 5. Ct. 2778, 49 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1976);
Pretzel & Stouffer v. Imperial Adjusters, Inc., 28 TR3d 42,
45 (7th Cir. 1994). |
District Court Judge Lindberg abused his
discretion by entering a severe default judgment for a
wrong that apparently caused no prejudice to the adverse
perty. See Momnzaerts v. Hartford Lyfe & Accident
Insurance Co., No. 06-2952, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 322
(7th Cir. Jan. 8, 2007). Cf. United States v. McLaughlin,
470 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2006).
A default judgment is a sanction for misconduct
during the litigation. Appellate review of decisions to
impose, or withhold, sanctions is deferential. See, e.g.,
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399-400,
110 S. Ct. 2447, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1990); National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427
U.S. 639, 96 S. Ct. 2778, 49 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1976); Pretzel
& Stouffer v. Imperial Adjusters, Inc.,U.S. 28 F. 3d 42, 45
(7 Cir. 1994).
8
District Court Judge Lindberg abused his
discretion by entering such a severe default judgment for
a wrong that apparently caused no prejudice to the
adverse party. See Mommaerts v. Hartford Life &
Accident Insurance Co., No. 06-2952, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 322 (7 Cir. Jan. 8, 2007), Ct. United States v.
McLaughlin, 470 F. 3d 698 (7" Cir. 2006). See transcript
of hearing.
District Court Judge Lindberg’s’ excessive
sanction and default judgment was unconstitutional in
that it was disproportionate to the alleged offense, Leo
Stoller signing a pleading with an attorney's permission.
Judge Lindberg also abused his discretion under
FRCP 60(b) when he found that Leo Stoller was a
vexatious litigant and barred Leo Stoller from initiating
any lawsuits in the Northern District of Illinois. Stoller's
motion for relief under FRCP 60(b) introduced new
evidence which supported reversal of Judge Lindberg‘s
findings.
9
As a direct result of Judge Lindberg's order, Leo
Stoller was forced to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy on or
about December 10, 2005, Case No. 05 B 64075.
Order Dated December 19, 2005
In an order dated December 19, 2005, the District
Court stated:
“Before the Court is defendants/counter-plaintiffs’
motion to enforce judgment [191-1] and
counter-defendants’ motion to vacate default
judgment [201]. Both motions are denied because
to date, judgment pursuant to F.R.C.R 58 has not
been entered in this case. In this Court’s
November 16, 2005 order [185], it found
each of the counter-defendants to be in
default. However, the Court has not conducted a
prove-up hearing or made any findings as to
appropriate damages, if any, stemming from
defendants’ counterclaims.
Defendants/counter-plaintiffs are ordered to file a
brief in support of their purported damages,
including all necessary affidavits and evidentiary
support, by 11/16/05. Defendant’s response is due
10
1/30/05 (sic). Upon review of the parties’ written
submissions, the Court will determine if an
evidentiary hearing is necessary.
Defendants/counter-plaintiffs’ request for
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 is denied for failure
to comply with F.R.C.P. 11(c)(1)(A), which
provides that such a motion must be made
fe wt enge from other motions or requests.’ In
violation of F.R.C.P. 1 1(c)(1)(A),
defendants/counter-plaintiffs made their request
for Rule 11 sanctions as part of a combined motion
to enforce judgment. [191].”
The Court denied Petitioner's request for sanctions.
Order Dated February 3, 2006
The February 3, 2006 order stated in part:
“In the interests of efficiency and judicial |
ae and because of the relationship between
Mr. Stoller and his wholly-owned corporate
counter-defendants, the Court exercises its
discretion and stays all proceedings in this case,
pending the resolution of Mr. Stoller’s
ij
bankruptcy proceedings. The Court also finds that
counter-plaintiffs, based on their own admission,
have waived their rights to pecuniary damages as
to each counter-defendant except Mr. Stoller...”.
Trustee Richard Fogel, Esq. and counsel for the Pure
Fishing, Inc., knowingly and willfully entered into a
consent judgment for $969,751.81, which the Court
entered on December 12, 2006, when Richard Fogel and
counsel for Pure Fishing knew or should have known
that the Defendants/Counter-plaintiffs’ had waived their
right to pecuniary (monetary) damages as to “as to each
counter-defendant except Mr. Stoller.”
