Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Meyer v. United States

Supreme Court, U.@

1D FILED

90 286 auc 21 29

No. ___oticé OF THE CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE

UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 20.

Charles L. Meyer, Petitioner

V.

The United States of America, Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Charles L. Meyer

Petitioner Pro Se

355 Pinewood Lane

San Antonio, Texas 78216

(210) 828-1913

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Both lower Courts held that the Trial Court Docket

No. 97-379C dismissal based on the 1986 Federal Circuit Hurick

decision represents law of the case doctrine. The Petitioner

argued exceptions to the law of the case doctrine for the issue of a

change in the law.

2. The issue of when does a legal action first accrue.

3. The Petitioner rebutted the Trial Court’s reasons to

dismiss which were cited in its Order to dismiss and were repeated

in the Federal Circuit’s Order to Affirm.

4. Both lower Courts disregarded the Petitioner’s

citation of the U. S. Supreme Court law principle decisions to

support his legal arguments.

5. Courts are required to accept the pleadings of a Pro

Se litigant.

6. The Trial Court made many judicial errors or in the

alternative abuses of discretion in dismissing the Plaintiff's legal

action.

LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

IN THE COURT BELOW

Charles L. Meyer, Petitioner Pro Se.

The United States of America, Respondents.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented for Review. ............-+.-- i--ii

List of parties to the Proceedings

a eee terete eee ee rer ili

PE II sk ce anc wee Sew New ee ees ot vi--x

TTT eT eee EET ETE 1--3

Stateement OF FUPISMICMIOM. . 2... ieee cece 3

I eek hac ch ein se se kk escvaeseeee 3-4

POPP PTET TELL Ee eee 4--6

Reasons for Granting Writ....................- 6--20

I. Exceptions to the law of

the case doctrine... 1... ccc ccc eees 6--7

II. The issue of when does a

legal action first accrue........-.....-- 8--13

-iv-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(Continued)

Il. The Petitioner rebutted

the Trial Court’s reasons

which were cited in its

Order to dismiss and re-

peated in the Federal

Circuit Order to Affirm. ............. 14--17

IV. Both lower Courts disre-

garded the Petitioner’s

citation of U. S. Supreme

Court law principle deci-

sions to support his legal

VI. The Trial Court made many

judicial errors or in the

alternative abuses of dis-

cretion in dismissing the

Plantiff’s legal action. .............. 19--20

APPENDICES

-y-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(Continued)

Page

Federal Circuit Order filed

eG te Oe ee ee ee or Al--A6

Petition for Rehearing denied by

the Federal Circuit on May 15,

NT Che Seana Ne Cree Nees B1--B2

Judgment as a Mandate May 22, 2000.......... Cl1--C2

Deputy Clerk’s Letter of Notice of

Rejection dated June 1,2000.............. B3--B4

Letter of Federal Circuit Court

Clerk dated June 20, 2000....... eee BS

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Adams v. U. S., 42 Fed.C1. 289

ee en neae dl

Allen v. McMurry, 101 S.Ct. 411,

414, 415, 449 U. S. 90, 60

ee et ere rere ree

American Trucking Associations v.

Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2341

2343, 496 U. S. 167, 110 L.Ed.

oo iki cs BV

Aubre v. United States, 40 Fed.C1.

SU 6a in hi

Bay Area La v. Ferbar Corp.

of Cal, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 542,

I io a ine cas

Boeing v. U. S., 31 Fed.C1. 289

bo OR are re See ee ee

Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,

334 U. S. 396, 66 S.Ct. 1039,

92-L.Ed. 1403 (1948) ................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Cooter v. Gell and Harmax Corp.,

110 S.Ct. 2447, 2456, 496 U. S.

384, 119 L.Ed. 2d 359 (1990)............. 14

Everett Plywood Corp. V. United,

States, 206 C1.Ct. 244, 251

PE Wee ROT CITI Iiss ask ss kode sa scuecs 15

Florida Power & Light Co. V. U. S.,

ee eee EE CAPERS ss cvs seca cbake 4,7

eee, pibsaal CEE eC ECO DE eee ae 14

Friedman v. U. S., 157 Ct.C1. 1,

Poo fe FR Td, 7s cnn ee 11,

12

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519,

520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30

Ramee UE CONS om si SG ik hk hel 9,

18

Heat and Control, Inc. V. Hester

Industries, Inc., 785 F.2d.

