Respondents Brief — United States v. G. Falk & Brother

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No.

fn the Supreme Court of the United Spat sorreme

FILE

OCTOBER TERM, 1905.

pare APR 23 19

THE UNITED STATES, JAM 3

Petitioner,

as

G. FALK & BROTHER,

Responde nts.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS ON APPLICATION FOR A

WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND

CIRCUIT.

Epwakp 8S. Hatcn,

J. Sruart TOMPKINS,

Counsel for the Respondents.

APPEAL PRINTING COMPANY, 14-16 VESEY ST., NEW YORK

~—

Antbe Supreme Court of the United States.

Tue UNITED STATES,

Petitioner, |

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\

if

against

G. FaLk & Bro.,

Respondents. |

)

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF RESPOND-

ENTS.

Statement.

The merchandise which is the subject of this pe-

tition is leaf tobacco in bales. It was imported

from Rotterdam on the Steamship Ryndam, and was

entered at New York on June 2, 1902. The total

importation consisted of thirty-one bales, num-

hered 2239 to 2269, inclusive. According to the

consular invoice, which isa sworn document and

presumptively correct, the gross weight of the

thirty-one bales, at the time they left Rotterdam,

was 2473.6 kilos. At the rate of 2.2046 pounds to

the kilo this equals 5453.0781 pounds. According

to the government weigher’s return, which is like-

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2

wise presumptively correct as to weight, the

thirty one bales, at the time of landing, weighed

5,520 pounds. So that the bales in question had

gained, on the voyage of importation, 66.9219

pounds,

(Note. lt has always been found impracticable

to print the invoice and entries in these custom

‘ases, as Will be obvious from an inspection, al-

though it has always been agreed on both sides

that they are a part of the record. The United

States Attorney called upon the Collector for their

production for use in the Courts below in this

case, and we have accordingly called upon the

Collector to file them in the office of the Clerk of

this Court, for inspection, if necessary.)

The record in this case covers bales numbered

2248, 2244 and 2263 of the above importation.

According to the Goverment weigher’s return

these bales weighed 178, 179 and 181 pounds re-

spectively at the time of landing. These bales

were withdrawn from bonded warehouse about

one year after importation, and weighed at that

time eight pounds less than at time of entry.

The question, therefore, presented in this case

is one whether the moisture which such tobacco ab-

sorbs on the voyage of importation, and which

disappears again, while it is in the custody of the

government, and before it is detivered over to the

importer to enter into the body of the merchandise

of the country for consumption, is dutiable at the

rate of $1.85 to the pound.

It is submitted that the statement made by the

learned Soliciter General about the importance of

this question by reason of possible loss of revenue

is speculative, and wholly unwarranted by the

record or experience, For example: In February,

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3

1903, the United States Cireuit Court held

that silk ribbons were properly dutiable at 50%

ad valorem instead of at 60% ad valorem, the rate

‘neretofore imposed.

This decision (which according to Government

reasoning in the case at bar, should have resulted

in reduced revenue), instead of leading to a loss of

revenue, caused an increase of $318,227.47 in

revenue from silk ribbon importations for the year

immediately following the decision.

So also the 20 per cent. reduction in duties ou

goods from Cuba caused the inaportation of $52, -

922,306 worth of dutiable merchandise in 1905, the

first full fiseal year after the Reciprocity Treaty

between the United States and Cuba went into ef-

fect: whereas, in 1908, the last full fiscal year

previous to the operation of the treaty, only $5, -

827,983 worth of dutiable merchandise from Cuba

was imported. In other words, although there

was a 20 per cent. reduction in duties, the value

of dutiable merchandise imported from Cuba in.

creased approximately $23,000,000 during the

above period (see Commerce and Navigation of the

United States, 1905, p. 21 and p. 33).

Clearly it would have been fallacious for the

(iovernment to have estimated at the beginning of

the 20 per cent. Cuban Treaty duty reduction

that the revenue to be derived from imports from

Cuba for the sueceeding years would be lessened

20 per cent. So also in the present case we con-

tend that the abolition of duty collections on

water, not inherently or commercially a part of

the taxable subject, tobacec, will not necessarily

cause any loss of revenue, but is more likely to

result in larger tobacco importations and increased

revenue.

