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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1906.

No. 171.

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,

v8.

A. L. SEEGERS AND W. B. SEEGERS, DOING BUSINESS

AS SEEGERS BROS.

IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TilE STATE OF SOUTH

CA a OC COE CO Cn Ce a

CAROLINA.

INDEX

Original. Print.

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Jupon & Dierwertver ([Nc.), Parnrers, Wasaineron, D. C., Jury 24, 1906.

S. A. L. RAILWAY VS. A. L. SEEGERS ET AL., ETC. 1

1 Tue Strate or Soutn CaRo.Lina:

In the Supreme Court, November Term, 1904, Fourth Circuit,

Chesterfield County.

A. L. Seecers and W, B. Sercers, Partners in Business Under the

Firm Name of Seeger Brothers, Plaintiffs- Appellants,

against

Seapoarp Air Line Raitway, Defendant-Respondent.

Case.

This action was commenced by the service of a summons and com-

plaint in Magistrate’s Court in the County of Chesterfield on the 31st.

day of August 1903 for fifty-one dollars and seventy-five cents, being

$1.75 for claim filed for loss of freight shipped to Plaintiffs and

$50.00 for penalty for failure to adjust and pay same within forty

days as provided by Statute.

The Complaint, paragraphs I and II, alleged the partnership of

the Plaintiffs and the incorporation of Defendant, which allega-

tions were admitted. The Complaint proceeded:

III. That on or about the fifth day of June A. D. 1908 the Pla-n-

tiffs had shipped to them from Columbia, 8. C. over the Defendant’s

line of railroad to McBee, 8. C., being a shipment wholly within the

State of South Carolina, one lot of bananas of the original cost of

$1.50 which said shipment in part reached its destination at McBee,

8. C. addressed and billed to Plaintiffs on or about the 6th day

2 of June A. D. 1903; but when the said shipment reached

McBee, 8. C. the same had been destroyed in part, and only

about one half vereof was delivered to Pla-ntiffs upon their pay-

ment of the frei, at thereon, amounting to twenty-five cents. There-

upon Pla-ntiffs refused to accept same and returned same to the

agent of Defendant at McBee, 8S. C., who accepted the same and after-

wards sold same to other parties.

IV. Thereupon, to wit, on or about the 6th day of June A. D.

1903 Pla-ntiffs filed with J. T. Bailey who was then and is now the

agent of Defendant at McBee, S. C. a claim for the original cost. of

said bananas, to wit, $1.50 and for twenty-five cents freight paid,

making a total of $1.75.

‘V. That the said defendant has failed and refused to adjust and

pay the said claim for $1.75 within forty days from and after the

filing of such claim with the agent of Defendant at the point of des-

tination of such shipment, to wit, at McBee, 8S. C.

VI. That Pla-ntiffs are advised and believe that the failure of

Defendant to adjust and pay said claim within the said period of

forty days has subjected the defendant to a penalty of fifty dollars,

to be recovered by Pla-ntiffs, they being the consignees of such ship-

ment.

1—171

PEN e ere Fa a a a OES

2 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS.

The prayer asked for $1.75 and for fifty dollars penalty. The

Complaint was verified.

The Defendant answered, admitting the shipment, but set up that

the shipment reached its destination in the same condition that it

was received, that it offered to refund the freight paid which was

refused, denied that it was due the Pla-ntiffs anything by way of

damages for injury to the shipment of bananas, set up that the

twenty-five cents freight paid was not for loss of or damage to prop-

erty and that Defendant had offered to refund said amount. That

on or about the 5th of August 1903 Defendant had tendered to

Pla-ntiffs the full amount of their claim, to wit, $1.75 without the

penalty, which was refused. The VI paragraph of the answer was

as follows:

3 That the Defendant, further answering the Complaint of

the Pla-ntiffs, alleges that the Statute No. 50 of Acts of 1903

under which the penalty set forth in the Complaint is claimed is

unconstitutional, and therefore null and void, and the Defendant

is not liable to Pla-ntiffs for said penalty.

The case came cn to trial before Magistrate S. H. Reid without a

jury on the 22nd of September, 1903, and he gave the following

judgment under the testimony taken, the Defendant offering no

testimony :

I find for the Pla-ntiffs $1.75 and interest from 7th of June, 1903,

together with fiftv dollars penalty, and the costs of this action

amounting to $2.35.

From this judgment the Defendant appealed to the Cireuit Court

on the following grounds:

I. Because the Magistrate erred in refusing and overruling the

motion for a non suit interposed by Defendant, at the close of Plain-

tiffs’ case, on the ground that there was no evidence tending to show

that the property alleged to have been lost or damaged while in the

possession of Defendant, was delivered to the Defendant in good

order, or that the alleged loss of or damage to same occurred while

same was in possession of Defendant.

II. Because it is submitted that Act No. 50 of Acts of 1903, under

which this suit was brought, is unc =stitutional, and therefore null

and void, and in violation of Art. 1, See. 5 of the Constitution of the

State of South Carolina, and of Art. XIV, See. 1 of the Constitution

of the United States, in that it operates to deprive Common Carriers

of property without due process of law, and denies to them the equal

protection of the law, and the Magistrate erred in so holding.

III. Because the Magistrate erred in holding that the loss or

damage to the said property was as much as One 75-100 dollars, the

amount of the claim filed, and the Pliantiffs were entitled to have

judgment against the Defendant for Fifty Dollars penalty and One

75-100 Dollars damage to the property.

4 IV. Because the Magistrate erred in holding that the

freight paid by Plaintiffs was a “claim for loss of or damage to

property while in the possession” of Defendant.

V. Because the Magistrate erred in giving judgment for the

penalty of Fifty Dollars, when the testimony showed that the claim

-

A, L. SEEGERS ET AL., ETC. 3

filed by Plaintiffs for One 75-100 Dollars was made up of two items,

to wit: One 50-100 Dollars, the value of the property alleged to

have been lost or damaged while in the possession of Defendant,

and 25c. freight paid by Plaintiffs for same.

VI. Beeause one of the Plaintiffs having testified that the agent

of the Defendant, a few days after the claim was filed, offered to pay

back to him the freight paid, which he refused, it is submitted that

the Magistrate erred in holding that the Plaintiffs were entitled to

judgment for the amount for which the claim was filed (which

amount included the freight,) and for the penalty of Fifty Dollars

and interest.

VII. Because the Magistrate erred in giving judgment against the

Defendant for Fifty One 75-100 Dollars and interest, when the law

does not provide for interest on the penalty, and when no interest

was asked for by the pleadings.

VIII. Because the judgment of the Magistrate was contrary to

the law and the evidence.

EDWARD McIVER,

STEVENSON & MATHESON,

Def'ts’ Attys.

The case came on for trial before his honor Judge R. C. Watts

on appeal and the following decree was rendered:

This was a suit in Magistrate Court on a claim for $1.75 for prop-

erty lost and freight paid thereon, and Fifty Dollars penalty under

the Act of 1903, 24 Stat. at Large, 81, for failure to adjust and pay

ihe said claim within forty days, the same being a shipment wholly

within this State.

5 The Magistrate gave judgment for the claim and also the

penalty. The Defendant appealed on various grounds, mak-

ing the question among others that this Statute imposed a penalty

on a debtor which happened to be a common carrier, not imposed

on any other debtor, and thereby denied to Defendant the equal

protection of the law. This case is largely in accord with the case of

Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. vs. Ellis 165 U. 8. 150, and after

careful consideration I sustain the contention of the Defendant.

This position is not in conflict with the recent case of Porter vs.

Charleston & Savannah Ry. Co. 63 S. C. 169, in which the consti-

tutionality of the Act of 1897, See. 1711 Civil Code, was considered

and sustained. That Act differed materially from the Act of 1905,

under which this suit is brought. It did not impose a penalty on

common carriers for failure to pay a debt, but for failing to pay or

refuse to pay within a specified time. The Court in Porter rs.

Charleston & Savannah Ry. Co., supra, in considering the Act of

1897, and in distinguishing it from the Act passed on in Gulf, Colo-

rado & Santa Fe Ry. Co., supra, says: “We are of opinion that our

Act of 1897 was passed, not for the purpose of enforcing more speedy

payment of claims against common carriers, but for the purpose of

enforcing more prompt action on the part of common carriers in

passing upon the validity of claims presented against them, and

that the time allowed by the Act, sixty days after the presentation of

L ee, seis : LIA ROSE OLA LPL SEA PLY ERE PEED AS Se PR LENE LILES AVERILL ALLEL LEADERS

4 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS.

any claim, is reasonable and suflicient to afford an opportunity to

investigaie the propriety and legality of the claims.” Since this

case the Act of 1903, now under discussion was passed, in which a

penalty is imposed on common carriers for a failure to pay these

claims in a given time, and this seems to me to be obnoxious to the

constitution both of the State and the United States.

The question is also made that the claim for loss of goods was only

$1.50, and that there was charged in the claim filed twenty five cents,

freight paid by, Pla-ntiffs on said goods, and that this was not “loss

of or damage to property,” and having filed their claim and brought

their suit for other things than those covered by the Statute,

6 mixing up those for which a penalty was allowed and those

for which no penalty was allowed, they could not get any

penalty in this action. It is unnecessary to decide this question

however, as the result would not be affected.

It is ordered, therefore, that the judgment of the Magistrate be

modified by reducing the sume to $1.75 and cost, in accordance with

the above views.

R. C. WATTS,

Presiding Judge.

May 28th. 1904.

The Pla-ntiffs gave due notice of intention to appeal, and they

now appeal to the Supeme Court on the following grounds to wit:

I. His honor erred in holding that this act in question, No, 50

Acts of 1903, 24 Statutes at Large, page 81, is in violation of the

Constitution of the State of South Carolina and of the United States,

and therefore null and void.

Il. His honor erred in holding that because the said Act applied

only to common carriers, and not to other persons either natural or

artificial, that it was therefore nuli and void; whereas he should have

held that the General Assembly of the State has the power to classify

the persons, natural or artificial, in the State under the State and

Federal Constitutions within certain reasonable bounds, and that a

classification of common carriers was such reasonable classification,

and that inasmuch as the said Act applied to all persons, natural

or artificial, coming under the head of common carriers, that the

said Act was not in violation of the Sections of the said Constitu-

tions set out in the decree, or any others.

III. His Honor erred in holding that inasmuch as the Act in

question provided for a penalty for failure to pay a claim within a

certain time, instead of as under the Act of 1879 to pay or refuse to

pay, that it was therefore unconstitutional.

7 IV. His Honor erred in modifying the judgment of the

Magistrate by eliminating the amount of the penalty.

W. P. POLLOCK,

Attorney for Pla-ntiffs-A ppellants.

To W. P. Pollock, Esq., Attorney for the Plaintiffs-Appellants:

You will please take notice that at the hearing of the above case

in the Supreme Court, the Defendant, Respondent will seck to sus-

_—

A. L. SEEGERS ET AL., ETC. 6

tain the order and judgment of the Circuit Judge, on the further

grounds fully set out in Defendant's LIL, IV, V & VI exceptions to

the judgment of the Magistrate who heard the case.

Respectfully,

STEVENSON & MATILESON,

EDWARD MclIVER,

Alt'ys for Defendant-Respondent.

We, the Attorneys for Appellants and Respondent, hereby agree

that the foregoing shall constitute the case and return for hearing

on appeal in the Supreme Court.

W. P. POLLOCK,

Appellants’ Attorney.

STEVENSON & MATIIESON,

EDWARD McIVER,

Respondent's Attorneys.

8 Sratre or Soutu CAROLINA:

In the Supreme Court, April Term, 1905, Fourth Circuit, Chesterfield

County.

A. L. Seeacers and W. B. Sercers, Partners in Business Under the

Firm Name of Seegers Brothers, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.

Seasoarp Arr Line Rartway, Defendant-Respoudent.

