Amicus Brief — Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Union Oil Co. of California

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In the Supreme Court of the Bnited States |

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE

SETH P. WAXMAN

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

DAVID W. OGDEN

Assistant Attorney General

LAWRENCE G,. WALLACE

Deputy Solicitor General

JAMES A. FELDMAN

Assistant to the Solicitor

ALBIN F. DROST

Acting General Counsel

JOHN M. WHEALAN

Solicitor

General

) INCYS ISACS

pte ee BARBARA BIDDLE

Associate Solicitors ys comagpami

United States Patent and y'

Trademark Office Department of Justice

Arlington, VA 22215 Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

202) 514-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence in the

record to permit a jury to conclude that respondent’s

patent application satisfies the written description

requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112.

2. Whether the courts below correctly construed the

scope of respondent’s patent for purposes of

determining whether, under 35 U.S.C. 102, the patent’s

claims were anticipated by certain specialty aviation

and racing fuels.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statement

Discussion

Conclusion

Appendix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co.,

804 F.2d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1986)

Dell Computer Corp, In re, 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996) ..............

Driscoll, In re, 562 F.2d 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1977) cecccsccccossosesse.

Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822) seoceo..o......

FCC v. Florida Power Co., 480 U.S. 245 CED kcistbsietta

General Elec. Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co.,

326 U.S. 242 (1945) ;

McCarty v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 160 U.S. 110

(1895) '

Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive

Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945)

Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535

(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981)

Ruschig, In re, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. RIED inaphdindech ccna

Saunders, In re, 444 F.2d 599 (C.C.P.A. 1971) cecccssessssssses..

Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech,

Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir., 1991)

Smith, In re, 458 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1972)

SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v.

Watson Pharm., Inc., 211 F.3d 21 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 121 S. Ct. 173 (2000)

Universal Oil Products Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining

Co., 322 U.S. 471 (1944)

Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed.

Cir. 1991)

(III)

RNS Wao eae? EO eee ere Eas

S80 §

3, 9, 10

Aral et tt es tee —

IV

Cases—Continued: Page

Wertheim, In re, 541 F.2d 257 (C.C.P.A. 1976) .......... 9, 10, 18

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,

395 U.S. 100 (1969) 18

Statutes, regulations and rule:

Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 .... a 9

Patent Term Guarantee Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.

106-43, § 4402(b)(1), 113 Stat. 1501 A-560 10

21 U.S.C. 355@) (1988) ....... “ 20

35 U.S.C. 102(b) 4

35 U.S.C. 102(f) 13, 19

35 U.S.C. 112 ... 3, 9, 13, 17, 18

35 U.S.C. 132 12

35 U:S.C. 282 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) ....... 10.

37 C.F.R. 1.111 12

40 C.F.R.:

Section 80.41 13

Section 80.45 7” 13

Sup. Ct. R. 10(¢) ... 14

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 00-249

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE

This brief is submitted in response to the Court’s

order inviting the Solicitor General to file a brief

expressing the views of the United States.

STATEMENT

Petitioners, a group of oil refiners, challenge the

validity of United States Patent No. 5,288,393 (the ’393

patent), owned by respondent. The ’393 patent is

directed to reformulated unleaded gasoline intended to

reduce harmful automobile emissions. After the filing

date of the ’393 patent, but before the patent issued, the

California Air Resources Board (CARB) set standards

for gasoline that may be sold in California, which were

formulated following detailed and joint consultations

with various interested entities, including respondent.

After CARB promulgated its standards, respondent

amended its application to include 41 claims, some of

which are similar to the CARB regulatory conditions.

After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment

in favor of respondent. The Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the record

(1)

2

contained substantial evidence to support the jury’s

factual determinations and that the district court had

correctly interpreted the scope of the patent claims.

1. Gasolines are derived from components that are

refined from crude oil. Those components must be

blended so that the resulting gasoline will have proper-

ties that will give satisfactory performance over an

extremely wide range of operating and climatic condi-

tions. C.A. App. 5952. The ’393 patent has to do with ©

producing gasolines with certain combinations of prop-

erties that will reduce automobile tailpipe emissions.

Pet. App. 2a.

2. On December 13, 1990, respondent filed a patent

application for what became the 393 patent. C.A. App.