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4

We respectfully predict that home interests will

be benefited by the increased importations of the

crude product, and the consequent encouragement

and expansion of the American cigar manufactur-

ing industry.

The Solicitor General at page 3 of his brief gives

‘serious loss of revenue’ and “the conflicting

views of the tribunals below as to the law’’ as the

two reasons why ‘‘a review by this Court seems

specially important.’’

For the reasons above stated, we submit that

there will be no loss of revenue. And as to the

alleged conflicting decisions, we need only say

that the ‘‘conflict’’ is not between any tworulings

of different Circuit Courts of Appeal, but merely

between the unanimous decision herein of the

Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

and of the Circuit Court of the Southern District

of New York.

This is not one of those conflicts of decisions

which this Court has stated justifies review.

In Forsyth vs. Hammond, 166 U. 8., 506, 514

Mr. Justice Brewer, speaking for this Court

said:

‘We reaffirm in this case the propositions

heretofore announced, to wit, that the power

of this Court in certiorari extends to every

case pending in the Circuit Courts of Appeal,

and may be exercised at any time during

such pendency, provided the case is one which

but for this provision of the statute would be

finally determined in that Court. And further,

that while this power is co-extensive with all

possible necessities and sufficient to secure to

this Court a final control over the litigation

in all the Courts of Appeal, it is a power

which will be sparingly exercised, and only

when the circumstances of the case satisfy us

5

that the importance of the question involved,

the necessity of avoiding conflict between tivo

or more Courts of Appeal, or between Courts

of Appeal and the Courts of a State, or some

matter affecting the interests of this nation in

its internal or external relations, demands

such exercise.”’

It is further stated in the brief forthe petitioner

that there are 8,252 protests on tobacco now pend-

ing before the Board of General Appraisers, but it

is tobe borne in mind that protests under this

topic are filed both at the time of entry an ‘ the

time of withdrawal. In the present case for ex-

ample, there were thirty-one bales entered upon

which a protest was filed at the time of entry, and

another each time that a bale or more was with-

drawn, so that this one importation of thirty-one

bales involves seventeen protests, and the 8,252

protests which usually would represent that many

importations does not on the present issue repre-

sent by a great number so many importations as

the statement contained in the petition would in-

dicate without further explanation.

ARGUMENT.

Z.

The principle of law which the Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals applied to the

facts in this suit is clear, has long

been settled and aquiesced in by the

Treasury Department, and would

seem to need no reiteration by this

Court.

The principle which the Circuit Court of Ap-

peals applied to the present case, was announced

6

by this Court in Seeherger vs. Wright & Lawther

Co., 157 U. 8., 183.

In that case the merchandise was flaxseed

which was dutiable at twenty cents per bushel of

fifty pounds. The proof in the case showed that

the seed contained dust, composed of clay, sand

and gravel to an average of four per cent. The

collector refused to allow for the four per cent. of

dust in computing the dutiable number of bushels

at 50 pounds to the bushel. This Court held that

an allowance should be made for such average

four per cent. of dust, and that ‘‘twenty cents

per bushel of fifty-six pounds’? meant ‘56 pounds

of clean seed, or at least seed freed from any

‘accidental’ impurities, such as the clay, sand

and gravel in question.

Mr. Justice Brown, delivering the opinion of

this Court, said:

‘“*We think the Court below was correct in

assuming that the tlaxseed in question, which

is made dutiable by the Act of 1883 at ‘twenty

cents per bushel of fifty-six pounds’, less the

tare, means fifty-six poundsof clean seed, orat

least seed freed from any accidental impurities,

such as the clay, sand and gravel in question.

If this seed had been washed or otherwise

cleansed of these impurities, it certainly will

not be contended tiat they would be subject

to an increased duty, by means of such cleans-

ing, or that a bushel of 56 pounds ofsuch seed

would be anything more or less than a stat-

utory bushel. Soif, without such cleansing

the amount of such impurities can be fixed at

a certain percentage, as the findings in this

case assume, we see no objection to the allow-

ance being made, though the seed ba not in

fact cleansed”’ (157 U.S., p. 186).

