Appendices — Vista Paint Corp. v. United States
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-55160
D.C. No. CV-90-6449-R
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
. Plaintiff,
VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Defendant.
VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant-A ppellant,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Counterdefendant-A ppellee.
VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Third-Party Plaintiff-A ppellant,
¥,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; SOUTH COAST
AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT; SAN DIEGO
AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT; AIR RESOURCES
BOARD; TECHNICAL REVIEW GROUP;
Third-Party Defendants-A ppellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, Chief District Judge, Presiding
2a
Argued and Subinitted August 19, 1992
Pasadena, California
MEMORANDUM+*
[Filed Sep. 24, 1992]
Before: TANG and HALL, Circuit Judges, and
WALKER, ** District Judge.
Vista Paint Corporation (“Vista”) appeals from the
district court’s summary judgment in favor of the govern-
ment finding Vista liable for violations of the Clean Air
Act (“CAA”) and awarding the United States (“USA”)
civil penalties and attorneys fees. Vista also appeals the
dismissal of its counterclaims and third-party complaint
against the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”),
California Air Resources Board (“ARB”), South Coast
Air Quality Management District (“SCAQMD”), and
San Diego Air Pollution Control District (“SDAPCD”).
The district court had jurisdiction over the enforcement
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) and 28 U.S.C.
§$ 1331, 1345, and 1355. Jurisdiction over the third-
party complaint and counterclaim was disputed. We have
jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§$ 1291. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand
this action to the district court.
I.
Vista contends that the district court erred in granting
motions striking certain of Vista’s affirmative defenses and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may
not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided
by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Vaughn R. Walker, United States District
Court Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by
designation.
Eee
3a
dismissing Vista’s counterclaims and third-party claims for
want of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state
a claim.
A. Invalidity claims and defenses.
As Vista had ample opportunity to submit comments
on the inclusion of the local rules in the California state
implementation plan (“SIP”) pursuant to section 307(d)
of the CAA, and to challenge EPA’s approval of the
inclusion of those rules in the SIP pursuant to section
307(b)(1) of the CAA, the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the third-party complaint, the
counterclaim, and the affirmative defenses dealing with
invalidity.
-B. Estoppel claims and defenses.
Assuming that there was jurisdiction over the estoppel
claims and defenses, the district court correctly dismissed
these claims and defenses for failure to state a claim.
Even if the EPA had promised not to exercise its enforce-
ment discretion against those paint manufacturers who
ceased sales of non-complying paint by September 1,
1987, and that promise was sufficient to estop EPA, Vista
admits that it did not halt the sale of non-complying paint
by that date. Accordingly, any “promise” would be in-
applicable to Vista and it could not prevail on its estoppel
theory as a matter of law.’ Accordingly, the district court
properly dismissed the claims and defenses based on
estoppel for failure to state a claim.
Il.
Vista also contends that the district court erred in
finding that Vista violated the CAA by selling or offering
1 Vista also argues that USA is estopped due to “EPA’s variance
representations.” However, Vista did not raise this argument until
its post-judgment motion. See infra Section IV.
4a
for sale non-complying paint, and by refusing to comply
with EPA’s information request.
A. Paint sale liability.
There was no genuine factual dispute precluding sum-
mary judgment as to Vista’s liability for selling or offering
for sale non-complying paint. Vista was manufacturing,
selling and offering for sale non-complying coatings in
1985 when the volatile organic compounds (“VOC”)
limits became effective. In June 1987, Vista told EPA
that it was selling non-complying paint in the SCAQMD
and the SDAPCD. In his deposition, Vista’s President,
Eddie Fischer, admitted that Vista had been violating the
rules since 1985 and was doing so before and after Sep-
tember 1, 1987. Vista also admitted that these violations
in the SDAPCD continued until October 12, 1987.
Vista did not raise the issue that the dates of the sales
were not proved for Sundays and holidays until after
summary judgment had been entered. In his declaration
in opposition to summary judgment, Fischer denied that
Vista offered for sale thousands of gallons of non-comply-
ing paint. However, Fischer expressly testified in his depo-
sition that non-complying paint was offered for sale after
September 1, 1987, in San Diego. A party may not
recant sworn testimony in order to defeat a summary
judgment motion. Juardo v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d
1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, as no issue of
fact or law remained, summary judgment as to liability
for non-complying paint sales was proper.
B. Compliance with information request.
There was no genuine factual dispute precluding sum-
mary judgment as to Vista’s liability for refusing to com-
ply with EPA’s information request. EPA’s second in-
formation request required Vista to establish and maintain
certain records and to submit certain reports. Vista’s
Sa
President admitted that the kind of information EPA
sought was available when EPA requested it. If Vista had
stopped offering for sale and selling non-complying paint
by September 1, 1987, it would have been relieved of
some of the requirements in this request. However, Vista
continued to sell such paint after September 1, 1987.
Vista’s President understood that the requirements of the
second request were waived only if Vista stopped selling
non-complying paint by September 1, 1987. Although
Vista admittedly continued to sell non-complying paint
after September 1, 1987, it never provided the informa-
tion requested by EPA. Accordingly, the court did not
err in granting summary judgment as to liability for
Vista’s refusal to comply with EPA’s information request
because no issue of fact or law remained.*
Ill.
Vista also contends that the district court erred in sum-
marily awarding civil penalties. Due to the factual nature
of many of the factors the district court was required to
consider in determining the civil penalty, summary judg-
ment was improper. Section 113(e)(1) of the Clean Air
Act requires that:
In determining the amount of any penalty to be as-
sessed under this section . . . the Administrator or
the court, as appropriate, shall take into considera-
tion (in addition to such other factors as justice
may require) the size of the business, the economic
impact of the penalty on the business, the violator’s
full compliance history and good faith efforts to
comply, the duration of the violation as established
by any credible evidence (including evidence other
than the applicable test method), payment by the
violator of penalties previously assessed for the same
2 Vista’s argument that the EPA had no authority to require the
sales data and that it had sufficient cause to act as it did were
only raised in its post-judgment motion. See Section IV.
6a
violation, the economic benefit of noncompliance,
and the seriousness of the violation.
42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (1992 Supp).°
A. Section 113(e)(1) factors.
1. economic impact/size of business
In opposition to summary judgment, Vista asserted that
there was a genuine factual dispute as to the economic
impact of the penalty on Vista’s business. The court
below specifically noted in its findings:
Vista is a major manufacturer, distributor and retail
seller of paint with its total sales last year exceeding
50 million dollars. . . . Imposition of the penalty
assessed below would amount to approximately six
percent of Vista’s sales in a single year of operation.
In his declaration, Fischer stated that Vista’s overall
sales for fiscal 1991 were about “$45 million and profits
were approximately two million dollars. Since then, sales
have been flat but profits have declined.” In addition,
Fischer declared that “[i]mposition of the fine sought by
the government in this case, would result in the destruc-
tion of my business and the loss of 400 number of jobs
[sic] in the Southern California area.” USA contends that
Fischer’s statements did not give the court any financial
information to help the court make its determination.
While Vista presented no business records, tax returns,
affidavits of accountants to controvert the USA claim that
the imposition of the full amount of the penalty would
amount to less than eleven percent of Vista’s sales in one
year, Fischer’s declarations raise a genuine issue of ma-
terail fact. Accordingly, the court erred in granting sum-
mary judgment as to this penalty factor.
3’ The 1990 Amendments became effective on November 15, 1990.
USA filed its complaint on December 3, 1990. Accordingly, the
Amendments apply to this case.
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2. full compliance history
The district court held that despite Vista’s history of
full compliance, a substantial penalty was warranted. As
there was no factual dispute, summary judgment as to
this factor was proper.
3. good faith efforts to comply
In opposition to summary judgment, Vista asserted that
there was a genuine factual dispute as to its state of mind.
A court should be wary of granting summary judgment
when good faith is in question. See White v. Roper, 901
F.2d 1501, 1503-06 (9th Cir. 1990); Hotel & Restaurant
Employees Union v. Rollison, 615 F.2d 788, 793 (9th
Cir. 1980). In his declaration, Fischer stated that Vista
made every attempt to cooperate with the EPA. USA
contends that there are no material facts in dispute re-
garding good faith. However, the mere fact that Vista
offered for sale and sold non-complying paint after Sep-
tember 1, 1987, does not establish that Vista acted in
bad faith. As there was a genuine issue of material fact,
sumary judgment was improper as to this factor.
In addition, the court erred in summarily finding that
Vista acted in bad faith in failing to respond to the in-
formation request. In his declaration, Fischer stated that
Vista attempted at all times to cooperate with the govern-
ment’s request. Fischer also stated that three Vista em-
ployees spent three days trying to compile the requested
4 At summary judgment, Vista argued that the issue of state of
mind was “relevant to the seriousness of any violation.” As good
faith is irreleavnt as to the seriousness of the violations, the court
correctly refused to consider good faith under that factor. Vista
did not argue that its state of mind was relevant to its good faith
efforts to comply. This error is likely due to the failure of USA to
bring its complaint under the 1990 CAA Amendments. As good
faith is a factor that the district court was required to consider,
summary judgment as to this issue was not proper.
8a
data. There were contested issues of material fact.°
Vista’s good faith was a question of fact that should not
have been decided on summary judgment.
4. duration of violation
The district court correctly ruled that the duration of
violation supported a substantial penalty. Vista’s argu-
ment that any violation occurred only on the day of the
deadline, but did not continue thereafter, is meritless.
The CAA explicitly provides for penalties for each day
that Vista fails to respond to an information request. 42
U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1992 Supp).
5. payment of penalties previously assessed
SDAPCD previously assessed a $500 penalty. Vista
argues that the court “appears to have given no weight to
SDAPCD’s evaluation of the proper penalty.” This argu-
ment is meritless. The district court was not obligated to
accept $500 as the proper penalty. The district court
considered the $500 Vista paid to the SDAPCD on a fine
originally set at $2,000.
6. economic benefit of noncompliance
The district court found that Vista obtained a “signifi-
cant economic benefit” that supported a “substantial
penalty.” While there may have been a factual dispute as
to this issue, the district court recognized that “Vista has
improperly failed to disclose information which it has or
had in its exclusive possession to assess the precise eco-
nomic benefit to it due to its illegal offer for sale and sale
of non-compliant coatings.” The court also found that
5 Vista’s contention that EPA’s “promise” that any deficiencies
in Vista’s responses would excite “immediate” action, and its
settlement letter that told Vista that EPA had “enough informa-
tion to make a settlement offer,” led Vista to believe that it had
satisfied the information request, was not raised until the post-
judgment motion.
