Petitioners Brief — Alabama v. Bozeman

Court, US.

s FILED

{AL \

JAN 2¢ 2e0/ WJ JAN 25 2001

No. 00-492 OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

¢

STATE OF ALABAMA,

Petitioner,

Vv.

MICHAEL HERMAN BOZEMAN,

Respondent.

¢

On Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Alabama

*

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

¢

BILL PRYOR

Attorney General of Alabama

SANDRA JEAN STEWART*

Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record*

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF ALABAMA

11 South Union Street

Montgomery, AL 36130-0152

(334) 242-7300

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does transfer of federal custody to state custody for

one day for purposes of arraignment, and transfer

back to federal custody before the disposition of

outstanding charges, a technical violation of the

Interstate Agreement on Detainers, require dismissal

of pending charges, even when there is no harm to the

prisoner either alleged or demonstrated?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PUTED oc cccescseicnsecssesiesntasninventheevenenien i

TABLES CP CORT IGT Ee ciccceveesnecescsesvinssntentnicbeahepmens ii

TABLE, OF AUT ae ccucacscosvcsnssicecensdvecsenysncnwarsetn iv

CPTI IIIS TREE ccnccsecintscicanstevsccaputnsyedionsmenananeniniae 1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ...............ccscssccsceccsves 1

EAT REFUGEE sitinanscisnstsemninnetronieameaionaens 1

STATEERITE OF TERR CATED csscvaxescncrstseicesscsvesapnnsestests 6

A. Relevant Events Occurring Prior to Trial .......... 6

1. Facts On Which The Underlying

COORIVECEIOING ARO TRIO oc sccsicsccssissinctseserseseees 6

2. Facts Surrounding Bozeman’s

Transfers Between Federal Custody and

RO COD cnaseriicshscienkietriateaoaebints 7

3. Facts Concerning Bozeman’s Assertions

That The IAD Had Been Violated............... 10

B. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals......... 15

C. The Supreme Court of Alabama ..................... 15

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................scceceseeeees 17

REOR FA E stsststvsinecnentnaadndtomaaianononnaals 18

A. When Analyzed In The Historical Setting In

Which The IAD Was Passed, Harmless Error

Was Meant To Apply To Violations Of The IAD

That Do Not Affect Substantial Rights............ 18

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

B. Harmless Error Analysis Is Applicable To The

Evaluation Of Errors Involving Both The

Constitution And Federal Statutes, Like The

BENE GidcckamenouashcaencesadiavoatndesoniitainiiniacstheOanexeeren 21

C. The Purposes Behind The IAD Also Support A

Finding That A Harmless Error Analysis

Should Be Applied To Violations Of The IAD. .29

D. When A Harmless Error Analysis Is Applied To

The Facts Presented In This Case, Dismissal

Of The Indictment Is Not Warranted............... x |

GENIE rikcdeshedsdusiavacissnsnseinctscanevensncsidascosscoceseey 36

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

FEDERAL CASES

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness

~ - SFechahyy, 4ST U.G. BAO (1DTS) ...cccsccsscsesescorssceses 21, 26

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).............. 23

Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,

SEE Chin Oe HME titahavidatdauininecabanksucnvebbipniiiaes 23, 24

Baxter v. United States, 966 F.2d 387

RIE Ce iniintn celaecncnidanbstichenumespcinaditnapnenbesinnatis 31

Beck v. Prupis, 120 S. Ct. 1608 (2000)...................... 26

Bob Jones University v. United States,

NE. APi> SPP CED vudesnscsdindannssnedceimncndbives 21, 29, 31

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1999)........ 20, 24

Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253 (1986) ............. 34

Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985) ............. 18, 30

Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989)................. 35

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) ...20, 22, 35

Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) .....ses-sess+e0004-23

Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983) .............. 23

Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981) ....19, 21, 29, 30

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) .......... 21

Dickerson v. New Banner Institute,

I Aree: SEN BUENO icine nshcksbeiua Saabigacsnidnunkuenicna 31-32

Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969)............ 23

Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982) ........c.ccceseeees 23

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997).......... 34

Kotteakos v. United States,

Se Te FP FED ince vininiicaconessis 20, 22, 23-24, 35

Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977)............cscececeeees 35

Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990) .......... -26

Neder v. Slate, SST WB. 1 CGI) vsciccocsescecssvscsssscnssces 23

New York v. Hill, 120 S. Ct. 659 (2000)..................... 28

O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995).................. 19

Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) ........ccccceseeeeees ).23

Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) ................... 33

Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23 (1999) ............ 23

Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987)................608 23, 35

- Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994) .......cccceceeeeeeees 26

Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) .................608 21, 23

Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983) ...... 21

Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983)................eeeeeee 22

Sassoon v. Stynchombe, 654 F.2d 371

See GR. IRR Sci dence cn aciqdecnctatinucseuensupiaibaantevndnanbiies 31

United States v. A Parcel of Land,

PE Ch BAS CIPO 4 tndebitinccccgnciinksacnapetesssnsnnsnenedinnd 26

United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950)............. 32

United States v. Daniels, 3 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1993)....30

United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) .......... 35

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

United States v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 1167

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 879 (1992) .......... 31

United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986)....... 4.23, 24

United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978)............. 30

United States v. Montalvo-Murllo,

BD MPs FEE. CERO via vrcaniceccnsincerenvsetatsntanpinioniaeion 23 |

United States v. Roy, 771 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1985) ...... 31

United States v. Taylor, 173 F.3d 538

(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 448 (1999) ........ 31

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992) ................csccssssees 26

STATE CASES

Bozeman v. State, CR-96-1611

(Ala. Crim. App. May 8, 1998)(mem.)..................... 15

Ex parte Bozeman, No. 1971759,

2000 WL 429936 (Ala. Apr. 21, 2000).............. 16, 19

FEDERAL STATUTES

ee ies Te RET vnsincsscciuvianionnséciakitenmetivbanaamaaneenanas 1

Be A rs TE AER OR. ksaccnsentaciacsavenseossnanccncuatnatiaaeans 5, 32

ee Se BF NE vdcpvansecnesnsnessatebasketepacupaisestagtacdnasuiond 27

STATE STATUTES

ALA. CODE § 13A-11-61 (1975)............ccosscsccsccscscceees 18

Vii ‘

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

ALA. CODE § § 15-9-80 through 15-9-88 (1975) ...1, 18

STATE RULES

Rule 45 of the Alabama Rules of Appellate

SERN RS SHE RaUDp PSH SO eR Te SIREN DO EL 5, 19, 20

OTHER AUTHORITIES

PIE Ee icin bs idiscntubhitcnipeabdadiartaatimntdiiante 1-2, 18, 29

I HII 5 skd deudiNcnanthana deka necks wpaviapetionds 4, 29, 35

NI I ik as rhcntbciciigea tte ata detainee Aiea 4,29.