So inthe present case the sworn consular in-

7

voice, coupled with the United States weigher’s

return at the time of landing, shows that the 31

bales covered by the invoice acquired an acci-

dental and temporary amount of moisture on the

voyage of importation to the extent of 66 pounds.

The principle of the Seeberger case is much more

clearly applicable to the present case for the rea-

son that the importer proves by actual weight the

amount of moisture which is absorbed and evap-

orates again before he gets his goods, whereas in

the Seeberger case an average percentage only was

shown, and the importer was delivered the gross

weight of the flaxseed imported; but in the pres-

ent case the added weight was only temporary, it

was not present before the goods were shipped, nor

was it present when they were withdrawn

from bond. The water was an_ extraneous

substance, which disappeared before the to-

bacco became incorporated with the gen-

eral mass of property in the United States.

In other words, the water on which duty was

here levied, did not constitute a part of the tax-

able subject or article of commerce, wrapper to-

bacco, originally, nor did it constitute a part of

the wrapper tobacco, which went into consumption

in the domestic markets.

The only paragraph under which duty can be

imposed on this merchandise is Paragraph 213 of

the Tariff Act of 1897, which, so far as pertinent

reads:

“Wrapper tobacco * * * if unstemmed,

‘One dollar and eighty-five cents per pound.”

Clearly Congress did not intend to provide in

Paragraph 213 for a duty of $1.85 per pound

on “water? which did not go into consumption

“

8

when it provided for a duty of $1.85 per

pound on ‘‘wrapper tobacco.”’’ We respectfully

submit that even if it was within the constitu-

tional power of Congress, it certainly was not the

purpose of Congress to tax either air or water at

any such exorbitant rate.

II.

The difference between the entered

and withdrawal weights. of the

bales in this case, did not repre-

sent a loss of the merchandise.

Section 2983 of the United States Revised Stat-

utes reads as follows:

‘In no case shall there be any abatement of

the duties or allowance made for any injury,

damage, deterioration, loss or leakage sus-

tained by any merchandise, while deposited in

any public or private bonded warehouse.’’

It would seem to be a matter of common sense

perception, rather than a matter of argument, that

an accidental amount of moisture temporarily

present in the bales at the end of a long sea voy-

age, does not, when it disappears again, constitute

a “‘loss’’ of the merchandise.

The Circuit Court of Appeals found no difficulty

in reaching a unanimous conclusion that such

evaporation was not a loss of the tobacco. That is

the real question in this case, and the numerous

statutes, which the learned counsel for the peti-

tioner seeks to construe, become immaterial, unless

they show an intent on the part of the Congress to

tax the moisture in question. No attempt is

made, in the brief for the petitioner, to spell out

such an intent. On the contrary, an intent wholly

irrelevant to this issue is sought to be shown, and

the statutes therefore are not pertinent.

iil.

The collector should have re-

weighed the goods on withdrawal

to correct his error in including a

non-taxable subject in his weights

at the time of entry.

The duty of $1.85 per pound on wrapper tobacco

under the statute is only an unconditional and

fixed duty as to tobacco entered for immediate

consumption. That provision of the law is quali-

fied by the provision which permits goods to be

placed in bond.

When goods are placed in bond the time within

which the duty becomes a fixed certainty does

not expire until the date of that withdrawal, be-

cause if the duty increased for instance between

its entry and its withdrawal from bond then $1.85

per pound does not apply as against the Goverment,

and if the amount is not fixed against both the

Government and the importer, then the amount is

not finally fixed at $1.85 a pound for goods in

bond until withdrawal.

Mosle vs. Bidwell (C C. A), 130 Fed.

Rep., 334.

If the law were altered while goods are in bond,

changing the manner of computation of duty, so

that they would have to be re-weighed for the

benefit of the Government, (for example, if the

law were changed to make the weight of immedi-

ate coverings of tobacco dutiable, as is the

10

ease of confectionery under Paragraph 212 of

the Tariff Act,) then the weigher’s return can only

be final as to goods that are entered for consump-

tion, and not placed in bond, and if the weigher’s

return is not final as against the Government,

neither can it be said to be final as against the im-

porter.