9a
Vista failed to submit admissible evidence to controvert
USA’s showing of Vista’s significant economic benefit.
Therefore, summary judgment was proper as to this pen-
alty factor.
7. seriousness of the violation
The court found that the seriousness of the violation
supported a -substantial penalty. In opposition to sum-
mary judgment, Vista asserted that there was a genuine
factual dispute as to the effects of its emissions on human
health. The only document filed by Vista in opposition
to summary judgment was a declaration by Fischer. Vista
offered no documentary evidence related to the quantity
of paint offered for sale to controvert the government’s
claims as to the potential health effects of the 13,000
gallons of paint it alleged Vista had offered for sale in
San Diego in September 1987. USA contends that its
claim was based on Fischer’s sworn testimony before the
San Diego Hearing Board that he had “13,000 gallons of
paint in the San Diego district.”
In its opposition, Vista represented that it had only sold
34 gallons of paint in September 1987 in the SDAPCD.
But, in his supporting declaration, Fischer estimates that
Vista sold at least 70 gallons. Fischer’s declaration raises
a genuine factual dispute as to the number of gallons
offered for sale. Therefore, this element of the serious-
ness factor was not properly disposed of on summary
judgment.
Vista also argues that any delay or lack of complete-
ness in providing the 1987 sales data had no adverse
impact on the public. This argument is meritless. EPA’s
ability to gather information on potential violations is
vital to enforcement of the CAA. It is irrelevant that no
ozone was formed from Vista's failure to supply the in-
formation. See United States v. Charles George Trucking
Co., 823 F.2d 685, 689 (1st Cir. 1987) (importance of
compliance with information requests ).
10a
B. Non-statutory factors.
1. governmental delay
In opposition to summary judgment, Vista asserted that
there was a genuine factual dispute as to the effect of
EPA’s inaction on the district’s proposed SIP revisions.
In General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530,
541 n.4 (1990), the Supreme Court found that “the
statutory remedies for EPA inaction include . . . a request
pursuant to § 113(b) ... for reduction or elimination of
penalties during any period in which unreasonable agency
delay results in prejudice.” See also United States v.
SCM Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1110, 1128 (D. Md 1987)
(government delay should neither mitigate against im-
position of a substantial penalty nor act to enhance the
penalty amount). Vista made such a request at summary
judgment.
Vista argues that EPA delayed from 1985 to 1987 in
notifying the industry that it would attempt to enforce
the federally approved, but locally superseded, rules.
Vista also argues that the district court failed to properly
consider EPA’s delay in acting on the proposed SIP revi-
sions and in bringing this action. Vista contends that had
the EPA rejected the revisions earlier, it would have made
none of the paint sales. The “mere failure by govern-
mental agencies to prosecute . . . does not allow a court
to reduce a penalty.” Public Interest Research Group of
New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913
F.2d 64, 81 (3rd Cir. 1990). EPA is only required to
act on revisions of SIPs within a reasonable time, not
necessarily within four months. General Motors Corp.,
496 U.S. at 536-42. USA contends that the EPA’s in-
action on the San Diego proposed revision was reason-
able as it was submitted less than a month before Septem-
ber 1, 1986. Whether this and the other delays were
reasonable was a question of fact that precluded summary
judgment as to this factor.
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2. unusual and perplexing nature of regulation
Vista did not bring up this argument until its post-
judgment motion. Vista cites only United States v. Louisi-
ana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Colo. 1987},
to support its argument that its penalty should have been
reduced because of the “unusual and perplexing” nature
of the regulatory scheme. Whatever the complexity of the
underlying legal basis for EPA’s actions, Vista’s President
was told by EPA and the San Diego District that, if it
did not stop selling non-complying paint by September 1,
enforcement would follow. There was nothing unusual
or perplexing in these instructions to Vista.
3. reliance
This argument was brought forth in Vista’s post-judg-
ment motion. The district court was not bound by Louisi-
ana-Pacific to consider “justifiable and detrimental reli-
ance.” Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the post-judgment motion as to this issue.
IV.
Unfortunately, Vista intertwined the distinct issues ad-
dressed on summary judgment with those addressed only
in its post-judgment motion." Vista never expressly argued
in its opening brief that the district court erred in denying
its post-judgment motion. Even in its reply brief, Vista’s
arguments were, at best, unclear. Vista did not even
touch on any of these arguments in its opening brief.
Accordingly, we refuse to consider these arguments.
6 After thorough review of the district court record, we conclude
that the following issues were raised for the first time in Vista’s
post-judgment motion: Vista’s liability for pre-notice of violation
sales, the burden of proof regarding the dates of any sales, abuse
of prosecutorial discretion, USA’s failure to follow EPA’s penalty
policy, constitutional excessiveness, EPA’s authority to require the
sales data, and Vista’s sufficient cause to act.
12a
V.
We affirm the district court’s decision to grant motions
striking certain of Vista’s affirmative defenses and dis-
missing Vista’s counterclaims and third-party claims for
want of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state
a claim. We also affirm the district court’s summary judg-
ment as to liability, and its denial of Vista’s post-judgment
motion. However, we reverse the district court’s summary
judgment as to the civil penalty, and remand to the district
court for trial on the penalty issues.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED.
13a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
No. CV 90-6449(R)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
¥;
VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Defendant.
VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Counterdefendant.
VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Third Party Plaintiff,
VW.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; CALIFORNIA AIR
RESOURCES BOARD; TECHNICAL REVIEW GROUP; SOUTH
Coast AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT; SAN
Dieco AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT,
Third Party Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING DEFENDANT’S COUNTER-
CLAIM, DISMISSING DEFENDANT’S THIRD
PARTY COMPLAINT, AND STRIKING CERTAIN
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
[Filed July 23, 1991]
l4a
The motion of plaintiff United States of America to
dismiss defendant Vista Paint Corporation’s counterclaim
and to strike certain affirmative defenses in this action,
and the motions of the third party defendants, Environ-
mental Protection Agency, California Air Resources
Board, Technical Review Group, South Coast Air Quality
Management District and San Diego Air Pollution Con-
trol District, to dismiss defendant’s third party complaint
in this action, came on regularly for hearing before this
Court on June 17, 1991. Appearing on behalf of the
plaintiff United States of America and third party defend-
ant Environmental Protection Agency were Stephen M.
Johnson and Peter Hsiao. Appearing on behalf of the
third party defendant South Coast Air Quality Manage-
ment District was Barbara Baird. Appearing on behalf
of the third party defendant San Diego Air Pollution Con-
trol District was Miriam Milich. Appearing on behalf of
the third party defendants Technical Review Group and
California Air Resources Board was Norman N. Filette.
Appearing on behalf of the defendant and third party
plaintiff was William H. Smiland. After considering the
moving and opposition papers, the arguments of counsel
and all other matters presented to the Court;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The motions of the third party defendants Environ-
mental Protection Agency, South Coast Air Quality Man-
agement District, San Diego Air Pollution Control Dis-
trict, California Air Resources Board and Technical Re-
view Group to dismiss defendant Vista Pain Corporation’s
third party complaint are granted in their entirety and the
third party complaint is dismissed with prejudice with
respect to all third party defendants based upon the fol-
lowing grounds:
a. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
review the claims raised in the third party complaint;
15a
b. The claims asserted by the defendant in the
third party complaint fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
2. Plaintiff United States of America’s motion to dis-
miss defendant’s counterclaim is granted in its entirety
and the counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice based
upon the following grounds:
a. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
review the claims raised in the counterclaim,
b. The claims asserted by the defendant in the
counterclaim fail to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted;
3. Defendant’s First through Sixth, Eighth, Twelfth,
Thirteenth, and Fifteenth through Eighteenth purported
affirmative defense, inclusive, are stricken in their entirety.
DATED: This 23rd day of June, 1991.
's/ Manuel L. Real
MANUEL L. REAL
Chief United States District Judge
Submitted by:
LourDES G. BAIRD
United States Attorney
ScoTT H. PARK
Assistant United States Attorney
/s/ Peter Hsiao Date 6-21-91
PETER HsIAO
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America and
Third Party Defendant Environmental Protection Agency
16a
PETER M. GREENWALD
District Counsel
s Peter Hsiao a Barbara Baird Date 6-21-91
BARBARA BAIRD
by telephone authorization
Principal Deputy District Counsel
Attorneys for Third Party Defendant South Coast Air
Quality Management District
LioypD M. HARMON, JR.
County Counsel
s/ Peter Hsiao’a Miriam Milich Date 6-21-91
MIRIAM MILIcH, Deputy
by telephone authorization
Attorneys for Third Party Defendant San Diego Air Pol-
lution Control District
DANIEL E. LUNGREN
Attorney General
R. H. CONNETT
Assistant Attorney General
s’ Peter Hsiao/a Norman Flette Date 6-21-91
NORMAN N. FLETTE
by telephone authorization
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Third Party Defendants Technical Review
Group and California Air Resources Board
17a
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
No. CV 90-6449-R
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
ws
VisTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Defendant.
Date: November 18, 1991
Time: 10:00 a.m.
[Filed Dec. 18, 1991]
The Motion for Summary Judgment brought by plain-
tiff United States of America came on regularly for hear-
ing on November 18, 1991, Chief United States District
Judge Manuel L. Real Judge Presiding. Peter Hsiao, As-
sistant United States Attorney appeared on behalf of the
United States. Robert Newell appeared on behalf of
defendant Vista Paint Corporation (“Vista”). After con-
sidering the pleadings filed herein, the papers and accom-
panying documents, declarations and exhibits, and in ac-
cordance with Plaintiff's Statement Uncontroverted Facts
and Conclusions of Law filed and entered concurrently
herewith, and there being no genuine issue of material
fact remaining in dispute;
18a
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
(1) The motion for summary judgment brought by
plaintiff United States of America is granted in all re-
spects;
(2) Judgment is granted to the United States of Amer-
ica and against defendant Vista for Vista’s violation of
Section 110 of the Clean Air Act pursuant to 113 of that
Act, 42 U.S.C. $$ 7410, 7413, for 578 days. Civil pen-
alties are accordingly assessed against Vista:
(a) for Vista’s 468 days of violation from December 3,
1985 up to June 24, 1987 in the amount of $1000.00 per
day of violation for a total of $468,000.00; and
(b) for Vista’s 110 days of violation from June 24,
1987 to October 12, 1987 in the amount of $12,500.00
per day of violation for a total of $1,375,000.00;
(3) Judgment is granted to the United States of Amer-
ica and against defendant Vista for Vista’s violation of
Section 114 of the Clean Air Act pursuant to Section 113
of that Act, 42 U.S.C. $$ 7413, 7414, for 1177 days
from August 26, 1987 to November 18, 1991, and civil
penalties are accordingly assessed against Vista for these
violations in addition to the above stated penalties in the
amount of $1000.00 per day of violation for a total of
$1,177,000.00.