Pursuant to the law of the case, the Agreed Final
Order entered and executed by Judge Lindberg on
December 12, 2006 is void ab initio.
DEFENDANTS/COUNTER DEFENDANTS
FRAUD ON THE ILLINOI DISTRICT COURT
The court in order dated February 3, 2006 stated
that the “ counter-plaintiffs, based on their own
12
admission, have waived their rights to pecuniary
(monetary) damages as to each counter-defendant except
Mr. Stoller...”. See also Appellant's Motion to Vacate
Nunc Pro Tunc Settlement Agreement and Final Order
Approving Settlement Agreement with Google, Inc. and
Trustee's Local 54.3(A) Joint Statement in the Pure
Fishing Case.
Judge Lindberg Recognizes That The Failure To
Serve Leo Stoller Results In A Denial Of The
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiffs’
Motion For Filing A Bond To Secure Costs On
Appeal
Judge Lindberg recognizes in a docket entry that
was made by the Clerk on Thursday, October 26, 2006:
“MINUTE entry before Judge George W.
Lindberg: The motion for filing of Bond to Secure
Costs on Appeal [230] is denied without prejudice
for failure to serve Leo Stoller with a copy of the
motion. To the extent
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ motion seeks an
order requiring Leo Stoller, personally, to pay a
bond,
13
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs must provide Leo
Stoller with notice of the motion.”
Judge Lindberg Establishes The Law Of The Case
That Failure toServe Notice on Leo Stoller Is
Fatal To The Defendants/Counter-
Plaintiffs’ Filing Of A Pleading
Judge Lindberg established that failure to serve
Leo Stoller notice was fatal to the
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ filing of a motion for
costs on appeal. Judge Lindberg ordered the
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs to file and reserve the
notice.
Order Dated August 22, 2006
The order stated:
“MINUTE entry before Judge George W.
Lindberg: Response due 9/11/2006 to the motion
by defendants Fishing Spirit, Inc., Fishusa, Inc.,
Pure Fishing, Inc., Counter Claimants Fishing
Spirit, Inc., Fishusa, Inc., Pure Fishing, Inc. for
judgment and for motion to Lift Stay and Enter
14
Final Judgment. Reply due 9/20/2006. Ruling set
for 10/18/2006 at 9:30 a.m. Response due
9/11/2006 on motion by Defendants Fishing Spirit,
Inc., Fishusa, Inc., Pure —. Inc., Counter
Claimants Fishing Spirit, Inc., Fishusa, Inc., Pure
Fishing, Inc. Third Motion for Judicial Notice.
Reply due 9/20/2006. Ruling set for 10/18/2006 at
9:30 a.m. No court appearance required on
8/24/2006.”
Leo Stoller, pro se, never received a copy of the
Minute Order dated August 22, 2006. Under 1RR.C.P.
Rule 60(a) - Failure to provide notice to a party of a Court
order and/or a pleading is sufficient grounds to vacate an
order and/or judgment as a matter of law.
August 31, 2006
Leo Stoller’s Chapter 13 was converted to a
Chapter 7, and Richard M. Fogel was appointed Trustee
on September 5, 2006. Trustee Richard Fogel informed
Plaintiff's attorneys,
15
Fioretti & Lower, that they have no authority to act on
behalf of Central Mfg. Inc. and Stealth Industries, Inc.
Order Dated September 15, 2006
Leo Stoller never received the Minute Order of
George W. Lindberg dated September 15, 2006.
September 20, 2006
Attorneys Fioretti & Lower, who represented
Central Mfg. Inc. and Stealth Industries, Inc., filed a
Motion for A Request For An Extension of Time to
Respond to Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Lift Stay and Enter Final Judgment and Third Motion
for Judicial Notice. The said motion by Fioretti & Lower
was filed on behalf of Central Mfg. Co., Central Mfg, Inc.,
S Industries, Inc., Stealth Industries, Inc., and Sentra
Industries, Inc. Leo Stoller was not a party to Fioretti &
Lower’s request for an extension of time because Trustee
Richard Fogel had informed Fioretti & Lower that they
had no authority to continue to represent any parties in
the Pure Fishing case. Stoller
16
filed a motion before Bankruptcy Judge Jack
Schmetterer requesting leave to have Fioretti & Lower
represent his companies in the Pure Fishing case.
