Transcript of Record — Lochner v. New York

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1904.

No. 292.

JOSEPH LOCHNER, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,

vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

IN ERROR TO THE COUNTY COURT OF ONEIDA COUNTY, STATE OF

NEW YORK.

INDEX

Original. Print.

Remittitur from court of appeals ...........--...-22+ sees kak a 1

Appeal book on appeal to court of appeals. ......... ..... <sAk d 2

IRRRMRORE. oo acc ceccccovesacnverccces seeserevesd ses icssatsse 1 2

SNE, sink 5b Gecth dd bDKASS bbb obs ee CReNeSSOSS Shah 2 2

SPE PTT er et TTT TPT te ee 3 3

Order disallowing demurrer ............. AKbon baceutantane es 4 4

Judgment of conviction... .............0--eeeee eee vat senee’s 5 4

Certificate of reasonable doubt .............. peusaa po veusen 6 5

Notice of appeal to appellate division ............ (pabuceeedss 7 5

Stipulation as to record ..... T hkd shy oa badh TAMER SORRAARA SPOS 8 &

Affidavit of no opinion. .......-.....-..4+ eee Sabo naae oak 8 6

Certificate of clerk of appellate division » inshci be keaseebneacad 4 7

Order of affirmance in appellate division...............-..... 10 7

Judgment in appellate division ...........-..... Sbxca Gans eee ll 7

Certificate of clerk of appellate division ................ QUAws 12° 8

Notice of appeal to court of appeals....... kates ey a 12 8

CGonthRodbe WG WOONTE visi. sas scence conte crete ncdcsceseeseunh. 13 9

Opinion of appellate division...... Oddo dene iva sdsdeaeneearvres 14 9

Certificate to appeal book ........... (Ska bx ba cee hn wash eae teen 25 16

Jupp & DerweiLer, Printers, Wasuincton, D. C., January 7, 1905,

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Il INDEX.

Originai, Print

Opinion of court of appeals, Parker, C.J ...........05 cee eeeees : 26 16

Gray, J. (concurring)................ ad 29

Vann, J. (concurring) .............0. 47 31

O’Brien, J. (dissenting). ............. 53 35

Bartlett, J. (dissenting) .............. 66 44

Order for judgment upon remittitur.............2... cece eeeceee i. a 46

EIS SEI ECS Pet Sa ee pee ey eee re | 47

Order allowing writ of error...... athe hte tinea ea ante cae-aan ears 73 48

PEE WINER IOE- GUM, cic cas oa ei cckve cibsecreb abides ese wee 74 49

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JOSEPH LOCHNER VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 1

a ; Court of Appeals.

Strate oF New YoOrK, 88:

Pleas in the court of appeals held at the capitol, in the city of Al-

bany,on the 12th day of January, in the year of our Lord one

thousand nine hundred and four, before the judges of said court.

Witness, the Hon. Alton B. Parker, chief judge, presiding.

W. H. SHANKLAND, Clerk.

Remittitur, January 13th, 1904.

THE PEOPLE, ETC., Resp’d’t,

ag’ st

Josepn Locaner, App’!’nt.

Be it remembered, that on the second day of December, in the

year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and two, Joseph Loch-

ner, the appellant in this action, came here into the court of

b appeals, by Lindsley & Mackie, his attorneys, and filed in the

said court a notice of appeal and return thereto from the

judgment of the appellate division of the supreme court in and for

the fourth judicial department. And The People of the State of

New York, the respondent in said action, afterward appeared iv said

court of appeals by Timothy Curtin, district attorney, its attorney.

Which said notice of appeal and the return thereto filed as afore-

said, are hereunto annexed.

Whereupon, the said court of appeals having heard this cause

argued by Messrs. William S. Mackie and Smith M. Lindsley, of

counsel for the appellant, and by Mr. ‘Timothy Curtin, district at-

torney, of counsel for the respondent, and after due deliberation had

thereon, did order and adjudge that the judgment of conviction ap-

pealed from herein be aud the same hereby is affirmed.

And it was also further ordered, that the record aforesaid, and the

proceedings in this court, be remitted to the Oneida county court,

there to be proceeded upon according to law. Therefore, it is con-

sidered that the said judgment conviction be affirmed, as aforesaid.

And hereupon, as well as the notice of appeal and return thereto

aforesaid as the judgment of the court of appeals aforesaid, by them

given in the premises, are by the said court of appeals remitted into

the Oneida county court before the judge thereof, according to the

form of the statute in such case made and provided, to be en-

c forced according to law, and which record now remains in the

said Oneida county court before the judge thereof, &c.

W. H. SHANKLAND,

Clerk of the Court of Appeals of the

State of New York.

JOSEPH LOCHNER VS.

Court of Appeals, Clerk’s Office.

ALBANY, January 13th, 1904.

I hereby certify that the preceding record contains a correct

transcript of the proceedings in said action in the court of appeals,

with the papers originally filed therein attached thereto.

[sEaL.] W. H. SHANKLAND, Clerk.

d Court of Appeals.

Tue Propte or THE State or New York, Respondent,

v8.

JosePpH Locaner, Appellant. !

Appeal Book.

Timothy Curtin, district attorney for respondent, Rome, N. Y.

Lindsley & Mackie, attorneys for appellant, Utica, N. Y.

Filed April 4, 1904, in Oneida Co. clerk’s office.

1 Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Toe Prope oF THE State or New York, sad

spondent, Statement.

vs.

JosepH Locunxr, Appellant.

Defendant was indicted for misdemeanor, second offence, to wit :

violation of article VIII, section 110, of chap. 415, Laws of 1897,

known as the labor law, in requiring and permitting an employee

working for him in his bakery to work more than sixty hours in

one week. Indictment was sent to Oneida county court from the

trial term of the supreme court, held at Rome, N. Y., in October,

1901, at which term defendant interposed demurrer. November

11th, 1901, in Oneida county court, demurrer to indictment argued.

February 3rd, 1902, order disallowing demurrerentered. February

12th, 1902, defendant arraigned in Oneida county court and refused

to plead. Judgment of conviction thereupon entered. County judge

of Oneida county granted certificate of reasonable doubt and defend-

ant served notice of appeal.

2 Supreme Court, Oneida County.

Tue Preopie or THe State oF New YorkK

against Indictment.

JosepH LOCHNER.

The grand jury of the county of Oneida, by this indictment, ac-

cuse Joseph Lochner of thecrime of misdemeanor, second offence,

—

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

3

to wit: with the violation of article VIII, section 110, of chapter

415 of the Laws of 1897, known as the labor laws of the State of

New York, and the said defendant wrongfully and unlawfully re-

uired and permitted an employee working for him in his biscuit,

bread and cake bakery and confectionery establishment, at the city

of Utica, in this county, to work more than sixty hours in one week,

committed as follows:

That the said Joseph Lochner on the 21st day of December, one

thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine, after having been duly

arrested upon the complaint of Frank Couverette, charged with

violation of article VIII of the said labor law, in permitting his em-

loyees to work more than sixty hours in one week, plead guilty

to the charge in and at the city court of Utica, a court of competent

jurisdiction, and was sentenced to pay a fine of twenty dollars, or in

default thereof, to stand committed for twenty days in the Oneida

county jail, and the said defendant paid his said fine of twenty doi- &

lars. That the said defendant after such conviction upon his plea

of guilty, wrongfully, unlawfuliy and knowingly, with the intent on

his part to violate the law, permitted and required one Aman

Schmitter, an employee in his employ, to work more than sixty hours

in one week, during the week commencing April 19th and

3 ending April 26th, one thousand nine hundred and one, at

his biscuit, bread and cake bakery and confectionery estab-

lishment situated at numbers 82-84 Soutia street, in the city of Utica,

this county, and thereby committing the crime of misdemeanor,

second offense.

Contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and pro-

vided, and against the peace of the People of the State of New York,

and their dignity.

TIMOTHY CURTIN,

District Attorney of Oneida County.

Endorsed : “ A true bill.”

SAMUEL R. WRIGHT, Foreman.

Supreme Court, Oneida County.

Tue PEopLe oF THE State or New YorK

against Demurrer.

JosePH LocHNER.

The defendant Joseph Lochner, above named, demurs to the in-

dictment presented by the last grand jury on the 22nd day of Octo-

ber, 1901, charging him with the crime of misdemeanor, second of-

fense, to wit: with the violation of article VIII, section 110, of

chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897, known as the labor laws of the

State of New York, on the following grounds:

First. That more than one crime is charged in the indictment,

4 JOSEPH LOCHNER VS.

within the meaning of section 278 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

of the State of New York.

4 Second. That more thau one crime is charged in the indiet-

ment, within the meaning of section 279 of the Code of Crim-

inal Procedure of the State of New York.

Third. That the facts stated do not constitute a crime.

Wherefore this defendant asks judgment of the court that he be

dismissed and discharged from the said premises specified in said

indictment.

Dated October 30, 1901.

WILLIAM S. MACKIE,

Attorney for Defendant.

Office and postoffice address, 115 Genesee St., Utica, N.Y.

At a term of the county court, held in and for the county of

Oneida, at the court house in the city of Rome, N. Y., November 11,

1901.

Present: Hon. Watson 'T. Dunmore, justice presiding.

Supreme Court, Oneida County.

Order Disallowing

against

g4 Demurrer.

THe PeopLe oF THE Strate or New York

JosePH LOCHNER.

A demurrer to the indictment having been interposed by the de-

fendant through his counsel, William S. Mackie, and

5 After hearing William S. Mackie, attorney for the said de-

fendant, in favor of such demurrer, and Timothy Curtin,

district attorney, in opposition thereto, *

Ordered, that the said demurrer be and the same is hereby over-

ruled and disallowed. Defendant may plead upon the first day of

the February, 1902 term of this court, at 2 o’clock p. m.

Enter

W. T. DUNMORE,

Oneida County Judge.

At a trial term of the county court held at the court house, in the

city of Utica, in and for the county of Oneida, commencing on Mon-

day, the 10th day of February, 1902.

Before Hon. W. T. Dunmore, Oneida county judge, presiding.

Tue PrEorie )

v8.

JosEPH LOCHNER.

Defendant, indicted for the crime of misdemeanor, second offense,

to wit: with the violation of article VIII, section 110, of chap. 415,

of the Laws of 1897, know as the labor laws of the State of New

Judgment of Conviction, etc.

—

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 5

York, and the defendant having refused to plead, and having been

thereupon duly convicted of misdemeanor second offense, is this

12th day of February, 1902, sentenced to pay a fine of $50 and to

stand committed until paid, not to exceed 50 days in the Oneida

county jail. Bail allowed in the sum of $50 and bond filed.

6 State oF New gga

Oneida County,

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of said

court kept by me as clerk thereof. Witness the seal of said

[u. s.] court, at the city of Utica, this 20th day of February, 1902.

JOSEPH PORTER, Clerk.

Oneida County Court.

Certificate of Rea-

- sonable Doubt.

Tue PEOPLE OF THE Strate oF New York

JosePH LOCHNER.

The defendant above named, having duly made application in

open court and during the term at which he was convicted, for a

certificate of reasonable doubt as to whether or not the judgment

of this court should stand, and after hearing William S. Mackie,

counsel for said defendant, and Hon. Timcthy Curtin, district at-

torney of Oneida county.

I, the undersigned, county judge of Oneida county, the judge

holding the term at which said defendant was convicted, do hereby

certify, that in my opinion, there is reasonable doubt whether the

judgment of conviction against the defendant above named for the

crime of misdemeanor, second offense, in requiring and permitting

an employee, working for him in his buscuit, bread and cake bakery

and confectionery establishment at Utica, N. Y., to work more than

sixty hours in one week, rendered in the Oneida county

7 court held at Utica, in and for the county of Oneida, N. Y.,

on the 12th day of February, 1902, should stand.

Dated February 12, 1902.

W. T. DUNMORE,

Oneida Co. Judge.

Oneida County Court.

THE PEOPLE oF THE SratE oF New York

v8. } Notice of Appeal.

JosePH LOcHNER.

Take notice, that the defendant above named, appeals to the ap-

pellate division of the supreme court from judgment of conviction

of the crime of misdemeanor, second offense, in requiring and per-

6 JOSEPH LOCHNER Vs.

mitting av employee working for him in his biscuit, bread and cake

and confectionery establishment at Utica, N. Y., to work

more than sixty hours in one week, rendered against him by the

ida county court at a term thereof, held at Utica, in and for the

county of Oneida, on the 12th day of February, 1902.

Dated February 12, 1902.

Yours, etc., WILLIAM 8S. MACKIE,

Attorney for Defendant, 115 Genesee Street, Utica, N. Y.

To the clerk of the county of Oneida and te Hon. Timothy Cur-

tin, district attorney of Oneida county.

8 Oneida County Court.

Tue Peorie or THe Stare or New York

v8.

JoserpH LocHNER.

It is hereby stipulated that the foregoing indictment, demurrer,

order disallowing demurrer, judgment of conviction, certificate of

reasonable doubt, and notice of appeal, are true copies of the origi-

nals aud the whole thereof on file in Oneida county clerk’s office,

and a certification of said papers by the clerk of Oneida county

is hereby waived.

Dated February 26, 1902.

\ Stipulation.

TIMOTHY CURTIN,

District Attorney

WILLIAM 8. MACKIE,

Attorney for Defendant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Tue Preopre or THE State or New York,

Respondent, Affidavit No Opinion.

vs.

Josern Locuyer, Appellant.

Onerpa County, 88:

William S. Mackie, being duly sworn, says that he is the

9 attorney for the defendant and appellant above named ; that

no opinion was given in the court below upon disallowing

the defendant’s demurrer herein, nor upon the judgment of con-

viction.

WILLIAM 8. MACKIE.

Sworn to before me Feb. 24th, 1902.

L. N. SOUTHWORTH,

Notary Public, Oneida Co., N. Y.

‘Tite PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. ?

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department,

erk’s Office, Rochester, N. Y.

I, Newell C. Fulton, clerk of the appellate division of the supreme

court in the fourth judicial department, do hereby certify that the

following is a copy of the order made by the said court upon the

appeal in the above entitled actiou or proceeding, and entered in

my office on the 13th day of May, 1902, and that the original case

or papers upon which said appeal was heard are hereunto annexed.

in witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the

seal of the said court, at the city of Rochester, this 16th day of May,

. 1902.

[smat.] NEWELL C. FULTON, Clerk.

10 At a term of the appellate division of the supreme court,

held in and for the fourth judicial department, atthe city of

Rochester, on the 13th day of May, 1902.

Present: Honorable Peter B. lana: senior associate judge,

residing. Honorable Alfred Spring, Honorable Pardon C. Wil-

iams, Honorable Frank H. Hiscock, Honorable Johu M. Davy, as-

sociate justices.

Tre Psopxe, Respondent,

- Order of Affirmance on Appeal from

JosepH Locuner, Appellant,

Judgment.

The above named defendant and — in this action having

appealed to the appellate division of the supreme court from a judg-

ment of conviction of the county court of Oneida county, and en-

tered in the clerk’s office of the county of Oneida, on the 12th day

of February, 1902, and the said appeal having been 4 Er by Mr.