Opinion by Tra B, Jones, A. J.:

This action was commenced in a Magistrate Court for the County

of Chesterfield to recover $1.75 for loss or damage to freight, a bunch

of bananas, shipped August 31, 1908, to plaintiffs at MeBee, S. C.,

from Columbia, 8S. C., over defendant’s line and for fifty dollars

penalty for failure to adjust and pay the said loss or damage within

forty days as required by the statute. The Magistrate rendered

judgment for the whole amount claimed, including the penalty.

On appeal to the Circuit Court, Judge Watts modified the judgment

of the Magistrate by reducing the amount to $1.75 and costs, hold-

ing that the statute imposing the penalty is unconstitutional under

the rule stated in Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. vs. Ellis, 165

U. S. 150. From this judgment plaintiffs appeal, and the main

question presented is the constitutionality of said statute.

The statute in question is entitled “An Act to regulate the

9 manner in which common carriers doing business in this State

shall adjust freight charges and claims for loss of or damage

to freight,” and was approved February 28, 1904, 24 Stat., 81. See-

tion 2 of said act, which more particularly concerns the present con-

troversy is as follows:

“Sec. 2. That every claim for loss of or damage to property while

in the possession of such common carrier shall be adjusted and paid

within forty days, in case of shipments wholly within this State, and

within ninety days, in case of shipments from without this State,

—

» SE NH PE RHE BNR HO GENRE SENG STS ET RRNA

6 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS.

after the filing of such claim with the agent of such carrier at the

point of destination of the shipment: Provided, That no such claim

shall be filed until after the arrival of the shipment or of some part

thereof at the point of destination, or until after the lapse ef a rea-

sonable time for the arrival thereof. In every case such common

carrier shall be liable for the wmount ef such loss or damage, to-

gether with interest thereon fron: the date of the filing of the claim

therefor until the payment thereof. Failure to adjust and pay such

claim within the periods respectively herein prescibed shall subject

each common carrier so failing to a penalty of fifty dollars for each

and every such failure, to be recovered by any consignee or con-

signees aggrieved in any Court of competent jurisdiction: Provided,

That unless such consignee or cousignees recover in such action the

full amount claimed, no penalty shall be recovered, but only the

actual amount of the loss or damage, with interest as aforesaid: Pro-

vided, further That no common earrier shall be liable under this

Act for property which never came into its possession, if it complies

with the provisions of Section 1710, Vol. 1, of the Code of Laws of

South Carolina, 1902.”

This Section was under consideration in the case of C. A. Best vs.

Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. Manuscript Decision, filed Oct. 20,

1905, in which the question presented was whether an action could

be maintained for the penalty alone, when there had been voluntary

payment and receipt of the loss or damage before suit but

19 after the expiration of the time named in the statute. This

Court heid that such action could not be maintained. The

Court used this language: “The object of the statute was not to

penalize the carrier for merely refusing to pay a claim within the

time required, whether just or unjust, but the design was to bring

about a reasonably prompt settlement of all proper claims, the

penalty, in case of a recovery in a Court, operating as a deterrent of

the carrier in refusing to settle just claims and as compensation of

the claimant for the trouble and expense of the suit which the car-

rier’s unreasonable delay and refusal made necessary.” Under this

view the common carrier is made liable for a penalty only in the

event of a refusal to pay a claim for loss or damage to goods while in

his possession, the bona fides and justice of the claim being estab-

lished by a Court of competent jurisdiction.

The present controversy requires the Court to go more fully into

the consideration of the purpose of the legislation in question, with

a view to ascertain the reasonableness of the classification of common

carriers as objects of this particular legislation. Common carriers

receive from the State the right to carry’on business in the State as

such. They are by the State endowed with special powers and privi-

leges which call for special duties and obligations to the public. It

is a duty which a common carrier owes, not only under his contract,

but under general law, to promptly and safely deliver goods con-

signed to him for transportation, and he is liable for all loss or

dainage to such goods while in his possession, not occasioned

by the act of God or the public enemy. The duty to make prompt

settlement for loss or damage to goods is but an incident of the duty

A. L. SEEGERS ET AL., ETC. ?

to transport and deliver safely and with reasonable diligence. The

statute in question was designed to effectuate an important public

purpose, viz., to compel the common carrier to perform with rea-

sonable diligence the duty which peculiarly appertains to his busi-

ness as a carrier of freight. The penalty is but a means to

11 that end. Whether the adoption of such means is wise,

politic or adequate is exclusively a legislative question, for

the Courts have nothing to do with the policy, wisdom or expediency

of legislation. A statute cannot be declared void unless it manifestly

violates some constitutional principle.

This statute is assailed as violative of the equality clause of the

fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and

a similar provision in Art. 1., See. 5, of the Constitution of this

State. The respondents, in argument here, and the Circuit Judge

relied on the Ellis Case, supra, to sustain the position that the statute

is unconstitutional. The ‘Texas statute which was declared void in

that case was as follows:

“Section i. Be it enacted by the les’slature of the State of Texas,

that after the time that this act sail take effeet, any person in this

State having a valid bona fide claim for personal services rendered

or labor done, or for damages, or for overcharges on freight, or

claims for stock killed or injured by the train of any railway com-

pany, provided that such claim for stock kiiled or injured shall be

presented to the agent of the company nearest to the point where

such stock was killed or injured, against any railway corporation

operating a railroad in this State, and the amount of such claim

does not exceed $50, may present the same, verified by his aflidavit,

for payment to such corperation by filing it with any station agent

of such corporation in any county where suit may be instituted for

the same, and if, at the expiration of thirty days after such presen-

tation, such claim has not been paid or satisfied, he may immediately

institute suit therecn in the proper Court; and if he shall finally

establish his claim, and obtain judgment for the full amount thereof,

as presented for payment to such corporation in such Ceart, or any

Court to which the suit may have been appealed, he shall be entitled

to recover the amount of such claim and all costs of suit, and in

addition thereto all reasonable attorney's fees, previded he

12 has an attorney employed in his case, not to exceed $10, to

be assessed and awarded by the Court or jury trying tho

issue.”

The difference between the i exas statute and our statute is mani-

fest. The Texas statute subjects railways companies to a penalty,

when successfully sued “on a claim for personal servives rendered or

labor done, or for damages, or for overcharges on freight, or claims

for stock killed or injured by the train of any railway company,

ete.” The relation of the railroad company to those who render it

services or lebor is the ordinary relation of employer and employee

and it may with some reason bo said that there is no sufficient ground

for making a distinction, such as would compel a railroad company

to pay such ordinary claims for services within a given time under

penalty, when no such obligation is imposed upon other employers

cael PALE: ASSL IRIE AIEEE LOSE NED

8 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY YS.

to whom similar services are rendered. So, the claims for damages

may include claims not substantially different from claims for

damages against individuals and corporations generally. So also,

when there was no statute in Texas requiring railroad companies

to fence their track against stock, it may be that it would be unrea-

sonable to impose a liability for such acts different from, or greater

than, the liability which should attach to the injury of stock by any

other person or class. But we venture to say if the Texas statute

had beer confined to the regulation of some duty which particularly

appertains to common carriers as such and imposed a penalty as a

means of securing the performance of that duty, the decision of the

Court would have been different. The Supreme Court of Texas had

considered the statute as a whole and had declared that it was in-

tended to -ompel the payment of debts. So considering it as a whole,

the Court treated it simply as a statute singling out railroad cor-

porations alone and imposing upon them a penalty for fail-

ure to pay certain debts.

13 In the case of Atchison, ete. Railway Co. vs. Matthews 19

Sup. Ct. Rep., 607, the Court held that a Kansas statute re

quiring reasonable attorney’s fee for the plaintiff in a recovery

against the railroad company for damages from fire caused by oper-

ating its train did not violate the fourteenth amendment. In the

Matthews Case the Court reviewed the Ellis Case and called atten-

tion to the fact that the Texas statute was treated as a whole by the

Texas Court and was so treated by the Supeme Court of the United

States. The Court said: It is true that the Ellis Case was one to

recover damages for the killing of a colt by a passing train. And

so it might be argued that the protection of the track from straying

stock and the protection of stock from meving trains would, within

the foregoing principles uphold legislation imposing an attorney's

fee in actions against railroad corporations. We were not insensi-

ble to this argument when that case was considered, but we accepted

the interpretation of the statute and its purpose given by the Su-

preme Court of Texas, as appears from this extract from our opinion :

‘The Supreme Court of the State considered this statute as a whole,

and as such it is presented to us for consideration. Considered as

such, it is simply a statute imposing a penalty upon railroad cor-

porations for a failure to pay certain debts.” The Court further

said: So that, according to the interpretation placed upon the Texas

statute by its Supreme Court, its purpose was generally to compel

the payment of small debts, and the fact that among the debts so

provided for was the liability for stock killed was not sufficient to

justify us ia separating the statute into fragments, and upholding

one part on the theory inconsistent with the policy of the State,

while, on the other hand, the purpose of this statute is, as declared

by the Supreme Court of Kansas, protection against fire—a matter

in the nature of a police regulation.” The Court further said: “It

is the essence of a classification that upen the class are not cast

duties and burdens different from those resting upon the

14 general public. Thus when the legislatare imposes on rail-

road corporations a double liability for stock killed by pass-

A. L. SEEGERS ET AL., ETC. 9

ing trains, it says, in effect, that if suit be brought against a railroad

company for stock killed by one of its trains, it must enter into

the Courts under conditions different from those resting on ordi-

nary suitors. If it is beaten in the suit, it must pay, not only the

damage which it has done, but twice that amount. If it succeeds, it

recovers nothing. On the other hand, if it should sue an individual

for destruction of its live stock, it could, under no circumstances,

recover any more than the value of that stock. So that it may be

said that in matter of liability, in case of litigation, it is not placed

on an equality with other corporations and individuals; yet this

Court has unanimously said that this differentiation of liability, this

inequality of right in the Courts, is of no significance upon the ques-

tion of constitutionality. Indeed the very idea of classification is

that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the fact of

inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.

Our conclusion in respect to this statute is that, for the reasons

above stated, giving full force to its purpose as declared by the Su-

preme Court of Kansas, to the presumption which attaches to the

action of a legislature that it has full knowledge of the conditions

within the State, and intends no arbitrary selection or punishment,

but simply seeks to subserve the general interest of the publie, it

must be sustained, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of

Kansas is affirmed.”

In the case of Erb, Receiver, vs. Morasch, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 819,

it was held that an exception of a dummy railroad operated by steam,

or of an electric railroad, from an ordinance limiting the speed of

railroad trains within a city does not make an unreasonable classi-

fication in denial of the equal protection of the laws. Responding

to the suggestion that there was testimony that the operation of the

street railway was in fact more dangerous than the operation

15 of the railroad in the hands of plaintiff, receiver, the Court

said: “It is not a question io be settled by the opinion of

witnesses and the verdict of a jury upon the question whether one

railroad in its operation is more dangerous than another. All that

is necessary to uphold the ordinance is that there is a difference

and, that existing, it is for the city council to determine whether

separate regulations shall be applied to the two. * * * Given

the fact of a difference, it is a part of the legislative power to deter-

mine what difference there shall be in the prescribed regulations.”

In the case of Fidelity Mut. L. Asso. vs. Mettler, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep.,

667, over a strong dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, in which

Mr. Justice Brown concurred, pointing out that the decision was in

conflict with the Ellis Case, the Court neverthelese held, that a Texas

statute imposing upon life and health insurance companies, upon

failing to pay a loss within the time specified in the policy, after

demand therefor, a liability to the holder of the policy, in addition

to the amount of loss, of 12 per cent. damages and reasonable attor-

ney’s fees, did not deny the equal protection of the law to such life

and health insurance companies, although such an. obligation was

not imposed upon other classes of insurance companies or associa-

tions. This decision was reviewed in Iowa Life Ins. Co. vs. Lewis,

2—171

0 SEABOARD ATR LINE RAILWAY VS.

2S Sap. Ce Rep. 2. and the Coart expressed satisfaction with the

case and its reasoning.