Trustee Fogel opposed Stoller's request and Judge
Schmetterer denied Stoller's request. After Richard
Fogel was appointed Trustee on September 6, 2007,
Stoller had no legal ‘representative before Judge
Lindberg in the Pure Fishing case. Richard Fogel
breached his fidiuciary duty to the estate of Leo Stolelr
by failing to allow Fioretti & Lower to represent Leo
Stoller's companies in the Pure Fishing case. Leo Stoller
had moved to disqualify Richard Fogel as Trustee in
Bankruptcy proceeding No. 05 B 64075. This Appeal is
pending before Judge William J. Hibbler, Case No: 06 C
06950. Leo Stoller was defending himself pro se, and Leo
Stoller was never notified of
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Motion to Lift Stay and
Enter Final Judgment and Third Motion for Judicial
Notice. The Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs filed their
Motion to Lift Stay and Enter Final Judgment on August
17, 2006. The only party that was noticed was Robert W.
Fioretti & John B. Lower. Leo Stoller was not ever
notified by Timothy C. Meece, counsel for Pure
17
Fishing, or any other party, that the motion to lift the
stay and enter final judgment was filed on August 17,
2006. Failure to serve notice on Leo Stoller is fatal to the
final orders and judgments issued in this case and
demand that the Court vacate the final judgments and
orders in this case for failure to serve on Leo Stoller
Defendants/Counter-Appellant's Motion to Lift The Stay
and Enter Final Judgment. The Court had already
established in this case that failure to notice Leo Stoller
resulted in the denial of “ ... to the extent
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ motion seeks an order
requiring Leo Stoller, personally, to pay a _ bond,
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs must provide Leo Stoller,
pro se with notice of the motion.
The attorneys for Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs
clearly took unfair advantage of the fact that Leo Stoller
was in bankruptcy and refused and/or failed to notify Leo
Stoller. Attorneys Fioretti & Lower, who represented the
corporate Plaintiffs-Counter/Defendants, never
represented Leo Stoller individually. Leo Stoller filed his
Pro Se Appearance SA-
18
086. The Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs had an
obligation to serve Leo Stoller notice which Judge
Lindberg recognized in his order dated October 26, 2006.
Under F.R.C.P. Rule 60, Leo Stoller was entitled
to relief from judgment and orders in the Pure Fishing
case for failure of the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs not
providing notice to Leo Stoller.
After Richard Fogel was appointed Trustee of Leo
Stoller’ s Estate on or about September 6, 2006, Mr.
Fogel had instructed Fioretti & Lower that they did not
have any authority to proceed on behalf of Leo Stoller’s
corporations in the Pure Fishing case.
September 26, 2006
Leo Stoller never received the September 26, 2006
order SA-136.
19
Order Dated October 4, 2006
Judge Lindberg grants
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Motion to Lift Stay and
Enter Final Judgment. Leo Stoller never received notice
of Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Motion to Lift Stay
and Entry of Final Judgment. Defendants failure to
serve Leo Stoller its Motion to Lift Stay and Enter Final
Judgment is fatal to Judge Lindberg’s entry of an order
granting Defendants/-Counter-Appellant's motion to lift
stay and entry of final judgment on October 4, 2006. Leo
- Stoller requested that Judge Lindberg, as a matter of
law, vacate its judgment entered on October 4, 2006
pursuant to Rule 60(b).
October 13, 2006
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs filed a Bill of Costs
on October 13, 2006 SA-142. The Defendants failed to
notify Leo Stoller of the Motion for Bill of Costs. The said
motion is void ab initio and any judgment that results
therefrom for failure to notify Leo Stoller.
20
October 18, 2006
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Filing of Bond To Secure Costs on Appeal and Petition
for Award of Attorney Fees and Nontaxable Costs. Both
motions are void ab initio for failure to serve a proper
notice on pro se Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Leo Stoller
and any orders and/or judgments that resulted
therefrom.
Judge Lindberg Recognizes That The Failure To
Serve Leo Stoller Results In A Denial Of The
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiffs’
Motion For Filing A Bond To Secure Costs On
Appeal
Judge Lindberg recognized in a previous docket
entry that was made by the Clerk on Thursday, October
26, 2006:
21
“MINUTE entry before Judge George W.