447. The application asserted an invention date of

March 1990.' At the time of the application, CARB had

begun a process designed to lead to the establishment

of requirements for reformulated gasolines that would

reduce emissions in California. The process involved

close consultation with interested parties, including

refiners such as petitioners and respondent, who shared

technical skills and data with CARB in an effort .to

arrive at standards that would achieve the maximum

reduction in emissions at the lowest cost. Respondent

was one of the firms that participated in the process.

' During the same time period, respondent was involved in a

joint research program sponsored by the automobile and oil indus-

tries to study how gasoline could be reformulated to reduce

harmful emissions. Trial Tr. 1130-1137. The participants in the

Auto/Oil program signed an agreement permitting each party to

perform independent research and to protect any intellectual

property assets that may arise from the individual research. bid.

At the time the patent application was filed, CARB had already

announced its intention to adopt reformulated gasoline regulations

designed to reduce emissions, although the precise shape of those

regulations was not yet clear. C.A. App. 5113-5131.

3 peas

CARB announced its new regulations in November

1991, which were to be effective in early 1996. At that

time, respondent was prosecuting the patent in the

Patent Office. During the prosecution, respondent filed

numerous information disclosure statements presenting

information for consideration by the examiner, includ-

ing one that informed the examiner of CARB’s Novem-

ber 1991 standards. C.A. App. 5778-5782.

The ’393 patent issued-on February 22, 1994. Pet.

App. 33a. The patent application contained 82 claims.

fd. at 2a. During the prosecution of the patent, all of

the patent’s claims were modified. As issued, the pat-

ent included 155 claims, but respondent disclaimed all

but the 41 at issue in this case. Ibid.

3. In April 1995, petitioners commenced this action

in the district court against respondent for a declara-

tory judgment that the ’393 patent was invalid. Re-

spondent counterclaimed, alleging that petitioners were

infringing the patent. Pet. App. 7a. After a 49-day trial

and 13 days of deliberations, a jury reached a verdict in

favor of respondent. Id. at 7a-8a. Two issues are of

primary importance here.

a. First, 35 U.S.C. 112 provides that

[t]he specification [in the patent application] shall

contain a written description of the invention, and of

the manner and process of making and using it, in

such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable

any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or

with which it is most nearly connected, to make and

use the same.

The “written description” component of that require-

ment must “convey with reasonable clarity to those

skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or

she was in possession of the invention.” Vas-Cath Inc.

v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-1564 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

4

Petitioners asserted that, because the claims of the ’393

patent were substantially revised from those included

in the original patent application, the patent application

failed to supply a “written description” sufficient to

show that respondent was in possession of the claimed

invention as of the filing date of the patent application.

Indeed, a primary argument of petitioners before this

Court is that the claims of the ’393 patent are derived

from the 1991 CARB standards;rather than from the

invention as described in the patent application in 1990.

See, e.g., Pet. 3, 14.

In a special verdict, the jury found that the written

description requirement was satisfied by each of the 41

claims of the 393 patent. Pet. App. 8a. The trial court

denied petitioners’ post-trial motion for judgment as a

matter of law on that point, finding “that substantial

evidence exists in the record regarding the written de-

scription to support the verdict that [the inventors] had

possession of the claimed subject matter.” Jd. at 54a.

b. Second, 35 U.S.C. 102(b) sets forth an “anticipa-

tion” requirement, which provides that a patent is valid

unless “the invention was patented or described in a

printed publication in this or a foreign country or in

public use or on sale in this country, more than one year

prior to the date of the application for patent.” Peti-

tioners argued that the 393 patent was anticipated,

because the compositions that it taught had in fact been

used in aviation and racing fuels long before the ’393

patent application was filed. The district court denied

petitioners’ summary judgment on that point, however,

construing the claims of the patent to extend only to

“unleaded gasoline fuels intended for regular use in

automobiles, 7.e., traditional motor gasoline to be mass-

produced at typical refineries for the general motoring

public.” Pet. App. 47a: The court held that, as so con-

5

strued, there remained a factual issue regarding

“whether the patent merely reveals new properties of a

previous invention * * * or whether it teaches a new

process defined by the properties of the resulting

composition.” Jd. at 46a. That issue was submitted to

the jury, which found that none of the 41 claims was

anticipated by prior art. Jd. at 8a. The district court

denied petitioners’ post-trial motion for judgment as a

matter of law on the anticipation issue. Jd. at 51a-53a.

4. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed.

Pet. App. la-31a.

a. With respect to the written description require-

ment, the court noted that that requirement “does not

require the applicant to describe exactly the subject

matter claimed” and that the “primary consideration is

factual and depends on the nature of the invention and

the amount of knowledge imparted to those skilled in

the art by the disclosure.” Pet. App. 13a. See also id. at

22a (referring to “the fact-sensitive nature of the

written description inquiry”). The court stated that the

393 patent “teaches that changes in the proportions of

different hydrocarbon-containing streams mixed to

produce gasoline with specific properties reduces the

amount of [emissions] from an automobile engine.” Jd.

at 14a. Accordingly, “the patent claims its inventive

products in terms of ranges of chemical properties,

which work in combination with ranges of other chemi-

cal properties to produce a gasoline that reduces

emissions.” Jbid.

The court rejected the argument that “range” claims

of the sort made by the ’393 patent violate the written

description requirement if they do “not describe the

exact chemical component of each combination that falls

within” the patent’s claims, Pet. App. 15a. The court

gave examples of the ways in which limitations in two

6

claims in the ’393 patent were supported by the teach-

ings recited in the patent’s specifications. Jd. at 16a-

17a. The court also explained that the relevant ques-

tion is “whether one of skill in the art could derive the

claimed ranges from the parent’s disclosure,” not

whether “the ranges in applicant’s claims * * * corre-

spond exactly to those disclosed in the parent appli-

cation.” Id. at 22a.

b. With respect to the anticipation argument, the

court of appeals noted that the ’393 patent “claims com-

positions of matter,” and that “(t]he scope of these

composition claims cannot * * * embrace only certain

uses of that composition.” Pet. App. 10a. The court

examined the district court’s construction of the patent,

and it concluded that the district court “refus[ed] to

narrow the scope of the claimed compositions to specific

uses.” Jbid. In particular, the court explained that the

district court “construed the claims to cover only a nar-

row class of fuel compositions, namely only standard

automotive gasoline,” and that the court “correctly ex-

cluded from claim scope a broader class of petroleum

formulations such as aviation fuels or racing fuels.”

Ibid.

The court of appeals found support for the district

court’s construction in the language used in the pre-

amble to each of the claims, which refers to an “un-

leaded gasoline” and one that is “suitable for combus-

tion in an automotive engine” or “in a spark ignition

automotive engine.” Pet. App. 10a. The court also

noted that the specification described the problem

addressed by the patent (“atmospheric pollution * * *

caused by the emission of gaseous pollutants in the

exhaust gases from automobiles”) as one involving ordi-

nary automobiles, and it noted that “ordinary passenger

automobiles” had been used in the tests leading up to

the invention. Jd. at lla. Because “the ’393 patent

covers only standard automotive fuel,” the court agreed

with the district court (and found substantial support

for the jury’s conclusion) that “the aviation and racing

fuels that allegedly invalidate the ’398 claims do not

anticipate because they do not contain each and every

limitation of the claims.” Jd. at 12a. Indeed, even aside

from the limitation to standard automotive fuels, the

court concluded that “the record does not show that the

aviation and racing fuels otherwise have the claimed

characteristics of the particular standard automotive

fuels recited in the ’393 patent.” Ibid. ,

c. Judge Lourie dissented from the majority’s hold-

ing with respect to the written description require-

ment. Pet. App. 24a-3la. He did not address the antici-

pation issue. See id. at 24a.

Judge Lourie stated that the written description

requirement requires “a precise description in the text

of the patent specification of all of the aspects of the

claimed invention.” Pet. App. 25a. He agreed with the

majority “that a patent need not describe the claimed

subject matter in precisely the same terms as used in

the claims,” but “it must still describe the invention

with all its claimed limitations in some manner.” /d. at

26a. With respect to the ’393 patent, Judge Lourie

acknowledged that there “surely is a description of

most of the particular claim limitations of the various

claims,” but he argued that “that is not the same as a

description of a specific composition described by a

particular selection of those characteristics.” Ibid.