Tn the Mettler case the Court said: “The ground for placing life

and health tneurance companies ina different class from fire, marine

and Inland insurance companies is obvieus, and we think that putting

ther in a didferent cles from mutual benefit and relief associations

deing bestines through badees, and bencvolent associations of the

character mentioned In the Texas Statute, is not an arbitrary classi-

tieation. bat resis on safiicient reason. The legislature evidently

intended to dsainguish between hfe and health Insurance companies

engaged In bastnes: for profits (and we are not called on to

ie eefine aw to the disnbaton of such profits) and lodges and

swecations ef a mutual benefit or benevolent character,

having in mind aly the necessity of the prompt payment of the

TRSLTANES MrEREN Im Very many cases In order to provide the means

of Living of which the beneficianes had been deprived by the death

of the tesured”

It appears to es that there ib even stronger reason for sustaining

a elasiiteation of all common carner: of freight for legislation, with

respect to thett quasi pablic duties as such, having also in mind the

mecessity af the pranpe payment of losses sustained by failure to

perform: said duty, as Im may eases such losses represent food, rai-

ment and other newssities of Tife.

In the case af Parmer” and Merchants’ Ins. Co. rs. Dabney, 23

Supe CK Repo SO the Court held walid a Nebraska statute allowing

& rewsenalle attorner’s fee to a plainuff in case of an unsuccessful

defence be an Inmsvtance company of a suit on a policy of insurance

covering real property wholly detroved by fire. We quote the

following fram that case as a complete answer to the suggestion of

imequatity im the ease at Rar in the Gassification of common carriers

for special keetshation of the kind Im question, and the suggestion of

inequality became the penalty falk upon the common carrier when

wrsvecessfal Se the sit, bat not upon the claimant when he is

unsuccessful ia the suit, The Court said:

“AU the groumé relied u to demonstrate that the statute

allowing a resonable altermer’s fee in case of the unsuccessful de-

fence of a suit to enforce certain Insurance policies is repugnant to

the equality clawe of the Mth Amendment are embraced in the

following propesitiess: Fin, becamse it arbitrarily subjects isur-

ance companies t a hebility for attorney's fees when other defend-

ants in other chases of cases are not subjected to such burden ; second,

because, whikt the obligation to pay attorney's fees is imposed

Ww om Insurance companies In the cases embraced by the statute,

ne such harden rests on the plaintiff in favor of the insurance

companies wher the sait on a policy is successfully defended; and,

third, because the statute arbitrarily distinguishes between insur-

ance policies be allowing an altorney’s fee in case of a suit on a

policy covering real estate, where the property has been totally de-

stroved, and eveeating the right to sach fees in suits to enforce poli-

eles on other chases of property, or where there has not been a total

destruction of the property covered by the insurance. Each and all

A. L, SEEGERS ET AL., ETC. 11

these propositions must rest on the assumption that contracts of in-

surance, generally considered, do not possess such distinctive attri-

butes as to justify their classification separate from other contracts,

and that contracts of insurance, as between themselves, may not be

classified separately depending upon the nature of the insurance,

the character of the property covered, and the extent of the loss

which may be supervened. But the unsoundness of these propo-

sitions is settled by the previous adjudications of this Court,” citing

cases.

The case of Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. R. Co. vs. May, 24 Sup.

Ct. Rep., 638; is an interesting and striking case. In that case the

Court held that a Texas statute, imposing a penalty in faver of con-

tiguous land owners against railway companies for permitting John-

son grass or Russian thistle to mature and go to seed upon their

road, does not deny such railway companies the equal protection of

the law. It might be suggested that Johnson grass is a curse or a

blessing according to the view point, a curse as to crops requiring

clean cultivation, a blessing when hay is the thing wanted; or it

might be suggested that Johnson grass could be easily communi-

cated to the railway company’s land or right of way by streams

from bottom lands above; or that it might be propagated from seed

dropped upon the ordinary public highways from wagons hauling

such hay, thence to lands adjoining, thence to the railway

18 company’s lands, thence to contiguous lands, but no such

penalty applies against other carriers against those in charge

of ordinary highways, against a contiguous land owner in favor of

the railway company, or as between contiguous land owners. It

will be further observed that the legislation effected the railway com-

pany in its capacity as owner or occupant of the land or right of

way. But the Court was guided in the decision of the case by these

sound principles.

“When a State legislature has declared that, in its opinion, policy

requires a certain measure, its action should not be disturbed by the

Courts under the 14th Amendment, unless- they can see clearly that

there is no fair reason for the law that would not require with

equal force its extension to others whom it leaves untouched.

* * * Great constitutional provisions must be administered with

caution. Some play must be allowed for the joints of the machine,

and it must be remembered that legislatures are the ultimate guard-

ians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a

degree as the Courts.”

This Court in Simmons vs. Telegraph Co., 63 S. C., 63, held that

the statute making telegraph companies liable for mental anguish

is not violative of the 14th Amendment or Art. 1. Sec. 5, of the

State Constitution, and in Johnson vs. Spartan Mills, 68 S. C., 355,

this Court held that See. 2719, making it unlawful for any corpora-

tion, person or firm to issue, pay out or circulate for payment for the

wages of labor, any order, check, memorandum, token or evidence

of indebtedness, payable in whole or in part otherwise than in lawful

money of the United States, except upon conditions specified in the

Act, did not violate the 14th Amendment and was upon a reasonable

12 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS.

classification, even though it contained a proviso that said section

shall not apply to agricultural contracts or advances made for

agricultural pu

In the case of Porter vs. Railway Co., 63 S. C., 169, this Court

held that the act, 22 Stat., 443, imposing a ‘penalty on com-

19 mon carriers for failure to pay or refuse to pay damages ete.

to freight within sixty days, does not violate those sections

of the State and Federal Constitutions providing for equal protec-

tion to all, this Court distinguishes that case from the Ellis case in

two particulars, viz, (1) that the South Carolina statute of 1897

applied to all common carriers, while the Texas statute, condem-ed

in the Ellis case, was limited to one class of common carriers, rail-

way corporations. (2) That the South Carolina statute was limited

to such claims as were peculiarly incident to the business of a com-

mon carrier, but the Texas statute was not so limited.

The statute considered in the Porter case was, in Johnson vs.

Southern Ry., 69 8. C., 322, held to be repealed by the Act of 1903

which is now under consideration. But the principle decided in the

Porter case is just as applicable in the present case. A valid dis-

tinction can not be based upon the difference between a require-

ment “to pay or refuse to pay” within a given time, as provided in

the Act of 1897, and a requirement “to pay” within a given time, as

required in the Act of 1903, for if it be unlawful to require the latter,

under penalty, it must also be lawful to require the former, since no

other person or class is required “to pay or refuse to pay,’ under

penalty. The decision rests upon the reasonableness of the classi-

fication of common carriers for particular legislation with respect to

the performance of their duty as such, thereby subserving an im-

portant public purpose within the police power of the State.

From this review of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the

United States and of this Court we think it is clear that the statute

is not unconstitutional.

The Respondent, in the event of the above conclusions being

reached, has upon notice and excepti-ns taken asked that this Court

consider whether the judgment of the Circuit Court should not be

affirmed upon the ground that the Magistrate erred in finding judg-

ment for the penalty, when the testimony showed that the

20 claim filed by plaintiff for One and 75/100 Dollars was made

up of two items, to wit: One and 50/100 Dollars, the value

of the property alleged to have been lost or damaged while in pos-

session of defendant, and 25c. freight paid by plaintiff for same.

The Magistrate having found as a fact that the amount of the loss

or damage was $1.75, as claimed, and this conclusion having been

affirmed by the Circuit Court by sustaining the Magistrate’s judg-

ment to that extent, we have no power to review or reverse such

conclusion of fact, unless there was absolutely no evidence tending te

sustain it. It was shown that the cost of the bunch of bananas in

Columbia, 8. C., was $1.50 and the freight thereon to McBee, S. C.,

as 25c. This was certainly some evidence that the value of the

bananas to plaintiffs at McBee was at least $1.75 and that such was

:

the amount of their loss. The Magistrate having adjudged tho loss

to be as claimed by plaintiffs, judgment for the penalty was proper.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the judgment

of the Magistrate Court is affirmed.

A. L. SEEGERS ET AL., ETC. 13

21 [Endorsed:] 6129. The State of South Carolina. In the

Supreme Court, April Term, 1905. Seegers Brothers, Ap-

pel’ts, v. S. A. L. Railway, Resp’d’t. Reversed. Opinion by Ira B.

Jones, A. J. We concur. Eugene B. Gary, Presiding Justice.

C. A. Woods, A. J. Report. Supreme Court of South Carolina.

ye fy Office. Columbia, S.C. Filed 13 Nov., 1905. U. R. Brooks,

jlerk.

22 THE State or Soutu CAROLINA:

In the Supreme Court.

A. L. SEEGERs and W. B. Segcers, Partners in Business under the

Firm Name of Seegers Bros., Plaintiffs, Appellants,

against —

SeapoarD Air Line Raritway, Defendants, Respondent.

To the Honorable Y. J. Pope, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of

the State of South Carolina:

Now comes Seaboard Air Line Railway, the Defendant and Re-

spondent of the above appeal, by its attorneys, Stevenson & Mathe-

son and Edward Mclver, complains and alleges that it is a citizen of

the United States of America. hat in the above entitled matter on

the 13th day of November, 1905, final judgment was rendered

against your petitioner by the Supreme Court of the State of South

Carolina, that being the highest court of law or equity in the said

State of South Carolina, wherein it was adjudged that the provisions

of the Statute of South Carolina of 1908, being Act No. 50, page 81,

of the Statutes of 1903, and Section 2 of said Act, which imposed a

penalty upon railroad companies for failure to pay claim for loss or

damage to property while in the possession of such common carrier

within forty days after the filing of such claim with the agent of the

common carrier at the point of destination, of $50.00 was constitu-

tional and was not in violation or in conflict with the provisions of

Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution in that

| @ the provisions of said Act did not deprive the said petitioner of the

: rights, privileges, or immunities secured to the other citizen- of

the United States and of said State, nor of liberty of property,

: without due process of law, nor the equal protection of the law.

Wherefore your petitioner prays for the allowance of a writ

: 23 of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to the

) Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina and judges

thereof to the end that the record in said matter may be removed

into the Supreme Court of the United States, and the error com-

plained of by your petitioner may be examined and corrected and

a «

said judgment reversed and your petitioner discharged, and your

petitioner will ever pray.

14 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS.

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY,

By STEVENSON & MATHESON,

Att’ys-at-Law and in Fact.

STEVENSON & MATHESON,

EDWARD McIVER,

Att’ys for S. A. L.

W. F. STEVENSON,

Att'y for S.A. L. Ry.

The writ of error, as prayed for in the foregoing petition, is hereby

allowed this 20th day of November, A. D. 1905, the writ of error to

operate as a supersedeas and the bond for that purpose is fixed at the

sum of $500 no/100. Dated at Newberry, this 20th day of November,

A. D. 1905.

Y. J. POPE,

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

of the State of South Carolina.

24 | Endorsed:] South Carolina. In the Supreme Ct. Seegers

Brothers vs. Seaboard Air Line Railway. Petition for writ of

error, order allowing same, & assignment of errors. Stevenson &

Matheson, Edward McIver, att’ys for defendant.

25 In the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina.

A. L. Seecers and W. B. Seecers, Partners in Business under the

Firm Name of Seegers Bros., Plaintiffs, Appellants,

against

SeapoarpD Air Line Raitway, Defendant, Respondent.

Assignment of Errors for Supreme Court of the United States.