1017, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1986).............. 20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v.

U. S., 842 F.2d 1573, 1577

i, 8s S| BPProee ee VE ee eeee eerie. 9,11

Hurick v. Lehman, 782 F.2d 984,

7, ek ee ee eae 6, 8,

Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives,

Laboratories, Inc., 107 S.Ct.

2182, 2189, 458 U. S. 844, 72

L.Ed. 2d 656 (1982) ..... tee eee eee eeee 20

J.E.T.S. Inc. V. U.S., 838 F.2d

1196, 1199, 1200 (Fed. Cir.

1988), cert. den., 486 U. S.

1057, 100 L.Ed.2d 926 (1988) ............ 7

Meyer v. U. S.,

Fed.C1. Slip Op. Docket No.

has i odd 6, 16

Fed.C1. Slip Op. Docket No.

DOVMEOIM....«.. <cssebh is vedi 8

Newell Companies, Inc. v. Kenney

Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765

Re SE ok os ok cs wk 11

ve

~ix-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U. S. 258,

267, 113 S.Ct. 1213, 1220,

eee hose GOO (1993S)... ics cc Kekic cs 10,

11

Siskind v. U. S., 116 C1.Ct. 809

UNG Sc os sea oe yaa el cus eet. wr 16,

17

Smith v. Marsh, 787 F.2d 510

SI ME eos AL Sows woe die Su 13

Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jor-

dan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U. S.

583, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 75 L.Ed.

NM i a 18

U.S. v. Cocoa Berkau, Inc, 990

F.2d 610, 613 (Fed. Cir. 1993)............ 9

U. S. v. Commodities Export Co.,

972 F.2d 1266, 1270 (Fed.

Ree oe 9, 10

Ulmet v. U. S., 17 C1.Ct. 679

Ree 7

-X-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Corp. v. Guenther, 281 U. S.

34, 50 S.Ct. 165, 167 (1980)............

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356,

373, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed.

I a Bs ak oe

ie ee oe he oe re

BU 66 60. CAS ke

BU Ee At OM

2 &O 6908.) ccs ec

Federal Circuit Rules

I os as Se

-xi-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Rules of the United States Claims Court

We ee POU t's NOE Vol cx ck acc sceeae 19

LAW DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS

Black’s Law Dictionary Sixth Edition

SUE Re BUONO, oN cenccccccescane 17

SD Sn: MI oe dais Syd aA weak vb banc 17

=e

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term,

Charles L. Meyer, Petitioner Pro Se,

Vv.

The United States of America, Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Charles L. Meyer, the Petitioner Pro Se herein,

respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit which was entered as a Mandate in the above-entitled case

on May 22, 2000.

OPINIONS BELOW

mS

The Order of the Federal Circuit filed April 3, 2000

Affirmed the Trial Court Order filed October 26, 1999 which

dismissed the Plantiff's Complaint. The Federal Circuit

incorporated this Trial Court Order into its Order to Affirm. This

Federal Circuit decision is included infra at Appendix A Pages

1--6. The Federal Circuit Order filed May 15, 2000 denied the

Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing. This Federal Circuit Order is

included infra at Appendix B Pages 1--2. The Federal Circuit

Published its Order of Judgment as a Mandate on May 22, 2000.

This Federal Circuit Order of Judgment is included infra at

Appendix C Pages 1--2. The Federal Circuit Deputy Clerk’s

Letter Notice of Rejection dated June 1, 2000 rejected the

Appellant’s second Petition for Rehearing. This Federal Circuit

Deputy Clerk’s Letter is included infra at Appendix B Pages 3--4.

The Appellant filed a Motion to Reconsider this Deputy Clerk’s

Letter Notice of Rejection on June 8, 2000. The Federal Circuit

Court Clerk letter dated June 20, 2000 rejects the Appellant’s

= %

Motion to Reconsider and states that the his Appeal before the

Federal Circuit is over. This Federal Circuit Court Clerk’s letter

dated June 20, 2000 is included infra at Appendix B Page 5. On

July 14, 2000 Chief Justice William B. Rehnquest granted the

Petitioner’s corrected application for an extension of time to file

this Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the U. S. Supreme Court.

