plaintiffs brief — COMPAGNIE FRANCAISE & Cv BOARD OF HEALTH

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By. Ox Moarenfor Es 9,

—s- Ynited States Supreme Court

Serco M1, (Yoo,

OCTOBER TERM, 1900.

No. &O.

(Ocrossr Term. 1899-—No. 286.)

- COMPAGNIE FRANCAISE DE NAVI-

GATION A VAPEUR, Plaintiff in Error,

VERSUS

THE STATE BOARD OF HEALTH

Defendants in Error.

OF LOUISIANA, et als.

In Error to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Brief in behalf of the Plaintiff in Error.

W. W. HOWE,

W. B. SPENCER,

Of Counsel.

PRINT, 626 NATCHEZ ST., N. O.

1

T. 8, THOMASON,

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Ocrosrr Term, 1899.

No. 286.

COMPAGNIE FRANCAISE DE NAVIGATION A

VAPEUR, Puarntirr 1n Error,

versus

THE STATE BOARD OF HEALTH OF LOUISIANA,

EDMOND SOUCHON, HAMPDEN S. LEWIS anp

CHARLES A. GAUDET, Derenpants in Error.

In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This case comes into this Court upon a Writ of Error to

the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The writ is sued out to

Teverse a judgment of that court affirming a judgment of

the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, which

maintained an exception of no cause of action filed by the

defendants in error to the original and supplemental peti-

tions of the plaintiff below, plaintiff in error here, and dis-

missed its suit.

An exception of no cause of action, under the practice

prevailing in Louisiana, is the equivalent of a general de-

murrer. It is not disputed that such an exception admits

_ as true all allegations of fact which are well pleaded in the

_ petition.

The original petition of the plaintiff in error tendered

the following case :

_ 1. The plaintiff in error is a corporation existing

under the laws of the French Republic, is a citizen of

‘said Republic, and is domiciled at Marseilles. It is the

owner of a large number of steamships, and especially of

the Steamship “Britannia,” and is engaged in the business

of transporting freight and passengers for hire from vari-

ous Mediterranean ports to various ports in the United

States, and more particularly to the Port of New Orleans.

2. The defendant in error, the State Board of Health,

is a body corporate created by Act No. 192 of the General

Assembly of the State of Louisiana of the year 1898. Said

Board is composed of seven members, and is charged by

' the provisions of said Act with the protection and preserva-

tion of the public health, the duty of promulgating a san-

itary code for the State, the regulation of infectious and

contagious diseases therein, and is vested with power to

prescribe a land and maritime quarantine against places

infected with such diseases. The Board is given power

to sue and capacity to be sued, and is domiciled in the

City of New Orleans.

3. The other defendants in error are members of said

Board, citizens of the State of Louisiana, and residents of

the City of New Orleans.

4. In the early part of September, 1898, the plaintiff in

error caused its Steamship “Britannia” to be cleared from

the ports of Palermo, Sicily, and Marseilles, France, for the

Port of New Orleans. Said Steamship carried one hundred

tons (100) of general merchandise and 408 passengers.

Both freight and passengers were destined for the Port of -

New Orleans. Some of the passengers were citizens of the

United States returning to their homes, and others were

subjects of the King of Italy intending to avail themselves

of the immigration laws of the United States, and to enter

and settle in the State of Louisiana and adjoining States.

5. The said passengers were in all respects and at that

time free from infectious and contagious diseases, and were

so free on the arrival of the said Steamship, on the 29th of

September, 1898, at the Quarantine Station established by

the defendant Board on the Mississippi River below the

City of New Orleans. On that day, in accordance with the

rules of said Board, the said “Britannia” was regularly in-

spected and her freight and passengers examined by the

officers of the Board, and the same being found entirely

free from disease of any kind, the said officers accordingly

issued to the said vessel a clean bill of health.

6. Notwithstanding the issue of this clean bill of health,

and although under the rules established by the defendant

’ Board the “Britannia” should have been permitted at once

to proceed to the Port of New Orleans and there discharge,

and although her cargo and passengers continued free of

Aisease, the said Board, on the 29th of September, 1898, at

a special meeting convened at the City of New Orleans,

whereat the other defendants in error, to-wit: Souchon,

Gaudet and Lewis, were present and voted affirmatively,

passed a resolution prohibiting the said vessel from coming

into the Port of New Orleans. A copy of this resolution

was sent by the said Board to the agents of the plaintiff in

error at New Orleans, The resolution is as follows:

“September 29th, 1898.