The Seaboard Air Line Railway, by its attorneys, Stevenson &

Matheson and Edward Melver, respectfully submit that the Supreme

Court of the State of South Carolina erred i in its decision in the above

entitled case—

1. In adjudging and deciding that Act No. 50, of the Acts of South

Carolina of 1903, page 81, Section 2, which is as follows:

“That every claim for loss of or damage to property while in the

possession of such common carrier shall be adjusted and paid within

forty days, in case of shipments wholly within this State, and within

ninety days, in case of shipments from without this State, after the

filing such claim with the agent of such carrier at the point of desti-

nation of such shipment; Provided, That no such claim shall be filed

until after the arrival of the shipment or some part thereof at the

point of destination, or until after the lapse of a reasonable time for

the arrival thereof. In every case such common carrier shall be

liable for the amount of such loss or damage, together with in-

a

ar

terest thereon from the date of the filing of the claim therefor until

the payment thereof. Failure to adjust and pay such claim within

the periods respectively herein prescribed shall subject each common

carrier so failing, to a penalty of fifty dollars for each and every such

failure, to be recovered by any consignee or consignees aggrieved in

any Court of competent jurisdiction; Provided, That unless such

consignee or consignees recover in such action the full amount

claimed, no penalty shall be recovered, but only the actual amount

of the loss or damage, with interest as aofresaid; Provided, further,

That no common carrier shall be liable under this act for property

which never came into its possession, if it complies with the provis-

ions of Section 1710, Vol. 1, of the Code of Laws of South Carolina,

1902.”

is constitutional and is not in violation of Art. 14, Section 1, of

Amendments of the United States Oonstitution whereas it should

have held that said act was in violation of the constitution of the

United States in that (a) it denies to common carriers the equal

protection of the law in that it singles them out of all citizens and

corporations and requires them to pay in certain cases a

26 penalty for failure to pay certain kinds of claims not imposed

on any other corporation. (%) In that it deprives common

carriers of the equal protection of the law in that it imposes a burden

on their right to litigate claims in the courts not imposed on any

other litigants. (¢) In that it requires them to pay a penalty in case

said carrier loses its case, while the adverse party is not subject to any

such penalty in case he loses, thus denying equal access to and pro-

tection before the courts, whereas there is no proper or reasonable

ground of distinction that would justify a classification such as to

prevent their free access to the courts on equal terms with other

litigants. (d) In that it imposes a penalty on common carriers for

failure to pay a certain kind of debt in a specified time not imposed

on any other debtor.

Whereas it is respectfully submitted that there is no proper basis

for the classification which would impose a penalty upon a common

carrier for failure to pay a debt in a specified time which is not im-

posed on any other debtor.

A. L. SEEGERS ET AL., TC. 15

STEVENSON & MATITESON,

EDWARD McIVER,

Alt’'ys for 8S. A. L. Ry.

16 SEAROARD AIR LINE RATLWAY VS.

27 Tue Unirep Srares or AMERICA:

The President of the United States of America to the Honorable

Judges of the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina,

Greeting:

Because in the record and proceedings, as also in the rendition of

the judgment of a plea which is in the said Supreme Court of the

State of South Carolina before you, or some of you, being the highest

court of law or equity of the said State in which a decision could be

had in said suit between A. L. Seegers and W. B. Seegers, doing busi-

ness as Seegers Bros., and Seaboard Air Line Railway, wherein was

drawn in question the validity of a statute of South Carolina on the

ground of its being repugnant to the constitution and laws of the

United States, and the decision was in favor of its validity, and

wherein was drawn in question the construction of a clause of the

Constitution of the United States, and the decision was against the

title, right, privilege, or exemption specially set up or claimed under

such clause of the Constitution of the United States a manifest error

hath appeared to the great damage of the said Seaboard Air Line

Railway, as by its complaint appears, we being willing that error, if

any has been, should be duly corrected and full and speedy justice

done to the parties aforesaid in this behalf, do command you, if judg-

ment be therein given, that under your seal distinctly and openly you

send the record and proceedings aforesaid, with all things concerning

the same, to the Supreme Court of the United States, together with

this writ, so that you have the same at Washington within 30 days

froin the date hereof, in the said Supreme Court to be then and there

held with the record and proceedings aforesaid being inspected, the

said Supreme Court may cause further to be done therein to correct

that error what of right and according to laws and customs of the

United States should be done.

28 Witness the Honorable Melville W. Fuller, Chief Justice

of the United States, the 2 day of December, A. D. 1905.

C. J. MURPITY,

Clerk of the Circuit Court of the United

States for the District of South Carolina.

Allowed by

Y. J. POPE,

Chief Justice.

[ Endorsed:] Writ of error. Copy.

29 Tue UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

To A. L. Seegers and W. B. Seegers, doing business under the name

and style of Seegers Bros., Greeting:

You are hereby cited and admonished to be and appear at a Su-

preme Court of the United States, at Washington, within thirty days

from the date hereof, pursuant to a writ of error filed in the Clerk’s

office of the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina, wherein

a

A. L. SEEGERS ET AL., ETC. 17

Seaboard Air Line Railway is plaintiff in error and you are defend-

ants in error to show cause, if any there be, why the judgment ren-

dered against the said plaintiff in error, as in the said writ of error

mentioned, should not be corrected, and why speedy justice should

not be done to parties in that behalf.

Witness the honorable Y. J. Pope, Chief Justice of the Supreme

Court of the State of South Carolina this 13 day of December, in

the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and five,

Y. J. POPE, Chiey Justice.

EDWARD McIVER,

STEVENSON & MATILESON,

W. F. STEVENSON,

Attys for 8S. A. L. Ry.

30 We hereby accept due service of of this citation December

13, 1905.

A. L. SEEGERS,

W. B. SEEGERS,

SEEGERS BROTHERS,

Defendants in Error.

W. P. POLLOCK,

Attorney for Defendants in Error.

[Endorsed:] Citation. Copy.

31 The State of South Carolina.

State oF SoutnH CAROLINA:

A. L. Sercers and W. B. Sercers, Partners in Business under the

Firm Name of Seegers Bros., Plaintiffs, Defendants in Error,

against

Seapoarp Arr Line Rartway, Defendant, Plaintiff in Error.

Know all men by these presents that we, Seaboard Air Line Rail-

way, as principal, and American Surety Company, of New York, as

surety, are held and firmly bound unto A. L. Seegers and W. B.

Seegers, partners in business under the firm name of Seegers Bros.,

in the sum of One Thousand ($1,000) Dollars to be paid to the said

obligees, their successors, representatives and assigns; to the payment

of which well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our successors

and assigns jointly and severally by these presents. Sealed with our

seals and dated this 25th day of November, A. D. 1905.

Whereas, the above named plaintiff in error hath prosecuted a writ

of error in the Supreme Court of the United States to reverse the

judgment rendered in above entitled action by the Supreme Court of

the State of South Carolina. Now therefore the condition of this

obligation is such that if the above named plaintiff in error shall

prosecute its said writ of error to effect an- answer er costs and dam-

3—171

a a

18 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY V8.

ages, if it shall fail to make youl its plea, then this obligation shall

be void; otherwise to remain in full force and effect.

| SeAL. | SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY,

By M. Bb. SMITH, Agent, [ SEAL. |

AMERICAN SURETY COMPANY OF

NEW YORK, [SHALL |

By MARION F. JACKSON,

Resident Vice President.

Attest:

J.T. ORME, Resident Assistant Seerctary.

Signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of

D. 8. MATILESON.

32 = Srare or Sourm Canotina, County of Chesterfield:

On this 25th day of November, A. D, 1905, before me personally

ge M. B. Smith, Agent for the Seaboard Air Line Railway, in

above State and County, known by me to be such person and such

agent described in and who executed the foregoing bond and

acknowledged that he executed the same of his free act and deed,

D. 8. MATHESON,

Notary Public of South Carolina,

Chesterfield County.

Srare or Greorata, County of Fulton:

On this 27 day of November, A, D, 1905, personally appeared be-

fore me Jos. T. Orme, who being duly sworn, deposes and says, that

he is the member of a local board of directors for the American

Surety Company of New York; that the seal affixed to the foregoing

instrument is the corporate seal fo said corporation, and that suid

instrument was signed and sealed on behalf of the said corporation

by authority of its board of directors, and that the said Jos, T. Orme

acknowledged said instrument to be the free act and deed of said

corporation.

[ SEAL. | W. G. LEAS,

Notary Public of Fulton County, Georgia.

J.T. ORME,

I hereby approve the foregoing bond and sureties this 20 day of

November, 1905.

[Seal Supreme Court of South Carolina. |

Y. J. POPE,

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

of the State of South Carolina.

A true copy,

U. R. BROOKS, Clerk.

[Endorsed:! Seegers Bros. vs. S. A. L. Appeal & supersedeas

bond. 30 Nov.

A. L, SEEGERS FT AL., ETC. 19

33 Soutu Carnouina, Chesterfield County:

In the Supreme Court.

A. L. Sevcers and W. B. Seecers, Partners in Trade under the

Name and Style of Seegers Bros.,

v8.

Seanoarp Ain Line Raitway.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true transcript of the

record in this caxe as completed, and also that the opinion of the

Supreme Court in the said case attac ‘hed is a correct copy of the

opinion rendered,

Witness my hand and the seai of the Supreme Court of South

Carolina December 13th, 1905,

[Seal Supreme Court of South Carolina. |

U. R. BROOKS,

Clerk Supreme Court of 8. C.

34 | Endorsed: | Supreme Court of the United States, October

term, 1906. Seaboard Air Line Railway, plaintiff in error, vs.

A. L. Seegers & W. B. Seegers, doing business as Seegers Brothers

defendants in error. Transcript of record from Supreme Court of

South Carolina, W. F. Stevenson, Att'y for PVM in Error.

Endorsed on cover: File No, 20,022. South Carolina supreme

court. Term No, 171. Seaboard Air Line Railway, plaintiff in

error, vs, A. L. Seegers and W. B. Seegers, doing business as Seegers

Bros. Filed December 22d, 1905. File No. 20,022.

’ Office Seweme Cowt, U. 8.

VILE,

OCT 7 1907

JAMES H. McKENNEY,

No. 15. a

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1906.

oe.

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY

PLaintirr in Error.

vs.

A. L. SEEGERS AND W. B. SEEGERS,

DOING BUSINESS AS SEEGERS BROS.

DeErEeNDANTS IN Exror.

IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ©

SOUTH CAROLINA.

ARGUMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.

}

i

ee i” eay

a oe a

his. Meomesidtadl

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1906.

No. 171.

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY

PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.

vs.

A. L. SEEGERS AND W. B. SEEGERS,

DOING BUSINESS AS SEEGERS BROS.

DEFENDANTS IN ERROR.

IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

SOUTH CAROLINA.

ARGUMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.

The Defendant in error brought their suit in a

Magistrates Court against Plaintiff in error for $1.75

the value of a bunch of bananas of the original cost

of $1.50 and twenty-five cents freight paid on same

and for $50 penalty for failure to adjnst and pay the

same in forty-days after claim filed. (folios 1 and 2)

It appeared that part of the bananas had been deliv-

ered to consignees but were returned on finding that

part of them were missing (folio 2.) The Railroad

Company efter the forty-days expired offered to pay

the claim aud freight but same was refused (folio 2. )

The case was tried before a Magistrate who gave

judgement for the full amount of the claim and

~

penalty ,fohe 3) and the Railway Company ap-

pealed to the Circuit Court on the grounds set out

im the record (fotos 3 and 4.) The Circuit Judge

reversed the Magistrate as to the penalty on the

ground of the uncoasitutionality of the Statute, his

——— ang foand in foltwos 5 and 6. The

mants to the Supreme Court of the

Sate af S Carolina which reversed the Circuit

Court as t that — (fohos $-20 inclusive. )

the Railway Company applied for and

obtai a wrt of error and brought the record to

this Court for renew. The Suture under consider-

atien and under which the penalty was imposed is

as follows:

AN ACT ve Recurate tae Manner in wHicn

Comox Carrrers pownc Business in THIS

Srate saaui Apyust Freicar CHarces anp

Cram ror Loss ok of Damact To Freicut.

