Opposition Brief — Navarro v. Broney Automotive Repairs, Inc. (No. 08-313)

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EUGENIO NAVARRO,

Petitioner,

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BRONEY AUTOMOTIVE REPAIRS, INC.,

4 STEPHEN BRONEY, TILDEN TOTAL

4 CAR CARE CENTER, ANTHONY BROWN,

Respondents. Fi

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Eleventh Circuit Court Of Appeals

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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

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HARRY O. BORETH*

GLASSER, BORETH & KLEPPIN

8751 W. Broward Blvd.

Suite 105

Plantation, FL 33324

(954) 424-1933

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*Counsel of Record

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 225-6964

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Although the Eleventh Circuit decided this case

consistent with sixty-five (65) years of jurisprudence

regarding individual coverage under the Fair Labor

Standards from this Court ~ the test for such cover-

age is whether the employee’s activities constitute

participation in the actual movement of persons or

things in interstate commerce, as opposed to “merely

affecting” interstate commerce (e.g., McLeod v.

Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943) (holding that the test

to establish individual coverage under the FLSA is

“not whether the employees activities merely affect or

indirectly relate to commerce but whether they are

actually in or so closely related to the movement of

the commerce as to be a part of it”) and Walling v.

Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1943) (holding

that “Congress in enacting this statute plainly indi-

cated its purpose to leave local business to the protec-

tion of the states” and did not “exercise in this Act the

full scope of the commerce power”)) — should this

Court grant a certiorari petition and enter a ruling

inconsistent with its established precedent, or should

the Court revisit its established precedent in this

area and reverse it (for seemingly no good reason

other than to allow the petitioner to recover under

the FLSA)?

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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT RULE 29.6

Respondent Broney Automotive Repairs, Inc.

does not have a parent corporation or subsidiary

corporation and there is no publicly held company

that owns 10% or more of its stock. It is a small,

family-owned company owned by Respondent Rom-

ney.

Respondents Stephen Romney and Anthony

Brown live in Broward County, Florida and own and

operate a car repair shop, the Respondent Broney

Automotive Repairs, Inc.

Respondent Tilden Total Car Care Center was

not served in this lawsuit, and is not represented by

counsel representing the other Respondents.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question Presented ............. a alaibnd bauuiobcaekousnaeeeie i

Corporate Disclosure Statement ...................002 0 li

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Table of Authorities .....................66 END anaes STN

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PERN TOU NEDO NGO cascode si ccdcnencvenconscewecdacdes cues

Reasons for Granting the Writ ........................0266 12

I. The decision below was decided consis-

tent with established precedent of this

Court and of the Eleventh Circuit, and

therefore the petition should be denied.... 12

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Alonso v. Dolphin Exterminating Co., 2005 WL

1901682 (llth Cir. 2005)................. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19

Ares v. Manuel Diaz Farms, Inc., 318 F.3d 1054

CR NG MNES Sica cus icivosncsosnududivepnounenwodsueaiadaccedtbanns 13

Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S.

See ecg UN AER SRS DPE MIS RR 90 RS COB ccOORE APS INE Rage 6

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders,

Le B96 LOG CLIG Cie. TOGB) ooo. csc ccc ceccs sccesecesseecs 12

Brennan v. Wilson Building, Inc., 478 F.2d

BE CEs Ge, TIT ere ao i cosaa sacsckcalics canoes 4,16,19

Casanova v. Morales, 2007 WL 4874773 (S.D.

1g RRO eMeeno Wasabi d sed te bikb cay nNateaibeomnleee ncaalan teense ohaienscues 8

Dunlop v. Industrial America Corp., 516 F.2d

Me TIES ROPETEE iin -s cchascsbvecundeueigeaclids mededatconveds 20

Guzman v. Irmadan, Inc., 551 F.Supp.2d 1368

Ses es IEE Siasdssccacanevtsccaheuuve tekwdn wioan dai sscbe yauseceses 18

Junkin v. Emerald Lawn Maintenance and

Landscaping, Inc., 2005 WL 2862079 (M.D.

We RN Bassi on svcaccivivtancsnaceec maboniatbheessouwessaennd 17, 18

Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 522

IEE aiciivk gs teens soaker vateapuds eas ee as cnc L. 2. SE

Kitchings v. Florida United Methodist Chil-

dren’s Home, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 1282 (M.D.

Nh INE Rei sdipicndk caknsncihuN veda saincuusluidcceiionmbinmmauan 14, 15

Marshall v. Victoria Transp. Co., 603 F.2d 1122

CI I BIE Secinncs ddneinaceacuen uueesanreees 5, 15, 23, 24

Ne ae SEEN PTET SR Mee ER EIN an ey Oe oe TES TRL TERA hy WE AOS. Me LRG SD SEE ERT egy RED RN Re Pee ANN

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Marshall v. Whitehead, 463 F.Supp. 1329 (M.D.