__,. “Resolution adopted in special session by the Louisiana

State Board of Health, September 29th, 1898 :

“Resolved, That hereafter, in the case of any town, city

- or parish of Louisiana being declared in quarantine; no

Be nes or bodies of people, immigrants, suldiers or others

shall be allowed to enter said town, city or parish so long

> as said quarantine shall exist, and that the President of the

Board shall enforce this resolution.

G. Farrar Parton, M. D., Sec’ty.”

The letter accompanying the foregoing resolution is as

follows : ;

gr 5s “Louisiana State Board of Health,

September 29th, 1898.

- _- “Messrs. Jas. Sawers & Son,

Ms Agents 8. S. Britannia, New Orleans, La.

.“Gentlemen: Referring to the detention of the S. S.

‘Britannia’ at the Mississippi River Quarantine Station, with

408 Italian immigrants on board, I have to inform you that

under the provisions of the new State Board of Health law,

Section 8, of which I enclose a marked copy, this Board

has adopted a resolution forbidding the landing of any body

of people in any town, city or parish in quarantine. Under

this resolution the immigrants now on board the ‘Britannia’

cannot be landed in any of the following parishes of Lou-

isiana, namely : Orleans, St. Bernard, Jefferson (right bank),

_ St. Tammany, Plaquemines, St. Charles, or St. John. You

will therefore govern yourselves accordingly.

Respectfully,

' Epmonp Sovcnon, M. D.,

President Louisiana State Board of Health.”

Subsequent to the foregoing resolution and notice, the

President of the defendant Board further notified the agents

of the plaintiff in error at New Orleans that if any attempt

was made to land the “Britannia’s”’ passengers at any place

contiguous to the port of New Orleans, in the State of Lou-

isiana, not then quarantined, that quarantine would at once

be established and enforced at such place. The effect of

this action was to prevent the vessel from landing her car-

go or discharging her passengers anywhere in the State of

Louisiana.

7. It is alleged by the petition that the resolution afore-

said, while purporting on its face to be general in character,

_ was, in fact, specially directed toward preventing and pro-

hibiting the landing of the cargo and passengers of the

_ “Britannia,’’ inasmuch as both prior and subsequent to the

er passage of the said resolution, the defendants in error had

permitted large bodies of people coming from the same

port in Sicily, to wit: Palermo, via the port of New York,

to be brought into the City of New Orleans by rail, and that

an illegal and arbitrary discrimination had been made to

the prejudice of the plaintiff in error.

8. It was further alleged that the defendants in error

based their asserted right to thus exclude from the State

-* of Louisiana persons in good health coming from non-in-

fected ports upon the following portion of Section 8 of Act

192 of 1898, to wit:

“The State Board of Health, in its discretion, may prohibit

the introduction into any infected portion of the State of per-

sons acclimated, unacclimated or said to be immune, when,

in its judgment, the introduction of such persons would add

to or increase the prevalence of the disease.”

9. The foregoing language was alleged by the petition

to confer no such power on the defendant Board, as was as-

- serted; and if the language cited did purport to confer such

_@ power, then the plaintiff in error averred that the same

6

was in violation of the Constitution of the United States,

and especially of Article 1, paragraph 8, Section 3 thereof,

conferring upon Congress the exclusive power to regulate

commerce with foreign nations and among the several

States.

10. The defendants in error were alleged to be joint

tort-feasors and solidarily liable in the sum of $2,500, the

amount of damages caused by their conduct up to the date

of the filing of the petition.

The plaintiff in error reserved its right to amend and

claim such further damages as might be found to have

been sustained by the illegal and arbitrary conduct of the

defendant. The petition further prayed for an injunction

prohibiting further interference with the landing of the

-Britannia’s cargo and the discharge of her passengers at

the port of New Orleans.

In order to save expense, the proceedings for injunction

are by stipulation omitted from this record. It suffices to

say that the injunction was refused on the face of the

papers.

11. After this deniai, the plaintiff in error filed its sup-

plemental petition. It reiterated the allegations of its origi-

nal petition. It then set forth compliance by the detained

- vessel with all the laws of the United States regulating

commerce with foreign nations, regulating quarantine,

and immigration into the United States; the fact that the

passengers of said vessel came from ports which were not

infected, and were not pretended to be infected with any

infectious or contagious disease ; and the further fact that

the vessel had sailed prior to the declaration by the Board

of the existence of an infectious disease in the City of New

7

Orleans, and that said vessel had no notice of the intended

action of the defendant Board. It further alleged that the il-

legal and arbitrary action of the said defendants in error in

preventing and prohibiting the landing of the Britannia

in the State of Louisiana, compelled the plaintiff in error

to send her for the discharge of her passengers to the port

of Pensacola, which was the nearest available port, and

thence to send her back to New Orleans for the discharge

of her cargo. There was a total delay of over three weeks,

and a resulting damage of something over eleven thousand

dollars, the particulars of which are specified in the

petition.