1 Wigmore, Evidence § 21 (Tillers rev. 1983)............. 19

Ps, HOE ER tik ps iitsiid berth clea dhe casuelagencbnt 18

\

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals is unpublished. (Pet. App. 15-26.) The

decision of the Alabama Supreme Court is not yet

reported, but can be found at 2000 WL 429936. (Pet.

App. 1-14.)

¢

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court

reversing Bozeman’s convictions was entered on April

21, 2000. An application for rehearing was overruled

on June 30, 2000. (Pet. App. 30.) The State filed a

petition for a writ of certiorari on September 28, 2000.

Jurisdiction in this Court exists under 28 U.S.C. §

1257(a).

°

STATUTES INVOLVED

The following provisions of the Interstate

Agreement on Detainers Act, also referred to as the

Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act,

which is codified in Alabama in Sections 15-9-80

through 15-9-88 of the Code of Alabama 1975 (set out

in full at Pet. App. 32-47):

Article I.

The party states find that charges

outstanding against a prisoner, detainers

based on untried indictments, informa-

tions or complaints and difficulties in

2

securing speedy trial of persons already

incarcerated in other jurisdictions,

produce uncertainties which obstruct

programs of prisoner treatment and

rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the

policy of the party states and the purpose

of this agreement to encourage the

expeditious and orderly disposition of

such charges and determination of the

proper status of any and all detainers

based on untried indictments, informa-

tions or complaints. The party states

also find that proceedings with reference

to such charges and detainers, when

emanating from another jurisdiction,

cannot properly be had in the absence of

cooperative procedures. It is the further

purpose of this agreement to provide

such cooperative procedures.

Article IV.

(a) The appropriate officer of the ju-

risdiction in which an untried indict-

ment, information or complaint is pend-

ing shall be entitled to have a prisoner

against whom he has lodged a detainer

and who is serving a term of imprison-

ment in any party state made available in

accordance with article V(a) hereof upon

presentation of a written request for

temporary custody or availability to the

appropriate authorities of the state in

which the prisoner is_ incarcerated;

provided, that the court having jurisdic-

3

tion of such indictment, information or

complaint shall have duly approved,

recorded and transmitted the request;

and provided further, that there shall be

a period of 30 days after receipt by the

appropriate authorities before the

request be honored, within which period

the governor of the sending state may

disapprove the request for temporary

custody or availability, either upon his

own motion or upon motion of the

prisoner.

(b) Upon request of the officer’s writ-

ten request as provided in paragraph (a)

hereof, the appropriate authorities having

the prisoner in custody shall furnish the

officer with a certificate stating the term

of commitment under which the prisoner

is being held, the time already served, the

time remaining to be served on the

sentenee, the amount of good time

earned, the time of parole eligibility of the

prisoner and any decisions of the state

parole agency relating to the prisoner.

Said authorities simultaneously shall

furnish all other officers and appropriate

courts in the receiving state who have

lodged detainers against the prisoner

with similar certificates and with notices

informing them of the request for custody

or availability and of the reasons there-

for.

(c) In respect of any proceeding made

possible by this article, trial shall be

commenced within 120 days of the

4

arrival of the prisoner in the receiving

state, but for good cause shown in open

court, the prisoner or his counsel being

present, the court having jurisdiction of

the matter may grant any necessary or

reasonable continuance.

(d) Nothing contained in this article

shall be construed to deprive any pris-

oner of any right which he may have to

contest the legality of his delivery as

provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but

such delivery may not be opposed or

denied on the ground that the executive

authority of the sending state has not

affirmatively consented to or ordered

such delivery.

(e) If trial is not had on any indict-

ment, information or complaint contem-

plated hereby prior to the prisoner’s

being returned to the original place of

imprisonment pursuant to article V(e)

hereof, such indictment, information or

complaint shall not be of any further

force or effect, and the court shall enter

an order dismissing the same with

prejudice.

Article IX.

1. This agreement shall be liberally

construed so as to effectuate its pur-

poses. ...

5

Section 2111 of Title 28 of the United States Code:

On the hearing of any appeal or writ

of certiorari in any case, the court shall

give judgment after an examination of the

record without regard to errors or defects

which do not affect the substantial rights

of the parties.

Rule 45 of the Alabama Rules of —

Procedure:

No judgment may be reversed or set

aside, nor new trial granted in any civil

or criminal case on the ground of misdi-

rection of the jury, the giving or refusal of

special charges or the improper admis-

sion or rejection of evidence, nor for error

as to any matter of pleading or proce-

dure, unless in the opinion of the court

to which the appeal is taken or applica-

tion is made, after an examination of the

entire cause, it should appear that the

error complained of has probably injuri-

ously affected the substantial rights of

the parties.

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises out of the transfer of custody of

Michael Bozeman between federal authorities and

state authorities in Covington County, Alabama, and

involves the application of the Interstate Agreement on

Detainers (IAD), to which both the federal government

and the State of Alabama are parties.

A. Relevant Events Occurring Prior To Trial,

1. Facts On Which The Underlying

Convictions Are Based

Michael Herman Bozeman was extremely jealous

when it came to his ex-wife, and he continually

harassed and threatened her. (Record 23-33, 46-49,

51-59, 79-82.) Around midnight, on June 14, 1995,

after drinking almost two quarts of Lord Calvert

whiskey, Bozeman and Jeff Anderson drove around

the City of Opp, Alabama, in Anderson’s van. (Record

126-28.) Bozeman brought with him a .22 caliber rifle

that he had a reputation for keeping in his possession

at all times. ~(Record 25, 129-30.) At Bozeman’s

instruction, Anderson drove by the townhouse of

Bozeman’s former wife, Carmen Yvonne Bozeman.

(Record 132-33.) When they approached the

townhouse, Bozeman stuck his .22 caliber rifle out of

the window and fired shots into the bedroom of the

residence, where his former wife was sleeping. (Record

33-36, 133-40.) Fortunately, Ms. Bozeman was not

hit by the gunfire. (Record 36.)

Bozeman then directed Anderson to drive to the

residence of Bozeman’s former sister-in-law, Linda

Weed. (Record 133-34.) Again, Bozeman stuck the

7

22 rifle out of the van window and opened fire on the

residence. (Record 133-40.) Ms. Weed was not at

home at the time of the shooting. (Record 59-60.)