Lindberg: The motion for filing of Bond to Secure
Costs on Appeal [230] is denied without prejudice
for failure to serve Leo Stoller with a copy of the
motion. To the extent
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ motion seeks an
order requiring Leo Stoller, personally, to pay a
bond, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs must provide
Leo Stoller with notice of the motion.”
Docket entry [235] consists of Local Rule 54.3(a) Joint
Statement and Agreed-Order by Pure Fishing, Inc.
(Attachments: #1 Exhibit 1 - Order of conversion and
appointment of trustee - Order authorizing trustee
action for corporations), Exhibit 18. Leo Stoller was
never served with Defendants/-Counter-plaintiffs’ Local
Rule 54.3(a) Joint Statement and Agreed Order and is
void ab initio for the same reason that Judge Lindberg
denied the Defendants/Counter-plaintiffs’ motion for
filing a bond to secure costs on appeal.
December 9, 2006
Leo Stoller filed and served on counsel for Pure
22
Fishing, Inc., Timothy C. Meece, and Richard M. Fogel,
Trustee, Stoller’ s Motion To Object To Agreed Rule
54.3(a) Joint Statement And Agreed Final Order Which
Provided A Judgment In Favor Of Pure Fishing in the
Amount of $969,751.81. Stoller objected to
Defendants/Counter-plaintiffs' Local Rule 54.3(a) Joint
Statement and Agreed Final Order. See Stoller’s Motion
To Object To Agreed Rule 54.3(a) Joint Statement And
Agreed Final Order Which Provided A Judgment In
Favor Of Pure Fishing In The Amount of $969,751.81.
“Leo Stoller has filed an appearance in this case
and is acting pro se. Leo Stoller never received any copy
of Pure Fishing ‘time and work records’ on which their
fee award request is based. In clear violation of Local
Rule 54.3(a), Pure Fishing made no attempt in good faith
to meet and confer with Leo Stoller ‘to agree on the
amount. of fees or related nontaxable expenses that
should be awarded prior to filing a fee motion’, in
violation of Lk 53.3(d). Pure Fishing’s request for an
award of attorneys fees and nontaxable costs of
$759,303.20 is void at initio for failing to comply with
Local Rule 54.3 - Attorney’s Fees and Related Non-
taxable Expenses.
Leo Stoller further objects to any agreement that
the Trustee Richard Fogel enters into with Pure Fishing
as it relates to Leo Stoller’ s companies Central Mfg. Inc.
d/b/a Central Mfg. Co. and Stealth Industries, Inc. on the
grounds that Leo Stoller has filed a request to remove
Richard Fogel as Trustee because he is not acting in the
best interest of the creditors of the estate of Leo Stoller.
As evidenced by the fact that Richard Fogel did not object
to even one entry of Pure Fishing’s request for
$759,303.20 despite the fact that upon information and
belief, the said fee request contains double billings for
the same work that was performed by two different law
firms in violation of the controlling case law, the
Continental case regarding attorneys fees. Leo Stoller is
appealing his motion before the Bankruptcy Court to
disqualify Richard Fogel as trustee of Leo Stoller’ s
estate. Therefore, any agreement entered into by Mr
Fogel is tainted and should be rejected until the Appeals
court rules on Stoller’s motion to disqualify trustee
Richard Fogel.”
24
Leo Stoller served his Motion to Object to Agreed
Rule 54.3(a) by mail to the attorneys of record and
hand-delivered it to the Clerk of the Court, U.S. District
Court, 219 S. Dearborn, Chicago, Illinois, on December 9,
2006.
“The fact that a party mails a document creates a
rebuttable presumption that the addressee actually
received the mailing.” Gentleman wrote, citing Hagner v.
Us., 285 U.S. 427 (1932). “Further, a party need not
show conclusively that a document was placed in the
mail; a custom or policy of mailing creates a presumption
that such mailing occurred.”
Decembex 12, 2006
Notwithstanding Stoller’s filing of his Motion To
Object To Agreed Rule 54.3(a) -Joint Statement And
Agreed Final Order Which Provided A Judgment In
Favor Of Pure Fishing In The Amount of $969,751.81, on
December 9, 2006, Judge Lindberg issued the following
Minute Order.