The conduct of the defendants in error is alleged to be in

violation of various specified laws of the United States and

rules and regulations made in pursuance thereof relating

to immigration from foreign countries into the ports of the

United States; and to be in violation of the existing

treaties between the United States on the one hand, and

the Kingdom of Italy and the Republic of France on the

other.

12. As already stated, the defendants excepted that the

petition and the documents annexed to and made part

thereof, disclosed no cause of action, and the Civil District

Court.so held. The plaintiff in error thereupon appealed

to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and there assigned as

error the denial by the lower court of its rights under the

following constitutional provisions, treaties and statutes,

to-wit :

(a) Section 3 of paragraph 8 of Article 1 of the Con-

stitution of the United States.

a Geere. oe

>

8

(6) Section 1 of the 14th Article of Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States.

(c) The treaties between the United sas and France

and Italy.

(d) The Acts of Congress of August 3, 1882; June 26,

1884; February 26, 1885; March 3, 1891; February 26,

1885; February 23, 1887; March 3, 1875; all regulating

foreign immigration into the United States. (Transcript,

pages 10 and 11).

The judgment of the lower court having in al] respects

_ been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and our

federal: rights hr-!zg been denied (pp. 22-25), this Writ of

Error was takev-.

IL.

In this Court the plaintiff in error has filed the following :

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.

(1)

The Supreme Court of Louisiana erred in affirming the

judgment of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Or-

- leans in this cause.

(2)

The Supreme Court of Louisiana erred in sustaining the

peremptory exception of the defendants in this cause.

(3)

The Supreme Court of Louisiana erred in holding that

the plaintiff’s suit was properly dismissed by the Civil Dis-

trict Cour: for the Parish of Orleans.

(4)

The Siepesine Court of Louisiana erred in holding that

the Act of the General Assembly of Louisiana, No. 192 of

9

1898, or any portion thereof, and especially Section 8 of said

act, conferred upon the defendant, the State Board of

Health, the authority to exclude or interfere with legitimate

foreign commerce as claimed by the defendants and as done

by them as set forth in the pleadings in this cause.

(5)

Even if Section 8 of the Act of the General Assembly of

Louisiana, No. 192 of 1898, attempted to confer upon the

said defendant, the State Board of Health, authority to ex-

clude or interfere with legitimate foreign commerce in the

manner stated in the petition and supplemental petition of

the plaintiffs in this cause, and admitted by the peremptory

exception of the defendants herein, the Supreme Court of

Louisiana erred in holding that Section 8 of said Act 192 of

1898, as construed and applied by the defendants in the

premises, was not repugnant to the 8th Section of the Ist

Article of the Constitution of the United States, conferring

on Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign

nations.

(6)

That even if Section 8 of the Act of the General Assem-

bly of Louisiana, No. 192 of 1898, did attempt to confer

upon the defendant, the State Board of Health, the right

and authority to exclude or interfere with the subjects and

citizens of foreign governments seeking to enter the

State of Louisiana in the manner conceded by the

_ pleadings in this cause, the Supreme Court of Lou-

isiana erred in holding that said Section 8 of

said Act No. 192 of 1898, as construed and applied

by the defendants, was not .in conflict with the treaties be-

tween the United States, on the one part, and the Repub-

10

lic of France and the Kingdom of Italy, on the other parts,

guaranteeing certain rights, privileges and immunities to

the subjects and citizens of said foreign countrjes, the said

treaties being as follows: The treaty with Italy of Febru-

ary 26, 1871, proclaimed November 23d, 1871, Article 1,

and the treaty with France of April 30, 1803, Article 8.

(7)

The Supreme Court of Louisiana erred in sustaining the

peremptory exception of defendants and in dismissing the

suit of plaintiffs in this, that Section 8 of the Act of the

General Assembly of Louisiana, No. 192 of 1898, as relied

upon and applied by the defendants and as construed and

applied ty the Court, contravenes the 14th Article of

Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, Sec-

tion 1, by depriving the plaintiff of its liberty and prop-

erty without due process of law and denying to it the equal

protection of the laws.