Bozeman then ordered Anderson to drive to the

home of Melton Williams, a man who had recently

begun dating Bozeman’s former wife. (Record 134,

141.) Bozeman repeatedly shot into the bedroom of

Mr. Williams’s residence, where Mr. Williams was

sleeping, (Record 83-85, 86, 180), and into Mr.

Williams’s vehicles, (Record 85-86, 180). Mr. Williams

was also fortunate that he was not hit by the gunfire.

2. Facts Surrounding Bozeman’s

Transfers Between Federal Custody

And State Custody

On June 15, 1995, the day after the shooting

incidents, Bozeman was arrested on a federal charge of

intimidating a witness, and he was placed in the

county jail in Covington County, Alabama, by federal

authorities.! (App. 54-55, 60, 66.) On June 16, 1995,

he was also arrested on federal charges of conspiracy

to possess with the intent to _ distribute

methamphetamine and his custody was transferred to

federal authorities, but he was placed in the county

jail in Montgomery County, Alabama. (App. 23, 62-63;

Record 102.)

In September of 1995, while Bozeman was in

federal custody, he was indicted by a Covington

! The record does not reflect whether these charges were related to

the shooting incidents underlying this case.

8

County Grand Jury for the unlawful possession or

receipt of a controlled substance, all stemming from

conduct that occurred in May of 1995. (Case No. CC-

95-350) (App. 62-64.) Temporary custody of Bozeman

was obtained from the federal authorities by Covington

County authorities in November 1995 for the specific

purpose of arraignment on the state drug charge, and

Bozeman was arraigned and appointed counsel on that

charge. (App. 62-64, 95-98.) After his arraignment

and before disposition of the state drug charge,

Bozeman was returned to the custody of the federal

authorities. (App. 66-67.) In June of 1996, the state

drug charge was dismissed. (App. 66-67.) At no time

before his state drug charge was dismissed did

Bozeman raise any allegations that his transfer from

federal custody to state custody and back to federal

custody violated the Interstate Agreement on

Detainers.

Thereafter, on September 20, 1996, Bozeman was

indicted in Covington County under state law on two

counts of discharging a firearm into an occupied

dwelling, two counts of discharging a firearm into an

unoccupied vehicle, and one count of discharging a

firearm into an unoccupied dwelling. (Case No. 97-16)

(App. 4-9, 61-62.) These charges are the charges

arising from the June 14, 1995, incident in which

Bozeman fired into the homes of his ex-wife, his

former sister-in-law, and his ex-wife’s boyfriend. They

are also the charges that form the basis of the detainer

in this case.

On October 10, 1996, the Covington County

District Attorney requested that a detainer be placed

on Bozeman so that he could be arraigned in

Covington County on the shooting charges. (App. 64,

100-02.) The Covington County District Attorney

9

specifically requested that Bozeman be made available

for his upcoming arraignment on the shooting charges

and requested that all necessary forms be mailed to

her for completion and returned to the proper federal

authorities in sufficient time for the State permissibly

to obtain Bozeman. (App. 100-02.) The federal

authorities in Atlanta responded that a detainer had

been filed on Bozeman pursuant to the District

Attorney’s “October 29, 1996” request. (App. 64-65.)

The record contains a notice to Bozeman of untried

indictments and the right to request disposition of the

charges in the shooting cases pursuant to Article III of

the IAD, which he signed on November 4, 1996, and

which acknowledges his receipt of the notice. (App.

34-36.) _

Because Bozeman had been transferred from the

Atlanta Federal Penitentiary to the federal prison in

Marianna, Florida, the Covington County District

Attorney’s request for a detainer did not reach

Bozeman until January of 1997. (App. 64-66.) On

January 8, 1997, the District Attorney sent a letter

and temporary custody form to the federal prison

authorities in Marianna, Florida. (App. 98-100.) The

letter and form indicated that Bozeman was needed for

arraignment and appointment of counsel in the

shooting case, case number CC-97-16, and that

Bozeman would be picked up on January 15, 1997

and returned to federal authorities one day later, on

January 16, 1997. (App. 98-99.) It was not until

January 23, 1997, however, that temporary custody of

Bozeman was transferred from federal authorities to

Covington County authorities. (App. 56-57, 58, 67.)

The next day, January 24, 1997, Bozeman was

arraigned on the shooting charges and custody of

Bozeman was transferred back to the federal

authorities. (App. 26-31, 67.)

10

3. Facts Concerning Bozeman’s Asser-

tions That The IAD Had Been Violated

On the day he was brought to Covington County for

arraignment, Bozeman filed a pro se motion to dismiss

his indictment in which he asserted as grounds for

dismissal violations of Articles [V(e) and V(e) of the

Interstate Agreement on Detainers. (App. 18-25.) In

that motion, Bozeman did not allege that the IAD

would be violated if he were returned to federal

custody before he was tried on the pending charges,

but instead claimed that the IAD had already been

violated when he was transferred in November 1995

for arraignment on the state drug charge. (App. 18-

25.) Bozeman argued that, because the State had

failed to dispose of the shooting charges in 1995 when

he was brought back to Covington County, the IAD

required that the shooting charges be dismissed.

(App. 18-25.) When Bozeman was brought back for

arraignment on the drug charge in November 1995,

however, the shooting indictments had not yet been

returned by the Covington County Grand Jury and, as

to those charges, there were no “untried indictments,

informations or complaints which form[ed] the basis of

[that] detainer or detainers.” See Article V(d) of the

IAD. (App. 4-9, 61-62.)

Bozeman was arraigned on the shooting charges on

January 24, 1997. (App. 26-31.) At that arrai ent,

appointed counsel for Bozeman indicated that) there

were some possible questions about whether the IAD

had been properly followed and he _ requested

permission to further investigate and research that

issue. (App. 27.) At the time of that discussion, there

had been no violation of the IAD as to the pending

charges; specifically, Bozeman had not yet been

returned to federal custody. Neither defense counsel

4 11

nor Bozeman informed. the trial judge at that time that

a return of Bozeman to federal. custody before he was

tried on the pending charges would result in a

violation of the IAD, nor did they object to his return to

federal custody. (App. 27-31.) Instead, counsel for

Bozeman agreed to: file any motions objecting to

violations of the IAD at some later time. (App. 27.)

Bozeman was returned to federal custody that same

day. (App. 26-31, 67.)