The facts in the present case show that it is not

final, because at the time of withdrawal the col-

lector did deduct from the weigher’s return the

actual and schedule tare. If he deducts the

weight of the coverings from the weigher’s return

at the time of withdrawal, he should also deduct

for the accidental moisture, which is no more du-

tiable than the coverings are. The collector hav-

ing refused to re-weigh the goods to ascertain the

amount of such moisture, and having insisted upon

collecting duty on it at that time, the Circuit

Court of Appeals held a cause of action arose

against him, and protest was properly lodged at

that time.

In Lawder vs. Stone, 187 U. S., 281, this Court

held that a portion of a cargo of pineapples which

had been reduced to slush, and which, therefore,

ceased to be goods, wares and merchandise, was

not dutiable, in spite of the provision of the law

that no allowance should be made for ‘‘damage,”’

unless itamounted to ten per cent. of the quantity

imported. This Court further held that the pro-

vision with respect to damage had no application

to the case inasmuch asthe slush was not damaged

goods, but not goods atall, and although the Govern-

ment Examiner’s return showed acertain number of

pineapples imported, including an estimated num

ber which he found by counting the tops in the

slush, that the importer had aright to prove that

: ttl

11

euch return was incorrect in fact, and that a cer-

tain number of pineapples returned by the exam-

iner had, in fact, been reduced to slush. In the

present case the Government Weigher has returned

a certain amount of accidental moisture for duty,

and since such moisture is not goods, wares and

merchandise, any more than the slush was in the

pineapple case, the importer is entitled to show

the amount of such accidental moisture returned

by the Government Weigher for duty, although

that fact cannot be ascertained until withdrawal.

IV.

Points in reply to the brief for the

petitioner.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals did

not decide that the weight of imported tobacco at

the time of its withdrawal in itself alone deter-

mined the amount of duties payable thereon, but

that the cause of action does not arise until the

withdrawal, for the reason that it is not known

until then what is the actual amount of accidental

moisture which is contained in the imported

tobacco.

If the principles of law involved in the facts in

this case are identical with the principles applied

to the facts in the case of the dust in flaxseed,

the numerous statutes which the counsel for the

government sets forth in its petition would seem

to be immaterial and irrelevant, for it might be

granted that they all have the meaning for which

he contends, and still this accidental moisture

would not be dutiable any more than the acci-

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12

dental dust in the flaxseed was. This Court said

: in that case that fifty pounds per bushel meant

fifty pounds of clean seed. It may equally be

said, in this case, that a pound of tobaoco means

the tobacco free from moisture acquired on the

voyage of importation.

It is stated in the brief for the petitioner herein

that ‘‘the amount of dutyis one thing, the rate an-

other, as if the same ‘‘rate’’ could be ‘‘collected’’

if the amount remained aconstant, and the weight

varied where the elements of rate are the unit of

value and the unit of weight. Rate means ratio

or proportion, so that $1.85 per pound means at

the ratio of $1.85 to the pound. In the present

case duties were collected on the tobacco con-

tuined in the three bales in question at the rate

of $1.87, approximately, to the pound.

cifhsn Dats ntadilie sini Sti sith Baise

We admit the truth of the proposition of law

stated in the heading to Point IIL of the brief for

the petitioner, that the tobacco was dutiable upon

its weight at ‘‘withdrawal’’ according to the facts

of this case. No doubt the learned Solicitor Gen-

eral has had occasion to state the proposition so

frequently in that form in the past that force of

habit has rendered him blind to the fact that he

is on the other side of the case for the moment.

It is further stated in the petition that:

‘In this case a certain amount of tobacco

went into warehouse which weighed less when

it came out. What became of the difference?

It (the difference) was lost. * * * It cer-

tainly disappeared. And if it disappeared, no

matter by what means, it must be lost.”

ha

The fallacy of the above argument lies in the

promise that “‘a certain amount of fobacco went

into wareh ‘se.”’ Asa matter of fact a certain

amount of tobacco, plus a certain amount of acci-

dental moisture, went into warehouse; it is the

moisture, coustituting the difference, that has dis-

appeared.