William S. Mackie, of counsel for the appellant, and Mr. Timothy

Curtin, of counsel for the respondent, and due deliberation having

nit he sat red and adjudged the jud led

It is hereby ordered and adju that the judgment so a

from be, and the same is benker affirmed, aad case remit Ao the

county court of Oneida county, pursuant to section 547 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure. Opinion by Davy, J., Spring and Hiscock,

JJ., concurring ; McLennan and Williams, JJ., dissenting.

[seat.] NEWELL C. FULTON, Clerk.

11 Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Toe ProrpLe OF THE a or New York, Re-

spondent,

eguine | nto

Joszpx Locuner, Appellant.

The above named defendant, Joseph Lochner, having appealed to

the appellate division of the supreme court, fourth department,

§ JosePH LOCHNER v8.

from a judgment of conviction for the crime of misdemeanor, to wit:

“ violation of article VIII, section 110 of chapter 415 of the Laws of

1897, known as the labor laws of the State of New York,” hereto-

fore rendered against him in the Oneida county court, and entered

in the clerk’s offiee of the county of Oneida on the 12th day of Feb-

ruary, 1902, adjudging the defendant guilty of the crime charged

- in the indictment and sentencing him to pay a fine of fifty dollars

and that he stand committed until paid not to exceed fifty days in

the Oneida county jail, and the said spree! having been duly heard

at a term of the appellate division of the supreme court for the

fourth department, and an order of said appellate division havin

been thereafter and on the 13th day of May, 1902, duly made an

entered in the office of the clerk of the said appellate division, order-

ing and adjudging that the judgment of conviction here appealed

from be aftirmed.

Now, on motion of Timothy Curtin, district attorney of Oneida

county, it is hereby adjudged and determined that the judgment

. oe here appealed from be, and the same is hereby, af-

rmed.

[seaL. ] NEWELL C. FULTON, Clerk.

12 Supreme Court, ey Division, Fourth Judicial Depart-

ment, Clerk’s Office, Rochester, N. Y.

I, Newell C. Fulton, clerk of the appellate division of the supreme

court, in the fourth judicial department, do hereby certify that the

annexed judgment is a true copy of the original now on file in this

office, and of the whole thereof.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the

seal of the said court at the city of Rochester, this 3d day of Oc-

tober, 1902.

[SmAL. ] NEWELL C. FULTON, Clerk.

Oneida County Court.

—

Tae Propie or THE State ory New York,

Respondent, | Notice of Appeal to

vs. j Court of Appeals.

JoserH Locuner, Appellant.

GENTLEMEN: Take notice that the defendant, Joseph Lochner,

above named, appeals to the court of appeals from the order of af-

firmance and the judgment of the apuel ate division, fourth depart-

ment, dated May 13, 1902, and entered in Oneida county clerk’s

office October 8th, 1902, affirming the judgment of conviction of the

crime of misdemeanor, to wit: violation of article VIII, section 110

of chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897, known as the labor laws of the

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 9

State of New York, in requiring and permitting an employee

18 working for him in his biscuit, bread and cake bakery and con-

fectionery establishment at Utica, N. Y., to work more than

sixty hours in one week, rendered against him by the Oneida county

court, at a term thereof held at Utica, N. Y.,in and for the county

of Oneida, on the 12th day of February, 1902.

Yours, &c., LINDSLEY & MACKIE,

Attorneys for Defendant, 115 Genesee Street,

Utica, N. Y.

Dated November 24, 1902.

.To the clerk of the county of Oneida, and to Hon. Timothy

Curtin, district attorney of Oneida county.

Certificate.

Srate oF New Aaa rae

Oneida County, :

I, George D. Frank, acting clerk of Oneida county, do hereby

certify that the foregoing are true copies of the original judgment

roll on affirmance by the appellate division, and notice of appeal to

the court of appeals on file in Oneida county clerk’s office and of

the whole thereof.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the

seal of said county this 1st day of December, 1902.

[u. s.] GEORGE D. FRANK,

Acting Clerk of Oneida County.

14 Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Tar Peopce or THE State oF New York, Respondent,

vs. opinion

JosepH Locuner, Appellant.

Argued at March term, 1902; decided at May term, 1902.

Present : Hon. Peter B. McLennan, senior associate justice presid-

ing. Spring, Williams, Hiscock and Davy, associate justices.

his is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of the defendant

in the Oneida county court, for a misdemeanor in violating article

VIII, section 110 of chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897 known as the

labor laws.

Timothy Curtin, for respondent.

William S. Mackie, for appellant.

Davy, J.:

The defendant was indicted by the cmp jury of Oneida county

for a oe of chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897, section 110, en-

—292

10 JoskPH LOCHNER Vs.

titled “An act in relation to labor.” The indictment in substance,

charges that the defendant, on the 2ist day of December, 1899,

committed the crime of misdemeanor, second offense, to wit: with

having violated article VIII, section 110 of chapter 416 of the Laws

of 1897, known as the labor laws of the State of New York,

15 _in permitting an employee working for him in his bakery to

work more than sixty hours in one week.

Section 110 of said act provides that “ No employee shall be re-

quired or permitted to work in a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or

confectionery establishment more than sixty hours in any one week,

or more than ten hours in any one day, unless for the purpose of

making a shorter work day on the last day of the week ; nor more

hours in any one week than will make an average of ten hours per

day for the number of days during such week in which such em-

ployee shall work.”

The defeudant demurred to the indictment on the ground that

more than one crime is charged in the indictment within the mean-

ing of sections 278 and 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and

that the facts stated in the indictment do not constitute a crime.

The demurrer was overruled, and the defendant when arraigned,

was tried and convicted of misdemeanor, second offense, and was

sentenced to pay a fine of $50 and to stand committed until paid,

not exceeding fifty days in the Oneida County jail. The appeal

from the judgment of conviction brings up for review the order

overruling the demurrer.

The indictment follows the language of the statute and the rule

is well settled that an indictment for a statutory misdemeanor, which

charges the facts constituting the crime in the words of the statute

and contains averments as to time, place and person and other cir-

cumstances to identify the particular transaction, is good. People

vs. West (106 N. Y., 293), People vs. King (110 N. Y., 422), People vs.

Welden (111 N. Y., 574).

The learned counsel for the appellant has devoted his argu-

16 ment principally to a discussion of the constitutionality of the

act, and he contends that the statute is an unlawful invasion

of the liberty of the defendant, because it unnecessarily prohibits

him from contracting with others to carry on his business; that it

is in violation of article XIV, section 1 of the Constitution of the

United States, which provides that no State shall make or enforce

any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the

citizens of the United States, nor deny any person within its juris-

diction the equal protection of the law, and that it is also a violation

of the following provisions of article I of the constitution of the

State of New York, viz: “No member of this State shall be dis-

franchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to

any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the ge

of his peers,” and “ No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or

property without due process of law.” wae

The statute authorizes the employment of men to labor in biscuit,

THE PEOPLE OF YHE STATE OF NEW YORK. il

bread or cake bakeries or confectionery establishments not more than

sixty hours in any one week or more than ten hours in any one day.

This section of the statute merely declares that ten hours’ labor

rformed within twenty-four hours shall constitute a day’s work,

and no employé shall be required or permitted to work a greater

number of hours for such employer. The constitutionality of this

act must be determined by the citizen’s right to pursue a lawful em-

ployment. If the restriction is arbitrary and does not pertain to the

welfare and health of the people, it cannot be upheld.

It has been frequently held that it isonly when a case is presented

which shows clearly that a statute when fairly and reasonably con-

strued, is brought in conflict with some provision of the Con-

17 stitution, that the court is justified in pronouncing the law

invalid, (Cooley Const. Lim., 164); and that the courts can-

not inquire whether the legislative enactments are unwise or ex-

dient.

ok State in the exercise of its constitutional power may regulate

the conduct of its citizens toward each other and when necessary

for the public good, the manner in which each shall use his prop-

erty. Munn vs. Ill. (94 U.S., 113), People vs. Budd (117 N. Y., 14).

So in the examination of this case, we start with the rule of law

well settled that nothing but a clear usurpation of power prohibited

by the Constitution will justify the judicial department in pronounc-

ing an act of the legislative department unconstitational and

void.

Sections 111 to 115 of the act in question’ aim to prescribe the

sanitary conditions necessary to be maintained, in order to properly

conduct a bakery and to protect the health of the community, and

the health of those engaged in business of that nature.

The act provides that: “All buildings or rooms occupied as bis-

cuit, bread, pie or cake bakeries shall be drained and plumbed in a

manner conducive to the proper and healthful sanitary condition

thereof, and shall be constructed with air shafts, windows or venti-

lating pipes, sufficient to insure ventilation. The factory inspector

may direct the proper drainage, plumbing and ventilation of such

rooms or buildings. No cellar or basement, not now used for a

bakery shall hereafter be so occupied or used, unless the proprietor

shall comply with the sanitary provisions of said act.”

It also provides that: “ Every room used for the manufacture of

flour or meal food products shall be at least eight feet in

18 —_ height and shall have, if deemed necessary by the factory in-

spector, an impermeable floor constructed of cement, or of

tiles laid in cement, or an additional flooring of wood properly sat-

urated with linseed oil. The side walls of such rooms shall be

plastered or wainscotted. The faetory inspector may require the

side walls and ceiling to be whitewashed, at least once in three

months. He may also require the wood work of such walls to be

painted. The furniture and utensils shall be so arranged as to be

readily cleansed and not prevent the proper cleaning of any part of

12 JOSEPH LOCHNER Vs.

aroom. The manufactured flour or meal food shall be kept in dry

and airy rooms so arranged that the floors, shelves and all other

facilities for storing the same can be properly cleaned.”

“Every such bakery shall be provided with a proper wash-room

and water-closet or water-closets apart from the bake-room, or rooms

where the manufacture of such food product is conducted, and no

water-closet, earth-closet, privy or ash-pit shall be within or con-

nected directly with the bake-room of any bakery, hotel or public

bake-room. Sleeping'places for the persons employed in the bakery

shall be separate from the rooms where flour or meal food products

are manufactured or stored. If the sleeping places are on the same

floor where such products are manufactured, stored or sold, the fac-

tory inspector may inspect and order them put in a proper sanitary

condition.”

Sub-division three of section 384 of the Penal Code provides: “Any

rson who violates or does not comply with the provisions of article

eight of the labor law, relating to bakeries and confectionery estab-

lishments, and employment of labor and the manufacture of flour

or meal food products therein,”—“ is guilty of a misdemeanor, and

upon conviction shall be punished for a first offense by a fine

19 of not less than twenty nor more than one hundred dollars ;

for a second offense by a fine of not less than fifty nor more

than two hundred dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than thirty

days, or by both such fine and imprisonment, for a third offense by

a “tel of not less than two hundred and fifty dollars, or by impris-

onment for not more than sixty days, or by both such fine and im-

prisonment.” ,

This brings us to the main question in the case, namely: The na-

ture and extent of the police power of the State.

There is little, if anything, to be said other than the courts have

already said on this subject.

It was remarked by Judge Gray in People vs. Ewer (141 N. Y.,

132), “ That it is difficult, if not impossible, to define the police power

of a State; or, under recent judicial decisions, to say where the con-

stitutional boundaries limiting its exercise are to be fixed.”

- The police power of the State is the power which enables it to pro-

mote the health, comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is very

broad and far-reaching, but it is not without its limitations.

The rule seems to be well settled, that when one devotes his prop-

erty to a use or carries on a business in which the public has an in-

terest, he holds the ae ry and carries on the business subject to

the police power of the State to regulate or control its use, so as to pro-

tect and preserve the public health, the public inorals and the general

safety and welfare of the public. Berthelf vs. O’Reilly (74 N. Y., 515).

The line between a valid exercise of the police power and the in-

vasion of private rights is clearly drawn by Judge Earl in

20 his opinion in matter of application of Jacobs (98 N. Y., 110).

He says: “Generally it is for the legislature to determine

what laws and regulations are needed to protect the public health

——

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 13

and secure the public comfort and safety, and while its measures

are calculated, intended, convenient and appropriate to accomplish

these ends, the exercise of its discretion is not subject to review by

the courts. But they must have some relation totheseends. Under

the mere guise of police regulations, personal rights and private

property cannot be arbitrarily invaded, and the determination of

the legislature is not final or conclusive. If it passes an act ostensi-

bly for the public health, and thereby destroys or takes away the

roperty of a citizen, or interferes with his personal liberty, then it

is for the courts to scrutinize the act and see whether it really relates

to and is convenient and appropriate tv promote the public health.”

It was remarked by Judge O’Brien in People vs. uberg (136

‘N. Y., 415) that: “ If the act and the constitution can be construed

so as to enable both to stand, and each can be given a proper and legit-

imate office to perform, it is the duty of the court to adopt such legis-

lation. The legislature, under the police power, may certainly regu-

late or even prohibit the carrying on of any business in such manner

and in such place as to become dangerous or detrimental to the

health, morals or good order of the community.”

Judge Vann in discussing the statute entitled An act to regulate

barbering on Sunday, People vs. Havnor, (149 N. Y., 204), says:

“ As barbers generally work more Lours each day than most men,

the legislature may have well concluded that legislation was neces-

sary for the protection of their health.” And at page 203, he says:

“It is to the interest of the State to have strong, robust, healthy

citizens, capable of self support, of bearing arms, and of add-

21 ing to the resources of the country. Laws to effect this pur-

pose, by protecting the citizens from overwork and requiring

a general day of rest to restore his strength and preserve his health,

have an obvious connection with the public welfare.”

It was held in People ez rel. Nechamcus vs. Warden, etc. (144

N. Y., 536), that: “The restraint of personal action is justified,

when it manifestly tends to protection of the health and comfort of

the community, and no constitutional guaranty is then violated.”

In Health Department vs. Rector (145 N. Y., 32), the court laid

down the rule that the legislature, in the exercise of its power to

conserve the public health, safety and welfare, may direct that cer-

tain improvements or alterations shall be made in tenant houses at

the owners’ expense, and that suitabie — be supplied to

receive and distribute a supply of water for domestic use. Judge

Peckham, in discussing the constitutionality of the act (page 43),

says: “ Laws and regulations of a police nature, though they may

disturb the enjoyment of individual rights, are not unconstitutional,

though no provision is made for such disturbances. They do not

appropriate private property for public use, but simply regulate its

use and enjoyment by the owner.” Under the police power, per-

sous and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and

— in order to secure the general comfort and health of the

public.

14 JOSEPH LOCHNKR Vs.

It has been held that the legislature might prohibit railroads

from permitting or requiring workmen who have worked iwenty-

four hours, to go on duty again until they have had eight hours’

rest. The same act also provides that ten hours’ work out of

22 twelve consecutive hours shall constitute a day’s labor.

People vs. Phyfe (136 N. Y., 554).

The State, under its police power, may require every locomotive

engineer to pass an examination before a board of examiners, as to

his skill in operating a locomotive engine, and his general com

tency as an engineer, and also inquire into his character and habits,

and to withhold the license if he be found reckless or intemperate.