Approximately one month later, on February 21,

1997, counsel for Bozeman filed Defendant’s Motion

To Dismiss, requesting that the indictment against

Bozeman charging him with the several shooting

violations be dismissed. (App. :32-36.) In support of

his motion, Bozeman alleged that Article IV(e) of the

IAD required dismissal of the indictment because he

had been brought to Covington County to face the

shooting charges and he had thereafter been returned

to his original place of incarceration prior to being

tried on the shooting charges. (App. 32-33.) In that

motion, Bozeman did not allege that he was prejudiced

in any way by the violation of the IAD. On February

25, 1997, Bozeman filed a Memorandum Brief In

Support Of Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, again

alleging violations of the IAD. (App. 37-42.) Bozeman

did not allege any prejudice in that memorandum

either.

On February 27, 1997, Bozeman was again

released from federal custody to the custody of

Covington County officials, this time for a trial on the

shooting charges. (App. 57, 67-68, 86-87.) Before the

trial began, the court held an in-chambers discussion

regarding Bozeman’s motions to dismiss on the

grounds that the IAD had been violated. (App. 45-47.)

Again, Bozeman failed to allege that he had been

12

prejudiced in any way by his previous one-day

transfer. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss

at that time so that the trial could proceed, but it

reserved to Bozeman the right to put on testimony and

evidence in support of his motions after the completion

of the trial and specifically reserved to him the right to

raise the issue by post-trial motion. (App. 45-47.) —

Bozeman’s trial proceeded on February 27, 1997,

well within 120 days of Bozeman’s first arrival in

Covington County for arraignment on the pending

shooting charges on January 24, 1997. The jury

convicted Bozeman on all five counts of the indictment

on February 28, 1997. (App. 114-15: Record 192-93.)

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court ordered

that Bozeman remain in the custody of Covington

County officials until the questions raised on the IAD

were resolved and until sentencing was completed.

(App. 48-49.) .

On March 12, 1997, a hearing was held on

Bozeman’'s motions to dismiss his indictment based on

alleged violations of the IAD. (App. 53-84.) At that

hearing, Bozeman did not present any testimony or

make any argument that he was harmed in any way

by the one-day transfer from federal custody to

Covington County custody and back to federal

custody. (App. 53-84.)

On April 25, 1997, Bozeman filed a Renewal Of

Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss in which he again

asserted violations of the IAD. (App. 109-10.) In this

motion, Bozeman added to his prior arguments

concerning the IAD an assertion that Article V(e) was

being violated by the failure to return him to federal

custody ‘at the earliest possible time consonant with

the purposes of the agreement.” In this motion,

13

Bozeman argued that the failure to return him to

federal custody was prejudicing him because, by

failing to return him, “the State is interfering with the

rehabilitation which would be taking place if

Defendant were in a federal penitentiary. This is

clearly contrary to the spirit of IAD.” (App. 110.) This

was the first time that Bozeman had alleged any

prejudice from a violation of the IAD, and this

allegation had nothing to do with his prior one-day

transfer of custody.

On May 16, 1997, the Covington County Circuit

Court judge denied Bozeman’s motions to dismiss the

indictment in a written order. (Pet. App. 27-29.) The

judge found that the only issue before him was

whether Article IV of the IAD had been violated. (Pet.

App. 27.) Finding that the goals of the IAD had been

met and that Bozeman had failed to demonstrate any

prejudice, the trial judge denied the motions to

dismiss. (Pet. App. 28-29.) Specifically, the trial judge

found, in pertinent part:

It seems to me that defendant was

brought to Covington County on both the

above mentioned occasions to attend to

short pre-trial matters, not anticipated to

require his extended presence. It made

much sense to bring him into the county

briefly to see to those matters, and

thereupon return him to the surround-

ings to which he was accustomed. That

course appears to have been conservative

of defendant’s interest in maintaining

any course of rehabilitation available to

him in federal prison. He certainly would

not receive much rehabilitation in a

county jail.

14

To paraphrase another court, at the

hearing of this matter there was a failure

of proof that the short transfers to

Covington County interfered with defen-

dant’s participation in any rehabilitative

program, or that he was denied, threat-

ened with the denial of, or feared losing

any privileges because of this state

charge, and no dismissal is appropriate.

The transfers involved in this case appear

to be wholly consistent with the goal of

the IAD to expedite the prosecution of

state charges without interfering with

any rehabilitative programs of the federal

government... .

(App. 28-29.)

Bozeman was sentenced on May 2\, 1997 to five

concurrent ten-year sentences,those_sentences to run

consecutively to the federal sentence that Bozeman

was then serving. “(App. 116-19.) Also on May 21,

1997, Bozeman. filed a Motion For Judgment

Notwithstanding The Verdict Or In The Alternative For

New Trial, in which he again asserted violations of the

IAD by his failure to be tried on the shooting charges

before being returned to the custody of federal officials.

(App. 11-12.) It was in this post-trial, post-decision

motion that Bozeman, for the first time, alleged

prejudice from his one-day transfer. (App. 111-12.)

Bozeman made thé conclusive allegation that the one-

day transfer denied him the opportunity adequately to

consult with counsel prior to trial. (App. 111-12.)

15

B. The Alabayaa Court of Criminal Appeals

Bozeman timely appealed to the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals. Among the issues raised in his brief

was the argument that his January 1997 one-day

transfer from federal officials to state officials and back

to federal officials, without disposing of the pending

indictment, violated the Interstate Agreement on

Detainers. Noting that the transfer of Bozeman in this

case did not interfere with the purposes of the IAD and

that Bozeman had asserted no prejudice from the

transfers until his appeal, and even then only

perfunctorily so, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals rejected Bozeman’s argument and affirmed

Bozeman’s convictions. Bozeman v. State, CR-96-

1611, mem. op. at 4, 6 (Ala. Crim. App. May 8, 1998)

(Pet. App. 19, 21-22, 26). Bozeman’s application for

rehearing in that court was overruled on June 19,

1998. (Pet. App. 31.)

C. The Supreme Court of Alabama

Bozeman applied to the Alabama Supreme Court

for certiorari, which it granted on February 19, 1999.

In his petition for a writ of certiorari, Bozeman’s sole

issue was his argument that there had been a violation

of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers requiring

dismissal of his indictment. On April 21, 2000, the

Alabama Supreme Court, in a per curiam, 5 to 3

decision, reversed Bozeman’s convictions, holding that

the violation of the IAD required dismissal of

Bozeman’s indictment. Ex parte Bozeman, No.

1971759, 2000 WL 429936 (Ala. Apr. 21, 2000). (Pet.

App. 1-10.) In doing so, the Alabama Supreme Court

refused to consider the State’s argument that Bozeman

had not demonstrated any harm from the technical

16

violation of Article [V(e) of the IAD. Jd. at 8. The Court

also held that its conclusion was “consistent with the

purpose of the Act to protect a _ prisoner’s

constitutional right to a fair and speedy trial,” but in

no way explained how the one-day technical violation

of the IAD impacted, affected, or even implicated

Bozeman’s right to a fair or speedy trial. Jd. at 8.

