Appendix — California State Board of Equalization v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.
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[No. B061726. Second Dist., Div. One. Nov. 10, 1992.]
McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION, Plaintiff and
Appellant, v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
SUMMARY
The trial court, in a sales tax refund action, ruled that
aircraft parts sold to a Mexican airline to service its
airplanes were not exports exempt from state sales taxes
(U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 2; Rev. & Tax, Code, § 6352),
and entered judgment denying the refund. The airline
received the parts at the manufacturer’s California plan
and shipped them by common carriers to the United
States-Mexican border, after which a forwarding agent
processed them through customs, the parts then being
loaded onto Mexican common carriers and shipped to a
Mexico City maintenance facility. (Superior Court of Los
Angeles county, No. C682604, Jan A. Pluim, Judge.)
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded with
instructions to vacate the judgment and enter judgment
for the taxpayer. The Court held that when an article is
manufactured and sold in one of the states for export to a
foreign country, it is free from state sales tax under the
import-export clause of the United States constitution
(U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 2) if at the time title passed the
certainty of the foreign destination was plain. Thus, the
court held, the sale of airplane parts was exempt from
taxation: all the documents indicated that the parts were
for export, the Mexican airline took title in California and
only shipped the parts by truck because they were too
large and in too great a quantity to be flown in its own
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aircraft, and the airline’s clear plan to ship the parts to
Mexico for its own use was acted on and continued
uninterrupted to completion other than for unavoidable
delays incidental to their journey. (Opinion by Ortega, J.,
with Spencer, P.J., and Dunn, J.,* concurring.)
HEADNOTES
Classified to California Digest of Official Reports
(la, 1b) Sales and Use Taxes § 17 - Sales Tax - Transac-
tions Subject to Tax - Exemptions - Foreign Com-
merce — What Constitutes Export - Export Stream. -
The trial court erred in ruling that aircraft parts sold
to a Mexican airline to service its airplanes were not
exports exempt from state sales taxes (U.S. Const.,
art. I, § 10, cl. 2; Rev. & Tax. Code, § 6352), where the
airline received the parts at the manufacturer's Cali-
fornia plan and shipped them by common carriers to
the United States-Mexican border, after which a for-
warding agent processed them through customs, the
parts then being loaded onto Mexican common car-
riers and shipped to a Mexico City maintenance facil-
ity. All the documents indicated that the parts were
for export, the Mexican airline took title in California,
and it only shipped the parts by truck because they
were to large and in too great a quantity to be flown
in its own aircraft. The airline’s clear plan to ship the
parts to Mexico for its own use was acted on and
continued uninterrupted to completion other than for
unavoidable delays incidental to their journey.
* Judge of the Municipal Court for the Long Beach Judicial
District sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the
Judicial Council.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
B3
[Property destined for, or in course of, removal
from state as subject to taxation therein, note, 11
A.L.R.2d 938. See also Cal.Jur.3d, Sales and use
Taxes, § 40;9 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed.
1989) Taxation, § 60.]
Taxpayers’ Remedies § 14 - Proceedings in Actions
to Recover Taxes Paid - Review - Questions of Law.
- When presented with uncontradicted facts on
appeal in tax matters, the appellate court is free to
make its own determinations.
Sales and Use Taxes § 3 - Nature and Purpose. -
California’s Sales and Use Tax Law (Rev. * Tax. Code,
§ 6001 et seq.) acts as a double filter designed to catch
all transactions involving the purchase or enjoyment
of tangible personal property in the state. The sales
tax applies only to retail sales in California.
Taxpayers’ Remedies § 13 - Proceedings in Actions
to Recover Taxes Paid - Evidence ~ Burden of Proof.
- The burden is one a taxpayer claiming an exemp-
tion to show entitlement to the exemption. Doubt as
to the applicability of the exemption is to be resolved
against the exemption, and those rules apply when
the taxpayer seeks a sales tax refund.
Sales and Use Taxes § 17 - Sales Tax - Exemptions -
Foreign Commerce - Construction of Statutes. —
Although statutes granting exemption from taxation
are strictly construed to the end that such concession
shall not be enlarged nor extended beyond the plain
meaning of the language employed, the rule does not
apply to the export exemption (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 6352), since it was created by the United States
Constitution, not state statute.