Application Number 00A38 extends the time to file this Petition

for Writ of Certiorari to and including September 12, 2000.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered as a

Mandate on May 22, 2000. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (c).

STATUTE INVOLVED

The first Paragraph of 28 U. S. C. § 2501 reads:

Time for filing suit

Every claim of which the United

States Court of Federal Claims has

jurisdiction shall be barred unless the

petition thereon is filed within six years

-4-

after the claim first accrues.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Plaintiff conditioned his Trial Court legal action on

the second of two injuries to him by the U. S. Government which

occurred on June 3, 1994 (Trial Court Appendix F-3) and filed his

legal action within six years after that date. The Plaintiff's Trial

Court legal action was not available in a previous suit, Florida

Power & Light Co.. Infra, and is based on a change in controlling

law (Trial Court Appendix A-3), Boeing v. U. S., 31 Fed.C1. 289

(1994). The Plaintiff cited American Trucking Associations v.

Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2341, 2343, 496 U. S. 167, 110 L.Ed.2d

149 (1990) for his legal remedy to correct this change in the law.

The U. S. Air Force neat 3, 1994 deleted from its applicable

Air Force Board of Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR)

written directive the second of two criteria which the Plaintiff

used in his original records correction application to this

Correction Board which he submitted to it in 1970 which it denied

a.

on April 5, 1971. The Petitioner’s original records correction

application stated that his Officer Effectiveness Reports (OERs)

between the reporting periods which ended July 31, 1965 through

July 31, 1970 were incorrectly prepared. The applicable written

directives (Trial Court Appendices B-3 and H-1) required the

Reporting Official to prepare each OER correctly. The

Correction Board was required to invalidate each OER when the

records correction Applicant provided that it was incorrectly

prepared. This auitins written directive which the Petitioner

used was dated February 18, 1970. The American Trucking

Associations decision, supra, permits the law to be applied

retroactively to correct any injustice which has occurred because

of a change in the law. Within each Armed Service a written

directive has the effect of being law. This law principle is

specified at United States Fidelity and Guaranty Corp. v.

Guenther, 281 U. S. 34, 50 S.Ct. 165, 167 (1930). The Plaintiff

requested the Trial Court to vacate the two AFBCMR requests

-6-

for reconsideration dated February 5 and April 21, 1997 and

remand to this Correction Board to be reconsidered. The Trial

Court instructions for remand to the AFBCMR would state that

this Correction Board would reaccomplish the Plaintiff's two

requests for reconsideration in accordance with the Air Force

written directives which were in effect at the time the Plaintiff

submitted his original records correction application in 1970.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

Exceptions to the law of the case doctrine

The Federal Circuit incorporated the Trial Court decision

to dismiss the Plaintiffs legal action filed October 26, 1999 in its

decision to Affirm this decision which was filed on April 3, 2000.

This Trial Court decision which is based on the earlier Trial Court

Docket No. 97-379C decision which cited Hurick, infra, conveys

the perception that the Trial Court Docket No. 97-379C decision

constitutes law of the case doctrine. The Petitioner pleaded

x %

before both lower Courts exceptions to the law of the case

doctrine based on J.E.T.S. Inc. v. U. S., 838 F.2d 1196, 1199,

1200 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. den., 486 U. S. 1057, 100 L.Ed.2d

926 (1988). The Plaintiff's Trial Court Motion to Reconsider

supplemented this averment with the following legal arguments.

The Plaintiff cited Ulmet v. U. S., 17 Cl.Ct. 679 (1989) which

stated that under the law of the case doctrine, decision on issues

of law made at one phase of litigation becomes binding predent to

be followed in successive stages of same case. This Motion to

Reconsider also cited Adams y. U. S., 42 Fed. Cl. 463 (1998)

which states that previous decisions in this Trial Court, although

persuasive and helpful, do ait constitute binding precedent for

other decisions in this Trial Court. The Plaintiff's Trial Court

Motion to reconsider also cited Florida Power & Light Co. v. U.