The State filed an application for rehearing

emphasizing that the technical violation of the IAD did

not require dismissal of the indictment because the

purposes of the Act had not been defeated and that the

court had erred in failing to apply a harmless error

analysis to the issue. On June 30, 2000, the court

rejected the State’s rehearing application.

¢

17

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is an

interstate compact within the Compact Clause of the

United States Constitution and it is, therefore, subject

to federal interpretation and federal law. Although

Bozeman was tried in an Alabama court on Alabama

charges and he appealed to the Alabama Supreme

Court, the supreme court did not apply its harmless

error rule because state law was allegedly preempted

by federal law. Unfortunately, the supreme court

erred by failing to apply the harmless error rule as a

matter of federal law.

When Alabama enacted the IAD, the harmless error

rule was firmly established as a part of federal law: it

existed at common law, had been enacted as a federal

statute, held applicable to most constitutional errors,

held applicable to statutory violations, and held

applicable on collateral review of convictions. In case

after case, this Court has asserted a preference for

application of the harmless error rule. It is against

this backdrop that the Court must decide if harmless

error applies to violations of the IAD.

Both case law from this Court and federal statutory

law mandate that any error be reviewed to determine

whether the error resulted in prejudice, whether that

error is a constitutional error or a violation of a

statute. The purposes behind the IAD also support a

determination that harmless error applies to a

violation of its provisions. In this case, where no harm

contemplated by the IAD occurred from the technical

one-day violation of Article [V(e) of the IAD, and where

dismissal of the indictment would result in a windfall

not contemplated by the Agreement, this Court should

find that dismissal of the indictment was not

18

mandated in this case. The Alabama Supreme Court

refused to apply the harmless error rule; its judgment

should be reversed and Bozeman’s_ shooting

convictions should be reinstated.

¢

ARGUMENT

A. When Analyzed in the Historical Setting in

Which the IAD Was Passed, Harmless Error Was

Meant to Apply to Violations of the IAD That Do

Not Affect Substantial Rights.

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is an

agreement between 48 states, including the State of

Alabama, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the

Virgin Islands, and the federal government. Carchman

v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985). “The [IAD] was

drafted in 1956 by the Council of State Governments,”

id., and was adopted in 1978 by the State of Alabama,

where it is now codified at sections 15-9-80 through

15-9-88 of the Code of Alabama 1975. (Pet. App. 32-

47) The overriding purpose of the IAD is to encourage

the expeditious and orderly disposition of untried

indictments and to encourage the determination of the

proper status of any and all detainers based on such

charges, in order to eliminate uncertainties that

obstruct programs designed to treat and rehabilitate

prisoners. See Article I of the IAD. Alabama joined

the IAD to meet the concerns expressed in the

Agreement. 1978 Ala. Acts 590.

Michael Bozeman was tried in an Alabama circuit

court in February of 1997 and convicted of crimes in

violation of Alabama statute, specifically section 13A-

11-61 of the Code of Alabama 1975. (App. 4-7, 114—

19

15.) He appealed those state convictions to the

Alabama appellate courts where, ordinarily, those

courts would apply the state harmless error rule to

identified errors before determining reversal was

necessary. See Rule 45 of the Alabama Rules of

Appellate Procedure (“No judgment may be reversed or

set aside, nor new trial granted in any civil or criminal

case ... for error as to any matter of pleading or

procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which

the appeal is taken or application is made, after an

examination of the entire cause, it should appear that

the error complained of has probably injuriously

affected substantial rights of the parties.”). In this

case, however, the Alabama Supreme Court,

recognizing that the IAD was a federal law subject to

federal construction, did not apply the harmless error

rule of Rule 45 because the court felt that that state

law was preempted by federal law in this context. See

Ex parte Bozeman, No. 1971759, 2000 WL429936, at

*2 (Ala. Apr. 21, 2000). (Pet. App. 6) In fact, this

Court has specifically held that, because the IAD “was

intended to be a grant of consent under the Compact

Clause, and because the subject matter of the Act is

an appropriate subject for congressional legislation,

the Detainer Agreement is a _ congressionally

sanctioned interstate compact the interpretation of

which presents a federal question.” Cuyler v. Adams,

449 U.S. 433, 442 (1981) (footnote omitted).

When the IAD was developed and enacted, the

harmless error rule was deeply entrenched in federal

jurisprudence. The idea that errors that did not affect

the verdict should not result in reversal of convictions

existed at common law. See generally 1 Wigmore,

Evidence § 21 (Tillers rev. 1983); see also, O’Neal v.

McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437 (1995) (referring to the

“original common-law harmless-error” rule). In 1919,

20

Congress enacted the first federal harmless error

statute, the predecessor to section 2111 of Title 28 of

the United States Code, in response to widespread

criticism that some appellate courts were reversing

cases based on mere technical errors that did not

affect the substantial rights of the parties, leading to

inconsistent results in cases. Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 757-62 (1946). In Kotteakos,

the Court, assessing the federal harmless error statute

and its application, held that it applied to more than

mere technical errors and specifically applied to

resolution of issues involving violations of federal

statutes. 328 U.S. at 757-62. Thereafter, in Chapman

v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court developed

a harmless error rule to apply to constitutional errors,

finding that, even though section 2111 was not meant

to and did not apply to constitutional issues, harmless

error analysis was the rule rather than the exception

and should apply to constitutional errors. A harmless

error rule was also developed to apply on collateral

proceedings. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619

(1993). In case after case, this Court has asserted a

preference for application of harmless error analysis to

errors that do not affect the substantial rights of the

parties.

Moreover, all 50 states have harmless error rules,

see, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 22, including

Alabama, Rule 45, Ala.R.App.P., demonstrating that

the States as well as this Court have a preference for

application of the rule to errors that do not affect the

substantial rights of the parties.

The IAD was passed against this long history of a

preference for the application of the rule of harmless

error. This Court must now determine whether, in

enacting the IAD, Congress intended the rule not to

Re»

LPs NOP ORI ETA Sy PAD

i ne

21

apply to its provisions. See, Alyeska Pipeline Service

Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (look to

historical backdrop concerning award of attorneys’

fees to determine whether Congress intended award of

attorneys’ fees where statute silent on matter);

Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983)

(same); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.

574 (1983) (look to historical background concerning

charitable purpose tax exemption). The only sensible

and reasonable interpretation is that harmless error

does apply to the IAD.