Reference is made to the loss of liquor by evap-

ovation, but the distinction between such a loss,

and that in the present case, is obvious, for in the

case of the evaporation of liquor there is a loss of

the thing in itself. Im the present case there is

not a loss of the tobacco.

It is stated no allowance was claimed at entry.

The importers on this question have protested uni-

formly both at the time of entry and withdrawal.

The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals shows

that they regarded a protest at the time of entry

premature, because no cause of action arose against

the Collector until he refused to make allowance for

the accidental moisture at the time of withdrawal.

This is a matter of practice and does not affect the

merits of the question.

The learned Solicitor-General cites Robertson vs.

Bradbury, 132 U. 8., 500, for the proposition that

no allowance for ordinary moisture, nor for evapor-

ation or shrinkage upon the voyage of importation

should be made. In that case the goods were sub-

ject to an ad valorem duty. In the case at bar the

duty is specific.

“When the duty was specific on this article

(sugar), being at a certain rate per pound, be-

fore the Act of 1846, it could, of course, ex.

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14

tend to no larger number of pounds than was

actually entered.”

Marriott cs. Brune, ad al., 9 How., 619,

Gl,

Lavwder vs. Stone, 187 UL S, 281.

The learned Solicitor General cites the case of

Jarnshaw vs. Cadwalader, 146 U.S. 247, as con-

trolling in thisease, In that ease the moisture found

in the iron ore in question constituted an inherent

part of it, and it was bought and sold in that con-

dition to merchants. And this Court held, in

effect, that indetermining the dutiable weight of

iron ore no deduction should be made on account

of moisture and that it would be improper to

ascertain the number of datiable tons after first

expelling the moisture by heating the ore to 212

degrees Fahrenheit, because iron ore as known to

the commerce of the United States was the ore in

its natural state in respect to moisture. The

moisture in the ore case was an incident. The

moisture in the present case is an accident. In the

present case it was not the subject of a commercial

transaction. It was neither bonght, sold, nor de-

livered.

A different case and one governed by Hrashaw

vs. Cadwalader, supra, would be made if after en-

try and before withdrawal the importer had, and

took advantage of, the opportunity to drive off all

moisture and create an abnormal! dryness in the to-

ba co. As a matter of fact, the sponge-like alsorb-

entcharacter of tobacco, and the fact that just before

it is weighed at entry it has been through ocean

transportation, gives to the Government an advan-

tage quite as considerable and quite as inequitable

us the importer sought to obtain in Ernshaw' s

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15

case; in the one case the importer sought to pro-

duce an abnormal and uncommereial dryness and

| minimum of weight to decrease duties, and in the

other the Government seeks to take advantage of

| an accidental and unavoidable but abnormal and

uncommercial amount of moisture and maximum

of weight to increase duties.

The bonded warehouse in New York is not an

unusually dry place, it has the temperature and

other climatic conditions that obtain in the places

where this tobacco is manufactured and where it is

consumed. The decrease in weight that comes to

the tobacco while in such warehouse is but the

normal elimi vation of a quantity of water that

but for the ocean of tran sportation would nol hare

been there at all—that was not there when the ex-

porter began the exportation and is not there when

the importer receives and uses the importation.

If the flaxseed in the Seeberger case had been

stored in bonded warehouse, and, in the process of

handling, the dust had sifted out of the bags,

which would have been a case precisely analogous

to the present, we do not think this Court

would have decided that case differently if the

importer in that case had proved the actual

amount of dust eliminated by weighing

at the time of withdrawal, rather than

claimed an average percentage at the time of en-

try. It would seem as if the Government counsel

should have acquiesced in the claim of the im-

porter in the present case, in view of its eminent

fairness toward the Government, inasmuch as the

importer only asked to be allowed for such mois-

ture as he showed by actual weight at the time of

withdrawa! had disappeared, and which the Con-

sular invoice showed he never bought.

16

Vv.

The unanimous decision of the Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals in the present

case was right, and should receive

the approbation of this Court by the

denial of the present application.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD 8. HATCH,

J. STUART TOMPKINS,

Counsel for the Respondents.

Dated New York, April 20th, 1906.

(9416)

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