BME TD ci ciccnchsccavedsshvahsmacteeibarsanthacasuuoninucs 20, 21, 22

McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d

RN AEB U Re MONG RD Paknk yi oecesactencscsviribidacechacessianvseres 11

McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943)......... passim

Mitchell v. Lublin McGaughy & Assocs., 358

EG OH AIR asks svuuusaineudes\eedulcesekedhevecvececneceseidecones 14

Navarro v. Broney Automotive Repairs, Inc.,

533 F.Supp.2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2008).............. passim

Rivera v. Heights Landscaping, Inc., 2004 WL

BAe CSc Fake ME ioecsiicasecscensecenccecesdecorcevcossensces 19

Russell v. Continental Restaurant, Inc., 430

FSup0.20 S21 CO. Mid. 2ZOOG) ........0...c0sccscceseneseseesers 19

Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc. 448 F.3d

I Oe BORE Ny I oes on sc aceccdcssaramevcnnbowect passim

Tilbury v. Mitchell, 123 F.Supp. 109 (W.D. La.

seek shi ck gus Lb cabs biatsbndileaidscawivds Sonldionil 15, 26, 27

Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564

RM eect toy el ssh caihanens waktwsdaneankgacaiiigaion passim

Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317

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STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

q Petitioner has presented no “compelling reason”

‘ for his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to be granted

(“Petition”). See Sup. Ct. R. 10. Specifically, Petitioner

fails to demonstrate that the Eleventh Circuit’s

opinion in this case (“Opinion”) is in conflict with a

decision of this Court, and Petitioner makes no ar-

gument that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision is in

conflict with a decision of another Court of Appeals or

that the Eleventh Circuit decided an important

federal question that has not been settled by this

Court. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a-c). While the Petition does

argue that the Opinion is in conflict with a prior

decision of this Court, it is not. See, e.g., McLeod uv.

Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 493-94 (1943); Walling v. 4

Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1943); :

Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 522, 523 (1942).

McLeod, Jacksonville Paper Co., and Kirschbaum Co.

are a triumvirate of cases that require the conclusion

that the Petition is in fact frivolous. f

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The “Question Presented” section of the Petition

suggests that the Opinion’s holding uses the wrong

test for individual coverage, as the Petition claims

that the Opinion, in concluding individual coverage

was not applicable to Petitioner, wrongly “con-

clude[ed] that petitioners [sic} activities merely

affected and did not sufficiently affect interstate ,

commerce” under the FLSA, as if that is not the 4

correct legal standard. In the Petition’s “Relevant

Provisions Involved” section, it quotes the language

2

from 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) which states that individ-

ual coverage exists for employees who are “engaged in

commerce”. ’

The Petition’s arguments that the Opinion does

not cite the correct legal standard are entirely mis-

placed (and are misleading) because this Court has

previously interpreted the “engaged in commerce”

language from § 207(a)(1) to mean that employees

that are entitled to invoke individual coverage may

do so if their work is “in the ‘channels of interstate

commerce, Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317

U.S. 564, 63 S. Ct. 332, 335, 87 L.Ed. 460, as distin-

guished from those who[se work] merely affected that

commerce.” McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 493-

94 (1943) (interpreting the phrase “engaged in com-

merce” to such extent as to be a veritable treatise

concerning that phrase contained in § 207(a)(1)).

Indeed, Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S.

564, 570-71 (1943) (quoting Kirschbaum Co. v. Wall-

ing, 316 U.S. 522, 523 (1942)), holds that the FLSA

does not apply “to business or transactions ‘affecting

commerce’”. This Court in McLeod framed the test as

follows:

The test under this present act, to determine

whether an employee is engaged in com-

merce, is not whether the employee’s activi-

ties affect or indirectly relate to interstate

commerce but whether they are actually in

or so closely related to the movement of the

commerce as to be a part of it.

3

McLeod, 319 U.S. at 497. Thus, the Opinion in this

case directly followed the language from controlling

precedent from this Court. The McLeod case is the

exact case that the district court relied on in this

case. Navarro v. Broney Automotive Repairs, Inc., 533

F.Supp.2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (citing McLeod, 319

U.S. at 491). The Opinion cites from Thorne v. All

Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1267-68 (11tl

Cir. 2006), which cites the same standard and relies

on the McLeod case for that standard; thus, the

Opinion appropriately relies on controlling precedent

of this Court. Petitioner does not argue his work was

in the channels of commerce, nor could he.

In McLeod, this Court noted that the definition of

goods contained in § 203(i) specifically “does not

include goods after their delivery into the actual

physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof

other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor

thereof.” McLeod, 319 U.S. at 494. Thus, the Court

held that therefore “handlers of goods for a whole-

saler who moves them interstate on order or to meet

the needs of specified customers are all in commerce,

while those employees who handle goods after acqui-

sition by a merchant for general local disposition are

not.” Id. at 494. This law is nothing new to the Peti-

tioner, as it was relied upon by the district court in

this case. Navarro, 533 F.Supp.2d at 1223 (citing

McLeod, 319 U.S. at 491). Thus, it is not clear why

this Petition was ever filed in the first instance, since

the goods in this case handled by Petitioner were

obtained from retailers.

The Petition further argues that “Petitioners [sic]

regular job duties, involved the pick-up and delivery

of auto-parts [sic] from various auto parts suppliers

that were manufactured outside the state of Florida.

[Petitioner] also regularly installed those auto-parts

[sic] into [Respondent’s] customers’ vehicles who

where [sic] the ultimate consumers.” (Pet. at 2). The

point-heading in the “reasons for granting the Peti-

tion” section of the Petition argues that “the inter-

state journey of goods does not cease to flow in

commerce until the goods have reached their final

destination and therefore all individuals who handle

these goods during flow [sic] through commerce are

individually covered”. (Pet. at 3).

