Appendix — California State Board of Equalization v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.

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[No. B061726. Second Dist., Div. One. Nov. 10, 1992.]

McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION, Plaintiff and

Appellant, v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION,

Defendant and Respondent.

SUMMARY

The trial court, in a sales tax refund action, ruled that

aircraft parts sold to a Mexican airline to service its

airplanes were not exports exempt from state sales taxes

(U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 2; Rev. & Tax, Code, § 6352),

and entered judgment denying the refund. The airline

received the parts at the manufacturer’s California plan

and shipped them by common carriers to the United

States-Mexican border, after which a forwarding agent

processed them through customs, the parts then being

loaded onto Mexican common carriers and shipped to a

Mexico City maintenance facility. (Superior Court of Los

Angeles county, No. C682604, Jan A. Pluim, Judge.)

The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded with

instructions to vacate the judgment and enter judgment

for the taxpayer. The Court held that when an article is

manufactured and sold in one of the states for export to a

foreign country, it is free from state sales tax under the

import-export clause of the United States constitution

(U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 2) if at the time title passed the

certainty of the foreign destination was plain. Thus, the

court held, the sale of airplane parts was exempt from

taxation: all the documents indicated that the parts were

for export, the Mexican airline took title in California and

only shipped the parts by truck because they were too

large and in too great a quantity to be flown in its own

B2

aircraft, and the airline’s clear plan to ship the parts to

Mexico for its own use was acted on and continued

uninterrupted to completion other than for unavoidable

delays incidental to their journey. (Opinion by Ortega, J.,

with Spencer, P.J., and Dunn, J.,* concurring.)

HEADNOTES

Classified to California Digest of Official Reports

(la, 1b) Sales and Use Taxes § 17 - Sales Tax - Transac-

tions Subject to Tax - Exemptions - Foreign Com-

merce — What Constitutes Export - Export Stream. -

The trial court erred in ruling that aircraft parts sold

to a Mexican airline to service its airplanes were not

exports exempt from state sales taxes (U.S. Const.,

art. I, § 10, cl. 2; Rev. & Tax. Code, § 6352), where the

airline received the parts at the manufacturer's Cali-

fornia plan and shipped them by common carriers to

the United States-Mexican border, after which a for-

warding agent processed them through customs, the

parts then being loaded onto Mexican common car-

riers and shipped to a Mexico City maintenance facil-

ity. All the documents indicated that the parts were

for export, the Mexican airline took title in California,

and it only shipped the parts by truck because they

were to large and in too great a quantity to be flown

in its own aircraft. The airline’s clear plan to ship the

parts to Mexico for its own use was acted on and

continued uninterrupted to completion other than for

unavoidable delays incidental to their journey.

* Judge of the Municipal Court for the Long Beach Judicial

District sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the

Judicial Council.

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

B3

[Property destined for, or in course of, removal

from state as subject to taxation therein, note, 11

A.L.R.2d 938. See also Cal.Jur.3d, Sales and use

Taxes, § 40;9 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed.

1989) Taxation, § 60.]

Taxpayers’ Remedies § 14 - Proceedings in Actions

to Recover Taxes Paid - Review - Questions of Law.

- When presented with uncontradicted facts on

appeal in tax matters, the appellate court is free to

make its own determinations.

Sales and Use Taxes § 3 - Nature and Purpose. -

California’s Sales and Use Tax Law (Rev. * Tax. Code,

§ 6001 et seq.) acts as a double filter designed to catch

all transactions involving the purchase or enjoyment

of tangible personal property in the state. The sales

tax applies only to retail sales in California.

Taxpayers’ Remedies § 13 - Proceedings in Actions

to Recover Taxes Paid - Evidence ~ Burden of Proof.

- The burden is one a taxpayer claiming an exemp-

tion to show entitlement to the exemption. Doubt as

to the applicability of the exemption is to be resolved

against the exemption, and those rules apply when

the taxpayer seeks a sales tax refund.

Sales and Use Taxes § 17 - Sales Tax - Exemptions -

Foreign Commerce - Construction of Statutes. —

Although statutes granting exemption from taxation

are strictly construed to the end that such concession

shall not be enlarged nor extended beyond the plain

meaning of the language employed, the rule does not

apply to the export exemption (Rev. & Tax. Code,

§ 6352), since it was created by the United States

Constitution, not state statute.