S., 41 Fed.Cl.477 (1998) for the doctrine of stare decisis which

compels lower courts to follow the decisions of higher courts on

questions of law.

-8-

Il.

The issue of when does a legal action first accrue.

The Docket No. 99-CV-895 Trial Court dismissed the

Plaintiffs Complaint based on the previous Docket No. 97-379C

Trial Court dismissal which was based on Hurick v. Lehman, 782

F.2d 984, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Hurick held that a serviceman

has six years after his date of discharge from the Armed Service to

file a legal action to legally question his discharge. This Trial

Court held that the Plaintiff's Complaint was untimely filed since

he waited more than six years after the date of his discharge as an

Officer from the Air Force Reserve in August, 1971. The

important issued of the Hurick decision is that its law principle

States “a legal action accrues”. The Plaintiff conditioned his legal

action on the second of two injuries to him which occurred on

June 3, 1994 and filed his legal action before this Trial Court on

October 26, 1999 pursuant to the first Paragraph of 28 U. S.C. §

2501. The Plaintiff based his Trial Court on the following legal

9.

arguments. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. U-S., 842 F.2d

1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985) for the issue of when does a claim

against the U. S. Government “first accrues”. “[4, 5] It is

generally stated that a claim ‘first accrues’ when all events have

occurred which fix the alleged liability of the defendant and entitle

the plaintiff to initiate an action. . . .” The Petitioner cited

before lower Courts this same averment with the citation of U. S.

v. Cocoa Be rkau, Inc., 990 F.2d 610 (Fed. Cir. 1993) and U. S. v.

Commodities Export Co., 972 F.2d 1266, 1270 (Fed. Cit. 1982)

which were stated in general terms. Both lower Courts

disregarded this averment since the Petitioner did not state a

citation with quotation marks. The Petitioner cited Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U. S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652

(1972) for this law principle. The pleadings of a Pro Se litigant

are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by Attorneys. For this Petition the Petitioner offers the actual

U.S. v. Cocoa Berkau, Inc. Court decision. "[3, 4] The law is

-10-

well settled that, as a general rule, a claim does not accrue until all

events necessary to fix the liability of a defendant have occurred.”

(Footnote 2 omitted.). . . United States v. Commodities Export

Co., 972 F.2d 1266, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (‘[A] cause of action

accrues when all events necessary to state a claim have occurred.)

iS he Therefore, the Plaintiff could not file this Trial Court legal

action until after the U. S. Government committed its second

injury to him on June 3, 1994.

The Plaintiff supplemented this issue of when does a legal

action first accure before the Trial Court by citing Bay Area

Laundry vy. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., Inc., 118 S.Ct. 542, 546, 549

(1997). "[1, 2]. . . A limitations period ordinarily does not begin

to run (i. e., accrue) until the plaintiff has a 'complete and present

cause of action.'. - .

[5]. . .acause of action does not become complete until

the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief. See Reiter v. Cooper,

St.

507 U. S. 258, 267, 113, S.Ct. 1213, 1220, 122 L.Ed.2d 604

(1993)... ."

A coordinate issue to the arguments presented supra for

the defense of limitations was made before both lower Courts.

The Trial Court relied on the 1986 Federal Circuit Hurick

decision. The Plaintiff relied on the 1985 Federal Circuit

Hopeland Band of Pomo Indians decision. The Petitioner cited

before both lower Courts Newell Companies, Inc. v. Kenney Mfg.

Co., 864 F.2d 751, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988). "[2-3]. . . Where

there is a direct conflict (i. e., between different Federal Circuit

decisions), the precedent decision is the first. . . ." The

Plaintiff's citation of the Hopland Band of Pomo Indians decision

is one year earlier than the Court's reliance on the Hurick decision.