Referring to the limitations of one of the ’393 claims,

Judge Lourie noted that “one can * * * find all of the

limitations” in that claim in the specification, but

“{w]hen one has to pick and choose among a wide range

of variables to construct a claim, the subject matter of

8

that claim has not been described as required by the

statute.” Jd. at 28a. In his view, therefore, the major-

ity had “us[ed] enablement reasoning” to find that the

patent application satisfied the distinct requirement

that the specification adequately described the inven-

tion as ultimately claimed. /d. at 24a. He concluded

that “[njo reasonable jury, carefully reading and

examining the patent specification, could conclude

* * * that the patent specification’s descriptions of

individual fuel characteristics or the teachings that

multiple fuel characteristics can be varied in particular

ways constitutes a sufficient written description of the

compositions of any of the claims.” Jd. at 31a.

DISCUSSION

Further review is not warranted. With respect to

the written description requirement, the jury’s conclu-

sion that the patent application demonstrated that,

prior to the CARB process, respondent was in posses-

sion of the invention that was ultimately claimed was

highly dependent on the specific, and highly technical,

facts of this case. With respect to the proper construc-

tion of the 393 patent, both lower courts agreed that, in

light of the specific terms of the patent specification and

claims, the patent should be construed not to cover

specialty aviation and racing fuels that may otherwise

have anticipated the claimed invention. In our view,

although both of those issues present close questions,

they involve only the meaning of the particular dis-

closures in the specifications of the ’393 patent and the

correct construction of that patent’s claims. The ulti-

mate importance of the ’393 patent is not yet entirely

clear. Even if it is as significant as petitioners fear,

however, this Court’s review is not warranted to ad-

dress relatively narrow issues regarding the particular

terms of a particular patent.

9

We share petitioners’ and amici’s concern about

possible misuse of the regulatory process by a patent

applicant. Moreover, it is important that protections

afforded to competitors and to the public against

inequitable conduct by patent holders be enforced. We

do not believe, however, that the court of appeals

decided any legal issue or altered settled legal princi-

ples in a way that would likely encourage misuse or

inequitable conduct by patent holders in the future.

l. a. The written description requirement of 35

U.S.C. 112 is intended to ensure that the inventor had

possession, as of the filing date of the application relied

on, of the specific subject matter later claimed. See,

e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d at 1563-1564;

In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976). It

thereby guards against overreaching by the inventor,

“by insisting that he recount his invention in such detail

that his future claims can be determined to be encom-

passed within his original creation.” Rengo Co. v.

Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (8d Cir.) (quoted in

Vas-Cath, 985 F.2d at 1561), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055

(1981). The written description requirement of Section

112 is distinct from the “enablement” requirement of

the same Section, which requires the description to be

sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to practice the

invention. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433-

434 (1822) (decided under the Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11,

1 Stat. 318, which did not require presenting claims to

an invention); see also Universal Oil Products Co. v.

Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944).

Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in the

court below described the question whether a written

description is sufficient as highly fact-specific. The

majority referred to “the often cited rule that written

description questions are intensely factual, and should

10

be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, without the ap-

plication of wooden rules.” Pet. App. 21a; see also id. at

22a (“Because of the fact-sensitive nature of the written

description inquiry, this court has often warned against

misapplication of precedents in this area.”). The dis-

senting judge similarly noted the “case-by-case analy-

sis” that must be applied to questions regarding the

adequacy of the written description in a patent, and he

acknowledged “that the written description require-

ment is a question of fact concerning which we owe con-

siderable deference.” Jd. at 30a. See also Vas-Cath, 935

F.2d at 1562 (“The primary consideration is factual.”);

In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1250 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (“the

precedential value of cases in this area is extremely

limited”); Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 263 (“[(b]jroadly

articulated rules are particularly inappropriate in this

area”); In re Smith, 458 F.2d 1389, 1895 (C.C.P.A. 1972)

(“Precisely how close the description must come to com-

ply with § 112 must be left to case-by-case develop-.

ment.”).

b. The substance of the written description issue

turns on whether there was sufficient evidence sup-

porting the jury’s conclusion that the 41 claims of the

"393 patent represent merely a narrowing of the origi-

nally claimed invention, as opposed to a new invention

that would not be entitled to the filing date of the

original application. Pet. App. 18a-2la.° The invention

underlying the ’393 patent is asserted to have been

° Once a patent issues, it is presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. 282 (1994

& Supp. IV 1998), as amended by Patent Term Guarantee Act of

1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4402(b)(1), 113 Stat. 1501A-560.

