Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lowry v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp.

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UW) FILED

NO-00=27 4 aus 17 007

OFACEOF THE CLERK

In The

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

October Term, 2000

MARGRET LOWRY, individually and as

guardian ad litem of NADINE LOWRY,

a minor,

Petitioner,

Vv.

MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS CORPORATION,

a California Corporation licensed to do

business in California

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT AND APPENDIX

LOUIS S. FRANECKE, ESQ.

MACK, HAZLEWOOD & FRANECKE

300 Montgomery Street

Suite 1060

San Francisco, CA 94104

Telephone: (415) 391-1560

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

—~

I.

S PRES ED FOR REV

A.

PREAMBLE

The questions are in two (2)

categories:

A. This Court has not revisited or

provided guidance to the Circuit Courts

regarding the "Government Contractor

Defense" since its first announcement in

Boyle, infra, in 1988. There is now

conflict and confusion in the lower Courts

and the Circuits as to the factual and

legal test of the "Government Contractor

Defense as expressed by this Court in

Boyle v. ni Techno ios, 487 U.S.

500, 108 S.C. 2510 (1988).

- B. The Eighth Circuit’s requirement

that a Rule 60(b)° Motion to correct an

error by the District Court must be made

within thirty (30) days of such ruling and

its not following of this Court’s Mandate

in Pio vestment v. swi ssoc.

Ltd. 507 U.S. 380 (1993) as to the

Excusable Neglect standard for filing an

Notice of Appeal one (1) day late, i.e.

ii

thirty-one (31) days after Entry of

Judgment.

B.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE:

i. Since this Court’s decision of

Boyle v. United Technologies, supra, in

1988, the Circuit Courts have gone in

diverse, expanded and conflicting

directions in the interpretation and

application of "The Government Contractor

Defense" i.e. what are the factual

criteria and law regarding the following

Government Contractor Defense issues:

a. Must the Specific Design Feature

be approved under the Government

Contractor Defense First (lst) of Three

(3) parts test, or is an overall general

design approval sufficient conformance?

b. Does Long Term Use of the product

by the Government after purchase relate

back to constitute "approval" of the

product per the Government Contractor

Defense First, Second and Third part of

the test, oor is it a Comparative

Negligence issue.

Cc. Are the Reasonably Detailed

iii

Specifications set forth by the Government

only "hopes and ambitions for a successful

result" or are they the test of the first

prong under Boyle, supra.

d. If the Reasonably Precise

Specifications are silent as to- other

warnings allegedly necessary according to

State law regarding the design defect, is

this then left to the State law criteria

to prove liability.

II. RULE 60(b) AND EXCUSABLE NEGLECT:

A. Is it a departure from the

accepted and usual course of judicial

proceedings for the Eighth Circuit to

require that a Rule 60(b) Motion be

brought only thirty (30) days after the

Order by the District Court to correct

error.

= * Is it a departure from this

Court’s mandate in Pioneer, supra, that

the Eighth Circuit, by advisory opinion,

did not find Excusable Neglect in the late

filing by one (1) day (i.e. thirty-one

(31) days after Entry of Judgment) of a

Notice of Appeal when:

1. The District Court allowed the

late filing Sua Sponte one (1) day late.

iv

2. Petitioner timely moved the

District Court per FRCP 4(a)(5) for

excusable neglect, was denied as "Moot",

since Leave had already been granted to

file the Notice of Appeal one (1) day

late.

3. Petitioner had received no Notice

of Entry of Judgment per Rule 77a and as

expressed in FRCP 4(a) (6).

4. Petitioner brought a Rule 60(b)

Motion to correct the Order of the

District Court to find facts of Excusable

Neglect within a reasonable time.

OF CO s

I.QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.......i

A. PREANBUB. ccssivecsccessvccsccceskh

B. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR :

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TABLE OF CONTENTS......22--eeeeeeeeeeeiv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ....cccccccccceeVili

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI........1

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ee ee ea rere rr reer rrr ere Te

IV. CONSTITUTITIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIGN TMVGOLVED. . ccccccecvscessesseeS

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............7

A. SIO os i es oa svc?

B. FACTS REGARDING THE CRASH,

ITS CAUSE AND THE AIR FORCE

INVESTIGATION OF THE PRE-CRASH

RG RE ee ee eee. |

C. THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

OF THE F-15 AND IT FLIGHT

CONTROL SYSTEM WHICH..............9

» FIRST PN 4 Kb ek Odd oe ee

— a nee, f

D. AFTER DELIVERY INCIDENTS

OF CROSS CONNECTED FLIGHT

vi.

vi

CONTROL RODS... ccccccccccccccscecold

E. FACTS REGARDING NOTICE OF

APPEAL AND RULE 60(b) MOTION.....14

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT....16

A. THERE IS CONFLICT AND

CONFUSION IN THE VARIOUS

CIRCUITS REGARDING THE

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE

WHICH THIS COURT HAS NOT

REVISITED SINCE ITS

ANNOUNCEMENT IN 1988.............16

1. THE CONFUSION OF THE SPECIFIC

DESIGN FEATURE WHICH MUST

i Pf Perera ere ree

2. THERE IS CONFUSION IN THE LOWER

CIRCUITS IN CONSIDERING LONG

TERM USE OF THE PRODUCT

RELATING BACK TO APPROVAL OF

THE DESIGN AT THE PURCHASE

STAGE BY THE GOVERNMENT..........22

a. BOYLE SPECIFICALLY

REJECTS LONG TERM USE

AS A FACTOR IN THE GOVERNMENT

CONTRACTOR DEFENSE..........24

b. LONG TERM USE DOES NOT

LOGICALLY LEND ITSELF TO

ANY 1 OF THE 3 PRONG OF THE

BOYLE TEST....ccccccccccccrctO

c. THERE IS CONFLICT AND

CONFUSION SINCE SEVERAL CASES

HAVE DENIED THE BOYLE

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE

EVEN WHEN THERE HAS BEEN LONG

vii

pe Ot re ae en a fl

dad. OTHER CASES ACCEPT LONG TERM

USE TO SUPPORT THE GRANTING

OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR

DEFENSE, BOYLE, supra.......28 :

e. LONG TERM USE ONLY GOES TO

COMPARATIVE FAULT OR

INTERVENING CAUSE...........31

3. THERE IS CONFUSION IN THE CIRCUIT

COURTS IF RESPONDENT MUST ESTABLISH

THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE

AGAINST RESPONDENT’S DESIGN DEFECT

CLAIM AND RESPONDENT’S FAILURE TO

WARN CLAIM INDEPENDENTLY OF EACH

OTHER... ccc cccccccccccccccccccccedl

B. RULE 60(b) AND EXCUSABLE

oy A ee ne ae |

1. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT HAS

DEPARTED FROM ACCEPTED AND

USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS REGARDING

RULE 60(b)..ccccccccccccscee34

2. THIS COURT HAS IGNORED THE

LACK OF NOTICE OF ENTRY OF

THE JUDGMENT, BOTH IN

EXCUSABLE NEGLECT AND THE

FRAP 4(A) (6) MOTION.........38

Via. PRAYER (6 Oe eee

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

In Re: Air Disaster at Ramstine Air Base

Sl F.3G 5760 (30h Cif. 1996) «...«-+i8,23,29

Boyle v. United Technologies

487 U.S. 500, 108 S.C. 2510

‘ei | eres oe ke, ee Oe Pe

Terre re Tote rere me Be ee

Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.

EM CGR SESS eRe Es

Carson v. Pierce

719 F.2d. 931, 933 CZ9BS) ccvccvsscesesedS

Dowd v. Textron, Inc.

792 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1986).....23,24,28

Emory v. McDonald Douglas

148 F.30. 347 (4tR Cig. 1996)... .00252248

Fink v. Union Central Life Insurance

Company

65 F.3d. 722 (8th Cir. 1995)..33,39,41,42

Fox v. Brewer .

620 F.2d. i177, 160 (@th Cir.

Gi J Pee eee TOURS TESTE TER TE COT Cr Sr Tt.

Gray v. Lockheed

(D.C. GA 1995) 880 F.Sup. 1559.........28

Haltiwanger v. Unisys Corp.

949 F.Sup. 898 (D.C. 1996).......18,23,30

duvel v. General D ics

878 F.2d. 1311, 1320

(llth cir. L9E9) cccvccccepesccccvensehOys aU

ix

Vv eli te:

634 F.Sup. 1551

(N.Dist. Texas, SOCS) cc scccvevecescvessad

oi -& is to

Litig. 897 F.2d 626

(2nd Cir. 1990) *e@ee7#*e@*e?#e?etfeseeseecetsecee#se#eee#ee#e##e#¢ a

Kleeman v. McDonnel ouglas

890 F.2d 1698, 701

COS CSF .: 29B9) oc cvenccvenss pie ee 19,15,16

Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, a Division of

Boeing Company

Te Weds. cee -20O: CAB. Chi tes cvccie cs 19

Lewis v. Babcock Industries

985 F.2d 83 (2nd Cir. 1993)......18,23,29

Oliver v. Oshgosh Truck, Corp.

(7th Cir. 1996)... .%... Wag NEKes ke wckas 16

Pail v. McCormick

S58 O.8 COE, GEG. CISGR ia cccticwcnvick 38

Parr v. U.S.

(1956) 76 S.C. 912, 351 U.S. 513.......38

s Vv swi ssoc.

Ltd. anit

507 U.S. 380 (1993)........i,iii,39,41,42

Ramey v. Martin Baker Aircraft Company

874 F.2d 946

COCR: CEE. EORR) ob cc kdctdccessses -19,28,24

os Vv. 7

(C.A. 3d. 1990) 905 F.2d.

702, 705, 706) ccccscccscccece e*eeeee#ee#ee?#e# : 2 ae

x

Smith v. Xerox Corp.

866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989)........ 18,25

Vv icopt °

(9th Cir. 1997) 107 P.3GecccccccceveelG9,17

Strickland v. Royal Lubricant Company

Fe Ge Was BOGUS a 66.0 6650060 cuss 28

Z

55 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1995)..... 21,32,27

vi Vv. © ics Cor atio

865 F.2d. 1474 (5th Cir. 1989)...... 21,28

Yeroshefsky v. Unisys Corp.

962 F.Sup. 710 (D. Maryland 1997)......30

ORITIES

28 U.8.C. Section 22SEC A) cccccccccccccecl

U.S. Court, Seventh Amendment..... sosesel

U.S. Eighth Cir. Court of Appeal

AT(ACD) ccccccsccescessceecesesessesesses&

FRAP, 4(a) (5).....+..+-ii,4,5,15,34, 35,37

FRAP, 4(@) (6) ccccvcccescccecdiy4, 33,37, 39

FRCP, Rule 60(b)....ii,iii,5,6,7,15,33,39

FRCP, Rule WrevcccccsececcesccessnaneS,ae

1

TO: THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE

AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES:

Petitioner Respectfully prays that a

Writ of Certiorari issue to review the

judgment and opinions of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

finally entered in this matter on or about

June 8, 2000.

II.

OPINIONS BELOW

On June 19, 1998, United States

District Court for the Eastern District of

Missouri, Judge E. Richard Webber, granted

Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment

and dismissed Petitioner’s Complaint.

