Appendix — Grimes v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
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APPENDIX A
UNREPORTED/NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 99-1689
CHARLES L. GRIMES:
JANE GILLESPIE GRIMES, h/w
Appellants
v.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.
ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-cv-04794
District Court Judge: The Honorable James McGirr Kelly
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
Tuesday, April 11, 2000
Before: NYGAARD, ALITO, and GIBSON, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: May 4, 2000)
The Honorable John R. Gibson, Circuit Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
ALITO, Circuit Judge:
Charles Grimes (“Grimes”) and his wife, Jane Grimes
(“Mrs. Grimes”) appeal from an order of the District Court
granting summary judgment to Northwest Airlines on all
their claims against Northwest. For the reasons given
below, we affirm the order of the District Court.
I.
Grimes and his wife bought tickets to fly Northwest
Airlines from Vancouver to Philadelphia on August 13,
1998. The flight involved a stop and change of planes at
Northwest’s Detroit hub. Onthe day of departure, Grimes
took great pains to ensure that he was assigned a seat in
the exit row for both the flight from Vancouver to Detroit
and the flight from Detroit to Philadelphia. In Detroit, the
Grimeses switched planes and boarded the plane to
Philadelphia. Grimes took his assigned seat in the exit
row.
While Grimes was sitting in the exit row, a woman
arrived holding a boarding pass for Grimes’s seat. Grimes
refused to move for her. The woman returned to the gate
and asked for help. The flight attendant then boarded the
plane and examined Grimes’s boarding pass. The gate
attendant concluded that Northwest had switched planes
for this flight and had switched seat assignments, and that
in the confusion it had assigned Ms. Combs the same seat
that it had already assigned to Grimes. The attendant told
Grimes to leave his seat and discuss the seating
arrangements outside the plane. Grimes said that he
would not leave the seat since he had waited many hours
at the airport to ensure that he got the seat. See App. at
960. An argument ensued. The gate attendant called the
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police and insisted that Grimes discuss the issue in the
jetway . Grimes refused and demanded to see the captain.
The police and the captain eventually arrived. After the
gate attendant explained the situation, the captain asked
the police to remove Grimes. Grimes was handcuffed and
removed from the plane, which departed without him.
Grimes and his wife then instituted the present suit,
alleging (1) false arrest and imprisonment, (2) assault and
battery , (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4)
defamation, (5) negligence, and (6) breach of contract.
Before trial, the District Court dismissed all claims for
emotional damages on the pleadings. The Court also
issued an order in limine which barred Mr. and Mrs.
Grimes from introducing any evidence at trial that missing
the plane had caused him to make bad investment
decisions. Shortly before the case was scheduled to go to
trial, the District Court granted summary judgment to
Northwest on all claims. Mr. and Mrs. Grimes now appeal.
Il.
Federal subject matter jurisdiction in this case is
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Court has appellate jurisdic-
tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. After careful review of
the briefs and the opinion of the District Court, we con-
clude that it was appropriate to grant summary judgment
to Northwest on all of the plaintiffs’ claims.
Neither party disputes that Mr . Grimes was injured as
a result of a dispute occurring during the course of an
“international flight.” Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims are
governed by the treaty popularly known as the Warsaw
Convention (the “Convention”).” One can recover under
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929,49 Stat. 3000 (1934),
codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40105.
4a
the Convention only if one is injured in an “accident” as
defined in Article 17.° For the purposes of Article 17, a
passenger is injured in an accident if his or her “injury is
caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening
that is external to the passenger." Air France v. Saks, 470
U.S. 392, 405 (1985). After reviewing the briefs and the
record, we agree with the District Court that no reason-
able juror could conclude that Mr. Grimes suffered an
“accident” under Article 17.
First, the fact that Grimes was asked to discuss his
seating outside the plane may have seemed unreasonable,
but confusion about seat assignments is hardly unexpected
or unusual. Nor is the removal of bumptious passengers
from planes. Thus, when Grimes refused to comply with
requests to leave his seat, he could not have been sur-
prised to find himself removed forcibly from the plane.
Grimes’s frustration is understandable and we are in no
position to tell whether the conduct of Northwest's
employees unduly exacerbated the situation. But it is
3 The plaintiffs argue that Article 25 permits suits to proceed
even if there is no “accident” under Article 17. We disagree. Article 25
does not create an independent cause of action. It merely removes the
limits on recovery created by other provisions of the Convention.
Accordingly to recover under the Convention one must always
establish the elements of a cause of action under Article 17. See In re
Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 932 F.2d
1475,1488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding Article 17 isnot interpreted as one
of the provisions that “exclude or limit” liability for which Article 25
applies ); Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F .2d 1462, 1483-85 (11th Cir.
1989) (holding wilful misconduct only removes liability cap in Article
22 of the Warsaw Convention and does not make the Warsaw
Convention inapplicable as a whole), rev'd on other grounds, 499 US.
530 (1991). Only after one establishes that an accident occurred can one
attempt to demonstrate that the accident came about as a result of
wilful misconduct, in which case one can benefit from the provisions of
Article 25.
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apparent that Grimes’s injuries did not come about as a
result of an “accident,” as that term is used in Article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention, and therefore he cannot recover
any damages from Northwest.
We are also persuaded by the District Court’s conclu-
sion that Mrs. Grimes may not recover for her alleged
injuries, both because she was not injured in an accident
and because the Warsaw Convention does not, in any case,
permit recovery for non-physical harms. As Mr. and Mrs.
Grimes are barred from recovering at all under the
Warsaw Convention, we do not need to reach the question
of whether the District Court was correct to bar Mr. and
Mrs. Grimes from seeking emotional damages and conse-
quential damages under their claims.