The Plaintiff's Trial Court Motion to reconsider cited

Friedman y. U. S., 157 Ct.CL 1, 310 F.2d 381, 385 (1982) which

delineates the difference between the original event which

occurred and a second event by a Federal Agency which occurred

“<

at a subsequent date which causes a legal action to accrue.

ici Sa incall amy reba agil Stitt

expounded the law for the deliberations by an administrative

agency for non-disability retirement legal actions. Friedman

stated: "[4-7]. . . the court has applied another principle in a

different type of case. That second principle governs situations

where the Congress has deliberately given an administrative body

the function of deciding all or part of the claimant's entitlement,

i.e., where Congress has interposed an administrative tribunal

between the claimant and the court. In those instances the claim

does not accrue until the executive body has acted (if seasonably

asked to act). So also where Congress has insisted that a special

demand be made or a special application filed. . . . -but once the

court has decided that the case falls into the former class (i.e.,

Cases other than disability retirement cases) it has ruled that the

claim accrues, not when the events occurred but when the agency

has rendered its determination.

iD.

Like the ‘continuing claim’ theory, the second principle fits

with general limitations law which recognized that in appropriate

cases conditions precedent to the accrual of a cause of action can

be established by statute, contract, or common law, and that

where such a condition precedent has been created the claim does

not ripen until the condition is fulfilled. . . .". The Petitioner for

this Petition cites Supreme Court Rule 10. (a) for reference. The

Tenth Circuit has decided a case on the same law principle but for

a different subject matter. The Petitioner was unable to find any

other U. S. Court of Appeals decision for this same law principle.

The Petitioner cites Smith v. Marsh, 787 F.2d 510 (10th Cir.

1986). A former soldier's action charging that the Army

Discharge Review Board and the Army Board for Correction of

Military Records unlawfully refused to upgrade his dishonorable

discharge accrued at the time of ABCMR decision not at time of

discharge, and thus, action brought within six years of ABCMR

decision was timely. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401 (a).

-14-

Il.

The Petitioner rebutted the Trial Court's reasons which were

cited in its Order to dismiss and repeated in the

Federal Circuit's Order to Affirm. ~-

The Petitioner pleaded the following cited Court decisions

before both lower Courts to rebut the legal argument that Res

Judicata applies to his dismissed Trial Court legal action. The

Petitioner cited Cooter v. Gell and Harmax Corp., 110 S.Ct.

2447, 2456, 496 U.S. 384, 119 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). "[15-17]. .

. ‘[D]ismissal. . . without prejudice’ is a dismissal that does not

‘operat[e] as an adjudication upon merits.' and thus does not have

a res judicata effect'. . ." A litigant may file a successor legal

action to a legal action which was dismissed for procedural error

provided the appropriate statute of limitations has not been

exceeded. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. U. S., 41 Fed.C1.

477, 484(1988). "[12-13] A second suit will not be precluded if

0%.

it asserts a cause of action that was not yet available when a

decision was rendered in a previous suit, even though that cause

of action may arise from the same transaction or series of

transactions that give rise to the first suit. See Everett Plywood

Corp. v. United States, 206 Cl.Ct. 244, 251, 512 F.2d 1087

(1975). . . ." Allen v. McMurry, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 415, 449

U.S. 90, 60 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) addresses a related law principle

to res judicata. "[1-4] The Federal courts have traditionally

adhered to the related doctrine of res judicata and collateral

estoppel... .

[5S]. . . But one general limitations the Court has

repeatedly recognized is that the concept of collateral estoppel

cannot apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is

asserted did not have a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate that

issue in the earlier case. . . ."

The Plaintiff did not plead the tolling of the statute of

limitations before the Trial Court. The Trial Court's citation of

-16-

Aubre v. United States, 40 Fed.Cl. 371 (1998) is not germane to

the Trial Court legal action. Aubre was a medical disability

retirement legal action. See Aubre synopsis, Ibid. at Pages

372--373. The Plaintiff's legal action is a non-disability retirement

by reason of years of completion of service.

The Trial Court erred by stating that in Docket No.

97-379C the Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the

statute of limitations before the Trail Court. The Plaintiff

specified the conditioning of that legal action on the second of

two injuries to him by the U. S. Government in a subsequent

pleading to his Complaint. The Plaintiff's legal research did not

find this Court decision until the vesiene of 1999. The Plaintiffs

‘Complaint cited Siskind v. U.S., 116 CLCt. 809 (1950). This

Court decision states that the U. S. Court of Claims may consider

only the allegations contained in the petition (i. e., the Plaintiffs

Complaint). This arcane Trial Court practice is not well known to

all litigants. The Petitioner pleaded for a different averment

=i?

before both lower Courts the citation of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118

U.S. 356, 373, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) which states:

". . . a discriminatory application of a statute or reguiation is

nonetheless unlawful." The Petitioner applies this Court decision

}

}

|

|

to the Trial Court's practice which is based on the Siskin decision,

supra, as follows. The terms which relate to the Siskin practice,

Black's Law Dictionary sixth edition Page 1286 and rule, Ibid.,

Page 1331, are synonymous. Therefore, the Petitioner avers that

based on the Yick Wo decision the Trial Court Siskin practice is

discriminatory and it should be overturned by this Court.