(Appendix (A 6)

The basis of the Order was that the

Court found that Respondent had

established the First, Second and Third

prong of the Government Contractor

Defense, Boyle, supra. The Court heavily

relied upon (1) post-delivery knowledge

gained in Long Term Use of the aircraft as

a basis for its opinion (A 15) and (2)

continuous back and forth involvement of

the Military rather than specific approval

2

of the defective item in issue. (A 13-14)

Secondly, the Court found that the

Government Contractor Defense barred

Petitioner’s failure to warn. claim

believing that the only burden = on

Respondent was to show that a material

issue of fact does not exist as to whether

the Air Force approved the warnings

pertaining to the defect at issue. (A 16-

18)

The District Court’s granting of

Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment

was entered on July 24, 1998. (A 24)

No Notice of Entry of Judgment was

provided Petitioner’s counsel per Rule 77,

nor did Respondent provide Notice of Entry

of Judgment.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal

on July 27, 1998. The District Court

wrote on the Notice "Leave to File

Granted, 7-29-98, signed by E. Richard

Webber". (A 1) |

On July 31, 1998 Petitioner brought a

Motion to File the Untimely Notice of

Appeal alleging Excusable Neglect facts

pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellant

Procedure 4(a)(5) and facts of 4(a) (6).

(A 3)

District Court Judge Webber wrote on

the Motion "Denied as Moot, 8-6-98, E.

Richard Webber". (ASA 418) No findings

of excusable neglect or good cause were

made. (A 3)

The Eighth Circuit Appellant Court

docketed the case on August 6, 1998.

Respondent had, pursuant to the

United States Eighth Circuit of Appeals,

Local Rule 47A(b), fifteen (15) days from

the date of docketing of the Appeal to

bring a Motion challenging or objecting to

"jurisdiction". They did not.

Petitioner’s Opening Brief was filed

on September 28, 1998.

Respondent brought a Motion on

October 13, 1998 (two (2) months after the

Appeal was docketed) challenging

jurisdiction of the Appellant Court. The

Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit,

dismissed the Appeal without explanation

on November 10, 1998. Appellant’s Motion

for Reconsideration was likewise, without

comment, denied on December 21, 1998.

On January 19, 1999, Petitioner moved

the District Court per Rule 60(b) for

4

findings of Excusable Neglect for filing

of a late Notice of Appeal pursuant to

FRAP 4(a)5 and 4(a)6. The District Court

found that a FRAP 4(a)(5) Motion had been

previously brought, but that a 4(a) (6)

Motion had not. This is despite

Petitioner raising the issue of lack of

Notice in their original Motion. (A 4)

On March 8, 1999, the District Court

Granted and found Excusable Neglect for

late filing of the Notice of Appeal. (A

26-27)

Petitioner timely filed her Second

Notice of Appeal on March 15, 1999

pursuant to said Order. (A 27)

On May 7, 1999 the Eighth Circuit

Appellant Court ordered that the

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss should be

taken with the Appeal for consideration

for disposition on the merits. (A 27)

On April 27, 2000 the United States

Court of Appeal, for the Eighth Circuit,

dismissed Petitioner’s Appeal on the

grounds that the Rule 60(b) Motion was

brought beyond thirty (30) days from the

District Court’s Denial as Moot of

Petitioner’s Motion to file late Notice of

5

Appeal and that the District Court should

not have considered Petitioner’s Rule

60(b) Motion as being brought beyond

thirty (30) days per Fox v. Brewer, 620

F.2d. 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1980). (A 21)

In advisory, the Court further found

that there were not sufficent facts

constituting Excusable Neglect for filing

the Notice of Appeal one (1) day late. (A

32)

Petitioner’s timely Petition for Re-

Hearing in Banc to the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals was denied without

comment on June 2, 2000.

On June 8, 2000 the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of

Missouri, filed the Judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth

Circuit ordering and adjudging that the

Judgment of the District Court in that

cause was Affirmed in accordance with the

opinion of the Court of Appeals. (A 40)

rit.

SD ON

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals

was entered on April 27, 2000. Petitioner

timely petitioned the United States Court

6

of Appeal for the Eighth Circuit for a Re-

Hearing in Banc which was denied on June

2, 2000.

The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section

1254(1).

IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISION INVOLVED

The Constitution of the United

States, 7th Amendment, Right to Trial by

Jury:

"In suits of common law, where the

value in controversy shall exceed $20.00

the right of trial by jury shall be

preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,

shall be otherwise re-examined in any

Court of the United States, then according

to the Rules of the Common Law."

FRCP, Rule 60(b) states,

"On Motion and upon such terms

as are just, the Court may

relieve a party or parties legal

representative from ae final

Judgment, Order or proceeding

for the following reasons: (1)

mistake, inadvertence, surprise

or Excusable Neglect;...(6) any

other reason justifying relief

from the operation of the

‘Judgment. The Motion shall be

7

made within a reasonable time

ce]

and for reasons (1)...not more

than one (1) year after the

Judgment, Order or proceeding

was entered or taken..."

Vv.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

INTRODUCTION

This case involves the crash of a

United States Air Force F-15 fighter jet

on May 30, 1995 at Spangdahlem Air Force

Base, Germany, killing Petitioner’s

Decedent Major Donald Lowry.

Petitioner’s Complaint alleges

Negligence and Defective Design on behalf

of the widow and child of Decedent Major

Lowry against Respondent McDonnell Douglas

Corporation.

Respondent brought a Summary Judgment

Motion based upon the affirmative defense

known as the Government Contractor

Defense; v. United Technologies, 487

U.S. 500, 108 S.C. 2510 (1988).

The lower District Court granted

Appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on

June 19, 1998, heavily relying upon "post

delivery knowledge" of the defect by a few

8

members, of the United States Air Force and

"continuous back and forth" involvement of

the Military at the purchasing stage

rather than approval of the specific

defect at issue. (A 6). Judgment was

entered on June 24, 1998. (A 24)

B. FACTS REGARDING THE CRASH, ITS CAUSE

AND THE AIR FORCE INVESTIGATION

OF THE PRE-CRASH MAINTENANCE

Respondent concedes that the cause of

the crash was a cross connection of

specific Lateral and Longitudinal Flight

Control Input Rods to the Mixer Assembly

of Major Lowry’s F-15 aircraft done

inadvertently during routine maintenance.

These Lateral and Longitudinal flight

control input rods to the mixer assembly

connect the pilot’s control stick to the

various flight control surfaces on the

wings and tail of the aircraft. If they

are not connected in the correct way, the

aircraft will be uncontrollable in flight.

The official United States Air Force

Mishap Board Investigation concluded that

it was generally assumed throughout the

Air Force that it was physically

impossible to cross connect the flight

control rods.

The maintenance instruction Technical

Orders, 1F-1SC-2-27GS00-1, published by

Respondent McDonnell, only provides a

schematic of the flight control rods and

mixer assembly, but provides ne step by

step instruction regarding connection of

the rods.

According to the highly trained level

7 United States Air Force mechanic who

cross~connected the rods, he was not aware

that these control rods could be cross

connected based upon all of his training,

_ knowledge and the Job Guide manuals (which

were prepared by Petitioner McDonnell-

Douglas).

C. THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

ie) E F-15

AND ITS FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM

The critical désign of the F-15

aircraft in this case was in two (2)

phases.

1. FIRST PHASE

The first phase was. the original

design of the F-15 A and B model from 1969

to 1972.

The original contract (F33657-70-

10

C300) °}&#£=«states that "performance

responsibilities were solely upon the

contractor", i.e. McDonnell-Douglas. This

contract states that the Air Force was not

responsible for what was taking place as

far as the design is concerned and the

performance of that design.

The Prime Item Development

Specification (PID), CP76301A328A081A (the

O81A PID) dated December 15, 1969 is the

basic Detailed Specification for the F-15

A/B aircraft. It establishes’ the

performance, "design", development and

test requirements for the F-15. This is

the contemplated "Reasonably Precise

Design Specification" required by Boyle,

supra.

The "081A PID" specifically requires

and incorporates Mil-F-9490C(1) dated 9

March 1966 as the applicable design

specification for the Flight Control

System which requires "foolproofness" of

this design.

The specifically required

specifications, MIL-F-9490C, "Flight

Control System - Design, installation and

test....", at paragraph 3.2.8 states,

11

"Fool broofness - All control

Systems shall be designed so

that incorrect assembly and

reversed operation of controls

is impossible."

Respondent has admitted that this

specification was not complied with since

it is possible to cross connect the

control rods.

The documents presented by the

Respondent to the lower Court, did not

address’ the actual defect of "cross

connected" rods during the design stages

of the F-15 A and B model. The lower

Court did not reference any.

There was presented no evidence that

the Military approved by waiver or

specification any deviance that the

control rods could be cross connected, or

that they waived any design error, defect

or warning that the control rods could be

cross connected at the mixer.

Yet, numerous documents presented to

the Air Force by Respondent McDonnell-

Douglas during the design phase

continuously assured the Air Force that

the flight control system was safe,

conforming to the specifications, that

there were no anomalies and no problems

12

associated with the design of the flight

control systen.

2. SECOND PHASE

The second phase, applicable to the

aircraft in question, began in the late

1970’s, through Engineering Change

Proposal (ECP) 450, where Respondent

McDonnell-Douglas, not the government, was

requested to propose, among other things,

the incorporation of an additional 2,000

pounds of internal fuel capacity for the

F-15, to be called the F-15C. (ASA 327)

Respondent’s designed a Left

Auxiliary Fuel Tank constructed around the

very control rods which were cross

connected in this case. The rods now

would pass through a tube that was

essentially sealed on both ends such that

you cannot tell in between whether the

rods are crossed or not.

Respondent._was also tasked, per the

ECP 450, to identify hazards in this

design change. Respondent, McDonnell’s

conclusions and statement to the military

was that their Safety Analysis of ECP450

did not reveal any hazards which would

Significantly degrade the operational

13

safety of the F-15. They did not address

the cross connect problem at all.

Similarly the specific System Safety

Analysis done by McDonnell, which had the

exact same design criteria for the control

system as established by Spec AO8lA and

MIL-F9490C (Impossibility of cross

connection), concluded that as far as risk

assessment "there is no significant risk

associated with this change"

Petitioner’s aircraft was delivered

to the United States Air Force in the late

1970’s.

D.__APTER DELIVERY INCIDENTS OF CROSS __

Cc D FLI O Ds

Petitioner concedes that there were

at least two (2) reported incidents of

crossed control rods going to the mixer

prior to Major Lowry’s crash in this case.

One in 1986 and the other in 1991. Both

of which did not cause a crash, and both

of which were caught by the line mechanics

who were flabbergasted that it was

possible to so cross connect.

The 1991 High Accident Potential

(HAP) Report shows that the Air Force was

unfamiliar with the possibility of cross-

ee

14

connection of the rods. It appears that

the Technical Orders were misinterpreted

to mean no rigging or operational checks

were required after the reinstallation of

the same flight control rods as in this

crash. The Air Force did not do a fix to

this problem until the crash herein.

E. FACTS REGARDING NOTICE OF APPEAL

AND RULE 60(b) MOTION _

Appellant filed her original Notice

of Appeal on July 27, 1998. (A 1)

There had been no Notice of the Entry

of the District Court’s Order granting

Motion for Summary Judgment appealed from

entered therein on June 24, 1998.

The District Court, granted

Petitioner’s Leave to File Plaintiff’s

Notice of Appeal by writing on the Notice

"Leave to File Granted, 7-29-98, signed by

E. Richard Webber". (A 1)

The case went up on Appeal, was

docketed, and Appellant’s Opening Brief

was filed on September 28, 1998.

The Court of Appeals, dismissed the

Appeal without explanation on November 10,

1998, pursuant to Motion by Defendant.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration

15

was denied on December 21, 1998.

Petitioner then immediately on

January 19, 1999 brought a Motion in the

District Court to relieve Petitioner from

Denial as Moot Appellee’s Motion to Grant

Leave to Extend Time for Filing of Notice

of Appeal pursuant and for findings of

Excusable Neglect per FRCP 60(b), FRAP

4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6). (A 3)

On March 8, 1999 the District Court

found Excusable Neglect for Appellee’s

filing a late Notice of Appeal, but denied

consideration of FRAP 4(a)(6) (lack of

Notice of Entry of original Judgment). (A

27)

Appellant’s Notice of Appeal was

filed in the District Court on March 15,

1999.