These two arguments are contrary to prior Su-

preme Court precedent, as stated above, because

goods are no longer in the stream of commerce for

purposes of individual coverage under the FLSA once

the goods wind up in the hands of the local retailer.

The ultimate consumer is the Respondent because it

bought the auto parts from a loca) retailer, because

this Court has previously held that goods lose their

interstate status and are “at rest” by the time the

retailer receives them. McLeod, 319 U.S. at 494

(acknowledging so); Brennan v. Wilson Building, Inc.,

478 F.2d 1090, 1095 (5th Cir. 1973) (interpreting the

holding of Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S.

564, 568 (1943) to be as follows: “the Court ruled that

the interstate journey of the goods did not end, and

the goods thus did not cease to flow in commerce,

until they reached their final destination — the retail

stores”). Accordingly, contrary to the Petitioner’s

arguments, precedent going back sixty-five (65) years

holds that goods that once may have had an inter-

state nature lose that status by the time the local

retailer receives them. /d.; Navarro v. Broney Auto-

motive Repairs, Inc., 5383 F.Supp.2d 1223 (S.D. Fla.

2008) (citing McLeod, 319 U.S. at 491).

The Petitioner’s next argument is that “any

regular contact with commerce, even if it is small,

will result in an employee being covered by the FLSA.

No de minimis rule applies.” (Pet. at 6) (citing Mar-

shall v. Victoria Transp. Co., 603 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th

Cir. 1979)). That is contrary to this Court’s prior

precedent, as this Court has specifically held before

that individual coverage is applicable only “[i]f a

substantial part of an employee’s activities related to

goods whose movement [was] in the channels of

interstate commerce....” Walling v. Jacksonville

Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 568 (1943). Recently, this

“substantial part” language has been interpreted by

the courts and the Department of Labor to mean that

an employee seeking to invoke individual coverage

must regularly and recurrently be engaged in inter-

state commerce. Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc.,

448 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 29 C.F.R.

§ 776.23(d)(2) & .24).

The Petitioner’s next argument is that the FLSA

is a remedial statute that is to be construed broadly.

It is not clear if the FLSA qualifies as a remedial

statute, as it was enacted during the depths of the

great depression to give incentive to employers to

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spread work around to reduce the unemployment

rate. Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446,

460 (1948) (finding that the FLSA was enacted “to

spread employment through inducing employers to

shorten hours [for existing workers] because of the

pressure of the extra costs [-— the payment of over-

time — which would require the employer to hire

additional workers].”). To the extent that the individ-

ual coverage should be construed broadly, it is only to

be construed broadly within the test enunciated by

this Court as identified herein. Apparently, the Peti-

tioner is seeking this Court to reverse sixty-five (65)

years of settled law on this issue, and create a whole

new jurisprudential test in pursuance of a general

axiom that the Court shoulc construe the statute

broadly. The Court should, obviously, reject that

invitation, because to entertain it would flummox

businesses in their attempts to comply with the

FLSA, by changing settled law in such a manner.

The Petitioner sets forth that in Walling v. Jack-

sonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 567 (1943), this

Court stated that “[i]t is clear that the purpose of the

Act was to extend federal control in this field

throughout the farthest reaches of the channels of

interstate commerce.” The Court should note that the

Jacksonville Paper Co. is referring to the actual

channels of commerce; which are not at issue here, as

Petitioner did not work in one. That case also held

that Congress did not intend to use its full commerce

clause power for employees who were neither working

in the channels of interstate commerce nor working

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with an instrumentality of commerce, but rather

Congress “plainly indicated its purpose to leave local

business to the protection of the states” and that

“Congress did not exercise in this Act the full scope of

the commerce power.” Id. at 570. The McLeod deci-

sion, as stated above, discusses this concept further,

and also holds that Congress did not exercise its full

commerce power in enacting the statute. That is why

the test for individual coverage requires an employee

seeking to invoke it to show that his or her activities

did more than just “affect” commerce.

°

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 16, 2007, Petitioner filed a Complaint in

the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Florida, bringing one substantive count for

overtime, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act,

29 U.S.C. § 201 et seg. (R1). Later, an Amended

Complaint was filed. (R20). Discovery ensued, and

the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Subject Matter Jurisdiction, or in the Alternative,

Request to Convert into Motion for Summary Judg-

ment, when it became clear that no jurisdiction

existed in the case. (R27). Shortly thereafter, the

Defendants moved to stay the case, because it was

evident that there was no subject matter jurisdiction.

(R30). The Court granted the Motion for Stay, (R37),

but despite the stay, the Petitioner filed his own

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, as to jurisdic-

tion. (R38). Petitioner’s counsel filed a similar motion

8

for summary judgment in another case, Casanova uv.

Morales, 2007 WL 4874773 *1 (S.D. Fla., Aug. 3,

2007), aff'd, ___ F.3d __, 2008 WL 94756 (11th Cir.

2008), which was denied by the same district court

judge that decided this case and affirmed by the

Eleventh Circuit. The district court converted the

motion into a summary judgment motion, and pro-

vided the Petitioner with additional time to respond,

after the motion was fully briefed, but the Petitioner

failed to submit any additional evidence or argument.