_ Finally, we note in passing that Grimes’s complaint in
the District Court alleged breach of contract. None of the
District Court’s opinions or orders specifically make
reference to this claim, and the plaintiffs’ opening brief to
this court does not argue that this claim should be rein-
stated. The Grimes have therefore waived their appeal
on the breach of contract claim, see, e.g., Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 153, 169 (3d Cir., March 13,
2000); Brenner v. Local 514, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters, 927 F .2d 1283. 1298 (3d Cir. 1991), and we will
not consider this issue.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is
affirmed.
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
Kindly file the foregoing Opinion.
/s/ Samuel A. Alito
Circuit Judge
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APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 99-1689
CHARLES L. GRIMES:
JANE GILLESPIE GRIMES, h/w
Appellants
v.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.
ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-cv-04794
District Court Judge: The Honorable James McGirr Kelly
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
Tuesday, April 11, 2000
Before: NYGAARD, ALITO, and GIBSON, Circuit Judges.
JUDGMENT
The Honorable John R. Gibson, Circuit Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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This cause came to be heard on the record from the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and was submitted under
Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) on April 11, 2000.
On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the District
Court be and is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs are taxed against appellant.
Attest:
/s/ Maureen M. Waldron
Acting Clerk
DATED: May 4, 2000
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APPENDIX C
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
No. CIV. A. 98-CV-4794
CHARLES L. GRIMES:
JANE GILLESPIE GRIMES,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.
July 30, 1999
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JAMES McGIRR KELLY, JUDGE
Presently before the Court is Defendant Northwest
Airlines, Incorporated’s (“Northwest”) Motion for
Summary Judgment. Defendant believes summary
judgment is appropriate because its liability is defined
by the Warsaw Convention, which Defendant argues
bars any recovery by Plaintiffs. The Court finds
Defendant’s position persuasive and, for the reasons that
follow, will grant Defendant’s motion.
IL. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Charles and Jane Grimes, having arrived in
Detroit from Vancouver, boarded a Northwest Airlines
flight destined for Philadelphia. Mr. Grimes had
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requested an exit row seat, and took a seat he believed
was assigned to him. Another passenger, Wendy Combs,
also held a boarding pass for the same seat and, finding
Mr. Grimes in her seat, sought the assistance of a
Northwest employee. This employee, Mark Leone,
inspected her pass and Mr. Grimes’. Combs apparently
tired of this dispute and found another seat.
Neither Grimes nor Leone took this cue and an
argument between the two developed. Grimes claims
Leone persisted in maintaining Grimes was in the wrong
seat and threatened to have Grimes removed from the
plane. Grimes also alleges that Leone stepped on his
foot and “brushed against Mr. Grimes with his crotch.”
(Pls.’ Mem. Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 4.) This “was
deliberate and it hurt Mr. Grimes.” Jd. Leone was not the
only aggressor, however; Grimes testified he insulted
Leone and refused to leave the seat, announcing airport
police would have to arrest him to get him off of the
plane. (Grimes Dep. at 62-63, 66.)
The dispute between Grimes and Leone escalated.
Airport police were called to the plane and the plane’s
captain was called upon to arbitrate. The captain
apparently was persuaded by Leone’s version of events
and ordered Grimes off the plane. He refused to leave
voluntarily, and was arrested by airport police for
disorderly conduct. Handcuffed, Grimes was led off the
plane by airport police. He claims he suffered injuries to
his wrists, ankles, neck, right shoulder, and right arm as
a result of his escort off of the plane. Mrs. Grimes claims
emotional injuries.
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I. DISCUSSION
A. The Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record
shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). An issue of fact is genuine only
if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and a fact is
material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under
the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986). The nonmoving party is entitled to every
favorable inference that can be drawn from the record.
Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 817 (3d Cir.1997). The
nonmovant, however, may not avoid summary judgment
by relying on evidence that is merely colorable or not
significantly probative, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, and
similarly may not rely on mere allegations, general
denials, or vague statements, Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc.,
934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940, 112
S.Ct. 376, 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991). It is the movant’s initial
burden to identify portions of the record demonstrating
what it believes is an absence of genuine issues of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323,
106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the burden of
proof at trial is the non-movant’s, however, the movant
can meet its obligation under Celotex by “pointing out to
the district court that there is an absence of evidence to
support the non-moving party’s case.” Jd. at 325.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-movant is
unable to rebut the movant’s absence of evidence claim.
Id. at 323.
ee ee ee ee ee
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B. The Warsaw Convention and Its Effect On
Plaintiffs’ Claims
Defendant believes it is entitled to summary
judgment because Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the
Warsaw Convention, which addresses airlines’ liability
for injuries occurring during international travel.’
Specifically, Defendant argues El Al Israel Airlines, Lid.
v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 119 S.Ct. 662, 142
L.Ed.2d 576 (1999), confirms that the Warsaw Convention
provides the exclusive cause of action for injuries
suffered during international flights, and Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 580, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113
L.Ed.2d 569 (1990), prohibits Mrs. Grimes from
recovering for her emotional injuries. With respect to
Mr. Grimes, Defendant contends he was not injured as a
result of an “accident” within the meaning of the Warsaw
Convention, and even if an “accident” did occur, the
record still supports summary judgment.
1. Plaintiffs’ Claims Under Article 25 of the
Warsaw Convention
Plaintiffs first argue the limitations the Supreme
Court recently has visited on recovery under the
Warsaw Convention all relate to Article 17, and have
: The Grimes trip qualifies as an international one eventhough
their trip from Vancouver to Philadelphia was interrupted by a stay in
Detroit. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air [hereinafter “Warsaw Convention”,
Oct. 12, 1929, art. 1(2), 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40105 (1997).
12a
never been explicitly extended to Article 25.” The Court,
however, does not find Article 25 is applicable here.
Plaintiffs have failed to adduce any evidence that any
Northwest employee acted with intent to injure
Plaintiffs or acted recklessly and with knowledge that
damage to Plaintiffs would result. See Piamba Cortes v.
