Appendix — Grimes v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.

Supreme Court brief2000

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

la

APPENDIX A

UNREPORTED/NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 99-1689

CHARLES L. GRIMES:

JANE GILLESPIE GRIMES, h/w

Appellants

v.

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.

ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-cv-04794

District Court Judge: The Honorable James McGirr Kelly

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

Tuesday, April 11, 2000

Before: NYGAARD, ALITO, and GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: May 4, 2000)

The Honorable John R. Gibson, Circuit Judge of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

2a

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

ALITO, Circuit Judge:

Charles Grimes (“Grimes”) and his wife, Jane Grimes

(“Mrs. Grimes”) appeal from an order of the District Court

granting summary judgment to Northwest Airlines on all

their claims against Northwest. For the reasons given

below, we affirm the order of the District Court.

I.

Grimes and his wife bought tickets to fly Northwest

Airlines from Vancouver to Philadelphia on August 13,

1998. The flight involved a stop and change of planes at

Northwest’s Detroit hub. Onthe day of departure, Grimes

took great pains to ensure that he was assigned a seat in

the exit row for both the flight from Vancouver to Detroit

and the flight from Detroit to Philadelphia. In Detroit, the

Grimeses switched planes and boarded the plane to

Philadelphia. Grimes took his assigned seat in the exit

row.

While Grimes was sitting in the exit row, a woman

arrived holding a boarding pass for Grimes’s seat. Grimes

refused to move for her. The woman returned to the gate

and asked for help. The flight attendant then boarded the

plane and examined Grimes’s boarding pass. The gate

attendant concluded that Northwest had switched planes

for this flight and had switched seat assignments, and that

in the confusion it had assigned Ms. Combs the same seat

that it had already assigned to Grimes. The attendant told

Grimes to leave his seat and discuss the seating

arrangements outside the plane. Grimes said that he

would not leave the seat since he had waited many hours

at the airport to ensure that he got the seat. See App. at

960. An argument ensued. The gate attendant called the

3a

police and insisted that Grimes discuss the issue in the

jetway . Grimes refused and demanded to see the captain.

The police and the captain eventually arrived. After the

gate attendant explained the situation, the captain asked

the police to remove Grimes. Grimes was handcuffed and

removed from the plane, which departed without him.

Grimes and his wife then instituted the present suit,

alleging (1) false arrest and imprisonment, (2) assault and

battery , (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4)

defamation, (5) negligence, and (6) breach of contract.

Before trial, the District Court dismissed all claims for

emotional damages on the pleadings. The Court also

issued an order in limine which barred Mr. and Mrs.

Grimes from introducing any evidence at trial that missing

the plane had caused him to make bad investment

decisions. Shortly before the case was scheduled to go to

trial, the District Court granted summary judgment to

Northwest on all claims. Mr. and Mrs. Grimes now appeal.

Il.

Federal subject matter jurisdiction in this case is

based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Court has appellate jurisdic-

tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. After careful review of

the briefs and the opinion of the District Court, we con-

clude that it was appropriate to grant summary judgment

to Northwest on all of the plaintiffs’ claims.

Neither party disputes that Mr . Grimes was injured as

a result of a dispute occurring during the course of an

“international flight.” Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims are

governed by the treaty popularly known as the Warsaw

Convention (the “Convention”).” One can recover under

2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to

International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929,49 Stat. 3000 (1934),

codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40105.

4a

the Convention only if one is injured in an “accident” as

defined in Article 17.° For the purposes of Article 17, a

passenger is injured in an accident if his or her “injury is

caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening

that is external to the passenger." Air France v. Saks, 470

U.S. 392, 405 (1985). After reviewing the briefs and the

record, we agree with the District Court that no reason-

able juror could conclude that Mr. Grimes suffered an

“accident” under Article 17.

First, the fact that Grimes was asked to discuss his

seating outside the plane may have seemed unreasonable,

but confusion about seat assignments is hardly unexpected

or unusual. Nor is the removal of bumptious passengers

from planes. Thus, when Grimes refused to comply with

requests to leave his seat, he could not have been sur-

prised to find himself removed forcibly from the plane.

Grimes’s frustration is understandable and we are in no

position to tell whether the conduct of Northwest's

employees unduly exacerbated the situation. But it is

3 The plaintiffs argue that Article 25 permits suits to proceed

even if there is no “accident” under Article 17. We disagree. Article 25

does not create an independent cause of action. It merely removes the

limits on recovery created by other provisions of the Convention.

Accordingly to recover under the Convention one must always

establish the elements of a cause of action under Article 17. See In re

Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 932 F.2d

1475,1488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding Article 17 isnot interpreted as one

of the provisions that “exclude or limit” liability for which Article 25

applies ); Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F .2d 1462, 1483-85 (11th Cir.

1989) (holding wilful misconduct only removes liability cap in Article

22 of the Warsaw Convention and does not make the Warsaw

Convention inapplicable as a whole), rev'd on other grounds, 499 US.

530 (1991). Only after one establishes that an accident occurred can one

attempt to demonstrate that the accident came about as a result of

wilful misconduct, in which case one can benefit from the provisions of

Article 25.

5a

apparent that Grimes’s injuries did not come about as a

result of an “accident,” as that term is used in Article 17 of

the Warsaw Convention, and therefore he cannot recover

any damages from Northwest.

We are also persuaded by the District Court’s conclu-

sion that Mrs. Grimes may not recover for her alleged

injuries, both because she was not injured in an accident

and because the Warsaw Convention does not, in any case,

permit recovery for non-physical harms. As Mr. and Mrs.

Grimes are barred from recovering at all under the

Warsaw Convention, we do not need to reach the question

of whether the District Court was correct to bar Mr. and

Mrs. Grimes from seeking emotional damages and conse-

quential damages under their claims.