(4) The United States of America is awarded its rea-
sonable attorney fees and expenses for establishing that
Vista’s responses to the United States’ requests for ad-
missions were without a legally justifiable reason. Plain-
tiff shall submit its declaration establishing its attorney
_ fees and other expenses within twenty-one (21) days of
this judgment.
(5) The United States of America is awarded its costs
of suit against Vista. The United States shall submit its
cost bill within twenty-one (21) days of this Order.
19a
(6) The United States of America is awarded interest
at the legally applicable rate of 4.98 per cent as of this
date on the entire judgment amount herein, to begin
accruing as of the date this judgment is entered.
DATED: This 18th day of Dec., 1991.
s Manuel L. Deal
MANUEL L. DEAL
Chief United States District Judge
Presented by:
LOURDES G. BAIRD
United States Attorney
LEON W. WEIDMAN
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Division
ScoTT H. PARK
Assistant United States Attorney
‘s/ Peter Hsiao
PETER HsIAo
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff
United States of America
20a
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
No. CV 90-6449-R
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
cs
VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Defendant.
Date: November 18, 1991
Time: 10:00 a.m.
STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
UNITED STATES’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Filed Dec. 18, 1991]
Plaintiff United States of America’s motion for sum-
mary judgment came on regularly for hearing on Septem-
ber 16, 1991, Chief United States District Court Judge
Manuel L. Real presiding. After having heard the argu-
ments of counsel and examined the pleadings, memoran-
dum and exhibits presented by the plaintiff and defend-
ants, the Court makes the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:
2la
STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
1. Vista is a major manufacturer, distributor and re-
tail seller of paint. It manufactures approximately 25,000
gallons of paint each month for sale at its stores in Calli-
fornia, and its total sales last year exceeded 50 million
dollars. Vista’s general office and its sole paint manu-
facturing plant are located in Fullerton, California. Vista
sells its paint at its own stores in Stanton, Costa Mesa,
La Habra, Orange, Mission Viejo, Ontario, Riverside,
El Cajon, Chula Vista, Huntington Beach, and San Diego,
California.
2. In 1984, as part of the State Implementation Plan
(“SIP”) for California to limit the VOC content of paint,
the South Coast Air Quality Management District
(“SCAQMD”’) and the San Diego County Air Pollution
Control District (“SDCAPCD”) adopted SIP Rules 1113
and 67.0. These rules regulate non-flat architectural coat-
ings, otherwise known as gloss or semi-gloss paints, which
are commonly used to paint structures, mobile homes or
pavement. In order to control air pollution from the
manufacture and application of these coatings, the rules
limit their VOC content to no more than 250 grams of
VOC per liter of coating (“250 g/l VOC”), and forbid
the sale,-offer for sale, or application of any such paint
exceeding these VOC limitations (“non-compliant coat-
ings”).
3. As background, local and regional government au-
thorities under California law have primary responsibility
for control of air pollution. Cal. Health & Safety Code
§ 40000 et seg. Two of these local authorities are the
SCAQMD, which includes Los Angeles and Orange
Counties, and the SDCAPCD, which includes San Diego
County. These districts are empowered to adopt rules
governing air pollution and to independently enforce them
as state law. /d. at § 40001. As for the federal govern-
ment, the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) provides the EPA
22a
with independent authority to enforce federally approved
air pollution control laws. Section 110 of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7410, requires among other things that each
State submit rules for emission limitations to be incorpo-
rated into the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”), and
enforced as federal law by the EPA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413.
4. In 1985, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”), pursuant to the CAA, approved SCAQMD
Rule 1113 and SDCAPCD Rule 67.0 as part of the SIP
for California, to be enforced as federal law. 50 Fed.
Reg. 3338 (January 24, 1985).
5. Vista’s president was aware of these rules and
their purpose in the time period between 1985 to 1987,
to control VOC emissions. Vista was both a long-time
manufacturer and seller of non-compliant coatings, having
produced its “Trim-Kote” and “Proformer” brands with
VOC's in excess of 250 g/l for over 10 years. Vista
offered these non-compliant coatings for sale for the five-
year period preceding February 1987.
6. EPA met with industry trade associations in 1987,
including the National Paint & Coatings Association and
the Southern California Paint & Coatings Association, re-
garding its strategy for taking enforcement action against
companies violating the 1985 VOC limitations set by
law. EPA informed the industry that it would, as a
matter of enforcement discretion, prioritize enforcement
against those companies that did not cease the manufac-
ture of non-compliant coatings by July 1, 1987 and who
did not cease their sale of non-compliant coatings by Sep-
tember 1, 1987. Thus, while EPA retained the discretion
to prosecute any company that violated the VOC limita-
tion after January 24, 1985, EPA announced that those
companies that persisted longest in their continuing viola-
tions of the Clean Air Act would be the first to be prose-
cuted.
= a ae
23a
7. On March 19, 1987, in order to determine the
compliance status of the paint industry with the VOC
limitations of federal law, EPA issued a request for in-
formation to a number of paint manufacturers, includ-
ing Vista, pursuant to Section 114 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7414 (“Section 114 Request”). EPA required that
each company report the volume of each non-architectural
coating that it manufactured from February to May 1987,
and the VOC content of each coating. Each company
was given until April 7, 1987 to submit their first re-
ports, and warned that non-compliance would subject
them to civil penalties.
8. Vista did not respond to EPA’s March 19 request.
Vista’s president cannot recall why Vista did not respond.
Faced with Vista’s recalcitrance, EPA subsequently issued
an Administrative Order against Vista pursuant to Section
113(a)(3) of the CAA, finding that Vista had violated
Section 114 of the CAA in failing to provide the re-
quested information to EPA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(a)(3),
7414. Per its Order, EPA directed Vista to disclose by
no later than April 16, 1987 the VOC content of the
architectural coatings that it manufactured or distributed
from February through May 1987.
9. Vista only partially complied with EPA’s Admin-
istrative Order, responding in a letter postmarked April
20, 1987 by disclosing the VOC content of the archi-
tectual coatings it manufactured in February and March
1987, only. Vista’s letter disclosed that its monthly paint
production was approximately 25,000 gallons of coatings,
with 55 percent by volume of the identified coatings ex-
ceeding the 250 g 1 VOC limitation of federal law. Vista
did not respond to EPA’s Order regarding its coatings
manufactured in April and May, 1987, and did not pro-
vide the requested information.
10. EPA subsequently sought more specific informa-
tion from the paint manufaciurers regarding the trade
24a
name, volume and VOC content of each non-compliant
coating sold in each California air quality district in
March, April and May 1987. On May 15, 1987, EPA
sent Vista a modified request for more specific informa-
tion to supplant its initial request for information. Allter-
natively, EPA specified that the paint manufacturer could
stipulate that it sold and/or offered for sale coatings in
violation of the 250 g1 VOC limitation, and the month
and location where the non-compliant paint was sold.
Vista was advised that a failure to provide the requested
information would subject Vista to an enforcement action.
for civil penalties of $25,000 per day of violation.
11. Vista responded by a letter dated June 12, 1987.
Without disclosing the months in which it sold non-
compliant coatings, Vista admitted to selling non-
compliant coatings in the SCAQMD and the SDCAPCD.
Vista’s president also confirmed Vista’s prior admissions
in his sworn deposition testimony. Yet the information
regarding the volume of each such non-compliant Vista
coating sold and the location of their sale was available
to Vista in March, April and May of 1987.
12. Based upon Vista’s admission, EPA issued a No-
tice of Violation to Vista on June 19, 1987 pursuant to
Section 113(a)(1) of the CAA.
13. EPA, in its continuing effort to compel Vista to
comply with the law, sent Vista a second Section 114
request on June 19, 1987, requesting documentation of
any quantities of Vista non-compliant coatings manufac-
tured and sold in the subsequent July-October 1987
period. This request required Vista to (1) establish and
maintain records regarding their non-compliant coatings,
(2) report the volume of non-compliant coatings sold in
August-October 1987 and their location of sale; (3) re-
port the name and VOC content of the coatings sold;
and (4) report the identity of coatings manufactured by
Vista from July-October 1987.
25a
14. The information requested by EPA’s June 19
Section 114 request was available to Vista at the time of
EPA’s request. EPA again warned Vista at that time of
the a $25,000 per day penalty if the requested information
was not received.
15. In an effort to further accommodate the paint
industry and Vista, EPA by its letter dated July 22, 1987
modified its second Section 114 request with a strictly
tailored condition. In this letter, EPA stipulated that if
Vista would commit to (1) the cessation of the manu-
facture of non-compliant coatings by July 1, 1987, (2)
the cessation of all sales of non-compliant coatings by
September 1, 1987 (a condition never fulfilled by Vista,
see below), and (3) disclose the time and location of
sales of non-compliant paint in August 1987 (another
condition never fulfilled by Vista), that Vista would be
relieved of its obligation to provide the other information
requested by EPA in its prior June 1987 letter. Vista
was still required to maintain all relevant records of its
manufacture and sale of non-compliant coatings. EPA
was explicit, however, that all conditions must be strictly
complied with if Vista was to be relieved of any of its
reporting obligations.
16. Vista continued to manufacture, sell and offer for
sale its non-compliant coatings throughout April to Octo-
ber 1987, but did not provide any reports to EPA. Vista
continued to manufacture non-compliant coatings in April,
May and June of 1987, and continued to sell and offer
for sale its non-compliant coatings in the Los Angeles
and San Diego areas throughout June, July, August and
September 1987. Although Vista continued to sell non-
compliant coatings, Vista submitted no report of its Au-
gust sales as requested in EPA’s July 22, 1987 letter, and
no report as required by EPA’s June 19, 1987 letter.