Sales and Use Taxes § 17 - Sales Tax - Exemptions -
Foreign Commerce - Application. — Goods do not
cease to be part of the general mass of property in the
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state subject as such to its jurisdiction and to taxation
in the usual way, until they have been shipped or
entered with a common carrier for transportation to
another state, or have been started on such transpor-
tation in a continuous route or journey. Under that
test, it is not enough that there is an intent to export,
or a plan that contemplates exportation, or an inte-
grated series of events that will end with it. The tax
immunity runs to the process of exportation and the
transactions and documents embraced in it. It is the
entrance of the articles into the export stream that
marks the start of the process of exportation. Then
there is certainty that the goods are headed for their
foreign destination and will not be diverted to
domestic use. Where an article is manufactured and
sold in one of the states for export to a foreign
country, it is free from state sales tax under the
import-export clause of the United States Constitu-
tion (U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 2) if at the time title
passed the certainty of the foreign destination was
plain.
COUNSEL
Lathan & Watkins, Albert R. Rodriguez, Robert D. Crock-
ett and Deanna W. Detchemendy for Plaintiff and Appel-
lant.
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Timothy G. Lad-
dish, Assistant Attorney General, Edmond B. Mamer and
Anthony F. Sgherzi, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Defendant and Respondent.
B5
OPINION
ORTEGA, J. -
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) sold
aircraft parts to Aeromexico, the Mexican national airline,
to service Aeromexico’s airplanes. Aeromexico received
the parts at MDC’s Long Beach plant and shipped them
by United States (U.S.) common carriers to the U.S.-
Mexican border at San Ysidro, California, where AM
MEX International, a forwarding agent, processed them
through U.S. and Mexican customs. After a 48-hour cus-
toms delay, the parts were loaded onto Mexican common
carriers and shipped to Aeromexico’s Mexico City main-
tenance facility.
Although the U.S. Constitution and the Revenue and
Taxation Code! except exports from state sales taxes,
defendant California State Board of Equalization (the
Board) assessed MDC sales tax on the parts. The Board
Claimed that the parts were not in the “export stream”
until they left the border and thus were subject to sales
tax. MDC paid the tax under protest and sued the Board
for a refund. After a court trial, the trial court entered
judgment for the Board. MDC appeals. We agree with
MDC that the parts were in the “export stream” and thus
were sales tax-exempt exports. We reverse the judgment.
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory refer-
ences are to the Revenue and Taxation Code.
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Facts
Beginning in 1968, MDC sold Aeromexico aircraft
parts to service Aeromexico’s airplanes, nearly all of
which were MDC manufactured. MDC produced nearly
all the parts at its Long Beach factory. Aeromexico’s pri-
mary service and maintenance facility was in Mexico
City. Between January 1, 1978, and December 31, 1980, the
period for which the Board assessed the disputed tax,
MDC delivered approximately 8,000 such orders, averag-
ing about 10 each working day, worth nearly $7 million,
to Aeromexico. All orders originated in Mexico, showed
Mexico City as the destination, and stated that the parts
were for export to Mexico. Aeromexico received and took
title to the parts free on board (f.o.b.) in Long Beach.
Aeromexico’s regular flights between Los Angles and
Mexico City were almost all passenger flights on small,
narrow-bodied, twin-engine DC-9 aircraft incapable of
carrying more than a small percentage of the parts. More-
over, during the relevant years, Mexican law prohibited
U.S. common carriers from operating in Mexico, and U.S.
law permitted Mexican common carriers to operate in the
U.S. only in the immediate border area.
Other than the few small items flown directly from
Los Angeles to Mexico City on Aeromexico aircraft, on
which the board did not assess sales tax, Aeromexico
shipped the parts, packaged for export, from Long Beach
on U.S. common truck carriers to the U.S.-Mexican border
a. San Ysidro. Aeromexico retained title and the U.S.
¢- \mon Carriers received possession. Separate lading
bills were prepared at Long Beach and San Ysidro.