Accordingly, the burden is on the challenger (petitioners here) to

prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. Carella v.

Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 138 (Fed. Cir.

1986).

ll

predicated upon the discovery that there are a number

of properties of gasoline that were previously thought

to have affected performance, but that the ’393 patent

teaches have predictable effects on emissions as well.

As the court explained, the “patent teaches one of

ordinary skill” that reducing certain specific properties

of gasoline progressively reduces carbon monoxide and

hydrocarbons, while reducing other properties pro-

gressively reduces carbon monoxide and nitrogen

oxides, “and so forth with several other relationships.”

Id. at 15a. The patent then “claims ranges for these

properties that provide cleaner gasoline emissions.”

Ibid. Although the claimed ranges of properties do not

inform refiners of the precise chemical makeup of the

resulting gasoline mixtures, the court of appeals con-

cluded that “the patentee in this case taught the

desired characteristics of the final automotive fuels,

realizing that those of skill in this art know that those

characteristics define the claimed products.” Jd. at 20a-

21a.

Petitioners argue that the written description was

inadequate, however, because the 41 claims of the

patent as issued differ from the claims in the original

application. In particular, petitioners argue that

respondent’s application simply included “long lists of

gasoline properties that in many respects simply

corresponded to then-existing legal requirements” for

gasoline, that the claims then were amended in a way

that “resemble[d]” the CARB requirements, and that

“(t]hose amendments contradicted the teachings of

[respondent’s] patent application.” Pet. 15.° Of course,

3 Petitioners repeatedly quote the word “resemble” in arguing

that respondent “participated with the rest of the oil industry in

CARB’s decision-making process, waited for CARB to make its

regulatory decisions, and then scrapped all of the original claims

u

12

modification of the claims of a patent during prosecu-

tion is an accepted practice, for a variety of reasons.

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. 132; 37 C.F.R. 1.111. As petitioners

(and the dissenting judge) see it, however, the ’393

application merely defined a large number of gasoline

mixtures (a whole forest of “unmarked trees,” in the

commonly used metaphor adapted from In re Ruschig,

379 F.2d 990, 994-995 (C.C.P.A. 1967)), in the hope that

some of them might turn out to be genuinely useful (2.e.,

the “blaze marks” in the Ruschig metaphor that are a

“help in finding one’s way through the woods,” ibid.).

As it turned out the useful ones “resembled” those that

emerged from the CARB process.

Regardless of which view is correct regarding the

adequacy of the written description in the ’393 patent,

the issue does not warrant review by this Court. The

Federal Circuit did not purport to eliminate or weaken

the requirement that the written description in a

patent application must describe the invention as .

ultimately embodied in the claims of the issued patent.

Nor did it purport to hold that a laundry list of claimed

combinations that do not point specifically to the claims

of the issued patent would constitute a sufficient

and substituted amended claims to ‘resemble’ the CARB regula-

tions.” Pet. 14; see also Pet. 2, 3, 4, 7, 15, 18. If, as the courts below

held, respondent had a patentable invention at the time of the ’393

patent application, the fact that respondent later narrowed the

claims of that invention to focus on its most useful commercial

applications would not render the 393 patent invalid. In any

event, although petitioners do not provide the record citation for

the term “resemble,” a review of the passage on which they appar-

ently rely indicates that it is ambiguous as to whether the claims

were narrowed for the purpose of resembling the CARB regula-

tions or whether they were narrowed in a way that simply had that

effect. We have provided the relevant excerpt from the testimony

in an Appendix to this Brief.