Sales and Use Taxes § 17 - Sales Tax - Exemptions -

Foreign Commerce - Application. — Goods do not

cease to be part of the general mass of property in the

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state subject as such to its jurisdiction and to taxation

in the usual way, until they have been shipped or

entered with a common carrier for transportation to

another state, or have been started on such transpor-

tation in a continuous route or journey. Under that

test, it is not enough that there is an intent to export,

or a plan that contemplates exportation, or an inte-

grated series of events that will end with it. The tax

immunity runs to the process of exportation and the

transactions and documents embraced in it. It is the

entrance of the articles into the export stream that

marks the start of the process of exportation. Then

there is certainty that the goods are headed for their

foreign destination and will not be diverted to

domestic use. Where an article is manufactured and

sold in one of the states for export to a foreign

country, it is free from state sales tax under the

import-export clause of the United States Constitu-

tion (U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 2) if at the time title

passed the certainty of the foreign destination was

plain.

COUNSEL

Lathan & Watkins, Albert R. Rodriguez, Robert D. Crock-

ett and Deanna W. Detchemendy for Plaintiff and Appel-

lant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Timothy G. Lad-

dish, Assistant Attorney General, Edmond B. Mamer and

Anthony F. Sgherzi, Deputy Attorneys General, for

Defendant and Respondent.

B5

OPINION

ORTEGA, J. -

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) sold

aircraft parts to Aeromexico, the Mexican national airline,

to service Aeromexico’s airplanes. Aeromexico received

the parts at MDC’s Long Beach plant and shipped them

by United States (U.S.) common carriers to the U.S.-

Mexican border at San Ysidro, California, where AM

MEX International, a forwarding agent, processed them

through U.S. and Mexican customs. After a 48-hour cus-

toms delay, the parts were loaded onto Mexican common

carriers and shipped to Aeromexico’s Mexico City main-

tenance facility.

Although the U.S. Constitution and the Revenue and

Taxation Code! except exports from state sales taxes,

defendant California State Board of Equalization (the

Board) assessed MDC sales tax on the parts. The Board

Claimed that the parts were not in the “export stream”

until they left the border and thus were subject to sales

tax. MDC paid the tax under protest and sued the Board

for a refund. After a court trial, the trial court entered

judgment for the Board. MDC appeals. We agree with

MDC that the parts were in the “export stream” and thus

were sales tax-exempt exports. We reverse the judgment.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory refer-

ences are to the Revenue and Taxation Code.

B6

Facts

Beginning in 1968, MDC sold Aeromexico aircraft

parts to service Aeromexico’s airplanes, nearly all of

which were MDC manufactured. MDC produced nearly

all the parts at its Long Beach factory. Aeromexico’s pri-

mary service and maintenance facility was in Mexico

City. Between January 1, 1978, and December 31, 1980, the

period for which the Board assessed the disputed tax,

MDC delivered approximately 8,000 such orders, averag-

ing about 10 each working day, worth nearly $7 million,

to Aeromexico. All orders originated in Mexico, showed

Mexico City as the destination, and stated that the parts

were for export to Mexico. Aeromexico received and took

title to the parts free on board (f.o.b.) in Long Beach.

Aeromexico’s regular flights between Los Angles and

Mexico City were almost all passenger flights on small,

narrow-bodied, twin-engine DC-9 aircraft incapable of

carrying more than a small percentage of the parts. More-

over, during the relevant years, Mexican law prohibited

U.S. common carriers from operating in Mexico, and U.S.

law permitted Mexican common carriers to operate in the

U.S. only in the immediate border area.

Other than the few small items flown directly from

Los Angeles to Mexico City on Aeromexico aircraft, on

which the board did not assess sales tax, Aeromexico

shipped the parts, packaged for export, from Long Beach

on U.S. common truck carriers to the U.S.-Mexican border

a. San Ysidro. Aeromexico retained title and the U.S.

¢- \mon Carriers received possession. Separate lading

bills were prepared at Long Beach and San Ysidro.