Aeromexico had no maintenance or landing facilities at
San Ysidro, which lacked rail connections or east-west
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transportation routs. At San Ysidro, Aeromexico
employees assisted AM MEX, an independent freight for-
warder, in processing the shipments through U.S. and
Mexican customs. Aeromexico used AM MEX’s facilities,
expertise in U.S. and Mexican customs regulations and-
fees, and relationships with both countries’ customs offi-
cials. AM MEX neither took title to the shipments nor was
legally obligated to ship the parts to Mexico City. The
shipments were not opened, inspected, or repackaged.
After the approximately 48 hours required to complete
customs processing, the parts were loaded onto Mexican
common carriers and trucked to Mexico City. All the
parts arrived in Mexico City.
The Board issued Aeromexico a registration certifi-
cate as a Mexican exporter, authorizing the San Ysidro
transfers, in 1968 and continually renewed it during and
after the relevant period. The board did not assess sales
tax on the shipments until January 1, 1978. MDC collected
and paid sales tax on a small percentage of the shipments
during the relevant period because in those few cases.
Aeromexico failed to provide MDC adequate documenta-
tion of the shipping process.
On July 3, 1985, the Board assessed MDC $348,413 in
deficient sales tax and $291,476 in interest on the nearly
$7 million of MDC’s January 1, 1978, to December 31,
1980, Aeromexico parts sales. MDC paid the tax and
interest under protest, petitioned for redetermination,
and filed a refund claim. The board denied the petition
and claim. On April 8, 1988, MDC filed this case, seeking
a refund. The case was tried in the court based on the
facts alleged in the complaint, stipulated facts, and four
witnesses’ oral testimony.
| i
B8
The court found and entered judgment for the Board,
stating: “1. As to the Export/Import clause: The court
finds that the repla[c]jement parts did not enter the
stream of exportation until they left San Ysidro by Mexi-
can common carrier. As stated in . . . Farmers’ Rice [Coop-
erative v. County of Yolo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 616 (122 Cal.Rptr.
65, 536 P.2d 465)] . . . and the Administrative Code,
‘Export has not begun where property is transported
from a point in this state to a warehouse or other collect-
ing point in this state even though it is intended that the
property then he transported, and is in fact, transported
to another country.’ The Court also finds that the parts
had not started on their ‘final and continuous journey’
until they left San Ysidro. Thus, the Court concludes the
replacement parts were not in the exportation process at
the time they left [MDC] in Long Beach and were there-
fore taxable. |
“2. As to... [slection 6385: The Court finds that
[sJection 6385 . . . does not qualify the sale between [19]78
& [19]81 as an exempt sale to a common carrier. The
parts . . . were shipped by UPS or a US common carrier
from Long Beach to San Ysidro and not by a facility of the
purchasing carrier Aeromexico, as required by Sales and
[Use] Tax Regulation 1621. Further, the parts were not
shipped to an out-of-state destination. In January of 1980,
[s]ection 6385 was amended by adding subsection (b).
Said subsection is not helpful to [MDC] because
Aeromexico did not transport the parts itself. They were
transported either by U.S. common carrier or Mexican
common Carriers.
“3. As to... [s]ection 6387: [s]ection 6387 is not
applicable here because the evidence does not support
BS
the fact that Aeromexico is a ‘forwarding agent, export
packer, or other person engaged in the business of pre-
paring goods for export or arranging for their exporta-
tion’. Also Annotation 325.1500 of the Business Taxes Law
Guide holds that ‘where an export packer is also a pur-
chaser the exemption of [section] 6387 does not apply.’
“In making the above findings the Court considered
the following facts: [{] 1. Bills of Lading were issued not
just in Long Beach, but also in San Ysidro. [{] 2. The
invoices show that the parts were to be shipped within-
. . . California by common USS. carriers. [{] 3. Once the
parts left Long Beach, [MDC] lost control over the pagts.
[1] 4. The parts were shipped from [MDC] to pom.
i{n] San Ysidro, CA. [{] 5. Some of the invoices reflected
that sales tax was billed to Aeromexico by [MDC]. [4] 6.
There was no evidence presented that the seller and
purchaser agreed that a particular form of transportation
was to take place between San Ysidro and Mexico City. In
fact there was no contract between Am-Mex . . . and
Aeromexico to deliver the parts to Mexico City. [{] 7.