24. EPA, per the CAA Section 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413,
gave notice to the appropriate State air pollution control
agency of this enforcement action.
26a
17. On August 19, 1987, Vista’s president, Eddie R.
Fisher, telephoned William Wruble of EPA Region IX to
ask for more time to sell his non-compliant coatings.
After discussing Vista’s situation, Mr. Fisher stated that
“he had no choice but to sell the [non-compliant] paint
past September 1, and was planning to do so.” Mr.
Fisher then stated that “he would (could) litigate if he
had to, since the option was to go out of business.”
18. Mr. Wruble denied Vista’s request for additional
time to sell its non-compliant coatings, and explained that
Vista’s failure to take EPA’s enforcement authority seri-
ously was not a reason to grant it additional time to sell
non-compliant coatings. Mr. Fisher then said that he
“didn’t think it was our [EPA’s] intention to put him_in
jail, although he’d be willing to pay a ‘reasonable’ fine to
be able to continue to sell his violating coatings.”
19. Vista was also warned by the local SDCAPCD to
cease its sale of non-compliant coatings by September 1,
1987, a warning Vista received at least by July 28, 1987.
Vista however continued to sell non-compliant coatings
throughout September 1987. Vista admits that such non-
compliant coatings remained offered for sale throughout
Vista’s San Diego stores in September 1987. Vista also
continued its refusal to respond to EPA’s request for
information.
20. Further evidence that Vista sold non-compliant
coatings after September 1, 1987 is provided where in-
spectors from the SDCAPCD purchased the Vista-brand
“Trim-Kote” coating, a non-compliant coating, from
Vista’s retail outlet on Kearney Villa Road in San Diego,
California, on September 2, 1987. The SDCAPCD’s lab-
oratory analysis revealed that the purchased paint had a
VOC concentration of 387 g/l, well above the permissible
250 g/l permitted by SDCAPCD Rule 67.
21. The SDCAPCD inspectors purchased a second
gallon of non-compliant coating, a Vista paint under the
eal
27a
brand name “Proformer”, from the same Vista San Diego
store on September 22, 1987. The SDCAPCD’s labora-
tory analysis revealed that the purchased paint had a
VOC concentration of 381 g/1, well above the permissible
250 g/l permitted by SDCAPCD Rule 67.
22. Both Vista’s records and its president corroborate
these violations. Vista’s April 16, 1987 report to EPA
identifies that its “Trim-Kote” and “Proformer” paints as
non-compliant coatings, have a VOC concentration of
340 and 380 g/l, respectively. Vista’s president confirmed
that Vista’s “Trim-Kote” and “Proformer” paints pur-
chased by the SDCAPCD inspectors would be expected to
have VOC concentrations in excess of 250 g/l. Mr. Fisher
further admits that non-compliant coatings were sold in
San Diego on September 2, 1987. Based upon these il-
legal sales, the SDCAPCD cited Vista with two mis-
demeanor Notices of Violations for its violations of
SDCAPCD Rule 67. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 42400.
23. Faced in September 1987 with enforcement action
from the SDCAPCD (EPA had not yet taken its en-
forcement action against Vista), Vista sought a variance
from the SDCAPCD Hearing Board.
24. As background, the variance procedure is a crea-
tion of the California Health & Safety Code §§ 42350 et
seq., and provides the applicant with a procedure to ob-
tain relief from a local rule (not a federal rule) under
certain strictly limited conditions. Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 42350. In part, an applicant cannot obtain a
variance unless the applicant attests that it “is, or will be,
in violation of Section 41701 or of any rule, regulation, or
order of the district.” Cal. Health and Safety Code
§ 42352(a). Thus, by applying for a variance, Vista
further admitted that it was in violation of SDCAPCD
Rule 67 and/or its intent to violate that Rule for the ex-
press purpose of selling the remainder of Vista’s non-
compliant paints within the next 90 days.
28a
25. Vista was subsequently unable to persuade a ma-
jority of the SDCAPCD Hearing Board at its September
24, 1987 hearing that a variance was warranted, and Vista
obtained no variance relief at any time from the
SDCAPCD. Vista applied to the SDCAPCD Hearing
Board for reconsideration, then dropped its request. Vista
represented instead that it had removed its non-compliant
paint from its San Diego stores as of October 12, 1987,
but after the September 24 variance hearing. Vista’s presi-
dent explains that he removed the non-compliant coating
from his San Diego stores because those coatings were
not selling well. Vista subsequently paid a fine to the
SDCAPCD for its violations of their local rules.
26. Vista offered for sale a significant amount of non-
compliant coatings in San Diego in September 1987. At
the SDCAPCD Hearing Board September 24, 1987 hear-
ing, Vista’s president testified under oath, as required by
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 40830, that 13,000 gallons
of non-compliant paint remained in Vista’s San Diego
stores. Vista’s president corroborated this admission when
he told SDCAPCD inspector George Seidel prior to the
hearing that during September 1987, Vista had 5200 gal-
lons of non-compliant paint for sale in Vista’s San Diego
stores. Until Vista’s variance was lost, Vista continued to
offer this paint for sale in violation of the SIP.
27. The VOC’s emitted by Vista’s paint are a primary
percursor of ozone, or smog, which the EPA has desig-
nated as a major air pollutant. 42 U.S.C. §$ 7408, 7450,
7451; 40 C.F.R. §€ 50.1, 50.9. The 13,000 gallons of
coating offered for sale in September 1987 in San Diego
by Vista would release approximately eight tons of VOC
hydrocarbons.
28. Ozone pollution causes serious adverse health
effects, including coughing, reduced lung capacity, respira-
tory infection and possible permanent lung damage. There
is also evidence that the young, the elderly, and those per-
sons with respiratory ailments (such as asthmatics) are
eae eee ell
29a
among those who are particularly susceptible to the ad-
verse effects of ozone. At certain concentration levels,
ozone irritates the respirator system and causes coughing,
wheezing, chest tightness and headaches. Due to its irri-
tation nature, ozone can aggravate asthma, bronchitis, and
emphysema. Some studies indicate that chronic exposure
to fairly low levels of ozone may reduce resistance to in-
fection and alter blood chemistry or chromosome struc-
ture. At higher concentrations [of ozone], hospitalization
becomes a possibility.
29. Ozone also causes significant damage to the en-
vironment, where ozone can destroy vegetation, reduce
crop yield, and damage exposed materials by causing
cracking, fading, and weathering. Moreover clear evi-
dence shows that ozone damages economically, ecologi-
cally, and aesthetically important plants. When exposed
to ozone, major annual crops produce reduced yields.
Some tree species suffer injury to needles or leaves, low-
ered productivity, and in severe cases, individual trees can
die.
30. EPA has through the federal Clean Air Act at-
tempted to control and regulate VOC emissions from a
variety of sources, including paint manufacturers. In 1987,
EPA found that 40 paint companies, including Vista,
were in violation of the federal-Clean Air Act’s limitation
on VOC concentrations in their coatings. All 40 paint
companies received a Notice Of Violation, and 38 an-
nounced their intent to cease non-compliant paint sales.
Only one company announced its intent to contiue to vio-
late the VOC restrictions, to intentionally violate the law
despite repeated warnings from the regulatory agencies,
and to disregard the effects of its violations on human
health and the environment: that company was Vista.
31. After EPA referred this matter to the U.S. Justice
Department for enforcement action, Vista for the first time
produced a letter it purportedly prepared on or about
August 4, 1987 and sent to EPA, that represented that
30a
Vista had ceased its manufacture of non-compliant coat-
ings on June 30, 1987, and “will not offer for sale any
non-compliant coatings after September 1, 1987.”
32. This representation has in fact proven to be false.
Vista’s president admits that sales of such coatings con-
tinued well after September 1, 1987. In addition, there is
no copy of the letter in EPA’s files or any other indication
that it was received by EPA prior to the date it was pro-
duced to the U.S. Department of Justice in 1989. Vista’s
president testified that he cannot recall ever seeing the
purported Vista August 4, 1987 letter before 1989 when
it was first produced to the U.S. Department of Justice.
33. Vista appears to have had no intention of ceasing
its sale of non-compliant coatings in August 1987, where
Vista’s president announced to EPA at precisely the same
time that Vista would continue its sales of non-compliant
paint after September 1, 1987, and Vista in fact did so.
Vista’s president said that Vista would go bankrupt if it
could not sell its non-compliant paint, a statement that
again cannot be reconciled with Vista’s purported August
1987 letter.
34. The United States propounded interrogatories and
requests for production of documents on May 1, 1991,
seeking this identical information requested by EPA in
1987. Vista responded with groundless objections with
no legal basis, and flatly refused to provide the informa-
tion or produce the relevant documents. The United
States then brought a motion to compel Vista to comply
with its discovery requests. As a result, this Court or-
dered that Vista first specifically identify by September 27,
1991 the quantity of its non-compliant coatings manufac-
tured and sold in 1987, and second produce the requested
documents at the U.S. Attorney’s Office by no later than
October 25, 1991, again mirroring the information re-
quested by EPA in 1987.
35. Vista did not identify its non-compliant coatings
with a verified response per this Court’s Order and as
Ea
3la
required by Section 114 of the Clean Air Act, but instead
directed the United States to look through unidentified
documents at its warehouse. Moreover, Vista has refused
to make those documents available for inspection until
October 25, 1991.
36. Vista has already provided its sworn response
stating unequivocally that no documents exist regarding
its sale or offer for sale of non-compliant coatings prior
to August 30, 1987. See Vista’s “Supplemental” Re-
sponses No. 2 and 3. This unexplained disappearance of
Vista’s documents is directly contrary to EPA’s Section
114 requirement that Vista retain those documents.
37. Vista sworn responses to the United States’ Re-
quests for Admission (““RFA’”’) cannot be reconciled with
the deposition testimony of Vista’s president, where he
admits precisely the same facts that Vista denies in its
RFA responses. For example, Vista’s president admits
that he knew that Vista was selling non-compliant coat-
ings in September 1987. Fisher Depo. p. 188. But see
Vista RFA No. 27. There are numerous other examples.
See Vista RFA Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7. See especially
Vista’s evasive response to RFA No. 13, 14.