(8)

The Supreme Court of Louisiana erred in holding that

Section 8 of the Act of the General Assembly of Louisiana,

No. 192 of 1898, relied upon by the defendants and applied

by them, and as construed and applied by the Court, did

not contravene the Acts of the Congress of the United

States regulating foreign immigration into the United

States, which Acts are as follows:

March 3, 1875, Chap. 141.

August 3, 1882, Chap. 376.

June 26, 1884, Chap. 121.

February 26, 1885, Chap. 164.

March 23, 1887, Chap. 120.

March 3, 1891, Chap. 551.

iL

And for these and other errors apparent on the face of

the record, plaintiff in error prays that the final judgment

of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in this cause be re-

versed and this cause remanded to that Court, with in-

structions to reverse the judgment of the Court of first in-

stance, and to remand the cause to that Court to be further

proceeded with according to law, and for such other and

further judgment and decree as may be proper in the

premises.

Il.

ae These assignments will be grouped and discussed in this

___ brief ander the following points :

STATEMENT OF POINTS.

First. The. statute drawn in question, on its face and

as construed and applied, is void for the reason that it is in

violation of Article I, Section 3, Paragraph 8, of the Consti-

ee tution of the United States, inasmuch as it vests authority

& in the State Board of Health, in its discretion, to interfere

* with, or prohibit interstate and foreign commerce.

Second. The statute is void for inasmuch as it is in con-

flict with Section 1 of the fourteenth Article of Amendment

to the Constitution of the United States, in that it deprives

the plaintiff of its liberty and property without due process

of law, and denies to it the equal protection of the law.

Third. ~ The statute, as construed and applied, is void for

the reason that it is in conflict with treaties between the

United States on the one part and the Kingdom of Italy

and the Republic of France on the other parts, guarantee-

ing certain rights, privileges and immunities to the sub-

jects and citizens of said countries.

12

- Fourth. The statute, as construed and applied, is void,

because it is in conflict with the laws of the United States

relating to foreign immigration into the United States.

IV.

FIRST POINT.

_. The statute drawn in question, on its face and as con-

_ stuted and applied, is void for the reason that it is in conflict

with Article 1, Section 3, Paragraph 8, of the Constitution of

the United States, inasmuch as it vests the State Board of

Health, in its discretion, with power to interfere with, or

prohibit interstate and foreign commerce.

Cases of this character have so often been before this

Court, that the general rules by which the case at bar is

to be determined may be said to be definitely fixed and

settled. It suffices, then, in our opinion, to briefly sum-

marize them. We accordingly submit that the following

propositions are well settled by the decisions of this Court :

First. The power to regulate interstate and foreign

commerce is exclusively vested in Congress, and this

power extends moreover to all necessary instruments of

ecommerce.

Second. By commerce is meant not merely barter and

traffic in merchandise, but also exchange of commodities,

navigation, the transportation of passengers and the inter-

course of people with each other.

Third. The power to regulate commerce is one which

affects many subjects, varied and quite unlike in their

natures. Some are in their nature of national importance,

and subject of uniform regulation, while. others are of

minor importance, and require regulation of an infinite

- asubject confided exclusively to the National Government,

13

variety to suit each local condition. As to such subjects

as are national in character, and as are susceptible of one

uniform system or plan of regulation, they may be justly

said to belong to that class over which Congress has exclu-

sive jurisdiction, and concerning which the States are not

permitted to legislate in any respect. As to those that are

of minor or local significance, which require to be provided’

for by such divers rules as the various localities may re-

quire, and which may be considered rather of importance

to the locality than to the nation at large, the

several States are permitted to legislate in the absencé

of legislation thereon by Congress; but, even then,

when Congress does legislate upon such subjects, the State

legislation is excluded and rendered inoperative in so far

as it may interfere or conflict with the legislation of Con-

gress.

Fourth. Commerce with foreign countries is in its na-

ture national, and the States have no power to regulate or

interfere with same, even in the absence of legislation by

Congress, for the absence of regulation by the National

Government is to be construed, not as a permission to the

States to regulate the same, but as indicating an intention

by Congress that such commerce be free of restrictions.

Fifth. In delegating to the National Government the

exclusive power to regulate interstate and foreign com-

merce, the several States did not surrender to it their

sovereign power to be exercised for the preservation of the

health, safety and morals of its citizens.