(R50n.4).

In response to the Defendants’ Motion for Sum-

mary Judgment, contrary to the testimony in Peti-

‘tioner’s deposition (and argued in the Petition),

Petitioner submitted an affidavit in which he averred

that he picked up parts from local retail auto parts

stores (in his deposition he stated that all he did was

install the parts and clean the shop on occasion).

(R44). The Court denied the Petitioner’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment, but granted the Re-

spondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment, based on

the clear binding precedent of Thorne v. All Restora-

tion Inc., 448 F.3d 1261 (llth Cir. 2006), McLeod v.

Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943), and other cases.

(R50). Thereafter, the district court entered a Final

Judgment in Defendants’ favor. (R51). Petitioner’s

Appeal followed (R52), and the Eleventh Circuit

affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Navarro uv.

Broney Automotive Repairs, Inc., 2008 WL 2315869

(11th Cir., June 6, 2008).

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The facts of this case are largely set forth in the

published opinion Navarro v. Broney Automotive

Repair, Inc., 533 F.Supp.2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2008). The

corporate Defendant is an automobile repair shop.

(R27-4). The business was created in October, 1999.

(R27-4). It is a mom-and-pop shop owned by Defen-

dants Stephen Romney ard Anthony Brown. (R27-4).

Petitioner began working for the Respondents in

September, 2004, and continued working there

through April 9, 2007. (R27-4). Petitioner was hired

as a “helper”. (R27-4). Petitioner testified that when

he was hired, he understood that his duties were to

help work on the cars in any way that he might be

asked, such as to exchange en alternator, starter

motor, radiator, or transmission. (R27-4). Petitioner

basically fixed and replaced parts. (R27-4). Romney

described Petitioner’s job duties similarly, and testi-

fied Petitioner performed oil changes, brake pad

changes, took parts off, and put parts back on,

“[bjasic stuff, very basic.” (R27-4).

Petitioner testified in his deposition that he did

not order parts for the business or have any direct

dealings with customers. (R27-4). Specifically, Peti-

tioner never received any payments from the custom-

ers or in any way dealt with credit cards. (R27-4). If

Petitioner worked on a vehicle, and his work required

that a new or replacement part be ordered, Petitioner

would tell Defendant Bromney, and Bromney would

order the part. (R27-4).

Romney orders his parts from Bennett Auto

Supply, a local auto parts supplier located at Dixie

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highway in Fort Lauderdale. (R27-4). Romney also

orders some parts from other automotive retailers,

such as Auto Zone, Pines (Auto Parts), and some local

dealerships. (R27-4). The parts were always delivered

to Romney’s shop by the auto parts suppliers, typi-

cally within one hour after the order was placed.

(R27-5). Petitioner testified very clearly that he

worked on the cars in any manner that was asked of

him by Mr. Romney and/or Mr. Brown, and he specifi-

cally identified replacing alternators, starter engines,

radiator, and transmissions. (R36-2). Petitioner

testified that sometimes he would diagnose what was

wrong with the cars, but that he did not deal with

front office paperwork, did not deal with the custom-

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’ ers, did not order parts, and did not deal with cus-

tomers. (R36-2). After listing these duties (and non-

duties), Petitioner plainly testified that there were no

other tasks that he performed, as follows:

Q: Other than the job duties that we dis-

cussed, are there any other job duties

other than, basically, removing parts or

replacing parts on the vehicles? Any-

thing else that I’m missing that you did

on a daily basis?

A: When there was nothing to do just to

clean the area.

7 * Y

Q: Any other job duties at Broney that we

naven’t mentioned already that you did

other than the cleaning up when there

ll

was slow times, and the fixing and re-

placing of parts?

A: No.

(R36-2). Nevertheless, despite this clear description of

his job duties, Petitioner submitted an affidavit in

opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment listing other job duties. In his affidavit,

Petitioner claims that he went and picked up parts

from local auto parts stores. (R35; Aff. of Navarro

q 9). The district court, believing that picking up the

auto parts has no bearing on whether the Petitioner

can invoke individual coverage, accepted the testi-

mony, and assumed for purposes of its opinion that

the Petitioner picked up parts from the local retailers

that the Defendants had purchased, despite a consid-

erable body of precedent that parties are not sup-

posed to submit affidavits inconsistent with their

previously given deposition testimony to thwart

summary judgment. McCormick v. City of Fort

Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1240 n.7 (11th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff cannot dispute that the corporate De-

fendant only earned $277,278 in the tax year October

1, 2005 to September 30, 2006. (R27-4). Additionally,

from 2004 — 2007, Plaintiff cannot rebut that the

corporate Defendant’s gross revenue was under

$500,000 annually. (R27-4). In fact, from the last two

quarters of 2003 to the present, the corporate Defen-

dant has never had a quarter in which gross revenue

exceeded $125,000, and never had four consecutive

quarters in which gross revenue exceeded $500,000

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annually. (R27-4). These facts made the Petitioner

concede below that there was no enterprise coverage,

see Navarro v. Broney Automotive Repairs, Inc., 533

F.Supp.2d 1223, 1224 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (noting that

“Navarro concedes that he cannot prove enterprise

coverage because Broney Automotive’s gross income

during the relevant period is less than $500,000”), but

Petitioner improperly suggests in a footnote that

there may be enterprise coverage. (Pet. at 3 n.1).