Secrren 1. Be a emaczed by the General Assembly

af the State of South Carolina, That from and after

the passage of this Act, all common carriers doing

pecan “ag State shall settle their freight charges

according to rate stipulated in the bill of lading:

Preveded, The rate therein stipulated be in conform-

ity with the classifications and rates made and filed

with the Inter-State Commerce Commission, in case

of shipments from without this State, and with those

ep cence aac ange ae State, in =

shipments wholly within thi te: by whic

classifeations and rates all consignees shall in all

cases be entitled to settle freight charges with such

carners: ee duty of such common

carner to i any Consignee or consignees of the

correct amount due for freight, according to such

classifications and rates; and upon payment or tender

of the amount due on any shipment, or on any part

of any shipment, which has arrived at its destination,

Ang to such classifications and rates, such com-

mon carrer shall deliver the freight in question to

3

the consignee or consignees, and any failure or re-

fusal to comply with the provisions hereof shall sub-

ject each such carrier so failing or refusing to a pen-

alty of fifty dollars for each such failure or refusal,

to be recovered by any consignee or consignees ag-

grieved by suit in any Court. of competent juris-

diction.

Sec. 2. That every claim for loss of or damage to

property while in the possession of such common

carrier shall be adjusted and paid within forty days,

in case of shipments wholly within this State, and

within ninety days, in case of shipments from with-

out this State, after the filing of such claim with the

agent of such carrier at the point of destination of

such shipment: Provided, That no such claim shall

be filed until after the arrival of the shipment or of

some part thereof at the point of destination, or un-

til after the lapse of a reasonable time for the arrival

thereof. In every case such common carrier shall

be liable for the amount of such loss or damage, to-

gether with interest thereon from the date of the fil-

ing of the claim therefor until the payment thereof.

Failure to adjust and pay such claim within the pe-

riods respectively herein prescribed shall subject each

common carrier so failing to a penalty of fifty dol-

iars for each and every such failure, to be recovered

by any consignee or consignees aggrieved in any

Court of competent jurisdiction: Provided, That un-

less such consignee or consignees recover in such

action the full amount claimed, no penalty shal! be

recovered, but only the actual amount of the loss or

damage, with interest as aforesaid: Provided, further,

That no common carrier shall be liable under this

Act for property which never came into its posses-

sion, if it complies with the provisions of Section

1710, Vol. 1, of the Code of Laws of South Caroli-

na, 1902.

Section two is the vital section in this case. Plain-

tiff in error contends that said Act is in violation: of

the constitution of the United States in that (a) it

“a

4

denies to common carriers the equal protection of

the law in that it singles them out of all citizens and

corporations and requires them to pay in certain

cases a penalty for failure to pay certain kinds of

claims not imposed on any other corporation. (4)

In that it deprives common carriers of the equal pro-

tection of the law in that it imposes a burden on

their right to litigate claims in the courts not im-

posed on any other litigants. (c) In that it requires

them to pay a penalty in case said carrier loses its

case, while the adverse party is not subject to any

such penalty in case he loses, thus denying equal ac-

cess to and protection before the courts, whereas

there is no proper or reasonable ground of distinc-

tion that would justify a classification such as to pre-

vent their free access to the courts on equal terms

with other litigants. (d) In that it imposes a pen-

alty on common carriers for failure to pay a certain

kind of debt in a specified time not imposed on any

other debtor.

ARGUMENT.

The present case is a shining illustration of the

iniquity of the legislation. A Claimant entitled to

$1.75 1s offered his money and declines it because

the offer was forty-two days after claim filed instead

of forty days and demands fifty dollars penalty for

the two days excess time, twenty-nine times the

amount of his claim or 2900 per cent. This was

visited on the Company because it litigated and if it

had succeed in defeating the claim or any part there-

of no penalty, attorney’s fee or other liability than

the cost would fall on the Claimant. The Statute

doesn’t close the door to the litigation but it says to

the Claimant, ‘‘go in and win if you can and if you

establish your claim in full the Defendant must pay

you a penalty for its temerity in litigating of 2900

per cent, of your claim, if you fail to establish your

claim in full you will still get the costs and not be

liable to any penalty. If you fail utterly you have

only the costs to pay, there is no penalty against you.

o

If, however, you owe the railroad company for

freight earned in the relation of common carrier or

demurrage or damage for getting possession of freight

shipped to ‘‘order notify’’ by deceit and without tak-

ing up the draft and bill of lading you can stand pat

and litigate. If you lose you cannot be made to pay

a penalty. The costs alone are chargeable to you.

We will deai with the questions as follows:

lst. Are Carriers discriminated against as be-

tween them and other debtors of the same class.

2nd. Are they denied access to the Courts on equal

terms with with other litigants. 3rd. Do the cases

cited by the Supreme Court of South Carolina sus-

tain its position?

First. The Statute in question was designed to

regulate the relations and respective rights of three

parties to Commerce. The Consignor, the Carrier

and the Consignee. Commerce and its regulation

is now one of the great complex problems of the

day and the relations of the three parties above desig-

nated are the the source of constant consideration.

The relation is contractual and owing to the public

nature of the duties of the Carrier, these relations

are susceptible of and subject to police regulation and

this regulation sweeps the entire field’ dealing with

all three and necessarily so for the reason that they

are undissolubly bound together by the contract of

Carriage and must be dealt with equally so that ho

advantage be given one over the other nor shall any

advantage be given to the one of them over his or its

competitor. Out of this relation there gréw mutual

claims which must be dealt with as between them-

selves and by the courts in case of disagreement.

There are claims against the Car.ier for, Ist. Loss

and damage to freight, 2nd. For overcharge. There

are claims against Consignors and Consignees, Ist.

For freight charges, 2nd. For demurrage, 3rd. For

balance due for undercharges where the Consignor

has classified it in a class carrying a lower rate than

6

its true class and where the rate named in the bill of

lading is erroneously laid and the Carrier is required

to settle that rate and deliver the goods and seek re-

lief in litigation as is now required in South Caroli-

na and 4th. For goods consigned ‘‘order notify’”’

when they are obtained from the company without

production of the bill of lading on misrepresenta-

tions, leaving the Carrier to pay for the goods to the

shipper and get his money out of the person so _ re-

ceiving them and this is of frequent occurrence.

The Statute under discussion does not deal with

Common Carriers in all their relations with the pub-

‘lic but only with them in this relation to Commerce

in the persons of Shipper and Consignee. Now in

dealing with those relations is it conceivable that the

Legislature can discriminate as between the parties?

Can they give a penalty to the Consignee when he

sues the Carrier, of 2900 per cent. of his claim when

they refuse to allow a penalty to the Carrier against

the Consignee where by coliusion between the Con-

signor and Consignee, in violation of right and hon-

esty they have classified the goods wrongfully and

owe a balance on freight which the Carrier must

collect by suit, or where the Consignee fraudently

gets possession of goods which the company has to

pay for to the Consignor (who could get the penal-

ty if he was not paid in 40 days)? Doesn’t this illus-

tration show the gross denial of equal protection of

the laws of this act? The Consignor ships goods

“order notify’? from Columbia to Charleston, the

party to be notified having information that they are

coming, by reason of his standing and by collusion

with some agent of the Carrier, gets the goods with-

out taking up the bill lading. The shipper makes

demand on the Carrier for the goods and if not paid

collects for the same with $50 penalty. The Carrier

demands the money of the party receiving the goods

and has to sue for them. No length of waiting, de-

lay, or vexation will give the Carrier the right to

a penalty against the wrongdoer. It will recover

the money only. Again, a shipper procures an

7

agent by mistake to insert a rate in the bill of lading °

far below the proper rate and on arrival in Charles-

ton the railroad is required to deliver the goods on

tender of that amount, and either lose the balance

or sue for it and in.the end gets its money but no

penalty, but if there is a shortage of a pair of socks

worth 25 cents in the shipment and the Consignee

can demand payment and the Carrier must pay in

40 days regardless of whether it has been able to as-

certain whether they were ever delivered to it in the

first instance or not or be subject to a penalty of $50

for not doing so. This is the whole scheme of the

law of South Carolina. In dealing with this class of

people engaged in a common undertaking with re-

ciprocal duties to each other they allow two mem-

bers of the class to go free regardless of their wrong-

doing and inflict a heavy penalty on the third mem-

ber in their favor. It is like the laws imposing

heavy penalties on the laborer for violating a con-

tract to labor and imposing none on the employer,

held to be unconstitutional in State vs. Williams, 32

S. C., 125, cited below:

These three people are all debtors of a certain class

,o wit: A class made up of those who became debt-

ors to each other from the mutual relations and duties

existing from their engagements in commerce in

handling of commodities. If they are not all in that

class why not? They have been so recognized by

the State in their legislation and by the United States

in its far reaching legislation in regulation of inter-

state commerce in which the principle is fully recog-

nized that they are all bound in the same bundle and

all to be held in check with heavy penalties. Our

assignments of errors cover this point and there is

no adequate answer to it in the opinion of the Su-

preme Court of South Carolina. They merely say

that the classification of common carriers is a good

classification. We grant that for purposes of certain

legislation but the classification must be reasonable

and adpated to the end in view and based on a dis-

tinction between the Carriers and all other per-

a)

sons as to the matter regulated. Here we have tried

to show that the matters reported were collection of

debts growing out of shipments of freight in which

claims of a similar nature arose against all parties to

the contract of shipment, and therefore all parties were

in one class as to the subject matter being regulated

and penalties were visited only upon one o/ the parties

to the class and he was denied the equal protection

of the law in that particular case. Now as to the

authorities. All agree that individuals of the same

class must be treated alike, the difficulty being deter-

mination of the identity of the members of a class.

We cite here: The State vs. Williams, 32S. C., at

page 125. Here the State had passed an act making

it a misdemeanor for a laborer on a farm under con-

tract duly entered into to violate the same and also

made it a misdemeanor for the employ er to violate the

contract but fixing a limitto the punishment for the

employer and no limit to that that of the laborer.

The Court say ‘‘We think there was error in oyer-

“ruling the demurrer; for the discrimination in the

‘‘punishment which may be imposed, under provis-

‘ions of Section 2084 of the General Statutes, or be-

“tween the laborer and the landholder renders the

“‘act clearly unconstitutional.’’ Now they belonged

to different classes. Landlord and laborers and leg-

islation affecting:each in a relation not common to

both might be discriminative, but legislation touch-

ing them on a common point and in their class as

parties to agricultural contracts must make them

equal before the law or be void. So here the Rail-

road Company is only one party to the compuct,

only one of the individuals making up the class

dealing in transportation of goods, wares and mer-

chandise and if any discrimination is made against

one member of a class in favor of another it cannot

stand.

This is an attempt to make a common carrier

pay one class of debts growing out of transportation

under penalties and forfeitures that are not inflicted

me

9

on other people, even other debts as before said

growing out of the same relation. The title of the

act shows its partisan character and that it was lev-

eled at one party to the contract of transportation.

It in effect says to a common carrier ‘you must

pay all claims made against you for loss of or damage

to goods shipped over your lines in this State within

forty days after claim filed, or be subjected to a pen-

alty of fifty dollars.’ What for? Fora failure to

pay its debt for forty daysl What individual or

other corporation is thus punished? Is not this an

arbitrary classification and discrimination against

common carriers? The Courts are not open to

them as to other litigants to adjudicate such claims,

the law says to them ‘if you lose your case, you will

be subject to a heavy penalty, (in this case nearly

thirty times as large as the claim in controversy, ) if

your adversary loses his case he has no penalty to

pay.’ Is not this unjust discrimination? Corpora-

tions are the same as persons within the provisions

both of the State and the United States Constitutions.

‘A State has no more power to deny to corpora-

tions the equal protection of the law than it has to ~

individual citizens.’’

Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. vs. Ellis,

165 U. S. 150, and case there cited.

I frankly admit that the Legislature has the power

to classify persons or corporations, yet it is equally

true that such classification cannot be made arbitrar-

ily. Classification for legislative purposes must have

some reasonable basis upon which to stand.

‘The differences which will support class legisla-

tion must be such as, in the nature of things, furnish

a reasonable basis for separate laws and regulations.’’

Ibid.

The State cannot say, for instance, that all farm-

ers or persons engaged in the cultivation of the soil,

must pay their debts contracted for the raising of

their crops or the purchase of their farming imple-

10

ments, within a given length of time, or be sub-

jected to a penalty not imposed on other debtors;

and yet there would be as much propriety in doing

this as there is in putting a penalty on common

carriers for not paying their debts incident to the

running of their business.