B. Harmless Error Analysis Is Applicable To The

Evaluation Of Errors Involving Both The

Constitution And Federal Statutes, Like The

IAD.

As noted, in Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 442

(1981), this Court held that the IAD is subject to

federal interpretation. Because the IAD is subject to

federal interpretation and federal law, those cases

addressing the issue of harmless error involving the

Constitution and federal statutes control. The

Supreme Court of Alabama, therefore, erred when it

failed to apply a rule of harmless error in this case.

“The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the

principie that the central purpose of a criminal trial is

to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt

or innocence, ... and promotes public respect for the

criminal process by focusing on the underlying

fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually

inevitable presence of immaterial error.” Delaware v.

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (internal

citation omitted); accord, Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570,

577 (1986). Harmless error rules recognize the

22

necessity for preserving society’s interest in the

administration of criminal justice and the general rule

that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered.

Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-18 (1983) (citing

United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981)).

In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946),

this Court noted the purpose behind the federal

harmless error rule: “to substitute judgment for

automatic application of rules; to preserve review as a

check upon arbitrary action and essential unfairness

in trials, but at the same time to make the process

perform that function without giving men fairly

convicted the multiplicity of loopholes which any highly

rigid and minutely detailed scheme of errors, especially

in relation to procedure, will engender and reflect in a

printed record.” Id. at 759-60 (emphasis added). The

Court continued that the federal harmless error rule

came down to “a very plain admonition: ‘Do not be

technical, where technicality does not really hurt the

party whose rights in the triai and in its outcome the

technicality affects.’” Id. at 760.

In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), this

Court held that the harmless error rule applies not

only to statutory violations, like those in Kotteakos,

but it also applies to federal constitutional errors.

Noting that none of the state federal harmless error

rules nor the federal harmless error rule distinguished

between federai constitutional errors and statutory

errors, the Court concluded that there were some

constitutional errors which could be so unimportant

and insignificant that they could be deemed harmless,

not requiring automatic reversal of the conviction. Id.

at 22. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that

the harmless error rules of the various states and the

federal rule served a very useful purpose in that they

23

blocked setting aside convictions for small errors that

had little, if any, likelihood of changing the result of

the trial. Jd. This Court has recognized and applied

the harmless error rule in myriad circumstances

involving constitutional error. See, e.g., Neder v. State,

527 U.S. 1 (1999) (where jury instructions failed to

submit materiality issue, an element of the offense, to

jury for consideration); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.

279 (1991) (introduction at trial of coerced confession);

Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (erroneous jury

instruction on standard to be applied in determining

whether material obscene); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570

(1986) (Sandstrom error); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460

U.S. 73 (1983) (Sandstrom error); Hopper v. Evans, 456

U.S. 605 (1982) (failure to give lesser included offense

jury instruction in capital case); United States v.

Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981) (denial of Sixth

Amendment right to counsel); Oregon v. Hass, 420

U.S. 714 (1975) (compulsory _ self-incrimination);

Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (denial of right

to counsel at preliminary hearing); Harrington uv.

California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (Bruton error).

In addition to applying the harmless error rule in

the very important area of constitutional analysis, this

Court has also applied the harmless error rule to

issues involving violations of federal statutes. See, e.g.,

Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 27-29 (1999)

(violation of Rule 32(a)(2) of Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure); United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S.

711, 716-22 (1990) (violation of Rule 6 of Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure and 18 U.S.C. §§6002,

6003); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S.

250, 255-56 (1988) (violation of Bail Reform Act of

1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (e)); United States v. Lane, 474

U.S. 438 (1986) (violation of Rule 8 of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure); Kotteakos v. United

24

States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) (violations of federal

statutes concerning indictments and conspiracies).

In United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986), this

Court noted that, since Chapman uv. California, 386

U.S. 18 (1967), it had made it consistently clear that

“St is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the

trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are

harmless, including most constitutional violations.’”

474 U.S. at 445 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Finding that “the argument for applying harmless-

error analysis is even stronger” in situations involving

violations of statutes which “are not themselves of

constitutional magnitude,” the Court held that a

violation of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure did not require reversal under the facts of

that case. 474 U.S. at 446. The Court went on to note

that “[i]t is difficult to see any logic in the argument

that although the harmless-error rule may be

applicable to constitutional violations, it should not be

applied to violations of mere procedural rules.” Id. at

446 n. 9. This Court also noted the lack of logic in an

argument that harmless error analysis can be applied

to constitutional error but not to violations of statutes

in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,

256 (1988), where it held: “It would be inappropriate

to devise a rule permitting federal courts to deal more

sternly with nonconstitutional harmless errors than

with constitutional errors that are likewise harmless.”

In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), this

Court answered the question of whether harmless

error applies to collateral proceedings under section

2254 of Title 28 of the United States Code, despite

Congress’s failure to address the matter in the habeas

corpus statute, in the affirmative. The Court, noting

that the habeas corpus statute was silent on the

25

application of the harmless error rule or the specific

standard of harmless error review required, 507 U.S.

at 631, and that it was generally reluctant to draw

inferences where Congress had failed to act, 507 U.S.

at 632, nonetheless fashioned a harmless error rule to

apply on collateral review. In reaching its conclusion,

the Court held:

In the absence of any express statu-

tory guidance from Congress, it remains

for this Court to determine what harm-

less-error standard applies on collateral

review of petitioner’s ... claim. We have

filled the gaps of the habeas corpus

statute with respect to other matters, ...

and find it necessary to do so here. As

always, in defining the scope of the writ,

we look first to the considerations un-

derlying our habeas jurisprudence, and

then determine whether the proposed

rule would advance or inhibit these

considerations by weighing the marginal

costs and benefits of its application on

collateral review.

Id. at 633 (internal citations omitted).

Just as the habeas corpus statute was silent on the

issue of whether harmless error applied to its

provisions, the IAD is silent on that issue. Even

though the IAD is silent on this issue, however, this

Court should, as it did in Brecht, find that the

harmless error rule applies because application of the

harmless error rule to the IAD would best advance the

purposes of the IAD, the costs to the prisoner would be

nil, and the benefits to society great.

26

Moreover, in construing the IAD, this Court must

do so against this historical backdrop establishing a

preference for the application of harmless error. In

case after case, this Court has emphasized that, in

construing statutes that are silent as to the

application of firmly rooted legal principles, the statute

must be interpreted in a way that is most consistent

with those established principles. See, e.g., Beck v.