There was no evidence showing that at the time of the
purchase, other than delivery to San Ysidro, that a date of
exportation was contemplated to and agreed upon by
purchaser and seller. [{] 8. Unlike . . . Gough [Industries v.
State Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 746 (336-p.2d
161)] . . . there was no exportation number received for
the parts. [{] 9. All customs arrangements for importing
into Mexico were made after shipment had been made to
San Ysidro.”
B10
ISSUES
(la) MDC contends the trial court erred because the
Aeromexico parts sales were in the “export stream” and
thus were sales tax-exempt exports under the import-
export clause of the U.S. Constitution and section 6352.
/MDC also contends sections 6385 and 6387 and Califor-
nia Code of Regulations, title 18, section 1621, which
exempt from sales tax sales to common carriers and for-
warding agents, and excuse compliance with lading bills
procedures, bar the Board from imposing sales tax on the
parts sales.?
DiscUSSION
“This case was presented to the trial court upon
stipulations of fact and oral and documentary evidence
which supplemented the stipulations. As there was no
conflict in the evidence the decisive facts are undisputed
and we are confronted with questions of law and not
bound by findings of the trial court. [Citations.]” Mole-
Richardson Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d
889, 894 [269 Ca.Rptr. 662].) (2) “When presented with
uncontradicted facts on appeal in tax matters, the appel-
lant court is free to make its own determinations. [Cita-
tion.] Our review of the legal question at issue is
undertaken independently and we are not bound by the
trial court’s determination.” (Rain Bird Sprinkler Mfg.
Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 784, 794
? Because we conclude MDC’s Aeromexico parts sales were
sales tax-exempt exports, we need not address MDC’s second
contention.
B11
[280 Cal.Rptr. 362].) Thus, in reviewing the undisputed
facts before us, we apply our independent judgment to
this legal question.
(3) “California’s Sales and Use Tax Law (.. . § 6001
et. seq.) acts as a ‘double filter designed to catch all
transactions’ involving the purchase or enjoyment of tan-
gible personal property in this state. [Citation.] The sales
tax applies only to retail sales in California. (§ 6051.)”
(Parfums-Corday, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1986) 187
Cal.App.3d 630, 634 [232 Cal.Rptr. 56], fn. omitted, italics
added.)
However, “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of
the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or
Exports, accept what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection Law: and the net Produce of all
Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or
Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the [U.S.];
and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and
Controul of the Congress.” (U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 2.)
“There are exempted from the [sales] taxes imposed by
this part the gross receipts from the sale of and the
storage, use, or other consumption in this State of tang-
ible personal property the gross receipts from the sale of
which, or the storage, use, or other consumption of
which, this State is prohibited from taxing under the
Constitution or laws of the [U.S.]....” (§ 6352.) The
dispositive issue before us is whether MDC’s Aeromexico
aircraft parts sales are exports exempt from the otherwise
applicable state sales tax.
(4) Guiding our analysis, “(t]he Board correctly
urges the following propositions: the burden is on the
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taxpayer claiming an exemption to show entitlement to
the exemption. (.. . § 6091.) Doubt as to the applicability
of the exemption is to be resolved against the exemption.
[Citations.]” (American Hospital Supply Corp. v. State Bd. of
Equalization (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1088, 1091-1092 [215
Cal.Rptr. 744].) Those rules apply where, as here, the
taxpayer seeks a sales tax refund: “In a suit for refund of
tax, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer. [Citation.]”
(Honeywell, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1982) 128
Cal.App.3d 739, 744 [180 Cal.Rptr. 479].)
“ee
(5) Although the Board correctly argues that ” ‘stat-
utes granting exemption from taxation are strictly con-
strued to the end that such concession will not be
enlarged nor extended beyond the plain meaning of the
language employed[]’ . . . ” (Parfums-Corday, Inc. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 637), the
export exemption was created by the U.S. Constitution,
not state statute. The Board’s argument does not apply
because it “would fail to give to exports the liberal pro-
tection that hitherto they have received... .” (Spalding &
Bros. v. Edwards (1923) 262 U.S. 66, 70 [67 L.Ed. 865,
867-868, 43 S.Ct. 485].) With these principles in mind, we
turn to the issue.