Aeromexico had no maintenance or landing facilities at

San Ysidro, which lacked rail connections or east-west

B7

transportation routs. At San Ysidro, Aeromexico

employees assisted AM MEX, an independent freight for-

warder, in processing the shipments through U.S. and

Mexican customs. Aeromexico used AM MEX’s facilities,

expertise in U.S. and Mexican customs regulations and-

fees, and relationships with both countries’ customs offi-

cials. AM MEX neither took title to the shipments nor was

legally obligated to ship the parts to Mexico City. The

shipments were not opened, inspected, or repackaged.

After the approximately 48 hours required to complete

customs processing, the parts were loaded onto Mexican

common carriers and trucked to Mexico City. All the

parts arrived in Mexico City.

The Board issued Aeromexico a registration certifi-

cate as a Mexican exporter, authorizing the San Ysidro

transfers, in 1968 and continually renewed it during and

after the relevant period. The board did not assess sales

tax on the shipments until January 1, 1978. MDC collected

and paid sales tax on a small percentage of the shipments

during the relevant period because in those few cases.

Aeromexico failed to provide MDC adequate documenta-

tion of the shipping process.

On July 3, 1985, the Board assessed MDC $348,413 in

deficient sales tax and $291,476 in interest on the nearly

$7 million of MDC’s January 1, 1978, to December 31,

1980, Aeromexico parts sales. MDC paid the tax and

interest under protest, petitioned for redetermination,

and filed a refund claim. The board denied the petition

and claim. On April 8, 1988, MDC filed this case, seeking

a refund. The case was tried in the court based on the

facts alleged in the complaint, stipulated facts, and four

witnesses’ oral testimony.

| i

B8

The court found and entered judgment for the Board,

stating: “1. As to the Export/Import clause: The court

finds that the repla[c]jement parts did not enter the

stream of exportation until they left San Ysidro by Mexi-

can common carrier. As stated in . . . Farmers’ Rice [Coop-

erative v. County of Yolo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 616 (122 Cal.Rptr.

65, 536 P.2d 465)] . . . and the Administrative Code,

‘Export has not begun where property is transported

from a point in this state to a warehouse or other collect-

ing point in this state even though it is intended that the

property then he transported, and is in fact, transported

to another country.’ The Court also finds that the parts

had not started on their ‘final and continuous journey’

until they left San Ysidro. Thus, the Court concludes the

replacement parts were not in the exportation process at

the time they left [MDC] in Long Beach and were there-

fore taxable. |

“2. As to... [slection 6385: The Court finds that

[sJection 6385 . . . does not qualify the sale between [19]78

& [19]81 as an exempt sale to a common carrier. The

parts . . . were shipped by UPS or a US common carrier

from Long Beach to San Ysidro and not by a facility of the

purchasing carrier Aeromexico, as required by Sales and

[Use] Tax Regulation 1621. Further, the parts were not

shipped to an out-of-state destination. In January of 1980,

[s]ection 6385 was amended by adding subsection (b).

Said subsection is not helpful to [MDC] because

Aeromexico did not transport the parts itself. They were

transported either by U.S. common carrier or Mexican

common Carriers.

“3. As to... [s]ection 6387: [s]ection 6387 is not

applicable here because the evidence does not support

BS

the fact that Aeromexico is a ‘forwarding agent, export

packer, or other person engaged in the business of pre-

paring goods for export or arranging for their exporta-

tion’. Also Annotation 325.1500 of the Business Taxes Law

Guide holds that ‘where an export packer is also a pur-

chaser the exemption of [section] 6387 does not apply.’

“In making the above findings the Court considered

the following facts: [{] 1. Bills of Lading were issued not

just in Long Beach, but also in San Ysidro. [{] 2. The

invoices show that the parts were to be shipped within-

. . . California by common USS. carriers. [{] 3. Once the

parts left Long Beach, [MDC] lost control over the pagts.

[1] 4. The parts were shipped from [MDC] to pom.

i{n] San Ysidro, CA. [{] 5. Some of the invoices reflected

that sales tax was billed to Aeromexico by [MDC]. [4] 6.

There was no evidence presented that the seller and

purchaser agreed that a particular form of transportation

was to take place between San Ysidro and Mexico City. In

fact there was no contract between Am-Mex . . . and

Aeromexico to deliver the parts to Mexico City. [{] 7.