Prupis, 120 S.Ct. 1608, 1615-17 (2000) (RICO

interpreted against backdrop of “well-established

common-law civil conspiracy principles”); United

States v. A Parcel of Land, 507 U.S. 111, 127-29

(1993) (forfeiture provisions of Comprehensive Drug

Abuse Prevention and Control Act interpreted against

backdrop of common law forfeiture rules); Wyatt v.

Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163-64 (1992) (whether qualified

immunity available defense for private defendant in

§1983 action determined against backdrop of common

law tort immunity); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S.

103, 108-19 (1990) (construing term “falsely made” in

18 U.S.C. §2314 against backdrop of common law

definition); Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness

Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (construing whether party

entitled to attorneys’ fees under Mineral Land Leasing

Act or National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

against backdrop of common law right to attorneys’

fees). There is nothing in the IAD to indicate that the

drafters of that legislation meant to change the

established precedent concerning harmless error.

Construing the IAD against this backdrop, harmless

error should apply to its provisions.

Other opinions from the Court bolster the

conclusion that harmless error applies to the IAD. In

Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994), a majority of this

Court held that a violation of the 120-day rule of

Article IV(c) of the IAD is not cognizable in a federal

27

habeas corpus action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

where the petitioner neither objected at the time his

trial date was set, nor suffered any prejudice as a

result of the commencement of his trial beyond the

120 days set in the rule. The IAD provides that

violation of the 120-day rule, like violation of the anti-

shuffling provision at issue here, requires dismissal of

the indictment with prejudice. Referring to the

statutory violation in that case as an “unwitting

judicial slip,” Justice Ginsburg found that the violation

in that case “ranke[d] with the nonconstitutional

lapses we have held not cognizable in a postconviction

proceeding.” 512 U.S. at 349. Moreover, Justice

Scalia, in his concurring opinion, also rejected the

availability of habeas review for violation of Article IV(c)

of the IAD. Addressing the issue of whether habeas

review should be available to the procedural violation

in that case, Justice Scalia wrote:

The class of procedural rights that are

not guaranteed by the Constitution

(which includes the Due Process Clause),

but that nonetheless are inherently

necessary to avoid a ‘complete miscar-

riage of justice,’ or numbered among ‘the

rudimentary demands of fair procedure,’

is no doubt a small one, if it is indeed not

a null set. The guarantee of trial within

120 days of interjurisdictional transfer

unless good cause is shown — a provi-

sion with no application to prisoners

involved with only a single jurisdiction or

incarcerated in one of two States that do

not participate in the voluntary IAD

compact — simply cannot be among that

select class of statutory rights.

28

If there was ever a technical rule, the

IAD’s 120-day limit is one.

Id. at 357-58.

Much like the 120-day rule of Article IV(c), the anti-

shuffling provision of Article IV(e) is a technical rule.

And just as habeas should not be available to review

such a violation because it is a mere procedural rule,

the harmless error rule should be available to review a

claim of error under that provision.

In New York v. Hill, 120 S. Ct. 659 (2000), this

Court addressed the issue of whether a prisoner could

waive violation of the 180-day provision of Article III(a)

of the IAD by merely complying with a trial date set

beyond the 180-day period and found that he could.

In rejecting Hill’s argument, this Court noted that no

provision of the IAD specifically addressed the issue of

waiver, id. at 663, but it nonetheless found that waiver

applied because of the general rule that presumes the

availability of waiver. Likewise, while no provision of

the IAD specifically addresses the issue of harmless

error, the general rule that presumes that harmless

error analysis of a given error is appropriate should

apply in the instance case.

Based on this Court’s long precedent, harmless

error analysis should be applied to violations of the

IAD. The failure of the Alabama Supreme Court to

follow this precedent constitutes reversible error.

oo OMe PCS a

29

C. The Purposes Behind The IAD Also Support A

Finding That A Harmless Error Analysis Should

Be Applied To Violations Of The IAD.

Article IV(e) of the IAD provides that an indictment

should be dismissed, with prejudice, if a prisoner is

returned to a sending state before resolution of

pending charges. The literal language of this provision

seems to preclude application of harmless error to it,

but in fact does not. This provision must be read in

conjunction with other provisions of the IAD;

specifically, it must be read in conjunction with those

provisions that outline the purposes for which the IAD

exists. See Article IX of the IAD (“This agreement shall

be liberally construed so as to effectuate its

purposes.”). See also, Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,

449-50 (1981) (Court looked to “the purpose of the

Detainer Agreement, as reflected in the structure of

the Agreement, its language, and its legislative

history,” to determine whether IAD had been violated);

Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,

986 (1983) (court should go beyond literal language of

statute if reliance on language defeats purposes of

statute). Read as a whole, the Agreement itself also

supports application of the harmless error rule.

Unlike many statutes, the reasons for the IAD and

the purposes behind it are clearly stated within the

legislation. Article I of the IAD states that the

Agreement was based on a finding that “charges

outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on

untried indictments, informations or complaints and

difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already

incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce

uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner

treatment and _ rehabilitation.” “Accordingly, its

purpose is to encourage the expeditious disposition of

30

such charges and to provide cooperative procedures -

among member States to facilitate such disposition.”

United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).

In United States v. Mauro, this Court further

elaborated on the purposes behind the IAD, noting

that the problems resulting in adoption of the IAD

included the serious disadvantages prisoners under

detainer were subjected to, including more onerous

conditions of incarceration, precluding their

participation in work assignments, activities, and

rehabilitation programs, and creating uncertainties

about the length of their sentences. Jd. at 359-60.

The Court concluded that “[t]he adverse effects of

detainers that prompted the drafting and enactment of

the Agreement are thus for the most part the

consequence of the lengthy duration of detainers.

Because a detainer remains lodged against a prisoner

without any action being taken on it, he is denied

certain privileges within the prison, and rehabilitation

efforts may be frustrated.” Jd. at 360. See also,

Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719-20, 729-30

(1985); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1981).

In enacting the IAD, the member States included a

clear statement of the purposes behind the IAD and

included a clear statement that the Agreement was to

be liberally construed to effectuate those purposes.