American Airlines, Inc. 177 F.3d 1272, 1290 (11th
Cir.1999) (arriving at this standard after an exhaustive
review of other circuits’ and countries’ treatment of
“willful”); see also Republic Natl Bank v. Eastern
Airlines, 815 F.2d 232, 238-39 (2d Cir.1987) (finding no
genuine issue of material fact existed regarding willful \
misconduct); Onyebuchim Onyeanusi v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 654, 657 (E.D.Pa.1990)
(same). The Court therefore will proceed to analyze
Plaintiffs’ claims under Article 17.
Article _25 prevents air carriers from availing
themselves of the Warsaw Convention's limitations on
liability when the carrier or its employees injures a
passenger through wilful misconduct.
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail
himself of the provisions of this convention
which exclude or limit his liability, if the
damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by
such default on his part as, in accordance with
? Article 17 provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event
of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily
injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused
the damage so sustained took place on the aircraft or
in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking.
Warsaw Convention art. 17.
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the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, is considered to be equivalent to
wilful misconduct.
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to
avail himself of the said provisions, if the
damage is caused under the same circumstances
by any agent of the carrier within the scope of
his employment.
Id. art. 25.
2. Plaintiffs’ Claims Under Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention
a. Mrs. Grimes’ Claims. Mrs. Grimes claims she
suffered emotional injuries as a result of the incident on
the plane. The Court agrees with Defendant that she
camot recover for these injuries. The Warsaw
Convention unequivocally is the exclusive remedy for
injuries suffered during the course of international air
travel, El Al Israel, 119 S.Ct. at 667-68, and the Warsaw
Convention does not permit recovery for purely mental
or emotional injuries, Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552. Mrs. Grimes’
claims are barred by the Warsaw Convention, and
Defendant’s motion is granted ‘with respect to Mrs.
Grimes’ claims.
b. Mr. Grimes’ Claims. Mr. Grimes claims he suffered
a variety of physical injuries during his confrontation
with Leone and his arrest by airport police. To
determine whether Defendant is liable, the Court should
consider where the accident occurred, the activity the
injured person engaged in, and the control by the
defendant of the injured person where and when the
injury occurred. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 155 (8d Cir.1977). Before the Court
engages in this analysis, however, it must find an
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accident within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention
occurred and, if so, that the accident happened while
the passenger was on board the plane or while she was
embarking or disembarking from the plane. Warsaw
Convention art. 17.
An accident has occurred only “if a passenger’s
injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event that
is external to the passenger.” Air France v. Saks, 470
U.S. 392, 405, 105 S.Ct. 1388, 84 L.Ed.2d 289 (1985). The
Court must apply this standard flexibly, considering all
of the circumstances that surrounded the passenger’s
injuries. Jd. The passenger is required to show only that
one link in the chain of events leading to his injury was
unexpected or unusual to prove an accident has
occurred. Jd. at 406. This one link, however, must relate
to the cause of the incident, not merely to the
occurrence itself. Jd. at 399. Where the Court is
confronted with contradictory evidence, it should defer
to the jury whether an “accident” occurred. Jd.
Plaintiffs claim Mr. Grimes was injured twice: first by
Leone, during the disagreement over whether Grimes
occupied the correct seat; and second by the airport
police, when he was removed from the plane. Neither
set of alleged injuries was caused by an “accident” under
the Warsaw Convention. An argument over seating is
neither unexpected nor unusual, particularly in view of
Grimes’ admissions that he refused to move to another
seat, as Leone instructed, and that he responded to
Leone’s instructions with unfavorable comments
regarding Leone’s appearance.
Similarly, the injuries Grimes claims to have
suffered when removed from the plane were not the
result of an “accident.” Whatever injuries he suffered
occurred because he was arrested, and he was arrested
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only because he refused to leave the plane voluntarily.
He never would have been handcuffed and taken off the
plane had he left when ordered by the plane’s captain. It
does not matter if it was the captain’s decision that
initiated the chain of events leading to his arrest; the fact
remains it was entirely within Grimes’ control whether
he was arrested. (See C. Grimes Dep. at 71.) Grimes’
decision interrupts the captain’s causal connection to the
alleged injuries. Moreover, this causal chain must extend
beyond when the arrest took place. Under Saks the
Court is required to look at the circumstances
surrounding the incident, and Grimes’ behavior and
decisions plainly are among the factors the Court must
consider. Grimes himself held the key as to whether he
would be arrested... He declined to be compliant; he
_ refused to leave voluntarily. Having precipitated this
result, neither the Warsaw Convention nor equity permit
him to recover from Defendant. The Court will enter
summary judgment in favor of Defendant.
An Order follows.
ORDER AND NOW, this 30th day of July, 1999, upon
consideration of Defendant Northwest Airlines,
Incorporated’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Document No. 21), Plaintiffs Charles L. Grimes and Jane
Gillespie Grimes’ response thereto, and Defendant’s
reply, it is hereby ORDERED:
1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED;
2. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant
Northwest Airlines, Incorporated and against Plaintiffs
Charles L. Grimes and Jane Gillespie Grimes; and
3. The Clerk of Court is ordered to mark this
matter closed.
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APPENDIX D
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
No. CIV. A. 98-CV-4794
CHARLES L. GRIMES:
JANE GILLESPIE GRIMES,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.
July 22, 1999
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JAMES McGIRR KELLY, JUDGE
Presently before the Court is Defendant Northwest
Airlines, Incorporated’s Motion in Limine. The Court
recently granted this motion, but subsequently received
Plaintiff's response. In view of Defendant’s lack of
objection to the Court's consideration of Plaintiff's
response, the Court will vacate its earlier Order granting
Defendant’s motion. As the Court previewed in that
Order, however, Defendant’s position is well supported
by the applicable law, and for that reason the Court will
grant Defendant’s motion.