_ Finally, we note in passing that Grimes’s complaint in

the District Court alleged breach of contract. None of the

District Court’s opinions or orders specifically make

reference to this claim, and the plaintiffs’ opening brief to

this court does not argue that this claim should be rein-

stated. The Grimes have therefore waived their appeal

on the breach of contract claim, see, e.g., Federal Deposit

Ins. Corp. v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 153, 169 (3d Cir., March 13,

2000); Brenner v. Local 514, United Brotherhood of

Carpenters, 927 F .2d 1283. 1298 (3d Cir. 1991), and we will

not consider this issue.

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is

affirmed.

TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT:

Kindly file the foregoing Opinion.

/s/ Samuel A. Alito

Circuit Judge

6a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 99-1689

CHARLES L. GRIMES:

JANE GILLESPIE GRIMES, h/w

Appellants

v.

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.

ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-cv-04794

District Court Judge: The Honorable James McGirr Kelly

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

Tuesday, April 11, 2000

Before: NYGAARD, ALITO, and GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

The Honorable John R. Gibson, Circuit Judge of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

7a

This cause came to be heard on the record from the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania and was submitted under

Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) on April 11, 2000.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and

adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the District

Court be and is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs are taxed against appellant.

Attest:

/s/ Maureen M. Waldron

Acting Clerk

DATED: May 4, 2000

8a

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

No. CIV. A. 98-CV-4794

CHARLES L. GRIMES:

JANE GILLESPIE GRIMES,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

July 30, 1999

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JAMES McGIRR KELLY, JUDGE

Presently before the Court is Defendant Northwest

Airlines, Incorporated’s (“Northwest”) Motion for

Summary Judgment. Defendant believes summary

judgment is appropriate because its liability is defined

by the Warsaw Convention, which Defendant argues

bars any recovery by Plaintiffs. The Court finds

Defendant’s position persuasive and, for the reasons that

follow, will grant Defendant’s motion.

IL. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Charles and Jane Grimes, having arrived in

Detroit from Vancouver, boarded a Northwest Airlines

flight destined for Philadelphia. Mr. Grimes had

9a

requested an exit row seat, and took a seat he believed

was assigned to him. Another passenger, Wendy Combs,

also held a boarding pass for the same seat and, finding

Mr. Grimes in her seat, sought the assistance of a

Northwest employee. This employee, Mark Leone,

inspected her pass and Mr. Grimes’. Combs apparently

tired of this dispute and found another seat.

Neither Grimes nor Leone took this cue and an

argument between the two developed. Grimes claims

Leone persisted in maintaining Grimes was in the wrong

seat and threatened to have Grimes removed from the

plane. Grimes also alleges that Leone stepped on his

foot and “brushed against Mr. Grimes with his crotch.”

(Pls.’ Mem. Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 4.) This “was

deliberate and it hurt Mr. Grimes.” Jd. Leone was not the

only aggressor, however; Grimes testified he insulted

Leone and refused to leave the seat, announcing airport

police would have to arrest him to get him off of the

plane. (Grimes Dep. at 62-63, 66.)

The dispute between Grimes and Leone escalated.

Airport police were called to the plane and the plane’s

captain was called upon to arbitrate. The captain

apparently was persuaded by Leone’s version of events

and ordered Grimes off the plane. He refused to leave

voluntarily, and was arrested by airport police for

disorderly conduct. Handcuffed, Grimes was led off the

plane by airport police. He claims he suffered injuries to

his wrists, ankles, neck, right shoulder, and right arm as

a result of his escort off of the plane. Mrs. Grimes claims

emotional injuries.

10a

I. DISCUSSION

A. The Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the record

shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). An issue of fact is genuine only

if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and a fact is

material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under

the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202

(1986). The nonmoving party is entitled to every

favorable inference that can be drawn from the record.

Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 817 (3d Cir.1997). The

nonmovant, however, may not avoid summary judgment

by relying on evidence that is merely colorable or not

significantly probative, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, and

similarly may not rely on mere allegations, general

denials, or vague statements, Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc.,

934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940, 112

S.Ct. 376, 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991). It is the movant’s initial

burden to identify portions of the record demonstrating

what it believes is an absence of genuine issues of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323,

106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the burden of

proof at trial is the non-movant’s, however, the movant

can meet its obligation under Celotex by “pointing out to

the district court that there is an absence of evidence to

support the non-moving party’s case.” Jd. at 325.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-movant is

unable to rebut the movant’s absence of evidence claim.

Id. at 323.

ee ee ee ee ee

lla

B. The Warsaw Convention and Its Effect On

Plaintiffs’ Claims

Defendant believes it is entitled to summary

judgment because Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the

Warsaw Convention, which addresses airlines’ liability

for injuries occurring during international travel.’

Specifically, Defendant argues El Al Israel Airlines, Lid.

v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 119 S.Ct. 662, 142

L.Ed.2d 576 (1999), confirms that the Warsaw Convention

provides the exclusive cause of action for injuries

suffered during international flights, and Eastern

Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 580, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113

L.Ed.2d 569 (1990), prohibits Mrs. Grimes from

recovering for her emotional injuries. With respect to

Mr. Grimes, Defendant contends he was not injured as a

result of an “accident” within the meaning of the Warsaw

Convention, and even if an “accident” did occur, the

record still supports summary judgment.

1. Plaintiffs’ Claims Under Article 25 of the

Warsaw Convention

Plaintiffs first argue the limitations the Supreme

Court recently has visited on recovery under the

Warsaw Convention all relate to Article 17, and have

: The Grimes trip qualifies as an international one eventhough

their trip from Vancouver to Philadelphia was interrupted by a stay in

Detroit. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to

International Transportation by Air [hereinafter “Warsaw Convention”,

Oct. 12, 1929, art. 1(2), 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), codified as

amended at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40105 (1997).

12a

never been explicitly extended to Article 25.” The Court,

however, does not find Article 25 is applicable here.

Plaintiffs have failed to adduce any evidence that any

Northwest employee acted with intent to injure

Plaintiffs or acted recklessly and with knowledge that

damage to Plaintiffs would result. See Piamba Cortes v.

