Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lowry v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp.
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UW) FILED
NO-00=27 4 aus 17 007
OFACEOF THE CLERK
In The
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
October Term, 2000
MARGRET LOWRY, individually and as
guardian ad litem of NADINE LOWRY,
a minor,
Petitioner,
Vv.
MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS CORPORATION,
a California Corporation licensed to do
business in California
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT AND APPENDIX
LOUIS S. FRANECKE, ESQ.
MACK, HAZLEWOOD & FRANECKE
300 Montgomery Street
Suite 1060
San Francisco, CA 94104
Telephone: (415) 391-1560
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
—~
I.
S PRES ED FOR REV
A.
PREAMBLE
The questions are in two (2)
categories:
A. This Court has not revisited or
provided guidance to the Circuit Courts
regarding the "Government Contractor
Defense" since its first announcement in
Boyle, infra, in 1988. There is now
conflict and confusion in the lower Courts
and the Circuits as to the factual and
legal test of the "Government Contractor
Defense as expressed by this Court in
Boyle v. ni Techno ios, 487 U.S.
500, 108 S.C. 2510 (1988).
- B. The Eighth Circuit’s requirement
that a Rule 60(b)° Motion to correct an
error by the District Court must be made
within thirty (30) days of such ruling and
its not following of this Court’s Mandate
in Pio vestment v. swi ssoc.
Ltd. 507 U.S. 380 (1993) as to the
Excusable Neglect standard for filing an
Notice of Appeal one (1) day late, i.e.
ii
thirty-one (31) days after Entry of
Judgment.
B.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE:
i. Since this Court’s decision of
Boyle v. United Technologies, supra, in
1988, the Circuit Courts have gone in
diverse, expanded and conflicting
directions in the interpretation and
application of "The Government Contractor
Defense" i.e. what are the factual
criteria and law regarding the following
Government Contractor Defense issues:
a. Must the Specific Design Feature
be approved under the Government
Contractor Defense First (lst) of Three
(3) parts test, or is an overall general
design approval sufficient conformance?
b. Does Long Term Use of the product
by the Government after purchase relate
back to constitute "approval" of the
product per the Government Contractor
Defense First, Second and Third part of
the test, oor is it a Comparative
Negligence issue.
Cc. Are the Reasonably Detailed
iii
Specifications set forth by the Government
only "hopes and ambitions for a successful
result" or are they the test of the first
prong under Boyle, supra.
d. If the Reasonably Precise
Specifications are silent as to- other
warnings allegedly necessary according to
State law regarding the design defect, is
this then left to the State law criteria
to prove liability.
II. RULE 60(b) AND EXCUSABLE NEGLECT:
A. Is it a departure from the
accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings for the Eighth Circuit to
require that a Rule 60(b) Motion be
brought only thirty (30) days after the
Order by the District Court to correct
error.
= * Is it a departure from this
Court’s mandate in Pioneer, supra, that
the Eighth Circuit, by advisory opinion,
did not find Excusable Neglect in the late
filing by one (1) day (i.e. thirty-one
(31) days after Entry of Judgment) of a
Notice of Appeal when:
1. The District Court allowed the
late filing Sua Sponte one (1) day late.
iv
2. Petitioner timely moved the
District Court per FRCP 4(a)(5) for
excusable neglect, was denied as "Moot",
since Leave had already been granted to
file the Notice of Appeal one (1) day
late.
3. Petitioner had received no Notice
of Entry of Judgment per Rule 77a and as
expressed in FRCP 4(a) (6).
4. Petitioner brought a Rule 60(b)
Motion to correct the Order of the
District Court to find facts of Excusable
Neglect within a reasonable time.
OF CO s
I.QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.......i
A. PREANBUB. ccssivecsccessvccsccceskh
B. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR :
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TABLE OF CONTENTS......22--eeeeeeeeeeeiv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ....cccccccccceeVili
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI........1
kin GRIMEOMNS Bee cc vcvcteccecsiesick
ee ee ea rere rr reer rrr ere Te
IV. CONSTITUTITIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIGN TMVGOLVED. . ccccccecvscessesseeS
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............7
A. SIO os i es oa svc?
B. FACTS REGARDING THE CRASH,
ITS CAUSE AND THE AIR FORCE
INVESTIGATION OF THE PRE-CRASH
RG RE ee ee eee. |
C. THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE F-15 AND IT FLIGHT
CONTROL SYSTEM WHICH..............9
» FIRST PN 4 Kb ek Odd oe ee
— a nee, f
D. AFTER DELIVERY INCIDENTS
OF CROSS CONNECTED FLIGHT
vi.
vi
CONTROL RODS... ccccccccccccccscecold
E. FACTS REGARDING NOTICE OF
APPEAL AND RULE 60(b) MOTION.....14
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT....16
A. THERE IS CONFLICT AND
CONFUSION IN THE VARIOUS
CIRCUITS REGARDING THE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
WHICH THIS COURT HAS NOT
REVISITED SINCE ITS
ANNOUNCEMENT IN 1988.............16
1. THE CONFUSION OF THE SPECIFIC
DESIGN FEATURE WHICH MUST
i Pf Perera ere ree
2. THERE IS CONFUSION IN THE LOWER
CIRCUITS IN CONSIDERING LONG
TERM USE OF THE PRODUCT
RELATING BACK TO APPROVAL OF
THE DESIGN AT THE PURCHASE
STAGE BY THE GOVERNMENT..........22
a. BOYLE SPECIFICALLY
REJECTS LONG TERM USE
AS A FACTOR IN THE GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR DEFENSE..........24
b. LONG TERM USE DOES NOT
LOGICALLY LEND ITSELF TO
ANY 1 OF THE 3 PRONG OF THE
BOYLE TEST....ccccccccccccrctO
c. THERE IS CONFLICT AND
CONFUSION SINCE SEVERAL CASES
HAVE DENIED THE BOYLE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
EVEN WHEN THERE HAS BEEN LONG
vii
pe Ot re ae en a fl
dad. OTHER CASES ACCEPT LONG TERM
USE TO SUPPORT THE GRANTING
OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR
DEFENSE, BOYLE, supra.......28 :
e. LONG TERM USE ONLY GOES TO
COMPARATIVE FAULT OR
INTERVENING CAUSE...........31
3. THERE IS CONFUSION IN THE CIRCUIT
COURTS IF RESPONDENT MUST ESTABLISH
THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
AGAINST RESPONDENT’S DESIGN DEFECT
CLAIM AND RESPONDENT’S FAILURE TO
WARN CLAIM INDEPENDENTLY OF EACH
OTHER... ccc cccccccccccccccccccccedl
B. RULE 60(b) AND EXCUSABLE
oy A ee ne ae |
1. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT HAS
DEPARTED FROM ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS REGARDING
RULE 60(b)..ccccccccccccscee34
2. THIS COURT HAS IGNORED THE
LACK OF NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
THE JUDGMENT, BOTH IN
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT AND THE
FRAP 4(A) (6) MOTION.........38
Via. PRAYER (6 Oe eee
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
In Re: Air Disaster at Ramstine Air Base
Sl F.3G 5760 (30h Cif. 1996) «...«-+i8,23,29
Boyle v. United Technologies
487 U.S. 500, 108 S.C. 2510
‘ei | eres oe ke, ee Oe Pe
Terre re Tote rere me Be ee
Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.
EM CGR SESS eRe Es
Carson v. Pierce
719 F.2d. 931, 933 CZ9BS) ccvccvsscesesedS
Dowd v. Textron, Inc.
792 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1986).....23,24,28
Emory v. McDonald Douglas
148 F.30. 347 (4tR Cig. 1996)... .00252248
Fink v. Union Central Life Insurance
Company
65 F.3d. 722 (8th Cir. 1995)..33,39,41,42
Fox v. Brewer .
620 F.2d. i177, 160 (@th Cir.
Gi J Pee eee TOURS TESTE TER TE COT Cr Sr Tt.
Gray v. Lockheed
(D.C. GA 1995) 880 F.Sup. 1559.........28
Haltiwanger v. Unisys Corp.
949 F.Sup. 898 (D.C. 1996).......18,23,30
duvel v. General D ics
878 F.2d. 1311, 1320
(llth cir. L9E9) cccvccccepesccccvensehOys aU
ix
Vv eli te:
634 F.Sup. 1551
(N.Dist. Texas, SOCS) cc scccvevecescvessad
oi -& is to
Litig. 897 F.2d 626
(2nd Cir. 1990) *e@ee7#*e@*e?#e?etfeseeseecetsecee#se#eee#ee#e##e#¢ a
Kleeman v. McDonnel ouglas
890 F.2d 1698, 701
COS CSF .: 29B9) oc cvenccvenss pie ee 19,15,16
Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, a Division of
Boeing Company
Te Weds. cee -20O: CAB. Chi tes cvccie cs 19
Lewis v. Babcock Industries
985 F.2d 83 (2nd Cir. 1993)......18,23,29
Oliver v. Oshgosh Truck, Corp.
(7th Cir. 1996)... .%... Wag NEKes ke wckas 16
Pail v. McCormick
S58 O.8 COE, GEG. CISGR ia cccticwcnvick 38
Parr v. U.S.
(1956) 76 S.C. 912, 351 U.S. 513.......38
s Vv swi ssoc.
Ltd. anit
507 U.S. 380 (1993)........i,iii,39,41,42
Ramey v. Martin Baker Aircraft Company
874 F.2d 946
COCR: CEE. EORR) ob cc kdctdccessses -19,28,24
os Vv. 7
(C.A. 3d. 1990) 905 F.2d.
702, 705, 706) ccccscccscccece e*eeeee#ee#ee?#e# : 2 ae
x
Smith v. Xerox Corp.
866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989)........ 18,25
Vv icopt °
(9th Cir. 1997) 107 P.3GecccccccceveelG9,17
Strickland v. Royal Lubricant Company
Fe Ge Was BOGUS a 66.0 6650060 cuss 28
Z
55 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1995)..... 21,32,27
vi Vv. © ics Cor atio
865 F.2d. 1474 (5th Cir. 1989)...... 21,28
Yeroshefsky v. Unisys Corp.
962 F.Sup. 710 (D. Maryland 1997)......30
ORITIES
28 U.8.C. Section 22SEC A) cccccccccccccecl
U.S. Court, Seventh Amendment..... sosesel
U.S. Eighth Cir. Court of Appeal
AT(ACD) ccccccsccescessceecesesessesesses&
FRAP, 4(a) (5).....+..+-ii,4,5,15,34, 35,37
FRAP, 4(@) (6) ccccvcccescccecdiy4, 33,37, 39
FRCP, Rule 60(b)....ii,iii,5,6,7,15,33,39
FRCP, Rule WrevcccccsececcesccessnaneS,ae
1
TO: THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES:
Petitioner Respectfully prays that a
Writ of Certiorari issue to review the
judgment and opinions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
finally entered in this matter on or about
June 8, 2000.
II.
OPINIONS BELOW
On June 19, 1998, United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Judge E. Richard Webber, granted
Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment
and dismissed Petitioner’s Complaint.