13

written description. The Federal Circuit’s decision

thus leaves in place the important safeguards in patent

law that petitioners emphasize. See Pet. 16.*

In these circumstances, review by this Court would

simply provide another opportunity to review the appli-

cation of the settled legal principles, on which peti-

tioners and the court of appeals largely agree, to the

particular facts of this case. As noted above, the ques-

tion whether a written description is sufficient is excep-

tionally closely tied to the particular circumstances of

each case. Further review of that issue, therefore, is

particularly unlikely to assist in developing generally

applicable legal principles in this area. The ’393 patent

may well be an important one, although it is impossible

to know with certainty the extent to which refiners will

find ways to produce non-infringing reformulated

gasoline that complies with the CARB—or other—

standards.’ But the validity of the ’393 patent is not in

4 Petitioners state (Pet. 16) that the court of appeals’ decision

was an “evisceration of the long-standing doctrine under § 112 that

stood as the only bulwark against gaming of the regulatory and

patent regimes.” We agree that Section 112 states important

requirements that protect the public against patent monopolies

that are unjustified by the purposes of patent law. We do not

agree, however, that Section 112 is particularly directed toward

“gaming of the regulatory and patent regimes,” or that it is the

“only bulwark” against such conduct. Other requirements of

patent law, such as the requirement that the patentee himself be

the inventor, see 35 U.S.C. 102(f), similarly serve to protect the

public against such “gaming,” as well as against other evils that

would be attendant on unjustified grants of patent rights.

5 On February 16, 1994, the Environmental Protection Agency

published regulations for reformulated gasoline designed to reduce

emissions in designated areas throughout the country, 40 C.F.R.

80.41, as well as regulations for determining compliance using an

emissions model that calculates performance by looking at the

levels of several components of gasoline. 40 C.F.R. 80.45. EPA

14

itself “an important federal question” that “has not

been, but should be, settled by this Court.” Sup. Ct. R.

10(e).°

2. For similar reasons, further review is not war-

ranted with respect to the anticipation issue. As the

parties recognize, that issue turns on the construction

of the patent claims in this case. If the claims of the

’393 patent apply to all fuels that are capable of being

used in internal combustion engines, then they may

well have been anticipated by the references to racing

and aviation fuels that long predated the patent

application here. On the other hand, if the claims of the

’393 patent are limited to “a narrow class of fuel com-

positions, namely only standard automotive gasoline,”

Pet. App. 10a, then the references to racing and avia-

tion fuels would not be invalidating.

The courts below relied on a number of features pre-

sent in the patent application to find that the term “[aJn

unleaded gasoline fuel suitable for combustion in an

automotive engine” (or “in a spark ignition automotive

engine”), Pet. App. 10a, point clearly to a composition of

matter that is distinct from the kinds of compositions

that are used in aviation or racing fuel. The district

court recognized that “‘suitable for combustion in an

automotive engine’ can be stretched to include any fuel

developed its regulations after the CARB process had begun.

Petitioners assert (Pet. 9) that respondent “will doubtless argue”

that reformulated gasolines that comply with EPA’s regulations

“infringe[{] [respondent’s] patents” that followed the ’393 patent.

6 Amici States (Br. 3) state that respondent has obtained four

patents similar to the ’393 patent, and that “the potential is there

for [respondent] to control the entire Nation’s gasoline market.”

We take no position on the validity or significance of those patents.

We note, however, that Congress could require a patentholder in

that situation to license its patent at just and reasonable rates.

See FCC v. Florida Power Co., 480 U.S. 245, 253-254 (1987).

15

that could be burned.” Id. at 41a. But both courts

found “extensive support,” id. at lla, for a narrower

construction in the patent application’s description of

the automobile emissions problem addressed by their

invention, its comparisons of the claimed gasolines to

“typical gasoline fuel,” its description of the benefits to

be obtained from use of the claimed gasolines, and its

use of ordinary passenger automobiles in testing the

claimed fuel. See id. at 1la-12a, 36a-39a.

Petitioners argue (Pet. 19-26) that the patent may -

not fairly be read to include the limitation to standard

automotive fuels adopted by the court of appeals. They

argue that the key phrase in the claims describes a fuel

“suitable for combustion” in an automobile, and that the

clear meaning of that phrase would include aviation and

racing fuels that can be—and sometimes are—used ina

standard automobile engine. Although the court of

appeals disagreed with petitioners on that point, the

court adopted the key legal principles relied upon by

petitioners. For example, petitioners rely (Pet. i) on

the principles that a court may not “include elements

not mentioned in the claim in order to limit such claim

and avoid a defence of anticipation,” McCarty v. Lehigh

Valley R.R., 160 U.S. 110, 116 (1895), and that “lilt is

not invention to perceive that the product which others

had discovered” could be used in ways not previously

perceived, General Elec. Co. v. Jewei Incandescent

Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242, 249 (1945). There was, how-

ever, no disagreement about those principles here. The

court of appeals agreed that claims could not be altered

by construction, stating that the “constuction of claims

is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim

language[{] in order to understand and explain, but not

to change, the scope of the claims.” Pet. App. 10a (quot-

ing Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech,

16

Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Moreover,

the court expressly held that “(t]he scope of these

composition claims cannot * * * embrace only certain

uses of that composition,” thus recognizing that merely

finding an obvious new use for an existing product is

not an invention. Pet. App. 10a.’