American Airlines, Inc. 177 F.3d 1272, 1290 (11th

Cir.1999) (arriving at this standard after an exhaustive

review of other circuits’ and countries’ treatment of

“willful”); see also Republic Natl Bank v. Eastern

Airlines, 815 F.2d 232, 238-39 (2d Cir.1987) (finding no

genuine issue of material fact existed regarding willful \

misconduct); Onyebuchim Onyeanusi v. Pan Am.

World Airways, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 654, 657 (E.D.Pa.1990)

(same). The Court therefore will proceed to analyze

Plaintiffs’ claims under Article 17.

Article _25 prevents air carriers from availing

themselves of the Warsaw Convention's limitations on

liability when the carrier or its employees injures a

passenger through wilful misconduct.

(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail

himself of the provisions of this convention

which exclude or limit his liability, if the

damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by

such default on his part as, in accordance with

? Article 17 provides:

The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event

of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily

injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused

the damage so sustained took place on the aircraft or

in the course of any of the operations of embarking or

disembarking.

Warsaw Convention art. 17.

13a

the law of the court to which the case is

submitted, is considered to be equivalent to

wilful misconduct.

(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to

avail himself of the said provisions, if the

damage is caused under the same circumstances

by any agent of the carrier within the scope of

his employment.

Id. art. 25.

2. Plaintiffs’ Claims Under Article 17 of the Warsaw

Convention

a. Mrs. Grimes’ Claims. Mrs. Grimes claims she

suffered emotional injuries as a result of the incident on

the plane. The Court agrees with Defendant that she

camot recover for these injuries. The Warsaw

Convention unequivocally is the exclusive remedy for

injuries suffered during the course of international air

travel, El Al Israel, 119 S.Ct. at 667-68, and the Warsaw

Convention does not permit recovery for purely mental

or emotional injuries, Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552. Mrs. Grimes’

claims are barred by the Warsaw Convention, and

Defendant’s motion is granted ‘with respect to Mrs.

Grimes’ claims.

b. Mr. Grimes’ Claims. Mr. Grimes claims he suffered

a variety of physical injuries during his confrontation

with Leone and his arrest by airport police. To

determine whether Defendant is liable, the Court should

consider where the accident occurred, the activity the

injured person engaged in, and the control by the

defendant of the injured person where and when the

injury occurred. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 155 (8d Cir.1977). Before the Court

engages in this analysis, however, it must find an

14a

accident within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention

occurred and, if so, that the accident happened while

the passenger was on board the plane or while she was

embarking or disembarking from the plane. Warsaw

Convention art. 17.

An accident has occurred only “if a passenger’s

injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event that

is external to the passenger.” Air France v. Saks, 470

U.S. 392, 405, 105 S.Ct. 1388, 84 L.Ed.2d 289 (1985). The

Court must apply this standard flexibly, considering all

of the circumstances that surrounded the passenger’s

injuries. Jd. The passenger is required to show only that

one link in the chain of events leading to his injury was

unexpected or unusual to prove an accident has

occurred. Jd. at 406. This one link, however, must relate

to the cause of the incident, not merely to the

occurrence itself. Jd. at 399. Where the Court is

confronted with contradictory evidence, it should defer

to the jury whether an “accident” occurred. Jd.

Plaintiffs claim Mr. Grimes was injured twice: first by

Leone, during the disagreement over whether Grimes

occupied the correct seat; and second by the airport

police, when he was removed from the plane. Neither

set of alleged injuries was caused by an “accident” under

the Warsaw Convention. An argument over seating is

neither unexpected nor unusual, particularly in view of

Grimes’ admissions that he refused to move to another

seat, as Leone instructed, and that he responded to

Leone’s instructions with unfavorable comments

regarding Leone’s appearance.

Similarly, the injuries Grimes claims to have

suffered when removed from the plane were not the

result of an “accident.” Whatever injuries he suffered

occurred because he was arrested, and he was arrested

15a

only because he refused to leave the plane voluntarily.

He never would have been handcuffed and taken off the

plane had he left when ordered by the plane’s captain. It

does not matter if it was the captain’s decision that

initiated the chain of events leading to his arrest; the fact

remains it was entirely within Grimes’ control whether

he was arrested. (See C. Grimes Dep. at 71.) Grimes’

decision interrupts the captain’s causal connection to the

alleged injuries. Moreover, this causal chain must extend

beyond when the arrest took place. Under Saks the

Court is required to look at the circumstances

surrounding the incident, and Grimes’ behavior and

decisions plainly are among the factors the Court must

consider. Grimes himself held the key as to whether he

would be arrested... He declined to be compliant; he

_ refused to leave voluntarily. Having precipitated this

result, neither the Warsaw Convention nor equity permit

him to recover from Defendant. The Court will enter

summary judgment in favor of Defendant.

An Order follows.

ORDER AND NOW, this 30th day of July, 1999, upon

consideration of Defendant Northwest Airlines,

Incorporated’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Document No. 21), Plaintiffs Charles L. Grimes and Jane

Gillespie Grimes’ response thereto, and Defendant’s

reply, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED;

2. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant

Northwest Airlines, Incorporated and against Plaintiffs

Charles L. Grimes and Jane Gillespie Grimes; and

3. The Clerk of Court is ordered to mark this

matter closed.

16a

APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

No. CIV. A. 98-CV-4794

CHARLES L. GRIMES:

JANE GILLESPIE GRIMES,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

July 22, 1999

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JAMES McGIRR KELLY, JUDGE

Presently before the Court is Defendant Northwest

Airlines, Incorporated’s Motion in Limine. The Court

recently granted this motion, but subsequently received

Plaintiff's response. In view of Defendant’s lack of

objection to the Court's consideration of Plaintiff's

response, the Court will vacate its earlier Order granting

Defendant’s motion. As the Court previewed in that

Order, however, Defendant’s position is well supported

by the applicable law, and for that reason the Court will

grant Defendant’s motion.