38. In the only information Vista has ever revealed
about its sales of non-compliant paint in September 1987,
Vista asserts that after September 1, 1987 it sold 35
gallons of non-compliant paint from one store, the identi-
cal store where SDCAPCD inspectors purchased non-
compliant Vista paint after September 1, 1987. How-
ever Vista has never revealed the total sales of non-
compliant paint in-all of its San Diego stores after Sep-
tember 1, 1987, and pointedly has continued its pattern
of obstruction and evasion in this litigation by refusing to
admit even its sales of this 35 gallons of paint. See RFA
No. 17 and Vista’s response.
39. There is no genuine issue of material fact remain-
ing in this case.
a
32a
40. To the extent that any of the following Conclu-
sions of Law are deemed to be uncontroverted facts, they
are incorporated into these Statement of Uncontroverted
Facts.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this
action pursuant to Section 113(b) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(b), and 28 U.S.C. $$ 1331, 1345 and 1355, and
personal jurisdiction over the parties herein.
2. Venue in this district is proper pursuant to 42
U.S.C. 7413 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
3. Liability for violations of Sections 101 and 114
of the federal Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C.
§$7410, 7414, is strict, pursuant to CAA Section 113,
42 U.S.C. § 7413.
4. Vista is a corporation covered by the CAA, 42
U.S.C. § 7602(e).
5. EPA satisfied the requirement that notice of this
action be given to the appropriate State air pollution con-
trol agency pursuant to the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413.
6. Vista illegally manufactured, offered for sale and
sold non-compliant coatings a VOC content in excess of
250 g 1 during the time period between and including
December 3, 1985 through October 12, 1987 in viola-
tion of the State Implementation Plan rules identified as
SCAQMD Rule 1113 and SDCAPCD Rule 67, and con-
tinued to violate those rules more than 30 days after hav-
ing received a Notice of Violation from EPA on June 24,
1987.
7. Vista has therefore violated Section 110 and 113
of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. S§ 7410, 7414, from
December 3, 1985 to October 12, 1987, a total of 578
days of violations, and there being no genuine issue of
material fact remaining, the United States is entitled to
summary judgment thereon.
33a
8. Vista illegally and unreasonably failed to respond
to EPA’s June 19, 1987 request for relevant information
in violation of Sections 113 and 114 of the CAA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7414, by its failure to (a) establish and
maintain records regarding their non-compliant coatings,
(b) report the volume of non-compliant coatings sold in
August-October 1987 and their location of sale; (c) re-
port the name and VOC content of the coatings sold; and
(d) report the identity of coatings manufactured by Vista
from July-October 1987.
9. Vista has therefore violated Sections 113 and 114
of the Clean Air Act from August 26, 1987 to November
18, 1991, a total of 1177 days of violations, and there
being no genuine issue of material fact remaining, the
United States is entitled to summary judgment thereon.
10. Section 113 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b),
provides for imposition of a civil penalty against Vista of
not more than $25,000 per day of violation for (1) the
sale or offer of sale of non-compliant VOC paint in viola-
tion of CAA Section 110, and (2) for the failure to
respond to EPA’s request for information in violation of
CAA Section 114. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2), (4). For
purposes of computing the appropriate civil penalty, the
penalty period begins when the source first commits the
violation, and not later when the NOV is issued. This
Court will first determine the maximum penalty allowable,
and then consider any mitigating circumstances.
11. In determining the civil penalty, the court “should
give effect to the major purpose of a civil penalty: deter-
rence. Civil penalties should be large enough to hurt,
and to deter anyone in the future from shown as little
concern as [defendant] did for the need to comply.
12. In assessing civil penalties, CAA Section 113 pro-
vides that the court shall take into consideration in addi-
tion to other factors “the size of the business, the
34a
economic impact of the penalty on the business and the
seriousness of the violation.” 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b).
13. The first two factors, the size of Vista’s business
and the economic impact of the penalty on its business,
support the imposition of a substantial penalty. Vista is a
major manufacturer, distributor and retail seller of paint,
with its total sales last year exceeding 50 million dollars.
Vista owns its manufacturing facilities in Fullerton, Calli-
fornia, its own stores in 15 different locations in California,
and its own trucks and transportation facilities for its busi-
ness operations. Imposition of the penalty assessed below
would amount to less than eleven per cent of Vista’s sales
in a single year of operation.
14. The third factor, the seriousness of the violation,
also supports a substantial penalty against Vista. After
more than two years of illegally selling non-compliant
coatings and after a Notice Of Violation, Vista continued
to manufacture and sell its non-compliant coatings at a
rate of 11,300 gallons per month. The excess VOC’s
added to the environment by manufacturing this paint are
significant; by applying these non-compliant paints, the
excess VOC’s added to the environment above that per-
mitted by law is approximately 16,000 lbs., or eight tons
a month. During the total period between December 3,
1985, and October 12, 1987, the application of Vista
paints has thereby added approximately 176 tons of excess
VOC’s to the environment over that permitted by law.
Given the devastating effects on human health, vegetation
and our environment of such unpermitted pollution, the
potential harm of Vista’s conduct is almost incalculable,
where Vista has contributed to the injuries from air pollu-
tion suffered by the population of Los Angeles, Orange
and San Diego Counties.
15. Vista’s failure to respond to EPA’s request for
information is equally serious. More than four years after
the information was requested by EPA, then by the U.S.
35a -
Department of Justice in this lawsuit, Vista has not yet
responded to EPA’s request that Vista specify the quan-
tity of non-compliant paint manufactured and sold in the
summer of 1987.
16. There is injury to the public when responsible par-
ties such as Vista do not respond to official inquiries
pertaining to its Clean Air Act compliance and liability.
EPA must expend a significant portion of its limited
monies to prosecute these actions, and the violator escapes
effective regulation of its pollution by hiding its violation
and challenging EPA to find the information on its own,
if it can. Where the regulatory program is designed to
protect public health, as with the Clean Air Act, it is
even more important to deter violators.
17. Finally, in considering other factors bearing on
Vista’s penalty, Vista’s conduct was calculated to violate
the law, and was intentional, knowing, and in bad faith.
Moreover, while other paint manufacturers accepted
EPA’s offer of leniency in exchange for their compliance
with the law, Vista literally dared EPA to enforce the
law, and then refused to disclose the evidence of its viola-
tions. Vista conduct has been consistent throughout this
case, and establishes a pattern of knowing disregard for
the law. Deterrence of Vista from the knowing, deliberate
and calculated violation of the environmental laws re-
quires imposition of these civil penalties.
18. The Court has considered all other mitigating
factors, and has reduced Vista’s civil penalty accordingly.
19. Regarding Vista’s CAA Section 110 violations,
the Court assesses a Civil penalty of $1,000 per day for
each of Vista’s 468 days of violations from December 3,
1985 to June 24, 1987 (the date Vista received its No-
tice of Violation from EPA), and $12,500 per day for
each of Vista’s 110 days of violation from June 24,
1987 to October 12, 1987. The total CAA Section 110
civil penalty is $1,843,000,
36a
20. Regarding Vista’s CAA Section 114 violations,
the Court assesses a civil penalty of $1,000 per day for
each day of Vista’s 1177 days of violation from August
26, 1987, the date Vista’s first response to EPA’s June
19, 1987 request for information was due, to November
18, 1991, the hearing date on the United States’ sum-
mary judgment motion. The total CAA Section 114 civil
penalty is $1,177,000.
21. In addition, Vista shall be required to pay the
reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses of the United
States pursuant to Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 37(c)
in making its proof of the matters denied in Vista’s Re-
sponses to Plaintiff's First Set Of Requests For Admis-
sions, dated March 29, 1991, where (a) the requests
were not held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a); (b)
the admission sought was of substantial importance; (c)
Vista had no reasonable ground for believing that it
might prevail on the matter; and (d) there was no other
good reason for Vista’s failure to admit the matters
presented.
22. To the extent that any of the foregoing Uncon-
troverted Facts are deemed to be conclusions of law,
they are incorporated into these Conclusions of Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: Dec. 18, 1991.
/s/ Manuel L. Real
Hon. MANUEL L. REAL
Chief United States District Judge
Presented by:
LouRDES G. BAIRD
United States Attorney
LEON W. WEIDMAN
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Division
ScoTT PARK
Assistant United States Attorney
Ninian
37a
/s/ Peter Hsiao
PETER HSIAO
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
38a
APPENDIX E
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
No. CV-90-6449-R
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
i Plaintiff,
VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Defendant.
Date: February 3, 1992
Time: 10:00 a.m.
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND FOR RELIEF
FROM AND AMENDMENT OF THE JUDGMENT
[Filed Feb. 10, 1992]
Defendant Vista Paint Corporation’s (“Vista”) Motion
For Findings Of Fact And For Relief From And Amend-
ment Of The Judgment came on regularly for hearing
before the Court on February 3, 1992. Defendant’s mo-
tion is denominated as one for reconsideration of this
Court’s prior entry of summary judgment against defend-
ant. The Court has also previously ordered that Vista
obtain a stay of execution of the judgment upon certain
conditions, such stay to expire on February 3, 1992. Af-
ter consideration of the moving and opposing papers, ex-
hibits and pleadings, and all arguments submitted to the
Court;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Vista’s Motion For Findings Of Fact And For
Relief From And Amendment Of The Judgment is denied
39a
in its entirety with prejudice, except as explicitly set forth
below.
2. The Court approves and enters amended findings
of fact and conclusions of law in the form submitted by
the United States.
3. The United States is hereby stayed from executing
upon the judgment under the identical conditions as pre-
viously imposed by this Court on Vista until February 7,
1992. After consideration of the papers filed in support
and in opposition to Vista’s prior request for a stay of
execution of the judgment, the Court finds that any addi-
tional stay should be strictly governed by Fed. R. Civ.
Proc. 62(d). Therefore, Vista may extend the stay of
execution of plaintiff's judgment provided in this Order
pursuant to Rule 62(d) only upon the condition that it
post a supersedeas bond in the amount of $3,170,896.00,
and that Vista deliver such bond to the Court along with
an application for the Court’s approval of the bond’s
amount and its terms of payment to the United States by
no later than February 7, 1992.
DATED: 2-3, 1992.