Sizth. But whatever may be the nature or extent of

this sovereign or police power, it cannot be exercised over

14

- nor can the State in its exercise, for any purpose whatever,

encroach upon powers granted to the general Government,

or upon rights granted or secured by the supreme law of

the land. Where, therefore, a statute of a State, enacted

in pursuance cf such police power, invades the domain

of legislation belonging exclusively to Congress, or en-

eroaches upon powers granted to the general Govern-

‘ment, or impairs rights secured by the supreme law of the

land, it is to that extent void.

In the light of these'well established principles we shall

now consider this Louisiana statute as interpreted and ap-

plied by the Supreme Court of Louisiana.

The powers conferred by this statute upon the Board of

Health are of the broadest and most unlimited character.

It rests with that Board to say what one or more of many

hundreds of contagious and infectious diseases exist; to

what extent a disease must exist to render a territory in-

oe - fected ; what part or portion of territory is infected ; what

kind or class of persons would, in its judgment, add to or

_inerease the prevalence of that disease by their introduc-

_tion into the State. In other words, it vests absolute juris-

diction and authority in this Board to declare ton-inter-

course between any part, or the whole of, the State of

Lovisiana, and any or all the other States and foreign

countries. It vests it with authority to absolutely prohibit

-. interstate and international commerce to such an extent:

and for such a length of time as a majority of these seven

- men may determine.

In effect, the result of the judgment of the Supreme

Court of Louisiana was to declare that the State of Louisi-

ana had the power to vest authority in the State Board of

NY

15

Health, in its discretion, to prohibit the introduction into

any part of the State, which they may have decided was in-

fected with a contagious or infectious disease, any and

ae all persons, even though they might be perfectly healthy,

eS oreven immune to the prevailing disease, whenever they

Fr should declare that in their judgment the introduction of

a such persons would add to, or increase the prevalence of.

the disease. This part of the law, it is clear, is directed to

the exclusion of healthy persons seeking to enter the

State. The other sectious of the law give the power to in-

tercept or prevent the entrance of diseased persons. And,

as in this case it is admitted that the “Britannia’s” pas-

sengers were healthy, and had not come from any place

where any infectious or contagious disease was prevalent,

the bald question is presented, whether the State of Louis-

iana, in the exercise of its police power, can prohibit per-

bea sons coming from foreign countries from entering its terri-

ae tory, upon the theory that, though healthy and otherwise

aS not objectionable, yet, in the opinion of certain officials,

they may contract a prevailing disease of some kind, and

thereby tend to spread it among the people residing there.

It is in this respect, we say, that the statute, so construed

and applied, is vicious and encroaches upon the powers

vested in the National Government.

While so far as the consideration of the question in hand

is concerned, it may be admitied that the grant of the au-

thority aforesaid may in all respects be a beneficent and

proper one for the protection of the health of citizens of

Luuisiana, nevertheless, its exercise is not unrestricted, but

finds its limitation when it reaches or touches subjects

confided to the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, and be-

16

yond that point, it is inoperative, and must give way to the

paramount authority of the National Government.

It is the exercise of this sovereign power by the several

States that has given occasion to this Court to be often

called upon to define and declare the limits of the State

and Federal power, and more especially has the exercise

of that power in relation to commerce been a frequent

cause of appeal to this Court.

It becomes, therefore, necessary to consider and deter-

mine, with reference to interstate and international com-

merce, the legitimate scope and the limitations of the po-

lice power of the States. .

There can be no question, from any aspect, that the po-

lice power can be exercised for the suppression of crime,

disease and pauperism, and that as an incident to the ex-

ercise of that power to that end, the State may rightfully

exclude from its borders criminals, paupers, or persons or

goods affected with infectious or contagious diseases. Of

necessity, if this power of exclusion is to be effective,

there must be an opportunity to investigate and inspect

not only the persons and things about to enter its

borders, but also the vehicles of commerce used to

transport thera. And as a necessary result of this

power of investigation and inspection, the State has the

right to stop at its borders both interstate and inter-

national commerce a reasonable length of time to enable

it to ascertain whether the persons and things, subjects

thereof, are in fact in anywise affected with disease likely

to prove dangerous to its citizens. And on the discovery

of the existence of such disease in such persons or property,

it may either exclude same, if likely to be of a permanent

ak dein yd?

oe

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17

character, or may detain same in quarantine, and use such

means as may be necessary to suppress same, if the disease

is likely to be of a temporary kind. In the same way, if

there be just grounds to suspect that such persons or prop-

erty have been exposed to any infectious or contagious dis-

ease, such persons or things may be detained a reasonable.

length of time in order to ascertain whether they are in

fact infected, but no longer. Such quarantine and inspec-

tion laws, however, are in no just sense regulations of com-

merce ; they may in a measure delay or affect it, but when

legally exercised, do not regulate, or impose such burdens

upon commerce as to amount to regulation within the

meaning of the Constitution.