Defendant moves to exclude certain damages

testimony Plaintiffs propose to offer. Specifically,

Plaintiffs allege the injuries Mr. Grimes suffered due to

17a

Defendant’s conduct left him unable to fly for a period of

four months, during which time the opportunity to

make investment decisions passed. As Plaintiffs see it, if

Mr. Grimes had completed the flight on which he

allegedly was injured, he would have been able to visit

the facility of a company in which he already invested.

He would have made critical observations, based on

which he would have delayed purchasing preferred

stock, and would have sold his common stock, later

repurchasing it at a far lower price. These transactions,

all frustrated by Defendant's actions, would have

yielded Plaintiffs over $1.3 million.’

Defendant argues this testimony is far too

speculative to be presented to a jury, and the Court

agrees. Parties may not present speculative damages

testimony to a jury, Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem

Township, 57 F.3d 258, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S.

915, 116 S.Ct. 308, 138 L.Ed.2d 208 (1995), but damages are

not speculative merely because the amount cannot be

determined with certainty. Rather, damages are

speculative only if the uncertainty surrounding them

relates to whether they actually exist. Jd; see also

Pashak v. Barish, 303 Pa.Super. 559, 450 A.2d 67, 69

(Pa.Super.Ct.1982). The damages claimed here hardly

could be more speculative; Plaintiffs’ claim is no more

grounded in factual reality than if they claimed

Defendants delayed Mr. Grimes from visiting a coffee

shop that sold a winning lottery ticket at approximately

the same time he would have been there. Plaintiffs’

theory rests entirely on the assumption that Mr. Grimes

would have learned the critical information on his visit,

1 Plaintiffs fail to explain why Mr. Grimes was unable to avail

himself of other investigatory means during this four month period.

18a

but Plaintiffs point to nothing allowing even an inference

that this discovery would have occurred. Plaintiffs’

damages theory therefore is an untenable blend of

supposition and hope, inappropriate for presentation to

the jury. Defendant’s motion is granted.

An Order follows.

ORDER AND NOW, this 22nd day of July, 1999, upon

consideration of Defendant Northwest Airlines,

Incorporated’s Motion in Limine (Document No. 29),

and Plaintiffs Charles and Jane Grimes’ response thereto,

it is hereby ORDERED:

1. The Court’s Order of July 15, 1999, is VACATED;

and

2. Defendant’s Motion in Limine (Document No.

29) is GRANTED.

~ 19a

APPENDIX E

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL ACTION

No. 98-CV-4794

CHARLES L. GRIMES:

JANE GILLESPIE GRIMES,

Plaintiffs,

v. -

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

FILED MAR 23 1999

MICHAEL E. KUNZ, Clerk

ORDER

AND NOW, this 22nd day of March, 1999, upon

consideration of U.S. Magistrate Judge Thomas J. Rueter’s

Report and Recommendation, Plaintiffs’ objections

thereto, and Defendant’s response to Plaintiffs’ objections,

it is hereby ORDERED:

1. The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED

AND ADOPTED; and

2. Count VII of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ James McGirr Kelly

ENTERED: 3/23/99

20a

APPENDIX F

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL ACTION

No. 98-4794

CHARLES L. GRIMES:

JANE GILLESPIE GRIMES,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

FILED JAN 19 1999

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THOMAS J. RUETER

United States Magistrate Judge January 19, 1999

Plaintiffs Charles L. Grimes and Jane Gillespie Grimes

(“Plaintiffs”), served a complaint (Doc. No.98-4794) upon

Defendant, Northwest Airlines, Inc. (“Defendant”), alleging

injuries from a dispute over seating assignment on

Northwest’s airplane. Plaintiffs seek compensatory and

punitive damages. Northwest has brought this present

Motion for Judgment onthe Pleadings to dismiss Count VII

of Plaintiff's complaint for punitive damages, alleging that

punitive damages are not recoverable under the Warsaw

Convention. For the following reasons, the court

recommends that Defendant’s motion be GRANTED.

2la

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant seeks judgment on the pleadings pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Because

Defendant’s motion does not seek to determine the

substantive merits of the case, this court will treat the

12(c) motion as a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim. Rodgers v. Atwork Cor p., 863 F. Supp. 242,

244 (E.D. Pa. 1994); A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure, § 1369 at 532-33 ( 1990). On review

of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, all

allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true, and

the plaintiff must be given the benefit of every favorable

inference to be drawn therefrom. Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969

F.2d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

Ii, BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege injuries arising out of a seating dispute

onan international Northwest Airlines flight. Based on the

facts alleged in the complaint, defendant’s employee

physically harmed plaintiff Charles Grimes. Then,

defendant’s employee, with the assistance of another

employee, summoned the airport police to arrest Mr. -

Grimes. Mr. Grimes further claims he was physically

injured in the process of his arrest and removal from the

aircraft.

In Count VII of the complaint, plaintiffs seek punitive

damages based on defendant’s wilful misconduct.

Defendant brings this motion before the court asserting

that plaintiffs’ injuries are governed by the Warsaw

22a

Convention! which prohibits recovery of punitive

damages.

DISCUSSION

The Warsaw Convention limits an airline’s liability for

passengers’ accidents on the aircraft or on embarking or

disembarking from the plane. Brown v. U.S. Airways,

Inc., 1998 WL 634901 at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1998). The

Supreme Court of the United States has recently

determined that “recovery for a personal injury suffered

‘on board [an] aircraft or in course of any of the operations

of embarking or disembarking,’ if not allowed under the

Convention, is not available at all.” El Al Israel Airlines.

Lid. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 1999 WL 772A at *4 (Jan. 12, 1999).

To recover under the Warsaw Convention, a passenger

must have been physically injured as a result of an

accident. Id. A passenger whose injury isnot compensable

under the Convention, that is the injury “entails no ‘bodily

injury’ or was not the result of an ‘accident,” will have no

recourse to an alternate remedy under local law. Id.