On May 7, 1999 the Eighth Circuit

Court put the issue of the Motion to

Dismiss the Appeal in consideration by the

panel to which this case is submitted for

disposition on the merits. The Eighth

Circuit dismissed the Appeal again and

found in advisory, that no excusable

neglect was shown. (A 21)

16

VI.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

A.

THERE IS CONFL CONFUSION

IN THE VARIOUS CIRCUITS

REG Ni E

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE

WHICH TH COUR S NOT REVI ED NCE

. ITS ANNOUNC 988

1. E CONFUSION OF THE ECIFIC DESIG

FEATURE WHICH MUST BE APPROVED

The Government Contractor Defense

test (Judicially, not Legislatively

enacted) was first announced in Boyle v.

United Technologies, 487 U.S.: 500, 108

S.C. 2510, 101 Law. Ed. 2d. 442 (1988) as

follows:

"Liability for design defects

and military equipment cannot be

imposed, pursuant to State law,

when:

1. The United States approved

reasonably precise

specifications;

2. The equipment conformed to

those specifications; and

3. The supplier warned the

United States about the dangers

in the use of the equipment that

17

were known to the supplier but

not to the United States."

Id. at 512.

Since that first announcement, the

various circuits have blurred the first

test by ignoring the distinction between

the Approval of "Reasonably Precise

Specifications" for the particular feature

in issue and have adopted an overall

"continuous back and forth" review of the

general design of the whole product as

being sufficient satisfaction of the first

test.

Some Circuits state that it is the

particular piece at issue that must be

approved. See Snell, supra (9th Cir.

1997); Oliver _v. Oshgosh Truck, Corp. 96

F.3d. 992, 998-99 ive Cir. 1996)

Cert.Denied 117 S.C. 1246 (1997); Tate v.

Boeing Helicopters 55 F.3d. 1150, 1154-55

(6th Cir. 1995); K Vv onald-

Douglas 890 F. 2d. 698, 701 tn. .Cir.

1989) Cert. Denied 495 U.S. 956 (1990).

However, other Circuits state that a

"continuous back and forth" review of the

overall design is such approval of

"Reasonably Precise Specifications"

without proof of the specific defective

18

design being specifically approved.

Harduvel v. General Dynamics 878 F.2d.

1311, 1320 (llth Cir. 1989) Cert. Denied

494 U.S. 1030 (1990); Lewis v. Babcock

Industries 985 F.2d. 85 (2nd Cir. 1992)

Cert. Denied 509 U.S. 924 (1993); Emory v.

McDonald Douglas Affirmed 148 F.3d. 347

(4th Cir. 1998)

"General evaluation of the substance

of the overall design is sufficent and

specific approval of each aspect is

unnecessary". Haltiwanger v. Unisys Corp.

949 F.Supp. 898, 905 (D.D.C. 1996).

Other Courts have indicated that "the

act of approving reasonable precise

specifications" is the act of "examining

and agreeing to a detailed description of

the working of a system" rather than the

specific defect. - Smith v. Xerox

Corporation 866 F.2d. 135, 138 (5th Cir.

1989)

Overall involvement rather than a

showing of approval of the specific design

feature is sufficent. See In Re: Air

Disaster at Ramstein Air Base 81 F.3d 870-

74 (5th Cir. 1996) Cert. Denied 519 U.S.

1028 (1996).

19

One Court has concluded that a

contractor’s inability to alter a design

once approved is evidence of government

acceptance of the design, i.e. approval

even if there was no direct approval of

the defect in issue. eemann v. Mc ald

Douglas 890 F. 2d 698 (4th Cir. 1989)

Cert. Denied 495 U.S. 953 (1990)

Additionally, other Courts have held

that "the process of continuous back and

forth itself becomes persuasive evidence -

of product conformity to the precise

specifications. Kleeman 890 F.2d. 702;

_ Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, a Di vision of

Boeing Company 755 F.2d. 352, 355 (3d.

Cir.) Cert. Denied 474 U.S. 821 (1985),

see also Hardival v. General Dynamics 878

F.2d. 1311, 1320 (llth Cir. 1989) cert.

Denied 494 U.S. 1030 (1990); Ramey 874

F.2d. at 950.

One Court went so far to say that the

requirement of approval of specific

Military Specifications could just be

rejected as "representing little more than

the hopes of participants that the project

in which they are about to embark will

turn out well". Vv Cc ald

20

Douglas Corporation 890 F.2d. 698 (4th

Cir. 1989) Cert. Denied 495 U.S. 953

(1990). This Circuit essentially rejects

the entire first prong of the Boyle test

that there be approval of the Detailed

Specifications. In essence that Court has

concluded that Boyle, supra, means

nothing.

In contrast, it seems Boyle, supra,

requires that the exercise of discretion

by the military be made in connection with

the particular design feature at issue in

each case.

Only where the military approves

reasonably precise specifications is there

an exercise of judgment by the Government.

Snell _v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.

(9th Cir. 1997) 107 F. 3d. at page 746,

747.

Logically, involvement of the

military with the contractor and with the

aircraft as a whole is not relevant to the

defense. Boyle, supra, seems to mandate

an examination of the involvement by the

military in making a design choice with

respect to the particular component

alleged to be defective. Snell, supra;

21

and Trevino v. General _ Dynamics

Corporation 865 F. 2d. 1474 (5th Cir.

1989)

Here, the District Court believed

that one of the considerations under the

first element of the Government Contractor

Defense is the existence of a "continuous

back and forth" review process between the

military and the contractor. (A 13-14)

However, such consideration should be

limited to the back and forth review

process regarding the design in question.

u Vv. 6 ipbuildi ne.»

supra, 89 F.3d at page 585; Tate v. Boeing

Helicopter, 55 F.3d 1150, 1154 (6th Cir.

1995). The District Court did not make

this distinction.

The lower Courts have gone too far in

the application of the Government

Contractor Defense merely allowing a broad

stroking, broad brushing, government

involvement in the purchase of an item

rather than approval of the specific

design feature and/or design choice

required by Boyle, supra.

This interpretation is costly,

causing lives to be lost and is beyond the

22

scope of the Boyle contemplated test.

This Court must address these issues for

guidance to the various circuits.

a 0 0

The District Court here erroneously

found that Long Term Use proves

conformance and approval of the Detailed

Specifications per the First part of the

test under Boyle, supra. (A 15-16)

There is conflict and confusion in

the Circuit Courts regarding does long

term use or knowledge of the defect after

delivery of the aircraft but prior to the

crash, negate any failure to approve

reasonably precise specifications,

compliance with the Specifications or fail

to warn on the part of the Defendant per

Boyle, supra.

Several Circuits have concluded the

government approval of Reasonably Precise

Specifications can be established by the

government’s continued use of a product

23

over an extended period of time,

particularly after the government is made

aware of any alleged defect. Ramey v.

Martin Baker Aircraft Company 874 F.2d.

946, 950 (4th Cir. 1989); is v oc

industries, Inc. 985 F.2d 85 (2nd Cir.

1992) Cert. Denied 509 U.S. 924 (1993);

Haltawanger 949 F. Supp. 904; In _ Re:

Disaster Ramstein Air Base 81 F.3d. 570,

574 (5th Cir. 1996); Dowd v. Textron 792

F.2d. at 412.

There is conflict and _ confusion

because:

a. Vv j 'e ° ies,

Supra, specifically did away with long

term use as a criteria for any of three

(3) prongs of the Boyle, supra, test.

b. Long term use is illogical and

contrary to the test enumerated in Boyle,

supra, as construing the Government

Contractor Defense.

c. There is conflict and confusion

in the Circuits since other cases, post-

Boyle, have logically not considered long

term use as a factor in the analysis of

the Government Contractor Defense because

it is at the time of the procurement of

24

the item of manufacture that the defense

applies.

dad. Other cases uphold long term use,

as a basis for granting the Government

Contractor Defense per Boyle, supra.

e. Long term use after delivery of

the item of manufacture only goes to

comparative fault, not "the government

made me do it" Boyle, supra, defense

applicable.

a. Boyle Spec call ejects Lo e

Use as a Factor In the Government

Contractor Defense

The "Long Term Use" argument began

with Dowd v. Textron, Inc. 792 F.2d. 409,

412 (4th Cir. 1986) decided before Boyle.

In Dowd, supra, the Court, even

though acknowledging that the Government

had not approved Reasonably Detailed

Specifications of the helicopter rotor

system, found that the Army had a Long

Term Use and knowledge regarding the

system in general constituted approval of

alleged design defects.

"The length and breath of the

Army’s experience with the 540

rotor system - and its decision

to continue using - amply

establish Government approval of

25

the alleged design defect."

In contrast, as stated in Hendrix v.

Bell_ Helicopter, Inc. 634 F.Supp. 1551

(N.D. Texas 1986); also pre-Boyle, supra;

"The Court finds Appellant’s

reliance on post-delivery events

to be mis-placed...the reason

for this is clear. In order for

the Government to balance the

risks and benefits inherent in

the use of the product, the

Government must be made aware of

any known defects in the product

prior to its intended use of the

product." (emphasis added)

In 1988, Boyle, supra, expressly

adopted the policy behind the

Discretionary Immunity Exception under the

Federal Tort Claims Act. Boyle, supra at

page 510, as a "design choice" criteria.

Boyle specifically adopted the

requisite element of Government approval

of Reasonably Precise Specifications and

thus in effect overrules any other

"approval" test. See Boyle, supra, page

$12.

Boyle, supra is thus specific. It is

at the time of the procurement that

conformance to Reasonably Precise

Specification is required, not later.

26

Anything else, should go to comparative

fault or intervening causes. The lower

Courts are confused on this issue.

» ff, e al

Itself To 3

Any 1 of The 3 Prongs of The Boyle Test

The first prong requires the Approval

of Reasonably Precise Specifications.

Obviously, long term use does not insure

that the government has become aware at

the procurement phase of the latent defect

which may have caused a particular

problem. Therefore, they could not have

"approved" it when they "bought" it.

It also clearly does not mean that

there has been a "design choice" or an

"approval" of the reasonably precise

specification when the item was designed,

Boyle, supra. Long term use is only use,

not design choice.

The second prong, Conformance With

the Specifications, likewise does not

logically flow from continued use.

Continued use by the user of a particular

product does not imply that that product

has in fact conformed to the original

specifications. Other considerations may

27

require the continued use of the product

such as replacement may be expensive, but

for which economically the government is

stuck. This is not a logical basis to

support any government approval of the

design relating back. See Lewis, supra.

The third prong, Failure To Warn;

long term use by the military does not

mean that they have become aware of the

latent defect. As Boyle specifically

states, at page 512, the warning by the

manufacturer is,

"The 3rd condition is necessary

because, in its absence, the

displacement of State Tort Law

would create some incentive for

the manufacturer to withhold

knowledge of § risks, since

conveying that knowledge might

disrupt the contract but

withholding it would produce no

liability."

The point is that just because the

Military later became aware of the latent

defect, the manufacturer may have already

been aware and failed to disclose it at

the procurement phase. Men may have died,

but the manufacturer remained silent.

Thus, fraud on the government for a

defective product.

28

The following cases are examples of

conflict and confusion of Long Term Use by

the military which has not constituted

satisfaction of the Failure to Warn, Third

prong of the Boyle test.