It may also enact that every railroad corporation shall not permit

any locomotive engineer in its employ to run a locomotive engine

more than ten consecutive hours in any one day. It may provide

when a locomotive engineer is found to be in a state of intoxication,

that the board be authorized to revoke and cancel his license, and

likewise whenever they shall be satisfied of the unfitness of the en-

gineer. Such legislation would be clearly within the scope and

power of the legislature to protect the lives of passengers and prop-

erty.

i Tiedman’s Lim. Police Power, 181, the author states: “If the

law did not interfere, the feverish, intense desire to acquire wealth—

inciting a relentless rivalry and competition, would ultimately pre-

vent, not only the wage-earner, but likewise the capitalists and the

employers themselves from yielding to the warnings of nature and

oe the instinct of self-preservation by resting periodically from

labor.”

The Utah statute, which limited the hours for labor in all under-

ground mines and smelting works, except in cases of emergency,

when life and property were in imminent danger, to eight hours,

was held to be constitutional by the Utah courts as well as by the

Supreme Court of the United States, the latter taking the position

that the State had a right to limit the hours for labor to

23 those engaged in dangerous or unhealthy employments.

Holden vs. Hardy (169 U. S., 361).

‘ Another common form of statutory regulation of the honrs of

labor, is the provision that workmen on public works shall not be

required to work more than a prescribed number of hours each day.

Where the regulation is applied to employees of the city, county or

State government, who are employed and were paid directly by

these respective governments The safety and health of a large

body of workmen gathered together in one place, a mine, a factory

or workshop, are endangered if proper precautions are not taken “4

the employer against the source of danger, and everywhere we fi

the statutes both varied and numerous, which require employers and

the owners of buildings, which are used as workshops, and the owners

of mines to do certain things which are declared by statute to be nec-

essary for the protection of the workmen. Inspectors are generally

appointed to see that suitable regulations are observed. These regu-

THE PEOPLE OF THE sTATE OF NEW YoR?. 15

lations in the main are all reasonable safe-guards and _ their consti-

tutionality has been rarely questioned.

Many other cases pertaining to this subject might be cited which

confirm the principles we have stated.

If the statute under consideration invades the right of property

and the liberty of the individual, then many of the statutes of this

State that have been held to be constitutional and their enactment

within the police power of the State, are subject to the same criti-

cism.

The statute in question does not restrict the right of the defendant,

to carry on his business or to engage as many persons as he sees fit in

such business, but it simply prohibits him from requiring or

24 compelling his employees to work more than ten hours in

any one day, or more than sixty hours in any one week; in

other words, the statute does not prohibit any right, but regulates if,

and there is a wide difference between regulation and prohibition,

between prescribing the terms by which the right may be enjoyed,

and the denial of that right altogether. The defendant is not de-

prived of any right or privilege, which is not denied to others in a

similar business. The provisions of the statute in question are

directed to all persons engaged in the bakery business. It neither

confers special privileges nor makes unjust discrimination. All who

are engaged in that business are entitled to its benefit and subjected

to its restrictions. It is open to any citizen to engage in that busi-

ness, and the privileges conferred belong equally to all.

It is very important for the health of the community, that bakers

should supply people with wholesome bread and pure food. The

people are interested in the business; it is of so much public inter-

est that the legislature under the police power of the State, may

control the business by any regulation which is necessary to secure

the public health. The regulations instituted by this statute were

for the purpose of protecting the health of the mI bo and giving

vag arson pure and wholesome bread and other articles of food sold

by bakers.

These establishments are compelled to do baking during the night-

time, in order to supply their customers in the morning. It is nec-

essary for them to have their ovens heated day and night, and their

employees are required to work more hours each day than men usu-

ally work who are engaged in other kinds of business. When we

consider the intense heat of the rooms where baking is done,

25 and the flour that floats in the air and is breathed by those

who work in bakeries, there can be but little doubt that pro-

longed labor day and night, subject to these conditions, might pro-

duce a diseased condition of the human system, so that the em-

ployees would not be capable of doing their work well and supply-

ing the public with wholesome food.

The legislature no doubt recognized the fact that proprietors of

these establishments desire to obtain as much labor as possible from

their employees, who from fear of being discharged, are often in-

16 JOSEPH LOCHNER Ys. .

duced to comply with the employer's request to work during both

night and day, and the legislature evidently reached the conclu-

sion that more than teu hours labor each day might be injurious to

the health of the employees.

The rule laid down in People vs. Havnor (supra), shows that the

courts are disposed to uphold a statutory lation enacted for the

safety of the public and to protect the health of the individual em-

— from the dangers threatened by excessive or exhaustive

abor.

We are of the opinion that the act is constitutional, that the judg-

ment of conviction is right and should be affirmed.

All concur, except McLennan and Williams, JJ., who dissent.

Srate or New York, \

Oneida County, Clerk’s Office, .

I, Hermon Clarke, clerk of said county, and of the supreme and

county courts therein, the same being courts of record, do hereby

certify, that I have applied the annexed copy of appeal book of the

case People of the State of New York against Joseph Lochner com-

prising the following papers, to-wit: statement, indictment, demur-

rer, order disallowing demurrer, judgment of conviction, &c., cer-

tificate of reasonable doubt, notice of appeal stipulation, affidavit of

no opinion, order of affirmance on appeal from judgment, judg-

ment, notice of appeal to court of appeals, certificate, opinion, and

remittitur and the endorsements thereupon with the original

thereof, on file in this office, and that the same is a correct tran-

script therefom, and of the whole of said original.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and affixed the

seal of said county and courts, at the city of Utica, this 27th day of

May 1904.

[Seal Oneida County, New York.j

HERMON CLARKE, Clerk.

— —, Deputy Clerk.

26 Opinion of Court of Appeals.

Parker, Ch. J.:

Defendant’s conviction is under sub-division 3, section 384/, Penai

Code, which makes a violation of article VIII, chapter 415, Laws

1897,a misdemeanor. The judgment is affirmed by the appellate di-

vision.

Defendant urges as ground for a reversal that article VI1I—which

on its face purports to be, as we shall see later, an exercise of

27 the police power of the State—offends against the first section

of the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution.

That section provides that “ No State shall make or enforce any law

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 17

which shall abridge the privil or immunities of citizens of

the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to an

rson within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” It

is also claimed that the statute violates those provisions of the State

constitution which declare that “No member of this State shall be

disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured

to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judg-

ment of his peers” (Const. art. 1, § 1), “nor be deprived of life,

liberty or property without due process of law.” (Const. art. 1, § 6.)

The first cases in which the 14th amendment is discussed by the

United States Supreme Court are the Slaughter House cases (83 U. S.

36), wherein is challenged the Louisiana statute authorizing the re-

moval of noxious slaughter houses from the more densely populated

part of New Orleans, and their location where they could least affect

the health and comfort of the people, and to that end granting a

corporation exclusive right for 25 years to maintain slaughter houses

within 3 parishes, containing between 200,000 and 300,000 people,

and including New Orleans. ‘This is held to be a police regulation

for the health and comfort of the people, and, therefore, within the

power of the State legislature, and not affected by the 14th amend-

ment, which the court says is not intended to interfere with the ex-

ercise of police power by the States.

In Barbier v. Connolly (113 U. S. 27) the Supreme Court has

before it a San Francisco ordinance prohibiting work in public

laundries within defined territory from 10 p. m. to 6 a. m., claimed

to be repugnant to the 14th amendment. The: court rules that the

ordinance is well within the police power, and in the course of the

opinion says: “ Neither the amendment—broad and comprehensive

as it is—nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with

the power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to

28 prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals,

education and good order of the people, and to legislate so as

to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add

to its wealth and prosperity ” (p. 31).

There are many interesting cases in the United States Supreme

Court sustaining statutes of different States which iu terms seem re-

pugnant to the 14th amendment, but which that court declares to be

within the police power of the States. Among them are statutes de-

claring a railroad company liable for damages to an employee al-

though caused by another employee pe . S. 205); fixing the

damages at double the value of stock killed, when due to the neglect

of a railroad company to maintain fences (129 U.S. 26); requirin

locomotive engineers to be licensed, and providing that the railroa

company employing them pay the fees of examination (128 U. S.

96); requiring cars to be heated otherwise than by stoves on rail-

roads over 50 miles in length (165 U. S. 628); providing for imme-

diate payment of wages by railroad companies to discharged em-

dies U.S. 404); prohibiting options to sell grain (184 U. S.

—292

18 josePH LocHNER v8.

wh providing for inspection of mines at expense of owners (185

U. 8. 203), and one declaring void all contracts for sales of stocks on

margins (187 U.S. 606). - j

I shall call special attention to but one other case, namely, Holden

v. Hardy (169 U. 8. 366). In that case the court reviews at length

many of the cases arising under the 14th amendment, beginning

with the Slaughter House cases. The case involves a Utah statute

providing that “the period of employment of workingmen in all

underground mines or workings shall be eight hours per day, ex-

cept in cases of emergency where life or ig, hh is in imminent

danger.” Violationis madea misdemeanor. The conviction of one

Holden under that statute is affirmed by the United States Supreme

Court. It is —. by defendant in that case that the statute has

no relation to the health or safety of the public or the persons af-

fected, or if so, only in a very remote degree, while its direet

29 ~=and principal effect is to interfere with the rights and liber-

ties of the contracting oe that the right to contract con-

tains three essential and indispensable elements, guaranteed and

protected by the United States Constitution, namely, “the right of

the employer and employee to agree upon (1) the character of the

service to be performed, (2) the amount to be paid for such service,

and (3) the number of hours per day during which the service is to

continue;” that the destruction or abridgment of one element is a

destruction or abridgment of the whole of said right to contract ;

that the statute abridges the “ privileges and immunities” in that

it deprives the employer and the employee of perfect freedom and

liberty to pursue unmolested a lawful vocation in a lawful manner ;

that the rights of the employer and employee in that direction were

unlimited before the adoption of the 14th amendment and that

since its adoption it is beyond the power of any State to make any

laws abridging or destroying such rights. This latter contentioo—

which if sustained would practically prevent ali further develop-

ment of the police power on the part of the States—is overborne by

the court. Many cases passed upon by the court since the adoption

of the 14th amendment are cited furnishing illustrations tending to

justify the boast of the devotees of the common law, that by the ap-

plication of established legal principles the law has been, and will

continue to be developed from time to time so as to meet the ever-

changing conditions of our widely diversified and rapidly develop-

ing business interests. ‘The court quotes from Mr. Justice Matthews

in Hurtado v California (110 U. S. 516, 530): “ This flexibility and

capacity for growth and adaptation is the peculiar boast and excel-

lence of the common law. * * * The Constitution of the United

States was ordained, it is true, by descendants of Englishmen,

who inherited the traditions of English law and history; but it

was made for an undefined and expanding future, and for a

people gathered and to be gathered from many nations and of

many tongues. * * * ‘There is nothing in Magna Charta,

rightly construed as a broad charter of public right and

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NRW YORK. 19

law, which ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems and

30 ofevery age; and as it was the characteristic principle of the

common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of

justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its supply have been

exhausted. On the contrary, we shall expect that the new and

various experiences of our own situation and system will mould and

shape it into new and not less useful forms.” The court illustrates by

forceful examples the necessity of recognizing in legal decisions the

change of conditions. After calling attention to the fact that in the

early history of the country there was no occasion for any special

protection of a particular class, as we were almost purely an agricul-

tural country, it instances coal mining and the manufacture of iron.

‘When these industries began in Pennsylvania as early as 1716 they

were carried on in such a limited way,and by such primitive methods,

that no special laws were deemed necessary to protect operatives ;

but since that time they have assumed such vast proportions in that

and other States, and developed so many dangers to the safety and

life of those engaged in them, that laws to meet such exigencies have

become necessary. It calls attention to many protective statutes

enacted in many different States providing for fire escapes in hotels,

theatres, factories and other large buildings; inspection of boilers;

appliances to obviate the dangers incident to railroad and steam-

boat transportation ; the protection of dangerous machinery against

accidental contact; the shoring up of ventilation shafts; means for

signaling in mines for fresh air; the elimination as far as possible

of dangerous gases, and safe means of hoisting and lowering em-

ployees in mines. It is said that statutes providing such safeguards

“have been repeatedly enforced by the courts of the several States ;

their validity assumed, and, so far as we are informed, they

have been uniformly held to be coastitutional ” (169 U. S. 366, 394),

which, of course, means that the courts of the several States making

these decisions hold that such statutes do not deprive citizens of any

of the rights or privileges guaranteed by the Constitution, nor de-

prive them of property without due process of law, for every

31 State constitution contains such a provision or its equivalent.

Of such illustrations the court further says (p. 387): “hey

are mentioned only for the purpose of calling attention to the

probability that other changes of no less importance may be made

in the future, and that while the cardinal principles of justice are

immutable, the methods by which justice is administered are sub-

ject to constant fluctuation, and that the Constitution of the United

States, which is necessarily and to a large extent inflexible and ex-

ceedingly difficult of amendment, should not be so construed as to

deprive the States of the power to so amend their laws as to make

them conform to the wishes of the citizens as they may deem best

for the public welfare without bringing them into conflict with the

supreme law of the land.” This broad-minded view—which is char-

acteristic of the development of the law by this great court since

the adoption of the 14th amendment—should, and doubtless will

20 JOSEPH LOCHNER Vs.

be followed by the courts of the several States whenever called upoa

to determine whether statutes offend against the provisions of State

coustitutions similar or equivalent to the provisions of the 14th

amendment. The cases cited, and the reasoning of the court, to

which but brief reference is here made, demonstrate that this statute

does not offend against the 14th amendment, and it necessarily fol-

lows that it is not repugnant to equivalent provisions in our State

constitution.

This eourt throughout all its history has maintained the same

position as that taken by the United States Supreme Court. Many

authorities could be cited in support of that assertion, but none

need be for they areall in one direction.

The impossibility of setting the bounds of the police power has

up to this time prevented any court from attempting it, and the

reason for it is well stated ‘by Judge Gray in People v. Ewer (141

N. Y., 129, 132). He says: “ It is difficult, if not impossible, to de-

fine the police power of a State; or, under recent judicial decisions,

to say where the constitutional boundaries limiting its exercise are

to be fixed. It is a power essential to be conceded to the State in

the interest and for the welfare of its citizens. We may say

32 _ of it that when its operation is in the direction of so regulat-

ing the use of private property, or of so restraining personal

action, as manifestly to secure, or to tend to the comfort, prosperity,

or protection of the community, no constitutional guaranty is vio-

lated, and the legislative authority is not transcended.” In that

case the constitutionality of section 292, Penal Code, is questioned.

That section makes it a misdemeanor to exhibit as a dancer a female

child under 14 years of age. The court denies that the statute

violates our constitution because it deprives the mother, the person

arrested, of the rights and privileges secured to her by the consti-

tution.

In People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden, etc. (144 N. Y. 529) the

constitutionality of chapter 602, Laws 1892, is challenged. The act

provides for examination and registration of master plumbers, and

makes it a misdemeanor for any person to engage in that trade with-

out such registration. This court holds the statute to be within the

police power of the ee and, therefore, not repugnant to the

constitution. Judge Gray says in the opinion (p. 535): “ There has

been much discussion upon the subject of what is a valid exercise

of the police power of the State through legislative enactment and

there is little to be added to what this and other courts have said.

The police power extends to the protection of persons and of prop-

erty within the State. In order to secure that protection, they may

be subjected to restraints and burdens by legislative acts. If the

act isa valid and reasonable exercise of the police power of the

State, then it must be submitted to, as a measure designed for the

protection of the public and to secure it against some danger, real

or anticipated, from a state of things which modifications in our

social or commercial life have brought about. The natural right

THE PROPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 21

to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is not an absolate right.