Given the agreement on the general nature of the

rules governing the construction of patent claims, this

case simply presents the question whether the courts

below erred in construing the particular terms of the

’393 patent. In our view, reasonable minds could differ

on that question. But it is difficult to imagine a case in

which the construction of the claims of a particular

patent would present an issue sufficiently important to

warrant this Court’s attention. In any event, as we

explained above, although the ’393 patent may turn out

to be a very important one, its precise ‘effect on the

gasoline market remains uncertain, and it is not of suffi-

cient general importance to warrant this Court’s -

review.

3. Petitioners argue (Pet. 15) that respondent en-

gaged in “gaming of the regulatory * * * process” by

filing a broad patent application, participating in the

CARB regulatory process without disclosing its patent

application, and then modifying the claims in the

application to more closely resemble the requirements

that CARB adopted. We share the concern expressed

by petitioners and amici that a party could attempt to

employ the patent laws to take unfair advantage of an

7 Petitioners assert (Pet. 25) that the court of appeals “nar-

row[ed] [the] patent claims to avoid invalidity.” The court’s con-

struction of the patent, however, was not based on a desire “to

avoid invalidity,” but on the court’s perception that its construction

was “confirm[ed]” by the claim language and found “extensive sup-

port in the specification.” Pet. App. 10a-11a.

17

open regulatory process. The federal and state govern-

ments have come increasingly to explore possibilities

for developing rules through open and voluntary con-

sensual processes involving all affected parties. Mem-

bers of a regulated industry may well be reluctant to

bring their own technical knowledge and policy views

to such a public forum if they fear that their competi-

tors will use the shared information about technologies

and regulatory strategies to craft overly broad patents.

Thus, the threats posed by “gaming” the regulatory

process could operate as a serious disincentive to indus-:

tries to participate in the kinds of alternative rule-

making strategies that are clearly in the public interest.

Although we share the concerns of petitioners and

amici, we do not think that the narrow legal questions

presented in the petition for certiorari present an

appropriate vehicle to address those concerns. Peti-

tioners rely solely on the “written description” require-

ment in 35 U.S.C. 112 to address what they view to

have been respondent’s “gaming.” But the “written

description” requirement does not vary depending on

whether a governmental entity ultimately determines

that practicing the patented invention is a useful (or

even the only) way to satisfy a legal requirement. The

fact that an invention is particularly useful in satisfying

a government clean air or other standard certainly does

not lessen the value of the invention to society or the

patent protection that it should be afforded. Thus, if

respondent “had possession” of the claims of the ’393

patent as of the December 1990 filing date of the patent

application, as the courts below held, the subsequent

adoption of regulations would not have any effect on the

18

sufficiency of the written description for patentability

purposes."

That is not to say that there are no mechanisms

available to address “gaming” of a regulatory system.

It has long been accepted that misuse of a patent or

inequitable conduct before the Patent Office can render

a patent unenforceable. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v.

Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 185-141 (1969)

(patent misuse); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v.

Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945) (in-

equitable conduct); see also Pet. App. 22a-23a (rejecting

petitioners’ argument that respondent engaged in

“inequitable conduct”). Petitioners, however, do not

present a claim of patent misuse, which in any event

typically involves the exploitation of patent protection

by the patentee. Petitioners do not argue that the

“patent misuse” doctrine should be expanded to include

the conduct they allege in this case, nor do they outline

the contours of liability under such a doctrine or the

8 The fact that respondent’s disclosure was broader than the

41 claims now at-issue is similarly of no moment if the 41 allowed

claims are sufficiently described in the specification. See

Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 263 (“That what appellants claim as paten-