Aircraft mechanic who allegedly

suffered injuries of being sprayed with

hydraulic fluid from a CH-47 Chinook

helicopter, Strickland v. Royal Lubricant

Company (1995) 91 F.Supp. 1460; Navy

divers killed by submarine hatch used for

18 years Trevino v. General Dynamics (5th

Cir. 1989) 865 F.2d. 1474; Naval crewman

killed in crash of S.3 jet aircraft used

since 1975, Gray v. Lockheed (D.C. GA

1995) 880 F.Supp. 1559.

d. Other Cases Accept Long Term Use To

t ve ent Contractor

Defense, Boyle, supra.

Dowd, supra, has been mentioned

earlier.

R . Marti Bal Aj x

Company 874 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1989). The

29

Navy was continuing to use a deficient

Maintenance Manual while apparently in the

process of deciding how to deal with the

risk created by the alleged design defect.

See 874 F.2d. at 951. . The cCourt’s

reasoning’ was that Long Term Use

constituted approval of the design defect.

In, Lewis _v. Babcock Industries 985

F.2d 83 (2nd Cir. 1993), Long Term Use was

held by the Second Circuit as a basis for

the approval of Reasonably Precise

Specifications at the time of procurement

level. In Lewis, supra, the design defect

was identified prior to the subject crash,

but the Air Force, instead of spending the

money to redesign the defect to the

ejection seat of the Jet Fighter, decided

to change the Maintenance Manuals and

replace existing parts. The Second

Circuit felt that this decision after the

fact by the United States Air Force

constituted "approval" at the time of

purchase.

In Re: Air Di ) t R ti ai

Base, 81 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 1996).

The Appeal Court there, at page 575,

indicated that the Trial Court had let

30

evidence in showing that the Air Force had

used the C5A aircraft for over 20 years.

The Court then said that

"from this evidence the District

Court could have concluded that

the C5A was built in accordance

with Air Force specifications.

See Smith v. Xerox Corp. 866

F.2d 135, 138 (Sth Cir. 1989)."

tiwanger v. Unisys Corp., 949

F.Supp. 898 at 903-04 (D.C. 1996), the

Court found that the item of manufacture

have been used for more that 20 years. It

stated,

"The Postal Service’s extended

use of the file product

manifests its substantive

acceptance and approval of the

basic and its specific features,

thus satisfying the First Prong

of the Boyle test, regardless of

the nature of the _. Postal

Service’s specifications."

Also see, Yeroshefsky v. Unisys Corp.

962 F.Supp 710 (D. MD 1997).

Thus there is conflict and confusion

in the Courts as to when an item of

manufacture is to be looked at to be in

conformance with the specifications. Long

Term Use does not and is not actual

approval at the procurement or purchasing

31

time by the Government.

e. Long Term Use Only Goes to Comparative

Fault or Intervening Cause

State law and Federal Common Law

allow for intervening causes or

comparative fault also may be afforded the

manufacturer if the military becomes aware.

of a latent defect and chooses to use it

unwisely, or modifies the equipment

themselves such that it becomes’ more

dangerous causing injury. There are

numerous checks and balances that a Jury

could consider regarding what the user,

i.e. Military, did with the product after

it was in their possession.

that all Respondent McDonnell Douglas must

show is that a material issue of fact does

not exist as to whether the Air Force

approved Warnings pertaining to the Defect

32

at issye ala Boyle, supra. (A117) Other

Courts are making the same mistake.

The Failure to Warn is a triable

issue if warnings are required by State

law (per the evidence) and were not

prohibited under any Government

Specification. The Eighth Circuit did not

understand that the absence of

specifications for warnings then puts the

burden on Respondent to conform to State

law regarding warnings in the use of the

defective product.

Under State law a manufacturer has a

duty to warn the user of its product of a

danger when the manufacturer has knowledge

of the danger or a reason to know of it

and has no reason to know that those who

use the product will realize its dangerous

condition. Butler ?. Ingalls.

Shipbuilding, Inc., supra, 89 F.3d at P.

586.

Yet, the military contractor defense

is not established as to a failure to warn

claim merely by satisfying the subject

elements as to a design defect claim.

Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 55 F.3d 1150,

1157 (6th Cir. 1995) Whereas the

33

government contractor’s defense may be

used to "trump" a design defect clain,

that defense is inapplicable to a failure

to warn claim, unless the evidence

supports a finding that in making its

decision whether to provide a warning

against the use of the particular design,

the contractor was acting in compliance

with Reasonably Precise Specifications

imposed on it by the United States.

Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.,

supra, 89 F.3d at p. 586.

The failure to warn requirements of

state law must thus’ be considered

independent of Boyle, supra.

Where the contract with the United

States imposes no requirements on the

contractor and thus no conflict exists

between the contract and a state law duty

to warn, Boyle, supra, commands’ that

Courts defer to the imposition of

liability under state tort law, regardless

of any conflict which may exist between

the contract and state law design

requirements. Butler iv. Ingalls

Shipbuilding, Inc., supra, 89 F. 3d at p.

586, quoting In re Joint E.&S. Dist. New

34

York Asbestos Litig. 897 F. 2d 626, 631

(2d Cir. 1990). This principle simply

demonstrates a crucial lack of the

necessary conflict between state and

federal warning requirements. In re Joint

E.&S. Dist. New York Asbestos Litig., 897

F.2d at p. 631. As the Boyle Court

pointedly explained, "[Cjonflict there

must be." Boyle v. United Technologies,

supra, 487 U.S. 500. And even a federal

contract specification requiring a certain

product design does not create a conflict

with state law requiring a certain set-of

warnings incident to the use of that

product or design. In _ re Joint E.&sS.

Dist. New York Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d

at p. 630.

This Court is asked to clarify and

advise regarding this important area of

the interpretation of the Government

Contractor Defense Rr Boyle, supra.

RULE 60(b) AND EXCUSABLE NEGLECT

1. R D Oo

ACC D USsvU. Cc CIAL

PROCEEDINGS REGARDING RULE 60 (b)

FRCP, Rule 60(b) states,

"On Motion and upon such terms

as are just, the Court may

35

relieve a party or parties legal

representative from ae final

Judgment, Order or proceeding

for the followings reasons: (1)

mistake, inadvertence, surprise

or Excusable Neglect;....(6) any

other reason justifying relief

from the operation of the

Judgment. e t all be

22 e

entered or taken..."

The Eighth Circuit Appellant Court

has made a serious misinterpretation in

the bringing of a Rule 60(b) Motion by

Petitioner LOWRY. The Court reasoned "+o

prevent its use as a substitute for Appeal

we have required a Rule 60(b) Motion

alleging judicial inadvertence to be made

within the time period allowed for

Appeal", i.e. thirty (30) days. (A 28)

Presumably referring to the Denial as Moot

of the Plaintiff’s Motion for a finding of

Excusable Neglect. The Court cites Fox v.

Brewer 620 F.2d. 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1980).

(A 29)

However, in Fox, the "Notice of

Appeal" and Motion for extension of time

were filed beyond thirty (30) days

required under FRAP 4(b) (5) against any of

36

the Judgments sought to be appealed. In

that case, the Rule 60(b) Motions were not

then timely filed, i.e. the "Notice of

Appeal" and Motions to permit the Notice

of Appeal were never filed within the

thirty (30) days per FRAP 4(b)(5) or 60

days of the Final Judgments sought to be

corrected. Fox, supra, page 180.

Here, Petitioner’s Notice of Appeal

was filed on July 27, 1998 (within the

sixty (60) day window). (A 1) Also,

Petitioner’s Motion to permit said filing

was in fact brought also within the thirty

(30) days per FRAP 4(b) (5). (A 3) When

the Rule 60 Motion was brought, within one

(1) year, it was not to argue or to open

up, out of thirty (30) days, something

that had never been done before. It was

in fact correcting a Motion which had been

done in the correct thirty (30) day time

period as required by the Eighth Circuit.

The Appellant Court here forgot,

misconstrued or misapprehended the in

between step of the Motion having been

brought under 4(a)(5) within the thirty

(30) day time period of the Granting of

Leave to file what had already been filed

37

Notice of Appeal. (A 29)

This Appellant Court’s error and

misapprehension of the case law has

blurred the distinctions between a Rule 60

Motion brought outside of thirty (30) days

solely to correct an Order of the District

Court on grounds which had never been

brought before verses, as here, a Rule 60

Motion which relates back to a Motion

which had been brought timely before,

asserting grounds for which relief was

appropriate within the thirty (30) day

requirement of FRAP 4(b)(5) and 4(b) (6).

The exact purpose of a Rule 60 Motion

is to correct whatever manifest errors or

inadvertence had actually been prompted by

the lower Court, i.e. a Rule 60(b) Motion

relating back to a Motion brought within

the proper time and relating to the same

issues.

Petitioner did bring a Motion in

time, after Leave was Granted to and did

file her Notice of Appeal, even though

Plaintiff’s Motion was Denied as Moot.

Yet the Eighth Circuit says therefore

Petitioner should have appealed it. (A

31) This is incorrect. Cases have always

Lait iniiaiiii iiiie

38

indicated that the substance of the ruling

and the effect of the ruling is the

appealable issue, not whether or not it

was purely a Denial of a parties’ Motion.

Parr v. U.S. (1956) 76 S.C. 912, 351 U.S.

513; Rosen v. Rurker (C.A.3d 1990) 905

F.2d. 702, 705, 706.

2. 1°) (@) CK 0O

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT, BOTH

N CUSABLE G

THE FRAP 4(A) (6) MOTION

The Eighth Circuit further did not

take into account the effect the lack of

Notice of the Entry of the original

Judgment required by FRCP 77(d), both from

the Court and/or from the party.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

77(d) states,

"Immediately upon the Entry of

an Order or Judgment the Clerk

shall serve a Notice of the

Entry by mail upon each

party...any party in addition

serve a Notice of such Entry in

the manner provided in Rule 5

for the Service of papers. Lack

of Notice of the Entry by the

Clerk does not effect the time

to Appeal...except as permitted

in Rule 4(a) of the Federal

Rules of Appellant Procedure."

39

The Eighth Circuit Court has ignored

the change in FRAP 4(a) instituted in 1991

and reasserted in the Supreme Court case

of Pioneer, infra, and the Eighth Circuit

case of Fink v. Union Central Life

insurance Company, 65 F.3d. 722 (8th Cir.

1995), regarding certain relaxed standards

of allowing late (beyond thirty (30) days)

filing of Notice of Appeals. FRAP 4(a) (6)

(A 32-38) |

Federal Rules of Appellant Procedure

4(a)(6) provides,

"The District Court, if it finds

(a) that a party entitled to

Notice of the Entry of Judgment

or Order did not receive such

Notice from the Clerk or any

party within 21 days of its

Entry and, (b) that no party

would be prejudiced, may, upon

Motion filed within 180 days of

Entry of the Judgment or Order

or within 7 days of receipt of

such Notice, whichever is

earlier, reopen the time for

Appeal for a period of 14 days

from the date of Entry of the

Order reopening the time for

Appeal."

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

in its advisory analysis of the finding of

Excusable Neglect by the District Court,

has set the bar too high. (A 37) A

40

relaxed standard, especially when there is

only a one (1) day late filing of a Notice

of Appeal, when there was no Notice of the

Entry of Judgment given by either the

District Court or the Respondent herein,

is appropriate.

This is clearly within the mandates

of Pioneer and Fink, supra.

The Court of Appeals has summarily

dismissed the lack of Notice of Entry of

Judgment as being unimportant and not

relating either to the bringing of the

Rule 60 Motion and, in its gratuitous

finding, that there was no Excusable

Neglect.

This Court is asked to reaffirm

Pi oneer and Fink, supra, and to mandate

that the Eighth Circuit not set such a

high barrier for the late filing of a

Notice of Appeal.

VI.

PRAYER FO LIEF

Petitioner respectfully requests to

be heard before this honorable Couyt.