Defendant moves to exclude certain damages
testimony Plaintiffs propose to offer. Specifically,
Plaintiffs allege the injuries Mr. Grimes suffered due to
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Defendant’s conduct left him unable to fly for a period of
four months, during which time the opportunity to
make investment decisions passed. As Plaintiffs see it, if
Mr. Grimes had completed the flight on which he
allegedly was injured, he would have been able to visit
the facility of a company in which he already invested.
He would have made critical observations, based on
which he would have delayed purchasing preferred
stock, and would have sold his common stock, later
repurchasing it at a far lower price. These transactions,
all frustrated by Defendant's actions, would have
yielded Plaintiffs over $1.3 million.’
Defendant argues this testimony is far too
speculative to be presented to a jury, and the Court
agrees. Parties may not present speculative damages
testimony to a jury, Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem
Township, 57 F.3d 258, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
915, 116 S.Ct. 308, 138 L.Ed.2d 208 (1995), but damages are
not speculative merely because the amount cannot be
determined with certainty. Rather, damages are
speculative only if the uncertainty surrounding them
relates to whether they actually exist. Jd; see also
Pashak v. Barish, 303 Pa.Super. 559, 450 A.2d 67, 69
(Pa.Super.Ct.1982). The damages claimed here hardly
could be more speculative; Plaintiffs’ claim is no more
grounded in factual reality than if they claimed
Defendants delayed Mr. Grimes from visiting a coffee
shop that sold a winning lottery ticket at approximately
the same time he would have been there. Plaintiffs’
theory rests entirely on the assumption that Mr. Grimes
would have learned the critical information on his visit,
1 Plaintiffs fail to explain why Mr. Grimes was unable to avail
himself of other investigatory means during this four month period.
18a
but Plaintiffs point to nothing allowing even an inference
that this discovery would have occurred. Plaintiffs’
damages theory therefore is an untenable blend of
supposition and hope, inappropriate for presentation to
the jury. Defendant’s motion is granted.
An Order follows.
ORDER AND NOW, this 22nd day of July, 1999, upon
consideration of Defendant Northwest Airlines,
Incorporated’s Motion in Limine (Document No. 29),
and Plaintiffs Charles and Jane Grimes’ response thereto,
it is hereby ORDERED:
1. The Court’s Order of July 15, 1999, is VACATED;
and
2. Defendant’s Motion in Limine (Document No.
29) is GRANTED.
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APPENDIX E
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION
No. 98-CV-4794
CHARLES L. GRIMES:
JANE GILLESPIE GRIMES,
Plaintiffs,
v. -
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.
FILED MAR 23 1999
MICHAEL E. KUNZ, Clerk
ORDER
AND NOW, this 22nd day of March, 1999, upon
consideration of U.S. Magistrate Judge Thomas J. Rueter’s
Report and Recommendation, Plaintiffs’ objections
thereto, and Defendant’s response to Plaintiffs’ objections,
it is hereby ORDERED:
1. The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED
AND ADOPTED; and
2. Count VII of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ James McGirr Kelly
ENTERED: 3/23/99
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APPENDIX F
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION
No. 98-4794
CHARLES L. GRIMES:
JANE GILLESPIE GRIMES,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.
FILED JAN 19 1999
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS J. RUETER
United States Magistrate Judge January 19, 1999
Plaintiffs Charles L. Grimes and Jane Gillespie Grimes
(“Plaintiffs”), served a complaint (Doc. No.98-4794) upon
Defendant, Northwest Airlines, Inc. (“Defendant”), alleging
injuries from a dispute over seating assignment on
Northwest’s airplane. Plaintiffs seek compensatory and
punitive damages. Northwest has brought this present
Motion for Judgment onthe Pleadings to dismiss Count VII
of Plaintiff's complaint for punitive damages, alleging that
punitive damages are not recoverable under the Warsaw
Convention. For the following reasons, the court
recommends that Defendant’s motion be GRANTED.
2la
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant seeks judgment on the pleadings pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Because
Defendant’s motion does not seek to determine the
substantive merits of the case, this court will treat the
12(c) motion as a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. Rodgers v. Atwork Cor p., 863 F. Supp. 242,
244 (E.D. Pa. 1994); A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure, § 1369 at 532-33 ( 1990). On review
of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, all
allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true, and
the plaintiff must be given the benefit of every favorable
inference to be drawn therefrom. Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969
F.2d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
Ii, BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs allege injuries arising out of a seating dispute
onan international Northwest Airlines flight. Based on the
facts alleged in the complaint, defendant’s employee
physically harmed plaintiff Charles Grimes. Then,
defendant’s employee, with the assistance of another
employee, summoned the airport police to arrest Mr. -
Grimes. Mr. Grimes further claims he was physically
injured in the process of his arrest and removal from the
aircraft.
In Count VII of the complaint, plaintiffs seek punitive
damages based on defendant’s wilful misconduct.
Defendant brings this motion before the court asserting
that plaintiffs’ injuries are governed by the Warsaw
22a
Convention! which prohibits recovery of punitive
damages.
DISCUSSION
The Warsaw Convention limits an airline’s liability for
passengers’ accidents on the aircraft or on embarking or
disembarking from the plane. Brown v. U.S. Airways,
Inc., 1998 WL 634901 at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1998). The
Supreme Court of the United States has recently
determined that “recovery for a personal injury suffered
‘on board [an] aircraft or in course of any of the operations
of embarking or disembarking,’ if not allowed under the
Convention, is not available at all.” El Al Israel Airlines.
Lid. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 1999 WL 772A at *4 (Jan. 12, 1999).
To recover under the Warsaw Convention, a passenger
must have been physically injured as a result of an
accident. Id. A passenger whose injury isnot compensable
under the Convention, that is the injury “entails no ‘bodily
injury’ or was not the result of an ‘accident,” will have no
recourse to an alternate remedy under local law. Id.