25
“MINUTE entry before Judge George W.
Lindberg: Mr Stoller’s motion to object to the agreed
54.3(a) joint statement will not be heard on 12/12/06
because Mr. Stoller failed to comply with the court’s
three-day notice requirement for the presentation of all
motions. Further, the motion to object to the agreed Rule
54.3(a) joint statement [256] is denied as moot because
the court entered the agreed order before it received the
instant motion.
Stoller clearly filed his said motion with the
Court’s three-day notice requirement. Furthermore, the
Court acknowledges that it received Stoller’ s said
motion and denied Stoller’ s motion as moot “because the
Court entered the agreed order before it received the
instant motion.” This was clear error, abuse of discretion
and grounds for reversal under Rule 60(b).
Judge Lindberg Establishes The Law Of The Case
That Failure to Serve Notice on Leo Stoller Is
Fatal To The Defendants/Counter-
Plaintiffs’ Filing Of A Pleading
26
Judge Lindberg established that failure to serve
Leo Stoller notice was fatal to the
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ filing of a pleading or
motion on Leo Stoller. All of the pleadings that were filed
in this case which were filed without service upon Leo
Stoller, deprived Leo Stoller of his due process and equal
protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the US. Constitution. The
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ failure to serve Stoller
the pleadings which led to the judgments in this
proceeding demanded that, pursuant to 1RR.C.P. 60(b),
the Court relieve Leo Stoller from any final judgment
and/or orders.
Further, in view of the fact the orders and
judgments in this case are defective as against one party,
Leo Stoller, they are therefore defective against all
parties, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, and the Court is
requested to vacate in its entirety any and all orders
and/or judgments entered against the
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants as a matter of law.
27
Judge Lindberg’s Reversible Error
The Seventh Circuit was unable to consider
whether the District Court abused its discretion in
denying the motion to vacate because the court's one
sentence order does not explain its decision. Circuit Rule
50 provides that "whenever a district court resolves any
claim or counterclaim on the merits, terminates the
litigation in its court ... the judge shall gives his or her
reasons, either orally on the record cr my written
statement." The purpose of this Rule is three-fold: "To
create the mental discipline that an obligation to state
reasons produces, to assure the parties that the court has
considered the important arguments, and to enable a
reviewing court to know the reasons for the judgment."
See Western States Inc. Co. v. Wisconsin Wholesale Tire,
Inc., 148 F. 3d 756, 758 (7" Cir. 1998) (per curium);
Pasquino v. Prather, 13 F. 3d 1049, 1051 (7 Cir. 1994);
Sims v. Lucas, 9 F. 3d 1293, 1294 (7 Cir. 1993) oid
curlum).
Judge Lindberg’s April 12, 2007 does not satisfy
Circuit Rule 50. The district court did not explain why,
for the purposes of Rule 60(b)(1) review. The Court's
28
order is inadequate because it does not even consist of a
bare conclusion of law or an "analysis of the relevant
facts and law leading to its conclusions." Western States,
id. Dunphy v. McKee, 134 F. 3d 1297, 1302 (7 Cir. 1998);
LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F. 3d 387, 393
(7 Cir. 1995); Pasquino, 13 F. 3d at 1050; In re Shell Oil
Co., 966 F. 2d 1130, 1132-33. Therefore, the order must
be vacated and remanded to the district court for an
explanation consistent with Circuit Rule 50. See Western
States, 148 F. 3d at 759-60; Dunphy, 134 F. 3d at 1302;
Sims, 9 F. 3d at 1294. See Rose Baker Parons v. City of
Aurora, et al., 1172, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7
Circuit), 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16237. This Court has
also the discretion to grant the Appellant the relief
requested below because Judge Lindberg has evidenced a
clear bias and prejudice against Leo Stoller thus far.
Judge Lindberg even refused to clarify his order dated
October 4, 2006. Leo Stoller merely made a request for
clarification.