The Supreme Court has ruled that liability under

Article 17 arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an

unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external

to the passenger. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405

(1985). The Supreme Court stated that this definition

“should be flexibly applied after assessment of all the

circumstances suzrounding a passenger’s injuries.” Jd.

(citations omitted). The Supreme Court noted that the

lower courts have interpreted Article 17 broadly enough to

encompass accidents such as torts committed by terrorists

and fellow passengers. Id. (citations omitted). However,

\

1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to

International Transportation by Air, Oct: 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. no.

876 (1934), codified as amended at U.S.C. § 40105 (1998).

23a

where there is evidence to the contrary, the Supreme

Court held that the trier of fact must decide whether an

“accident” caused the passenger's injuries. Saks,, 470 U.S.

at 405.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals defines “accident”

within the meaning of Article 17 to be:

[A]n event, a physical circumstance, which

unexpectedly takes place not occurring to the

usual course of things. If the event on board an

airplane is an ordinary, expected, and usual

occurrence, then it cannot be termed an accident.

To constitute an accident, the occurrence on

board the aircraft must be unusual, or

unexpected, an unusual or unexpected happening.

Abramson v. Jaoan Airlines Co.. Ltd., 739 F.2d 130, 132 (3d

Cir. 1984) (quoting DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch

Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193, 1196 (3d Cir. 1978). In Abramson,

the plaintiff claimed the defendant airline exacerbated his

pre-existing hiatal hernia by preventing him from lying

down in unoccupied first-class seats. Id. at 131. The Third

Circuit held that defendant’s actions were not an “accident”

under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention because the

injury did not arise from an “unusual or unexpected

happening within the definition of DeMarines.” Id. at 133.

The Court reasoned, “[iJnthe absence of proof of abnormal

external factors, aggravation of a pre-existing injury during

the course of a routine and normal flight should not be

considered an ‘accident’ within the meaning of Article 17.

Id.

However, a determination of whether plaintiffs’

injuries were the result of an accident is not necessary to

the disposition of the present motion. Recovery for

personal injuries is exclusively limited to the remedies

24a

provided in the Warsaw Convention. Tseng, 1999 WL 7724,

at *4. It is well-settled that punitive damages are not

recoverable under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Jn

re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 982

F.2d 1475, 1487 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 502 U.S. 994 (1991);

In re Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267, 1288

(2d Cir.), cert. denied 502 U.S. 920 (1991); Brown, 1998 WL

634901, at *1; Zarolli v. U.S.. Airways, Inc., 1998 WL 195697,

at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar., 24, 1998). Additionally, punitive

damages are not recoverable under Article 25 of the

Convention (pertaining to wilful misconduct of the airline).

Korean Air Lines Disaster, 982 F.2d at 1488-89. Therefore,

plaintiffs cannot recover for punitive damages.

Accordingly, the court makes the following

RECOMMENDATION

AND NOW, this 19th day of January, 1999, it is hereby

respectfully recommended that Defendant’s Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings, treated as a Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, be GRANTED, and Count VII of the

complaint requesting punitive damages be DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Thomas J. Rueter

THOMAS J. RUETER

ENTERED: 1/20/99

25a

APPENDIX G

WARSAW CONVENTION

49 Stat. 3000; TS 876

CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION

OF CERTAIN RULES RELATING TO

INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION BY AIR

The President of the German Reich, the Federal President

of the Republic of Austria, His Majesty the King of the

Belgians, the President of the United States of Brazil, His

Majesty the King of the Bulgarians, the President of the

Nationalist Government of China, His Majesty the King of

Denmark and Iceland, His Majesty the King of Egypt, His

Majesty the King of Spain, the Chief of State of the

Republic of Estonia, the President of the Republic of

Finland, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty

the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British

Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the

President of the Hellenic Republic, His Most Serene

Highness the Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary, His

Majesty the King of Italy, His Majesty the Emperor of

Japan, the President of the Republic of Latvia, Her Royal

Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg, the President

of the United Mexican States, His Majesty the King of

Norway, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, the

President of the Republic of Poland, His Majesty the King

of Rumania, His Majesty the King of Sweden, the Swiss

Federal Council, the President of the Czechoslovak

Republic, the Central Executive Committee of the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics, the President of the United

States of Venezuela, His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia:

Having recognized the advantage of regulating ina uniform

manner the conditions of international transportation by air

in respect of the documents used for such transportation

and of the liability of the carrier,

Have nominated to this end their respective

Plenipotentiaries, who being thereto duly authorized,

have concluded and signed the following convention:

26a

CHAPTER I. SCOPE—DEFINITIONS

Article 1

(1) This convention shall apply to all international

transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by

aircraft for hire. It shall apply equally to gratuitous

transportation by aircraft performed by an air

transportation enterprise.

(2) For the purpose of this convention the expression

“international transportation” shall mean any

transportation in which, according to the contract made by

the parties, the place of departure and the place of

destination, whether or not there be a break in the

transportation or a transshipment, are situated either

within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or

within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if

there is anagreed stopping place withina territory subject

to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of

another power, even though that power is not a party to

this convention. Transportation without such an agreed

stopping place between territories subject to the

sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the same

High Contracting Party shall not be deemed to be

international for the purposes of this convention.

(3) Transportation to be performed by several successive

air carriers shall be deemed, for the purposes of this

convention, to be one undivided transportation, if it has

been regarded by the parties as a single operation,

whether it has been agreed upon under the form of a

single contract or of a series of contracts, and it shall not

lose its international character merely because one

contract or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely

within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty,

mandate, or authority of the same High Contracting Party.

Article 2

(1) This convention shall apply to transportation

performed by the state or by legal entities constituted

under public law provided it falls within the conditions

laid down in article 1.

27a

(2) This convention shall not apply to transportation

performed under the terms of any international postal

convention.

CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION DOCUMENTS

SECTION I. PASSENGER TICKET

Article 3

(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must

deliver a passenger ticket which shall contain the

following particulars:

(a) The place and date of issue;

(b) The place of departure and of destination;

(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the

calrier may reserve the right to alter the

stopping places in case of necessity, and that if

he exercises that right, the alteration shall not

have the effect of depriving the transportation

of its international character,

(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;

(e) Astatement that the transportation is subject to

the rules relating to liability established by this

convention.

(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger

ticket shall not affect the existence or the validity of the

contract of transportation, which shall none the less be

subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the

carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket

having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail

himself of those provisions of this convention which

exclude or limit his liability.

SECTION IL. BAGGAGE CHECK

Article 4

(1) For the transportation of baggage, other than small

personal objects of which the passenger takes charge

himself, the carrier must deliver a baggage check.

28a

(2) The baggage check shall be made out in duplicate,

one part for the passenger and the other part for the

carrier.

(3) The baggage check shall contain the following

particulars: :

(a) The place and date of issue;

(b) The place of departure and of destination;

(c) Thename and address of the carrier or carriers;

(d) The number of the passenger ticket;

(e) Astatement that delivery of the baggage will be

made to the bearer of the baggage check;

(f) The number and weight of the packages;

(g) The amount of the value declared in accordance

with article 22(2);

(h) Astatement that the transportation is subject to

the rules relating to liability established by this

convention. .

(4) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the baggage

check shall not affect the existence or the validity of the

contract of transportation which shall none the less be

subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the

carrier accepts baggage without a baggage check having

been delivered, or if the baggage check does not contain

the particulars set out at (d), (f), and (h) above, the carrier

shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of

the convention which exclude or limit his liability.

SECTION IL AIR WAYBILL

Article 5

(1) Every carrier of goods has the right to require the

consignor to make out and hand over to him a document

called an “air waybill”: every consignor has the right to

require the carrier to accept this document.

29a

(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of this document

shall not affect the existence or the validity of the contract

of transportation which shall, subject to the provisions of

article 9, be none the less governed by the rules of this

convention.

Article 6

(1) The air waybill shall be made out by the consignor in

three original parts and be handed over with the goods.

(2) The first part shall be marked “for the carrier”, and

shall be signed by the consignor.-The second part shall be

marked “for the consignee”; it shall be signed by the

consignor and by the carrier and shall accompany the

goods. The third part shall be signed by the carrier and

handed by him to the consignor after the goods have been

accepted.

(3) The carrier shall sign on acceptance of the goods.

(4) The signature of the carrier may be stamped; that of

the consignor may be printed or stamped.

(5) If, at the request of the consignor, the carrier makes

out the air waybill, he shall be deemed, subject to proof

to the contrary, to have done so on behalf of the

consignor.

Article 7

The carrier of goods has the right to require the consignor

to make out separate waybills when there is more than

one package.

Article 8

The air waybill shall contain the following particulars:

(a) The place and date of its execution;

(b) The place of departure and of destination;

(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the

carrier may reserve the right to alter the

stopping places in case of necessity, and that if

he exercises that right the alteration shall not

30a

have the effect of depriving the transportation

of its international character,

(d) The name and address of the consignor;

(e) The name and address of the first carrier;

(f). The name and address of the consignee, if the

case So requires;

(g) The nature of the goods;

(h) The number of packages, the method of

packing, and the particular marks or numbers

upon them;

(i) The weight, the quantity, the volume, or

dimensions of the goods;

(j) The apparent condition of the goods and of the

(k) The freight, if it has been agreed upon, the date

and place of payment, and the person who is to

pay it,

(1) If the goods are sent for payment on delivery,

the price of the goods, and, if the case so

requires, the amount of the expenses incurred;

(m) The amount of the value declared in accordance

with article 22(2);

(n) The number of parts of the air waybill;

(0) The documents handed to the carrier to

accompany the air waybill;

(p) The time fixed for the completion of the

transportation and a brief note of the route to be

followed, if these matters have been agreed

upon,

(q) Astatement that the transportation is subject to

the rules relating to liability established by this

convention.

3la

Article 9

If the carrier accepts goods without an air waybill having

been made out, or if the air waybill does not contain all

the particulars set out in article 8(a) to (i), inclusive, and

(q), the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the

provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his

liability.

Article 10

(1) Theconsignor shall be responsible for the correctness

of the particulars and statements relating to the goods

which he inserts in the air waybill.

(2) Theconsignor shall be liable for all damages suffered

by the carrier or any other person by reason of the

irregularity, incorrectness or incompleteness of the said

particulars and statements.

Article 11

(1) The air waybill shall be prima facie evidence of the

conclusion of the contract, of the receipt of the goods and

of the conditions of transportation.

(2) The statements in the air waybill relating to the

weight, dimensions, and packing of the goods, as well as

those relating to the number of packages, shall be prima

facie evidence of the facts stated; those relating to the

quantity, volume, and condition of the goods shall not

constitute evidence against the carrier except so far as

they both have been, and are stated in the air waybill to

have been, checked by him in the presence of the

consignor, or relate to the apparent condition of the goods.

Article 12

(1) Subject to his liability to carry out all his obligations

under the contract of transportation, the consignor shall

have the right to dispose of the goods by withdrawing

them at the airport of departure or destination, or by

stopping them in the course of the journey on any landing,

or by calling for them to be delivered at the place of

destination, or in the course of the journey to a person

other than the consignee named in the air waybill, or by

32a

requiring them to be returned to the airport of departure.

He must not exercise this right of disposition in such a way

as to prejudice the carrier or other consignors, and he

must repay any expenses occasioned by the exercise of

this right.

(2) If it is impossible to carry out the orders of the

consignor the carrier must so inform him forthwith.