(6) The parties correctly agree that “goods do not
cease to be part of the general mass of property in the
State, subject, as such, to its jurisdiction, and to taxation
in the usual way, until they have been shipped, or entered
with a common carrier for transportation to another
State, or have been started upon such transportation in a
continuous route or journey.” (Coe v. Errol (1886) 116 U.S.
B13
517, 527 [29 L.Ed. 715, 718-719, 6 S.Ct. 475].)3 “Under that
- test it is not enough that there is an intent to export, or a
plan which contemplates exportation, or an integrated
series of events which will end with it. [Citation.] The tax
immunity runs to the process of exportation and the
transactions and documents embraced in it. [Citations.]”
(Empresa Siderurgica v. Merced Co., supra, 337 U.S. at p. 156
[93 L.Ed. at pp. 1279-1280].)” “It is the entrance of the
articles into the export stream that marks the start of the
process of exportation. Then there is certainty that the
goods are headed for their foreign destination and will
not be delivered to domestic use. Nothing less will suf-
fice.” (Id. at p. 157 [93 L.Ed. at p. 1280].)* “[W]here an
article is manufactured and sold in one of the states for
export to a foreign country, it is free from state sales tax
under the import-export clause of the [U.S.] Constitution
if at the time title passed the certainty of the foreign
destination was plain.” (Gough Industries v. State Board of
Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 746, 749 [336 P.2d 161].) (1b)
3 Although Coe dealt with the commerce, rather than the
import-export, clause of the U.S. Constitution, “the meaning of
‘export’ is the same under” the commerce clause and the
import-export clause. (Empresa Siderurgica v. Merced Co. (1949)
337 U.S. 154, 156, fn. 2 [93 L.Ed. 1276, 1279-1280, 69 S.Ct. 995];
Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board (1946) 329 U.S. 69, 83 [9] L.Ed.
80, 93, 67 S.Ct. 156].)
4 While later cases expanded the analysis to include other
factors, at least where, as here, the tax is assessed on exported
goods and not related services, the export exemption still
applies to goods in the “export stream.” (See Washington Rev.
Dept. v. Stevedoring Assn. (1978) 435 U.S. 734, 751-761 [55
L.Ed.2d 682, 697-704, 98 S.Ct. 1388]; Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages
(1976) 423 U.S. 276, 279, 290-294 [46 L.Ed.2d 495, 506-508, 96
S.Ct. 535}.)
B14
Although the parties agree on these general principles,
they dispute whether MDC’s aircraft parts sold to
Aeromexico had entered the export stream and thus were
exempt from sales tax.
In Coe v. Errol, supra, 116 U.S. 517, the court upheld
New Hampshire’s tax on logs cut within the state and
floated downriver for eventual sale in Maine. Although
the usual practice was to bring the logs to Maine for sale,
at the time the tax was imposed, the logs were in New
Hampshire awaiting eventual but indefinite transport to
Maine and had not been sold to potential buyers or
delivered to a common carrier.
In Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, supra, 262 U.S. 66, a
Colombian company contracted with New York commis-
sion merchants to buy baseball bats and balls from a New
York baseball equipment manufacturer for export to Col-
ombia. Based on instructions from the Colombian com-
pany, the commission merchants instructed the
manufacturer to specially package the equipment for
export and deliver it to a common carrier. Upon delivery,
the common carrier gave the manufacturer a receipt
which the manufacturer sent to the commission mer-
chants in exchange for an export bill of lading. The com-
mission merchants paid the manufacturer for the
equipment. When the equipment was delivered to Col-
ombia, the Colombian company paid the merchants’ com-
mission. The court invalidated a tax previously paid by
the manufacturer under protest because the equipment
was a tax-exempt export. The court rejected the argument
that the tax should be upheld because the commission
merchants, who retained title until delivery to Colombia,
“might change their mind and retain the bats and balls
B15
for their own use. There was not the slightest probability
of any such change and it did not occur. . . . Theoretical
possibilities may be left out of account.” (Id. at p. 70 [67
L.Ed. at pp. 867-868].)
In Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, supra, 329 U.S. 69,
a California oil company contracted to sell oil to the New
Zealand government. The oil was to be delivered f.o.b. at
Los Angeles, payment to be made in London. Delivery
was to be made to a New Zealand naval tanker in Los
Angeles for delivery to New Zealand. Richfield pumped
the oil through pipelines from its California refinery to
storage tanks at a California port. When the tanker
arrived, Richfield pumped the oil from the tanks to the
ship. Richfield gave the ship’s captain a bill of lading
listing Richfield as shipper and consigning the oil to the
New Zealand government in Auckland. The tanker deliv-
ered the oil as agreed. None of the oil was used or
consumed in the U.S. When the Board assessed sales tax
on the oil, Richfield paid under protest and sued for a
refund. The California Supreme Court upheld the tax, but
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the oil was
a tax-exempt export.
The court stated: “the certainty that the goods are
headed to sea and that the process of exportation has
Started may normally be best evidenced by the fact that
they have been delivered to a common carrier for that
purpose. But the same degree of certainty may exist
though no common carrier is involved. The present case
is an excellent illustration. The foreign purchaser fur-
nished the ship to carry the oil abroad. Delivery was
made into the hold of the vessel from the vendor’s tanks
B16
located at the dock. That delivery marked the commence-
ment of the movement of the oil abroad. It is true, as the
Supreme Court of California observed, that at the time of
the delivery the vessel was in California waters and was
not bound for its destination until it started to move from
the port. But when the oil was pumped into the hold of
the vessel, it passed into the control of a foreign pur-
chaser and there was nothing equivocal in the transaction
which created even a probability that the oil would be
diverted to domestic use. It would not be clearer that the
oil had started upon its export journey had it been deliv-
ered to a common carrier at an inland point. The means of
shipment are unimportant so long as the certainty of the
foreign destination is plain.” (Richfield Oil Corp. v. State
Board, supra, 329 U.S. at pp. 82-83 [91 L.Ed. at pp. 92-93],
fn. omitted, italics added.)
In Empresa Siderurgica v. Merced Co., supra, 337 U.S.
154, a Colombian company bought a Merced County,
California, cement plant for export to Colombia. The
buyer paid for and took title to the plant in California and
obtained an export license. The buyer hired a common
carrier to dismantle and pack the plant for shipment and
deliver the shipments to a rail carrier for delivery to the
buyer. The county assessed property taxes on the portion
of the plant remaining in the county when assessed, even
those portions already dismantled and packed for ship-
ment. No tax was assessed on the 12 percent of the plant
already shipped out of the county. The court upheld the
tax because “it is not enough that on the tax date there
was a purpose and plan to export this property. Nor is it
sufficient that in due course that plan was fully executed.
Part of the plant that is taxed was dismantled, but it had
B17
not been delivered to any carrier for export or otherwise
started on its journey on the tax date. It might still have
been diverted into the domestic market. The fact that any
such diversion would entail a breach of contract, that a
part of the plant had already started on its export journey,
that an export license had been obtained and a letter of
credit deposited in this country increases the expectation
on the tax date that exportation of the entire plant would
eventuate. But that prospect, no matter how bright, does
not start the process of exportation. On the tax date the
movement to foreign shores had neither started nor been
committed.” (Id. at p. 157 [93 L.Ed. at p. 1280].)
In Gough Industries v. State Board of Equal., supra, 51
Cal.2d 746, a California electrical products manufacturer
sold products to a Saudi Arabian oi] company for use in
Saudi Arabia. The contract and purchase order included a
required export date and special export number and spec-
ified that the goods were for export and were to be
delivered to a common carrier for special export packag-
ing and delivery to Saudi Arabia. Title passed when the
manufacture delivered the goods by truck to a packing
company in Wilmington. The packing company packed
the goods according to the buyer’s specifications and
forwarded them by truck to the port, where they were
loaded on ship and delivered to Saudi Arabia.