Vit.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ee a ee

Al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

MARGARET LOWRY,

No.: 4-96-CV1572 ERW

Plaintiff,

Ve

MCDONNELL~-DOUGLAS

CORPORATION, /s/ Leave to File

Granted

7/29/98

/s/ E. Richard Webber

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

(Filed June 27, 1998)

Comes now Plaintiff, Margaret Lowry,

and hereby notices her appeal from the

judgment of Dismissal per Defendants

Motion for Summary Judgment granted and

entered herein on June 24, 1998

Dated: 7/27/98

/s/

Louis S. Franecke, Esq.

Attorney for Plaintiff

425 Battery Street

Suite 450

San Francisco, CA 94111

(415) 391-1560 phone

A2

CERTIFICA OF SERVIC

The undersigned hereby certifies that a

true and accurate copy of the above and

foregoing was sent via United States

Postal Service, this 27th day of July,

1998 to:

BRYAN CAVE

Mr. Peter Herzog

211 North Broadway

One Metropolitan Square

St. Louis, MO 63102

/s/

\-

A3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

MARGRET LOWRY, individually )

and as guardian ad litem cf ) No.: 4-96-

NADINE LOWRY, a minor, ) CV1572 ERW

) EX PARTE

) MOTION BY

) PLAINTIFF

) TO FILE

Plaintiff, ) NOTICE OF

) APPEAL PER

) FEDERAL

) RULE OF

v. ) APPELLANT

) PROCEDURE

) 4(a) (5)

MCDONNELL~DOUGLAS CORPORATION, )

a California Corporation )

licensed to do business in )/s/ DENIED

California, ) AS MOOT

8/6/98

)/s/

)E. Richard

) Webber

Defendants. )

)

(Filed July 31,1995)

COMES NOW, Plaintiff Margret Lowry,

et al., and hereby requests pursuant to

Federal Rules of Appellant Procedure

4(a) (5) that the Court extend the time for

filing Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal

pursuant to said Rule from the Judgment of

A4

Dismissal evidently entered in this Court

on June 24, 1998 pursuant to Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff has filed a Notice of

Appeal on July 27, 1998 herein (Exhibit

1). Evidently, the Judgment of Dismissal

was entered on June 24, 1998 giving, it is

believed, until July 24, 1998, or thirty

(30) days, for the filing of said Notice

per FRAP Rule 4.

However, counsel for Plaintiff, is

demonstrating excusable neglect and good

cause in that Plaintiff’s counsel

calculated incorrectly the thirty (30)

days, believing that the thirty (30) days

did not count the original June 24, 1998

and that thirty (30) days would fall on

atu J 2 . Under that mis-

assumption, Plaintiff’s counsel _ filed

Notice of Appeal on Monday, the first

available day, July 27, 1998, believing

that it was properly within the thirty (30

day Notice of Appeal rule time.

Plaintiff has previously complied

with all prior Rules of the District

Court, has made timely filings in all

respects, and has properly conformed to

all of the requirements of this Court.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel

A5

also begs the Court that excusable neglect

is shown by Plaintiff’s counsel’s mis-

calculation of the time due to the weekend

time and the calculations thereto.

Plaintiff’s counsel is in San Francisco,

and has searched his file and does not

find any Notice from the Clerk indicating

the actual Date of Entry of the Judgment

herein. However, Plaintiff’s counsel was

informed that it was entered on June 24,

1998 and was attempting to proceed

thereto.

This case involves a Wrongful Death

action of a United States Air Force F-15

pilot in Spangdahlem Germany, leaving a

wife and child. There are substantial

issues of law and fact raised by the

Motion for Summary Judgment pertaining to

the Government Contractor Defense as set

forth in Boyle v. United Technologies 487

U.S. 500, 108 S.Ct. 2510 (1988), for which

direction is needed from the Appellant

level regarding the unusual fact pattern

involved in this case.

Plaintiff’s counsel herein previously

argued aforementioned case of Boyle v.

United Technologies, supra, before the

United States Supreme Court and has an

intimate familiarity with the issues which

=

A6

have been presented since that decision in

1988. The case at bar here will assist

the Courts in defining further decisions

and should prove to be of economic benefit

to the time spent by the Courts in making

said future decisions.

Plaintiff begs the Court to grant per

FRAP 4(a)(5) said Motion and extend the

time of Notice of Entry of Appeal no more

than thirty (30) days from Entry of

Judgment or ten (10) days from the

granting of this Motion as per Plaintiff’s

already filed Notice of Appeal filed on

July 27, 1998. ;

Dated: July [s] 28, 1998

/s/

LOUIS S. FRANECKE, ESQ.

A7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

MARGARET LOWRY,

)

) No.: 4-96-

) CV1572 ERW

)

Plaintiff, )

)

Vv. )

)

MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS CORPORATION, )

)

)

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMO UM ORDER

This matter is before the Court on

defendant McDonnell Douglas’ (MDC) motion

for summary judgment. For the reasons

given below, the motion is granted.

Plaintiff Margaret Lowry brings this

action in diversity alleging defendant MDC

defectively designed an F-15 aircraft

flown by her husband Major Donald G.

Lowry, Jr. She further alleges that MDC

failed to warn of any defects associated

with the F-15,

A8

I. Facts

- This case arises from the crash of an

F-15C fighter jet at Spangdahlem Air Base,

Germany on May 30, 1995. On that date

Major Donald G. Lowry, Jr. was killed

during takeoff when the flight control

system of his Ff-15 malfunctioned. Prior

to the accident, the aircraft had spent

twenty days on the ground for maintenance.

On May 11, 1995, Air Force mechanics

installed a new left auxiliary fuel tank.

This necessitated the removal of the

flight control rods, devices that control

the movement of tne F-15’s flight control

surfaces (ailerons, stabilators and

rudders). On May 17, 1995, Air Force

mechanics reinstalled the control rods.

The parties agree that the control rods

were cross-connected during the

reinstallation. Cross-connection can

result in an inability to control the F-

15. ;

Major Lowry and the mechanics failed

to detect the cross-connection before

takeoff. | After taxiing to the takeoff -

| |

position,| Lowry began to accelerate.

Lowry’s wingman noticed that when Lowry

Ag

attempted to take off, the nose wheel rose

approximately six inches but then returned

to the ground. Lowry accelerated, and

— to take off again. The F-15

rolled sharply to the left, turned upside

down and crashed. Lowry was killed

instantly. The parties po that the

cross-connected control rods caused the

3 |

accident. } |

In 1967, the Department of Defense

(DoD) issued a request for proposal to MDC

and other defense contractors for the

design of a tactical aircraft to replace

the F-4 Phantom. After a bidding and

design competition, DoD awarded MDC the

contract to design, develop and test the

F-15. MDC has modified the aircraft

1

In doing so, the parties rely on the

conclusions of the Aircraft Accident

Investigation Report prepared by the Air

Force. However, opinions of accident

investigators as to the cause of, or the

factors contributing to, military aircraft

accidents occurring after April 21, 993

may not be considered in civil

proceedings. 10 U.S.C. Section 2254.

Accordingly, the Court has not considered

the Report’s conclusion in ruling on

defendant’s motion.

A10

numerous times since the initial award;

however, all modifications are subject to

‘Air Force approval.

: The Air Force took an active role in

the design and production phases of the F-

15. The Air Force maintained an office in

St. Louis, the place of manufacture. Air

Force representatives were present at

MDC’s facilities on a daily basis to

review the design and testing of systems

in the F-15. MDC and the Air Force met

frequently, and the Air Force reviewed and

approved all aspects of the F-15,

including the flight control. systen.

Indeed, the Air Force rejected MDC’s

initial design for the flight control

system, insisting on the system used in

the F-15 flown by Major Lowry. During the

approval process for the flight control

system, MC submitted detailed descriptions

of the design and operation of the control

rod assembly. MDC also submitted testing

results of the system to the Air Force.

Finally, the Air Force and MDC jointly —

staffed a System Safety Group that met

first semiannually, and later annually, to

review safety issues connected with the

All

emerging design of the F-15.

Plaintiff alleges that the design of

the flight control system of the F-15 was

defective because it allowed the control

rods to be cross-connected. The purpose

of the flight control system is_ to

manipulate the surfaces on the F-15 -

rudders, ailerons and stabilators - to

maneuver the aircraft. The system is

composed of a mixer assembly, which

translates the pilot’s movement of the

control stick, and control rods which

change the position of the’ control

surfaces. In its initial proposal, MDC

envisioned an electronic flight control

system, eliminating the need for control

rods. However, the Air Force preferred

the mechanical system described above.

In the mid-1970’s the Air Force

ordered MDC to redesign the F-15 to

accommodate an additional 2,000 pounds of

internal fuel. This design change

required that the control rods run through

a sealed chamber in an auxiliary fuel

tank. Because the control rods run

through the auxiliary tank, the rods must

be removed during repair or maintenance of

Al2

the tank. When repairs are completed, the

rods are reinstated. Reinstallation of

control rods and maintenance procedures

are governed by General Systems Technical

Orders, Air Force Technical Orders and

technical manuals. The Air Force approved

and tested this ‘change using the same

process applied to the original design for

the F-15.

The Air Force first became aware that

removal of the control rods could result

in a cross-connection during

reinstallation several year prior to Major

Lowry’s crash. In 1986 and 1991, the Air

Force conducted, investigated incidents of

cross-connected control rods in F-15’s.

In both “incidents, Air Force personnel

noted abnormalities prior to takeoff. The

Air Force’s investigation of the 1986

incident concluded that "Cross-connecting

the rods is an easy mistake to make with

the present procedures." (Deft. Ex. G)

After these incidents, the Air Force

amended its General System Technical Order

and its Air Force Technical Order to read:

WARNING: Wrong routing of flight control

rods could result in loss of life and/or

A 13

aircraft." The Air Force also required MC

to include these warnings in technical

manuals published after 1986. After the

1991 incident, the Air Force conducted a

review of the F-15’s_ flight control

system. MDC did not participate in the

review. The Air Force declined to

redesign the flight control system after

determining that pre-flight systems checks

conducted by maintenance personnel and

pilots were sufficient to detect

improperly connected control rods.

: is °

The standards applicable to summary

judgment motions are well settled.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a

motion for summary judgment if all of the

information before the court shows "there

is no genuine issue of material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, (1986). The

initial burden is placed on the moving

party. City o i Vv.

Associated Elect. Co-op, Inc., 838 F.2d

268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988) (the moving party

Al4

has the burden of clearly establishing the

nonexistence of any genuine issue of fact

that is material to a judgment in its

favor). Once this burden is discharged,

if the record does in fact bear out that

no genuine dispute exists, the burden then

shifts to the non-moving party who must

set forth affirmative evidence ' and

specific fact showing there is a genuine

dispute on that issue. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986).

Once the burden shifts, the non-

moving party may not’ rest on the

allegations in his pleadings, but by

affidavit or other evidence must set forth

specific facts showing that a genuine

issue of material fact exists.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The non-moving party

"must do more than simply show that there

is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S.574, 586 (1986). This Court is

required to view the facts in a light most

favorable to the non-moving party, and

must give the non-moving party the benefit

A 15

of any inference that can logically be

drawn from those facts. Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587; Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d

844, 846 (8th Cir. 19832). Moreover, this

Court is required to resolve all conflicts

in favor of the non-moving party. Robert

Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir. 1976).

The trial court may not consider the

credibility of the witnesses or the weight

of the evidence. White v. Pance, 961 F.2d

776, 779 (8th Cir. 1992).

A. Design Defect Claims

MDC contends that it is entitled to

summary judgment based on the government

contractor defense established in Boyle v.

United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500

(1988). In Boyle, the Supreme Court held

that military contractors cannot be held

liable for design defects if: (1) the

government approved reasonably precise

specifications; (2) the equipment

conformed to those specifications ; and

(3) the contractor informed the government

of dangers associated with use of the

equipment known to it but not’ the

government. Id. at 512. The defense is

A 16

an affirmative one; MDC has the burden of

establishing it. Snell v. Bell Helicopter

Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 746 (9th Cir.