“Clear and hostile discrimination against particu-

lar persons and classes’’ cannot be made.

Bells Gap R. R. vs. Pa., 14s U. S., 232.

Here, it is submitted, is a clear, and I might per-

haps add hostile, discrimination against common

carriers, requiring them to pay their debts within a

given time, or suffer a heavy penalty, imposed on no

one else, even though the conditions be identical.

Such classification ‘‘must always rest upon some

difference which bears a reasonable and just relation

to the act in respect to which the classification is

proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and

without any such basis.’’

Porter vs. Ry., 63 S. C., 180, quoting from

Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. vs. Ellis, supra.

It is conceded that for some things common car-

riers might very properly be classified and distin-

guished from persons, and even from other

corporations; as for instance when the nature of the

business engaged in is of a peculiarly dangerous

character, the Tegislature i in the exercise of its police

mien may justly require many things to be done

them, not required of others. But it is earnestly

p Re over 3 that this can never be done in reference

to their liability for the payment of their debts, and

that no law can whi med vs be made requiring them

to pay their debts under greater penalties than are

imposed on others, or putting a greater burden on

their right to litigate claims “against them, than is

imposed on others. Where is the ‘‘distinctive dif-

ference between the business of a common carrier

and any other class of persons’ ( Porter vs. Ry. Co.,

63 S. C., 180,) in so far as the payment of its debts

7

>

is concerned? Of course there are marked distinc-

tions between the kind of business carried on by a

common carrier and other classes of business, and in

many particulars no doubt provisions of the law may

be properly made to apply to common carriers that

need not apply to other kinds of business; duties

arising out | the peculiar nature of the business in

which they are engaged, and not resting alike on

other kinds of business, may properly be imposed on

them, but surely there is no difference in their obli-

gation to pay their. debts, from that of any other

debtor; and surely they should have the same free

right to litigate as others have, else, it is respectfully

submitted, a blow is struck at the very foundation of

justice, as administered by the Courts.

As is said in Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. vs. Ellis, supra,

‘*A statute to compel ‘the payment of indebtedness

does not come within the scope of police regulations.

The hazardous business of railroading carriers with

it no special necessity for the prompt payment of

debts. This is a duty resting upon all debtors; and

while in certain eases there may be a peculiar obliga-

tion which may be enforced by penalties, yet noth-

ing Of that kind springs from the mere work of rail-

road transportation. * * It is not a statute for the

protection of particular classes of individuals sup-

posed to need protection, but for the punishment of

certain corporations on account of their delinqueti cy.’

I have quoted extensively from this case and I

hope I may be pardoned for even further quotations,

as this case is very much like the case under ‘consid-

eration.

u

The Supreme Court of the United , States in_ this

case—Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. vs. Ellis—consttued and

held unconstitutional, a Texas statute very much like

the one under consideration, and the well consider-

ed opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer, is so much in

point here that I might well adopt his opinion in to-

to as my atgument in this case. “The question in

that case was as to the constitutionality of ‘an act of

12

the State of Texas providing that railroad Companies

failing to pay certain claims of less thrn fifty dollars

for thirty days after presentation, should be liable for

an attorney's fee, not exceeding ten dollars. In

holding the act unconstitutional, Mr. Justice Brew-

er, speaking for the Court, says: The Supreme

of the State considered this statute as a whole and

held it valid, and as such it is presented to us for

consideration. Considered as such it is simply a

statute imposing a penalty upon railroad corporations

for a failure to pay certain debt. No individuals are

thus punished, and no other corporations. The act

singles out a certain class of debtors and punishes

them, when, for like delinquencies, it punishes no

others. They are not treated as other debtors, or

equally with other debtors. They cannot appeal to

the Courts, as other litigants, under like conditions,

and with like protection. If litigation terminates

adversely to them, they ars mulcted in the attorneys

fees of the saccessful plaintiff; if it terminates in

their favor, they recover no attorney’s fees. It is no

sufficient answer to say that they are punished not only

when adjudged to be in the wrong. They do re-

cover any if right; while their adversaries recover if

right, and pay nothing if wrong. In the suits there-

fore, to which they are parties, they are discrimina-

ted against, and are not treated as others. They do

not stand equal before the law. They do not receive

its equal protection. All this is obvisous from a

‘mere inspection of the seatute.”’

Change ‘‘attorney’s fees’’ to ‘‘penalty,’” wherever

it occurs, and the above is so applicable to this case,

that it might well have been written for this case.

The learned Justice goes on to say—‘‘It is, of

course, proper that every debtor should pay his debts

and there might be no impropriety in giving to ev-

ery successful suitor attorney’s fees. Such provision

would bear a reasonable relation to the delinquency

of the debtor, and would certainly create no in-

equality of right or protection. But before a dis-

13

tinction can be made between debtors, and one be

punished for a failure to pay his debts, while anoth-

er is permitted to become in like manner delinquent

without any punishment, there must be some differ-

ence in the obligation to pay, and some reason why

the duty of payment is more imperative in the one

instance than in the other.

If it is said that this penalty is cast only upon cor-

porations, and to them special privileges are granted,

and therefore upon them special burdens may be

imposed, it is a sufficient answer to say that the pen-

alty is not imposed upon all corporations. The bur-

den does not go with the privilege. Only railroads

of all corporations (here only common carriers of all

corporations) are selected to bear this penalty. The

rule of equity is ignored.”’

Again, he goes on to say: ‘‘Neither can it be sus-

tained as a proper means of enforcing the payment

of small debts. and preventing any unnecessary liti-

gation in respect to them, because it does not im-

pose the penalty in all cases where amount in con-

troversy is within the limit named in the statute. In-

deed, the statute arbitrarily singles out one class of

debtors, and punishes it for a failure to perform cer-

tain duties—duties which are equally obligatory up-

on all debtors; a punishment not visited by reason

of the failure to comply with any proper police regu-

lations, or for the protection of the laboring classes,

or to prevent litigation about trifling matters, or in

consequence of any special corporate privileges be-

stowed by the State. Unless the Legislature may

arbitrarily select one corporation, or one class of cor-

porations, one individual, or one class of individuals,

and visit a penalty on them which is not imposed on

others guilty of like delinquency, this statute cannot

be sustained. Arbitrary selection can never be justi-

fied by calling it classification.”’

Similar statutes in the States of Alabama, Missis-

sippi, Michigan, Arkansas, Nebraska, Illinois and

‘

14

West Virginia have beeu held unconstitutional.

Railroad Co. vs. Morris, 65 Ala., 193.

Railroad Co. vs. Moss, 60 Miss., 641.

Wilder vs. Railroad Co., 70 Mich., 382.

Railroad Co. vs. Williams, 49 Ark., 492.

Railroad Co. vs. Baty, 6 Neb. 37.

Frorer vs. People, 141 Ill., 171.

Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill., 66.

In Wilder vs. Railroad Co., supra, the Court on

page 384 says:

*‘Corporations have equal rights with natural per-

sons as far as their privileges in the Courts are con-

cerned. They can sue and defend in all Courts the

same as natural persons, and the law must be ad-

ministered as to them with the same equality and

justice which it bestows upon every suitor, and with-

out which the machinery of the law becomes

the engine of tyranny. ‘This Statute proposes to

punish a railroad company for defending a suit

brought against it with a penalty of $25.00, if it fails

to successfully main its defense. ‘The individual sues

for the loss of his cow, and if it is shown that such

loss was occasioned by his own neglect, and through

no fault of the company, and he thereby loses his

suit, the railroad can recover only the ordinary statu-

ary costs of $10 in the justice’s Court; but, if he suc-

ceeds because of the negligence of the company, the

plaintiff is permitted to tax the $10 and an addition-

al penalty of $25; for it is nothing more or less than

a penalty. Calling it an ‘‘attorney fee’’ does not

change its real nature or effect. It is a punish-

ment to the company, a reward to the plaintiff, and

an incentive to litigation on his part. This inequali-

ty and injustice cannot be sustained upon any prin-

ciple known to law. It is repugnant to our form of

government, and out of harmony with the genius of

our free institutions. The legislature cannot give to

one party in litigation such privileges as will arm

7

15

him with spec‘al and important pecuniary advantages

uver his antagonist.”’

This is the view taken by the Michigan Court on

such legislation as we are now considering, and

while this case has no binding force on this Court,

we submit that the reasoning is sound and unanswer-

able, and in exact accord with the decisions of the

Supreme Court of the United States.

In Durkee vs. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, the

Court uses this language: ‘‘It is obvious there can

be no certain remedy in the laws where the legisla-

ture may prescribe one rule for one suitor, or class

of suitors in the Courts, and another for all others

under like circumstances, or may discriminate be-

tween parties to the same suit, giving one most

unjust pecuniary advantage over the other. Parties

thus discriminated against would not obtain justice

freely, and without being obliged to purchase it.

To the extent of such discrimination they would be

obliged to buy justice and pay for it; thus making it

a matter of purchase to those who could afford to

pay, contrary to the letter and spirit of this provi-

sion.

The act in question is directed against all common

carners while the Texas act, construed by the Su-

preme Court of tne United Statea, in Gulf, C. & S.

F. Ry. vs. Ellis, is directed against railroad com-

panies only. But it is evident from a careful reading

of the case that the reasoning of the Court and the

authorities cited, apply just as forcibly to our act as

to the Texas act. Indeed the words ‘common car-

riers’ might be substituted for the words ‘railroad

companies,’ wherever they occur in the opinion,

without in any respect impairing the force of the

argument.

Our Supreme Court in Porter vs. Railway Co. 63

S. C. 169, has held section 1711 Code of Laws, Vol.

1, constitutional. That section, since repealed by

the a‘* now under consideration, (see Johnson vs.

§6

Sea. Ry. 68 SoC. 322.) required common carriers

“to pay fer ot refase tw pay for ali loss” X&c., and

the Court in holding it constitutional uses the fo!-

a nnenae “We are of opinion that our act

of 1897 was passed ret for the porpose of enforcing

more speedy payment of claims against common

earners, bat for the parpose of enforcing more

prompt action on the part of common carriers, in

2 ma the validity of Claims presented against

a that the ume allowed by the act--sixty

days —alter presentation of any Claim is reasonable

and suthcient tw afford an opportunity to investigate

ony legality of the claim.”” It is true

Court

on to distinguish between the

statute of Smeal se unconstitutional in Gulf, C. &

S. F. Ry. ws. Bis, and our act then under consider-

ation, on the farther ground that the Tex:s act was

directed against Railroad Companies, while our act

was directed agaimst common carncrs, but the rea-

ing im the Gall, C&S. FL Ry. case will not

bear this distinction, as will be most apparant from

a careful reading of that case. This too was obiter

dictum, as the dicison was iy put on the

ground that our act, then u consideration, did

net impose a penalty for failure to pay, but for fail-

wre to act, to Investigate and accept or refuse the

claim. That act merely required common carriers

pay—it merely required them to

act, here the act under consideration requires them

to pay, or te take the penalty. A marked distinc-

tion we sabenit, oy ae big’ y hyena hpaameaes

ruling in the Galt, C. & S. FL Ry. case.

The i

g

yr

j

f

4

17

by a penalty if it is not ended and the debt paid be-

fore 40 days expires. It does not provide that the

consignee must sue in, time to have the case tried i

time to pay the claim within the 40 days if it is ad-

judged against the carrier and there is no way that

the carrier, if if believes the claim to be unjust, can

get an adjudication of the claim in time to pay it

and save the penalty if it is adjudged to be just, and

the result is that in the large majority of cases like

the present rather than risk the confiscating penalty

of 2900 per cent they are. forced ta pay the claim

right or wrong. But the Court of South Carolina

says it is designed to require the prompt payment of

just claims. If you.make the conditions of entering

the courts to ascertain what claims are just, and what

are not, so onerous on one litigant and so easy on

the other party to the. same contract, the party on

whom the burden is placed is discriminated against

and they are both ih the same plight, are both stand-

ing on the contract to transport and safely deliver,

by the carrier, for a consideration paid by the con-

signee and'should both be treated alike. But they

are not.~ The courts which were established in

tecognition of the fact that there are differences’ as

to property rights, as to ‘‘just claims’? which should’

be settled by an unbiased tribunal are free- and:

open to one party to the contract without liability to

penalty if he declines to pay arid ‘litigates while to

the other party the door is barred by a_confiscatory

penalty. “A right guaranteed to him is practically

taken away by the burden imposed as a coridition to

its assertion unless he makes good his contention.