The detection and suppression or exclusion of criminals,

paupers, and persons and things infected with disease is

the basis and sole justification of the enforcement of quar-

antine and inspection laws, and when enacted for this pur-

pose and limited to this extent, they are upheld as a valid

exercise of the police power of the State. Whenever, and

to the extent that they go beyond this, they amount to an

interference with commerce, and invade the domain of the

National Government, and are void, for the State can never

in the exercise of any of its reserved powers interfere

with the powers confered upon Congress in the control and

regulation of legitimate interstate and international

commerce.

Turning now to the decisions of this Court, it will be

found that the basis upon which it has upheld the exclu-

sion, inspection and quarantine laws of various States, is.

that criminals, diseased persons and things, and paupers,

are not legitimate subjects of commerce. They may be at-

18

tendant evils, but are not legitimate subjects of traffic and

transportation, and, therefore, in their exclusion or deten-

tion, the State is not interfering with legitimate commerce,

which is the only kind entitled to the protection of the

Constitution.

In the License Cases, 5 How., at pages 576, 577, Mr.

Chief Justice Taney said :

« It has ind¢ed been suggested that if a State deems the

traffic in ardent spirits to be injurious to its. citizens and

calculated to introduce immorality, vice and pauperism

-jnto the State, it may constitutionally refuse to permit its

importation notwithstanding the laws of Congress; and

that a State may do this upon the same principle that it

may resist and prevent the introduction of disease, pesti-

lence or pauperism from abroad. But. it must be

remembered that disease, pestilence and pauperism

are not subjects of commerce, although sometimes among

its attendant evils: Tifey,dre not things to be regulated

and trafficked in but to be prevented as far as human fore-

sight or human means can guard against them. But

spirits and distilled liquors are universally admitted to be

subjects of ownership and property, and are therefore

subjects of exchange, barter, and traffic like any other

commodity in which a right of property exists. And Con-

gress, under its general power to regulate commerce with

foreign nations, may prescribe what articles of merchandise

shall be admitted and what excluded; and may therefore

admit, or not, as it shall deem best, the importation of

ardent spirits. And inasmuch as the laws of Congress

authorize their importation, no State has a right to pro-

hibit their introduction.”

In Leisy vs. Hardin, 135 U. 8. at p. 113, Mr. Chief Justice

Fuller, referring with apprebation to the decision rendered

by Mr. Justice Matthews in Bowman vs. Railway, 125 U. 8.

465, says:

“Articles in such a condition as tend to spread disease

19

are not merchantable, are not legitimate subjects of trade

and commerce, and the self-protecting power of each State,

therefore, may be rightfully exercised against their intro-

duction, and such exercise of power cannot be considered a

regulation of commerce prohibited by the Constitution ; and

the observations of Mr. Justice Catron in the License Cases,

5 How. 504, 599, are quoted tw the effect that what does not

belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police

power of the State. but that which does belong to commerce

is within the jurisdiction of the United States ; and to extend

the police power over subjects of commerce would be to

make commerce subordinate to that power; and would en-

able the State to bring within the police power ‘any article

of consumption that a State may wish to exclude, whether it

belong to that which was drunk, or to food and clothing;

and with nearly equal claims to propriety, as malt liquors

and the products of fruits other than grapes stand on no

higher ground than the light wines of this and other coun-

tries excluded by the effect of the law as it now stands.

And it would be only another step to regulate real or sup-

posed extravagance in food or clothing.’ ”

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Re Rahrer, 140 U. 8. at p. 557,

quoting the License Cases, p. 599, says:

“The law and the decision apply equally to foreign and

domestic spirits, as they must do on the principle assumed

in support of the law. The assumption is that the police

power was not touched by the Constitution but left to the

States as the Constitution found it. This is admitted; and

whenever a thing from character or condition is of a de-

scription to be regulated by the power in the State, then the

regulation may be made by the State and Congress cannot

interfere. But this must always depend upon facts sub-

ject to legal ascertainment, so that the injured may have

redress. And the fact must find its support in this,

whether the prohibited article belongs to and is subject to

be regulated as a part of foreign commerce or of commerce

among the States. Iffrom its nature it does not belong to

commerce, or if its condition from putrescence or other cause

20

is such when it is about to erter the State that it no longer

belongs to commerce, or in othe~ words is not a commercial

article, then the State power may exclude its introduction.