IV.

Both lower Courts disregarded the Petitioner's citation of

U.S. Supreme Court law principle decisions to support

his legal arguments.

The Petitioner cited 18 different U. S. Supreme Court

decisions in presenting his averments before both lower Courts. |

Both lower Courts disregarded these Petitioner's pleadings which

were based on U. S. Supreme Court decisions. The Petitioner

“3

pleaded separately before both lower Courts the citation of Briggs

v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 334 U. S. 396, 68 S.Ct. 1039, 92 L.Ed.

1403 (1948) and Thurs

Ltd., 460 U.S. 583, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 75 L.Ed. 2d 260 (1983) for

the law principle that once the U. S. Supreme Court decides a law

principle that law principle Court decision is controlling on all

inferior Courts. Both lower Courts disregarded the Petitioner's

averment where he pleaded each applicable Supreme Court law

principle before these lower Courts. The Petitioner avers that the

lower Courts judicial proceedings are a departure from accepted

Jurisprudence proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's

supervisory power to correct these Judicial errors or in the

alternative abuses of discretion.

¥.

Courts are required to accept the pleadings of a Pro Se

litigant.

The Petitioner proceeded Pro Se before both lower Courts

and cited Haines v. Kerner, supra, for this law principle. The

-19-

pleadings of a Pro Se litigant are held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by Attorneys. The Petitioner avers

that he argued the law correctly before both lower Courts. The

Petitioner's perception is that both lower Courts disregarded the

legal arguments made by a civil action Pro Se litigant who is not

represented by Counsel. In response to this perception the

Appellant's second Petition for Rehearing cited 28 U.S. C. § 1654

Appearance personally or by counsel.

In all courts of the United States the parties may

plead and conduct their own cases personally or

by counsel as, by the rules of such courts,

respectfully, are permitted to manage and

conduct causes therein.

See Claims Court Rule 81. (d) (8) and Federal Circuit Rule 47.3

(a).

VI.

The Trial Court made many judicial errors or in the

alternative abuses of discretion in dismissing the

Plaintiff's legal action.

-20-

The Plaintiffs Trial Court Motion to reconsider stated the

Trial Court erred in its many instances of judicial errors or in the

alternative many instances of abuses of discretion. The Plaintiff

cited in his Trial Court Motion to Reconsider many Court

decisions for this alternatively stated averment. For the sake of

brevity the Petitioner cites only one Court decision for each of

these two legal arguments. For judicial error the Plaintiff cited

Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 107 S.Ct.

2182, 2189, 458 U.S. 844, 72 L.Ed.2d 656 (1982). For abuse of

discretion the Plaintiff cited Heat and Control, Inc. v. Hester

Industries, Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

CONCLUSION

The Petitioner requests that this Petition for Writ of

Certiorari be considered by the next session of the U. S. Supreme

Court which is scheduled to convene in October 2000. All cases

which were selected for oral argument during this fiscal year of

the U. S. Supreme Court have previously been heard.

Bi.

WHEREFORE, the Petitioner respectfully prays that a Writ of

Certiorari will be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Charles L. Meyer

Petitioner Pro Se

355 Pinewood Lane

San Antonio, Texas 78216

(210) 828-1913

22.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On the eighteenth day of August, 2000 40 copies of the

Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari for the dismissed Docket

No. 00-5035 from the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit was placed in the United States Mail, Certified, Return

receipt requested, and served upon the following listed individual

pursuant to Supreme Court Rule Number 29.2.