Many of the federal appellate courts addressing this

issue have found that the purposes of the IAD would

not be served by dismissal of an indictment because of

a technical violation of Article IV(e) of the Agreement

and they have held dismissal was not warranted under

such circumstances. United States v. Daniels, 3 F.3d

25, 27-28 (ist Cir. 1993) (finding the purposes of the

IAD were not violated by two brief, same-day transfers

and dismissal of indictment therefore was not

31

required); United States v. Roy, 771 F.2d 54, 59-60 (2d

Cir. 1985) (one-day interruption of state prison

confinement by transfer to federal custody for motion

hearing posed no threat to prisoner’s rehabilitation

sufficient to require dismissal of indictment under

IAD); Sassoon v. Stynchombe, 654 F.2d 371, 374-75

(Sth Cir. 1981) (“A brief removal of a prisoner to the

receiving jurisdiction and his prompt return to the

sending jurisdiction after arraignment and prior to

trial is consonant with the intention of the Interstate

Agreement on Detainers.”); United States v. Taylor, 173

F.3d 538 (6th Cir.) (finding that purposes of IAD not

violated by six brief, same-day transfers and dismissal

of indictment not, therefore, required), cert. denied,

120 S. Ct. 448 (1999); United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d

628, 635-37 (7th Cir. 1987) (stressing that the IAD

should be construed to effectuate its overall intent,

dismissal of indictment not warranted despite one-day

transfer), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988); Baxter v.

United States, 966 F.2d 387, 389-90 (8th Cir. 1992)

(returned to custody the same day, no violation of IAD

because no violation of purposes of IAD); United States

v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 1167, 1170-71 (9th Cir.) (one-

day transfer not violation of IAD because no evidence

that purposes of IAD not met), cert. denied, 506 U.S.

879 (1992). In rejecting the prisoners arguments in

those cases, the federal appellate courts held that,

despite the technical violation of the statute and the

literal language of the relevant provisions, the

Agreement was not violated because of the purposes

behind the IAD. In doing so, those courts relied on the

“well-established canon of statutory construction that

a court should go beyond the literal language of a

statute if reliance on that language would defeat the

plain purpose of the statute ....” Bob Jones

University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983);

see also, Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, 460 U.S.

32

103, 110 (1983); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323,

337-38 (1950).

In the case before this Court, no tenable claim can

be made that the purposes behind the IAD were

violated. Bozeman has not established any plausible

or cognizable prejudice from his one-day transfer. He

has not alleged that his right to a speedy trial was

denied. Nor could he: Bozeman was tried well within

the 120-day period provided in Article IV(c) of the

Agreement. Moreover, he has not alleged. that the one-

day transfer led to any denial of participation in a

federal rehabilitation program, any denial of privileges

he would have otherwise received, or it affected his

sentence in any way. The purposes behind the IAD

simply would not be vindicated by dismissing

Bozeman’s indictment.

Nor, critically, did Congress exempt the IAD from

application of the harmless error. Had _ the

participants in the IAD intended the harmless error

rule, customarily applicable to most constitutional

errors and errors violating statutes and rules, not

apply, surely they would have said so in the statute.

Otherwise, “[o]Jn the hearing of any appeal or writ of

certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment

without regard to errors or defects which do not affect

the substantial rights of the parties.” 28 U.S.C. §

2111 (emphasis added). In this case, no substantial

right of Bozeman’s was affected. Therefore, the

harmless error rule applies.

33

D. When A Harmless Error Analysis Is Applied To

The Facts Presented In This Case, Dismissal Of

The Indictment Is Not Warranted.

“Mere ‘technical errors’ which do not ‘affect the

substantial rights of the parties’ are not sufficient to

set aside a jury verdict in an appellate court.” Palmer

v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116 (1943). In this case,

any error in transferring custody of Bozeman for one

day from federal custody to state custody and back to

federal custody was, at most, a technical violation of

Article [V(e) of the IAD. Dismissal of his indictment

was not, therefore, warranted.

In this case, Bozeman failed to present any

evidence that he was harmed by the brief one-day

transfer that occurred in this case. He failed to

demonstrate that any of the purposes behind the IAD

were frustrated by his one-day transfer; specifically, he

failed to show that his right to a speedy trial was

frustrated, that he was denied any rehabilitation to

which he was entitled, or that his sentence was

negatively affected in any way.

The prosecutor in this case, shortly after the

indictment was returned on September 20, 1996,

sought to have Bozeman returned to Covington

County, Alabama from federal custody so that he

could be tried on the outstanding charges. (App. 64,

100-02) He was brought back to Covington County for

arraignment and was arraigned and returned to

federal custody the next day. (App. 26-31, 56-58, 67)

Despite his obvious knowledge of the provisions of the

IAD, including the anti-shuffling provisions (App. 18-

25), Bozeman did not inform the trial judge that, if he

were returned to federal custody before trial, his rights

under the IAD would be violated, and he did not object

34

to his return to federal custody when he was returned

(App. 26-31). Moreover, he specifically agreed to have

the IAD issues that he had already raised resolved at a

future time. (App. 27) It was approximately one

month later, just before he was returned to Covington

County for trial, that Bozeman first objected to his

temporary transfer, and even then he failed to allege

that he had been prejudiced by the transfer. (App. 32-

36, 37-42) Bozeman was then tried on February 27-

28, 1997, within 34 days of his initial transfer to

Alabama.

Not only did Bozeman fail to allege any harm from

his temporary one-day transfer, he appeared to

acquiesce in it. In the light of these facts and the

specific purposes behind the IAD, Bozeman should not

be granted the windfall that dismissal of the

indictment would grant him in this case. “This Court

has frequently articulated the ‘great principle of public

policy, applicable to all governments alike, which

forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced

by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose

care they are confided.’” Brock v. Pierce County, 476

U.S. 253, 260 (1986) (citing United States v. Nashville,

C. & St. L.R. Co., 118 U.S. 120 (1886)). “ ‘Reversal for

error regardless of its effect on the judgment,

encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and

bestirs the public to ridicule it.’” Johnson v. United

States, 520 U.S. 461, 470 (1997) (internal citation

omitted). Considering the character of the proceeding

at stake here — a criminal trial involving convictions

for violent felony offenses — and the relation of the

error asserted to that proceeding — a mere technical,

procedural violation not resulting in any harm to

Bozeman — this Court should weigh the balance in

favor of the State of Alabama and against Bozeman,

finding that any error in the violation of Article IV(e) of

35

the IAD in this case was harmless error. Kotteakos uv.

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762 (1946).

Finally, while this Court does not generally apply a

harmless error analysis in the first instance, see, e.g.,

Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1989);

Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504 (1987); Moore uv.

Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977), it has done so, see,

e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509-12

(1983); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24-26

(1967), and should do so in this case. The Alabama

Supreme Court was asked to do the analysis, but

chose not to do so. This Court should, therefore,

address the harmless error argument advanced by the

State of Alabama in this case and should find that the

technical violation of Article IV(e) in this case was

harmless error.

36

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama

should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

BILL PRYOR

Attorney General of Alabama

SANDRA JEAN STEWART

Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF ALABAMA

11 South Union Street

Montgomery, AL 36130-0152

(334) 242-7300

January 25, 2001