In a terse response, Judge Lindberg refused to
even clarify his order. The record is clear that Judge
Lindberg has issued the most severe sanction in the
29
history of the Northern District of Illinois, canceling all
of Stoller's STEALTH marks, fining Stoller over
$950,000 as a sanction disproportionate to Stoller's
alleged wrongdoing. Now Judge Lindberg refuses to
even clarify his October 4, 2006 order. There is no
question that Judge Lindberg is biased and prejudiced
against Leo Stoller.
REASONS FOR REVIEW
The Seventh Circuit dismissed Stoller's initial
appeal. Subsequently, Stoller filed a motion under FRCP
60(b) before the District Court, Judge Lindberg. Judge
Lindberg erroneously denied Stoller's FRCP 60(b)
motion with a one word order dated April 12, 2007, in
violation of Circuit Rule 50.
Circuit Rule 50 states:
Whenever a district court resolves any claim or
counterclaim on the merits, terminates the litigation
in its court (as by remanding or
30
transferring the case, or denying leave to proceed in
forma pauperis with or without prejudice), or enters
an interlocutory order that may be appealed to the
court of appeals, the judge shall give his or
her reasons, either orally on the record or by written
statement. The court urges the parties to bring to
this court’s attention as soon as possible any failure
to comply with this rule.
The Seventh Circuit ruled on May 29, 2008:
We have never explicitly stated whether Circuit
Rule 50 applies to rulings on Rule 60(b) motions, nor do
we have any occasion to resolve that question here ....
SUMMARY
In view of the fact that the Seventh Circuit has
refused to clarify whether Circuit Rule 50 applies to
rulings on FRCP 60(b) motions, this Court is requested
to issue a clarification.
31
CONCLUSION
Petitioner is requesting that this Court resolve
the question as to whether Circuit Rule 50 applies to
rulings on FRCP 60(b) motions.
Vet llo submitted,
Leo Cot ble
7115 W. North Avenue, #272
Oak Park, Illinois 60302
(312) 545-4554
32
STATEMENT
Petitioner certifies that all materials are listed in
the appendix contained in this brief.
Nop lhe
Leo Stoller
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
LEO STOLLER,
v.
PURE FISHING, INC.,
FISHING SPIRIT, INC.,
FISHUSA, INC.,
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
APPENDIX
DECISION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LEO STOLLER
v.
PURE FISHING, ET AL.
Case No: 05-C-725
Date: April 12, 2007
Before George W. Lindberg, Judge
Mr. Stoller's motion for relief from judgment is denied.
No appearance required on 4/25/07 at 9:30 a.m.
A-2
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
Case: No. 07-1936
Date: May 29,2008
LEO STOLLER,
Plainttff/Counter-Defendant-Appella
nt~
PURE FISHING INC., et al.,
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs-Appel
lees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 05 C 725—George W. Lindberg. Judge.
A-3
SUBMITTED DECEMBER 19, 2007'~DECIDED MAY
29,2008
Before RIPPLE, MANION, and WOOD, Circuit
Judges.
WOOD, Circuit Judge. After appealing a default
judgment entered against him and having that appeal
dismissed for failure to prosecute, Leo Stoller filed a
motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) asking the district
court to reconsider the underlying merits of the default
judgment. Stoller now appeals the district court’s denial
of the Rule 60(b) motion. We affirm.
The present dispute stems from a lawsuit for
trademark infringement that Stoller, along with one of ©
his companies known as Central Manufacturing
Company (CMC), Med against Pure Fishing
Incorporated (FF1) and other related entities. After
protracted and contentious litigation that expanded to
' After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that
oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the
briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2).
include multiple counterclaims, the district court entered
a default judgment against CMC and Stoller and awarded
PFI damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees on one of its
counterclaims. Stoller (apparently purporting to act on
behalf of both CMC and himself) Med a timely notice of
appeal, which was docketed in this court as No. 06-3792.
PFI then filed a motion in the district court to require
Stoller to post a bond as security for the costs and fees
associated with his appeal. he district court granted the
motion, and Stoller promptly filed a second notice of
appeal, which was docketed as No. 06-4057. We
construed this second notice as a motion to suspend
enforcement of.the order requiring an appeal bond. We
then denied the motion and in an order dated February
12, 2007, we dismissed the appeal in No. 06-3792 for
failure to prosecute because Stoller failed to pay the bond
or Me an appellate brief.