And again; the right is dénied him to be equal with

the other patty to‘the litigation in that he catinot get

his right submitted:to'a Court in time ‘to decide it,

in the 40 days. He cant require the claimant to

bring his swit in 40 days or be’ barred of the’ penalty

and naturally the claimant waits till the time expires.

To put them on an equal footing in this respect the

claimant should be required to bring his suit so as

to get an adjudication in the time allowed to pay

18

without penalty or be barred the penalty. So the

Legislature has attempted to so regulate matters

growing out of the contractural relation of cdrrier

and consignee to make the carrier either submit to

wrong or litigate at great disadvantage with the ship-

per, who is not required to pay any penalty growing

out of his failure to pay any liability growing out of

his contract nor allowed to proceed so as to deter-

mine the rights of the carrier in time to pay his

liabilities without penalty. Classify them therefore

as mutual contraetors as to shipment, transportation,

and receipt of freight and one is given, plain and

unconscionable advantage over the other; class them

as litigants and one is given confiscatory power over

the other without any reciprocal liability and class

them as debtors, of the peculiar class made up of

carriers and consignees and the door of the court is

closed to the one by the enormous advantage given

the other without any reciprocal disadvantage. Is

this allowable under our Constitution?

We would repeat that the classification must be

with reference to the matter and relation dealt with?

It is known that all railroads own more or less real

estate. Would it be permissible to pass an Act that

where a common carrier failed to return its land for

taxation it should be taxed on double its value, while

the individual landowner in default should be taxed

be taxed on only 5 per cent ‘additional valuation?

That would not stand a minute, simply because the

classification of the railroad as a common carrier has

no relation to the subject regulated, It is the class

of landowners. Suppose it went further and denied

the right of common carriers to go into court to

correct the assessment on its property and left the

courts open to all other taxpayers for that purpose.

Would this not be denying the equal protection of

the law and denying equal access to the courts?

Would the fact that the R. R. Co. was classed as a

common carrier have any thing to do with it? Can,

therefore, the State say that two parties can enter in-

to a contract, that if one party fails to carry his part

“7

Te ee ee

19

out, he can refuse to pay and stand a suit and if he

looses he is not liable to any penalty except for costs.

But if the other party fails and appeals to the court

and looses he shall be liable to a penalty in favor of

his co-contractor. Doesn’t that deny equality be-

fore the courts and do not the courts exist for afford-

ing the protection of the law and therefore does not

denial of equality before the court deny equal pro-

tection of the law?

AUTHORITY.

We cite now the case of Cotting vs. Kansas City

Stock Yards Co., 183.U. S. p. 79.

‘*Do the laws secure to aniindividual an equal pro-

tection when he is allowed to come into court and

make his claim or defense subject to the condition

that, upon a failure to make good that claim or de-

fense, the penalty for such failure either appropriates

all his property, or subjects him to extravagant and

| unreasonable loss? Let us make some illustrations

to suggest the scope of this thought.

Suppose a law were passed that if any laboring

man should bring or defend an action and fail in his

claim or defense, either in whole or in part, he

should in the one instance forfeit to the defendant

half of the amount of his claim, and in the other be

punished by a fine equal to half of the recovery

against him, and that such law by its terms applied

only to laboring men, would there be the slightest

hesitation in holding that the laborer was denied the

equal protection of the laws? The mere fact that

the Courts are open to hear his claim or defense is

not sufficient, if upon him, and upon him alone,

there is visited a substantial penalty for a failure to

make good his entire claim or defense.

Take another illustration: Suppose a statute that

every corporation failing to establish its entire claim,

or make good its entire defense, should as a penalty

therefor forfeit its corporate franchise, and that no

20

penalty of any kind exyvept the matter of costs was

attached to like failures of other litigants, could it be

said that the corporations received the equal protec-

tion of the laws?

Take still another illustration: Suppose a law

which, while opening the doors of the Courts to all

litigants, provided that a’failure of any plaintiff or

defendant to make ‘good ‘his entire’ claim or entire

defense should subject him to a forfeiture of all his

property or to some other great penalty; then, even

if, as all litigants were tfeated ‘alike, it could be said

that there was equal protection of the Jaws, would

not such burden upon all be adjudged a denial of

due process of law? Of course, these are extreme

illustrations, and they serve only’ to fllustrate the

proposition that a statute (although in térms opening

the doors of the Courts to'a_patticular litigant)

which places upon him as a penalty for a failure to

make good his defense a burden so great as to prac-

tically intimidate him from asserting that which he

believes to be his rights is, when no such penalty is

inflicted upon others, tantamount to the denial of

the equal protection ‘of. the. laws. -It may be said

that these illustrations,are not pertinent because they:

are of civil actions, whereas their statute makes cers

tain conduct by the Stock Yards Company a crimi-.

nal offense, and simply imposes punishment for such

offense.”’

Mr. Justice Brewer’ puts his‘ finger 6n the vital

spot when he says that a Statute that imposed a

heavy penalty if a Corporation: failed “to make goott

its defense and ‘“‘no penalty of any kind except 4

‘matter of costs was attached to like failures of other

‘litigants, could it be said ‘the corporatfdns ‘receiv ed

“the equal protection of the law?”

This covers our case. It fits State vs. Williams

32 S. C. supra.

We cite at length Seine vs. Jennings, 48 L.

R. A. 340 and case cited therein. ; | aye

aoe

a

21

*

“Counsel for appellants contend that the judgment

wud ccerce are erroneous, in that the lien decreed

against the property of appeliants includes in ad-

dition to tae principal and interest of the debt, and

the usual costs, the allowance af attorney’s fees to

the respective lien claimants. These allowance were

mace in pusuance of Par. 18, chap. 117, p. 375,

Sess. Laws, 1893, which reads as follows: ‘‘In all

siits for the foreclosure of liens, provided for in this

act in which the plaintiff shall obtain a judgment

and decree of foreclosure against the property de-

scribed in said lien there shall be taxed as costs, in

addition to the costs already provided for in such

cases, a reasonable sum as an attorney fee to be fixed

by the court at the time of rendering such judgment

and decree.’’ It will be seen that this section im-

peses a penalty upon the defendannt for exercising,

in this class of cases, the common rights of making

« defense, which is accorded to every other litigants

of the courts, by subjecting him to the payment of

the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees if he is successful, with-

out giving him (the defendant) a reciprocal right if

he is victorious. As furnishing support for this

character of legislation, we are referred to the fol-

lowing cases, wherein statutes allowing an attorney’s

fee to plaintiff in actions against railroad companies

for the killing of stock have been held to be consti-

tutional: Peoria D. & E. E. Co. vs. Duggan, 109

Il. 537, 50 Am. Rep. 619; Kansas P. R. Co. vs.

Mower, 16 Kan. 573; Perkins vs. St. Louis, I. M.

& S. R. Co. 103 Mo. 52; 11 L. R. A. 426, 15 S.

W. 320; Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. vs. Bey,

$2 lowa, 312 12 L. R. A. 436, 3 Inters. Com. Rep.

584, 48 N. W. 98. An examination of these cases

discloses that the statutes there under consideration

required the railroad company to fence its right of

way, and provided penalties for the nonperformance

of this statutory duty,—among them, an attorney’s

fee,—but no such reason underlies the legislation in

in question. The attorney’s fee allowed by the fore-

going provisions of our statute is not in the nature

=

of a penalty for the voiolation of any statutory duty,

but a punishment for the failure to pay the claim of

the lienor, and cannot be sustained upon the princi-

ples announced in those cases. Its validity, there-

fore, depends upon whether it violates any provision

of our Constitution. Section 6 of our Bill of Rights

enacts: ‘‘The courts of Justice shail be open to ev-

ery person, and speedy remedy afforded for every

injury to person, property, or character; and that

right and justice should be administered without

sale, denial or delay.’’ In Durkeville vs. Janesville,

28 Wis. 464, 9 Am. Rep. 500, an act that exempted

the city of Janesville from the payment of costs in

any action brought against it to set aside any any as-

sessment or tax deed, or to prevent the collection of

taxes in said city, was held to conflict with Par. 9,

Art. 1, of the Constitution of Wisconsin, which was

substantially like the foregoing section of our bill of

rights. Chief Justice Dixon, in discussing the con-

struction and effect to be given to that provision,

said; ‘‘It is obvious there can be no certain remedy

to the laws, where the legislature may prescribe one

rule for one suitor or class of suitors in the courts,

and another for all others in like circumstances, or

may discriminate between parties to the same suit,

giving One most unjust pecuniary adventage over the

other. Parties thus discriminated against would not

obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to

purchase it. To the extent of such discrimination,

they would be obliged to buy justice and pay for it,

thus making it a matter of purchase to those who

could afford to pay, contrary to the letter and and

spirit of this provision. Certainty of remedy implies

uniformity of remedy and equality of rights and

privilege in all things respecting it, which can only be

obtained by general laws, equally binding upon ev-

ery member in the community. The language de-

notes that there can be but one remedy for all simi-

lar cases, which must operate upon all persons or

parties alike, and be equally free and favorable to

all.’”’ In South and North Ala. R. Co. vs. Morris,

23

65 Ala. 193, a statute which imposed upon an un-

successful appellant a reasonable attorney fee incur-

red by reason of taking an appeal from a decision

rendered by a justice cf the peace in a suit against

railrailroad companies for damage to live stock, not-

withstanding it gave the same right to both parties,

was held to be in conflict with the 14th Amend-

inent to the Constitution of the United States and

Par. 14 of their Bill of Rights, which is identical

with par. 6 of ours. Itis there said: ‘“The clear le-

gal effect of these provisions is to place all persons,

natural and corporaate as near as practicable, upon a

basis of equality in the enforcement, and defense of

their rights in courts of justice in this State, except

so far as may be otherwise provided i in the constitu-

tion. ‘his right, though subject to legislative regu-

lation, cannot be impaired or destroyed under the

guise or device of being regulated. Justice cannot be

sold or denied by the exaction of a pecuniary con-

sideration for its enjoyment from one, whan it is giv-

en freely and open-handed to another, without mon-

ey and without price. Nor can it be permitted that

litigants shall be debarred from the free exercise of

this constitutional right, by the imposition of arbi-

trary, unjust, and odious discriminations, perpetrated

under color of establishing peculiar rules for a_par-

ticular occupation. Unequal partial, and discrimi-

natory legislation, which secures this right to some

tavored class or classes, and denies it to others, who

are thus excluded from that equal protection design-

ed to be secured by the general law of the land, is in

clear and manifest opposition to the letter and spirit

of the foregoing constitutional provisions.’’

In Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co. v. Moss, 60

Miss., 641. a similar statute was adjudged unconsti-

tutional, the court saying: ‘“The right of appeal

cannot be fettered and clogged with reference to the

parties litigant, or the attitude they occupy as plain-

tiff or defendant. All litigants whether plaintiff or

defendant, should be regarded with equal favor by

the law, and before the tribunals for administering

———_-—----___+

2

it, and should have the same right to appeal with

others similarly situated. All must have the equal

protection of the law and its instrumentalities. Whe

same rule muet exist for all in the same circum-

stances.”’

In Wilder v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co., 70 Mich.,

382, 38 N. W., 289, the court in discussing ‘the

question, says: ‘“This inequality and injustice can-

not be sustained upon any principle known to the

law. It is repugnant to our form of government,

and out of harmony with the genius of our free in-

stitutions. The legislature cannot give to one party

in litigation such privileges as will arm him wit

special and important pecuniary advantages over his

antagonist.”’

In Randolph v. Builders’ and Plentcis Supply

Co., 106 Ala., 501, 17 So., 721, the provision allow-

ing attorney's fee was held to be in violation of par.