The court held the goods were tax-exempt exports:
“(a) the agreement of sale contemplated shipment of the
goods in export, that is, from a seller in the [U.S.] to a
buyer in a foreign country; (b) from the beginning of the
transaction, the goods were committed to go all the way
to the foreign country; (c) the movement of the goods had
actually started when the tax was sought to be imposed;
B18
and (d) the journey was continuous and unbroken by any
action or delay taken for a purpose independent of the
transportation of the goods. [{] Therefore, it is immaterial
that the goods were shipped to the packer in Wilmington
and there packed for ocean travel, such being incidental
and necessary for the safe transportation of the goods
[citation], or that there was a change in the form of
transportation from overland travel by truck to overseas
travel by ship, with incidental preparation for the latter
[citations]. [{] . . . [¥] The fundamental difference
between the Empresa case and the present one is this: In
the Empresa case, the movement of the goods sought to
be taxed had not started when the tax was imposed,
while in the present case the movement of the goods had
started on a continuous journey in foreign commer-
ce ... when the tax was imposed.” (Gough Industries v.
State Board of Equal., supra, 51 Cal.2d at pp. 749-75v.)
Applying these principles to the facts before us, we
conclude that MDC’s Aeromexico parts sales were tax-
exempt exports. Aeromexico bought the parts for mainte-
nance of its aircraft. All the documents indicated that the
parts were for export to Aeromexico’s Mexico City main-
tenance facility. Aeromexico took title in California and
only shipped the parts by truck because they were too
large and in too great a quantity to be flown to Mexico
City in its own aircraft. Aeromexico only used AM MEX
because U.S. trucks could not legally transport the parts
from Long Beach to Mexico City. AM MEX never took
' title to the goods and merely facilitated their transfer to
Mexican trucks to complete the journey. Indeed, the mini-
mal border delay would have been greater had Aeromex-
ico not used AM MEX’s specialized services. The goods
B19
were delivered into the export stream and never diverted
or delayed, other than for the border transfer without
which they could not have completed their journey.
Aeromexico had no use for the parts at the border, and
never attempted to, or did, divert the parts. All the parts
were delivered to Aeromexico’s Mexico City maintenance
facility. As in Gough, Richfield, and Spalding, and unlike in
Empresa and Coe, Aeromexico’s clear plan to ship the
parts to Mexico City for its own use was acted upon and
continued uninterrupted to completion other than for
unavoidable delays incidental to their journey.
The Board’s reliance on two additional cases is mis-
placed. In Hugo Neu Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (1970) 7
Cal.App.3d 21 [86 Cal.Rptr. 332], a Terminal Island scrap
processing company bought steel scrap from a variety of
independent suppliers who had no contractual relation-
ship with the processing company. Title passed at the
company’s plant when the company bought it from the
suppliers. The company processed the scrap into reuse-
able material and, pursuant to contract, shipped it to a
group of Japanese manufacturers. All the scrap eventu-
ally was shipped to the Japanese buyers. However, Los
Angeles County assessed Property taxes on the
unprocessed and processed scrap still on Terminal Island.
The court found the tax proper because, although the
company intended to ship the scrap to Japan, it had not
yet begun its journey. Here, the parts already were at the
border when the Board assessed the tax, and Aeromexico
could not legally have avoided the delay.
In Farmers’ Rice Cooperative v. County of Yolo (1975) 14
Cal.3d 616 [122 Cal.Rptr. 65, 536 P.2d 465], the coopera-
tive stored rice in port grain elevators while awaiting
B20
shipment to buyers. The court upheld assessment of
property taxes on such stored rice, although the coopera-
tive had contracted to sell it to Okinawan and Puerto
Rican buyers, because the rice was still in storage when
the tax was assessed. Again, in our case the parts already
were in transport at the border and briefly delayed only
for the legal necessity of transferring them to Mexican
trucks.
Thus, we conclude that MDC’s Aeromexico parts
sales were tax-exempt exports.
DisPOsITION
We reverse the judgment. The case is remanded to
the trial court with instructions that it vacate its earlier
judgment and enter judgment for MDC.
MDC is entitled to its costs on appeal.
Spencer, P.J., and Dunn, J.,* concurred.
* Judge of the Municipal Court for the Long Beach Judicial
District sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the
Judicial Council. ;
APPENDIX “C”
A ore «alae
Cl
Second Appellate District, Division One,
No. B061726 S030279
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN BANK
(Filed Feb. 11, 1993)
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION, Appellant
V.
STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF THE
STATE OF CALIF., Respondent
Respondent’s petition for review DENIED.
Mosk, J. is of the opinion the petition should be granted.
Lucas
Chief Justice
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