(Appendix (A 6)
The basis of the Order was that the
Court found that Respondent had
established the First, Second and Third
prong of the Government Contractor
Defense, Boyle, supra. The Court heavily
relied upon (1) post-delivery knowledge
gained in Long Term Use of the aircraft as
a basis for its opinion (A 15) and (2)
continuous back and forth involvement of
the Military rather than specific approval
2
of the defective item in issue. (A 13-14)
Secondly, the Court found that the
Government Contractor Defense barred
Petitioner’s failure to warn. claim
believing that the only burden = on
Respondent was to show that a material
issue of fact does not exist as to whether
the Air Force approved the warnings
pertaining to the defect at issue. (A 16-
18)
The District Court’s granting of
Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment
was entered on July 24, 1998. (A 24)
No Notice of Entry of Judgment was
provided Petitioner’s counsel per Rule 77,
nor did Respondent provide Notice of Entry
of Judgment.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal
on July 27, 1998. The District Court
wrote on the Notice "Leave to File
Granted, 7-29-98, signed by E. Richard
Webber". (A 1) |
On July 31, 1998 Petitioner brought a
Motion to File the Untimely Notice of
Appeal alleging Excusable Neglect facts
pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellant
Procedure 4(a)(5) and facts of 4(a) (6).
(A 3)
District Court Judge Webber wrote on
the Motion "Denied as Moot, 8-6-98, E.
Richard Webber". (ASA 418) No findings
of excusable neglect or good cause were
made. (A 3)
The Eighth Circuit Appellant Court
docketed the case on August 6, 1998.
Respondent had, pursuant to the
United States Eighth Circuit of Appeals,
Local Rule 47A(b), fifteen (15) days from
the date of docketing of the Appeal to
bring a Motion challenging or objecting to
"jurisdiction". They did not.
Petitioner’s Opening Brief was filed
on September 28, 1998.
Respondent brought a Motion on
October 13, 1998 (two (2) months after the
Appeal was docketed) challenging
jurisdiction of the Appellant Court. The
Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit,
dismissed the Appeal without explanation
on November 10, 1998. Appellant’s Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise, without
comment, denied on December 21, 1998.
On January 19, 1999, Petitioner moved
the District Court per Rule 60(b) for
4
findings of Excusable Neglect for filing
of a late Notice of Appeal pursuant to
FRAP 4(a)5 and 4(a)6. The District Court
found that a FRAP 4(a)(5) Motion had been
previously brought, but that a 4(a) (6)
Motion had not. This is despite
Petitioner raising the issue of lack of
Notice in their original Motion. (A 4)
On March 8, 1999, the District Court
Granted and found Excusable Neglect for
late filing of the Notice of Appeal. (A
26-27)
Petitioner timely filed her Second
Notice of Appeal on March 15, 1999
pursuant to said Order. (A 27)
On May 7, 1999 the Eighth Circuit
Appellant Court ordered that the
Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss should be
taken with the Appeal for consideration
for disposition on the merits. (A 27)
On April 27, 2000 the United States
Court of Appeal, for the Eighth Circuit,
dismissed Petitioner’s Appeal on the
grounds that the Rule 60(b) Motion was
brought beyond thirty (30) days from the
District Court’s Denial as Moot of
Petitioner’s Motion to file late Notice of
5
Appeal and that the District Court should
not have considered Petitioner’s Rule
60(b) Motion as being brought beyond
thirty (30) days per Fox v. Brewer, 620
F.2d. 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1980). (A 21)
In advisory, the Court further found
that there were not sufficent facts
constituting Excusable Neglect for filing
the Notice of Appeal one (1) day late. (A
32)
Petitioner’s timely Petition for Re-
Hearing in Banc to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals was denied without
comment on June 2, 2000.
On June 8, 2000 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, filed the Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit ordering and adjudging that the
Judgment of the District Court in that
cause was Affirmed in accordance with the
opinion of the Court of Appeals. (A 40)
rit.
SD ON
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals
was entered on April 27, 2000. Petitioner
timely petitioned the United States Court
6
of Appeal for the Eighth Circuit for a Re-
Hearing in Banc which was denied on June
2, 2000.
The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1254(1).
IV.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISION INVOLVED
The Constitution of the United
States, 7th Amendment, Right to Trial by
Jury:
"In suits of common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed $20.00
the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, then according
to the Rules of the Common Law."
FRCP, Rule 60(b) states,
"On Motion and upon such terms
as are just, the Court may
relieve a party or parties legal
representative from ae final
Judgment, Order or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise
or Excusable Neglect;...(6) any
other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the
‘Judgment. The Motion shall be
7
made within a reasonable time
ce]
and for reasons (1)...not more
than one (1) year after the
Judgment, Order or proceeding
was entered or taken..."
Vv.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
INTRODUCTION
This case involves the crash of a
United States Air Force F-15 fighter jet
on May 30, 1995 at Spangdahlem Air Force
Base, Germany, killing Petitioner’s
Decedent Major Donald Lowry.
Petitioner’s Complaint alleges
Negligence and Defective Design on behalf
of the widow and child of Decedent Major
Lowry against Respondent McDonnell Douglas
Corporation.
Respondent brought a Summary Judgment
Motion based upon the affirmative defense
known as the Government Contractor
Defense; v. United Technologies, 487
U.S. 500, 108 S.C. 2510 (1988).
The lower District Court granted
Appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
June 19, 1998, heavily relying upon "post
delivery knowledge" of the defect by a few
8
members, of the United States Air Force and
"continuous back and forth" involvement of
the Military at the purchasing stage
rather than approval of the specific
defect at issue. (A 6). Judgment was
entered on June 24, 1998. (A 24)
B. FACTS REGARDING THE CRASH, ITS CAUSE
AND THE AIR FORCE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PRE-CRASH MAINTENANCE
Respondent concedes that the cause of
the crash was a cross connection of
specific Lateral and Longitudinal Flight
Control Input Rods to the Mixer Assembly
of Major Lowry’s F-15 aircraft done
inadvertently during routine maintenance.
These Lateral and Longitudinal flight
control input rods to the mixer assembly
connect the pilot’s control stick to the
various flight control surfaces on the
wings and tail of the aircraft. If they
are not connected in the correct way, the
aircraft will be uncontrollable in flight.
The official United States Air Force
Mishap Board Investigation concluded that
it was generally assumed throughout the
Air Force that it was physically
impossible to cross connect the flight
control rods.
The maintenance instruction Technical
Orders, 1F-1SC-2-27GS00-1, published by
Respondent McDonnell, only provides a
schematic of the flight control rods and
mixer assembly, but provides ne step by
step instruction regarding connection of
the rods.
According to the highly trained level
7 United States Air Force mechanic who
cross~connected the rods, he was not aware
that these control rods could be cross
connected based upon all of his training,
_ knowledge and the Job Guide manuals (which
were prepared by Petitioner McDonnell-
Douglas).
C. THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
ie) E F-15
AND ITS FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
The critical désign of the F-15
aircraft in this case was in two (2)
phases.
1. FIRST PHASE
The first phase was. the original
design of the F-15 A and B model from 1969
to 1972.
The original contract (F33657-70-
10
C300) °}&#£=«states that "performance
responsibilities were solely upon the
contractor", i.e. McDonnell-Douglas. This
contract states that the Air Force was not
responsible for what was taking place as
far as the design is concerned and the
performance of that design.
The Prime Item Development
Specification (PID), CP76301A328A081A (the
O81A PID) dated December 15, 1969 is the
basic Detailed Specification for the F-15
A/B aircraft. It establishes’ the
performance, "design", development and
test requirements for the F-15. This is
the contemplated "Reasonably Precise
Design Specification" required by Boyle,
supra.
The "081A PID" specifically requires
and incorporates Mil-F-9490C(1) dated 9
March 1966 as the applicable design
specification for the Flight Control
System which requires "foolproofness" of
this design.
The specifically required
specifications, MIL-F-9490C, "Flight
Control System - Design, installation and
test....", at paragraph 3.2.8 states,
11
"Fool broofness - All control
Systems shall be designed so
that incorrect assembly and
reversed operation of controls
is impossible."
Respondent has admitted that this
specification was not complied with since
it is possible to cross connect the
control rods.
The documents presented by the
Respondent to the lower Court, did not
address’ the actual defect of "cross
connected" rods during the design stages
of the F-15 A and B model. The lower
Court did not reference any.
There was presented no evidence that
the Military approved by waiver or
specification any deviance that the
control rods could be cross connected, or
that they waived any design error, defect
or warning that the control rods could be
cross connected at the mixer.
Yet, numerous documents presented to
the Air Force by Respondent McDonnell-
Douglas during the design phase
continuously assured the Air Force that
the flight control system was safe,
conforming to the specifications, that
there were no anomalies and no problems
12
associated with the design of the flight
control systen.
2. SECOND PHASE
The second phase, applicable to the
aircraft in question, began in the late
1970’s, through Engineering Change
Proposal (ECP) 450, where Respondent
McDonnell-Douglas, not the government, was
requested to propose, among other things,
the incorporation of an additional 2,000
pounds of internal fuel capacity for the
F-15, to be called the F-15C. (ASA 327)
Respondent’s designed a Left
Auxiliary Fuel Tank constructed around the
very control rods which were cross
connected in this case. The rods now
would pass through a tube that was
essentially sealed on both ends such that
you cannot tell in between whether the
rods are crossed or not.
Respondent._was also tasked, per the
ECP 450, to identify hazards in this
design change. Respondent, McDonnell’s
conclusions and statement to the military
was that their Safety Analysis of ECP450
did not reveal any hazards which would
Significantly degrade the operational
13
safety of the F-15. They did not address
the cross connect problem at all.
Similarly the specific System Safety
Analysis done by McDonnell, which had the
exact same design criteria for the control
system as established by Spec AO8lA and
MIL-F9490C (Impossibility of cross
connection), concluded that as far as risk
assessment "there is no significant risk
associated with this change"
Petitioner’s aircraft was delivered
to the United States Air Force in the late
1970’s.
D.__APTER DELIVERY INCIDENTS OF CROSS __
Cc D FLI O Ds
Petitioner concedes that there were
at least two (2) reported incidents of
crossed control rods going to the mixer
prior to Major Lowry’s crash in this case.
One in 1986 and the other in 1991. Both
of which did not cause a crash, and both
of which were caught by the line mechanics
who were flabbergasted that it was
possible to so cross connect.
The 1991 High Accident Potential
(HAP) Report shows that the Air Force was
unfamiliar with the possibility of cross-
ee
14
connection of the rods. It appears that
the Technical Orders were misinterpreted
to mean no rigging or operational checks
were required after the reinstallation of
the same flight control rods as in this
crash. The Air Force did not do a fix to
this problem until the crash herein.
E. FACTS REGARDING NOTICE OF APPEAL
AND RULE 60(b) MOTION _
Appellant filed her original Notice
of Appeal on July 27, 1998. (A 1)
There had been no Notice of the Entry
of the District Court’s Order granting
Motion for Summary Judgment appealed from
entered therein on June 24, 1998.
The District Court, granted
Petitioner’s Leave to File Plaintiff’s
Notice of Appeal by writing on the Notice
"Leave to File Granted, 7-29-98, signed by
E. Richard Webber". (A 1)
The case went up on Appeal, was
docketed, and Appellant’s Opening Brief
was filed on September 28, 1998.
The Court of Appeals, dismissed the
Appeal without explanation on November 10,
1998, pursuant to Motion by Defendant.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
15
was denied on December 21, 1998.
Petitioner then immediately on
January 19, 1999 brought a Motion in the
District Court to relieve Petitioner from
Denial as Moot Appellee’s Motion to Grant
Leave to Extend Time for Filing of Notice
of Appeal pursuant and for findings of
Excusable Neglect per FRCP 60(b), FRAP
4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6). (A 3)
On March 8, 1999 the District Court
found Excusable Neglect for Appellee’s
filing a late Notice of Appeal, but denied
consideration of FRAP 4(a)(6) (lack of
Notice of Entry of original Judgment). (A
27)
Appellant’s Notice of Appeal was
filed in the District Court on March 15,
1999.