14 of their Bill of Rights which, as above stated, is

identical with par. 6 of ours, ‘‘in that it allows a fee

to the plaintiff's attorney for prosecuting his suit suc-

cessfully, whereas a like fee is not allowed the de-

fendants attorney in case the plaintiff fails in his suit,

and on that account it is discrimisative and class leg-

islation.”’

It is difficult to see how the designation of such

fee as ‘‘costs’’ obviates the objection that it confers

upon the plaintiff a right that 1s denied to defendant,

and that it is an ‘‘attempt to grant special privileges

and advantages to one class of itiga nts at the expense

and to the detriment of another.”’-* * * *

It is no answer to say that the debtor may avoid

the imposition of this additional cost by paying his

honest debts, because the very purpose of the litiga-

tion he invokes is to determine whether he owes the

debt or not.

These Citations wr 4 fortify our position and

answer the position of the Supreme Court of South

Carolina that the penalty is designed to enforce

25

{ rompt, payment of just claims. ‘The intention may

ve goud but the result of the Statute is to take away

from the corporation the right to have a legal deter-

mination of the question whether the debt is just or

now, F

It puts to flight the idea that two parties engaged

in litigation can be so placed by a Statute that one

has an advantage over the other without the Statute

being void for violation of the Constitution. We

cite as appropriate to this point C. Y. C. Vol. 8,

1139, as follows: ‘In the absence of special cir-

“cumstances, however, all litigants, whether plain-

‘ci fls or defendants should be considered equal before

‘che law, and a regulation operating wholly in favor

“of one of the parties, would not be a reasonable

“regulation.”

But it may be said that this is fixing a penalty for

uiepayment of claims promptly and not imposing

it for litigation. ‘The Supreme Court of South Car-

olina has held otherwise. In the case of Best vs.

Railway, 72 S. C., 483, the Court held that when

the claim was paid and accepted after the time limit

for the penalty had expired, that the penalty could

not be recovered. That the penalty only applied

where the claim was litigated, and was designed to

operate as a ‘‘deterrant of the Carrier in refusing to set-

‘*tle just claims and as ¢ compensation of the Claimant for

‘*the trouble and expense of the suit.’

We cite the case as follows: ‘‘We concur, how-

ever, in the view of the Circuit Court that under the

act of February 23, 1903, 24 Stat., 81, an action

cannot be maintained for a penalty alone, after a set-

tlement for loss or damage before suit. ‘The Statute

being penal should receive such strict construction

as would not defeat the obvious intent of the legis-

lature.”’

The act expressly provides: ‘‘Failure to adjust

and pay such claim within the periods respectively

herein prescribed, shall subject each common car-

26

rier so failing to a penalty of fifty dollars for each

and every — failure, to recovered by any con-

signee or consignees aggrieved, in any Cor rt of

competent jurisdiction: Provided, that unless such

consignee or consignees recover in such action the

full amount claimed, no penalty shall be recovered,

but only the actual amount of loss or damage, with

interest as aforesaid.”’

“It seems that the plain meaning of the Statute is

to make recovery of the amount claimed in a Court

of competent jurisdiction a condition precedent to a

recovery of the penalty, as the Statute expressly says

that no penalty shall be recovered unless the con-

signee recover the full amount claimed in such:

action. The term ‘“‘recoyer,’’ when considered by

itself, is not the usual or apt word to indicate a vol-

untary payment or receipt of money for damages

suffered but ordinarily means the obtaining in a suit

of a right to something by a verdict and judgment

of a court, and that this is the meaning in the pres-

ent statute is manifest by the context, ‘‘recover in

such action.”’ The object of the statute was not to

penalize the carrier for merely refusing to pay a claim

within the time required, whether just or unjust,

but the design was to bring about a_ reasonably

prompt settlement of all proper claims, the penalty,

in case of a recovery in court, operating as a deter-

rent of the carrier in refusing to settle just claims,

and as compensation of the claimant for the trouble

and expense of the suit which the carrier's unreas-

onable delay and refusal made necessary.

It is true that the statute authorizes a suit for the

vary lh in the same action for the loss or damage,

t that is very far from saying that the penalty is

not dependant upon the recovery of the claim by ac-

tion in court. Doubtless the Act provided for such

a joinder mainly because the recovery of the penalty

“is dependent upon recovery at law of the claim.”’

So no penalty can be recovered unless the claim is

27

litigated and the penalty is litigated and the penalty

is to deter the railroad from litigating just claims

and compensate the claimants for having the suit.

This means that the penalty is imposed to prevent

freedom of access to the courts by the railroad com-

pany and compensate the consignee for his trouble

in court, and inasmuch as no penalty is fixed against

the consignee who sues on a bogus claim in case he

fails to establish his claim, a distinct discrimination

is made in his favor, He és compensated when right

and not punished when wrong, while his antagonist is

puntshed when wrong .nd not compensated when right.

Can it be said that these litigants, then, are on

equal footing before the Court? Is the law equal

hen the two parties to the same litigation are

placed before the Court unequally, regardless of

any classification? Doesn't it deny to the Railroad

Company the right to have legally determined the

justice of the claims; deterring it directly from ea-

tering Court—which is established for the sole pur-

pose of settling such disputes?

This is the construction placed upon the act by

our own Court and that settles its meaning.

Third.

We will now notice the case relied on by the

Supreme Court of South Carolina. The first is the

case of Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe R. R. Co. vs.

Matthews, 174, U.S. 96. The Court says ‘‘there

‘tis no good reason why railroad corporations alone

“should be punished for not paying their debts.

‘Compelling payment of debtseis not a police regu-

‘“‘Jation. * * The purpose of this Statute is, not

‘*to compel the payment of debts, but to secure the

‘utmost care on the part of railroad companies to

‘prevent the escape of fire from their moving

‘«rains.”’ 174 U.S. page 98. We will say that

this is and always has been a matter of police regula-

tion and penalty for violating laws for prevention of

fires have always been imposed but the act under

Set

pin

discussion in this case is not a police regulation but

is held by our own Supreme Court to be ‘designed

“to bring about a reasonably prompt settlement of

“all proper claims’? (which grow oat of a certain

class of contracts) and to re-emburse the Claimant

‘for the trouble and expense of the suit.”’

This is heid by the very case relied on above nvr

to be a police regulation and therefore inadmissible.

Further, in distinguishing between the Matthews

case and the Ellis case at page 100 of 174 U. S., the

Court says ‘‘so that, according to the interpetation

‘‘placed upon the Texas Statute by its own Supreme

‘Court, its purpose was generally to compel the pay-

‘“‘ment of small debts’ * * * while on the other

‘‘hand, the purpcse of this Statute is, as declared by

“the Supreme Court of Kansas, protection against

“‘fire--a matter in the nature of a police reculation.”’

The distinction then between the Matthews case

and the case at bar is drawn by this Court clearly for

the State Supreme Court says that this law is de-

signed to compel the prompt payment of certain

debts and is nota penalty for disregarding some

police regulation. The reasoning of the Matthew's

case is all on our side and even there the Court says

at page 105 that the Statute there under discussion

is ‘‘near the line of separation.’’ {f that be so the

Statute here is over the line, and arbitrary. ;

The next case cited is that of Erb. Receiver v. Mon-

arch 177 U. S., 584. That is a case where the rail-

roads were limited as to speed in a city and the ques-

tion was made that a dummy line was excepted from

the ordinance and therefore the equal protection of

the law was denied. The Court held that the clas-

sification was proper and bore a reasonable relation

to matter under regulation to wit: the safety of the

public from fast trains in the city. Now that case

bears no relation to this. ‘That was a matter of po-

lice regulation. This is a regulation of suits grow-

ing out of violation of contract giving one party to

29

the suit an advantage over the other in results. The

cases are not parallel.

The next case is Fidelity Mut. L. Association vs.

Mettler, 185 U. S., 308. This case was a suit against

the Life Insurance Co. for insurance in which dam-

ages Were allowed of 12 per cent. and reasonable at-

torney’s fee if the company lost. This was part of

the condition of allowing Insurance Companies to

do do business in Texas and that was the ground on

which it was sustained—the Court saying; ‘‘this

“particular liability amounted to one of the condit-

“ens on which life and health companies were to do

“‘business in Texas and the power of the State in the

“matter of the imposition of conditions on its own

‘‘and foreign corporations has been repeatedly recog-

“nized by this Court.’’ The case is decided on that

point. All that is said as to the point under discus-

sion here is oder and nothing is said except that if

the constitutional question were open the reasoning

in the Mathews case would conclude the same. No

authoritative discussiion is made of the same. The

case of Iowa L. I. Co. vs. Lewis, 187 U. S., 335

merely refers to the case of Mettler as conclusive of

this, both being Texas cases and says the ‘‘reason-

ing’” of that case is satisfactory. Since there was no

“‘reasoning”” in that case under the point heere be-

ing considered they must have referred to the con-

clusion that the States conditions precedent to doing

business conluded the Insurance Co.

In Farmers and Merchants Ins. Co. vs. Dobney,

189 LU. S., 301, the Court follows the other cases

and also decides that insurance contracts can be

classified alone and that there was no reason, when

once classified, that different regulations should

not be made to apply to them. This is not

disputed here, but in this case the contract of ship-

ment may be classified and has been and the State

steps in and attempts to penalize one of the parties

to the contract for a violation of it while it does not

penalize the others violation. After classifying the

EL RL EO RE EAP AT ETRE G8 EN

Ri»

comtnats & aadertakes to di: scrwmimate against tg

thes t the sae and attempts to bali doze one of

gee parties Grom stanchag on its nights before the

Court. Tits question has not been decided in any

of the ahoxre cass. They are the only cases ths far

that have bad the rake anplied to sustain contracts

ant are all cases Wa Which an attorney's fee is allow-

ec. which $s GRerent from the case at har, thet be-

iag 2 cee ef penalty and unficted to for the avowed

pucpess of preventing the defeadant from going in-

te Court. & Gober attempt, by making him go

tate Comet om wrequal terms with his antagonist, to

wo deprive hiea of the right to ltgate ditims against

~

We wowk! cemerk as % these insurance cases that

while they grow owt of contracts and are classed as

imsutance contrat by this Coart, there is not the

want of meetadiee there which exists here. The

contracts have penalties provided by way of forfeiture

agunese the vated ene he failed to comply with

the conditions ef the contract and the Statute then

placed and the Qoart enforced a mutual penalty 2s

against the company when & failed to carry out its

part of the comtract and oquality was thus maintained.

The cae of M. KR. X& TL R. R. Co. vs. May re-

ferred to bx the Sapreme Court of South Carolina

was decdkd ia hestatiag by a hare major-

tty of the Court on the that the scattering of

seed of Mewmcan by passing trains, and the

rendency be the Raairoad Company to ignore them

as I WAS RET wn hashandry, and ‘they might

the a Noses vee snag aN

% Fo a man’s

kand amd cstabiksh themselves where they can spreac

such grass and weeds at their neighbors’ door jus-

ties them ta acdias. This may be true. It

31

Those questions I repeat and close.

1. Can the State after properly classifying con-

tracts for shipment of freight in a class by them-

selves, provide penalties for one party to the con-

tract if it violates it and give the penalty to the mem-

ber injured, and not inflict a like penalty on the

other party or parties when they violate the terms of

the contract?

2. Can the Legislature place one of the parties to

a contract, when litigation arises out of the same, in

a position to be punished if it is wrong and to have

no redress against the other party if right while the

other party is rewarded if right and not punished if

wrong and still be within the rule of equality before

the law?

3. Can the Legislature discriminate against liti-

gants giving the one an advantage -r the other

where cause of action arises out 0: a contract to

which both are paries?

4. Can the Legislature inflct a penalty for non-

payment of a debt on one of the parties to a con-

tract out of which the debt grows and not inflict any

penalty for non-payment of a debt on another party

to the same contract or contracts of the same class.

W. F. Srevenson,

Stevenson & MATHESON,

Epwarp Mclver.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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