There was no evidence showing that at the time of the

purchase, other than delivery to San Ysidro, that a date of

exportation was contemplated to and agreed upon by

purchaser and seller. [{] 8. Unlike . . . Gough [Industries v.

State Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 746 (336-p.2d

161)] . . . there was no exportation number received for

the parts. [{] 9. All customs arrangements for importing

into Mexico were made after shipment had been made to

San Ysidro.”

B10

ISSUES

(la) MDC contends the trial court erred because the

Aeromexico parts sales were in the “export stream” and

thus were sales tax-exempt exports under the import-

export clause of the U.S. Constitution and section 6352.

/MDC also contends sections 6385 and 6387 and Califor-

nia Code of Regulations, title 18, section 1621, which

exempt from sales tax sales to common carriers and for-

warding agents, and excuse compliance with lading bills

procedures, bar the Board from imposing sales tax on the

parts sales.?

DiscUSSION

“This case was presented to the trial court upon

stipulations of fact and oral and documentary evidence

which supplemented the stipulations. As there was no

conflict in the evidence the decisive facts are undisputed

and we are confronted with questions of law and not

bound by findings of the trial court. [Citations.]” Mole-

Richardson Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d

889, 894 [269 Ca.Rptr. 662].) (2) “When presented with

uncontradicted facts on appeal in tax matters, the appel-

lant court is free to make its own determinations. [Cita-

tion.] Our review of the legal question at issue is

undertaken independently and we are not bound by the

trial court’s determination.” (Rain Bird Sprinkler Mfg.

Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 784, 794

? Because we conclude MDC’s Aeromexico parts sales were

sales tax-exempt exports, we need not address MDC’s second

contention.

B11

[280 Cal.Rptr. 362].) Thus, in reviewing the undisputed

facts before us, we apply our independent judgment to

this legal question.

(3) “California’s Sales and Use Tax Law (.. . § 6001

et. seq.) acts as a ‘double filter designed to catch all

transactions’ involving the purchase or enjoyment of tan-

gible personal property in this state. [Citation.] The sales

tax applies only to retail sales in California. (§ 6051.)”

(Parfums-Corday, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1986) 187

Cal.App.3d 630, 634 [232 Cal.Rptr. 56], fn. omitted, italics

added.)

However, “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of

the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or

Exports, accept what may be absolutely necessary for

executing its inspection Law: and the net Produce of all

Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or

Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the [U.S.];

and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and

Controul of the Congress.” (U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 2.)

“There are exempted from the [sales] taxes imposed by

this part the gross receipts from the sale of and the

storage, use, or other consumption in this State of tang-

ible personal property the gross receipts from the sale of

which, or the storage, use, or other consumption of

which, this State is prohibited from taxing under the

Constitution or laws of the [U.S.]....” (§ 6352.) The

dispositive issue before us is whether MDC’s Aeromexico

aircraft parts sales are exports exempt from the otherwise

applicable state sales tax.

(4) Guiding our analysis, “(t]he Board correctly

urges the following propositions: the burden is on the

B12

taxpayer claiming an exemption to show entitlement to

the exemption. (.. . § 6091.) Doubt as to the applicability

of the exemption is to be resolved against the exemption.

[Citations.]” (American Hospital Supply Corp. v. State Bd. of

Equalization (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1088, 1091-1092 [215

Cal.Rptr. 744].) Those rules apply where, as here, the

taxpayer seeks a sales tax refund: “In a suit for refund of

tax, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer. [Citation.]”

(Honeywell, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1982) 128

Cal.App.3d 739, 744 [180 Cal.Rptr. 479].)

“ee

(5) Although the Board correctly argues that ” ‘stat-

utes granting exemption from taxation are strictly con-

strued to the end that such concession will not be

enlarged nor extended beyond the plain meaning of the

language employed[]’ . . . ” (Parfums-Corday, Inc. v. State

Bd. of Equalization, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 637), the

export exemption was created by the U.S. Constitution,

not state statute. The Board’s argument does not apply

because it “would fail to give to exports the liberal pro-

tection that hitherto they have received... .” (Spalding &

Bros. v. Edwards (1923) 262 U.S. 66, 70 [67 L.Ed. 865,

867-868, 43 S.Ct. 485].) With these principles in mind, we

turn to the issue.