(3) If the carrier obeys the orders of the consignor for

the disposition of the goods without requiring the

production of the part of the air waybill delivered to the

latter, he will be liable, without prejudice to his right of

recovery from the consignor, for any damage which may

be caused thereby to any person who is lawfully in

possession of that part of the air waybill.

(4) The right conferred on the consignor shall cease at

the moment when that of the consignee begins in

accordance with article 13, below. Nevertheless, if the

consignee declines to accept the waybill or the goods, or

if he cannot be communicated with, the consignor shall

resume his right of disposition.

Article 13

(1) Except in the circumstances set out in the preceding

article, the consignee shall be entitled, on arrival of the

goods at the place of destination, to require the carrier to

hand over to him the air waybill and to deliver the goods

to him, on payment of the charges due and on complying

perce ag conditions of transportation set out in the air

waybill.

(2) Unless it is otherwise agreed, it shall be the duty of

the carrier to give notice to the consignee as soon as the

goods arrive.

(3) If the carrier admits the loss of the goods, or if the

goods have not arrived at the expiration of seven days

after the date on which they ought to have arrived, the

consignee shall be entitled to put into force against the

carrier the rights which flow from the contract of

transportation

33a

u

Article 14

The consignor and the consignee can respectively enforce

all the rights given them by articles 12 and 13, each in his

own name, whether he is acting in his own interest or in

the interest of another, provided that he carries out the

obligations imposed by the contract.

Article 15

(1) Articles 12, 13, and 14 shall not affect either the

relations of the consignor and the consignee with each

other or the relations of third parties whose rights are

derived either from the consignor or from the consignee.

(2) The provisions of articles 12, 13, and 14 can only be

varied by express provision in the air waybill.

Article 16

(1) The consignor must furnish such information and

attach to the air waybill such documents as are necessary

to meet the formalities of customs, octroi, or police before

the goods can be delivered to the consignee. The

consignor shall be liable to the carrier for any damage

occasioned by the absence, insufficiency, or irregularity of

any such information or documents, unless the damage is

due to the fault of the carrier or his agents.

(2) The carrier is under no obligation to enquire into the

correctness or sufficiency of such information or

documents.

CHAPTER IIL. LIABILITY OF THE CARRIER

Article 17

The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the

event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any

other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident

which caused the damage so sustained took place on

board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations

of embarking or disembarking.

Article 18

(1) Thecarrier shall be liable for damage sustained inthe

event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any

ofa

checked baggage or any goods, if the occurrence which

caused the damage so sustained took place during the

transportation by air.

(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of the

preceding paragraph shall comprise the period during

which the baggage or goods are in charge of the carrier,

whether in an airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the

case of a landing outside an airport, in any place

whatsoever.

(8) The period of_the transportation by air shall not

extend to any transportation by land, by sea, or by river

performed outside an airport. If, however, such

transportation takes place in the performance of acontract

for transportation by air, for the purpose of loading,

delivery or transshipment, any damage is presumed,

subject to proof to the contrary, to have been the result of

an event which took place during the transportation by air.

Article 19

The carrier shall be liable for damage occasioned by delay

in the transportation by air of passengers, baggage, or

goods.

Article 20

(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he

and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid

the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to

take such measures.

(2) Inthe transportation of goods and baggage the carrier

shall not be liable if he proves that the damage was

occasioned by an error in piloting, in the handling of the

aircraft, or in navigation and that, in all other respects, he

and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid

the damage.

Article 21

If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or

contributed to by the negligence of the injured person the

court may, in accordance with the provisions of its own

35a

law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his

liability.

Article 22

(1) Inthe transportation of passengers the liability of the

carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of

125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the

court to which the case is submitted, damages may be

awarded in the form of periodical payments, the

equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not

exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract,

the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit

of liability.

(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of

goods, the liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum

of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor has made,

at the time when the package was handed over to the

carrier, a special declaration of the value at delivery and

has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In

that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not

exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that that

sum is greater than the actual value to the consignor at

delivery.

(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes

charge himself the liability of the carrier shall be limited

to 5,000 francs per passenger.

(4) Thesums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer

to the French franc consisting of 65 1/2 milligrams of gold

at the standard of fineness of nine hundred thousandths.

These sums may be converted into any national currency

in round figures.

Article 23

Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or

to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in this

convention shall be null and void, but the nullity of any

such provision shall not involve the nullity of the whole

contract, which shall remain subject to the provisions of

this convention.

36a

Article 24

(1) Inthe cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action

for damages, however founded, can only be brought

subject to the conditions and limits set out in this

convention.

(2) Inthe cases covered by article 17 the provisions of

the preceding paragraph shall also apply, without

prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons who

have the right to bring suit and what are their respective

rights.

Article 25

(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of

the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit

his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful

misconduct or by such default on his part as, inaccordance

with the law of the court to which the case is submitted,

is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.

(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail

himself of the said provisions, if the damage is caused

under the same circumstances by any agent of the carrier

acting within the scope of his employment.

Article 26

(1) Receipt by the person entitled to the delivery of

baggage or goods without complaint shall be prima facie

-evidence that the same have been delivered in good

condition and in accordance with the document of

transportation.

(2) Incase of damage, the person entitled to delivery

must complain to the carrier forthwith after the discovery

of the damage, and, at the latest, within 3 days from the

date of receipt in the case of baggage and 7 days from the

date of receipt in the case of goods. In case of delay the

complaint must be made at the latest within 14 days from

the date on which the baggage or goods have been placed

at his disposal.

37a

(3) Every complaint must be made in writing upon the

document of transportation or by separate notice in

writing dispatched within the times aforesaid.

(4) Failingcomplaint within the times aforesaid, no action

shall lie against the carrier, save in the case of fraud on his

part.

Article 27

In the case of the death of the person liable, an action for

damages lies in accordance with the terms of this

convention against those legally representing his estate.

Article 28

(1) Anactionfor damages must be brought, at the option

of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High

Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile

of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or

where he has a place of business through which the

contract has been made, or before the court at the place

of destination.