/s/ Manuel L. Real
MANUEL L. REAL
Chief United States District Judge
Submitted by:
LourRDES G. BAIRD
United States Attorney
LEON W. WEIDMAN
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Division
Scott H. PARK
Assistant United States Attorney
/s/ Peter Hsiao
PETER HSIAO
Assistant United States Attorney
SEE a
40a
APPENDIX F
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
No. CV 90-6449-R
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Defendant.
Date: February 3, 1991
Time: 10:00 a.m.
AMENDED FINDINGS OF UNCONTROVERTED
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Filed Feb. 11, 1992]
Plaintiff United States of America’s motion for sum-
mary judgment came on regularly for hearing on Novem-
ber 18, 1991, Chief United States District Court Judge
Manuel L. Real presiding. Subsequently, defendant’s
Motion For Findings Of Fact and For Relief From And
Amendment Of The Judgment came on regularly for
hearing on February 3, 1992. After having heard the
arguments of counsel and examined the pleadings, memo-
randum and exhibits presented by the plaintiff and de-
wt enchant at
4la
fendants, the Court makes the following amended findings
of fact and conclusions of law:
STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
1. Vista is a major manufacturer, distributor and re-
tail seller of paint. It manufactures approximately 25,000
gallons of paint each month for sale at its stores in Cali-
fornia, and its total sales last year exceeded 50 million
dollars. Vista’s general office and its sole paint manu-
facturing plant are located in Fullerton, California. Vista
sells its paint at its own stores in Stanton, Costa Mesa,
La Habra, Orange, Mission Viejo, Ontario, Riverside,
E] Cajon, Chula Vista, Huntington Beach, and San Diego,
California.
2. In 1984, as part of the State Implementation Plan
(“SIP”) for California to limit the VOC content of
paint, the South Coast Air Quality Management District
(“SCAQMD”) and the San Diego County Air Pollution
Control District (“SDCAPCD”) adopted SIP Rules 1113
and 67.0. These rules regulate non-flat architectural coat-
ings, otherwise known as gloss or semi-gloss paints, which
are commonly used to paint structures, mobile homes or
pavement. In order to control air pollution from the
manufacture and application of these coatings, the rules
limit their VOC content to no more than 250 grams of
VOC per liter of coating (“250 g/l VOC”), and forbid
the sale, offer for sale, or application of any such paint
exceeding these VOC limitations (“non-complaint coat-
ings”).
3. As background, local and regional government
authorities under California law have primary responsi-
bility for control of air pollution. Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 40000 et seq. Two of these local authorities are
the SCAQMD, which includes Los Angeles and Orange
Counties, and the SDCAPCD, which includes San Diego
County. These districts are empowered to adopt rules
governing air pollution and to independently enforce them
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as state law. Id. at § 40001. As for the federal govern-
ment, the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) provides the EPA
with independent authority to enforce federally approved
air pollution control laws. Section 110 of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7410, requires among other things that each
State submit rules for emission limitations to be incor-
porated into the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”), and
enforced as federal law by the EPA. See 42 U.S.C.
7413.
4, In 1985, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”), pursuant to the CAA, approved SCAQMD
Rule 1113 and SDCAPCD Rule 67.0 as part of the SIP
for California, to be enforced as federal law. 50 Fed.
Reg. 3338 (January 24, 1985).
5. Vista’s president was aware of these rules and their
purpose in the time period between 1985 to 1987, to
control VOC emissions. Vista was both a long-time manu-
facturer and seller of non-compliant coatings, having pro-
duced its “Trim-Kote” and “Proformer” brands with
VOC’s in excess of 250 g/l for over 10 years. Vista offered
these non-compliant coatings for sale for the five-year
period preceding February 1987.
6. EPA met with industry trade associations in 1987,
including the National Paint & Coatings Association and
the Southern California Paint & Coatings Association,
regarding its strategy for taking enforcement action against
companies violating the 1985 VOC limitations set by law.
EPA informed the industry that it would, as a matter
of enforcement discretion, prioritize enforcement against
those companies that did not cease the manufacture of
non-compliant coatings by July 1, 1987 and who did not
cease their sale of non-compliant coatings by September 1,
1987. Thus, while EPA retained the discretion to prose-
cute any company that violated the VOC limitation after
January 24, 1985, EPA announced that those companies
that persisted longest in their continuing violations of the
Clean Air Act would be the first to be prosecuted.
EE
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7. On March 19, 1987, in order to determine the
compliance status of the paint industry with the VOC
limitations of federal law, EPA issued a request for in-
formation to a number of paint manufacturers, including
Vista, pursuant to Section 114 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7414 (“Section 114 Request”). EPA required that each
company report the volume of each non-architectural
coating that it manufactured from February to May 1987,
and the VOC content of each coating. Each company
was given until April 7, 1987 to submit their first reports,
and warned that non-compliance would subject them to
civil penalties.
8. Vista did not respond to EPA’s March 19 request.
Vista’s president cannot recall why Vista did not respond.
Faced with Vista’s recalcitrance, EPA subsequently issued
an Administrative Order against Vista pursuant to Section
113(a)(3) of the CAA, finding that Vista had violated
Section 114 of the CAA in failing to provide the requested
information-to EPA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(a)(3), 7414.
Per its Order, EPA directed Vista to disclose by no later
than April 16, 1987 the VOC content of the architectural
coatings that it manufactured or distributed from Febru-
ary through May 1987.
9. Vista only partially complied with EPA’s Adminis-
trative Order, responding in a letter postmarked April 20,
1987 by disclosing the VOC content of the architectural
coatings it manufactured in February and March 1987,
only. Vista’s letter disclosed that its monthly paint pro-
duction was approximately 25,000 gallons of coatings,
with 55 percent by volume of the identified coatings
exceeding the 250 g/l VOC limitation of federal law.
Vista did not respond to EPA’s Order regarding its coat-
ings manufactured in April and May, 1987, and did not
provide the requested information.
10. EPA subsequently sought more specific informa-
tion from the paint manufacturers regarding the trade
name, volume and VOC content of each non-compliant
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coating sold in each California air quality district in
March, April and May 1987. On May 15, 1987, EPA
sent Vista a modified request for more specific informa-
tion to supplant its initial request for information. Alter-
natively, EPA specified that the paint manufacturer could
stipulate that it sold and/or offered for sale coatings in
violation of the 250 g/1 VOC limitation, and the month
and location where the non-compliant paint was sold.
Vista was advised that a failure to provide the requested
information would subject Vista to an enforcement action
for civil penalties of $25,000 per day of violation.
11. Vista responded by a letter dated June 12, 1987.
Without disclosing the months in which it sold non-com-
pliant coatings, Vista admitted to selling non-compliant
coatings in the SCAQMD and the SDCAPCD. Vista’s
president also confirmed Vista’s prior admissions in his
sworn deposition testimony. Yet the information regarding
the volume of each such non-compliant Vista coating sold
and the location of their sale was available to Vista in
March, April and May of 1987.
12. Based upon Vista’s admission, EPA issued a No-
tice of Violation of Vista on June 19, 1987 pursuant to
Section 113(a)(1) of the CAA.
13. EPA, in its continuing effort to compel Vista to
comply with the law, sent Vista a second Section 114
request on June 19, 1987, requesting documentation of
any quantities of Vista non-compliant coatings manu-
factured and sold in the subsequent July-October 1987
period. This request required Vista to (1) establish and
maintain records regarding their non-compliant coatings,
(2) report the volume of non-compliant coatings sold in
August-October 1987 and their location of sale; (3) report
the name and VOC content of the coatings sold; and
(4) report the identity of coatings manufactured by Vista
from July-October 1987.
14. The information requested by EPA’s June 19
Section 114 request was available to Vista at the time of
a
45a
EPA’s request. EPA again warned Vista at that time of
the $25,000 per day penalty if the requested information
was not received.
15. In an effort to further accommodate the paint in-
dustry and Vista, EPA by its letter dated July 22, 1987
modified its second Section 114 request with a strictly
tailored condition. In this letter, EPA stipulated that if
Vista would commit to (1) the cessation of the manu-
facture of non-compliant coatings by July 1, 1987, (2) the
cessation of all sales of non-compliant coatings by Sep-
tember 1, 1987 (a condition never fulfilled by Vista, see
below), and (3) disclose the time and location of sales
of non-compliant paint in August 1987 (another condi-
tion never fulfilled by Vista), that Vista would be relieved
of its obligation to provide the other information re-
quested by EPA in its prior June 1987 letter. Vista was
still required to maintain all relevant records of its manu-
facture and sale of non-compliant coatings. EPA was
explicit, however, that all conditions must be strictly com-
plied with if Vista was to be relieved of any of its report-
ing obligations.
16. Vista continued to manufacture, sell and offer for
sale its non-compliant coatings throughout April to Octo-
ber 1987, but did not provide any reports to EPA. Vista
continued to manufacture non-compliant coatings in April,
May and June of 1987, and continued to sell and offer
for sale its non-compliant coatings in the Los Angeles
and San Diego areas throughout June, July, August and
September 1987. Although Vista continued to sell non-
compliant coatings, Vista submitted no report of its Au-
gust sales as requested in EPA’s July 22, 1987 letter,
and no report as required by EPA’s June 19, 1987 letter.
EPA, per the CAA Section 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413, gave
notice to the appropriate State air pollution control agency
of this enforcement action.
17. On August 19, 1987, Vista’s president, Eddie R.
Fisher, telephoned William Wruble of EPA Region IX
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to ask for more time to sell his non-compliant coatings.
After discussing Vista’s situation, Mr. Fisher stated that
“he had no choice but to sell the [non-compliant] paint
past September 1, and was planning to do so.” Mr.
Fisher then stated that “he would (could) litigate if he
had to, since the option was to go out of business.”
18. Mr. Wruble denied Vista’s request for additional
time to sell its non-compliant coatings, and explained that
Vista’s failure to take EPA’s enforcement authority seri-
ously was not a reason to grant it additional time to sell
non-compliant coatings. Mr. Fisher then said that he
“didn’t think it was our [EPA’s] intention to put him in
jail, although he’d be willing to pay a ‘reasonable’ fine
to be able to continue to sell his violating coatings.”
19. Vista was also warned by the local SDCAPCD to
cease its sale of non-compliant coatings by September 1,
1987, a warning Vista received at least by July 28, 1987.
Vista however continued to sell non-compliant coatings
throughout September 1987. Vista admits that such non-
compliant coatings remained offered for sale throughout
Vista’s San Diego stores in September 1987. Vista also
continued its refusal to respond to EPA’s request for
information.