Petitioner’s concession of this point below makes that

issue not appealable. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala.

v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347, 1354 (llth Cir. 1998)

(holding that points waived below are not appeal-

able).

a

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE DECISION BELOW WAS DECIDED

CONSISTENT WITH ESTABLISHED PRE-

CEDENT OF THIS COURT AND OF THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, AND THEREFORE

THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED.

Section 207(a) of the FLSA provides, in relevant

part:

Except as otherwise provided in this section,

no employer shall employ any of his employ-

ees who in any workweek is engaged in

commerce or in the production of goods for

commerce, or is employed in an enterprise

engaged in commerce or in the production of

goods for commerce, for a workweek longer

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13

than forty hours unless such employee re-

ceives compensation for his employment in

excess of the hours above specified at a rate

not less than one and one-half times the

regular rate at which he is employed.

29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). This Court has expressly held

that the “engaged in commerce” term in § 207(a)(1)

means that to invoke individual coverage an em-

ployee must show more than that they merely affect

interstate commerce, but rather must show that they

significantly affect it, that is, actually be involved in

it. McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 493-94 (1943)

(interpreting the phrase “engaged in commerce” to

such extent as to be a veritable treatise concerning

that phrase contained in § 207(a)(1)). The McLeod

case, which was decided shortly after Walling uv.

Jacksonville Paper Co., requires the conclusion that

certiorari should not be granted by this Court, as

there is nothing for it to decide

Nevertheless, Respondents will address several

arguments made by the Petitioner. Simply put, the

FLSA requires an employer to pay overtime at a rate

of one and one-half the employee’s regular rate for all

time worked over 40 hours in a week. These FLSA

overtime provisions apply in two circumstances: (1)

where an employee is engaged in commerce or the

production of goods for commerce — individual cover-

age; or (2) where an employee works for an enterprise

engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for

commerce — enterprise coverage. Ares v. Manuel Diaz

Farms, Inc., 318 F.3d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 2003).

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14

“The burden of proof lies on employees to establish

that they were engaged in interstate commerce, or in

the production of goods, and that such production was

for interstate commerce.” Kitchings v. Florida United

Methodist Children’s Home, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 1282,

1292 n.25 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (citing D.A. Schulte, Inc.,

v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 121 (1946) and Warren-

Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 90

(1942)).

Under the first type of FLSA coverage — “individ-

ual coverage” — an employee is entitled to time-and-a-

half overtime pay as long as he or she is “engaged in

commerce or in the production of goods for com-

merce.” See 29 U.S.C. § 207. To determine whether an

employee performed such work, a court must focus its

inquiry on the activities of the employee and not on

the business of the employer. See Mitchell v. Lublin

McGaughy & Assocs., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959); see

also Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d

1264, 1267-68 (1lth Cir. 2006). In Thorne, the Elev-

enth Circuit held that it was “the intent of Congress

to regulate only activities constituting interstate

commerce, not activities merely affecting commerce”,

and thus an employee must be “engaged in com-

merce”, which means he must be “directly participat-

ing in the actual movement of persons or things in

interstate commerce”. Thorne, 448 F.3d at 1266.

Further, in addition to the requirement that the

individual must be directly participating in the actual

movement of persons or things in interstate com-

merce, “[fJor an employee to be engaged in commerce,

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‘a substantial part of the employee’s work must be

related to interstate commerce.” Kitchings, 393

F.Supp.2d at 1293 n.26 (quoting Boekemeier v. Fourth

Universalist Soc’y in City of New York, 86 F.Supp.2d

280, 287 (S.D. N.Y. 2000) and (citing Walling uv.

Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 572 (1943)).

The second type of FLSA coverage — “enterprise

coverage” — does not apply, because, as stated above,

the lack of enterprise coverage has been conceded by

the Petitioner.

The Petitioner lodges the following arguments

concerning why the Opinion should be reversed: 1)

the unpublished Alonso’ case, which does not contain

a facts section; 2) the term “engaged in commerce”

should be given a broad, liberal construction”; 3) the

Marshall case requires the conclusion that no de

minimis rule applies; 4) the Petitioner fails to distin-

guish the Thorne or McLeod cases, but argues in

contravention to them that the ultimate consumers of

the retail goods were the Defendants’ customers and

not the Defendants, and the Petitioner handled and

picked up goods that were previously in interstate

commerce; and 5) cases from the Tenth Circuit and

Eastern District of Arkansas, and the former Fifth

Circuit’s Tilbury’ case require reversal. The Peti-

tioner’s arguments, none of which has any merit, will

be discussed in turn.

' Alonso v. Dolphin Exterminating Co., 2005 WL 1901682

(11th Cir. 2005).

? Tilbury v. Mitchell, 123 F.Supp. 109 (W.D. La. 1954).

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16

The Alonso Case is Not Applicable,

and Was Overruled by Thorne

Petitioner has relied on Alonso v. Dolphin Exter-

minating Co., 2005 WL 1901682, *1 (11th Cir. 2005),

but that decision is not supportive of individual

coverage in the circumstances presented by. this case.