On May 7, 1999 the Eighth Circuit
Court put the issue of the Motion to
Dismiss the Appeal in consideration by the
panel to which this case is submitted for
disposition on the merits. The Eighth
Circuit dismissed the Appeal again and
found in advisory, that no excusable
neglect was shown. (A 21)
16
VI.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
A.
THERE IS CONFL CONFUSION
IN THE VARIOUS CIRCUITS
REG Ni E
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
WHICH TH COUR S NOT REVI ED NCE
. ITS ANNOUNC 988
1. E CONFUSION OF THE ECIFIC DESIG
FEATURE WHICH MUST BE APPROVED
The Government Contractor Defense
test (Judicially, not Legislatively
enacted) was first announced in Boyle v.
United Technologies, 487 U.S.: 500, 108
S.C. 2510, 101 Law. Ed. 2d. 442 (1988) as
follows:
"Liability for design defects
and military equipment cannot be
imposed, pursuant to State law,
when:
1. The United States approved
reasonably precise
specifications;
2. The equipment conformed to
those specifications; and
3. The supplier warned the
United States about the dangers
in the use of the equipment that
17
were known to the supplier but
not to the United States."
Id. at 512.
Since that first announcement, the
various circuits have blurred the first
test by ignoring the distinction between
the Approval of "Reasonably Precise
Specifications" for the particular feature
in issue and have adopted an overall
"continuous back and forth" review of the
general design of the whole product as
being sufficient satisfaction of the first
test.
Some Circuits state that it is the
particular piece at issue that must be
approved. See Snell, supra (9th Cir.
1997); Oliver _v. Oshgosh Truck, Corp. 96
F.3d. 992, 998-99 ive Cir. 1996)
Cert.Denied 117 S.C. 1246 (1997); Tate v.
Boeing Helicopters 55 F.3d. 1150, 1154-55
(6th Cir. 1995); K Vv onald-
Douglas 890 F. 2d. 698, 701 tn. .Cir.
1989) Cert. Denied 495 U.S. 956 (1990).
However, other Circuits state that a
"continuous back and forth" review of the
overall design is such approval of
"Reasonably Precise Specifications"
without proof of the specific defective
18
design being specifically approved.
Harduvel v. General Dynamics 878 F.2d.
1311, 1320 (llth Cir. 1989) Cert. Denied
494 U.S. 1030 (1990); Lewis v. Babcock
Industries 985 F.2d. 85 (2nd Cir. 1992)
Cert. Denied 509 U.S. 924 (1993); Emory v.
McDonald Douglas Affirmed 148 F.3d. 347
(4th Cir. 1998)
"General evaluation of the substance
of the overall design is sufficent and
specific approval of each aspect is
unnecessary". Haltiwanger v. Unisys Corp.
949 F.Supp. 898, 905 (D.D.C. 1996).
Other Courts have indicated that "the
act of approving reasonable precise
specifications" is the act of "examining
and agreeing to a detailed description of
the working of a system" rather than the
specific defect. - Smith v. Xerox
Corporation 866 F.2d. 135, 138 (5th Cir.
1989)
Overall involvement rather than a
showing of approval of the specific design
feature is sufficent. See In Re: Air
Disaster at Ramstein Air Base 81 F.3d 870-
74 (5th Cir. 1996) Cert. Denied 519 U.S.
1028 (1996).
19
One Court has concluded that a
contractor’s inability to alter a design
once approved is evidence of government
acceptance of the design, i.e. approval
even if there was no direct approval of
the defect in issue. eemann v. Mc ald
Douglas 890 F. 2d 698 (4th Cir. 1989)
Cert. Denied 495 U.S. 953 (1990)
Additionally, other Courts have held
that "the process of continuous back and
forth itself becomes persuasive evidence -
of product conformity to the precise
specifications. Kleeman 890 F.2d. 702;
_ Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, a Di vision of
Boeing Company 755 F.2d. 352, 355 (3d.
Cir.) Cert. Denied 474 U.S. 821 (1985),
see also Hardival v. General Dynamics 878
F.2d. 1311, 1320 (llth Cir. 1989) cert.
Denied 494 U.S. 1030 (1990); Ramey 874
F.2d. at 950.
One Court went so far to say that the
requirement of approval of specific
Military Specifications could just be
rejected as "representing little more than
the hopes of participants that the project
in which they are about to embark will
turn out well". Vv Cc ald
20
Douglas Corporation 890 F.2d. 698 (4th
Cir. 1989) Cert. Denied 495 U.S. 953
(1990). This Circuit essentially rejects
the entire first prong of the Boyle test
that there be approval of the Detailed
Specifications. In essence that Court has
concluded that Boyle, supra, means
nothing.
In contrast, it seems Boyle, supra,
requires that the exercise of discretion
by the military be made in connection with
the particular design feature at issue in
each case.
Only where the military approves
reasonably precise specifications is there
an exercise of judgment by the Government.
Snell _v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.
(9th Cir. 1997) 107 F. 3d. at page 746,
747.
Logically, involvement of the
military with the contractor and with the
aircraft as a whole is not relevant to the
defense. Boyle, supra, seems to mandate
an examination of the involvement by the
military in making a design choice with
respect to the particular component
alleged to be defective. Snell, supra;
21
and Trevino v. General _ Dynamics
Corporation 865 F. 2d. 1474 (5th Cir.
1989)
Here, the District Court believed
that one of the considerations under the
first element of the Government Contractor
Defense is the existence of a "continuous
back and forth" review process between the
military and the contractor. (A 13-14)
However, such consideration should be
limited to the back and forth review
process regarding the design in question.
u Vv. 6 ipbuildi ne.»
supra, 89 F.3d at page 585; Tate v. Boeing
Helicopter, 55 F.3d 1150, 1154 (6th Cir.
1995). The District Court did not make
this distinction.
The lower Courts have gone too far in
the application of the Government
Contractor Defense merely allowing a broad
stroking, broad brushing, government
involvement in the purchase of an item
rather than approval of the specific
design feature and/or design choice
required by Boyle, supra.
This interpretation is costly,
causing lives to be lost and is beyond the
22
scope of the Boyle contemplated test.
This Court must address these issues for
guidance to the various circuits.
a 0 0
The District Court here erroneously
found that Long Term Use proves
conformance and approval of the Detailed
Specifications per the First part of the
test under Boyle, supra. (A 15-16)
There is conflict and confusion in
the Circuit Courts regarding does long
term use or knowledge of the defect after
delivery of the aircraft but prior to the
crash, negate any failure to approve
reasonably precise specifications,
compliance with the Specifications or fail
to warn on the part of the Defendant per
Boyle, supra.
Several Circuits have concluded the
government approval of Reasonably Precise
Specifications can be established by the
government’s continued use of a product
23
over an extended period of time,
particularly after the government is made
aware of any alleged defect. Ramey v.
Martin Baker Aircraft Company 874 F.2d.
946, 950 (4th Cir. 1989); is v oc
industries, Inc. 985 F.2d 85 (2nd Cir.
1992) Cert. Denied 509 U.S. 924 (1993);
Haltawanger 949 F. Supp. 904; In _ Re:
Disaster Ramstein Air Base 81 F.3d. 570,
574 (5th Cir. 1996); Dowd v. Textron 792
F.2d. at 412.
There is conflict and _ confusion
because:
a. Vv j 'e ° ies,
Supra, specifically did away with long
term use as a criteria for any of three
(3) prongs of the Boyle, supra, test.
b. Long term use is illogical and
contrary to the test enumerated in Boyle,
supra, as construing the Government
Contractor Defense.
c. There is conflict and confusion
in the Circuits since other cases, post-
Boyle, have logically not considered long
term use as a factor in the analysis of
the Government Contractor Defense because
it is at the time of the procurement of
24
the item of manufacture that the defense
applies.
dad. Other cases uphold long term use,
as a basis for granting the Government
Contractor Defense per Boyle, supra.
e. Long term use after delivery of
the item of manufacture only goes to
comparative fault, not "the government
made me do it" Boyle, supra, defense
applicable.
a. Boyle Spec call ejects Lo e
Use as a Factor In the Government
Contractor Defense
The "Long Term Use" argument began
with Dowd v. Textron, Inc. 792 F.2d. 409,
412 (4th Cir. 1986) decided before Boyle.
In Dowd, supra, the Court, even
though acknowledging that the Government
had not approved Reasonably Detailed
Specifications of the helicopter rotor
system, found that the Army had a Long
Term Use and knowledge regarding the
system in general constituted approval of
alleged design defects.
"The length and breath of the
Army’s experience with the 540
rotor system - and its decision
to continue using - amply
establish Government approval of
25
the alleged design defect."
In contrast, as stated in Hendrix v.
Bell_ Helicopter, Inc. 634 F.Supp. 1551
(N.D. Texas 1986); also pre-Boyle, supra;
"The Court finds Appellant’s
reliance on post-delivery events
to be mis-placed...the reason
for this is clear. In order for
the Government to balance the
risks and benefits inherent in
the use of the product, the
Government must be made aware of
any known defects in the product
prior to its intended use of the
product." (emphasis added)
In 1988, Boyle, supra, expressly
adopted the policy behind the
Discretionary Immunity Exception under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Boyle, supra at
page 510, as a "design choice" criteria.
Boyle specifically adopted the
requisite element of Government approval
of Reasonably Precise Specifications and
thus in effect overrules any other
"approval" test. See Boyle, supra, page
$12.
Boyle, supra is thus specific. It is
at the time of the procurement that
conformance to Reasonably Precise
Specification is required, not later.
26
Anything else, should go to comparative
fault or intervening causes. The lower
Courts are confused on this issue.
» ff, e al
Itself To 3
Any 1 of The 3 Prongs of The Boyle Test
The first prong requires the Approval
of Reasonably Precise Specifications.
Obviously, long term use does not insure
that the government has become aware at
the procurement phase of the latent defect
which may have caused a particular
problem. Therefore, they could not have
"approved" it when they "bought" it.
It also clearly does not mean that
there has been a "design choice" or an
"approval" of the reasonably precise
specification when the item was designed,
Boyle, supra. Long term use is only use,
not design choice.
The second prong, Conformance With
the Specifications, likewise does not
logically flow from continued use.
Continued use by the user of a particular
product does not imply that that product
has in fact conformed to the original
specifications. Other considerations may
27
require the continued use of the product
such as replacement may be expensive, but
for which economically the government is
stuck. This is not a logical basis to
support any government approval of the
design relating back. See Lewis, supra.
The third prong, Failure To Warn;
long term use by the military does not
mean that they have become aware of the
latent defect. As Boyle specifically
states, at page 512, the warning by the
manufacturer is,
"The 3rd condition is necessary
because, in its absence, the
displacement of State Tort Law
would create some incentive for
the manufacturer to withhold
knowledge of § risks, since
conveying that knowledge might
disrupt the contract but
withholding it would produce no
liability."
The point is that just because the
Military later became aware of the latent
defect, the manufacturer may have already
been aware and failed to disclose it at
the procurement phase. Men may have died,
but the manufacturer remained silent.
Thus, fraud on the government for a
defective product.
28
The following cases are examples of
conflict and confusion of Long Term Use by
the military which has not constituted
satisfaction of the Failure to Warn, Third
prong of the Boyle test.
Aircraft mechanic who allegedly
suffered injuries of being sprayed with
hydraulic fluid from a CH-47 Chinook
helicopter, Strickland v. Royal Lubricant
Company (1995) 91 F.Supp. 1460; Navy
divers killed by submarine hatch used for
18 years Trevino v. General Dynamics (5th
Cir. 1989) 865 F.2d. 1474; Naval crewman
killed in crash of S.3 jet aircraft used
since 1975, Gray v. Lockheed (D.C. GA
1995) 880 F.Supp. 1559.
d. Other Cases Accept Long Term Use To
t ve ent Contractor
Defense, Boyle, supra.