(6) The parties correctly agree that “goods do not

cease to be part of the general mass of property in the

State, subject, as such, to its jurisdiction, and to taxation

in the usual way, until they have been shipped, or entered

with a common carrier for transportation to another

State, or have been started upon such transportation in a

continuous route or journey.” (Coe v. Errol (1886) 116 U.S.

B13

517, 527 [29 L.Ed. 715, 718-719, 6 S.Ct. 475].)3 “Under that

- test it is not enough that there is an intent to export, or a

plan which contemplates exportation, or an integrated

series of events which will end with it. [Citation.] The tax

immunity runs to the process of exportation and the

transactions and documents embraced in it. [Citations.]”

(Empresa Siderurgica v. Merced Co., supra, 337 U.S. at p. 156

[93 L.Ed. at pp. 1279-1280].)” “It is the entrance of the

articles into the export stream that marks the start of the

process of exportation. Then there is certainty that the

goods are headed for their foreign destination and will

not be delivered to domestic use. Nothing less will suf-

fice.” (Id. at p. 157 [93 L.Ed. at p. 1280].)* “[W]here an

article is manufactured and sold in one of the states for

export to a foreign country, it is free from state sales tax

under the import-export clause of the [U.S.] Constitution

if at the time title passed the certainty of the foreign

destination was plain.” (Gough Industries v. State Board of

Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 746, 749 [336 P.2d 161].) (1b)

3 Although Coe dealt with the commerce, rather than the

import-export, clause of the U.S. Constitution, “the meaning of

‘export’ is the same under” the commerce clause and the

import-export clause. (Empresa Siderurgica v. Merced Co. (1949)

337 U.S. 154, 156, fn. 2 [93 L.Ed. 1276, 1279-1280, 69 S.Ct. 995];

Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board (1946) 329 U.S. 69, 83 [9] L.Ed.

80, 93, 67 S.Ct. 156].)

4 While later cases expanded the analysis to include other

factors, at least where, as here, the tax is assessed on exported

goods and not related services, the export exemption still

applies to goods in the “export stream.” (See Washington Rev.

Dept. v. Stevedoring Assn. (1978) 435 U.S. 734, 751-761 [55

L.Ed.2d 682, 697-704, 98 S.Ct. 1388]; Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages

(1976) 423 U.S. 276, 279, 290-294 [46 L.Ed.2d 495, 506-508, 96

S.Ct. 535}.)

B14

Although the parties agree on these general principles,

they dispute whether MDC’s aircraft parts sold to

Aeromexico had entered the export stream and thus were

exempt from sales tax.

In Coe v. Errol, supra, 116 U.S. 517, the court upheld

New Hampshire’s tax on logs cut within the state and

floated downriver for eventual sale in Maine. Although

the usual practice was to bring the logs to Maine for sale,

at the time the tax was imposed, the logs were in New

Hampshire awaiting eventual but indefinite transport to

Maine and had not been sold to potential buyers or

delivered to a common carrier.

In Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, supra, 262 U.S. 66, a

Colombian company contracted with New York commis-

sion merchants to buy baseball bats and balls from a New

York baseball equipment manufacturer for export to Col-

ombia. Based on instructions from the Colombian com-

pany, the commission merchants instructed the

manufacturer to specially package the equipment for

export and deliver it to a common carrier. Upon delivery,

the common carrier gave the manufacturer a receipt

which the manufacturer sent to the commission mer-

chants in exchange for an export bill of lading. The com-

mission merchants paid the manufacturer for the

equipment. When the equipment was delivered to Col-

ombia, the Colombian company paid the merchants’ com-

mission. The court invalidated a tax previously paid by

the manufacturer under protest because the equipment

was a tax-exempt export. The court rejected the argument

that the tax should be upheld because the commission

merchants, who retained title until delivery to Colombia,

“might change their mind and retain the bats and balls

B15

for their own use. There was not the slightest probability

of any such change and it did not occur. . . . Theoretical

possibilities may be left out of account.” (Id. at p. 70 [67

L.Ed. at pp. 867-868].)

In Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, supra, 329 U.S. 69,

a California oil company contracted to sell oil to the New

Zealand government. The oil was to be delivered f.o.b. at

Los Angeles, payment to be made in London. Delivery

was to be made to a New Zealand naval tanker in Los

Angeles for delivery to New Zealand. Richfield pumped

the oil through pipelines from its California refinery to

storage tanks at a California port. When the tanker

arrived, Richfield pumped the oil from the tanks to the

ship. Richfield gave the ship’s captain a bill of lading

listing Richfield as shipper and consigning the oil to the

New Zealand government in Auckland. The tanker deliv-

ered the oil as agreed. None of the oil was used or

consumed in the U.S. When the Board assessed sales tax

on the oil, Richfield paid under protest and sued for a

refund. The California Supreme Court upheld the tax, but

the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the oil was

a tax-exempt export.

The court stated: “the certainty that the goods are

headed to sea and that the process of exportation has

Started may normally be best evidenced by the fact that

they have been delivered to a common carrier for that

purpose. But the same degree of certainty may exist

though no common carrier is involved. The present case

is an excellent illustration. The foreign purchaser fur-

nished the ship to carry the oil abroad. Delivery was

made into the hold of the vessel from the vendor’s tanks

B16

located at the dock. That delivery marked the commence-

ment of the movement of the oil abroad. It is true, as the

Supreme Court of California observed, that at the time of

the delivery the vessel was in California waters and was

not bound for its destination until it started to move from

the port. But when the oil was pumped into the hold of

the vessel, it passed into the control of a foreign pur-

chaser and there was nothing equivocal in the transaction

which created even a probability that the oil would be

diverted to domestic use. It would not be clearer that the

oil had started upon its export journey had it been deliv-

ered to a common carrier at an inland point. The means of

shipment are unimportant so long as the certainty of the

foreign destination is plain.” (Richfield Oil Corp. v. State

Board, supra, 329 U.S. at pp. 82-83 [91 L.Ed. at pp. 92-93],

fn. omitted, italics added.)

In Empresa Siderurgica v. Merced Co., supra, 337 U.S.

154, a Colombian company bought a Merced County,

California, cement plant for export to Colombia. The

buyer paid for and took title to the plant in California and

obtained an export license. The buyer hired a common

carrier to dismantle and pack the plant for shipment and

deliver the shipments to a rail carrier for delivery to the

buyer. The county assessed property taxes on the portion

of the plant remaining in the county when assessed, even

those portions already dismantled and packed for ship-

ment. No tax was assessed on the 12 percent of the plant

already shipped out of the county. The court upheld the

tax because “it is not enough that on the tax date there

was a purpose and plan to export this property. Nor is it

sufficient that in due course that plan was fully executed.

Part of the plant that is taxed was dismantled, but it had

B17

not been delivered to any carrier for export or otherwise

started on its journey on the tax date. It might still have

been diverted into the domestic market. The fact that any

such diversion would entail a breach of contract, that a

part of the plant had already started on its export journey,

that an export license had been obtained and a letter of

credit deposited in this country increases the expectation

on the tax date that exportation of the entire plant would

eventuate. But that prospect, no matter how bright, does

not start the process of exportation. On the tax date the

movement to foreign shores had neither started nor been

committed.” (Id. at p. 157 [93 L.Ed. at p. 1280].)

In Gough Industries v. State Board of Equal., supra, 51

Cal.2d 746, a California electrical products manufacturer

sold products to a Saudi Arabian oi] company for use in

Saudi Arabia. The contract and purchase order included a

required export date and special export number and spec-

ified that the goods were for export and were to be

delivered to a common carrier for special export packag-

ing and delivery to Saudi Arabia. Title passed when the

manufacture delivered the goods by truck to a packing

company in Wilmington. The packing company packed

the goods according to the buyer’s specifications and

forwarded them by truck to the port, where they were

loaded on ship and delivered to Saudi Arabia.