It must yield whenever the concession is demanded by the welfare,

health or prosperity of the State. The individual must sacrifice his

rticular interest or desires if the sacrifice is a necessary one in

order that organized society asa whole shall be benefited. That is

a fundamental condition of the State, and which, in the end,

33 accomplishes by reaction a general good, from which the in-

dividual must also benefit.”

In Health Department v. Rector, ete. (145 N. Y. 32) the court eon-

siders a provision of the New York consolidation act requiring that

tenement houses already erected shall be furnished by the owners

with water, “ whenever they shall be directed so to do by the board

‘of health,” “in sufficient quantity at one or more places on each

floor, occupied or intended to be occupied by one or more families.”

The health department served a notice requiring defendant to sup-

ly water, as commanded by the statute, in buildings owned by it.

fendant refused to do so, and an action was brought by the health

department to compel compliance. Defendant contends in that case

that the statute violates that provision of the State constitution

which declares that no member of this State shall “ be deprived of

life, liberty or property without due process of law.” This court

holds that the statute does not offend against the constitution, but

that it is a valid exercise of the police power; that the legislature,

by virtue of that power, can direct that improvements or altera-

tions shall be made in existing houses at the owners’ expense when

it clearly appears that it tends in some plain and appreciable man-

ner to guard and protect the public; and that a compensation need

not be made to the owner in such case, the effect of the act being

not to appropriate — property, but simply to regulate its use

and enjoyment by the owner. Judge Peckham, writing the opinion

of the court, says (p. 43): “ Laws and regulations of a police nature,

though they may disturb the enjoyment of individual rights, are

not unconstitutional, though no provision is made for compensation

for such disturbances. ‘They do not appropriate private property

for public use, but simply regulate its use and enjoyment by the

owner.”

People v. Havnor (149 N. Y. 195) is a case}as near the border

line perhaps as any to be found in this State—certainly ve

much nearer to it than the case under consideration. te

exhaustively considers the authorities in this State bearing

upon the police power. The case involves the consti-

34 _tutionality of what is known as the Sunday barber law, which

makes it a misdemeanor for any person to carry on the busi-

ness or work of a barber on the first day of the week except in the

city of New York and the village of Saratoga, where such business

or work may be carried on until one o’clock in the afternoon of that

day. The statute is held to be constitutional, because a valid exer-

cise of the police power. The opinion is written by Judge Vann.

After a careful examination of the authorities he presents the under-

**

JOSEPH LOCHNER V8.

22 |

1 uestion in this way (p. 201): “ The vital question, therefi

cop Bee the real snpcint the statute under consideration bene

reasonable connection with the public health, welfare or safety.”

After stating that the object of the act is to require the observance

of Sunday, not as a holy day, but as a day of rest and recreation, he

proceeds—with argument buttressed by authority in this State and

in other jurisdictions—to answer the question in the affirmative. In

the course of the argument he says (p. 203): “According to the com-

mon judgment of civilized men, public economy requires, for sani-

tary reasous, a day of general rest from labor, and the day naturally

selected is that regarded as sacred by the greatest number of the

citizens, as this causes the least inconvenience through interference

with business. It is to the interest of the State to have strong, robust,

healthy citizens, capable of self-support, of bearing arms, and of add-

ing to the resources of the country. Laws to effect this purpose,

by protecting the citizen from overwork and requiring a general

day of rest to restore his strength and preserve his health, have an

obvious connection with the public welfare. * * * The statute

under discussion tends to effect this result, because it requires

sons engaged in a kind of business that takes many hourseach ts

to refrain from carrying it on during one day in seven. This af-

fords an opportunity, recurring at regular intervals, for rest, needed

both by the employer and the employed, and the latter, at least, may

not bave the power to observe a day of rest without the aid of legisla-

tion. * * * As barbers generally work more hours each

35 day than most men, the legislature may well have concluded

we that legislation was necessary for the protection of their

ealth.”

The pertinency and controlling force of that argument to the ques-

tion under consideration here will be manifest when we come to an

examination of the statute.

No authorities can be found in this court which conflict with the

cases to which I have called attention. Rodgers’ case (166 N. Y. 1)

is cited in opposition, but why [ cannot see. The police power is

not even considered in that case. The defense to that portion of the

statute which is condemned as unconstitutional because it requires

a stipulation in all contracts with the State and meant 2st that

the contractor shall “ pay the prevailing rate of wages at least,” being

rested on the ground (1) that the State as proprietor can do what an

individual proprietor can do, namely, insist upon any reasonable

provision in a contract as a condition for doing the work ; (2) that

the State is proprietor not ouly as to contracts for work for the bene-

fit of the entire State, but also as to contracts for work authorized by

it for the various subdivisions of the State made for convenience of

administration ; (3) that hence it violates no provision of the con-

stitution.

Having shown by an examination of a few of the leading authori-

ties relating to the police power that the decisions of this court are

in harmony with those of the United States Supreme Court, and —

tite PeopLe o# Tite sTATE OF NEW YoRE. 93

having specially brought out some of the argument in those decis-

ions for the purpose of presenting something of the vast scope of

that power, we come next to the question, In what spirit should the

court approach the consideration of a statute said on the one hand to

offend against the constitution, and on the other to be a proper ex-

ercise of the police power ?

The courts are frequently confronted with the temptation to substi-

tute their judgment for that of the legislature. A given statute,

though plainly within the legislative power, seems so repugnant to

a sound public policy as to strongly tempt the court to set aside the

statute, instead of waiting, as the spirit of our institutions require,

until the people can compel their representatives to repeal the ob-

: noxious statute.

36 In the early history of this country eminent writers gave

expression to the fear that the power of the courts to set aside

the enactments of the representatives chosen to legislate for the peo-

ple would in the end prove a weak point in our governmental sys-

tem, because of the difficulty of keeping the exercise of such great

power within its legitimate bounds. So far in our judicial history

it must be said that the courts have in the main been conservative

in passing upon legislation attacked as uticonstitutional, but occa-

sionally, and especially when a case is one on the border line, it is

quite possible that the judgment of the court that the legislation is

unwise may operate to carry the decision to the wrong side of that

border line. Certain it is that the courts have greatly extended

their jurisdiction over many administrative acts that were originally

supposed not to present cases for the court to pass upon, and in that

way the courts have come to play a very important part in State and

municipal administration. Some expression of our views on that

subject is given in Matter of Guden {171 N. Y. 529, 535).

Now when considering the mental attitude with which the court

should begin an examination of this question, it is well to have in

mind not only the great breadth and scope of the police power, and

the legislative control over it as expressed in some of the opinions

from which we quote supra, but it is also well to have in mind some

of the expressions of this court as to the way in which the court

should approach the consideration of such a question as this, involy--

ing the constitutionality of a statute.

Judge Andrews says, in People v. King (110 N. Y. 418, 428): “ By

means of this power the legislature exercises a supervision over

matters affecting the common weal. * * * It may be exerted

whenever necessary to secure the peace, good order, health, morals

aud general welfare of the community, and the propriety of its exer-

cise within constitutioual limits is purely a matter of legislative discre-

tion with which courts cannot interfere.”

37 Judge Gray says, in Nechameus’ case ( ): “ The courts

should always assume that the legislature intended by its en-

actments to promote those ends [public health, comfort and safety ],

_ and if the act admits of two constructions, that should be given to

JOSEPH LOCHNER vs.

it which sustains it and makes it manele in furtherance of the

interests.” (144 N, Y. 529, 536.)

“ Whether the legislation is wise is not for us to consider. The

motives actuating and the inducements held out to the legislature -

are not the .subject of inguiry by the courts, which are bound to

assume that the law making y acted with a desire to promote

the public good. Its enactments must stand, ? grange always that

Searles not sueteavene: he anes _ ee of constitu-

i is always one of powe: ing else. t in applyi

the test the courts must bear in mind that it is their duty to alent the

force of law to an act of the legislature whenever it can be fairly so

construed and applied as to avoid conflict with the constitution.”

(Bohmer v. Haffen, 161 N. Y. 390, 399.)

Where there “ is room for two constructions, both equally obvious

and reasonable, the court must, in deference to the legislature of the

State, assume that it did not overlook the provisions of the coustitu-

tion, and designed the act * * * to take effect. Our duty,

therefore, is to adopt the construction which, without doing violence

to the fair meaning of the words used, brings the statute into har-

mony with the provisions of the constitution.” (Supervisors ».

Brodger, 112 U. 8. 261, 268; People ex rel. Burrows v. Supervisors

of Orange Co., 17 N. Y. 236, 241; People ex rel. Bolton v. Albertson,

55 N. Y. 50, 54; Matter of Gilbert El. Ry. Co., 70 N. Y. 361, 367

Matter of N. Y. & L. I. Bridge Co. v. Smith, 148 N. Y. 540, 551.)

The court is inclined to so construe the statute as to validate it.

People v. Equitable Trust Co., 96 N. Y. 387, 394; People ez rel,

inkler v. Terry, 108 N. Y.1,7; Matter of N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 70

N. Y. 327, 342; People ex rel. Killeen v. Angle, 109 N. Y.

38 564, 567; Rogers +. Common Council of Buffalo, 123 N. Y

178, 181; he ex rel. Carter v. Rice, 135 N. Y. 473, 484.)

“ Every actof the legislature must be presumed to be in harmony

with the fundamental law until the contrary is clearly made to ap-

pear.” (People ez rel. Kemmler v. Durston, 119 N. Y. 569, 577.)

“Before an act of the legislature can be declared void as repug-

nant to the constitution, the conflict must be manifest.” (Matter of

Stilwell, 189 N. Y. 337, 341.)

“If the act and the constitution can be so construed as to enable

both to stand, and each can be given a proper and legitimate office

to perform, it is the duty of the court to adopt such construction.”

(People v. Rosenberg, 138 N. Y. 410, 415.)

The statute under consideration in that case is held to be within

the — power, as is the statute considered in the following case.

“ It is not necessary to the validity of a penal statute that the legis-

lature should declare on the face of the statute the eee urpose

for which it was enacted.” (People v. West, 106 N. Y. 293, 297.)

Having considered the authorities bearing upon the subject of the

exercise of pte power at greater le than could be justified

were it not for the different view that obtains in this court as to the

authority of the legislature to pass the statute in question, aud

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 5

having glanced at a few authorities indicating the frame of mind in

which the court should approach the consideration of the question of

the constitutionality of an act of the legislature—we come to the con-

sideration of the statute in question, aided by the principles estab-

lished by the United States Supreme Court and the courts of this:

State, to which reference has been made.

I quote the whole statute, notwithstanding its length, in order

that it may be at once determined upon its mere reading whether the

ae aga of the legislature was to subserve, in some measure, the

public good under the police power of the State.

39 “Articte VIII.

“ BAKERIES AND CONFECTIONERY EsTABLISHMENTS.

“§ 110. Hours of labor in bakeries and confectionery establishments.—

Noemployee shall be required or permitted to work in a biscuit,

bread or cake bakery or confectionery establishment more than sixty

hours in any one week, or more than ten hours in any one day un-

less for the purpose of making a shorter work day on the last day

_of the week; nor more hours in any one week than will make an

average of ten hours per day for the number of days during such

week in which such employee shall work.

“§ 111. Drainage and plumbing of buildings and rooms occupied by

bakeries—All buildings or rooms occupied as biscuit, bread, pie or

cake bakeries, shall be drained and plumbed ina manner conducive

to the proper and healthful sanitary condition thereof, and shall be

constructed with air shafts, windows or ventilating pipes, sufficient to

insure ventilation. The factory inspector may direct the proper

drainage, plumbing and ventilation of such rooms or bui =

No cellar or basement, not now used for a bakery shall hereafter

so occupied or used, unless the proprietor shall comply with the sani-

tary provisions of this article.

“§ 112. Requirements as to rooms, furniture, utensils and manufact-

ured products—Every room used for the manufacture of flour or

meal food products shall be at least eight feet in height and shall

have, if deemed necessary by the factory inspector, an impermeable

floor constructed of cement, or of tiles laid in cement, or an additional

flooring of wood properly saturated with linseed oil. The side walls

of sach rooms shall be plastered or wainscoted. The factory in-

spector may — the side walls and ceiling to be whitewashed,

at least once in three months. He may also require the wood work

of such walls to be painted. The furniture and utensils shall be so

ee as to be readily cleansed and not prevent the proper clean-

ing of any partof the room. The manufactured flour or meal food

products shall be kept in dry and airy rooms so arranged that

40 the floors, shelves and other facilities for storing the same can

be ise so ~ gage No domestic animals, except cats, shall

il

Bee

area

4 Soar Locititke. ¥s.

be allowed to remain in a‘room used as a biscuit, bread, pie or cake’ |

bakery or any room in such bakery where flour or meal products

are stored.

“$113. Wash rooms and closes; sleeping places.—Evory such

bakery shall be provided with a proper wash-room and water-closet

or water-closets apart from the bake-room, or rooms where the man-

ufacture of such food uct is conducted, and no water-closet,

~ earth-closet, privy or it shall be within or connected directly

with the bake-room of any bakery, hotel or public restaurant.

“ No person shall sleep in a room occupied as a bake-room. Sleep-

ing places for the persons employed in the bakery shall be separate

from the rooms where flour or meal food products are manufactured

or stored. If the sleeping places are on the the same floor where such

products are manuf , stored or sold, the factory inspector may

inspect and order them put in a proper sanitary condition.

§ 114. Inspection of bakeries. —The factory inspector shall cause

all bakeries to be inspected. If it be found upon such inspection

that the bakeries so inspected are constructed and conducted in com-

pliance with the provisions of this chapter, the factory inspector

at issue a certificate to the persons owning or conducting such

eries.

“§ 115. Notice requiring alterations.—If, in the opinion of the fac-

tory inspector, altevations are required in or upon premises occupied

ma used as bakeries, in order to comply with the provisions of this

article, a written notice shall be served by him upon the owner, agent

or lessee of such premises, either personally or by mail, requiri

such alterations to be made within sixty days after such service, ie

such alterations shall be made accordingly.”

That the public generally are interested in having bakers’ and

confectioners’ establishments cleanly and wholesome in this day of

appreciation of, and apprehension on account of, microbes, which

cause disease and death, is paren? question. Not many years

Al ago the baking was largely done in the family; but now in

a large peronatage of the houses in cities and villages the

baker is relied on to a large extent to furnish bread, biscuits, cake

and pie, as well as confectionery, while over many cou roads

the bakers’ wagons go twice a week or more to supply the farmers

and inhabitants of small settlements with their wares. Indeed it .

can be safely said that the family of to-day is more dependent upon

the baker for the necessaries of life than upon any other source of

supply. That being so it is within the police power of the legisla-

ture to so regulate the conduct of that business us to best promote

and protect the health of the people. And to that end the legisla-

ture undertakes to provide—by a statute which bears on its face

evidence of a1: intelligent draftsman acquainted with the dangers

of unsanitary conditions in such yor prammpediac ts joe: drain-

age and plumbing of the building and rooms occupied for such pur-

pose.