Dowd, supra, has been mentioned
earlier.
R . Marti Bal Aj x
Company 874 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1989). The
29
Navy was continuing to use a deficient
Maintenance Manual while apparently in the
process of deciding how to deal with the
risk created by the alleged design defect.
See 874 F.2d. at 951. . The cCourt’s
reasoning’ was that Long Term Use
constituted approval of the design defect.
In, Lewis _v. Babcock Industries 985
F.2d 83 (2nd Cir. 1993), Long Term Use was
held by the Second Circuit as a basis for
the approval of Reasonably Precise
Specifications at the time of procurement
level. In Lewis, supra, the design defect
was identified prior to the subject crash,
but the Air Force, instead of spending the
money to redesign the defect to the
ejection seat of the Jet Fighter, decided
to change the Maintenance Manuals and
replace existing parts. The Second
Circuit felt that this decision after the
fact by the United States Air Force
constituted "approval" at the time of
purchase.
In Re: Air Di ) t R ti ai
Base, 81 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 1996).
The Appeal Court there, at page 575,
indicated that the Trial Court had let
30
evidence in showing that the Air Force had
used the C5A aircraft for over 20 years.
The Court then said that
"from this evidence the District
Court could have concluded that
the C5A was built in accordance
with Air Force specifications.
See Smith v. Xerox Corp. 866
F.2d 135, 138 (Sth Cir. 1989)."
tiwanger v. Unisys Corp., 949
F.Supp. 898 at 903-04 (D.C. 1996), the
Court found that the item of manufacture
have been used for more that 20 years. It
stated,
"The Postal Service’s extended
use of the file product
manifests its substantive
acceptance and approval of the
basic and its specific features,
thus satisfying the First Prong
of the Boyle test, regardless of
the nature of the _. Postal
Service’s specifications."
Also see, Yeroshefsky v. Unisys Corp.
962 F.Supp 710 (D. MD 1997).
Thus there is conflict and confusion
in the Courts as to when an item of
manufacture is to be looked at to be in
conformance with the specifications. Long
Term Use does not and is not actual
approval at the procurement or purchasing
31
time by the Government.
e. Long Term Use Only Goes to Comparative
Fault or Intervening Cause
State law and Federal Common Law
allow for intervening causes or
comparative fault also may be afforded the
manufacturer if the military becomes aware.
of a latent defect and chooses to use it
unwisely, or modifies the equipment
themselves such that it becomes’ more
dangerous causing injury. There are
numerous checks and balances that a Jury
could consider regarding what the user,
i.e. Military, did with the product after
it was in their possession.
that all Respondent McDonnell Douglas must
show is that a material issue of fact does
not exist as to whether the Air Force
approved Warnings pertaining to the Defect
32
at issye ala Boyle, supra. (A117) Other
Courts are making the same mistake.
The Failure to Warn is a triable
issue if warnings are required by State
law (per the evidence) and were not
prohibited under any Government
Specification. The Eighth Circuit did not
understand that the absence of
specifications for warnings then puts the
burden on Respondent to conform to State
law regarding warnings in the use of the
defective product.
Under State law a manufacturer has a
duty to warn the user of its product of a
danger when the manufacturer has knowledge
of the danger or a reason to know of it
and has no reason to know that those who
use the product will realize its dangerous
condition. Butler ?. Ingalls.
Shipbuilding, Inc., supra, 89 F.3d at P.
586.
Yet, the military contractor defense
is not established as to a failure to warn
claim merely by satisfying the subject
elements as to a design defect claim.
Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 55 F.3d 1150,
1157 (6th Cir. 1995) Whereas the
33
government contractor’s defense may be
used to "trump" a design defect clain,
that defense is inapplicable to a failure
to warn claim, unless the evidence
supports a finding that in making its
decision whether to provide a warning
against the use of the particular design,
the contractor was acting in compliance
with Reasonably Precise Specifications
imposed on it by the United States.
Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.,
supra, 89 F.3d at p. 586.
The failure to warn requirements of
state law must thus’ be considered
independent of Boyle, supra.
Where the contract with the United
States imposes no requirements on the
contractor and thus no conflict exists
between the contract and a state law duty
to warn, Boyle, supra, commands’ that
Courts defer to the imposition of
liability under state tort law, regardless
of any conflict which may exist between
the contract and state law design
requirements. Butler iv. Ingalls
Shipbuilding, Inc., supra, 89 F. 3d at p.
586, quoting In re Joint E.&S. Dist. New
34
York Asbestos Litig. 897 F. 2d 626, 631
(2d Cir. 1990). This principle simply
demonstrates a crucial lack of the
necessary conflict between state and
federal warning requirements. In re Joint
E.&S. Dist. New York Asbestos Litig., 897
F.2d at p. 631. As the Boyle Court
pointedly explained, "[Cjonflict there
must be." Boyle v. United Technologies,
supra, 487 U.S. 500. And even a federal
contract specification requiring a certain
product design does not create a conflict
with state law requiring a certain set-of
warnings incident to the use of that
product or design. In _ re Joint E.&sS.
Dist. New York Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d
at p. 630.
This Court is asked to clarify and
advise regarding this important area of
the interpretation of the Government
Contractor Defense Rr Boyle, supra.
RULE 60(b) AND EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
1. R D Oo
ACC D USsvU. Cc CIAL
PROCEEDINGS REGARDING RULE 60 (b)
FRCP, Rule 60(b) states,
"On Motion and upon such terms
as are just, the Court may
35
relieve a party or parties legal
representative from ae final
Judgment, Order or proceeding
for the followings reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise
or Excusable Neglect;....(6) any
other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the
Judgment. e t all be
22 e
entered or taken..."
The Eighth Circuit Appellant Court
has made a serious misinterpretation in
the bringing of a Rule 60(b) Motion by
Petitioner LOWRY. The Court reasoned "+o
prevent its use as a substitute for Appeal
we have required a Rule 60(b) Motion
alleging judicial inadvertence to be made
within the time period allowed for
Appeal", i.e. thirty (30) days. (A 28)
Presumably referring to the Denial as Moot
of the Plaintiff’s Motion for a finding of
Excusable Neglect. The Court cites Fox v.
Brewer 620 F.2d. 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1980).
(A 29)
However, in Fox, the "Notice of
Appeal" and Motion for extension of time
were filed beyond thirty (30) days
required under FRAP 4(b) (5) against any of
36
the Judgments sought to be appealed. In
that case, the Rule 60(b) Motions were not
then timely filed, i.e. the "Notice of
Appeal" and Motions to permit the Notice
of Appeal were never filed within the
thirty (30) days per FRAP 4(b)(5) or 60
days of the Final Judgments sought to be
corrected. Fox, supra, page 180.
Here, Petitioner’s Notice of Appeal
was filed on July 27, 1998 (within the
sixty (60) day window). (A 1) Also,
Petitioner’s Motion to permit said filing
was in fact brought also within the thirty
(30) days per FRAP 4(b) (5). (A 3) When
the Rule 60 Motion was brought, within one
(1) year, it was not to argue or to open
up, out of thirty (30) days, something
that had never been done before. It was
in fact correcting a Motion which had been
done in the correct thirty (30) day time
period as required by the Eighth Circuit.
The Appellant Court here forgot,
misconstrued or misapprehended the in
between step of the Motion having been
brought under 4(a)(5) within the thirty
(30) day time period of the Granting of
Leave to file what had already been filed
37
Notice of Appeal. (A 29)
This Appellant Court’s error and
misapprehension of the case law has
blurred the distinctions between a Rule 60
Motion brought outside of thirty (30) days
solely to correct an Order of the District
Court on grounds which had never been
brought before verses, as here, a Rule 60
Motion which relates back to a Motion
which had been brought timely before,
asserting grounds for which relief was
appropriate within the thirty (30) day
requirement of FRAP 4(b)(5) and 4(b) (6).
The exact purpose of a Rule 60 Motion
is to correct whatever manifest errors or
inadvertence had actually been prompted by
the lower Court, i.e. a Rule 60(b) Motion
relating back to a Motion brought within
the proper time and relating to the same
issues.
Petitioner did bring a Motion in
time, after Leave was Granted to and did
file her Notice of Appeal, even though
Plaintiff’s Motion was Denied as Moot.
Yet the Eighth Circuit says therefore
Petitioner should have appealed it. (A
31) This is incorrect. Cases have always
Lait iniiaiiii iiiie
38
indicated that the substance of the ruling
and the effect of the ruling is the
appealable issue, not whether or not it
was purely a Denial of a parties’ Motion.
Parr v. U.S. (1956) 76 S.C. 912, 351 U.S.
513; Rosen v. Rurker (C.A.3d 1990) 905
F.2d. 702, 705, 706.
2. 1°) (@) CK 0O
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT, BOTH
N CUSABLE G
THE FRAP 4(A) (6) MOTION
The Eighth Circuit further did not
take into account the effect the lack of
Notice of the Entry of the original
Judgment required by FRCP 77(d), both from
the Court and/or from the party.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
77(d) states,
"Immediately upon the Entry of
an Order or Judgment the Clerk
shall serve a Notice of the
Entry by mail upon each
party...any party in addition
serve a Notice of such Entry in
the manner provided in Rule 5
for the Service of papers. Lack
of Notice of the Entry by the
Clerk does not effect the time
to Appeal...except as permitted
in Rule 4(a) of the Federal
Rules of Appellant Procedure."
39
The Eighth Circuit Court has ignored
the change in FRAP 4(a) instituted in 1991
and reasserted in the Supreme Court case
of Pioneer, infra, and the Eighth Circuit
case of Fink v. Union Central Life
insurance Company, 65 F.3d. 722 (8th Cir.
1995), regarding certain relaxed standards
of allowing late (beyond thirty (30) days)
filing of Notice of Appeals. FRAP 4(a) (6)
(A 32-38) |
Federal Rules of Appellant Procedure
4(a)(6) provides,
"The District Court, if it finds
(a) that a party entitled to
Notice of the Entry of Judgment
or Order did not receive such
Notice from the Clerk or any
party within 21 days of its
Entry and, (b) that no party
would be prejudiced, may, upon
Motion filed within 180 days of
Entry of the Judgment or Order
or within 7 days of receipt of
such Notice, whichever is
earlier, reopen the time for
Appeal for a period of 14 days
from the date of Entry of the
Order reopening the time for
Appeal."
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
in its advisory analysis of the finding of
Excusable Neglect by the District Court,
has set the bar too high. (A 37) A
40
relaxed standard, especially when there is
only a one (1) day late filing of a Notice
of Appeal, when there was no Notice of the
Entry of Judgment given by either the
District Court or the Respondent herein,
is appropriate.
This is clearly within the mandates
of Pioneer and Fink, supra.
The Court of Appeals has summarily
dismissed the lack of Notice of Entry of
Judgment as being unimportant and not
relating either to the bringing of the
Rule 60 Motion and, in its gratuitous
finding, that there was no Excusable
Neglect.
This Court is asked to reaffirm
Pi oneer and Fink, supra, and to mandate
that the Eighth Circuit not set such a
high barrier for the late filing of a
Notice of Appeal.
VI.
PRAYER FO LIEF
Petitioner respectfully requests to
be heard before this honorable Couyt.
Vit.