Mr. William K. Suter ~

Court Clerk

U. S. Supreme Court

1 First Street, N. E.

Washington, D. C. 20543

On the eighteenth day of August, 2000 one copy of the

Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari for the dismissed

Docket No. 00-5035 from the U. S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit was placed in the regular United States Mail and

served pursuant to Supreme Court Rule Number 29.4.

Solicitor General of the United States

Room 5614, Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.

Washington, D. C. 20530-0001

93.

Charles L. Meyer

Petitioner Pro Se

A-1

NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6,

this order is not citable as precedent.

It is a public order.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

00-5035

CHARLES L. MEYER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

ON MOTION

Before MAYER, Chief Judge, PLAGER and LINN, Circuit

Judges. PLAGER, Circuit Judge.

ORDER

The United States moves for summary affirmance of the

October 27, 1999 judgment of the Court of Federal Claims

dismissing Charles L. Meyer's complaint. Meyer opposes.

A-2

On October 26, 1999 Meyer filed a complaint in the Court

of Federal Claims seeking review of two decisions of the Air

Force Board of Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR)

denying Meyer's requests for Correction of his Officer

Effectiveness Reports (OER) that he received between August 1,

1965 and July 31, 1969. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed

the complaint as barred by the doctrine of res judicata and the

statute of limitations:

[Meyer] alleges that he separated from

the United States Air Force in 1971, reenlisted

in 1972, and ultimately retired in 1975. The

complaint states that [Meyer] claimed that the

OER's had been improperly prepared, causing

him to be passed over twice for promotion.

The AFBCMR denied [Meyer] first application

for correction in 1971. [Meyer] filed a claim

in the district court, challenging the AFBCMR's

denial, which was dismissed. See Meyer v._

Seamans, affd, 478 F.2d 1403 (7th Cir. 1973).

This was only the beginning of a series of cases

instituted by [Meyer] regarding the same claim.

In 1975, [Meyer] filed a similar claim in the

Court of Claims, which was also dismissed.

See Meyer v. United States, 212 Ct.cl. 537

(1976). [Meyer] subsequently sought two

reconsiderations with the AFBCMR, which

A-3

was denied on February 5 and April 21, 1997.

[Meyer] sought review of the AFBCMR

determinations twice more in this court,

which dismissed [Meyer's] claims as barred

by the six-year statute of limitations, see

Meyer v. United States, No. 97-379C,

slip op. (Fed. CL, Nov. 13, 1997), aff'd,

No. 98-5082, slip op. (Fed. Cir., October

13, 1998); 28 U.S.C. 2501 (1994), and

on res judicata grounds, see Meyer v. United

States, No. 99-114C, slip op. (Fed. Cl. Mar.

12, 1999).

Upon close examination of [Meyer's]

complaint in the instance case, this court also

finds that [Meyer's] complaint is barred by the

statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2501, and the

doctrine of res judicata.

[Meyer] asserts that the AFBCMR's

decisions denying his requests for correction

constitute a second injury, which restarts the

statute of limitations period. It is well settled

law, however, that requests for reconsideration

which were not filed within a short time after

the initial decision doe not toll the statute of

limitations. See Aubre v. United States, 40

Fed. Cl. 371 (1998).

In addition, [Meyer] avers that res_

judicata is inapplicable where the party has

not had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate."

However, [Meyer] had a full and fair oppor-

tunity to litigate the statute of limitations

A-4

before the court in Meyer v. United States,

No. 97-379C, slip op. (Fed. Cl. Nov. 13, 1997).

Accordingly, this court lacks

jurisdiction and [Meyer's] complaint is

dismissed.

Meyer filed a motion for reconsideration. In denying the motion,

the Court of Federal Claims noted that Meyer had filed three

actions concerning the same matter and warned that restrictions

on Meyer's access to courts "may be appropriate in the future."

Meyer appealed to this court.

The United States moves for summary affirmance of a

case "is approrpriate, inter alia when the position of one party is

so clearly correct as a matter of law that no substantial question

regarding the outcome of the appeal exists." Joshua v. United

States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (summarily affirming

the Court of Federal Claims' dismissal of a complaint). The

United States argues that summary affirmance is appropriate

because res judicata and the applicable statute of limitations

clearly preclude Meyer from relitigating his claims. Meyer argues

A-5

that the arguments of the United States "are a conscious attempt

to obfuscate the merits of this Formal Appeal."