And as an incident to this power, the State may use means

to ascertain the fact, and here is the limit between the sov-

ereign power of the State and the Federal power; that is

to say, that which does not belong to commerce is within

the jurisdiction of the police power of the State; and that

which does belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of

the United States. And to this limit must all the general

views come that were suggested in the reasoning of the

court in the cases of Gibbons vs. Ogden ; Brown vs. Mary-

land ; and New York vs. Miln.”

But it is quite different with property the subject of

daily commercial transactions, as well as with persons not

affected with disease or tainted with crime; they are le-

gitimate subjects of interstate and foreign commerce, and

their transportation and travel from State to State and

from foreign countries are under the protection of the

Constitution and cannot be restrained save by Congress

itself.

In Leisy vs. Hardin, 135 U. 8. at p. 125, where the ques-

tion was whether, it being the public policy of the State of

Iowa to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating

liquors within the border of that State, it could prohibit

the transportation into its borders from another State, and

the sale there in the original package, of such intoxicating

liquors, this Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, said :

“Whatever our individual. views may be as to the

deleterious or dangerous qualities of particular articles, we

cannot held that any articles which Congress recognizes as

subjects of interstate commerce are not such, or that what-

ever are thus recognized can be contrulled by any State

laws amounting to regulations while they retain their

character, although at the same time, if directly dangerous

21

in themselves, the State may take appropriate measures to

guard against injury before it obtains complete jurisdiction

over them. To concede toa State the power to exclude,

directly or indirectly, articles so situated without Con-

gressional permission, is to concede to a majority of the

people of a State represented in the State Legislature the

power to regulate commercial intercourse between the

States by determining what shall be its subjects, when that

power was distinctly ~ »nted to be exercised by the people

of the United States re esented in Congress, and its pos-

session by the latter was considered essential to that more

perfect union which the Constitution was adopted to

create.”’

Mr. Justice Matthews, in Bowman vs. Ry. Co., 125 U. 8.

at p. 489, said, in reference to a statute of Iowa having as

its purpose the prohibition of importatior of spiritous

liquors into the State, as follows:

“It has never been regarded as within the legitimate

scope of inspection laws to prohibit trade in respect to any

known article of commerce, irrespective of its condition

and quality, merely on account of its intrinsic nature and

the injurious consequences of its use or abuse.

“For similar reasons, the statute of [owa under éonsider-

ation cannot be regarded as a regulation of quarantine or

a sanitary provision for the purpose of protecting the phy-

sical health of the community, or a law to prevent the in-

troduction into the State of disease, contagious, infectious

or otherwise. Doubtless, the States have the power to pro-

vide by law suitable measures to prevent the introduction

into the States of articles of trade which on account of their

existing condition would bring in and spread disease, pesti-

lence, and death, such as rags or other substances infected

with the germs of yellow fever or the virus of small pox, or

cattle or meat or other provisions that are diseased or de-

cayed, or otherwise, from their condition and quality, unfit

for human use or consumption. Such articles are not

merchantable; they are not legitimate subjects of trade

and commerce. They may be rightly outlawed as intrinsi-

The learned Justice then quotes with approval the ob-

servations of Mr. Justice Catron in the License Cases, supra.

He then proceeds (p. 498) as follows :

“The section of the statute of Iowa, the validity of which

is drawn in question in this case, does not fall within our

enumeration of the legitimate exertions of the police

power. It is not an exercise of the jurisdiction of the

over persons and property within the limits of other

States. It seeks to prohibit and stop their passage and

into its own limits, and is designed as a regu-

lation for the conduct of. commerce before the merchandise

is brought to its border. It is not one of those local regu-

lations designed to aid and facilitate commerce; it is not

‘an inspection law to secure the duc quality and measure

of a commodity; it is a law to regulate or restrict

the sale of an article deemed injurious to the health and

morals of the community; it is not a regulation confined

te the purely internal and domestic commerce of the

State; it is not a restriction which only operates upon

after it has become mingled with, and forms part

Se ee ee ane on Rate. It is, on the

other hand, a regulation directly affecting interstate com-

merce in an essential and vital point. If authorized in the

present instance upon the grounds and motives of the

policy which has dictated it, the very reacon would justify

any and every other State regulation of interstate com-

merce upon any grounds and reasons which might prompt

im particular cases their adoption. It is, therefore, a regu-

lation of that character which constitutes an unauthorized

_

=

-

So

Be

os

S

23

interference with the power given to Congress over the

subject.””