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI
ee a ee
Al
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MARGARET LOWRY,
No.: 4-96-CV1572 ERW
Plaintiff,
Ve
MCDONNELL~-DOUGLAS
CORPORATION, /s/ Leave to File
Granted
7/29/98
/s/ E. Richard Webber
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
(Filed June 27, 1998)
Comes now Plaintiff, Margaret Lowry,
and hereby notices her appeal from the
judgment of Dismissal per Defendants
Motion for Summary Judgment granted and
entered herein on June 24, 1998
Dated: 7/27/98
/s/
Louis S. Franecke, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
425 Battery Street
Suite 450
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 391-1560 phone
A2
CERTIFICA OF SERVIC
The undersigned hereby certifies that a
true and accurate copy of the above and
foregoing was sent via United States
Postal Service, this 27th day of July,
1998 to:
BRYAN CAVE
Mr. Peter Herzog
211 North Broadway
One Metropolitan Square
St. Louis, MO 63102
/s/
\-
A3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MARGRET LOWRY, individually )
and as guardian ad litem cf ) No.: 4-96-
NADINE LOWRY, a minor, ) CV1572 ERW
) EX PARTE
) MOTION BY
) PLAINTIFF
) TO FILE
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE OF
) APPEAL PER
) FEDERAL
) RULE OF
v. ) APPELLANT
) PROCEDURE
) 4(a) (5)
MCDONNELL~DOUGLAS CORPORATION, )
a California Corporation )
licensed to do business in )/s/ DENIED
California, ) AS MOOT
8/6/98
)/s/
)E. Richard
) Webber
Defendants. )
)
(Filed July 31,1995)
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Margret Lowry,
et al., and hereby requests pursuant to
Federal Rules of Appellant Procedure
4(a) (5) that the Court extend the time for
filing Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal
pursuant to said Rule from the Judgment of
A4
Dismissal evidently entered in this Court
on June 24, 1998 pursuant to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff has filed a Notice of
Appeal on July 27, 1998 herein (Exhibit
1). Evidently, the Judgment of Dismissal
was entered on June 24, 1998 giving, it is
believed, until July 24, 1998, or thirty
(30) days, for the filing of said Notice
per FRAP Rule 4.
However, counsel for Plaintiff, is
demonstrating excusable neglect and good
cause in that Plaintiff’s counsel
calculated incorrectly the thirty (30)
days, believing that the thirty (30) days
did not count the original June 24, 1998
and that thirty (30) days would fall on
atu J 2 . Under that mis-
assumption, Plaintiff’s counsel _ filed
Notice of Appeal on Monday, the first
available day, July 27, 1998, believing
that it was properly within the thirty (30
day Notice of Appeal rule time.
Plaintiff has previously complied
with all prior Rules of the District
Court, has made timely filings in all
respects, and has properly conformed to
all of the requirements of this Court.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel
A5
also begs the Court that excusable neglect
is shown by Plaintiff’s counsel’s mis-
calculation of the time due to the weekend
time and the calculations thereto.
Plaintiff’s counsel is in San Francisco,
and has searched his file and does not
find any Notice from the Clerk indicating
the actual Date of Entry of the Judgment
herein. However, Plaintiff’s counsel was
informed that it was entered on June 24,
1998 and was attempting to proceed
thereto.
This case involves a Wrongful Death
action of a United States Air Force F-15
pilot in Spangdahlem Germany, leaving a
wife and child. There are substantial
issues of law and fact raised by the
Motion for Summary Judgment pertaining to
the Government Contractor Defense as set
forth in Boyle v. United Technologies 487
U.S. 500, 108 S.Ct. 2510 (1988), for which
direction is needed from the Appellant
level regarding the unusual fact pattern
involved in this case.
Plaintiff’s counsel herein previously
argued aforementioned case of Boyle v.
United Technologies, supra, before the
United States Supreme Court and has an
intimate familiarity with the issues which
=
A6
have been presented since that decision in
1988. The case at bar here will assist
the Courts in defining further decisions
and should prove to be of economic benefit
to the time spent by the Courts in making
said future decisions.
Plaintiff begs the Court to grant per
FRAP 4(a)(5) said Motion and extend the
time of Notice of Entry of Appeal no more
than thirty (30) days from Entry of
Judgment or ten (10) days from the
granting of this Motion as per Plaintiff’s
already filed Notice of Appeal filed on
July 27, 1998. ;
Dated: July [s] 28, 1998
/s/
LOUIS S. FRANECKE, ESQ.
A7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MARGARET LOWRY,
)
) No.: 4-96-
) CV1572 ERW
)
Plaintiff, )
)
Vv. )
)
MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS CORPORATION, )
)
)
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMO UM ORDER
This matter is before the Court on
defendant McDonnell Douglas’ (MDC) motion
for summary judgment. For the reasons
given below, the motion is granted.
Plaintiff Margaret Lowry brings this
action in diversity alleging defendant MDC
defectively designed an F-15 aircraft
flown by her husband Major Donald G.
Lowry, Jr. She further alleges that MDC
failed to warn of any defects associated
with the F-15,
A8
I. Facts
- This case arises from the crash of an
F-15C fighter jet at Spangdahlem Air Base,
Germany on May 30, 1995. On that date
Major Donald G. Lowry, Jr. was killed
during takeoff when the flight control
system of his Ff-15 malfunctioned. Prior
to the accident, the aircraft had spent
twenty days on the ground for maintenance.
On May 11, 1995, Air Force mechanics
installed a new left auxiliary fuel tank.
This necessitated the removal of the
flight control rods, devices that control
the movement of tne F-15’s flight control
surfaces (ailerons, stabilators and
rudders). On May 17, 1995, Air Force
mechanics reinstalled the control rods.
The parties agree that the control rods
were cross-connected during the
reinstallation. Cross-connection can
result in an inability to control the F-
15. ;
Major Lowry and the mechanics failed
to detect the cross-connection before
takeoff. | After taxiing to the takeoff -
| |
position,| Lowry began to accelerate.
Lowry’s wingman noticed that when Lowry
Ag
attempted to take off, the nose wheel rose
approximately six inches but then returned
to the ground. Lowry accelerated, and
— to take off again. The F-15
rolled sharply to the left, turned upside
down and crashed. Lowry was killed
instantly. The parties po that the
cross-connected control rods caused the
3 |
accident. } |
In 1967, the Department of Defense
(DoD) issued a request for proposal to MDC
and other defense contractors for the
design of a tactical aircraft to replace
the F-4 Phantom. After a bidding and
design competition, DoD awarded MDC the
contract to design, develop and test the
F-15. MDC has modified the aircraft
1
In doing so, the parties rely on the
conclusions of the Aircraft Accident
Investigation Report prepared by the Air
Force. However, opinions of accident
investigators as to the cause of, or the
factors contributing to, military aircraft
accidents occurring after April 21, 993
may not be considered in civil
proceedings. 10 U.S.C. Section 2254.
Accordingly, the Court has not considered
the Report’s conclusion in ruling on
defendant’s motion.
A10
numerous times since the initial award;
however, all modifications are subject to
‘Air Force approval.
: The Air Force took an active role in
the design and production phases of the F-
15. The Air Force maintained an office in
St. Louis, the place of manufacture. Air
Force representatives were present at
MDC’s facilities on a daily basis to
review the design and testing of systems
in the F-15. MDC and the Air Force met
frequently, and the Air Force reviewed and
approved all aspects of the F-15,
including the flight control. systen.
Indeed, the Air Force rejected MDC’s
initial design for the flight control
system, insisting on the system used in
the F-15 flown by Major Lowry. During the
approval process for the flight control
system, MC submitted detailed descriptions
of the design and operation of the control
rod assembly. MDC also submitted testing
results of the system to the Air Force.
Finally, the Air Force and MDC jointly —
staffed a System Safety Group that met
first semiannually, and later annually, to
review safety issues connected with the
All
emerging design of the F-15.
Plaintiff alleges that the design of
the flight control system of the F-15 was
defective because it allowed the control
rods to be cross-connected. The purpose
of the flight control system is_ to
manipulate the surfaces on the F-15 -
rudders, ailerons and stabilators - to
maneuver the aircraft. The system is
composed of a mixer assembly, which
translates the pilot’s movement of the
control stick, and control rods which
change the position of the’ control
surfaces. In its initial proposal, MDC
envisioned an electronic flight control
system, eliminating the need for control
rods. However, the Air Force preferred
the mechanical system described above.
In the mid-1970’s the Air Force
ordered MDC to redesign the F-15 to
accommodate an additional 2,000 pounds of
internal fuel. This design change
required that the control rods run through
a sealed chamber in an auxiliary fuel
tank. Because the control rods run
through the auxiliary tank, the rods must
be removed during repair or maintenance of
Al2
the tank. When repairs are completed, the
rods are reinstated. Reinstallation of
control rods and maintenance procedures
are governed by General Systems Technical
Orders, Air Force Technical Orders and
technical manuals. The Air Force approved
and tested this ‘change using the same
process applied to the original design for
the F-15.
The Air Force first became aware that
removal of the control rods could result
in a cross-connection during
reinstallation several year prior to Major
Lowry’s crash. In 1986 and 1991, the Air
Force conducted, investigated incidents of
cross-connected control rods in F-15’s.
In both “incidents, Air Force personnel
noted abnormalities prior to takeoff. The
Air Force’s investigation of the 1986
incident concluded that "Cross-connecting
the rods is an easy mistake to make with
the present procedures." (Deft. Ex. G)
After these incidents, the Air Force
amended its General System Technical Order
and its Air Force Technical Order to read:
WARNING: Wrong routing of flight control
rods could result in loss of life and/or
A 13
aircraft." The Air Force also required MC
to include these warnings in technical
manuals published after 1986. After the
1991 incident, the Air Force conducted a
review of the F-15’s_ flight control
system. MDC did not participate in the
review. The Air Force declined to
redesign the flight control system after
determining that pre-flight systems checks
conducted by maintenance personnel and
pilots were sufficient to detect
improperly connected control rods.
: is °
The standards applicable to summary
judgment motions are well settled.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a
motion for summary judgment if all of the
information before the court shows "there
is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, (1986). The
initial burden is placed on the moving
party. City o i Vv.
Associated Elect. Co-op, Inc., 838 F.2d
268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988) (the moving party
Al4
has the burden of clearly establishing the
nonexistence of any genuine issue of fact
that is material to a judgment in its
favor). Once this burden is discharged,
if the record does in fact bear out that
no genuine dispute exists, the burden then
shifts to the non-moving party who must
set forth affirmative evidence ' and
specific fact showing there is a genuine
dispute on that issue. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986).
Once the burden shifts, the non-
moving party may not’ rest on the
allegations in his pleadings, but by
affidavit or other evidence must set forth
specific facts showing that a genuine
issue of material fact exists.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The non-moving party
"must do more than simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S.574, 586 (1986). This Court is
required to view the facts in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and
must give the non-moving party the benefit
A 15
of any inference that can logically be
drawn from those facts. Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 587; Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d
844, 846 (8th Cir. 19832). Moreover, this
Court is required to resolve all conflicts
in favor of the non-moving party. Robert
Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir. 1976).
The trial court may not consider the
credibility of the witnesses or the weight
of the evidence. White v. Pance, 961 F.2d
776, 779 (8th Cir. 1992).
A. Design Defect Claims
MDC contends that it is entitled to
summary judgment based on the government
contractor defense established in Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500
(1988). In Boyle, the Supreme Court held
that military contractors cannot be held
liable for design defects if: (1) the
government approved reasonably precise
specifications; (2) the equipment
conformed to those specifications ; and
(3) the contractor informed the government
of dangers associated with use of the
equipment known to it but not’ the
government. Id. at 512. The defense is
A 16
an affirmative one; MDC has the burden of
establishing it. Snell v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 746 (9th Cir.