Alonso contains no discussion of the facts, much less

any analysis of them, whatsoever, but merely holds

that a “laborer transporting fumigation materials and

chemicals, which had traveled in interstate commerce

to defendants’ customers within the state”, presented

an issue of fact preventing summary judgment on the

question of whether the plaintiff was engaged in

interstate commerce.’ The Middle District of Florida’s

* The Alonso opinion, in pertinent part, states as follows, in

holding the plaintiff was:

‘engaged in commerce’ through his duties as a

laborer transporting fumigation materials and

chemicals, which had traveled in interstate

commerce to defendants’ customers within the

state. Although these duties required no trans-

portation outside the state of Florida, the mate-

rials and chemicals, which had traveled in

interstate commerce, continued to flow in inter-

state commerce until they reached Dolphin Ex-

terminating Company’s customers. See [Brennan

uv. Wilson Bldg., Inc., 478 F.2d 1090 (5th

Cir.1973)] at 1095 (holding elevator operators [to

be] ‘engaged in commerce’ because the goods they

transported continue to flow in interstate com-

merce until delivered to the tenants of the build-

ing).

Alonso v. Dolphin Exterminating Co., 2005 WL 1901682 (1ith

Cir. 2005).

17

decision in Junkin* explains the problems with

Alonso, concerning relying on it to argue that it

applies to a case where retail goods are handled. The

plaintiff in Junkin worked for a lawn maintenance

company and his work required him to transport

herbicides and fertilizers manufactured or shipped

out of state. Junkin, 2005 WL 2862079 at *1. The

court found that there was no enterprise coverage

because the employer’s annual volume of business did

not exceed $500,000, id. at *3, and there was no

individual coverage because the mere act of trans-

porting goods that previously found themselves in the

flow of interstate commerce does not mean that an

employee engaged in commerce or produced goods or

services for commerce. The court noted that

“[bJrought to its logical end, such a theory would

mean that an employee who, in the course of his

duties, simply moves an item (which originated in

another state) from one place to another within the

same property ... has ‘engaged in commerce’ by

‘transporting’ that item. Such a theory cannot stand,

as it would, in essence, nullify the ‘interstate’ re-

yuirement and ultimately render the Commerce

Clause meaningless.” Id. at *4. As for the persuasive-

ness or lack thereof of the Alonso decision, it was

deemed not persuasive because of its failure to pro-

vide a factual background and because, “[a]s an

unpublished opinion, under Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-

2, Alonso is not binding precedent and is, at best,

* Junkin v. Emerald Lawn Maintenance and Landscaping,

Inc., 2008 WL 2862079 (M.D. Fla. 2005).

18

persuasive authority.’ However, given the fact that

the court there relied on undisclosed facts in the

record, the Court does not find them to be persuasive

here.” Id. at *4 n.6.

Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit’s subsequent

decision in Thorne explaining that activities do not

constitute “engaging in commerce” simply because

the employer purchased goods which had previously

moved in interstate commerce, Thorne, 448 F.3d at

1268, completely eclipses the applicability of the

reasoning used by the court in Alonso. Thorne’s

determination that, “[wJhen goods reach the customer

for whom they were intended, the interstate journey

ends and employees engaged in any further intrastate

* Under Local Rule 36-2, the Eleventh Circuit makes clear

that “[ulnpublished opinions are not considered binding prece-

dent.” lith Cir. R. 36-2. The Eleventh Circuit clarifies that

“[a]lthough unpublished opinions may be cited as persuasive

authority, they are not considered binding precedent. Reliance

on unpublished opinions is not favored by the court.” 11th Cir. R.

36-2, 1.0.P.-6 (emphasis added). The Local Rules further explain

that “[t}he court may cite [unpublished opinions} where they are

specifically relevant to determine whether the predicates for res

judicata, collateral estoppel, or double jeopardy exist in the case,

to ascertain the law of the case, or to establish the procedural

history or facts of the case.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2, I.0.P.-7. Thus, the

Eleventh Circuit contemplates the limited use of its unpublished

opinions for specific cases, but clearly frowns upon reliance on

unpublished opinions when they are not “specifically relevant”

to a particular case. The Defendants request that the Court find

that the Alonso opinion is not binding and that it is not persua-

sive authority, since it has been superseded by Thorne. See

Guzman v. Irmadan, Inc., 551 F.Supp.2d 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2008)

(acknowledging Thorne supersedes Alonso).

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movement of the goods are not covered under the

[FLSA]”, id. at 1267 (emphasis in original), cannot be

reconciled with the reported Alonso decision; the

Thorne court clearly distinguished and rejected

Alonso, to the extent it purports to hold if an em-

ployee merely handles goods that at one time traveled

interstate that employee is entitled to invoke individ-

ual coverage. See also Russell v. Continental Restau-

rant, Inc., 4830 F.Supp.2d 521, 526 (D. Md. 2006)

(granting motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and citing Thorne for the proposition that

there is no individual coverage for employees “who

handle goods after an employer acquires the goods for

local disposition”). Even before Thorne, other courts

had reached the same conclusion. Brennan v. Wilson

Building, Inc., 478 F.2d 1090, 1095 (5th Cir. 1972)

(citing Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at

567) (noting that the Jacksonville Paper “Court ruled

that the interstate journey of the goods did not end,

and the goods thus did not cease to flow in commerce

until they reached their final destination — the retail

stores”); Rivera v. Heights Landscaping, Inc., 2004

WL 434214 *4 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (holding that “‘mere

use, physical touching, or consumption of goods’ that

have traveled in interstate commerce is not enough

{to establish individual coverage]” and “Plaintiffs

cannot establish individual coverage merely by show-

ing that in the course of their work they used rakes,

fertilizers, or other goods that originated out of

state”). Importantly, Thorne relied on McLeod for its

holding.