1997).

Government approval "requires more

than a rubber stamp." Trevino v. General

Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1480 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989).

In other words, the contractor must show

more than a signature indicating approval

of a design. Id. at 1480. Moreover, the

contractor must show the government

approved reasonably precise specifications

for the particular feature at issue, not

the entire piece of hardware. Snell, at

747. See also Oliver _v. Oshkosh Truck

Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 998-99 (7th Cir.

1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1246

(1997); Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 55

F.3d 1150, 1154-55 (6th Cir. 1995);

Kleeman _v. McDonnell Douglas, 890 F.2d

698, 701 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,

495 U.S. 953 (1990). The first condition

of the Boyle test is satisfied where the

government and the contractor engaged ina

"continuous back and forth" review of the

design at issue. Harduvel _v. General

A 17

Dynamics Corp, 878 F.2d 1311, 1320 (llth

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1030

(1990).

Here, the government engaged in

significant and ongoing oversight of the

design of the flight control system of the

F-15. Prior to entering the initial F-15

contract, the government rejected MDC’s

proposed electrical control systen,

instead requiring that MDC build the F-15

with control rods. The Air Force

maintained an office at MDC during the

design and manufacturing stages. Air

Force personnel testified that’ they

frequently met with MDC aircraft designers

regarding the flight control system. MDC

submitted the results of tests conducted

as to the operation and safety of the

flight control systen. This evidence

establishes the "continuous back and

forth" necessary to satisfy the first

prong of the Boyle test. Tate, 55 F.3d at

1155. Moreover, the Air Force was aware

that the control rods could be cross-

connected, and declined to order a

redesign of the F-15 after two

investigations. Government awareness of a

A 18

defect is persuasive evidence of approval

of a precise specification. In Re Air

Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, 81 F.3d

570, 575 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,

117 S.Ct. 583 (1996); Lewis v. Babcock

Indus. ~» 965 Ps 26: 8S C2m8 Cieid,

cert. denied, 509 U.S. 924 (1993); Ramey

Vv. in- er Ai . Oo. S7é. 7.28

946, 950 (4th Cir. 1989). The Court finds

that MDC has established the first prong

of the government contractor defense.

The second prong of the Boyle test

requires the contractor to establish that

the design conformed to the reasonably

precise specifications. A contractor may

establish conformity with evidence that

the military was "present and actively

involved throughout the design, review,

development and testing of the [equipment

at issue]." Ramstein, 81 F.3d at 575. In

Kleeman, the Fourth Circuit explained:

"(W]jhere the procurement process involves

this kind of continuous exchange between

the contractor and the government, the

process itself becomes persuasive evidence

of the product conformity to precise

specifications." Kleeman, 890 F.2d at

I shim

A19

702. The facts here are that the Air

Force closely scrutinized the development

and testing of the flight control system

produced by MDC. In addition, the Air

Force required that all F-15’s produced by

MDC conform to its specifications prior to

delivery and payment. The Court finds

that MDC has established the second prong

of the government contractor defense.

In contesting MDC’s ability to

establish the second prong of the Boyle

test, plaintiff relied on specification

MIL~-F-9490C 3.2.8, which states: "[a]1ll

control systems shall be designed so that

incorrect assembly and reversed operation

of controls is impossible." In Kleeman,

the Fourth Circuit found that such a

requirement "represent[s] little more than

the hopes of participants that the project

on which they are about to embark will

turn out well." Kleeman, 890 F.2d at 703.

The Kleeman court noted that such general

requirements often overlap with specific

ones, and may serve conflicting purposes.

id. at 703. Such is the case here. The

Court finds the requirement contained in

MIL-F-9490C 3.2.8 is a general one and

A 20

that MDC’s failure to comply with it is

irrelevant to the government contractor

defense in this case.?

The third prong of the Boyle test

requires that the contractor show that it

either informed the government of the

dangers inherent in the design, or that

the government knew of any dangers

associated with the design. Boyle, 487

U.S. at 5123; Gray, 125 F.3d at i379;

Ramstein, 81 F.3d at 576. The Court finds

that the record does not support

plaintiff’s contention that MDC failed to

warn the Air Force of any dangers

associated with the control rod systen.

The evidence is that the Air Force

was aware of the possibility that control

rods could be cross connected during

reinstallation. MDC and the Air Force

jointly developed and tested the F-15.

Air Force publications and manuals

That the requirement is a general one is

revealed by the document itself. MIL-F-

9490C is a_ self-described series of

general specifications for piloted

aircraft. Nothing in the document

purports to apply to the F-15C or its

unique flight control systen.

A21

informed mechanics that failure to

properly reinstall the control-rods could

lead to a cross-connection and result in

loss of life. Those warnings were first

published in 1986, and reestablished in

1993. Air Force personnel charged with

managing the flight control system

testified at deposition that the Air Force

was aware of the possibility of cross

connection by 1993, two years before Major

Lowry’s crash. A showing that’ the

government is aware of all the relevant

dangers establishes the third prong of the

Boyle test. Tate, 55 F.3d at 1156; Lewis,

985 F.2d at 89-90.

For the reasons given above, the

Court finds that MDC has established all

three prongs of the Boyle test, and there

are no genuine issues of material fact

concerning the applicability of the

government contractor defense to alleged

design defects here. MDC’s motion for

summary judgment on Courts I & III of the

complaint is granted.

MDC next argues that the government

contractor defense’ shields it from

liability on plaintiff’s failure to warn

A22

claims. Tort law duties to warn serve a

different objective than providing

information as required under the third

prong of the Boyle test. Accordingly,

whether the government contractor defense

applies to a failure to warn claim

requires a separate analysis from a design

defect claim Tate, 55 F.3d at 1157. The

insulate itself from liability for a

failure to warn clain, the contractor must

establish:

(1) the United States exercised

it’s discretion and approved the

warnings, if any; (2) the

contractor provided warnings

that conformed to the approved

warnings; and (3) the contractor

warned the United States of the

danger in the equipment’s use

about which the contractor knew

but the United States did not.

id.

Plaintiff initially argues that Boyle

does not apply here because MDC has not

presented evidence that the Air Force

precluded MDC from including warnings as

to the flight control system. This

argument misconstrues MDC’s burden. MDC

must only show that a material issue of

fact does not exist as to whether the Air

A23

Force approved warnings pertaining to the

defect at issue. Under plaintiff’s

standard, the government contractor

defense would only apply when the military

adhered a warning for a piece of hardware.

This is contrary to Boyle, which

recognized the defense on the theory that

a contractor may violate state tort law

when it manufactured a product with a

defect approved by the government. Boyle,

487 U.S. at 509. This distinction, which

plaintiff fails to recognize, is

recognized by the cases she relies on.

Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 89

F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 1996); In Re Joint S &

ist ew Yo sbestos Lit., 897 F.2d

626 (1990). Accordingly, the Court

rejects plaintiff’s argument.

Under the first prong of the Boyle

test, MDC must establish that the Air

Force exercised discretion and approved

warnings. The facts are that the F-15

contract required MDC to produce technical

manuals for review by the Air Force. The

manuals were completed and delivered after

numerous discussions between MDC and the

Air Force. Although MDC authored the

A 24

initial drafts for the manuals, the Air

Force determined the final contents. Any

changes to technical orders or manuals,

including the addition of warnings, were

within the sole discretion of the Air

Force. The Court finds the above facts

demonstrated the Air Force’s discretion

and approval over the technical orders and

manuals and therefore establishes the

first prong of the Boyle test.

The second prong is likewise

satisfied. There is no evidence that the

warnings contained in the MDC publications

did not meet the Air Force’s

specifications. The evidence clearly

demonstrates that the Air Force examined

and approved the manuals during the design

state. Moreover, after the 1986 incident,

the Air Force ordered MDC to add a

specific warning regarding possible cross-

connection of control rods to the F-15

publications.

Finally, the Court finds that MDC has

satisfied the third prong of the Boyle

test. To satisfy this prong, MDC must

show that it warned the Air Force of any

danger in the control rods use of which it

A25

was aware but the Air Force was not. MDC

has provided evidence that after the 1986

and 1991 incidents, the Air Force was

aware of the potential for cross-

connection of control-rods in the F-15.

Because MDC did not have superior

knowledge, it cannot be held liable in

this case. The government’ contract

defense bars the plaintiff’s failure to

warn claims.

III. Conclusion

The Court finds that MDC has shown

that a genuine issue of material fact does

not exist as to whether the government

contractor defense is applicable in this

case. Therefore, the Court will grant

MDC’s motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant’s

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED

(dOC. nO. 34).

A separate judgment in accord with

this Memorandum and Order is entered this

same date.

Dated this _/s/ 19th day of June, 1998.

/s/

A 26

E. RICHARD WEBBER

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

A27

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

MARGARET LOWRY,

No.: 4-96-

CV1572 ERW

Plaintiff,

Ve

MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS

CORPORATION,

Defendant.

ee ee ee ee ee ee ee See See See ee See ee ee ee

JUDGMENT

(Entered June 24, 1998)

Pursuant to the memorandum and order

entered herein this date,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and

DECREED that plaintiff’s complaint is

DISMISSED.

Dated this _/s/ 19th day of June, 1998.

/s/

E. RICHARD WEBBER

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

A 28

No. 99-1750 |

No. 99-1805

Margaret Lowry, *

* Appeal from

Appellant/Cross-Appellee, * the United

* States

Vv. * District

* Court of the

McDonnell Douglas, *

Corporation * Eastern

* District of

Appellee/Cross-Appellant.* Missouri

Submitted: January 12, 2000

Filed: April 27, 2000

Before BOWMAN, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and LOKEN,

Circuit Judges.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

This case is before us for the second

time, on appeal from the order of the

A29

District Court granting summary judgment

to McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) on

the wrongful death claim of plaintiff

Margret Lowry’. Lowry alleges that MDC

defectively designed and failed to warn of

defects in a United States Air Force F-15

aircraft that crashed at Spangdahlem Air

Base in Germany on May 30, 1995, killing

Major Donald Lowry, plaintiff’s decedent.

The District Court concluded that MDC was

shielded from liability by the federal

military contractor defense set forth in

Boyle _v. United Technologies Corp. 487

U.S. 500 (1988). Lowry filed her first

notice of appeal out of time, and the

The original complaint and, as far as we

have seen, all documents filed by the

parties in this case, including the

briefs, spell the plaintiff’s first name

"Margret." The District Court docketed

the case spelling the plaintiff’s name

"Margaret," and it is the practice of this

Court’s clerk to use the came caption as

the District Court when docketing an

appeal, unless advised otherwise. We are

not inclined to meddle with the caption

sua sponte, absent an indication from

lowry that the spelling of her first name

has been wrong from the

inception of the case.

A 30

District Court allowed the defective

filing, notwithstanding Lowry’s failure to

file a\ motion and made a showing that

would justify extending the filing

deadline under Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 4(a). Two days after the notice

of appeal was docketed, Lowry did file a

motion for an extension under Rule

4(a)(5), but the District Court denied

that motion as moot. On MDC’s motion,

dismissed the first appeal for lack of

jurisdiction. As we will explain in more

detail, Lowry then filed a motion with the

District Court invoking Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60(b) and seeking relief

from the District Court’s earlier orders

relating to the untimely notice of appeal.

The court granted the motion, which

ultimately allowed Lowry to timely file

another notice of appeal. We have taken

with the case MDC’s motion to once again

dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction, an issue MDC also raises in

a cross appeal from the District Court’s

decision to grant relief from judgment

under Rule 60(b). Cf. Karras v. Karras,

16 F.3d 245, 247 (8th Cir. 1994) (per

A 31

curiam) (noting that party seeking

reversal of district court’s failure to

grant Rule 60(b) relief should file a

notice of appeal from that order). It is

to the question of our jurisdiction that

we turn first.