1997).
Government approval "requires more
than a rubber stamp." Trevino v. General
Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1480 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989).
In other words, the contractor must show
more than a signature indicating approval
of a design. Id. at 1480. Moreover, the
contractor must show the government
approved reasonably precise specifications
for the particular feature at issue, not
the entire piece of hardware. Snell, at
747. See also Oliver _v. Oshkosh Truck
Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 998-99 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1246
(1997); Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 55
F.3d 1150, 1154-55 (6th Cir. 1995);
Kleeman _v. McDonnell Douglas, 890 F.2d
698, 701 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 953 (1990). The first condition
of the Boyle test is satisfied where the
government and the contractor engaged ina
"continuous back and forth" review of the
design at issue. Harduvel _v. General
A 17
Dynamics Corp, 878 F.2d 1311, 1320 (llth
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1030
(1990).
Here, the government engaged in
significant and ongoing oversight of the
design of the flight control system of the
F-15. Prior to entering the initial F-15
contract, the government rejected MDC’s
proposed electrical control systen,
instead requiring that MDC build the F-15
with control rods. The Air Force
maintained an office at MDC during the
design and manufacturing stages. Air
Force personnel testified that’ they
frequently met with MDC aircraft designers
regarding the flight control system. MDC
submitted the results of tests conducted
as to the operation and safety of the
flight control systen. This evidence
establishes the "continuous back and
forth" necessary to satisfy the first
prong of the Boyle test. Tate, 55 F.3d at
1155. Moreover, the Air Force was aware
that the control rods could be cross-
connected, and declined to order a
redesign of the F-15 after two
investigations. Government awareness of a
A 18
defect is persuasive evidence of approval
of a precise specification. In Re Air
Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, 81 F.3d
570, 575 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S.Ct. 583 (1996); Lewis v. Babcock
Indus. ~» 965 Ps 26: 8S C2m8 Cieid,
cert. denied, 509 U.S. 924 (1993); Ramey
Vv. in- er Ai . Oo. S7é. 7.28
946, 950 (4th Cir. 1989). The Court finds
that MDC has established the first prong
of the government contractor defense.
The second prong of the Boyle test
requires the contractor to establish that
the design conformed to the reasonably
precise specifications. A contractor may
establish conformity with evidence that
the military was "present and actively
involved throughout the design, review,
development and testing of the [equipment
at issue]." Ramstein, 81 F.3d at 575. In
Kleeman, the Fourth Circuit explained:
"(W]jhere the procurement process involves
this kind of continuous exchange between
the contractor and the government, the
process itself becomes persuasive evidence
of the product conformity to precise
specifications." Kleeman, 890 F.2d at
I shim
A19
702. The facts here are that the Air
Force closely scrutinized the development
and testing of the flight control system
produced by MDC. In addition, the Air
Force required that all F-15’s produced by
MDC conform to its specifications prior to
delivery and payment. The Court finds
that MDC has established the second prong
of the government contractor defense.
In contesting MDC’s ability to
establish the second prong of the Boyle
test, plaintiff relied on specification
MIL~-F-9490C 3.2.8, which states: "[a]1ll
control systems shall be designed so that
incorrect assembly and reversed operation
of controls is impossible." In Kleeman,
the Fourth Circuit found that such a
requirement "represent[s] little more than
the hopes of participants that the project
on which they are about to embark will
turn out well." Kleeman, 890 F.2d at 703.
The Kleeman court noted that such general
requirements often overlap with specific
ones, and may serve conflicting purposes.
id. at 703. Such is the case here. The
Court finds the requirement contained in
MIL-F-9490C 3.2.8 is a general one and
A 20
that MDC’s failure to comply with it is
irrelevant to the government contractor
defense in this case.?
The third prong of the Boyle test
requires that the contractor show that it
either informed the government of the
dangers inherent in the design, or that
the government knew of any dangers
associated with the design. Boyle, 487
U.S. at 5123; Gray, 125 F.3d at i379;
Ramstein, 81 F.3d at 576. The Court finds
that the record does not support
plaintiff’s contention that MDC failed to
warn the Air Force of any dangers
associated with the control rod systen.
The evidence is that the Air Force
was aware of the possibility that control
rods could be cross connected during
reinstallation. MDC and the Air Force
jointly developed and tested the F-15.
Air Force publications and manuals
That the requirement is a general one is
revealed by the document itself. MIL-F-
9490C is a_ self-described series of
general specifications for piloted
aircraft. Nothing in the document
purports to apply to the F-15C or its
unique flight control systen.
A21
informed mechanics that failure to
properly reinstall the control-rods could
lead to a cross-connection and result in
loss of life. Those warnings were first
published in 1986, and reestablished in
1993. Air Force personnel charged with
managing the flight control system
testified at deposition that the Air Force
was aware of the possibility of cross
connection by 1993, two years before Major
Lowry’s crash. A showing that’ the
government is aware of all the relevant
dangers establishes the third prong of the
Boyle test. Tate, 55 F.3d at 1156; Lewis,
985 F.2d at 89-90.
For the reasons given above, the
Court finds that MDC has established all
three prongs of the Boyle test, and there
are no genuine issues of material fact
concerning the applicability of the
government contractor defense to alleged
design defects here. MDC’s motion for
summary judgment on Courts I & III of the
complaint is granted.
MDC next argues that the government
contractor defense’ shields it from
liability on plaintiff’s failure to warn
A22
claims. Tort law duties to warn serve a
different objective than providing
information as required under the third
prong of the Boyle test. Accordingly,
whether the government contractor defense
applies to a failure to warn claim
requires a separate analysis from a design
defect claim Tate, 55 F.3d at 1157. The
insulate itself from liability for a
failure to warn clain, the contractor must
establish:
(1) the United States exercised
it’s discretion and approved the
warnings, if any; (2) the
contractor provided warnings
that conformed to the approved
warnings; and (3) the contractor
warned the United States of the
danger in the equipment’s use
about which the contractor knew
but the United States did not.
id.
Plaintiff initially argues that Boyle
does not apply here because MDC has not
presented evidence that the Air Force
precluded MDC from including warnings as
to the flight control system. This
argument misconstrues MDC’s burden. MDC
must only show that a material issue of
fact does not exist as to whether the Air
A23
Force approved warnings pertaining to the
defect at issue. Under plaintiff’s
standard, the government contractor
defense would only apply when the military
adhered a warning for a piece of hardware.
This is contrary to Boyle, which
recognized the defense on the theory that
a contractor may violate state tort law
when it manufactured a product with a
defect approved by the government. Boyle,
487 U.S. at 509. This distinction, which
plaintiff fails to recognize, is
recognized by the cases she relies on.
Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 89
F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 1996); In Re Joint S &
ist ew Yo sbestos Lit., 897 F.2d
626 (1990). Accordingly, the Court
rejects plaintiff’s argument.
Under the first prong of the Boyle
test, MDC must establish that the Air
Force exercised discretion and approved
warnings. The facts are that the F-15
contract required MDC to produce technical
manuals for review by the Air Force. The
manuals were completed and delivered after
numerous discussions between MDC and the
Air Force. Although MDC authored the
A 24
initial drafts for the manuals, the Air
Force determined the final contents. Any
changes to technical orders or manuals,
including the addition of warnings, were
within the sole discretion of the Air
Force. The Court finds the above facts
demonstrated the Air Force’s discretion
and approval over the technical orders and
manuals and therefore establishes the
first prong of the Boyle test.
The second prong is likewise
satisfied. There is no evidence that the
warnings contained in the MDC publications
did not meet the Air Force’s
specifications. The evidence clearly
demonstrates that the Air Force examined
and approved the manuals during the design
state. Moreover, after the 1986 incident,
the Air Force ordered MDC to add a
specific warning regarding possible cross-
connection of control rods to the F-15
publications.
Finally, the Court finds that MDC has
satisfied the third prong of the Boyle
test. To satisfy this prong, MDC must
show that it warned the Air Force of any
danger in the control rods use of which it
A25
was aware but the Air Force was not. MDC
has provided evidence that after the 1986
and 1991 incidents, the Air Force was
aware of the potential for cross-
connection of control-rods in the F-15.
Because MDC did not have superior
knowledge, it cannot be held liable in
this case. The government’ contract
defense bars the plaintiff’s failure to
warn claims.
III. Conclusion
The Court finds that MDC has shown
that a genuine issue of material fact does
not exist as to whether the government
contractor defense is applicable in this
case. Therefore, the Court will grant
MDC’s motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant’s
motion for summary judgment is GRANTED
(dOC. nO. 34).
A separate judgment in accord with
this Memorandum and Order is entered this
same date.
Dated this _/s/ 19th day of June, 1998.
/s/
A 26
E. RICHARD WEBBER
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE
A27
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MARGARET LOWRY,
No.: 4-96-
CV1572 ERW
Plaintiff,
Ve
MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
ee ee ee ee ee ee ee See See See ee See ee ee ee
JUDGMENT
(Entered June 24, 1998)
Pursuant to the memorandum and order
entered herein this date,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and
DECREED that plaintiff’s complaint is
DISMISSED.
Dated this _/s/ 19th day of June, 1998.
/s/
E. RICHARD WEBBER
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE
A 28
No. 99-1750 |
No. 99-1805
Margaret Lowry, *
* Appeal from
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, * the United
* States
Vv. * District
* Court of the
McDonnell Douglas, *
Corporation * Eastern
* District of
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.* Missouri
Submitted: January 12, 2000
Filed: April 27, 2000
Before BOWMAN, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and LOKEN,
Circuit Judges.
BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
This case is before us for the second
time, on appeal from the order of the
A29
District Court granting summary judgment
to McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) on
the wrongful death claim of plaintiff
Margret Lowry’. Lowry alleges that MDC
defectively designed and failed to warn of
defects in a United States Air Force F-15
aircraft that crashed at Spangdahlem Air
Base in Germany on May 30, 1995, killing
Major Donald Lowry, plaintiff’s decedent.
The District Court concluded that MDC was
shielded from liability by the federal
military contractor defense set forth in
Boyle _v. United Technologies Corp. 487
U.S. 500 (1988). Lowry filed her first
notice of appeal out of time, and the
The original complaint and, as far as we
have seen, all documents filed by the
parties in this case, including the
briefs, spell the plaintiff’s first name
"Margret." The District Court docketed
the case spelling the plaintiff’s name
"Margaret," and it is the practice of this
Court’s clerk to use the came caption as
the District Court when docketing an
appeal, unless advised otherwise. We are
not inclined to meddle with the caption
sua sponte, absent an indication from
lowry that the spelling of her first name
has been wrong from the
inception of the case.
A 30
District Court allowed the defective
filing, notwithstanding Lowry’s failure to
file a\ motion and made a showing that
would justify extending the filing
deadline under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a). Two days after the notice
of appeal was docketed, Lowry did file a
motion for an extension under Rule
4(a)(5), but the District Court denied
that motion as moot. On MDC’s motion,
dismissed the first appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. As we will explain in more
detail, Lowry then filed a motion with the
District Court invoking Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) and seeking relief
from the District Court’s earlier orders
relating to the untimely notice of appeal.
The court granted the motion, which
ultimately allowed Lowry to timely file
another notice of appeal. We have taken
with the case MDC’s motion to once again
dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, an issue MDC also raises in
a cross appeal from the District Court’s
decision to grant relief from judgment
under Rule 60(b). Cf. Karras v. Karras,
16 F.3d 245, 247 (8th Cir. 1994) (per
A 31
curiam) (noting that party seeking
reversal of district court’s failure to
grant Rule 60(b) relief should file a
notice of appeal from that order). It is
to the question of our jurisdiction that
we turn first.