We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Federal

Claims in dismissing Meyer's complaint. We also note that this is

Meyer's third appeal to this court concerning the same claim.

Thus, because no substantial question exists regarding the

outcome of the instant appeal, the court summarily affirms the

judgment of the Court of Federal Claims.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The United States' motion for sumaffirmance is

granted.

(2) Each side shall bear its own costs.

FOR THE COURT

APR _-3 2000 /S/S. Jay Plager __

Date /T/S. J. Plager

Circuit Judge

A-6

cc: Charles L. Meyer

John C. Einstman, Esq.

s13 Filed

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL

CIRCUIT

APR - 3 2000

JAN HORBALY

CLERK

B-1

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

00-5035

CHARLES L. MEYER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER

A petition for rehearing en banc having been filed by the

APPELLANT, and the matter having first been referred as a

petition for rehearing to the motions panel, and thereafter

petition for rehearing en_banc having been referred to the circuit

judges who are in regular active service,

UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is

ORDERED that the petition for rehearing be, and the

same hereby is, DENIED and it is further

ORDERED that the petition for rehearing en banc be, and

the same hereby is, DENIED.

The mandate of the court will issue on May 22, 2000.

FOR THE COURT

B-2

/S/ Jan Horbaly

\ /T/ Jan Horbaly

Clerk

Dated: May 15, 2000

Filed

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL

CIRCUIT

cc: CHARLES L. MEYER

JOHN C. EINSTMAN MAY 15, 2000

JAN HORBALY

CLERK

MEYER V. US, 00-5035

(CFC - 99-CV-895)

FSEKKSEKSSESSSSTEESSEKAEKEESESSETEKEAERS

° Note: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, *

” this order is not citable as precedent. *

° It is a public record. .

FSEREKSEKSSSESEARSESEKEAERSEAEKESETAEEEERE

ee

B-3

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

717 MADISON PLACE, N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20439

JAN HORBALY ; TELEPHONE: 633-6550

CLERK AREA CODE 202

June 1, 2000

RE: MEYER V. US

Appeal No. 00-5035

NOTICE OF REJECTION

CHARLES L. MEYER'S recently-submitted combined

petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc does

not comply with:

[X] Timeliness (Fed. R. App. P. 40)

[ ] Length (Fed. Cir. R. 35)

[X] Statement (Fed. Cir. R. 35 (b))

[ ] Addendum (Fed. Cir. R. 35)

[X] Other Repetiti sions §

rehearing are not authorized.

The Clerk has been instructed by the Court to reject for

filing any paper not in compliance with the Rules of Practice.

Accordingly, the original combined petition for rehearing and

B-4

suggestion for rehearing en banc is returned herewith. The copies

will be held in room 401 for retrieval until June 15, 2000.

Very truly yours,

Jan Horbaly, Clerk

By:

JUN 1 2000 /S/

Date /T/ Deputy Clerk

(NOTE: This signature

is illegible.)

Enclosure

CHARLES L. MEYER

JOHN C. EINSTMAN

B-5

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

717 MADISON PLACE, N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20439

JAN HORBALY TELEPHONE: 633-6550

CLERK AREA CODE 202

JUN 20, 2000

Charles L. Meyer

355 Pinewood Lane

San Antonio, Texas 78216

RE: Meyer v. United States, 00-5035

Dear Mr. Meyer:

This letter is in reference to your motion to reconsider the

court's June 1, 2000 notice of rejection of your second combined

“petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc. As

the notice of rejection indicated, the court does not permit

repetitive petitions for rehearing. Therefore, your appeal in this

court is over.

Very truly yours,

/S/ Jan Horbaly

/T/ Jan Horbaly

JH/Ih

cc: John C. Einstman, Esq.

C-1

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

00-5035

CHARLES L. MEYER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal

Claims in 99-CV-895, Judge Nancy B. Firestone.

This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: AFFIRMED

ENTERED BY ORDER OF

THE COURT

DATED: April 3, 2000

/S/ Jan Horbaly

/T/ Jan Horbaly

Clerk

ISSUED AS A MANDATE: May 22, 2000