The court held the goods were tax-exempt exports:

“(a) the agreement of sale contemplated shipment of the

goods in export, that is, from a seller in the [U.S.] to a

buyer in a foreign country; (b) from the beginning of the

transaction, the goods were committed to go all the way

to the foreign country; (c) the movement of the goods had

actually started when the tax was sought to be imposed;

B18

and (d) the journey was continuous and unbroken by any

action or delay taken for a purpose independent of the

transportation of the goods. [{] Therefore, it is immaterial

that the goods were shipped to the packer in Wilmington

and there packed for ocean travel, such being incidental

and necessary for the safe transportation of the goods

[citation], or that there was a change in the form of

transportation from overland travel by truck to overseas

travel by ship, with incidental preparation for the latter

[citations]. [{] . . . [¥] The fundamental difference

between the Empresa case and the present one is this: In

the Empresa case, the movement of the goods sought to

be taxed had not started when the tax was imposed,

while in the present case the movement of the goods had

started on a continuous journey in foreign commer-

ce ... when the tax was imposed.” (Gough Industries v.

State Board of Equal., supra, 51 Cal.2d at pp. 749-75v.)

Applying these principles to the facts before us, we

conclude that MDC’s Aeromexico parts sales were tax-

exempt exports. Aeromexico bought the parts for mainte-

nance of its aircraft. All the documents indicated that the

parts were for export to Aeromexico’s Mexico City main-

tenance facility. Aeromexico took title in California and

only shipped the parts by truck because they were too

large and in too great a quantity to be flown to Mexico

City in its own aircraft. Aeromexico only used AM MEX

because U.S. trucks could not legally transport the parts

from Long Beach to Mexico City. AM MEX never took

' title to the goods and merely facilitated their transfer to

Mexican trucks to complete the journey. Indeed, the mini-

mal border delay would have been greater had Aeromex-

ico not used AM MEX’s specialized services. The goods

B19

were delivered into the export stream and never diverted

or delayed, other than for the border transfer without

which they could not have completed their journey.

Aeromexico had no use for the parts at the border, and

never attempted to, or did, divert the parts. All the parts

were delivered to Aeromexico’s Mexico City maintenance

facility. As in Gough, Richfield, and Spalding, and unlike in

Empresa and Coe, Aeromexico’s clear plan to ship the

parts to Mexico City for its own use was acted upon and

continued uninterrupted to completion other than for

unavoidable delays incidental to their journey.

The Board’s reliance on two additional cases is mis-

placed. In Hugo Neu Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (1970) 7

Cal.App.3d 21 [86 Cal.Rptr. 332], a Terminal Island scrap

processing company bought steel scrap from a variety of

independent suppliers who had no contractual relation-

ship with the processing company. Title passed at the

company’s plant when the company bought it from the

suppliers. The company processed the scrap into reuse-

able material and, pursuant to contract, shipped it to a

group of Japanese manufacturers. All the scrap eventu-

ally was shipped to the Japanese buyers. However, Los

Angeles County assessed Property taxes on the

unprocessed and processed scrap still on Terminal Island.

The court found the tax proper because, although the

company intended to ship the scrap to Japan, it had not

yet begun its journey. Here, the parts already were at the

border when the Board assessed the tax, and Aeromexico

could not legally have avoided the delay.

In Farmers’ Rice Cooperative v. County of Yolo (1975) 14

Cal.3d 616 [122 Cal.Rptr. 65, 536 P.2d 465], the coopera-

tive stored rice in port grain elevators while awaiting

B20

shipment to buyers. The court upheld assessment of

property taxes on such stored rice, although the coopera-

tive had contracted to sell it to Okinawan and Puerto

Rican buyers, because the rice was still in storage when

the tax was assessed. Again, in our case the parts already

were in transport at the border and briefly delayed only

for the legal necessity of transferring them to Mexican

trucks.

Thus, we conclude that MDC’s Aeromexico parts

sales were tax-exempt exports.

DisPOsITION

We reverse the judgment. The case is remanded to

the trial court with instructions that it vacate its earlier

judgment and enter judgment for MDC.

MDC is entitled to its costs on appeal.

Spencer, P.J., and Dunn, J.,* concurred.

* Judge of the Municipal Court for the Long Beach Judicial

District sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the

Judicial Council. ;

APPENDIX “C”

A ore «alae

Cl

Second Appellate District, Division One,

No. B061726 S030279

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN BANK

(Filed Feb. 11, 1993)

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION, Appellant

V.

STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF THE

STATE OF CALIF., Respondent

Respondent’s petition for review DENIED.

Mosk, J. is of the opinion the petition should be granted.

Lucas

Chief Justice

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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