I.
In order for us to make our
discussion as easy to follow as possible,
and to assist the reader in referring back
to the pertinent facts and the timing of
events, we will forgo further narrative
description of the procedural history of
the case in favor of a chronological
listing, beginning with the District
Court’s decision to grant summary judgment
on its merits.
June 19, 1998 The District Court granted
MDC’s motion for summary judgment on the
merits. Counsel for MDC has represented
to this court that he faxed the District
Court’s order to counsel for Lowry on this
date; in fact, the copy of the order in
the addendum to Lowry’s brief (which she
has called “Appendix I") bears a
typewritten notation at the top "cc: Lou
Franecke [Lowry’s counsel] (by fax)
A32
6/19/98" and fax legends showing the
document was faxed twice on June 19, once
from the District Court and again from the
offices of MDC’s counsel.
June 24, 1998 Judgment was entered on the
District Court docket.
July 24, 1998 The thirty days allowed for
filing a timely notice of appeal from the
summary judgment, as provided in Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), expired.
July 27, 1998 Lowry tendered her notice
of appeal to the District Court.
July 29, 1998 Lowry’s notice of appeal
was filed. On it was handwritten: "Leave
to file granted 7/29/98 /s/ E. Richard
Webber."
July 31, 1998 Lowry filed a motion styled
"Ex Parte Motion by Plaintiff to File
Notice of Appeal per Federal Rule of
Appellant [sic] Procedure 4(a)(5)." The
motion sought an extension of time to file
a notice of appeal from the summary
A 33
judgment, alleging "excusable [sic]
neglect and. good cause" for the delay.
August 6, 1998 The District Court denied
the "Ex Parte Motion" as moot.
October 13, 1998 MDC filed with the Court
of Appeals a motion to dismiss the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. In the motion,
MDC argued that Lowry’s notice of appeal
was untimely, and that the _ court’s
notation purporting to grant "leave to
file" was not effective to extend the time
for filing the notice of appeal,
unaccompanied as it was by a Rule 4(a)
motion from Lowry and findings by the
District Court.
November 10, 1998 This Court granted
MDC’s motion to dismiss the appeal. That
judgment in its entirety, reads as
follows: "The motion of appellee for
dismissal of the appeal is granted. The
appeal is hereby dismissed. See Eighth
Circuit Rule 47A(b)." This Court’s Rule
47A(b) sets out the procedure for filing
"a motion to dismiss a docketed appeal on
A34
the ground the appeal is not within the
court’s jurisdiction. "?
Lowry makes much of the fact that MDC did
not file this initial motion to dismiss
within fifteen days after the first appeal
was docketed, as ean in Eighth
Circuit Rule 47A(b). She did not mention
this in her response in opposition to the
motion to dismiss, but only in her "motion
for reconsideration" filed with this
Court. In any even, it is not clear what
she would have this panel do about that
now. That case is closed and the mandate
has issued. Moreover, if there is any
question about this Court’s jurisdiction,
the Court may (and, indeed, it must) sua
sponte examine the issue. See Faysound
Ltd. v. Falcon Jet Corp. 940 F.2d 339, 341
n.2 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1096 (1992).
Also, and again for the reason that
the first appeal is closed, we reject any
contention, see Reply Brief of Lowry at
12, that the filing of the first notice of
appeal presented "unique circumstances"
justifying this Court’s assertion of
jurisdiction over an otherwise untimely
appeal. See Osterneck v. Erns & Whinney,
489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989) (explaining that
"unique circumstances" doctrine "applies
only where a party has appeal and has
received specific assurance by the
judicial officer that this act has been
properly done"). But see Schwartz v.
Pridy, 94 F.3d 453, 456 n.3 (8th Cir.
1996) (noting that "the continued vitality
of the doctrine has been questioned").
A35
January 6, 1999 The mandate issued on our
judgment dismissing the appeal.
January 19, 1999 Lowry filed in the
District Court a document styled "Notice
and Motion to Relieve Plaintiffs [sic]
from Denial as Moot Motion to Grant Leave
to Extend Time for Filing Notice of Appeal
(FRCP 60, FRAP 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6))." In
the motion Lowry acknowledged that "[t]he
District Court cannot. grant untimely
Appeals to be filed unless findings that
the conditions prescribed by the Rules
(FRAP 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6)) have been
satisfied." Notice and Motion at 2.
Lowry continued, "By the Judge not
designating and finding good cause of
[sic] excusable neglect pursuant’ to
Motion, this does not confirm [sic]
jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals."
Id. at 4.
February 12, 1999 The District Court
vacated its order granting leave to file
This is a defense that could have been
successful, if at all, only in response to
the motion to dismiss the first appeal.
A36
the untimely notice of appeal. The Court
noted that it "incorrectly treated
{Lowry’s} notice of appeal as a motion for
an extension of time"; this was error, the
court said, because the notice of appeal
was unaccompanied by a motion and a
showing of excusable neglect. Order at 3.
The court also vacated its order denying
as moot Lowry’s Rule 4(a)(5) motion. The
court gave MDC ten days to respond to the
revived 4(a) (5) motion.
Lowry also haa argued in her 60(b)
motion that she was entitled to relief
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(a)(6) because she did not’ receive
written notice of the entry of judgment.
The District Court declined to address
that argument, noting it was not raised in
the original 4(a)(5) motion for an
extension of time to file a notice of
later motion to reconsider that ruling.)
appeal. (The court also denied Lowry’s
March 8, 1999 The District Court granted
Lowry’s Rule 4(a)(5) motion, finding the
requisite excusable neglect. The court
noted that the reasons for the delay were
ak a
ates, “as
. ee ee ee ee ee ee eee
A 37
"within Lowry’s counsel’s control, [but]
do not indicate bad faith so much as
carelessness in keeping up with filing
deadlines." Order at 5. The court put
Lowry on notice that she had ten days to
file a new notice of appeal.
March 15, 1999 Lowry timely filed her
second notice of appeal from the original
summary judgment granted to MDC.
March 29, 1999 MDC filed with this Court
yet another motion to dismiss the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction, which we ordered
taken with the case. As we have said, MDC
also raises the jurisdictional issue in a
cross appeal from the District Court’s
decision to grant Lowery’s motion for Rule
60(b) relief.
II.
We begin with the question of whether
the District Court properly granted
Lowry’s motion filed under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b). Rule 60(b)
provides, as relevant here, that a
‘district "court may relieve a party...from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding
A 38
for...mistake." The motion must be
filed, however, "within a reasonable time,
and...not more than one year after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered
or taken." The District Court determined
that is could properly consider Lowry’s
60(b) motion filed nearly six months after
the orders in question were entered, and
then held that the court was mistaken in
granting “leave to file" the untimely
notice of appeal without a motion from
Lowry. The court also held that it erred
in denying Lowry’s original 4(a) (5) motion
as moot, a decision the court made because
it had accepted for filing (albeit
mistakenly) the defective notice of appeal
two days before the 4(a)(5) motion was
filed. A court’s decision that a movant
has shown grounds warranting 60(b) relief
is reviewed for abuse of discretion, but
"we review the district court’s power to
entertain [a motion for] relief" in the
first instance de novo. Spinar v. South
Dakota Bd. of Regents, 769 F.2d 1060, 1062
(8th Cir. 1986). At issue here is not
Rule 60(b)(1) mistake by a party, but
A39
mistake by the court.? It remains the
law in this Circuit that "relief under
Rule 60(b)(1) for judicial error other
than for judicial inadvertence" is not
available. Fox v. Brewer, 620 F.2d 177,
180 (8th Cir. 1980). Assuming without
deciding that the mistakes alleged were
the result of "judicial inadvertence," the
District Court nevertheless should not
have considered Lowry’s motion for Rule
MDC misapprehends the District Court’s
ruling that the court itself, and not
Lowry or her counsel, made the Rule
60(b) (1) mistakes, a confusion’ that
creates a blurring of arguments between
the two rules at issue in this case. See
Brief of McDonnell Douglas Corp. at 26
("(M]iscounting cannot be considered the
type of ’exceptional circumstances’ which
this Court has deemed necessary to revisit
a final judgment.") ; id at 27
("(PJlaintiff’s untimely notice of appeal
was attributable solely to her counsel’s
miscalculation, which does not constitute
‘excusable neglect’ under Rule 4(a)(5) or
‘mistake’ under Rule 60(b)."). Had the
District Court in fact granted Lowry’s
60(b) motion to vacate the judgment based
on her counsel’s mistake in calculating
the time for filing her notice of appeal,
we likely would agree with MDC that this
is an improper use of Rule 60(b). But
that is not what happened here.
A 40
60(b) relief because such relief was not
timely sought, notwithstanding that the
motion was made within the one year
specified by the Rule. A 60(b) motion
also must be brought within a "reasonable
time" and, "({tjJo prevent its use as a
substitute for appeal, we have required a
Rule 60(b) motion alleging judicial
inadvertence to be made within the time
period allowed for appeal," that is,
thirty days from the entry of judgment.
Id. This certainly makes sense in this
case, as in other cases alleging mistake
by the court, where all relevant facts
evidencing the court’s errors were known
as soon as the orders were entered. The
argument raised in Lowry’s 60(b) motion
presents a theory identical to the theory
that, in substance, would have formed the
basis of Lowry’s appeal from the denial of
the Rule 4(a)(5) motion.
Although = the consequences of
enforcing the rule in Fox might seem harsh
in this situation, the result cannot be
characterized as unfair. It is clear both
from Lowry’s 4(a)(5) motion and from her
later 60(b) motion that she was fully
A 41
aware that Rule 4(a)(5) requires a showing
of excusable neglect before an extension
for filing a notice of appeal can be
granted. She even submitted with her
4(a) (5) motion a proposed order purporting
to make such a finding. Lowry filed her
motion two days after the court granted
her the very relief that the motion now
sought under Rule 4(a) (5)--an extension of
time to file her notice of appeal. By
filing that motion, Lowry conceded that
the court’s sua sponte granting of "leave
to file" two days earlier was insufficient
under the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure to remedy the defective notice
of appeal.* Lowry got her extension, but
by a procedure that was in violation of
The practice of accepting an untimely
notice of appeal for filing without a
motion and a showing of excusable neglect
was rendered invalid in 1979 when Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 was amended
to require a motion. See Campbell _ v.
White, 721 F.2d. 644, 645-46 (8th Cir.
1983) ("We think it clear that the 1979
amendment requires the filing of a motion
and that the notice of appeal received
after the date for filing notices may not
be considered a motion for extension.").
A 42
the strictly enforced jurisdictional
requirements of Rule 4. Months later,
when she filed her 60(b) motion, it was
not because she had suddenly learned of
facts that were outside the record when
the asserted mistakes were made; she was
on notice as soon as her 4(a)(5) motion
was denied that it was a mistake. Thus
she was not relieved of her obligation to
promptly challenge the court’s failure to
enunciate a finding of excusable neglect
so as to satisfy this Court’s
jurisdictional requirements. It was
Lowry’s responsibility to act diligently
in these circumstances, either by asking
the District Court to reconsider its
ruling or by appealing from that ruling,
to see that a 4(a)(5) extension was
properly granted and to protect her right
to have this Court consider her appeal on
the merits. No one prevented her,
actually or effectively, from exercising
her rights, nor did anyone or anything
lull her into thinking the court’s actions
were beyond challenge.