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Where an employer is the “ultimate consumer” of

the goods that have moved in interstate commerce,

the journey of those goods through interstate com-

merce is at an end. The relevant statutory language

of the FLSA is as follows:

(i) “Goods” means goods (including ships

and marine equipment), wares, products,

commodities, merchandise, or articles or sub-

jects of commerce of any character, or any

part or ingredient thereof, but does not in-

clude goods after their delivery into the ac-

tual physical possession of the ultimate

consumer thereof other than a_ producer,

manufacturer, or processor thereof.

29 U.S.C. § 203(i) (emphasis added). In a case on

point, a defendant-employer was found to be the

“ultimate consumer” of “the gas and other petroleum

products, tires and mechanical parts used in operat-

ing and maintaining defendants’ trucks and other

machines ... which renders [the employees using

those materials and products] excepted from [individ-

ual] coverage.” Marshall v. Whitehead, 463 F.Supp.

1329, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 1978). The Whitehead court

based its decision on Dunlop v. Industrial America

Corp., 516 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1975), finding that “the

use of such products by the defendants’ employees in

the course of its business makes the defendants the

‘ultimate consumers’ of such goods within the mean-

ing of Section 3(i) and renders them excepted from

coverage under Section 3(s) on this ground.” White-

head, 463 F.Supp. at 1341. In this case, Petitioner

21

did not pass on (for sale) any oil filters, oil, air filters,

and the like to customers of the Respondents. Rather,

just as in Whitehead, these materials ended their

journey through interstate commerce once they

reached the Respondents’ supplier’s place of business

(the retailers, such as Bennett Auto). For the reasons

addressed herein, the Respondents request that the

Court hold that the Petitioner has not met his burden

to establish individual coverage, and not grant certio-

rari.

“Engaged in Commerce”

Is Somewhat Limited

Under individual coverage jurisprudence, “com-

merce” and “interstate commerce” are narrower terms

of art than in other areas of Commerce Clause juris-

prudence. As this Court has clarified, in enacting the

FLSA, Congress did not intend to exercise the full

extent of its constitutional regulatory powers, and

clearly intended to exempt local businesses:

[W]e cannot be unmindful that Congress in

enacting this statute plainly indicated its

purpose to leave local business to the protec-

tion of the states. [citations omitted]. More-

over as we stated in Kirschbaum Co. uv.

Walling [citations omitted], Congress did not

exercise in this Act the full scope of the com-

merce power.

Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 571

(1943). Further, because the FLSA manifests the

“concern of Congress to avoid undue displacement of

22

state regulation of activities of a dominantly local

character ... [t]he focus of coverage became ‘com-

merce’, not in the broadest constitutional sense, but

in the limited sense of Section 3(b) of [the FLSA, 29

U.S.C. § 203(b)]: ‘trade, commerce, transportation,

transmission, or communication among the several

States....’” Marshall v. Whitehead, 463 F.Supp.

1329, 1345 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (citing Mitchell v. H. B.

Zachry Co., 362 U.S. 310, 315 (1960)). Further, the

following language from this Court shows why work-

ers like the Petitioner who handle goods purchased

from a retailer are not “engaged in commerce”, and

thus are not entitled to invoke individual coverage

under the FLSA:

liIn the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29

U.S.C.A. s 201 et seg., Congress did not in-

tend that the regulation of hours and wages

should extend to the furthest reaches of fed-

eral authority. ... So handlers of goods for a

wholesaler who moves them interstate on

order or to meet the needs of specified cus-

tomers are in commerce, while those employ-

ees who handle goods after acquisition by a

merchant for general local disposition are

not.

McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 493 (1943). The

corporate Defendant is a purely local, one-location,

mom-and-pop auto repair shop with annual gross

sales of less than $500,000. This is exactly the sort of

local business Congress, in enacting the FLSA, in-

tended to leave to the regulation of the several states.

Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 571.

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23

The Marshall Case is Inapposite

The Petitioner relies on Marshall v. Victoria

Transp. Co., 603 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1979). That case

is not applicable, because the employees were in-

volved in regular and recurrent transportation of

individuals engaged in interstate travel, as follows:

The evidence before the district court clearly

established that transporting persons mak-

ing international journeys was a regular, re-

curring, and substantial part of the work of

defendants’ employees in the operation of all

of their routes. Because their work was en-

twined with a continuous stream of interna-

tional travel, they were engaged in commerce

within the meaning of the Act.