(2) Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law

of the court to which the case is submitted.

Article 29

(1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an

action is not brought within 2 years, reckoned from the

date of arrival] at the destination, or from the date on

which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date

on which the transportation stopped.

(2) The method of calculating the period of limitation

shall be determined by the law of the court to which the

case is submitted.

Article 30

(1) In the case of transportation to be performed by

various successive carriers and falling within the definition

set out in the third paragraph of article 1, each carrier

who accepts passengers, baggage or goods shall be

subject to the rules set out in this convention, and shall be

deemed to be one of the contracting parties to the

ee

38a

contract of transportation insofar as the contract deals

with that part of the transportation which is performed

under his supervision.

(2) In the case of transportation of this nature, the

passenger or his representative can take action only

against the carrier who performed the transportation

during which the accident or the delay occurred, save in

the case where, by express agreement, the first carrier has

assumed liability for the whole journey.

(3). As regards baggage or goods, the passenger or

consignor shall have a right of action against the first

carrier, and the passenger or consignee who is entitled to

delivery shall have a right of action against the last carrier,

and further, each may take action against the carrier who

performed the transportation during which the

destruction, loss, damage, or delay took place. These

carriers shall be jointly and severally liable to the

passenger or to the consignor or consignee.

CHAPTER IV. PROVISIONS RELATING TO

COMBINED TRANSPORTATION

Article 31

(1) In the case of combined transportation performed

partly by air and partly by any other mode of

transportation, the provisions of this convention shall

apply only to the transportation by air, provided that the

transportation by air falls within the terms of article 1.

(2) Nothing inthis convention shall prevent the parties in

the case of combined transportation from inserting in the

document of air transportation conditions relating to other

modes of transportation, provided that the provisions of

this conventionare observed as regards the transportation

by air.

CHAPTER V. GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 32

Any clause contained in the contract and all special

agreements entered into before the damage occurred by

which the parties purport to infringe the rules laid down

39a

by this convention, whether by deciding the law to be

applied, or by altering the rules as to jurisdiction, shall be

null and void. Nevertheless for the transportation of goods

arbitration clauses shall be allowed, subject to this

convention, if the arbitration is to take place within one of

ee referred to in the first paragraph of

article 28.

Article 33

Nothing contained in this convention shall prevent the

carrier either from refusing to enter into any contract of

transportation or from making regulations which do not

conflict with the provisions of this convention.

Article 34

This convention shall not apply to international

transportation by air performed by way of experimental

trial by air navigation enterprises with the view to the

establishment of regular lines of air navigation, nor shall it

apply to transportation performed in extraordinary

circumstances outside the normal scope of an air carrier's

business.

Article 35

The expression “days” when used in this convention means

current days, not working days.

Article 36

This convention is drawn up in French in a single copy

which shall remain deposited in the archives of the

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Poland and of which one

duly certified copy shall be sent by the Polish Government

to the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties.

Article 37

(1) This convention shall be ratified. The instruments of

ratification shall be deposited in the archives of the

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Poland, which shall give

notice of the deposit to the Government of each of the

High Contracting Parties.

40a

(2) Assoonas this convention shall have been ratified by

five of the High Contracting Parties it shall come into force

as between them on the ninetieth day after the deposit of

the fifth ratification. Thereafter it shall come into force

between the High Contracting Parties which shall have

ratified and the High Contracting Party which deposits its

i of ratification on the ninetieth day after the

eposit.

(3) It shall be the duty of the Government of the

Republic of Poland to notify the Government of each of

the High Contracting Parties of the date on which this

convention comes into force as well as the date of the

deposit of each ratification.

Article 38

(1) This convention shall, after it has come into force,

remain open for adherence by any state.

(2) The adherence shall be effected by a notification

addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland,

which shall inform the Government of each of the High

Contracting Parties thereof.

(3) Theadherence shall take effect as from the ninetieth

day after the notification made to the Government of the

Republic of Poland.

Article 39

(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may

denounce this convention by a notification addressed to

the Government of the Republic of Poland, which shall at

once inform the Government of each of the High

Contracting Parties.

(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the

notification of denunciation, and shall operate only as

regards the’ party which shall have proceeded to

denunciation.

Article 40

(1) Any High Contracting Party may, at the time of

signature or of deposit of ratification or of adherence,

declare that the acceptance which it gives to this

4la

convention does not apply to all or any of its colonies,

protectorates, territories under mandate, or any other

territory subject to its sovereignty or its authority, or any

other territory under its suzerainty.

(2) Accordingly any High Contracting Party may

subsequently adhere separately in the name of all or any

of its colonies, protectorates, territories under mandate, or

any other territory subject to its sovereignty or to its

authority or any other territory under its suzerainty which

have been thus excluded by its original declaration.

(3) Any High Contracting Party may denounce this

convention, inaccordance with its provisions, separately or

for all or any of its colonies, protectorates, territories

under mandate, or any other territory subject to its

sovereignty or to its authority, or any other territory under

its suzerainty.

Article 41

Any High Contracting Party shall be entitled not earlier

than two years after the coming into force of this

convention to call for the assembling of anew international

conference in order to consider any improvements which

may be made in this convention. To this end it will

communicate with the Government of the French

Republic which will take the necessary measures to make

preparations for such conference.

This convention, done at Warsaw on October 12, 1929, shall

remain open for signature until January 31, 1930.

42a

APPENDIX H

Article IX of Montreal Protocol No. 4 To Amend the

Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to

International carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12

October 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at the

Hague of 28 September 1955, Signed at Montreal on 25

September 1975

Article IX

Article 25 of the Convention shall be deleted and

replaced by the following:

Article 25

In the carriage of passengers and baggage, the limits

of liability specified in Article 22 shall not apply if it is

proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission

of the carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent to

cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that

damage would probably result; provided that, in the case

of such act or omission of a servant or agent, it is also

proved that he was acting within the scope of his

employment.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.