I.

In order for us to make our

discussion as easy to follow as possible,

and to assist the reader in referring back

to the pertinent facts and the timing of

events, we will forgo further narrative

description of the procedural history of

the case in favor of a chronological

listing, beginning with the District

Court’s decision to grant summary judgment

on its merits.

June 19, 1998 The District Court granted

MDC’s motion for summary judgment on the

merits. Counsel for MDC has represented

to this court that he faxed the District

Court’s order to counsel for Lowry on this

date; in fact, the copy of the order in

the addendum to Lowry’s brief (which she

has called “Appendix I") bears a

typewritten notation at the top "cc: Lou

Franecke [Lowry’s counsel] (by fax)

A32

6/19/98" and fax legends showing the

document was faxed twice on June 19, once

from the District Court and again from the

offices of MDC’s counsel.

June 24, 1998 Judgment was entered on the

District Court docket.

July 24, 1998 The thirty days allowed for

filing a timely notice of appeal from the

summary judgment, as provided in Federal

Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), expired.

July 27, 1998 Lowry tendered her notice

of appeal to the District Court.

July 29, 1998 Lowry’s notice of appeal

was filed. On it was handwritten: "Leave

to file granted 7/29/98 /s/ E. Richard

Webber."

July 31, 1998 Lowry filed a motion styled

"Ex Parte Motion by Plaintiff to File

Notice of Appeal per Federal Rule of

Appellant [sic] Procedure 4(a)(5)." The

motion sought an extension of time to file

a notice of appeal from the summary

A 33

judgment, alleging "excusable [sic]

neglect and. good cause" for the delay.

August 6, 1998 The District Court denied

the "Ex Parte Motion" as moot.

October 13, 1998 MDC filed with the Court

of Appeals a motion to dismiss the appeal

for lack of jurisdiction. In the motion,

MDC argued that Lowry’s notice of appeal

was untimely, and that the _ court’s

notation purporting to grant "leave to

file" was not effective to extend the time

for filing the notice of appeal,

unaccompanied as it was by a Rule 4(a)

motion from Lowry and findings by the

District Court.

November 10, 1998 This Court granted

MDC’s motion to dismiss the appeal. That

judgment in its entirety, reads as

follows: "The motion of appellee for

dismissal of the appeal is granted. The

appeal is hereby dismissed. See Eighth

Circuit Rule 47A(b)." This Court’s Rule

47A(b) sets out the procedure for filing

"a motion to dismiss a docketed appeal on

A34

the ground the appeal is not within the

court’s jurisdiction. "?

Lowry makes much of the fact that MDC did

not file this initial motion to dismiss

within fifteen days after the first appeal

was docketed, as ean in Eighth

Circuit Rule 47A(b). She did not mention

this in her response in opposition to the

motion to dismiss, but only in her "motion

for reconsideration" filed with this

Court. In any even, it is not clear what

she would have this panel do about that

now. That case is closed and the mandate

has issued. Moreover, if there is any

question about this Court’s jurisdiction,

the Court may (and, indeed, it must) sua

sponte examine the issue. See Faysound

Ltd. v. Falcon Jet Corp. 940 F.2d 339, 341

n.2 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502

U.S. 1096 (1992).

Also, and again for the reason that

the first appeal is closed, we reject any

contention, see Reply Brief of Lowry at

12, that the filing of the first notice of

appeal presented "unique circumstances"

justifying this Court’s assertion of

jurisdiction over an otherwise untimely

appeal. See Osterneck v. Erns & Whinney,

489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989) (explaining that

"unique circumstances" doctrine "applies

only where a party has appeal and has

received specific assurance by the

judicial officer that this act has been

properly done"). But see Schwartz v.

Pridy, 94 F.3d 453, 456 n.3 (8th Cir.

1996) (noting that "the continued vitality

of the doctrine has been questioned").

A35

January 6, 1999 The mandate issued on our

judgment dismissing the appeal.

January 19, 1999 Lowry filed in the

District Court a document styled "Notice

and Motion to Relieve Plaintiffs [sic]

from Denial as Moot Motion to Grant Leave

to Extend Time for Filing Notice of Appeal

(FRCP 60, FRAP 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6))." In

the motion Lowry acknowledged that "[t]he

District Court cannot. grant untimely

Appeals to be filed unless findings that

the conditions prescribed by the Rules

(FRAP 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6)) have been

satisfied." Notice and Motion at 2.

Lowry continued, "By the Judge not

designating and finding good cause of

[sic] excusable neglect pursuant’ to

Motion, this does not confirm [sic]

jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals."

Id. at 4.

February 12, 1999 The District Court

vacated its order granting leave to file

This is a defense that could have been

successful, if at all, only in response to

the motion to dismiss the first appeal.

A36

the untimely notice of appeal. The Court

noted that it "incorrectly treated

{Lowry’s} notice of appeal as a motion for

an extension of time"; this was error, the

court said, because the notice of appeal

was unaccompanied by a motion and a

showing of excusable neglect. Order at 3.

The court also vacated its order denying

as moot Lowry’s Rule 4(a)(5) motion. The

court gave MDC ten days to respond to the

revived 4(a) (5) motion.

Lowry also haa argued in her 60(b)

motion that she was entitled to relief

under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

4(a)(6) because she did not’ receive

written notice of the entry of judgment.

The District Court declined to address

that argument, noting it was not raised in

the original 4(a)(5) motion for an

extension of time to file a notice of

later motion to reconsider that ruling.)

appeal. (The court also denied Lowry’s

March 8, 1999 The District Court granted

Lowry’s Rule 4(a)(5) motion, finding the

requisite excusable neglect. The court

noted that the reasons for the delay were

ak a

ates, “as

. ee ee ee ee ee ee eee

A 37

"within Lowry’s counsel’s control, [but]

do not indicate bad faith so much as

carelessness in keeping up with filing

deadlines." Order at 5. The court put

Lowry on notice that she had ten days to

file a new notice of appeal.

March 15, 1999 Lowry timely filed her

second notice of appeal from the original

summary judgment granted to MDC.

March 29, 1999 MDC filed with this Court

yet another motion to dismiss the appeal

for lack of jurisdiction, which we ordered

taken with the case. As we have said, MDC

also raises the jurisdictional issue in a

cross appeal from the District Court’s

decision to grant Lowery’s motion for Rule

60(b) relief.

II.

We begin with the question of whether

the District Court properly granted

Lowry’s motion filed under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60(b). Rule 60(b)

provides, as relevant here, that a

‘district "court may relieve a party...from

a final judgment, order, or proceeding

A 38

for...mistake." The motion must be

filed, however, "within a reasonable time,

and...not more than one year after the

judgment, order, or proceeding was entered

or taken." The District Court determined

that is could properly consider Lowry’s

60(b) motion filed nearly six months after

the orders in question were entered, and

then held that the court was mistaken in

granting “leave to file" the untimely

notice of appeal without a motion from

Lowry. The court also held that it erred

in denying Lowry’s original 4(a) (5) motion

as moot, a decision the court made because

it had accepted for filing (albeit

mistakenly) the defective notice of appeal

two days before the 4(a)(5) motion was

filed. A court’s decision that a movant

has shown grounds warranting 60(b) relief

is reviewed for abuse of discretion, but

"we review the district court’s power to

entertain [a motion for] relief" in the

first instance de novo. Spinar v. South

Dakota Bd. of Regents, 769 F.2d 1060, 1062

(8th Cir. 1986). At issue here is not

Rule 60(b)(1) mistake by a party, but

A39

mistake by the court.? It remains the

law in this Circuit that "relief under

Rule 60(b)(1) for judicial error other

than for judicial inadvertence" is not

available. Fox v. Brewer, 620 F.2d 177,

180 (8th Cir. 1980). Assuming without

deciding that the mistakes alleged were

the result of "judicial inadvertence," the

District Court nevertheless should not

have considered Lowry’s motion for Rule

MDC misapprehends the District Court’s

ruling that the court itself, and not

Lowry or her counsel, made the Rule

60(b) (1) mistakes, a confusion’ that

creates a blurring of arguments between

the two rules at issue in this case. See

Brief of McDonnell Douglas Corp. at 26

("(M]iscounting cannot be considered the

type of ’exceptional circumstances’ which

this Court has deemed necessary to revisit

a final judgment.") ; id at 27

("(PJlaintiff’s untimely notice of appeal

was attributable solely to her counsel’s

miscalculation, which does not constitute

‘excusable neglect’ under Rule 4(a)(5) or

‘mistake’ under Rule 60(b)."). Had the

District Court in fact granted Lowry’s

60(b) motion to vacate the judgment based

on her counsel’s mistake in calculating

the time for filing her notice of appeal,

we likely would agree with MDC that this

is an improper use of Rule 60(b). But

that is not what happened here.

A 40

60(b) relief because such relief was not

timely sought, notwithstanding that the

motion was made within the one year

specified by the Rule. A 60(b) motion

also must be brought within a "reasonable

time" and, "({tjJo prevent its use as a

substitute for appeal, we have required a

Rule 60(b) motion alleging judicial

inadvertence to be made within the time

period allowed for appeal," that is,

thirty days from the entry of judgment.

Id. This certainly makes sense in this

case, as in other cases alleging mistake

by the court, where all relevant facts

evidencing the court’s errors were known

as soon as the orders were entered. The

argument raised in Lowry’s 60(b) motion

presents a theory identical to the theory

that, in substance, would have formed the

basis of Lowry’s appeal from the denial of

the Rule 4(a)(5) motion.

Although = the consequences of

enforcing the rule in Fox might seem harsh

in this situation, the result cannot be

characterized as unfair. It is clear both

from Lowry’s 4(a)(5) motion and from her

later 60(b) motion that she was fully

A 41

aware that Rule 4(a)(5) requires a showing

of excusable neglect before an extension

for filing a notice of appeal can be

granted. She even submitted with her

4(a) (5) motion a proposed order purporting

to make such a finding. Lowry filed her

motion two days after the court granted

her the very relief that the motion now

sought under Rule 4(a) (5)--an extension of

time to file her notice of appeal. By

filing that motion, Lowry conceded that

the court’s sua sponte granting of "leave

to file" two days earlier was insufficient

under the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure to remedy the defective notice

of appeal.* Lowry got her extension, but

by a procedure that was in violation of

The practice of accepting an untimely

notice of appeal for filing without a

motion and a showing of excusable neglect

was rendered invalid in 1979 when Federal

Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 was amended

to require a motion. See Campbell _ v.

White, 721 F.2d. 644, 645-46 (8th Cir.

1983) ("We think it clear that the 1979

amendment requires the filing of a motion

and that the notice of appeal received

after the date for filing notices may not

be considered a motion for extension.").

A 42

the strictly enforced jurisdictional

requirements of Rule 4. Months later,

when she filed her 60(b) motion, it was

not because she had suddenly learned of

facts that were outside the record when

the asserted mistakes were made; she was

on notice as soon as her 4(a)(5) motion

was denied that it was a mistake. Thus

she was not relieved of her obligation to

promptly challenge the court’s failure to

enunciate a finding of excusable neglect

so as to satisfy this Court’s

jurisdictional requirements. It was

Lowry’s responsibility to act diligently

in these circumstances, either by asking

the District Court to reconsider its

ruling or by appealing from that ruling,

to see that a 4(a)(5) extension was

properly granted and to protect her right

to have this Court consider her appeal on

the merits. No one prevented her,

actually or effectively, from exercising

her rights, nor did anyone or anything

lull her into thinking the court’s actions

were beyond challenge.