The Supreme Court has ruled that liability under
Article 17 arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an
unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external
to the passenger. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405
(1985). The Supreme Court stated that this definition
“should be flexibly applied after assessment of all the
circumstances suzrounding a passenger’s injuries.” Jd.
(citations omitted). The Supreme Court noted that the
lower courts have interpreted Article 17 broadly enough to
encompass accidents such as torts committed by terrorists
and fellow passengers. Id. (citations omitted). However,
\
1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air, Oct: 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. no.
876 (1934), codified as amended at U.S.C. § 40105 (1998).
23a
where there is evidence to the contrary, the Supreme
Court held that the trier of fact must decide whether an
“accident” caused the passenger's injuries. Saks,, 470 U.S.
at 405.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals defines “accident”
within the meaning of Article 17 to be:
[A]n event, a physical circumstance, which
unexpectedly takes place not occurring to the
usual course of things. If the event on board an
airplane is an ordinary, expected, and usual
occurrence, then it cannot be termed an accident.
To constitute an accident, the occurrence on
board the aircraft must be unusual, or
unexpected, an unusual or unexpected happening.
Abramson v. Jaoan Airlines Co.. Ltd., 739 F.2d 130, 132 (3d
Cir. 1984) (quoting DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch
Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193, 1196 (3d Cir. 1978). In Abramson,
the plaintiff claimed the defendant airline exacerbated his
pre-existing hiatal hernia by preventing him from lying
down in unoccupied first-class seats. Id. at 131. The Third
Circuit held that defendant’s actions were not an “accident”
under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention because the
injury did not arise from an “unusual or unexpected
happening within the definition of DeMarines.” Id. at 133.
The Court reasoned, “[iJnthe absence of proof of abnormal
external factors, aggravation of a pre-existing injury during
the course of a routine and normal flight should not be
considered an ‘accident’ within the meaning of Article 17.
Id.
However, a determination of whether plaintiffs’
injuries were the result of an accident is not necessary to
the disposition of the present motion. Recovery for
personal injuries is exclusively limited to the remedies
24a
provided in the Warsaw Convention. Tseng, 1999 WL 7724,
at *4. It is well-settled that punitive damages are not
recoverable under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Jn
re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 982
F.2d 1475, 1487 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 502 U.S. 994 (1991);
In re Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267, 1288
(2d Cir.), cert. denied 502 U.S. 920 (1991); Brown, 1998 WL
634901, at *1; Zarolli v. U.S.. Airways, Inc., 1998 WL 195697,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar., 24, 1998). Additionally, punitive
damages are not recoverable under Article 25 of the
Convention (pertaining to wilful misconduct of the airline).
Korean Air Lines Disaster, 982 F.2d at 1488-89. Therefore,
plaintiffs cannot recover for punitive damages.
Accordingly, the court makes the following
RECOMMENDATION
AND NOW, this 19th day of January, 1999, it is hereby
respectfully recommended that Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, treated as a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, be GRANTED, and Count VII of the
complaint requesting punitive damages be DISMISSED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Thomas J. Rueter
THOMAS J. RUETER
ENTERED: 1/20/99
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APPENDIX G
WARSAW CONVENTION
49 Stat. 3000; TS 876
CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION
OF CERTAIN RULES RELATING TO
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION BY AIR
The President of the German Reich, the Federal President
of the Republic of Austria, His Majesty the King of the
Belgians, the President of the United States of Brazil, His
Majesty the King of the Bulgarians, the President of the
Nationalist Government of China, His Majesty the King of
Denmark and Iceland, His Majesty the King of Egypt, His
Majesty the King of Spain, the Chief of State of the
Republic of Estonia, the President of the Republic of
Finland, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty
the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British
Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the
President of the Hellenic Republic, His Most Serene
Highness the Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary, His
Majesty the King of Italy, His Majesty the Emperor of
Japan, the President of the Republic of Latvia, Her Royal
Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg, the President
of the United Mexican States, His Majesty the King of
Norway, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, the
President of the Republic of Poland, His Majesty the King
of Rumania, His Majesty the King of Sweden, the Swiss
Federal Council, the President of the Czechoslovak
Republic, the Central Executive Committee of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the President of the United
States of Venezuela, His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia:
Having recognized the advantage of regulating ina uniform
manner the conditions of international transportation by air
in respect of the documents used for such transportation
and of the liability of the carrier,
Have nominated to this end their respective
Plenipotentiaries, who being thereto duly authorized,
have concluded and signed the following convention:
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CHAPTER I. SCOPE—DEFINITIONS
Article 1
(1) This convention shall apply to all international
transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by
aircraft for hire. It shall apply equally to gratuitous
transportation by aircraft performed by an air
transportation enterprise.
(2) For the purpose of this convention the expression
“international transportation” shall mean any
transportation in which, according to the contract made by
the parties, the place of departure and the place of
destination, whether or not there be a break in the
transportation or a transshipment, are situated either
within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or
within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if
there is anagreed stopping place withina territory subject
to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of
another power, even though that power is not a party to
this convention. Transportation without such an agreed
stopping place between territories subject to the
sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the same
High Contracting Party shall not be deemed to be
international for the purposes of this convention.
(3) Transportation to be performed by several successive
air carriers shall be deemed, for the purposes of this
convention, to be one undivided transportation, if it has
been regarded by the parties as a single operation,
whether it has been agreed upon under the form of a
single contract or of a series of contracts, and it shall not
lose its international character merely because one
contract or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely
within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty,
mandate, or authority of the same High Contracting Party.
Article 2
(1) This convention shall apply to transportation
performed by the state or by legal entities constituted
under public law provided it falls within the conditions
laid down in article 1.