THE PEOPLE OF THE staT# OF NEW YORK. 27

Is there room to doubt that the sole purpose of the legislature

in prohibiting the use of cellars for bakeries unless the occupant

first complies with the sanitary provisions of this article is to protect

the public from the use of the food made dangerous Be germs

that thrive in darkness and uncleanness? Is it ible that any

one can question that the sole purpose of the legislature is the safe-

guarding of the public health when it provides for floors, ceili

and sidewalls of such material as that they may be readily clea ;

compels the keeping of flour or meal products in a and xf

rooms, 80 arranged that the storing facilities can be properly cl f

and prohibits the keeping of domestic animals within such rooms?

And will any one question the motive which induced the prohibi-

‘tion of a “ water-closet, earth-closet, privy orasphit * * * within

or connected directly with the bake-room of any bakery, hotel or

public restaurant”? If not, why should any one question the object

of the legislature in providing in the same article and as a part of

the scheme that “no rh shall be required or permitted to

work” in such an establishment “ more than sixty hours in any one

week,” an average of ten hours for each working day. It is

42 but reasonable to assume from this statute as a whole that

the legislature had in mind that the health and cleanliness of

the workers, as well as the cleanliness of the work-tooms, was of the

utmost importance, and that a man is more likely to be careful and

cleanly when well, and not overworked, than when exhausted by

fatigue, which makes for careless and slovenly habits, and tends to

dirt and disease.

If there is opportunity—and who can doubt it—for this view,

then the legislatare had the power to enact as it did, and the courts

are bound to sustain its action as justified by the police power, as

we see from the authorities re to earlier in this opinion.

I hear but one ment advanced for the purpose of convincing

the mind that the object of this statute is not to protect the public,

aod that argament is that article VIII is to be found in the labor

law. Therefore, it is said it is a labor law, not a health law.

The question presented by that argument is, Does the label or the

body of the statute prevail? Does calling a statute names deprive

it of its intended and real character? If a statute relating princi-

pally to banking happens, in the course of codification, to be in-

corporated as an article in the general corporation law, does it cease

to operate on the banking business? I submit without argument

that the questions answer themselves.

Assuming, however, for the purpose of argument only, that the

label is of such substantial importance that it may be as

inst the obvious meaning of the statute, then I say that article

ITI bears its own title, which is: “ Bakeries and confectionery estab-

lishments.” All that is contained in that article relates to bakeries

and confectionery establishments and theit conduct, and to no other

sabject whatever. Therefore, it is fully, appropriately and harmoni-

y entitled.

28 JOSEPH LOCHNER Vs.

Again, inasmuch as it is obvious, as we have seen, from a mere

reading of the statute, that the legislative purpose is to benefit the

blic, we must assume—even if the object of the legislature

43 _ in limiting the hours of work of employees is not to protect

the health of the general public, who takes the wares made

by such employees—that the legislature intends to protect the

health of the employees in such establishments; that, for some

reason sufficient to it, it has reached the conclusion that in work

of this character men ought not to be employed more than an

average of ten hours a day. Now that being so—and certainly no

more restricted view of that statute can be taken by those who

would destroy it—we find that the action of the legislature is within

the police power not only under the authorities of the United States,

but of this State, and of this court.

ial attention has meeey been called to Holden’s case (169

U.S. 366). A Utah statute making it a misdemeanor to employ a

man more than 8 hours per day in “ underground mines or work-

ings ” is sustained, and a conviction thereunder upheld, by the

United States Supreme Court, on the ground that it is within the

police power of the State to pass such a statute. That interesting

case—to which I have made extended reference supra—is in point

and controlling so far as the 14th amendment is concerned, and

should be controlling in this court so far as equivalent provisions

of our State constitution are concerned.

It must also be held, under the authority of Havnor’s case (supra)

—even though it may be assumed from the reading of the statute

that the object of the legislature is to protect employees in such es-

tablishments from working more than ten hours a day—that it is

within the police power, and, therefore, not repugnant to the State

constitution. The statute which that case passes upon makes it a

misdemeanor to carry on the business of a barber on the first day

of the week, and a judgment of conviction under that law is

affirmed in this court because “The statute under consideration has

a reasonable connection with the public health, welfare or safety.”

Certainly if this court could so hold in that case it must so hold in

this, even under the construction of the statute which those would

ive to it who are affected by the fact that article VIII, chapter 32,

neral Laws, is grouped with 12 other articles, the compilatiun

being known as the labor law, instead of being in the

44 domestic law, with articles entitled, Flour and meal, Beef

and pork, or in the public health law with articles such as

Adulteration, Practice of medicine or the like.

Again many medical authorities classify workers in bakers’ or con-

fectioners’ establishments with potters, stone cutters, file grinders

and other workers whose occupation necessitates the inhalation of

dust particles, and hence predisposes its members to cousumption.

The published medical opinions and vital statistics bearing upon

that subject standing alone fully justify the section under review as

one to protect the health of the employees in such establishments,

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORE. 29

and it is the duty of this court to assume that the section was framed

not only in the light of, but also with full appreciation of the force

of the medical authority bearing upon the subject—authority which

reasonably challenges the attention, and stimulates the helpfulness

of the philanthropist.

The conclusion necessarily follows, therefore, from an examination

‘of the statute in the light of the authorities cited, that the purpose

of article VIII, and every part of it, including the provision in ques-

tion, is to benefit the public; that it has a just an reasonable rela-

tion to the public welfare, and hence is within the police power pos-

sessed by the legislature. But if, in violation of the duty of the court

as stated in Brodger’s case (supra)—which is “ to adopt the constr uc-

‘tion which, without doing violence to the fair meaning of the words

used, brings the statute into harmony with the provisious of the

Constitution ”—we award to the title of a general law such potency

as causes it to overcome both the title and the provisions of an article

therein, thus making the provision a labor law, we are still required

to hold that it is within the police power.

The judgment should be affirmed.

Gray, J.:

I shall concur with the chief judge; whose opinion I regard as

carefully expressed and convincing in its reasoning. The

45 question for us is, in the first place, whether, notwithstanding

its embodiment in the labor law, we may treat the statutory

provision, in question, as a health law and, in the next place, if we

may do so, whether its enactment is a reasonable exercise of the po-

lice power of the State, which the courts should give effect to. I am

of the opinion that its being placed in the labor law furnishes no

adequate reason for limiting its reading and construction by those

considerations, which appertain to laws passed, strictly, in the in-

terest of labor; if, from its association with other provisions, in pari

materia, a different and independent purpose is disclosed. To de-

prive a health law of its intended operation, because it is not found

in the statute book under that, or a kindred, title, would be, in my

opinion, to apply an unreasonable and an unsatisfactory test of its

validity. If the court concludes that the intent of an enactment in

some valid exercise of the police power is to regulate some particular

trade, or occupation, then, clearly, it should be quite immaterial

under what heading it appears to be classified in the statutes. It

would not do to nullify the will of the people upon so technical and

narrow a consideration. Therefore, I think we may proceed, beyond

that ground, to the determination of the question whether, if a

health law, the 110th section of this article VIII was reasonable

and, therefore, a valid exercise of the police power. If it stood

alone, unaccompanied and Baal i ig by cognate provisions,

I should incline to the view that the enactment was unconsti-

tutional. It might, justly, be held to fall within that class of legis-

lation, which has received judicial condemnation ; because, as a reg-

30 JOSEPH LOCHNER Ys.

ulation of the hours of the employed, its object would appear to be

for their protection against the exaction of a disproportionate amount

of work for the wages paid. That would be to infringe upon the ©

liberty of contract. But I think we must read the section in connec-

tion with those sections which immediately follow, and then it ig

that we find it to be made certain that the object of the legislative

enactment had relation to the conservation of the public health,

We perceive that the legislature is dealing with the workings

of a business conducted upon a scale, calling for the employ-

46 ment of more or less laborers, and which is affected by a

public interest, in the sense that the food product may, sensi-

03 Bip srg for its healthfulness upon the observance of sanitary

rules and precautions. Such precautionary regulations may in-

volve, as well, the establishment of proper conditions to insure the

maintenance of the normal vitality of the workman, as the whole-

someness of the general environment. We must presume that the

legislative body was animated by a reasonable intention to

the public welfare and if the courts can give effect to it, because

tending to guard the public health, they should, unhesitatingly, do

80. a i will not be allowed, arbitrarily, to interfere with the

personal liberty of the citizen, under the specious guise of an ex-

ercise of the police power, and therefore it is, that our courts may

supervise, as a judicial question, a determination of the legislature

to exercise the a power in restraint of some trade, or calling.

It is true that the tendency has been growing in the direction of

an excess of paternalism in government and that the courts of this

and of other States have, rather, hastened to uphold legislative in-

terference with the pursuits of citizens, upon any plausible pretext

of its being in furtherance: of the general welfare. The Federal

Supreme Court has, in the broadest terms, recognized the power of

the individual States to exercise a police power of internal regu-

lation; when the object is to promote by reasonable laws the pub-

lic safety, health and comfort. To the legislative body is conceded

the power to govern men and the affairs of men, through the es-

tablishment of such rules and regulations as may be conducive to

the public betterment, because — to the protection of the

lives, health and comfort of persons and the protection of property,

and that concession has been, in my opinion, at times, more broadly

made in the decisions of the courts, than the conservative spirit of

our democratic form of government will justify. But that the legis-

lature has, and should have, the broadest authority to exercise a po-

lice — of internal regulation, in the direction of protect-

47 ing the peace, the safety and the health of the community I

fully concede. In this law, which restricts the working hours

of employés in bakery and confectionery establishments, I think we

may, fairly, perceive a statutory regulation, reasonably promotive of

the public health, because compelling the master of such an estab-

lishment to conduct it in a manner, the least capable of affecting his

product prejudicially. We may, not unreasonably, assume that an

‘at PropLit of dt staré oF Nw Yor. $1

employé may work too long for his health under the conditions, and

that an impaired vitality and the possible devel t of organic

diseases may be the result. If, to obviate the le consequences

to the consumer of the food manufactured, the legislature deter-

mines to interfere, by limiting, among other regulations, the hours

of the workman, I do not think we should hold the interference to

be without reason.

Vann, J.:

_ I concur in the result reached by the chief judge, for the follow-

ing reasons:

ihe power of the legislature to pass what it may consider “ health

laws” is not unlimited, but is bounded by the duty of the courts to

determine whether the act has a fair, just and reasonable relation

to the general welfare. (Matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 108; People

v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389,401 ; People v. Haynor, 149 N. Y.-195, 200.)

As was said by the court in the Gillson case: “ Under an exercise

of the police power the enactment must have some relation to the

comfort, the safety, or the welfare of society, and it must not be in

conflict with the constitution. The law will not allow the rights of

property to be invaded under the guise of a police regulation for

the protection of health, when it is manifest that such is not the

object and purpose of the regulation. * * * It is generally

for the legislature to determine what laws and regulations are needed

to protect the public health and serve the public comfort and safety

and if its measures are calculated, intended, convenient or appro-

priate to accomplish such ends, the exercise of- its discretion is not

the subject uf judicial review.”

We have before us simply that part of the labor law which

48 regulates the hours of labor in eries and confectionery

establishments by limiting them to not exceeding sixty per

week and ten per day, “ unless for the ) purpose of making a shorter

work day on the last day of the week.

The draftsman of this statute apparently used as a model “The

bakehouse regulation act” L grey by the English Parliament in

1863, but he went far beyond that pattern in limiting the hours of

labor, for the New York statute applies to all employees in bakeries,

while the English act makes no regulation of hours per day or week,

but simply prohibits the employment of persons under eighteen

ears of age between nine at night and fivein the morning. (26-27

ictoria, cap. 40.) Both acts contain similar provisions to secure

cleanliness and ventilation of the rooms used to carry on the busi-

ness as well as the separation of sleeping apartments therefrom, none

of which are now called in question.

I do not think the regulation in question can be sustained, unless

we are able to say from common knowledge that working in a bakery

and candy factory is an unhealthy employment. If such an occu-

pation is unhealthy the legislature had the 7 to prohibit em-

ployers from requiring or permitting»their employees to spend more

$a JosEPH LOCHNER Ys.

than a specified number of hours per day or week in the work, be-

cause such a command would be in the interest of tue public health

and barack Sew the general welfare. Asin the Jacobs case we

took judicial notice of the nature and qualities of tobacco (p. 113),

80 in this case we may take judicial notice of the effect of very fine

icles of flour and sugar when inhaled into the lungs from the

eated atmosphere of manufactories of bread and candy. Neces-

sarily in considering the subject we may resort to such sources of

information as were open to the legislature.

Vital statistics show that those vocations which require persons to

remain for long periods of time in a confined and heated atmosphere

filled with some foreign substance, which is inhaled into the lungs,

are injurious to health and tend to shorten life. Bakers and con-

fectioners, who, during working hours, constantly breathe air filled

with the finest dust from flour and sugar, have a tendency to

49 consumption, the most terrible scourge known to modern

civilization and resulting in more deaths than any other dis-

ease. (1 People’s Cyc. 479; Mulhall’s Dict. Statistics, 193 and 683.)

Thus in the article on phthisis in volume 18 of the last edition of

the weed ea) Britannica it is said: “ Occupations which neces-

sitate the inhalation of irritating particles, as in the case of stone

masons, needle ape workers in minerals, in cotton, flour, straw,

&c., are especially hurtful, chiefly from the mechanical effects upon

the delicate pulmonary tissues of the matter inhaled. No less prej-

udicial are occupations carried on in a heated and close atmosphe*e,

as is often the case with compositors, goldbeaters, semp-tresses, etc.”

So in Alden’s Encyclopedia, vol. 9, title Consumption, the follow-

ing occurs: “ Often the workshops of tailors, printers, bakers and

other businesses carried on in close, ill-ventilated apartments by large

numbers of working people are nurseries of cousumption.”

We quote from a few more out of many authorities to the same

effect. “It is certain that much might be done to improve the pub-

lic health in this respect by more attention on the part of employers

of labor to the comfort and habits of those who are, in more senses

than one, their ‘ hands’ and the sources of their prosperity. A cer-

tain kind of improvement has, indeed, been already effected by the

San abt living of the working classes during the last twenty years.

Still it is well known and proved by careful inquiries that the work-

shops of tailors, printers, bakers and other businesses carried on- in

close, ill-ventilated apartments, by large numbers of workmen are,

in a very aggravated sense, nurseries of consumption. * * *

The cutters and needle-grinders of Sheffield appear to owe their

notoriously short lives to consumption brought on by the inhalation

of metallic particles in the close and stifling atmosphere of their

workshops. * * * . Even admitting, therefore, that the causes of

consumption may be in part practically irremovable, there seems

no reason to doubt that very much might be done to dimin-

50 ish its prevalence, as well as to arrest its course when already

formed, by due attention to the comfort of the laboring popu-

lation, both in their dwellings and in the pursuit of their occupa-

tions.” (4 International Cyclopedia, 286.)

“ Particular occupations predi (to consumption), weed

such as occasion constant inhalation of small particles.” (2 John-

son ata re8 488.) :

“Thus tailors, seamstresses and similar workers are especially

prone to the disease. More especially is this true of occupations

whose performance necessitates the inhalation of dust particles.

as é ve dust particles rae otal aga of the ame pe so

which line the air passages and y inducing chronic :

which, in turn, are liable to lead to consumption.” (3 Chambers

Encyclopedia, 438.)