table to them is Jess than what they describe as their invention is

not conclusive if their specification also reasonably describes that

which they do claim. Inventions are constantly made which curn

out not to be patentable, and applicants frequently discover during

the course of prosecution that only a part of what they invented

and originally claimed is patentable.”); In re Saunders, 444 F.2d

599, 607 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (recognizing right of applicant initially

claiming broad genus “to retreat to an otherwise patentable

species” by narrowing claims during prosecution). Therefore, even

if respondent’s claims were amended to “resemble” the CARB

regulations, as long as the amended claims are sufficiently de-

scribed in the originally filed specification, the reason for amend-

ment is not a fact that will affect the patentability analysis under

35 U.S.C. 112.

19

legal consequences that would flow from a finding that

it occurred. Nor do petitioners argue before this Court

that fraud was committed on the Patent Office itself.

Another potentially relevant means to challenge a

patent would be the requirement of 35 U.S.C. 102(f)

that a patent is invalid if the patentee “did not himself

invent the subject matter sought to be patented.” The

district court, however, rejected petitioners’ derivation

argument under Section 102(f) in this case, finding that

“{njo competent evidence was introduced in support of

th{e) argument” that respondent “had copied the inven-

tion from CARB.” Union Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield

Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Indeed,

the district court sanctioned petitioners in part for their

failure to make good on their commitment to the court

to produce evidence on that point. Ibid. Petitioners did

not preserve that issue on appeal and have not pre-

sented it in their petition for certiorari.

Similarly, other government agencies, such as the

Federal Trade Commission, may impose non-patent

remedies against parties who make affirmative misrep-

resentations to a public or private regulatory body

involved in setting industry standards. See Jn re Deil

Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996) (sanctioning firm

for making an affirmative misrepresentation to a non-

profit association that it had no intellectual property

that would be affected by an upcoming industry stan-

dard, while concealing its issued patent whose claims

covered portions of the industry standard). Those

remedies too are not at issue in this case.’

® Petitioners rely (Pet. 14) on SmithKline Beecham Consumer

Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 211 F.3d 21 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 173 (2000), for the proposition that a copy-

right that covers a matter required by regulation—labels on medi-

cine—supports their contention that the issuance of regulations by

20

What is at issue in this case are essentially fact-

specific questions concerning the application of settled

legal standards in patent law to the particular terms of

what may be a very significant patent. This case does

not present a suitable vehicle for this Court to address

the larger problems surrounding the intersection of the

patent and regulatory processes that petitioners and

amici seek to raise.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

SETH P. WAXMAN

Solicitor General

DAVID W. OGDEN

ALBIN F. DROST Assistant Attorney General

Acting General Counsel LAWRENCE G. WALLACE

JOHN M. WHEALAN Deputy Solicitor General

Solicitor JAMES A. FELDMAN

LINDA MONCYS ISACSON Assistani to the Solicitor

MARK NAGUMO General

Associate Solicitors »

United States Patent and Pap ae neg

Trademark Office Attorneys

JANUARY 2001

CARB has a bearing upon the validity of the ’393 patent. Smith-

Kline, however, concerned whether a federal statute concerning

generic drugs (21 U.S.C. 355(j) (1988)) had the effect of creating an

exception in the copyright law for labels on generic drugs. This

case involves the patent laws, not the copyright laws, and there is

no issue in this case concerning the possible effect of another

federal statute on the patent protection that should be afforded

respondent.

APPENDIX

The following testimony of Dr. Peter J. Jessup is

reprinted from C.A. App. 562-563:

Q: BY MR. KEKER:

After the CARB regulations, and that is the

California Air Resources Board regulations, came out in

November of 1991, were the claims that still remained

in your patent changed completely to copy the RVP,

the T50 and the olefin numbers of the Air Resources

Board regulations?

MR.CIRESI: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: That was the same question.

MR.KEKER: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: _ All right. Overruled.

THE WITNESS: Okay. Some of our claims were

narrowed. Some of our claims were broader than the

CARB regulations. Some of them were narrowed at

various times to resemble the CARB regulations, but

they were never copied from the CARB regulations.

That’s rather a strange thing to say.

Q: Were the numbers that you used in the claims

for RVP and T50 and olefins taken from the numbers

that the Air Resources Board used in their regulations?

A: No, we never did that.

(la)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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