20. Further evidence that Vista sold non-compliant
coatings after September 1, 1987 is provided where in-
spectors from the SDCAPCD purchased the Vista-brand
“Trim-Kote” coating, a non-compliant coating, from Vista’s
retail outlet on Kearney Villa Road in San Diego, Calli-
fornia, on September 2, 1987. The SDCAPCD’s labora-
tory analysis revealed that the purchased paint had a
VOC concentration of 387 g’1, well above the permissible
250 g/l permitted by SDCAPCD Rule 67.
21. The SDCAPCD inspectors purchased a second
gallon of non-compliant coating, a Vista paint under the
brand name “Proformer”, from the same Vista San Diego
store on September 22, 1987. The SCPAPCD’s laboratory
ie
47a
analysis revealed that the purchased paint had a VOC
concentration of 381 g/l, well above the permissible 250
g/l permitted by SDCAPCD Rule 67.
22. Both Vista’s records and its president corroborate
these violations. Vista’s April 16, 1987 report to EPA
identifies that its “Trim-Kote” and “Proformer” paints as
non-compliant coatings, have a VOC concentration of
240 and 380 g/l, respectively. Vista’s president confirmed
that Vista’s “Trim-Kote” and “Proformer” paints purchased
by the SDCAPCD inspectors would be expected to have
VOC concentrations in excess of 250 g/l. Mr. Fisher
further admits that non-compliant coatings were sold in
San Diego on September 2, 1987. Based upon these
illegal sales, the SDCAPCD cited Vista with two mis-
demeanor Notices Of Violation for its violations of
SDCAPCD Rule 67. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 42400.
23. Faced in September 1987 with enforcement action
from the SDCAPCD (EPA had not yet taken its enforce-
ment action against Vista), Vista sought a variance from
the SDCAPCD Hearing Board.
24. As background, the variance procedure is a cre-
ation of the California Health & Safety Code §§ 42350
et seq., and provides the applicant with a procedure to
obtain relief from a local rule (not a federal rule) under
certain strictly limited conditions. Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 42350. In part, an applicant cannot obtain a
variance unless the applicant attests that it “is, or will
be. in violation of Section 41701 or of any rule, regula-
tion, or order of the district.” Cal. Health and Safety Code
§ 42352(a). Thus, by applying for a variance, Vista
further admitted that it was in violation of SDCAPCD
Rule 67 and/or its intent to violate that Rule for the
express purpose of selling the remainder of Vista’s non-
compliant paints within the next 90 days.
48a
25. Vista was subsequently unable to persuade a ma-
jority of the SDCAPCD Hearing Board at its September
24, 1987 hearing that a variance was warranted, and
Vista obtained no variance relief at any time from the
SDCAPCD. Vista applied to the SDCAPCD Hearing
Board for reconsideration, then dropped its request. Vista
represented instead that it had removed its non-compliant
paint from its San Diego stores as of October 12, 1987,
but after the September 24 variance hearing. Vista’s pres-
ident explains that he removed the non-compliant coating
from his San Diego stores because those coatings were not
selling well. Vista subsequently paid a fine to the
SDCAPCD for its violations of their local rules.
26. Vista offered for sale a significant amount of non-
compliant coatings in San Diego in September 1987. At
the SDCAPCD Hearing Board September 24, 1987 hear-
ing, Vista’s president testified under oath, as required by
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 40830, that 13,000 gallons
of non-compliant paint remained in Vista’s San Diego
stores. Vista’s president corroborated this admission
when he told SDCAPCD inspector George Seidel prior
to the hearing that during September 1987, Vista had
5200 gations of non-compliant paint for sale in Vista’s
San Diego stores. Until Vista’s variance was lost, Vista
continued to offer this paint for sale in violation of the.
SIP.
27. The VOC’s emitted by Vista’s paint are a primary
precursor of ozone, or smog, which the EPA has desig-
nated as a major air pollutant. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7450,
7451; 40 C.F.R. §€ 50.1, 50.9. The 13,000 gallons of
coating offered for sale in September 1987 in San Diego
by Vista would release approximately eight tons of VOC
hydrocarbons.
28. Ozone pollution causes serious adverse health
effects, including coughing, reduced lung capacity, respir-
atory infection and possible permanent lung damage.
49a
There is also evidence that the young, the elderly, and
those persons with respiratory ailments (such as asth-
matics) are among those who are particularly susceptible
to the adverse effects of ozone. At certain concentration
levels, ozone irritates the respiratory system and causes
coughing, wheezing, chest tightness and headaches. Due
to its irritation nature, ozone can aggravate asthma, bron-
chitis, and emphysema. Some studies indicate that chronic
exposure to fairly low levels of ozone may reduce resist-
ance to infection and alter blood chemistry or chromo-
some structure. At higher concentrations [of ozone], hos-
pitalization becomes a possibility.
29. Ozone also causes significant damage to the en-
vironment, where ozone can destroy vegetation, reduce
crop yield, and damage exposed materials by causing
cracking, fading, and weathering. Moreover clear evi-
dence shows that ozone damages economically, ecologi-
cally, and aesthetically important plants. When exposed
to ozone, major annual crops produce reduced yields.
Some tree species suffer injury to needles or leaves, low-
ered productivity, and in severe cases, individual trees
can die.
30. EPA has through the federal Clean Air Act at-
tempted to control and regulate VOC emissions from a
variety of sources, including paint manufacturers. In
1987, EPA found that 40 paint companies, including
Vista, were in violation of the federal Clean Air Act’s
limitation on VOC concentrations in their coatings. All
40 paint companies received a Notice Of Violation, and
38 announced their intent to cease non-compliant paint
sales. Only one company announced its intent to con-
tinue to violate the VOC restrictions, to intentionally
violate the law despite repeated warnings from the regu-
latory agencies, and to disregard the effects of its vio-
lations on human health and the environment: that com-
pany was Vista.
50a
31. After EPA referred this matter to the U.S. Justice
Department for enforcement action, Vista for the first
time produced a letter it purportedly prepared on or about
August 4, 1987 and sent to EPA, that represented that
Vista had ceased its manufacture of non-compliant coat-
ings on June 30, 1987, and “will not offer for sale any
non-compliant coatings after September 1, 1987.”
32. This representation has in fact proven to be false.
Vista’s president admits that sales of such coatings con-
tinued well after September 1, 1987. In addition, there
is no copy of the letter in EPA’s files or any other indica-
tion that it was received by EPA prior to the date it was
produced to the U.S. Department of Justice in 1989.
Vista’s president testified that he cannot recall ever seeing
the purported Vista August 4, 1987 letter before 1989
when it was first produced to the U.S. Department of
Justice.
33. Vista appears to have had no intention of ceasing
its sale of non-compliant coatings in August 1987, where
Vista’s president announced to EPA at precisely the same
time that Vista would continue its sales of non-compliant
paint after September 1, 1987, and Vista in fact did so.
Vista’s president said that Vista would go bankrupt if it
could not sell its non-compliant paint, a statement that
again cannot be reconciled with Vista’s purported August
1987 letter.
34. The United States propounded interrogatories and
requests for production of documents on May 1, 1991,
seeking this identical information requested by EPA in
1987. Vista responded with groundless objections with no
legal basis, and flatly refused to provide the information
or produce the relevant documents. The United States
then brought a motion to compel Vista to comply with its
discovery requests. As a result, this Court ordered that
Vista first specifically identify by September 27, 1991 the
quantity of its non-compliant coatings manufactured and
Sla
sold in 1987, and second produce the requested docu-
ments at the U.S. Attorney’s Office by no later than
October 25, 1991, again mirroring the information re-
quested by EPA in 1987.
35. Vista did not identify its non-compliant coatings
with a verified response per this Court’s Order and as
required by Section 114 of the Clean Air Act, but in-
stead directed the United States to look through un-
identified documents at its warehouse. Moreover, Vista
has refused to make those documents available for inspec-
tion until October 25, 1991.
36. Vista has already provided its sworn response stat-
ing unequivocally that no documents exist regarding its
sale or offer for sale of non-compliant coatings prior to
August 30, 1987. See Vista’s “Supplemental” Responses
No. 2 and 3. This unexplained disappearance of Vista’s
documents is directly contrary to EPA’s Section 114 re-
quirement that Vista retain those documents.
37. Vista sworn responses to the United States’ Re-
quests for Admission (“RFA”) cannot be reconciled
with the deposition testimony of Vista’s president, where
he admits precisely the same facts that Vista denies in
its RFA responses. For example, Vista’s president admits
that he knew that Vista was selling non-compliant coat-
ings in September 1987. Fisher Depo. p. 188. But see
Vista RFA No. 27. There are numerous other examples.
See Vista RFA Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7. See especially Vista’s
evasive response to RFA No. 13, 14.
38. In the only information Vista has ever revealed
about its sales of non-compliant paint in September 1987,
Vista asserts that after September 1, 1987 it sold 35
gallons of non-compliant paint from one store, the identi-
cal store where SDCAPCD inspectors purchased non-
compliant Vista paint after September 1, 1987. How-
ever, Vista has never revealed the total sales of non-
compliant paint in all of its San Diego stores after Sep-
oo
52a
tember 1, 1987, and pointedly has continued its pattern
of obstruction and evasion in this litigation by refusing
to admit even its sales of this 35 gallons of paint. See
RFA No. 17 and Vista’s response.
There is no genuine issue of material fact remaining in
this case.
40. To the extent that any of the following Conclu-
sions of Law are deemed to be uncontroverted facts, they
are incorporated into these Statement of Uncontroverted
Facts.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this
action pursuant to Section 113(b) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(b), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345 and 1355, and
personal jurisdiction over the parties herein.
2. Venue in this district is proper pursuant to 42
U.S.C. 7413 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
3. Liability for violations of Sections 110 and 114 of
the federal Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410,
7414, is strict, pursuant to CAA Section 113, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413.
4. Vista is a corporation covered by the CAA, 42
U.S.C. § 7602(e).
5. EPA satisfied the requirement that notice of this
action be given to the appropriate State air pollution
control agency pursuant to the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413.