- “The bacillus of tuberculosis finds, indeed, the most favorable

conditions for its existence in the squalor of congested slums, in the

foul atmosphere of dusty workshops, in close courts, alleys, etc.”

(70 Fortnightly Review, 308.)

“A very large number of the most efficient workmen employed

in quarries, metal works, cotton and wool manufactories, print trades

ant many other occupations exposing them to bad air and dust fall

victims to this infection.” (194 Edinburgh Review, 444.)

“Since statistics still show that the mortality from phthisis in

_ people who follow certain trades is much greater than in others,

there can be no doubt of the casual relationship between occupation

and pulmonary disease and of dust being the causa causans. * * *

In 1866 it was demonstrated that * * * two kinds of occu

tion had long been recognized as hurtful, viz.: 1, those that give

rise to — ~ chemical pe of eos es vi ust,

grit or flu i iffused throug e atmosphere; 2, those in

which the suaraitesi are —— to abrupt changes of temperature.”

(The Lancet, vol. 165, p. 1345.)

“ Living in a close atmosphere and in a high temperature, bakers

are subject to lung diseases, more especially phthisis.” (5 Reference

Handbook of Medical Science, 276.)

51 “ Those engaged in carding of cotton and workers in flax,

hemp, tobacco and flour, and chaff cutters suffer in the same

manner, but to a less degree than such as are compelled to inhale

more decidedly irritating particles.” (Fowler & Godlee’s Diseases

of the Lungs, 272.)

“ Dusty occupations, as in the case of millers, bakers, knife-grind-

ers, stone-masons, and the like, are fraught with special dangers to

vulnerable persons.” (5 Allbutt’s System of Medicine, 229.)

“The inhalation of impure air in occupations associated with a

very dusty atmosphere renders the lungs less capable of resisting

infection.” (Osler’s Practice of Medicine, 269.)

“ Dusty occupations make people prone to disease. The statistics

of Berlin as to street-cleaners, cabmen, coal workers and miners

show this.” (35 Journal Am. Med. Assn. 1028.) “The question as

to what business had best be carried on * tuberculosis patients is

pent = be mbler, * * * The butchers, he thinks, generally

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. $3

ing.

siekly sinell much like that of heated bones, superad to the

steam and other fumes. There are, in brief, many incidents in the

occupation of baking which reduce vital energy, predispose

52 _— to lung affections and shorten life.” (Arlige Diseases of Oc-

cupations, 255.)

The occupations of ropemakers, carpetmakers, bakers, etc., “ being

essentially dust-producing processes, they one and all induce a

workers excessive reste from pulmonary affections. Althoogh

the mortality of these worke

is considerably below that of metal workers, nevertheless it is in

every case inordinately high, exceeding the mortality of agricultur-

ists by proportions varying from 77 to 120 per cent.” (Latham’s

ister-General’s Report, 148.)

ecording to the data presented by Dr. C. Moeller in his work

on Hygiene of the Baker Industry (p. 295): “of bakers dying

between the ages of 45 and 65, twenty-five per cent. died from

chronic bronchitis or related diseases.” He points out “the per-

sistency of the flour dust and starchy particles in the bronchial

tubes, and even in the lungs” by oe a medical cecil to

the effect “that even two and a half weeks after leaving the employ-

ment, starchy particles and other evidences of flour cust had bee

found in the expectoration of bakers examined.”

According to the tables of comparative mortality in the Federal

census of 1900, the number of deaths among bakers and confec-

tioners was three and two-tenths per cent. greater than the average

of general industrial occupations. These tables are somewhat

favorable to bakers between the ages of 15 and 44, but are unfavor-

able to them between the ages of 45 and over, the average being as

stated above. (See, also, 1 Parke’s Manual of Practical Hygiene,

133; 62 Medical Record, 334; Medical Examiner and Practi oner,

Nov. 1902, tit. Occupations; id. July, 1901, tit. Occupation as

affecting the death rate.)

The heaviest death rate in wos falls to cabdrivers, ee

rinters, tailors and bakers. (Mulhall’s Dictionary of i

95.) Statisties relating to thirty-nine trades in England

rs from — and other lang d

bakers

ife. (Id.

MA ibtle she cesiiadity those who breathe air filled with 3

minute particles of flour is than among those who work in.

stone, metal or clay, still it seems to be demonstrated that it is

ter than in avocations y. The dustladen air in a

er’s or confectioner’s establishment is more benign and less liable

to irritate than particles of stone or metal, hence, while bakers are

classified with potters, stone masons, file grinders, ¢tc., still they are

regarded as less liable to pulmonary disease than other members of

the class. The evidence while not uniform leads to the conclusion

that the occupation of a baker or confectioner is unhealthy and

tends to result in diseases of the riage’ | organs. As statutes

are valid which provide that women or children shall not be em-

ployed in any manufacturing establishment more than a certain

number of hours in a single day, so I think an act is valid which

provides that in an employment which the legislature deems, and

which is in fact, to some extent detrimental to health, no person,

regardless of age or sex, shall be permitted or uired to labor

more than a certain number of hours per day or week. Such legi

lation, under such circumstances, isa health law and is a valid

exercise of the police power.

I vote for ce.

O’Brien, J. (dissenting):

The defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor under one of the

subdivisions of section 384 of the Penal Code, in that he violated

erticle eight, section 110, chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897, known as

the labor law. The indictment cha that on the twenty-first

day of December, 1899, he was arrested upon the com laint of one

of his employees for violating the law in permitting the employee

to work in a bakery more than sixty hours in one week; that he

was convicted in the city court and fined twenty dollars, or in

default thereof stand committed to the county jai! for twenty days,

and that he paid the fine ; that after such conviction the defend-

54 ~—_ ant “ wrongfully, uulawfally and knowingly, with intent on

his part to violate the law, permitted and required” another em-

ployee named to work more than sixty hours in one week during

the week commencing April 19th an ending April 26th, 1901, in

the defendant's biscuit, bread and cake bakery and confectionery

establishment, thereby committing a misdemeanor as a second

offense, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and

an and against the peace of the people of the State of New

ork and their dignity.

The defendant demurred to the indictment on two grounds: (1)

That more than one crime was charged; and (2) thet the facts

committed to the county jail onl: “the fine was paid, not to

sion by ad court and from this jadgment the defendant _

ied to this court, and the appeal brings up for review all

ns raised by the demurrer to the indictment.

comply with * * * the provisions of article eight

labor law, relating to bakeries and confectionery establish-

ments, the employment of labor and the manufacture of flour or

meal food products therein * * * is guilty of a misdemeanor

and upon conviction shall be punished for a first offense by a fine

of not less than twenty nor more than one hundred dollars; fora

second offense by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than two hun-

dred dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than thirty days, or

by both such fine and imprisonment; for a third offense by a fine

of not less than two hundred and fifty dollars, or by imprisonment

for not more than sixty days, or by both such fine and imprison-

ment.

55 It will be seen that this section of the Penal Code does not

specify the acts or omissions which are made crimes, nor does

it in any appropriate terms define the crime at all, but refers for that

rpose to another law. When we turn to article eight of the labor

aw, referred to above, we find that it contains six separate sections,

commanding certain things and prohibiting certain things. The

ticular section which the indictment charges to have been vio-

ated by the defendant is the first section of the article, or section

110, and that reads as follows: “No employee shall be required or

permitted to work in a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or confection-

ery establishment more than sixty hours in any one week, or more

than ten hours in any one day, unless for the purpose of making a

shorter work day on the last day of the week; nor more hours in

any one week than will make an average of ten hours per day for

the number of days during such week in which such employee shall

work.” While this section of the labor law does forbid certain

things, no penalty whatever is attached to a violation, and, there-

fore, in order to get a definition of the particular crime charged in

the indictment we must examine two general statutes upon different

subjects ; that is to say, we must read the Penal Code for tho penalty

or the punishment, and we must read the labor law in order to as-

certain the particular act or omission which constitutes the crime.

One of the grounds of the demarrer is that the indictment charges

two crimes. It will be seen that two things or two acts or omissions

have been forbidden by the statute; it forbids the master from either

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. $7

permitting or requiring the servant to work more than the time

specified in the statute. Assuming for the present that the statute

is valid, it makes it a crime for the master to permit the servant to

work over the statutory time; and it also makes it a crime for him

to require or compel the servant to so work. The two acts or omis-

sions inhibited by the statute are essentially different in nature and

character. It is one thing to permit the servant to work ; it is quite

another thing to compel or require it. Permitting him to

56 work more than the ten hours might be intentional or invol-

untary. Compelling or requiring him to work would be a

deliberate act on the part of the master in violation of the statute.

‘In the one case the punishment might very well be nominal ; in the

other case it would necessarily have to be substantial, and, hence, it

would seem that two acts or omissions so essentially different in na-

ture and character and each constituting a crime in itself could rot

properly be united in the same charge, and in this view the objec-

tion that more than one crime is stated in the indictment is good.

But the objection was also made that the acts or omissions stated

in the indictment do not constitute a crime, and this objection raises

the question as to the validity of the statute and is of much more

importance than the form or substance of the indictment. It will

be seen from an examination of the law that there is no prohibition

agaiust the act of the servant himself in working longer than the

statutory time. He may work as many hours as he likes during the

day and he violates no law and commits no offense whatever. So

the broad question is whether a statute which makes it a crime for

the master to permit his servant to do what the servant has a perfect

right to do can bea valid law. No restrictions are im upon

the servant with respect to the hours of labor or otherwise. As al-

ready remarked, he has a perfect right to work as many hours in a

day or week as he may want to, but the master must see to it, at the

ril of committing a crime, that his servants are driven out of the

uilding the moment the clock registers the requisite ten hours, and

that, too, without regard to the conditions and circumstances affect-

ing the business or the interests of the master. It is acrime for the

master to require or permit his servant to work over the statutory

time, no matter how willing or even desirous the servant may be to

earn extra compensation for overwork. The master is forbidden to

contract with his servant for longer hours and extra pay, no matter

what inay be the wants or necessities of the business, or the judg-

ment or will of the servant with respect to such a contract. fe

57 _— is obviously one of those paternal laws, enacted doubtless with

the best intentions, but which in its operation must inevitably

= enmity and strife between master and servant. They are not

eft free to make their own bargains in their own way, but their

mutual interests are governed by statute.

The sweeping character of the legislation in question may be il-

lustrated by a reference to the last section of the article of the labor

law referred to in the indictment; that is to say, tosection 115. It is

sted as follows: “If, in the opinion of

i ; me : ’ guid ,

shall be

f,

have such a sweeping effect or confer such arbitrary powers upon a

ministerial officer that affected the liberty and the property of the

individual.

It is contended in behalf of the defendant that the law under

which he was convicted violates section one of article fourteen of the

Constitution of the United States, which prohibits any State from

making or enforcing any law which shall deny toany person within ~

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law, and those provisions

of the constitution of this State which enact that no member

58 of this State shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the

ights or privileges, secured to any citizen thereof, unless by

the law of the land and the judgment of his peers, nor be deprived

of life, liberty or property without due process of law. (Const. art.

1, §§ 1,6.) The _ ~% law of the a do -“ ne an act —

legislature passed for the very purpose of working the wrong.

coulen is that no person shall be deprived of any of the rights or

privileges secured to him by the constitution, unless the matter’

sLall be adjudged against him upon a trial had according to law.

It cannot be done by mere oe. (Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill,

140; White v. White, 5 Barb. 474; People v. Toynbee, 20 Barb. 198;

Wynebamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378; People ez rel. Warren v. Beck,

144 N. Y. 237; People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1; People

v. Orange County Road Const. Co., 175 N. Y. 84.) The doctrine of

these cases condemus the legislation in question as an invasion of

the rights, liberties and property of the citizen. The three cases

last cited grew out of the same law that is violated in the case at

bar, or similar laws, and they eannot be distinguished from it in

principle.

The labor law excludes from its regulations and restrictions all

— engaged in farm work or domestic service (art. 1, § 3) and,

ence, a very large proportion of the people of the State who labor

for a living are not affected by it at all. Why this large class of

nit PROPLE OF Tam state OF xEW vont. oe

- wage earners who toil for a livelihood are excluded from the bene-

fits of the statute, and those who employ them exem from its bur-

dens and restrictions, it is difficult to conceivs. farmers and

__ that large class of people both in the city and in the country who

case is based is aimed at a very small class of persons, namely, those

who conduct “a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or confectionery

bakeries. The law does not even apply to bakers in the small towns

and villages who do their own seek. It applies only to bakers who

find it necessary to employ labor, and they alone are subjected to

criminal prosecution in case they permit the servant to work more

than ten hours in a day, even though the servant is willing and is

given extra compensation. The baker is forbidden, under the

penalty of fine and imprisonment, to contract or agree with his

servant upon the hours of labor in such way as would be mutuall

beneficial, but his business is practically regulated by statute. If

for any reason he suffers or permits his servant to work an addi-

tional half-hour beyond the statutory time his liberty and his prop-

erty are put at the mercy of the servant, who may procure him to

be arrested and imprisoned. It does not appear from the record in

this case, or in any other way, that there is anything in the business

or vocation of a baker that would authorize the legislature to impose

such criminal penalties upon him for permitting his servant to work

more than ten hours in the day, or to restrict his freedom of con-

tract, which is a right enjoyed by all other employers of labor.

The guaranties of the constitution may be invaded without any

physical interference with the person or property of the citizen. He

is deprived of his property within the meaning of the constitution

when arbitrary and unnecessary restrictions are imposed upon his

conduct of any lawful business, and when he is deprived of the right

to make contracts for the transaction thereof. Liberty, in its broad

sense, means the right, not only of freedom from actual restraint of

the person, but the right of such use of his faculties in all lawful

ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any

lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation. Ail

laws, therefore, which impair or trammel those ri hts or restrict

his freedom of action, or his choice of methods in the trans-

action of his lawful business, are infringements u his

fundamental right of liberty, and are void. (Mattero Jacobs,

98 N. Y. 98.) They cannot and should not escape the scrutiny of

the courts merely because they are made to assume, by argument or

otherwise, the guise of police regulations. SS

‘The statute in question deprives the defendant of the equal pro-

tection of the law, since it enacts that certain acts or omissions on

his part ‘ing the conduct of his business and his relations to

his own servants are crimes and punished criminally, which, as to

all the rest of the community not within the terms of this law, are

entirely innocent. The very small fraction of the community who |

happen to conduct bakeries, or confectionery establishments, are

prohibited, under pain of fine and imprisonment, from Fabs agesanes

the conduct of their own business by contracts or mu agree-

ments with their employees, whereas all the rest of the community

who find it necessary to employ labor in private business may do

so. Class legislation of this character which discriminates in favor

of one person and against another is forbidden by the Constitution

of the United States, if not by the constitution of the State; and so

it has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States and by

this court. (Gulf, C. & 8. F R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. 8. 150; Cotting

v. Kansas City S. Y. Co., 183 U.S. 79; Connolly v. U.S. P. Co., 184

U.S. 540; People v. Orange County Road Constr. Co., 175 N. Y. 87,

90.) It is, I think, quite obvious that the legislation in question is,

upon its face, in conflict with the constitutional guaranties referred

to, unless it can be brought within the scope of the police powér.