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(2) This convention shall not apply to transportation
performed under the terms of any international postal
convention.
CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION DOCUMENTS
SECTION I. PASSENGER TICKET
Article 3
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must
deliver a passenger ticket which shall contain the
following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the
calrier may reserve the right to alter the
stopping places in case of necessity, and that if
he exercises that right, the alteration shall not
have the effect of depriving the transportation
of its international character,
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) Astatement that the transportation is subject to
the rules relating to liability established by this
convention.
(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger
ticket shall not affect the existence or the validity of the
contract of transportation, which shall none the less be
subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the
carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket
having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail
himself of those provisions of this convention which
exclude or limit his liability.
SECTION IL. BAGGAGE CHECK
Article 4
(1) For the transportation of baggage, other than small
personal objects of which the passenger takes charge
himself, the carrier must deliver a baggage check.
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(2) The baggage check shall be made out in duplicate,
one part for the passenger and the other part for the
carrier.
(3) The baggage check shall contain the following
particulars: :
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) Thename and address of the carrier or carriers;
(d) The number of the passenger ticket;
(e) Astatement that delivery of the baggage will be
made to the bearer of the baggage check;
(f) The number and weight of the packages;
(g) The amount of the value declared in accordance
with article 22(2);
(h) Astatement that the transportation is subject to
the rules relating to liability established by this
convention. .
(4) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the baggage
check shall not affect the existence or the validity of the
contract of transportation which shall none the less be
subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the
carrier accepts baggage without a baggage check having
been delivered, or if the baggage check does not contain
the particulars set out at (d), (f), and (h) above, the carrier
shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of
the convention which exclude or limit his liability.
SECTION IL AIR WAYBILL
Article 5
(1) Every carrier of goods has the right to require the
consignor to make out and hand over to him a document
called an “air waybill”: every consignor has the right to
require the carrier to accept this document.
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(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of this document
shall not affect the existence or the validity of the contract
of transportation which shall, subject to the provisions of
article 9, be none the less governed by the rules of this
convention.
Article 6
(1) The air waybill shall be made out by the consignor in
three original parts and be handed over with the goods.
(2) The first part shall be marked “for the carrier”, and
shall be signed by the consignor.-The second part shall be
marked “for the consignee”; it shall be signed by the
consignor and by the carrier and shall accompany the
goods. The third part shall be signed by the carrier and
handed by him to the consignor after the goods have been
accepted.
(3) The carrier shall sign on acceptance of the goods.
(4) The signature of the carrier may be stamped; that of
the consignor may be printed or stamped.
(5) If, at the request of the consignor, the carrier makes
out the air waybill, he shall be deemed, subject to proof
to the contrary, to have done so on behalf of the
consignor.
Article 7
The carrier of goods has the right to require the consignor
to make out separate waybills when there is more than
one package.
Article 8
The air waybill shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of its execution;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the
carrier may reserve the right to alter the
stopping places in case of necessity, and that if
he exercises that right the alteration shall not
30a
have the effect of depriving the transportation
of its international character,
(d) The name and address of the consignor;
(e) The name and address of the first carrier;
(f). The name and address of the consignee, if the
case So requires;
(g) The nature of the goods;
(h) The number of packages, the method of
packing, and the particular marks or numbers
upon them;
(i) The weight, the quantity, the volume, or
dimensions of the goods;
(j) The apparent condition of the goods and of the
(k) The freight, if it has been agreed upon, the date
and place of payment, and the person who is to
pay it,
(1) If the goods are sent for payment on delivery,
the price of the goods, and, if the case so
requires, the amount of the expenses incurred;
(m) The amount of the value declared in accordance
with article 22(2);
(n) The number of parts of the air waybill;
(0) The documents handed to the carrier to
accompany the air waybill;
(p) The time fixed for the completion of the
transportation and a brief note of the route to be
followed, if these matters have been agreed
upon,
(q) Astatement that the transportation is subject to
the rules relating to liability established by this
convention.
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Article 9
If the carrier accepts goods without an air waybill having
been made out, or if the air waybill does not contain all
the particulars set out in article 8(a) to (i), inclusive, and
(q), the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the
provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his
liability.
Article 10
(1) Theconsignor shall be responsible for the correctness
of the particulars and statements relating to the goods
which he inserts in the air waybill.
(2) Theconsignor shall be liable for all damages suffered
by the carrier or any other person by reason of the
irregularity, incorrectness or incompleteness of the said
particulars and statements.
Article 11
(1) The air waybill shall be prima facie evidence of the
conclusion of the contract, of the receipt of the goods and
of the conditions of transportation.
(2) The statements in the air waybill relating to the
weight, dimensions, and packing of the goods, as well as
those relating to the number of packages, shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts stated; those relating to the
quantity, volume, and condition of the goods shall not
constitute evidence against the carrier except so far as
they both have been, and are stated in the air waybill to
have been, checked by him in the presence of the
consignor, or relate to the apparent condition of the goods.
Article 12
(1) Subject to his liability to carry out all his obligations
under the contract of transportation, the consignor shall
have the right to dispose of the goods by withdrawing
them at the airport of departure or destination, or by
stopping them in the course of the journey on any landing,
or by calling for them to be delivered at the place of
destination, or in the course of the journey to a person
other than the consignee named in the air waybill, or by
32a
requiring them to be returned to the airport of departure.
He must not exercise this right of disposition in such a way
as to prejudice the carrier or other consignors, and he
must repay any expenses occasioned by the exercise of
this right.
(2) If it is impossible to carry out the orders of the
consignor the carrier must so inform him forthwith.
(3) If the carrier obeys the orders of the consignor for
the disposition of the goods without requiring the
production of the part of the air waybill delivered to the
latter, he will be liable, without prejudice to his right of
recovery from the consignor, for any damage which may
be caused thereby to any person who is lawfully in
possession of that part of the air waybill.