Additionally, it should be remembered
that Lowry sought to reopen ae post-
A43
judgment procedural décision, not a
decision that precluded adjudication on
the merits of the case. This is, Lowry
"received a ruling on the merits of [her]
claim" from the District Court. MIF
Realty L.P. v. Rochester Assocs., 92 F.3d
752, 756 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that
court should "balance the policy favoring
finality in judgments against the
competing policy of granting parties a
hearing on the merits of their claims" in
case where Rule 60(b) was invoked to set
aside dismissal that was entered iin
anticipation of settlement that was never
finalized). Our decision does not deprive
Lowry of her day in Court on the substance
of her complaint.
The 60(b) motion was, in fact if not
in form, Lowry’s attempt to be relieved
from our conclusion in the first appeal in
this case that we had no jurisdiction to
hear the appeal. Lowry had no quarrel
with the District Court’s erroneous
procedural rulings until this Court
decided it was without jurisdiction; now
it is too late. Because Lowry’s 60(b)
motion was not filed within the thirty
A44
days permitted for filing a notice of
appeal from the denial of the 4(a) (5)
motion, the District Court erred in
considering the 60(b) motion.
III.
Even if the Rule 60(b) motion had
been timely filed and properly granted so
as to give the District Court’ the
authority to revisit the Rule 4(a) (5)
motion, we conclude that the District
Court abused its discretion in finding
that Lowry had shown excusable neglect.
See Me olitan Fed. Bank v. W.R. G
Co., 999 F.2a 1257, 1259 (8th Cir. 1993)
(standard of review). ;
The time limits detailed in Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 for filing a
notice of appeal in the district court are
"mandatory and jurisdictional." Browder v.
Director, Dep’t of Corrections, 434 U.S.
257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v.
Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)).
Under the terms of the rule, as relevant
here, the district court may extend the
time for filing a notice of appeal upon
motion by a party made within thirty days
of the filing deadline and with a showing
A 45
of excusable neglect.° See Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a) (5). The question here is whether
Lowry can demonstrate excusable neglect.
In i Vv Lo e ife
Insurance Co., this Court adopted the
Lowry’s motion was styled "Ex Parte Motion
by Plaintiff to File Notice of Appeal per
Federal Rule of Appellant [sic] Procedure
4(a)(5)." A party may file an ex parte
4(a)(5) motion to extend the time for
filing a notice of appeal only if the
motion is filed within the time permitted
for filing the notice of appeal in the
first place, ordinarily (and in this case)
thirty days from the date judgment is
entered. See Hable v. Pairolero, 915 F.2d
394, 395 (8th Cir. 1990). Lowry’s motion
was not filed within that period, but it
was not ex parte either, as it was served
on opposing counsel.
Also, to the extent Lowry may be
proposing that we might apply the less
stringent "good cause" standard referred
to in Rule 4(a)(5) (she mentions it
throughout - her brief, usually in
conjunction with the "excusable neglect"
standard), we must reject that suggestion.
The good cause standard is applicable only
when the party seeking an extension files
her 4(a)(5) motion within the thirty-day
period allowed for filing a timely notice
of appeal, that is, when she is seeking
permission to file late rather’ than
forgiveness for having- filed late. See
Bartunek v. Bubak, 941 F.2d. 726, 728 (8th
Cir. 1991).
A46
"more flexible analysis of the excusable
neglect standard" set forth in Pioneer
Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick
Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S.
380 (1993), for application to Rule
4(a)(5) cases. Fink, 65 F.3d 722, 724
(8th Cir. 1995). In Pioneer, the Supreme
Court "conclude[d] that the determination
{of whether neglect is excusable] is at
the bottom an equitable one, taking
account of all relevant circumstances
surrounding the party’s omission."
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. The Court found
those circumstances to include "the danger
of prejudice to the [non-moving party],
the length of the delay and its potential
impact on judicial proceedings, the reason
for the delay, including whether it was
within the reasonable control of the
movant, and whether the movant acted in
good faith." Id.
For some reason, MDC opted not to
discuss all four of the Pioneer factors,
or even to discuss the Pioneer standard at
all in its brief, and mentions the case
only fleetingly in its motion to dismiss.
Instead, MDC’s argument focuses only on
A47
the reasons that Lowry gave for failing to
file a timely notice of appeal. We will
assume, then, that MDC is not claiming
that any prejudice will result to the
company from granting Lowry’s 4(a) (5)
motion. Indeed, we discern none, except
that final resolution of the case has been
postponed. As for the second factor, the
delay of one week in filing the original
4(a) (5) motion was minimal. But then it
seems that the delay always will be
minimal in actual if not relative terms,
and the prejudice to the non-movant will
often be negligible, since the Rule
requires a 4(a)(5) motion to be filed
within thirty days of the last day for
filing a timely notice of appeal. See
e.g., Prizevoits v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co.,
76 F.3d 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1996) ("We do
not think it can make a difference that no
harm to the appellee has been _ shown.
There is unlikely ever to be harm in the
Rule 4(a) (5) setting, because the
neglectful appellant has only 30 days
after the expiration of his time for
appealing in which to request relief.").
The delay is more significant, of course,
4
A48
if we count the months caused by the late
filing (and subsequent granting) of
Lowry’s 60(b) motion. But even taking
that delay into account, there is no
apparent "impact on judicial proceedings."
And there is no record evidence that Lowry
did not act in good faith, as that term is
generally understood (although we are a
bit troubled by the sometimes inconsistent
and shifting excuses for the failure to
timely file the notice of appeal that
appear throughout the record in this
case).
That brings us to the fourth factor:
Lowry’s reason for missing the filing
deadline. We think this is key to the
analysis. The four Pioneer factors do not
carry equal weight; the excuse given for
the late filing must have the greatest
import. While prejudice, length of delay,
and good faith might have more relevance
in a closer case, the reason-for-delay
factor will always be critical to the
inquiry. We acknowledge, of course, that
the Supreme Court has said that neglect
need not be "caused by circumstances
beyond the control of the movant" to be
A49
excusable, Pioneer 507 U.S. at 392, and
that a finding of sufficient innocence on
the part of the movant is not a condition
precedent to our obligation to consider
the other equitable factors, see id. at
395 n. 14. But at the end of the day, the
focus must be upon the nature of the
neglect. Therefore we must examine
carefully the reasons Lowry gave for
missing the deadline.
In the original 4(a)(5) "Ex Parte
Motion" (filed July 31, 1998), Lowry said
that counsel "calculated incorrectly the
thirty (30) days, believing that the
thirty (30) days did not count’ the
original June 24, 1998 and that thirty
(30) days would fall on Saturday July 25,
1998." In fact counsel was correct about
the first part; the thirty-day window did
not begin on the date of entry, June 24,
1998 but on the next day. See Fed.R. App.
P. 26(a)(1). Counting thirty days
beginning with June 25, 1998, however,
still makes the last day for filing a
timely notice of appeal July 24, 1998, not
July 25. Lowry also claimed in the "Ex
Parte Motion" that "excusable neglect is
A 50
shown by Plaintiff’s counsel’s
miscalculation of the time due to the
weekend time and the calculations
thereto." We are not certain exactly what
that means, as the rules clearly provide
that intermediate weekends are to be
counted in the thirty-day computation.
See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(2). (If the
last day for filing, however, falls ona
weekend or a legal holiday, that day is
not included in the thirty days allowed
for filing. See id. 26(a)(3)). In the
later-filed "Notice and Motion to Relieve
Plaintiffs [sic] from Denial as Moot
Motion to Grant Leave to Extend Time for
Filing Notice of Appeal (FRCP 60, FRAP
4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6))" (filed January 19,
1999), Lowry further offered that "[a]ny
miscalculations on the time was [sic] also
compounded by the weekend and the number
of days in the month of June." As we have
said, it is unclear (and unexplained) why
"the weekend" provides an excuse. As for
the number of days in June, if Lowry is
suggesting that June being a thirty-day
month, rather than a thirty-one-day month,
three off his calculations, that argument
A51
is specious. If June had thirty-one days
instead of thirty, the notice of appeal
would have been due one day sooner.
What we have, then, is garden-variety
attorney inattention. Although neglect no
longer needs to be beyond a party’s
“control to be deemed excusable,
"inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or
mistakes construing the rules do not
usually constitute ’excusable’ neglect."
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392. Notwithstanding
the "flexible" Pioneer standard,
experienced counsel’s misapplication of
clear and unambiguous procedural rules
cannot excuse his failure to file a timely
notice of appeal. "Here the rule is
crystal clear, the error egregious, the
excuses so thin as to leave the lapse not
only unexcused but inexplicable."
Prizevoits, 76 F.3d at 134. If we were to
apply the excusable neglect standard to
require that we deem lLowry’s neglect
excusable in this case., it is hard to
fathom the kind of neglect that we would
not deem excusable. See id; se so
ti j OE ey,
130 F.3d. 996, 998 (llth Cir. 1997) ("That
A’52
the ' four-part Pioneer standard for
determining excusable neglect applies does
not change existing law that a lawyer’s
misunderstanding of clear law cannot
constitute excusable neglect. Ze St
could, almost every appellant’s lawyer
would plead his’ own inability to
understand the law when he fails to comply
with a deadline. We do not believe that
the [Supreme] Court intended a practice
that would require courts to be that
lenient about disobedience to plain
law."). The District Court abused its
discretion in holding that Lowry
demonstrated excusable neglect under Rule
4(a) (5).
We make short work of Lowry’s
argument that she was entitled to relief
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(a)(6) because she did not receive notice
from the Court or from a party of the
entry of judgment. The District Court
declined to address the issue because it
was not properly raised in her original
4(a)(5) motion, and we see no error in
that conclusion. Moreover, even if we
were to consider the question and to
A53
accept the assertion that Lowry did not
receive written notice of the entry of
judgment, she acknowledged in her 4(a) (5)
motion that "counsel was informed that
[judgment] was entered on June 24, 1998
and was attempting to proceed thereto."
Thus Lowry had actual notice of the entry
of judgment, if in fact she did not
receive written notice. Further, it was
Lowery’s responsibility to check the
docket for entry of judgment, particularly
when she knew on June 19, 1998, that the
District Court had signed an order
granting summary judgment to MDC. See
Zi t is Cc. v. Zimmer Co., 32
F.3d 357, 361 (8th Cir. 1994).
In sum, then, we hold that the
District Court was without authority to
consider Lowry’s 60(b) motion to "undo"
the court’s denial of her original 4(a) (5)
motion. In any case, Lowry cannot
demonstrate that her neglect was
"excusable" so as to entitle her to an
extension of time to file her notice of
appeal. The timely filing of a notice of
appeal being mandatory and jurisdictional,
we dismiss the appeal and decline to
A54
address the merits in what could only be
an advisory opinion. See id..
A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS,
EIGHT CIRCUIT
A 55
No. 99-1750EMSL
No. 99-1805EMSL
Margaret Lowry,
4:96CV1572ERW
+ + +
/s/
Appellant/Cross~Appellee, *
: * Appeal from the
Vv. * United States
* District Court
McDonnell Douglas, * for the Eastern
Corporation * District of
* Missouri
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.*
JUDGMENT
(Filed June 8, 2000)
This appeal from the United States
District Court was submitted on the record
of the district court, briefs of the
parties and was argued by counsel.
After consideration, it is hereby
ordered and adjudged that the judgment of
the district court in this cause is
affirmed in accordance with the opinion of
this Court.
(5172-010199)
A 56
April 27, 2000
A true copy
ATTEST: /s/ Michael E. Gans
CLERK, U.S COURT OF APPEALS,
EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
MANDATE ISSUED JUN 9 2000
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.