Two months after we dismissed his appeal, Stoller
filed in the district court a Rule 60(b) motion in which he
rehashed the merits of his underlying lawsuit and
complained about various orders that had been entered
against Aim in that lawsuit. The district court denied the
Rule 60(b) motion in a one-line order; that action
prompted the present appeal. Stoller argues that the
district court abused its discretion when it denied the
Rule 60(b) motion and that the district court’s one-line
order violated Circuit Rule 50. He also complains about
an order designating him as a vexatious litigant who
must receive prior authorization before filing any new
lawsuits, though it is not clear whether his challenge
refers to an order issued by the district judge or by the
Executive Committee of the Northern District, both of
which barred him from further filings.
We review a district court’s denial of relief under Rule
60(b) for abuse of discretion. See Arrieta v. Battaglia, 461
F.3d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 2006). The district court’s order
here was decidedly not an abuse of its discretion, because
all of the arguiments in Stoller’s Rule 60(b) motion could
have been addressed by this court in the underlying
appeal that was dismissed for failure to prosecute. A Rule
60(b) motion is not a substitute for appeal, and thus
Stoller’s attempt to use it as such was appropriately
rejected. See Bell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 214 F.3d 798,
801 (7th Cir. 2000); Oxxford Clothes XX, Inc. v.
Expeditors Int'l of Wash., Inc., 127 F.3d 574,577(7th Cir.
1997).
Stoller’s argument that the district court’s one-line
order violated Circuit Rule 50 fares no better. Circuit
Rule 50
reads as follows:
Whenever a district court resolves any claim or
counterclaim on the merits, terminates the litigation
in its court (as by remanding or transferring the
case, or denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis
with or without prejudice), or enters an interlocutory
order that may be appealed to the court of appeals,
the judge shall give his or her reasons, either orally
on the record or by written statement. The court
urges the parties to bring to this court’s attention as
soon as possible any failure to comply with this rule.
We have never explicitly stated whether Circuit Rule 50
applies to rulings on Rule 60(b) motions, nor do we have
any occasion to resolve that question here. We note,
however, that the matters described in Rule 50 all refer
to events leading up to the final judgment in a case,
whereas FED. K Civ. P. 60 provides a number of
mechanisms to correct or change a judgment or order.
Once the reasons for the judgment or order have been
stated properly, as Rule 50 requires, it may be enough for
a district court to signal its conclusion that no change is
required with a very brief statement. In this case, even if
Rule 50 applies, its purposes were fully met. The district
court’s reasoning is clear from both the record and the
court’s brief statement, and thus there is no need to
remand for a more fulsome explanation. See Books uv.
Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 1996). The district
court gave ample insight into its thinking in its orders
addressing the unc, lying merits of the suit, and Stoller
raised no new issues in his Rule 60(b) motion. It was
clear from the record that Stoller was improperly
attempting to use Rule 60(b) as a substitute for his
dismissed appeal. Remanding for additional explication
would be a pointless gesture.
Finally, Stoller argues that the district court erred
when it declared that he was: a vexatious litigant and
barred him from filing additional lawsuits without
obtaining prior authorization. That is not properly an
issue in this appeal, however. The present appeal
involves only Stoller’s challenge to the Rule 60(b) order;
the court’s decision on the underlying merits is not
before us. If Stoller is instead trying to challenge the
order issued by the Executive Committee of the
Northern District of [llinois barring him from filing new
lawsuits without leave from the Committee, that too is
something beyond the scope of this appeal. Stoller could
not have challenged the Executive Committee’s order in
his Rule 60(b) motion and, in any event, he already has
appealed the Executive Committee’s order to this court.
That appeal (No. 07-1934) was dismissed for failure to
pay the docketing fee. Finally, we note that on August 23,
2007, through an order entered in Google Inc. v. Central
Mfg. Co. et al., Nos. 07-1569, 07- 1612, and 07-1651, this
court barred Stoller from filing any new appeals until he
pays a fine of $10,000; the present appeal, filed on April
24, 2007, is the last one Stoller lodged before the filing
bar took effect. See also Google, Inc. v. Central Mfg. Inc.,
No. 07-1651, 2008 WL 896376, at *1 (7th Cir. Apr. 2,
2008).
AFFIRMED.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.