(4) The right conferred on the consignor shall cease at
the moment when that of the consignee begins in
accordance with article 13, below. Nevertheless, if the
consignee declines to accept the waybill or the goods, or
if he cannot be communicated with, the consignor shall
resume his right of disposition.
Article 13
(1) Except in the circumstances set out in the preceding
article, the consignee shall be entitled, on arrival of the
goods at the place of destination, to require the carrier to
hand over to him the air waybill and to deliver the goods
to him, on payment of the charges due and on complying
perce ag conditions of transportation set out in the air
waybill.
(2) Unless it is otherwise agreed, it shall be the duty of
the carrier to give notice to the consignee as soon as the
goods arrive.
(3) If the carrier admits the loss of the goods, or if the
goods have not arrived at the expiration of seven days
after the date on which they ought to have arrived, the
consignee shall be entitled to put into force against the
carrier the rights which flow from the contract of
transportation
33a
u
Article 14
The consignor and the consignee can respectively enforce
all the rights given them by articles 12 and 13, each in his
own name, whether he is acting in his own interest or in
the interest of another, provided that he carries out the
obligations imposed by the contract.
Article 15
(1) Articles 12, 13, and 14 shall not affect either the
relations of the consignor and the consignee with each
other or the relations of third parties whose rights are
derived either from the consignor or from the consignee.
(2) The provisions of articles 12, 13, and 14 can only be
varied by express provision in the air waybill.
Article 16
(1) The consignor must furnish such information and
attach to the air waybill such documents as are necessary
to meet the formalities of customs, octroi, or police before
the goods can be delivered to the consignee. The
consignor shall be liable to the carrier for any damage
occasioned by the absence, insufficiency, or irregularity of
any such information or documents, unless the damage is
due to the fault of the carrier or his agents.
(2) The carrier is under no obligation to enquire into the
correctness or sufficiency of such information or
documents.
CHAPTER IIL. LIABILITY OF THE CARRIER
Article 17
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the
event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any
other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident
which caused the damage so sustained took place on
board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations
of embarking or disembarking.
Article 18
(1) Thecarrier shall be liable for damage sustained inthe
event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any
ofa
checked baggage or any goods, if the occurrence which
caused the damage so sustained took place during the
transportation by air.
(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of the
preceding paragraph shall comprise the period during
which the baggage or goods are in charge of the carrier,
whether in an airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the
case of a landing outside an airport, in any place
whatsoever.
(8) The period of_the transportation by air shall not
extend to any transportation by land, by sea, or by river
performed outside an airport. If, however, such
transportation takes place in the performance of acontract
for transportation by air, for the purpose of loading,
delivery or transshipment, any damage is presumed,
subject to proof to the contrary, to have been the result of
an event which took place during the transportation by air.
Article 19
The carrier shall be liable for damage occasioned by delay
in the transportation by air of passengers, baggage, or
goods.
Article 20
(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he
and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid
the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to
take such measures.
(2) Inthe transportation of goods and baggage the carrier
shall not be liable if he proves that the damage was
occasioned by an error in piloting, in the handling of the
aircraft, or in navigation and that, in all other respects, he
and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid
the damage.
Article 21
If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or
contributed to by the negligence of the injured person the
court may, in accordance with the provisions of its own
35a
law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his
liability.
Article 22
(1) Inthe transportation of passengers the liability of the
carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of
125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the
court to which the case is submitted, damages may be
awarded in the form of periodical payments, the
equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not
exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract,
the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit
of liability.
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of
goods, the liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum
of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor has made,
at the time when the package was handed over to the
carrier, a special declaration of the value at delivery and
has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In
that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not
exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that that
sum is greater than the actual value to the consignor at
delivery.
(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes
charge himself the liability of the carrier shall be limited
to 5,000 francs per passenger.
(4) Thesums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer
to the French franc consisting of 65 1/2 milligrams of gold
at the standard of fineness of nine hundred thousandths.
These sums may be converted into any national currency
in round figures.
Article 23
Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or
to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in this
convention shall be null and void, but the nullity of any
such provision shall not involve the nullity of the whole
contract, which shall remain subject to the provisions of
this convention.
36a
Article 24
(1) Inthe cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action
for damages, however founded, can only be brought
subject to the conditions and limits set out in this
convention.
(2) Inthe cases covered by article 17 the provisions of
the preceding paragraph shall also apply, without
prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons who
have the right to bring suit and what are their respective
rights.
Article 25
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of
the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit
his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful
misconduct or by such default on his part as, inaccordance
with the law of the court to which the case is submitted,
is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail
himself of the said provisions, if the damage is caused
under the same circumstances by any agent of the carrier
acting within the scope of his employment.
Article 26
(1) Receipt by the person entitled to the delivery of
baggage or goods without complaint shall be prima facie
-evidence that the same have been delivered in good
condition and in accordance with the document of
transportation.
(2) Incase of damage, the person entitled to delivery
must complain to the carrier forthwith after the discovery
of the damage, and, at the latest, within 3 days from the
date of receipt in the case of baggage and 7 days from the
date of receipt in the case of goods. In case of delay the
complaint must be made at the latest within 14 days from
the date on which the baggage or goods have been placed
at his disposal.
37a
(3) Every complaint must be made in writing upon the
document of transportation or by separate notice in
writing dispatched within the times aforesaid.
(4) Failingcomplaint within the times aforesaid, no action
shall lie against the carrier, save in the case of fraud on his
part.
Article 27
In the case of the death of the person liable, an action for
damages lies in accordance with the terms of this
convention against those legally representing his estate.
Article 28
(1) Anactionfor damages must be brought, at the option
of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile
of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or
where he has a place of business through which the
contract has been made, or before the court at the place
of destination.
(2) Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law
of the court to which the case is submitted.