6. Vista illegally offered for sale and sold non-com-
pliant coatings a VOC content in excess of 250 g/I during
the time period between and including December 3, 1985
through October 12, 1987 in violation of the State Im-
plementation Plan rules identified as SCAQMD Rule 1113
and SDCAPCD Rule 67, and continued to violate those
rules more than 30 days after having received a Notice
of Violation from EPA on June 24, 1987,
53a
7. Vista has therefore violated Section 110 and 113
of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7414, from
December 3, 1985 to October 12, 1987, a total of 578
days of violations, and there being no genuine issue of
material fact remaining, the United States is entitled to
summary judgment thereon.
8. Vista illegally and unreasonably failed to respond
to EPA’s June 19, 1987 request for relevant information
in violation of Sections 113 and 114 of the CAA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7414, by its failure to (a) establish and
maintain records regarding their non-compliant coatings,
(b) report the volume of non-compliant coatings sold in
August-October 1987 and their location of sale; (c) re-
port the name and VOC content of the coatings sold; and
(d) report the identity of coatings manufactured by Vista
from July-October 1987.
9. Vista has therefore violated Sections 113 and 114
of the Clean Air Act from August 26, 1987 to November
18. 1991, a total of 1177 days of violations, and there
being no genuine issue of material fact remaining, the
United States is entitled to summary judgment thereon.
10. Section 113 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b),
provides for imposition of a civil penalty against Vista
of not more than $25,000 per day of violation for (1) the
sale or offer for sale of non-compliant VOC paint in viola-
tion of CAA Section 110, and (2) for the failure to respond
to EPA’s request for information in violation of CAA
Section 114. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2), (4). For pur-
poses of computing the appropriate civil penalty, the
penalty period begins when the source first commits the
violation, and not later when the NOV is issued. This
Court will first determine the maximum penalty allowable,
and then consider any mitigating circumstances.
11. In determining the civil penalty, the court “should
give effect to the major purpose of a civil penalty: deter-
rence. Civil penalties should be large enough to hurt, and
54a
to deter anyone in the fuiure from shown as little concern
as [defendant] did for the need to comply.
12. The CAA was amended in November 1990, in
part, to add new CAA Section 113(e)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(e)(1). In assessing civil penalties, CAA Section
113(e)(1) provides that the Court shall consider (1) the
size of the business; (2) the economic impact of the
penalty on the business; (3) the seriousness of the viola-
tion; (4) the violator’s full compliance history and good
faith efforts to comply; (5) the duration of the violation
as established by any credible evidence; (6) payment by
the violator of penalties previously assessed for the same
violation; (7) the economic benefit of noncompliance,
and such other factors as justice may require.
13. The first two factors, the size of Vista’s business
and the economic impact of the penalty on its business,
support the imposition of a substantial penalty. Vista is
a major manufacturer, distributor and retail seller of paint,
with its total sales last year exceeding 50 million dollars.
Vista owns its manufacturing facilities in Fullerton, Cali-
fornia, its own stores in 15 different locations in Cali-
fornia, and its own trucks and transportation facilities for
its business operations. Imposition of the penalty assessed
below would amount to approximately six per cent of
Vista’s sales in a single year of operation.
14. The third factor, the seriousness of the violation,
also supports a substantial penalty against Vista. After
more than two years of illegally selling non-compliant
coatings and after a Notice Of Violation, Vista continued
to manufacture and sell its non-compliant coatings at a
rate of 11,300 gallons per mwnath. The excess VOC's
added to the environment by manufacturing this paint
are significant; by applying these non-compliant paints,
the excess VOC’s added to the environment above that
permitted by law is approximately 16,000 Ibs, or eight
tons a month. During the total period between December
3, 1985 and October 12, 1987, the application of Vista
red
55a
paints has thereby added approximately 176 tons of ex-
cess VOC’s to the environment over that permitted by
law. Given the devastating effects on human health, vege-
tation and our environment of such unpermitted pollution,
the potential harm of Vista’s conduct is almost incalcula-
ble, where Vista has contributed to the injuries from air
pollution suffered by the population of Los Angeles,
Orange and San Diego Counties.
15. Vista’s failure to respond to EPA’s request for
information is equally serious. More than four years after
the information was requested by EPA, then by the U.S.
Department of Justice in this lawsuit, Vista has not yet
responded to EPA’s request that Vista specify the quantity
of non-compliant paint manufactured and sold in the
summer of 1987.
16. There is injury to the public when responsible
parties such as Vista do not respond to official inquiries
pertaining to its Clean Air Act compliance and liability.
EPA must expend a significant portion of its limited
monies to prosecute these actions, and the violator escapes
effective regulation of its pollution by hiding its violation
and challenging EPA to find the information on its own,
if it can. Where the regulatory program is designed to
protect public health, as with the Clean Air Act, it is
even more important to deter violators.
17. The fourth and fifth factors, the violator’s full
compliance history, good faith efforts to comply, and the
duration of the violation as established by any credible
evidence, also supports a substantial penalty against Vista.
Vista’s CAA violations were persistent evidence an ex-
tended history of deliberate non-compliance. See, @.2.
Conclusion Of Law €47, 9. Vista’s conduct was calcu-
lated to violate the law, and was intentional, knowing.
and in bad faith. Moreover, while other paint manufac-
turers accepted EPA’s offer of leniency in exchange for
their compliance with the law, Vista literally dared EPA
56a
to enforce the law, and then refused to disclose the evi-
dence of its violations. Vista conduct has been consistent
throughout this case, and establishes a pattern of knowing
disregard for the law. Deterrence of Vista from the know-
ing, deliberate and calculated violation of the environ-
mental laws requires imposition of these civil penalties.
18. The sixth factor, the payment by the violator of
penalties previously assessed for the same violation, has
been considered, where Vista has made no prior payment
to plaintiff for its violations of federal law, and where it
has made a $500.00 payment on a $2000.00 penalty im-
posed by the San Diego Air Pollution Control District for
Vista’s violations of its Rule 67.0 occurring on September
2 and 22, 1987.
19. The seventh factor, the economic benefit of non-
compliance, also supports a substantial penalty against
Vista. By its failure to properly respond to EPA’s Section
114 requests for information or to the United States’
discovery in this case, Vista has improperly failed to dis-
close information which it has or had in its exclusive
possession to assess the precise economic benefit to it due
to its illegal offer for sale and sale of non-compliant coat-
ings. Based upon the record before the Court as detailed
in the Court’s Findings Of Fact, the Court concludes that
Vista obtained a significant economic benefit from its
illegal offer for sale and sales of non-compliant coatings.
See Findings Of Fact 44 1, 9. Moreover, Vista has failed
to submit admissible evidence to controvert the United
States’ showing of Vista’s significant economic benefit.
20. The Court has considered all other mitigating
factors, and has reduced Vista’s civil penalty accordingly.
21. Regarding Vista’s CAA Section 110 violations,
the Court assesses a civil penalty of $1,000 per day for
each of Vista’s 468 days of violations from December 3,
1985 to June 24, 1987 (the date Vista received its Notice
of Violation from EPA), and $12,500 per day for each
CAAA eaiwin Batts Yet eee. 2
57a
of Vista’s 110 days of violation from June 24, 1987 to
October 12, 1987. The total CAA Section 110 civil
penalty is $1,843,000.
22. Regarding Vistas CAA Section 114 violations,
the Court assesses a civil penalty of $1,000 per day for
each day of Vista’s 1177 days of violation from August.
26, 1987, the date Vista’s first response to EPA’s June
19, 1987 request for information was due, to November
18, 1991, the hearing date on the United States’ summary
judgment motion. The total CAA Section 114 civil pen-
alty is $1,177,000.
23. In addition, Vista shall be required to pay the
reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses of the United
States pursuant to Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 37(c)
in making its proof of the matters denied in Vista’s Re-
sponses to Plaintiff's First Set Of Requests For Admis-
sions, dated March 29, 1991, where (a) the requests
were not held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a);
(b) the admission sought was of substantial importance;
(c) Vista had no reasonable ground for believing that it
might prevail on the matter; and (d) there was no other
good reason for Vista’s failure to admit the matters
presented.
24. To the extent that any of the forgoing Uncontro-
verted Facts are deemed to be conclusions of law, they
are incorporated into these Conclusions of Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: Feb. 11, 1992
/s/ Manuel L. Real
Hon. MANUEL L. REAL
Chief United States District J udge
58a
Presented by:
LourDEs G. BAIRD
United States Attorney
LEON W. WEIDMAN
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Division
SCOTT PARK
Assistant United States Attorney
/s/ Peter Hsiao
PETER Hsiao
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff
United States of America
59a
APPENDIX G
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-55160
D.C. No. CV-90-6449-R
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
" Plaintiff,
VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Defendant.
VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant-A ppellant,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Counterdefendant-A ppellee.
VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Third-Party Plaintiff-
Appellant,
Vv.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; SOUTH COAST
AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DIstTRICT; SAN DIEGO AIR-
POLLUTION CONTROL DisTRICT; AIR RESOURCES BOARD;
TECHNICAL REVIEW GROUP;
Third-Party Defendants-
Appellees.
60a
ORDER
[Filed Feb. 17, 1993]
Before: TANG and HALL, Circuit Judges, and WALKER,*
District Judge
Appellees’ petition for rehearing is hereby DENIED.
* The Honorable Vaughn R. Walker, United States District Court
Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by desig-
nation.
6la
APPENDIX H
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-55160
D.C. No. CV-90-6449-R
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
Vs
VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Defendant.
VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant-A ppellant,
va
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Counterdefendant-A ppellee.
VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,
Third-Party Plaintiff-
Appellant,
¥.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; SOUTH COAST
AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT; SAN DIEGO AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT; AIR RESOURCES BOARD;
TECHNICAL REVIEW GROUP;
Third-Party Defendants-
Appellees.
62a
ORDER
[Filed Mar. 22, 1993]
Before: TANG and HALL, Circuit Judges, and WALKER,*
District Judge.
The panel has voted to deny appellant’s petition for
partial rehearing. Judges Tang and Hall have voted to
reject the suggestion for partial rehearing en banc and
Judge Walker has so recommended.
The full court has been advised of the suggestion for
partial rehearing en banc and no active judge has re-
quested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc.
Fed. R. App. P. 35.
The petition for partial rehearing is DENIED and the
suggestion for partial rehearing en banc is REJECTED.
* The Honorable Vaughn R. Walker, United States District Court
Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designa-
tion.
aati ial
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.