That is the only ground upon which the statute is defended by the

learned district attorney. He contends that it isa health law a

for the purpose of protecting the public health, or at least the health

of those persons employed in bakeries. The argument is that the

defendant was forbidden by the statute to permit his workmen to

work more than ten hours in a day, to the end that his customers

might have wholesome bread, biscuit and confectionery,

61 whereas if they were permitted to work ten and a half hours

in the day the product of the bakery would be unwholesome

or dangerous to health. What possible relation or connection the

number of hours that the workmen are permitted to work in the

bakery has, or can have, to the healthful quality of the bread made

there is quite impossible to conceive. The baker in the small towns,

or even in the large towns, who does his own work and does not

employ labor, may work day or night without fear of molestation,

since no one thought it necessary to protect the public against his

unwholesome product. It has already been observed that the law

does not impose any penalties or restrictions upon the workman

himself for working too much, and if the purpose was to protect his

health against his own avarice, or his own misdirected energy, it is

quite remarkable that it did not at least forbid him from working

more than ten hours in a day.

The contention that the defendant was convicted for violating a

health law is, at best I think, but a mere disguise that is not suffi-

cient to save the statute from condemnation. There is nothing on the

face of the law nor in its manifest operation to show that it has any

THE PEOPLE OF THE staTE OF NEW YorRE.

relation to the public health. It is no

of a general statute known as the

it was not intrusted to any of the health a

inspector, which shows what its real scope and was.

factory inspector is not the officer with the enforcement of

health laws. The legislature classified it as a labor law, and it is

that and nothing else. ich encroach upon the personal or

ey rights of the citizen, as guaranteed by the Constitution, are

rally defended Sreecrioel ea bat they are police regalations

t the courts have prescribed a test by means of which their true

character and purpose may be known. The rule is that the court

must be able to say judicially that the statute in question is a health

law, and has some appropriate relation to the promotion or

protection of health. It will not be deceived or misled by mere

names or pretenses. The cases are numerous in which the

62 courts have,condemned statutes as invasions of the rights se-

cured to the citizen by the Constitution, though enacted or

sought to be upheld under the guise of health laws or other police

regulations. They all arrive at the same result, and that is that the

legislature may not under the guise of a statute to protect against

some wrong, real or imaginary, arbitrarily strike down private

rights and invade personal freedom or confiscate private property.

The police power must be exercised within its ge ome sphere and

by appropriate methods. (Matter of Jacobs, supra ; People v. Marx, 29

N. Y. 377; People v. Arensberg, 103 N. Y. 388; People v. Gillson, 109

N. Y. 389; Colon v. Lisk, 158 N. Y. 188; People ez rel. Rodgers v.

‘Coler, 166 N. Y.1; ie v. Buffalo Fish Co., 164 N. Y. 101, 104;

People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y.1.) It will not do to say that the legis-

lature in enacting the statute in question may have thought that it

was a health law, or had some relation to health. The action of the

legislature, or its views or reasons for the passage of the law, does

not conclude the courts, but they must determine for themselves

whether in any given case the legislation which is claimed to be an

exercise of the police power is meen! what it is claimed to be.

Every labor law, however stringent and arbitrary, could just as well

be upheld upon the ground that it is a health law ; but in all the dis-

cussions that have stm had in the courts for many years concern-

ing the validity of legislation of this character, there are to be found

but very few cases where it was even claimed that the statute was

enacted for the purpose of preserving or promoting health, or that it

had any relation whatever to that subject. When it is manifest, as

it is in this case, that the law has no relation whatever to the sub-

ject of health, and that its real object and purpose was to regulate

the hours of labor between master and servant in a business which is

private and not dangerous to morals, or to health, freedom to con-

tract with each other, defining their mutual obligations, cannot be

prohibited without violating the fundamental law.

The defendant was charged in the indictment with the violation

6—292

of a statute may be good that requires and prescribes sanitary -

lations binding upon the landlord who owns and lets asnbeat

houses in cities, but this would not save another section of the stat-

ute that prescribes the maximum rent that he may demand and re-

ceive from his tenants. It is even quite possible that a law might

be held that enjoins upon farmers or persons employing

mestic help the mee of preserving their health against infectious

diseases by reasonable and proper safeguards, such as ventilation of

the rooms where they sleep and the like, but this would not save a

separate section of the law prescribing the compensation that the

master is required to pay to the servant. So that the section of the

labor law with which we are now concerned can borrow no strength

from its association with other sections of the statute that may be

good. The single section of the labor law that we are now dealing -

with must stand or fall upon its own intrinsic character and can re-

ceive no support from the company in which it is found. If that

section had also provided that every employee of a bakery would

be guilty of a misdemeanor if he neglected or refused to faithfully

serve his master for ten full hours in each day no one I appre-

hend would then claim that it was a health law. And yet every

argument and every authority cited in defense of the section

64 in its present form would be just as good then as they are now.

The section would then be just as much of a health law as it

is now. :

It cannot be repeated too often that if the single section of the

law with which we are now concerned and which is the sole basis of

the criminal charge in this case, stood alone, the argument that it is

a health law and within the police power would not have even a color

of reason or authority to support it. But what the learned district

attorney urges upon us is that since the section is found in the article

associated with other sections prescribing sanitary regulations, we

must assume that the legislators for some unexpressed reason suffi-

cient to them, reached the conclusion that a baker ought not to be

rmitted or required to work on an average of more than ten hours

in aday. Ofcourse this reasoning is without force and does not

meet the difficulty. The question is not what the unexpressed reason

THE PEOPLE OF THE STAT OF NEW YORK. 48

is that moved the lawmakers, so long as it is impossible for any

court to discover that reason or any reason to bring the enactment

within the — the police power. It is always open to the courts

to inquire and determine whether a statute is in fact fairly within

the police power. That principle is found imbedded in all the cases

on that — If it were otherwise and the real view of the legisla-

ture is made the dominant idea, then the court would be deprived of

all power to declare any law void provided the legislature called it

an exercise of the police power, or some one contended that it was

supposed to be such upon some theory that the 2 age interest re-

quired its enactment. There would be no limit then to the police

power and every statute however arbitrary and in violation of the

‘constitutional safeguards for the protection of life, liberty or prop-

erty could be upheld on the plea that the lawmakers called it a

health law or intended it as such, or thought it was necessary for

that purpose. It is incumbent upon the courts to see to it that such

laws are really what they profess to be, or if claimed to be police

regulations that they are such within the reasonable scope of that

power.

65 The bakers’ vocation is one that has existed practically in

all ages and in all countries. Wherever cereals are converted

into bread, the standard food of the human race, except possibly as

to those races that are considered savage or semi-savage, the making

of bread is one of the most common employments. The process is

familiar to the domestics in every public or private house in the

land as well as in the places called. bakeries, where bread is made

for sale to the public. It has never been supposed that it was a trade

or vocation that was or might be dangerous to health, morals or

good order, or that there was anything about it to justify legislation

restricting the right of the master and servant to make their own

contracts, express or —- with respect to hours of work or the

here is nothing in the record before us from

overwork, a right which the law gives to all other persons employ-

ing labor. If the legislature can do all this then the right to enact

what w the servant shall receive per day or per hour must

necessarily follow as an inevitable conclusion. A statute fixing the

wages of the servant at such a sum as to enable him to live more

comfortably could be defended as a health law by the same argu-

pport of the section of the 43a

rity adduced in su

hich is the only see

ss within the power of the re to enact that a

ess than the quantity prescribed by

When there is no coutract regulating the matter,

and there is a dispute between the parties as to what constitutes a

ton of coal or a bushel of wheat, the statute would doubtless be

available to settle the controversy. So in the case of the master

and servant with respect to the number of hours that shall con-

stitute a day’s work. The legislature may no doubt define what is

or shall constitute a day’s work, but it cannot prohibit the parties

from making agreements for themselves, and then custom or con-

pig express or implied, would control the mutual obligations of

the

The facts stated in the indictment do not constitute a crime, and

therefore, the demurrer must be sustained, the judgment of convic-

tion reversed and the defendant discharged.

Bartuiett, J. (dissenting) :

I agree with Judge O’Brien for reversal. In one of the encyelo-

ro authorities cited for respondent it is said: “ Bakers and con-

ectioners who, during working hours, constantly breathe air filled

with the finest dust from flour and sugar, have a tendency to con-

sumption,” etc. The authorities cited condemning the calling of a

baker as unhealthy, doubtless refer to localities where they grind

the grain, loaf-sugar and other materials used. It may be observed

in passing that “ the medical authorities without number ” might lose

some of their force if the writer were, where he should be, in court

and subjected to cross-examination.

It is common experience that the baker, like the cooks in hotels,

restaurants and private families, has provided for him in his busi-

ness flour, sugar and the other ingredients duly prepared for imme-

diate use. The claim that the compounding of these constituents, so

prepared, in the business of a baker, is an unhealthy occupation, will

surprise the bakers and good housewives of this State. The grind-

ing of steel, like the needle-grinding of Sheffield, England, and of

other similar materials and substances, causing clouds of eg rer

dust, is not to be confounded with the avocation of the family baker

engaged in the necessary and highly appreciated labor of

67 producing bread, pies, cakes and other commodities more cal-

culated to cause dyspepsia in the consumer than consumption

in the manufacturer.

The country miller of fifty years ago who a long and happy

life amid the hum of machinery and the grinding process of

the upper and nether stones, little dreamed of a coming day when

the legislature, in the full panoply of paternalism, would rescue his.

_ successor from the appalling dangers of the life he led until old age

agg enn tly said that the limits of the police powe

t has uently said t e limi

cannot be accurately defined ; that it is not desirable the legidlatens

should be thus trammeled.

When this court held that the a acted in the legitimate,

_ undiscriminating exercise of the police power in compelling all bar-

bers to observe strictly the first day of the week, commonly called

Sunday, except in the village of Saratoga Speers and the city of New

York, the legal profession doubtless concluded that the elasticity of

the undefined had arrived at its Ultima Thule. (People v. Havnor,

149 N. Y. 195.) That this conclusion was erroneous is shown by

the fact that the case is now doing duty against the baker when

men in kindred occupations are permitted to work as many hours

as necessity dictates.

Another question in this case is whether section 110, contained in

article 8 of the labor law (chapter 415, Laws of 1897), is within the

police power. This section is contained in article 8, which consists

of sections 110, 111, 112, 113, 114 and 115. I am of the opinion

that all the sections of said article, excepting section 110, are within

the police power, relating as they do to sanitary conditions concern-

ing the business of a baker. Placing section 110, relating exclu-

sively as it does to hours of labor in bakeries and confectionery

establishments, in article 8, does not bring it within the police

wer.

an a recent case this court said : “In the interest of public health,

of public morals and of public order, a State may restrain and for-

bid what would otherwise be the right of a private citizen.

68 It may enact laws to regulate the extent of labor which

women and children or persons of immature years shall be al-

lowed to perform, and prohibit — their employment in dan-

hag occupations. (Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120

ass. 383; Tiedeman’s Police Power, § 85.)” (People ». Orange

County Road Cons. Co., 175 N. Y. 84, 87, 88.)

The State may also regulate the hours of labor in deep and un-

healthy mines, and in any vocation where it is pursued at the risk

of health and life. It is use I believe that the occupation of a

baker does not fall within these general principles, and the array of

authorities cited, I vote for reversal.

Parker, Ch. J., Gray and Vann, JJ., read for affirmance, and

Haight, J., concurs; O’Brien and Bartlett, JJ., read for reversal, and

Martin, J., concurs.

Judgment affirmed.

Strate or New York, \ gs

Oneida County Clerk’s Office, f°

I, Hermon Clarke, clerk of said county, and of the supreme and

county courts therein, the same being courts of record, do hereby.

ify, that I have compared the annexed copy of opinions and the

office, and that the same is a correct transcript therefrom, and of

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and affixed the

peal of said county and courts, at the city of Utica, this 27 day of

f ‘Muy. 1904. ; t

[Seal Oneida County, New York.]

HERMON CLARKE, Clerk,

By GEO. D. FRANK,

Deputy Clerk.

69 At a term of the Oneida county court, held at the court

house in the city of Utica, on the 4th day of April, 1904.

Present: Hon. Watson T. Dunmore, justice presiding.

Oneida County Court, Oneida County.

against

JosepH LOcHNER.

Tue Prorpie or tHe Strate or NEw oe

The defendant, Joseph Lochner, having appealed to the court of

appeals from the judgment of conviction heretofore, and on the 3rd

day of October, 1902, entered in the above entitled action, affirming

the judgment entered in said action on the 10th day of February,

1902 and said court of appeals having heard the said appeal, and

having ordered and adjudged that said judgment of conviction so

appealed from be affirmed :

ow, upon filing the remittitur from said court of appeals, and

upon motion of Timothy Curtin, district attorney of Oneida county,

for the people:

Ordered, that said judgment of the court of appeals, be and the

same is hereby made the judgment of this court; and that the afore-

said judgment entered herein on the 10th day of February, 1902, be

and the same is hereby affirmed, and that judgment of this court be

entered herein affirming said judgment of conviction.

Enter.

W. T. DUNMORE,

Oneida Co., Judge.

Strate or New York, :

Oneida County Clerk’s Office, f * °

I, Hermon Clarke, clerk of said county, and of the supreme and

county courts therein, the same being courts of record, do hereby

certify, that I have compared the annexed copy of order, affirming

jud. and the endorsements thereupon with the original thereof, on

Tite PEOPLE OF TRE State OF KEW YORK. 47

: file in this office, and that the same is a correct transcript therefrom,

and of the whole of said original.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and affixed the

seal of said county and courts, at the city of Utica, this 27 day of

May 1904.

[Seal Oneida County, New York. ]

HERMON CLARKE, Clerk,

By GEO. D. FRANK,

Deputy Clerk.

70 Endorsed :] Oneida county court: The People of the State

of New York against Joseph Lochner. Order upon remittitur

from court of appeals, affirming judgment. ‘Timothy Cartin, dis-

trict attorney of Oneida roan & 103 S. James street, Rome, N. Y.

Filed April 4 1904 in Oneida Co. clerk’s office

Sir: Take notice of an entry of an order, of which the within is a

copy, duly granted and filed in Oneida Co. clerk’s office April 4,

190i—end copy of which: is served upon you.

Yours, &c., TIMOTHY CURTIN,

Dist. Att’y of Oneida Co.

71 Oneida County Court, Oneida County.

Tue Peorre or tHE Strate or New York

against ;

JosePH LOCHNER.

Judgment of the 4th day of April, 1904.

The defendant, Joseph Lochner having appealed to the court of

appeals from the judgment heretofore, and ou the 3rd day of Oc-

tober, 1902, entered in the above entitled action, affirming the

judgment entered in said action, on the 10th day of February, 1902,

and said court of appeals having heard the said appeal and ordered

and adjudged that said judgment so appealed from be affirmed, and

the remittitur from said court of appeals having been duly filed in

this court, aud an order daly entered thereon, making the judgment

of the court of appeals the judgment of this court, and directing

pagans to be entered herein, as hereinafter adjudged,

Now, on motion of Timothy Curtin, district attorney of Oneida

county, for the people,

It is adjudged, that the judgment of conviction hereinbefore

mentioned, ‘entered herein on the 10th day of February, 1902,

be and the same is hereby affirmed, and that this judgment be en-

forced according to law.