Id. at 1125. The court in Thorne made clear that

employees who purchase goods at a retail store (even

if the goods traveled interstate) are not engaged in

commerce for purposes of individual coverage (unlike

the employees in Victoria Transp. Co.), as follows:

When goods reach the customer for whom

they were intended, the interstate journey

ends and employees engaged in any further

intra state [sic] movement of the goods are

not covered under the Act. McLeod, 319 U.S.

at 493, 63 S. Ct. 1248. Courts distinguish be-

tween merchants who bring commerce across

state lines for sale and the ultimate con-

sumer, who merely purchases goods that

previously moved in interstate commerce for

intrastate use. Therefore, a customer who

purchases an item from Home Depot is not

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engaged in commerce even if Home Depot

previously purchased it from out-of-state

workers.

Thorne, 448 F.3d at 1267. This slams the door on any

argument by the Petitioner that he was engaged in

interstate commerce for purposes of individual cover-

age. Even if he purchased the items, he still would

not be entitled to individual coverage. As the district

court explained:

As the Supreme Court has stated, Con-

gress did not intend to exercise the full scope

of its power under the Commerce Clause in

[enacting] the FLSA. See Walling v. Jackson-

ville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 570-71, 63

S. Ct. 332, 87 L.Ed. 460 (1943). Therefore, to

establish individual coverage, [the plaintiff],

must show that he was engaged in ‘the ac-

tual movement of persons or things in inter-

state commerce.’ See Thorne, 448 F.3d at

1266.

Navarro, 533 F.Supp.2d at 1223. Accordingly, nothing

in Victoria Transp. Co. requires the conclusion that

reversal is warranted.

The Thorne Case is Not Distinguishable

One of the Petitioner’s arguments is that in his

affidavit he indicates he picked up materials at least

once per week at various retail stores. The Petitioner

described how these stores were Bennett Auto, Ad-

vance Auto, and similar retailers. Jd. The Plaintiff’s

argument has been rejected by this Court and the

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courts of appeals, as set forth above. The court in

Thorne made clear that even employees who purchase

goods at a retail store (even if the goods traveled

interstate) are not engaged in commerce for purposes

of individual coverage, as follows:

When goods reach the customer for whom

they were intended, the interstate journey

ends and employees engaged in any further

intra state [sic] movement of the goods are

not covered under the Act. McLeod, 319 U.S.

at 493, 63 S. Ct. 1248. Courts distinguish be-

tween merchants who bring commerce across

state lines for sale and the ultimate con-

sumer, who merely purchases goods that

previously moved in interstate commerce for

intrastate use. Therefore, a customer who

purchases an item from Home Depot is not

engaged in commerce even if Home Depot

previously purchased it from out-of-state

workers.

Thorne, 448 F.3d at 1267. This slams the door on any

argument by the Petitioner that he was engaged in

interstate commerce for purposes of individual cover-

age. Even if he purchased the items (which he did

not), he still would not be entitled to invoke individ-

ual coverage. As stated above, the courts have held

that the ultimate consumer of the retail goods is the

individual who purchases them, and not the individ-

ual who happens to own a car or home into which

those goods are installed.

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26

The Cases from Other Circuits

and Tilbury Are Not Controlling

On page 8, the Petitioner cites to a case from the

Tenth Circuit and a case from the Eastern District of

Arkansas. Those cases de not eclipse the clear line of

cases from this Court which set forth the pertinent

rubrics concerning individual coverage. The foregoing

requires denial of the Petition.

Further, the Petitioner relies on Tilbury from the

former Fifth Circuit, but that case does not help him

for several reasons. First, the Tilbury decision notes

that workers who unpacked shipments of meat were

not engaged in commerce, because “the shipments

had completed their interstate journey when they

came to rest on defendant’s storage room floor”.

Tilbury v. Mitchell, 123 F.Supp. 109, 112 (W.D. La.

1954). Second, the group of employees who the Court

found were subject to the FLSA, were butchers and

boners who regularly and necessarily in the course of

their employment handled or otherwise worked upon

these meats which then were immediately placed in

interstate commerce, and thus the court held that the

employees were “engaged in the production of goods

for commerce”, which is not an argument that the

Petitioner has espoused in this Petition — the Peti-

tioner has argued that he was “engaged in com-

merce”, but not that he was engaged in the

production of goods for commerce, and so any such

argument to the contrary has been waived by the

Petitioner. Jd.

SY Ses te hc ea Sb te tg

27

‘Concerning the Petitioner’s argument that the de

minimis rule applies, that rule, as explained in

Tilbury, is that even if the percentage of the em-

ployer’s business dedicated to the production of goods

for commerce is very small (seemingly “de minimis”),

it is not de minimis for purposes of individual cover-

age, meaning that as long as workers were regularly

and recurrently engaged in the production of goods

for commerce, the court was not going to hold that

such employees were not entitled to individual cover-

age under the theory that the employer’s overall

involvement in the production of goods for commerce

(because of the nature of its business) was otherwise

very low. Id. at 112-13. The Tilbury decision does not

require that the Petition be granted.

,

Vv

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of

certiorari should not be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

*HARRY O. BORETH

GLASSER, BORETH & KLEPPIN

8751 W. Broward Blvd., #105

Plantation, Florida 33324

(954) 424-1933

*Counsel of Record

September, 2008

* gs ee ee a Corea rt SOO re (ors

LESLIE Ce NO Dee edo LOE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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