Article 29
(1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an
action is not brought within 2 years, reckoned from the
date of arrival] at the destination, or from the date on
which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date
on which the transportation stopped.
(2) The method of calculating the period of limitation
shall be determined by the law of the court to which the
case is submitted.
Article 30
(1) In the case of transportation to be performed by
various successive carriers and falling within the definition
set out in the third paragraph of article 1, each carrier
who accepts passengers, baggage or goods shall be
subject to the rules set out in this convention, and shall be
deemed to be one of the contracting parties to the
ee
38a
contract of transportation insofar as the contract deals
with that part of the transportation which is performed
under his supervision.
(2) In the case of transportation of this nature, the
passenger or his representative can take action only
against the carrier who performed the transportation
during which the accident or the delay occurred, save in
the case where, by express agreement, the first carrier has
assumed liability for the whole journey.
(3). As regards baggage or goods, the passenger or
consignor shall have a right of action against the first
carrier, and the passenger or consignee who is entitled to
delivery shall have a right of action against the last carrier,
and further, each may take action against the carrier who
performed the transportation during which the
destruction, loss, damage, or delay took place. These
carriers shall be jointly and severally liable to the
passenger or to the consignor or consignee.
CHAPTER IV. PROVISIONS RELATING TO
COMBINED TRANSPORTATION
Article 31
(1) In the case of combined transportation performed
partly by air and partly by any other mode of
transportation, the provisions of this convention shall
apply only to the transportation by air, provided that the
transportation by air falls within the terms of article 1.
(2) Nothing inthis convention shall prevent the parties in
the case of combined transportation from inserting in the
document of air transportation conditions relating to other
modes of transportation, provided that the provisions of
this conventionare observed as regards the transportation
by air.
CHAPTER V. GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 32
Any clause contained in the contract and all special
agreements entered into before the damage occurred by
which the parties purport to infringe the rules laid down
39a
by this convention, whether by deciding the law to be
applied, or by altering the rules as to jurisdiction, shall be
null and void. Nevertheless for the transportation of goods
arbitration clauses shall be allowed, subject to this
convention, if the arbitration is to take place within one of
ee referred to in the first paragraph of
article 28.
Article 33
Nothing contained in this convention shall prevent the
carrier either from refusing to enter into any contract of
transportation or from making regulations which do not
conflict with the provisions of this convention.
Article 34
This convention shall not apply to international
transportation by air performed by way of experimental
trial by air navigation enterprises with the view to the
establishment of regular lines of air navigation, nor shall it
apply to transportation performed in extraordinary
circumstances outside the normal scope of an air carrier's
business.
Article 35
The expression “days” when used in this convention means
current days, not working days.
Article 36
This convention is drawn up in French in a single copy
which shall remain deposited in the archives of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Poland and of which one
duly certified copy shall be sent by the Polish Government
to the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties.
Article 37
(1) This convention shall be ratified. The instruments of
ratification shall be deposited in the archives of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Poland, which shall give
notice of the deposit to the Government of each of the
High Contracting Parties.
40a
(2) Assoonas this convention shall have been ratified by
five of the High Contracting Parties it shall come into force
as between them on the ninetieth day after the deposit of
the fifth ratification. Thereafter it shall come into force
between the High Contracting Parties which shall have
ratified and the High Contracting Party which deposits its
i of ratification on the ninetieth day after the
eposit.
(3) It shall be the duty of the Government of the
Republic of Poland to notify the Government of each of
the High Contracting Parties of the date on which this
convention comes into force as well as the date of the
deposit of each ratification.
Article 38
(1) This convention shall, after it has come into force,
remain open for adherence by any state.
(2) The adherence shall be effected by a notification
addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland,
which shall inform the Government of each of the High
Contracting Parties thereof.
(3) Theadherence shall take effect as from the ninetieth
day after the notification made to the Government of the
Republic of Poland.
Article 39
(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may
denounce this convention by a notification addressed to
the Government of the Republic of Poland, which shall at
once inform the Government of each of the High
Contracting Parties.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the
notification of denunciation, and shall operate only as
regards the’ party which shall have proceeded to
denunciation.
Article 40
(1) Any High Contracting Party may, at the time of
signature or of deposit of ratification or of adherence,
declare that the acceptance which it gives to this
4la
convention does not apply to all or any of its colonies,
protectorates, territories under mandate, or any other
territory subject to its sovereignty or its authority, or any
other territory under its suzerainty.
(2) Accordingly any High Contracting Party may
subsequently adhere separately in the name of all or any
of its colonies, protectorates, territories under mandate, or
any other territory subject to its sovereignty or to its
authority or any other territory under its suzerainty which
have been thus excluded by its original declaration.
(3) Any High Contracting Party may denounce this
convention, inaccordance with its provisions, separately or
for all or any of its colonies, protectorates, territories
under mandate, or any other territory subject to its
sovereignty or to its authority, or any other territory under
its suzerainty.
Article 41
Any High Contracting Party shall be entitled not earlier
than two years after the coming into force of this
convention to call for the assembling of anew international
conference in order to consider any improvements which
may be made in this convention. To this end it will
communicate with the Government of the French
Republic which will take the necessary measures to make
preparations for such conference.
This convention, done at Warsaw on October 12, 1929, shall
remain open for signature until January 31, 1930.
42a
APPENDIX H
Article IX of Montreal Protocol No. 4 To Amend the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12
October 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at the
Hague of 28 September 1955, Signed at Montreal on 25
September 1975
Article IX
Article 25 of the Convention shall be deleted and
replaced by the following:
Article 25
In the carriage of passengers and baggage, the limits
of liability specified in Article 22 shall not apply if it is
proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission
of the carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent to
cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that
damage would probably result; provided that, in the case
of such act or omission of a servant or agent, it is also
proved that he was acting within the scope of his
employment.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.