GEORGE D. FRANK,

Dep. Co. Clerk.

JOSEPH LOCHNER Vs.

Srare or New York, \ ae X

Oneida County Clerk's Office, (™' ;

I, Hermon Clarke, clerk of said county, and of the supreme and

county courts therein, the same being courts of record, do hereby

certify, that I have ——— the annexed copy of order and the en-

doreements thereupon with the original thereof, on file in this office,

rh itewor is a correct transcript therefrom, and of the whole

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and affixed the

9 “ere county and courts, at the city of Utica, this 27 day of

ay,

[Seal Oneida County, New York.]}

HERMON CLARKE, Clerk,

By GEO. D. FRANK,

Deputy Clerk.

72 ae :] Oneida county court: The People of the State

of New York against ye hner. Judgment upon remit-

titur from court of sepeels rming judginent. Filed April 4

1904 in Oneida Co. clerk’s office.

Sm: Take notice of an entry of a judgment, of which the within

is a copy, duly granted in the within entitled action, on the

4th day of April, 1904, and duly entered ia the office of the

clerk of Oneida county, on the 4th day of April, 1904. Copy of

which is herewith served.

Dated, Rome, N. Y., April 5, 1904.

Yours, &c., TIMOTHY CURTIN,

District Attorney of Oneida County,

103 S. James Street, Rome, N. Y.

In the Supreme Court of the United States.

against

Tue Prop.e or tHe State oF New York, Plaintiffs and Defend-

Josxpn Locuner, Defendant and Plaintiff in Error,

ants in Error.

Upon motion of Frank Harvey Field, Esq., attorney for plaintiff

in error, and upon filing the petition for a writ of error and assign-

ment of errors, it is

Ordered that a writ of error be and hereby is allowed, to have re-

viewed by the Supreme Court of the United States the judgment

heretofore poarfine 5 herein by the county court of Oneida county in

the State of New York, and affirmed by the appellate division of

the supreme court for the fourth judicial department of the State of

New York, and by the court of appeals of the State of New York,

THE PROPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW roRK.

49

~ gaid court of being the court of last resort of said State of

New York; and that the amount of bond on said writ of error be,

and hereby is fixed at one hundred dollars ($100).

And it is further ordered that ull further proceedings in t

county court of Oneida county be suspended and stayed until

determination of said writ of error by the Supreme Court of

United States.

R. W. PECKHAM,

Asso. Jus. Sup. Ct. U. 8.

County Court, Oneida County.

Tue Prope oF THE Srate or New York, pice

JosepH Locuner, Defendant.

To the Supreme Court of the United States:

Joseph Lochner, defendant in the above entitled cause, feeling

himself aggrieved by the verdict of the jury and the judgment en-

tered thereon, on the 10th day of February, 1902, comes now,

by Frank Harvey Field, his attorney, and petitions said court for

an order allowing said defendant to prosecute a writ of error to the

honorable the Supreme Court of the United States under and ac-

cording to the laws of the United States in that behalf made and

provided, and also that an order be made fixing the amount of se-

curity which defendant should give and furnish upon said writ of

error, and that upon the giving of such security, all further pro-

ceedings of this court be suspended and stayed until the determina-

tion of said writ of error by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Aud your petitioner will ever pray.

FRANK HARVEY FIELD,

Attorney for Defendant.

HENRY WEISMANN, Of Counsel.

Strate oF New York, a:

Oneida County Clerk’s Office, } :

I, Hermon Clarke, clerk of said county, and of the supreme and

county courts therein, the same being courts of record, do hereby

certify, that I have compared the annexed copy of petition and

order for writ of error and the endorsements thereupon with the

original thereof, on file in this office, and that the same is a correct

transcript therefrom, and of the whole of said original.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set ome, and affixed the

seal of said county and courts, at the city of Utica, this 28 day of

May 1904.

(Seal Oneida County, New York.]

. HERMON i

————, Deputy Clerk.

7—292

of New

for writ of error. (Copy). Frank Harvey Field, attorney for

and plaintiff in error, 44 Courtstreet, borough of Brooklyn,

New York, N. Y. Filed May 27, 1904, in Oneida Co. clerk's

In the Supreme Court of the United States.

Tae Peopie or tae Stats or New York,

laintiffs,

against

Joszernx Locuner, Defendant.

Now comes the plaintiff in error, in the above entitled cause, b

Frank Harvey Field, his attorney, and says that in the record

proceedings in the above entitled matter, there is manifest error in

this, to wit :-—

Assignment of Errors.

A

That the court below erred in holding that section 110 of article

r 415 of the Laws of 1897, of the State of New York, en-

8, of —

titled “ The labor law,” does not violate article 14, section 1, of the

Constitution of the United States, in holding that the facts as set

forth in the indictment constitute a crime.

11.

That the court below erred in holding that section 110 of article

8, of chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897 of the State of New York, en-

titled “The labor law” was constitutional and not in violation of

article 14, section 1 of the Constitution of the United States.

Il.

That the court below erred in holding that section 110 of article

8, of chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897 of the State of New York, en-

titled “ The labor law” is a health measure, and is a reasonable and

proper exercise of the police power of the said State of New York.

IV.

That the court below erred in holding that section 110, of

77 article 8, of chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897 of the State of

New York, entitled “ The labor law” did not violate the Ist

eection of the 14th amendment of the Constitution of the United

States, in that it did not abridge the privileges and immunities of

the citizeus of the United States in respect to the freedom of indi-

viduals to enter into contract with one another.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 51

nA

That the court below erred in holding that section 110, of article

8, of chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897, of the State of New York, en-

titled “ The labor law,” did not violate section 1 of article 14 of the

Constitution of the United States, in that it did not deprive plaintiff

in error of his liberty and property “ without due process of law,”

in that it did not permit him to agree with his employees upon the

number of hours per day and week in which they should work.

VI.

' That the court below erred in holding that section 110 of article

8, of chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897, of the State of New York, en-

titled “ The labor law” does not violate article 14, section 1 of the

Constitution of the United States, in that it denies to plaintiff in

error the equal protection of the laws, and in holding said act is not

class legislation, and is equal and uniform.

VII.

That the court below erred in holding that section 110 of article

8, of chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897 of the State of New York, en-

titled “ The labor law” does not violate article 14, section 1 of the

Constitution of the United States, in that said law fixes an arbitrary

number of hours during which employees in bakeries in said State

shall be employed and allowed to work, thus discriminating between

such employees and employees in other lines of business, and in re-

fusing to allow such employees to contract with their employers for

extra hours of work, as in other occupations they are allowed to do.

78 VIII.

That the court below erred in holding that section 110 of article

8, of chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897 of the State of New York, en-

titled “The labor law” does not violate article 14, section 1 of the

Constitution of the United States, in that by reason of the nature of

the bakery business it is sometimes necessary to contract with em-

ployees for extra hours of labor, in order to save and preserve the

property of the employer; and by the decision of the court below,

-y plaintiff in error is deprived of his property without due process

of law.

And the defendant in the above entitled cause, (plaintiff in error

in this court) prays the court that the fina) judgment rendered in

this cause by the county court of Oneida county in the State of New

York, affirmed by the appellate division for the fourth judicial de-

ovesapei of the said State and by the court of appeals of the said

tate may be reversed, annulled, and altogether held for nothing ;

that the plaintiff in error nay be adjudged to be innocent of the

a costs to the plaintiff in error, in

laws and customs of the United States thereunto

foregoing assignment of errors may be and a

pear of record, the plaintiff in error presents the same to the aenil

and prays that disposition be made thereof as in accordance

wi

79 All of which is respectfully submitted,

FRANK HARVEY FIELD,

Attorney for Plaintiff in Error

(Defendant in the Lower Court).

HENRY WEISMANN,

Of Counsel. [seat]

Srate or New Yorx, \ a

Oneida County Clerk’s Office, :

I, Hermon Clarke, clerk of said county, and of the supreme

and county courts therein, the same being courts of record, do

hereby certify, that I have eng. a the annexed copy of ass’g’t

of errors, and the endorsements thereupon with the original thereof,

on file in this office, and that the same is a correct transcript there-

from, and of the whole of said original.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and affixed the

seal of _ county and courts, at the city of Utica, this — day of

aed

[Seal Oneida County, New York.]

HERMON CLARKE, Clerk,

—— —, Deputy Clerk.

80 [Endorsed :] U. S. Supreme Court. Joseph Lochner, de-

fendant and eee in error, against The People of the

State of New York, plaintiffs and defendants in error. Assignment

of errors. (Copy) rank Harvey Field, attorney for defendant,

and plaintiff in error, 44 Court street, borough of Brooklyn, city of

New York, N. Y. Filed May 27, 1904 in Oneida Co. clerk’s office

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 53

81 Usrrep Srares or Amegica, ss:

[Seal of the Supreme Court of the United States.)

The President of the United States of America to the honorable the

judge of the county court of Oneida county, State of New York,

Greeting :

Because in the record and proceedings, as also in the rendition of

the judgment of a plea which is in the said county court upon a re-

mittitur from the court of appeals of the State of New York before

you, ~~ the highest court of law or equity of the said State in

which a decision could be had in the said suit between The People

‘of the State of New York, plaintiff, and Joseph Lochner, defendant,

wherein was drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of,

or an authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision

was against their validity; or wherein was drawn in question the

validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, said State,

on the ground of their being repuguant to the Constitution, treaties,

or laws of the United States, and the decision was in favor of such

their validity ; or wherein was drawn in question the con-

82 _ struction of a clause of the Constitution, or of a treaty, or statute

of, or — bayer ee or United States, and the roid

cision was against the title, right, privilege, or exemption specially

set up or claimed under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty,

statute, or commission; a manifest error hath happened to the great

damage of the said defendant as by his complaint appears. We

being willing that error, if any hath been, should be duly corrected,

and full and speedy justice done to the parties aforesaid in this be-

half, do command you, if judgment be therein given, that then under

your seal, distinctly and openly, you send the record and »roceed-

ings aforesaid, with all things concerning the same, to the Supreme

Court of the United States, together with this writ, so that you have

the same in the said supreme court at peices oa within 30 days

from the date hereof, that the record and p ings aforesaid being

inspected, the said supreme court may cause further to be done

therein to correct that error, what of right. and according to the laws

and customs of the United States, should be done.

Witness the Honorable Melville W. Fuller, Chief Justice of the

United States, the 18th day of May, in the year of our Lord one thou-

sand pine hundred and four.

JAMES H. McKENNEY,

Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Allowed by

R. W. PECKHAM,

Associate Justice of the

Supreme Court of the United States.

* mppengecs :] Filed or lodged May 27, 1904, in Oneida Co. clerk’s

office. ;

JOSEPH LOCHNER V5.

pe and Alexander Stein, residing in the city of

i of New York, as surety, are held and

unto the People of the State of New York, in the full

Now the condition of the above obligation is such, that if the

above named Joseph Lochner shall appear and answer the charge

inst him in whatever court it may be prosecuted, and pending

the decision of this appeal shall at all times render himself ame-

nable to the orders and process of the court, and in the event of the

affirmance of the decision of the court of appeals of the State of New

York appear and render himself unto the jurisdiction of the

84 court; then this obligation to be void, else in full force and

virtue.

JOSEPH LOCHNER. L. 8.

ALEXANDER STEIN. {..s.

Attest

Sealed and delivered in presence of

SMITH M. LINDSLEY.

WILLIAM 8. MACKIE.

Approved by

W. T. DUNMORE,

County Judge of Oneida County.

85 State or New York, \ i.

County of Oneida, :

Alexander Stein being duly sworn, says that he is a freeholder in

the State of New York, and resides in the city of Utica, in the

county of Oneida, and is worth the sum of two hundred dollars

& ite PEOPLi of Tite state OF NEW Yon. 56

| © ($200) over and above all debts and liabilities and property exempt

from execution.

ALEXANDER STEIN.

Sworn to before me this 18th day of April, 1904.

MARY R. JONES,

Notary Public.

Strate oF New Yorxk,|..

County of Oneida, ee:

On this 18th day of April 1904, before me personally came Joseph

Lochner and Alexander Stein to me known to be the individuals

described in and who executed the foregoing bond and they sev-

erally duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

Y R. JONES,

Notary Public.

State or New York, ae

Oneida County Clerk’s Office, } 4

I, Hermon Clarke, clerk of said county, and of the supreme and

county courts therein, the same being courts of record, do hereby

certify that I have compared the annexed copy of undertaking on

appeal and the endorsements thereupon with the original thereof,

on file in this office, and that the same is a correct transcript there-

from, and of the whole of said original. :

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the

- of — county and courts, at the city of Utica, this 4 day of

une 1

[Seal Oneida County, New York.]

HERMON CLARKE, Clerk.

—— —, Deputy Clerk.

86 ganar : Oneida county court. The people of the State

of New York vs. Joseph Lochner. Undertaking on appeal to

United States Supreme Court. I approve of the within undertaking

both as to its manner and form me as to the sufficiencies of the

sureties therein. W.T. Dunmore, Oneida Co. judge. Filed May 11,

1904 in Oneida Co. clerk’s office. Apeewved, May 2, 1904. R. W.

Peckham, asso. jus. Sup. Ct. U. S.

87 Untrep States oF AMERICA, ss:

To the People of the State of New York, Greeting :

You are hereby cited and admonished to be and anaes

preme Court of the United States, at Washington, within 30 days

from the date hereof, pursuant to a writ of error, filed in the clerk’s

office of the county court of Oneida county, State of New York,

wherein Joseph Lochner is plaintiff in error and you are defendant

at a Su-

any there be, why the judgment

Pagan cald weit of r

R. W. P ;

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court

of the United States.

W. T. DUNMORE,

Oneida County Judge.

88 On this 2nd day of June, in the year of our Lord one thou-

sand nine hundred and four, personally appeared Medford B.

Farri nm before me, the subscriber, and makes oath that he de-

liv: a true copy of the within citation to Frank pin gore Hig-

gins, lieutenant governor of the State of New York, chief ex-

ecutive magistrate during the absence of the governor in Europe.

MEDFORD B. FARRINGTON,

Sworn to and subscribed the 2nd day of June, A. D. 1904.

aged William M. Thomas, ad Pablic, }

Albany, Albany Co., N.

W. M. THOMAS,

Notary Public, Albany Co., N. Y.

Fees $1.00.

On the 27th day of May, in the year of our Lord one thou-

sand nine hundred and four, personally onpeees Joseph E.

Clark Jr., before me, the subscri and made oath that he de-

livered a true copy of the within citation to John Cunneen,

attorney general of the State of New York.

JOSEPH E. CLARK, Jr.

Sworn to and subscribed the 7th day of June, A. D. 1904.

(Seal of Nathaniel F. Cornwell, Notary Public, Kings County.)

NATHANIEL F. CORNWELL,

Notary Public, Kings County.

Endorsed on cover: File No. 19,392. New York, Oneida county,

county court. Term No. 292. Joseph Lochner, piaintiff in error,

vs. The People of the State of New York. Filed June 8th, 1904.

File No. 19,392.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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