Additionally, it should be remembered

that Lowry sought to reopen ae post-

A43

judgment procedural décision, not a

decision that precluded adjudication on

the merits of the case. This is, Lowry

"received a ruling on the merits of [her]

claim" from the District Court. MIF

Realty L.P. v. Rochester Assocs., 92 F.3d

752, 756 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that

court should "balance the policy favoring

finality in judgments against the

competing policy of granting parties a

hearing on the merits of their claims" in

case where Rule 60(b) was invoked to set

aside dismissal that was entered iin

anticipation of settlement that was never

finalized). Our decision does not deprive

Lowry of her day in Court on the substance

of her complaint.

The 60(b) motion was, in fact if not

in form, Lowry’s attempt to be relieved

from our conclusion in the first appeal in

this case that we had no jurisdiction to

hear the appeal. Lowry had no quarrel

with the District Court’s erroneous

procedural rulings until this Court

decided it was without jurisdiction; now

it is too late. Because Lowry’s 60(b)

motion was not filed within the thirty

A44

days permitted for filing a notice of

appeal from the denial of the 4(a) (5)

motion, the District Court erred in

considering the 60(b) motion.

III.

Even if the Rule 60(b) motion had

been timely filed and properly granted so

as to give the District Court’ the

authority to revisit the Rule 4(a) (5)

motion, we conclude that the District

Court abused its discretion in finding

that Lowry had shown excusable neglect.

See Me olitan Fed. Bank v. W.R. G

Co., 999 F.2a 1257, 1259 (8th Cir. 1993)

(standard of review). ;

The time limits detailed in Federal

Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 for filing a

notice of appeal in the district court are

"mandatory and jurisdictional." Browder v.

Director, Dep’t of Corrections, 434 U.S.

257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v.

Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)).

Under the terms of the rule, as relevant

here, the district court may extend the

time for filing a notice of appeal upon

motion by a party made within thirty days

of the filing deadline and with a showing

A 45

of excusable neglect.° See Fed. R. App.

P. 4(a) (5). The question here is whether

Lowry can demonstrate excusable neglect.

In i Vv Lo e ife

Insurance Co., this Court adopted the

Lowry’s motion was styled "Ex Parte Motion

by Plaintiff to File Notice of Appeal per

Federal Rule of Appellant [sic] Procedure

4(a)(5)." A party may file an ex parte

4(a)(5) motion to extend the time for

filing a notice of appeal only if the

motion is filed within the time permitted

for filing the notice of appeal in the

first place, ordinarily (and in this case)

thirty days from the date judgment is

entered. See Hable v. Pairolero, 915 F.2d

394, 395 (8th Cir. 1990). Lowry’s motion

was not filed within that period, but it

was not ex parte either, as it was served

on opposing counsel.

Also, to the extent Lowry may be

proposing that we might apply the less

stringent "good cause" standard referred

to in Rule 4(a)(5) (she mentions it

throughout - her brief, usually in

conjunction with the "excusable neglect"

standard), we must reject that suggestion.

The good cause standard is applicable only

when the party seeking an extension files

her 4(a)(5) motion within the thirty-day

period allowed for filing a timely notice

of appeal, that is, when she is seeking

permission to file late rather’ than

forgiveness for having- filed late. See

Bartunek v. Bubak, 941 F.2d. 726, 728 (8th

Cir. 1991).

A46

"more flexible analysis of the excusable

neglect standard" set forth in Pioneer

Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick

Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S.

380 (1993), for application to Rule

4(a)(5) cases. Fink, 65 F.3d 722, 724

(8th Cir. 1995). In Pioneer, the Supreme

Court "conclude[d] that the determination

{of whether neglect is excusable] is at

the bottom an equitable one, taking

account of all relevant circumstances

surrounding the party’s omission."

Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. The Court found

those circumstances to include "the danger

of prejudice to the [non-moving party],

the length of the delay and its potential

impact on judicial proceedings, the reason

for the delay, including whether it was

within the reasonable control of the

movant, and whether the movant acted in

good faith." Id.

For some reason, MDC opted not to

discuss all four of the Pioneer factors,

or even to discuss the Pioneer standard at

all in its brief, and mentions the case

only fleetingly in its motion to dismiss.

Instead, MDC’s argument focuses only on

A47

the reasons that Lowry gave for failing to

file a timely notice of appeal. We will

assume, then, that MDC is not claiming

that any prejudice will result to the

company from granting Lowry’s 4(a) (5)

motion. Indeed, we discern none, except

that final resolution of the case has been

postponed. As for the second factor, the

delay of one week in filing the original

4(a) (5) motion was minimal. But then it

seems that the delay always will be

minimal in actual if not relative terms,

and the prejudice to the non-movant will

often be negligible, since the Rule

requires a 4(a)(5) motion to be filed

within thirty days of the last day for

filing a timely notice of appeal. See

e.g., Prizevoits v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co.,

76 F.3d 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1996) ("We do

not think it can make a difference that no

harm to the appellee has been _ shown.

There is unlikely ever to be harm in the

Rule 4(a) (5) setting, because the

neglectful appellant has only 30 days

after the expiration of his time for

appealing in which to request relief.").

The delay is more significant, of course,

4

A48

if we count the months caused by the late

filing (and subsequent granting) of

Lowry’s 60(b) motion. But even taking

that delay into account, there is no

apparent "impact on judicial proceedings."

And there is no record evidence that Lowry

did not act in good faith, as that term is

generally understood (although we are a

bit troubled by the sometimes inconsistent

and shifting excuses for the failure to

timely file the notice of appeal that

appear throughout the record in this

case).

That brings us to the fourth factor:

Lowry’s reason for missing the filing

deadline. We think this is key to the

analysis. The four Pioneer factors do not

carry equal weight; the excuse given for

the late filing must have the greatest

import. While prejudice, length of delay,

and good faith might have more relevance

in a closer case, the reason-for-delay

factor will always be critical to the

inquiry. We acknowledge, of course, that

the Supreme Court has said that neglect

need not be "caused by circumstances

beyond the control of the movant" to be

A49

excusable, Pioneer 507 U.S. at 392, and

that a finding of sufficient innocence on

the part of the movant is not a condition

precedent to our obligation to consider

the other equitable factors, see id. at

395 n. 14. But at the end of the day, the

focus must be upon the nature of the

neglect. Therefore we must examine

carefully the reasons Lowry gave for

missing the deadline.

In the original 4(a)(5) "Ex Parte

Motion" (filed July 31, 1998), Lowry said

that counsel "calculated incorrectly the

thirty (30) days, believing that the

thirty (30) days did not count’ the

original June 24, 1998 and that thirty

(30) days would fall on Saturday July 25,

1998." In fact counsel was correct about

the first part; the thirty-day window did

not begin on the date of entry, June 24,

1998 but on the next day. See Fed.R. App.

P. 26(a)(1). Counting thirty days

beginning with June 25, 1998, however,

still makes the last day for filing a

timely notice of appeal July 24, 1998, not

July 25. Lowry also claimed in the "Ex

Parte Motion" that "excusable neglect is

A 50

shown by Plaintiff’s counsel’s

miscalculation of the time due to the

weekend time and the calculations

thereto." We are not certain exactly what

that means, as the rules clearly provide

that intermediate weekends are to be

counted in the thirty-day computation.

See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(2). (If the

last day for filing, however, falls ona

weekend or a legal holiday, that day is

not included in the thirty days allowed

for filing. See id. 26(a)(3)). In the

later-filed "Notice and Motion to Relieve

Plaintiffs [sic] from Denial as Moot

Motion to Grant Leave to Extend Time for

Filing Notice of Appeal (FRCP 60, FRAP

4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6))" (filed January 19,

1999), Lowry further offered that "[a]ny

miscalculations on the time was [sic] also

compounded by the weekend and the number

of days in the month of June." As we have

said, it is unclear (and unexplained) why

"the weekend" provides an excuse. As for

the number of days in June, if Lowry is

suggesting that June being a thirty-day

month, rather than a thirty-one-day month,

three off his calculations, that argument

A51

is specious. If June had thirty-one days

instead of thirty, the notice of appeal

would have been due one day sooner.

What we have, then, is garden-variety

attorney inattention. Although neglect no

longer needs to be beyond a party’s

“control to be deemed excusable,

"inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or

mistakes construing the rules do not

usually constitute ’excusable’ neglect."

Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392. Notwithstanding

the "flexible" Pioneer standard,

experienced counsel’s misapplication of

clear and unambiguous procedural rules

cannot excuse his failure to file a timely

notice of appeal. "Here the rule is

crystal clear, the error egregious, the

excuses so thin as to leave the lapse not

only unexcused but inexplicable."

Prizevoits, 76 F.3d at 134. If we were to

apply the excusable neglect standard to

require that we deem lLowry’s neglect

excusable in this case., it is hard to

fathom the kind of neglect that we would

not deem excusable. See id; se so

ti j OE ey,

130 F.3d. 996, 998 (llth Cir. 1997) ("That

A’52

the ' four-part Pioneer standard for

determining excusable neglect applies does

not change existing law that a lawyer’s

misunderstanding of clear law cannot

constitute excusable neglect. Ze St

could, almost every appellant’s lawyer

would plead his’ own inability to

understand the law when he fails to comply

with a deadline. We do not believe that

the [Supreme] Court intended a practice

that would require courts to be that

lenient about disobedience to plain

law."). The District Court abused its

discretion in holding that Lowry

demonstrated excusable neglect under Rule

4(a) (5).

We make short work of Lowry’s

argument that she was entitled to relief

under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

4(a)(6) because she did not receive notice

from the Court or from a party of the

entry of judgment. The District Court

declined to address the issue because it

was not properly raised in her original

4(a)(5) motion, and we see no error in

that conclusion. Moreover, even if we

were to consider the question and to

A53

accept the assertion that Lowry did not

receive written notice of the entry of

judgment, she acknowledged in her 4(a) (5)

motion that "counsel was informed that

[judgment] was entered on June 24, 1998

and was attempting to proceed thereto."

Thus Lowry had actual notice of the entry

of judgment, if in fact she did not

receive written notice. Further, it was

Lowery’s responsibility to check the

docket for entry of judgment, particularly

when she knew on June 19, 1998, that the

District Court had signed an order

granting summary judgment to MDC. See

Zi t is Cc. v. Zimmer Co., 32

F.3d 357, 361 (8th Cir. 1994).

In sum, then, we hold that the

District Court was without authority to

consider Lowry’s 60(b) motion to "undo"

the court’s denial of her original 4(a) (5)

motion. In any case, Lowry cannot

demonstrate that her neglect was

"excusable" so as to entitle her to an

extension of time to file her notice of

appeal. The timely filing of a notice of

appeal being mandatory and jurisdictional,

we dismiss the appeal and decline to

A54

address the merits in what could only be

an advisory opinion. See id..

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS,

EIGHT CIRCUIT

A 55

No. 99-1750EMSL

No. 99-1805EMSL

Margaret Lowry,

4:96CV1572ERW

+ + +

/s/

Appellant/Cross~Appellee, *

: * Appeal from the

Vv. * United States

* District Court

McDonnell Douglas, * for the Eastern

Corporation * District of

* Missouri

Appellee/Cross-Appellant.*

JUDGMENT

(Filed June 8, 2000)

This appeal from the United States

District Court was submitted on the record

of the district court, briefs of the

parties and was argued by counsel.

After consideration, it is hereby

ordered and adjudged that the judgment of

the district court in this cause is

affirmed in accordance with the opinion of

this Court.

(5172-010199)

A 56

April 27, 2000

A true copy

ATTEST: /s/ Michael E. Gans

CLERK, U.S COURT OF APPEALS,

EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

MANDATE ISSUED JUN 9 2000

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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