In Minnesota vs. Barber, 136 U. 8. 313, the Court had

occasion to consider a statute of Minnesota, requiring that

cattle, sheep and swine designed for slaughter for human

food shall be inspected in that State before being slaugh-

tered, and held same to be unconstitutional, as in effec:

prohibiting the importation into that State of all fresh

beef, mutton or pork, although ‘entirely sound, healthy and

fit for human food. Mr. Justice Harland, in delivering

the opinion of the Court (p. 328), said : .

“But a law. providing for the inspection of ani-

mals whose meats are designed for human food

cannot be regarded as a rightful exertion of the police

powers of the State, if the inspection prescribed is of such

a character or is burdened with such conditions as will pre-

vent altogether the introduction into the State of sound

meats, the products of animals slaughtered in other States.

It is one thing for a State to exclude from its iimits cattle,

sheep, or swine actually diseased, or meats that, by reason

of their condition, or the condition of the animals from

which they are taken, are unfit for human food, and punish

ali sales of such animals or of such meats within its limits.

It is quite a different thing for a State to declare, as did

Minnesota by the necessary operation of its statute, that

fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb, or pork, articles that are

used in every part of this country to support human life,

shall not be sold at all for human food within its limits,

unless the animals from which such meats are taken are

inspected in that State, or as is practically said, unless the

animal is slaughtered in that State.”

A case similar in principle to the one at bar came before

this Court in Railway vs. Husen, 95 U. 8. 465. In that

ease, there was drawn in question the constitationality of

a statute of Missouri, which provided for the exclusion from

24

Missouri of all cattle coming from Texas during certain

months of the year, it being contended that such cattle were

liable to be infected with a dangerous infectious disease

known as Texas fever. The Court held the statute void for

the reason that it made no distinction between healthy cat-

tle and unhealthy cattle coming from Texas. It held that

while it would have been competent for the State of Mis-

souri, in the exercise of its police power, to pass quarantine

and inspection laws for the purpose of detecting such of

the cattle as were diseased, and to exclude such as were so

infected, it was a violation of the commerce clause pf

the Federal Constitution to prohibit the introduction of

healthy cattle from that State into Missouri, and that the

statute in effect authorized such exclusion, and was there-

fore void.

An interesting case, involving the right of a State to im-

pose conditions upon the entrance into its borders of per-

sons from other States or foreign countries, was decided by

the Supreme Court of Maine in the case of City of Bangor

vs. n this case, there was drawn in ques-

tion the validity of a statute of that State, which provided

that any carrier, which brought into the State a person not

having a settlement therein, must remove him from the

State upon request of the proper officers, if he fell into dis-

tress within one year, or should be liable for his support.

The defendant had brought from New York into that State

on his steamship 56 Italian laborers, who within a year be-

came paupers, and suit was brought to recover the expense

of their support by the City. The statute, as applied, was

declared by the Supreme Court of Maine to be a regulation

25

of interstate commerce and void. In the course of its

opinion, the Court said :

“ But it is claimed that this is the exercise of the police

power of the State. That the State in the exercise of its

police power may indirectly to some extent affect com-

merce between foreign countries and the United States or

between the States, may be conceded. But what the po-

lice power of the State embraces and how far it extends

does not appear to have been definitely determined. It

may exercise it to require quarantine or inspection before

landing persons brought from abroad. It may exercise it

to prevent the landing of passengers infected with conta-

gious disease. It may exercise it over the landing of con-

vieted felons from abroad. It may exercise it over persons

who have been subjected to contagious diseases, so as to be

liable to be infected with it and communicate it to others,

and thereby endanger the health of the community. But

it cannot exercise it to prevent commerce, nor can it exer-

cise it over the carrying or landing of persons who are not

at the time they are brought into the State in a condition

to be dangerous to the public. I+ cannot exercise it over

' persons who are free from contagion, who have not been

subjected to any danger of contagious disease, on the

ground that they may become dangerous in that. respect

_ within a year or any other fixed period of time after the

landing.”

A case almost exactly parallel to the case at bar arose in

California, and was decided by the Supreme Court of that

State in State vs. Steamship Constitution, 42 Cal. 578. The

statute drawn in question in that case vested in certain

officers the exclusion from the Siate of persons that were

affected with disease, or that were criminals, or that were

liable to become a public charge. The statute was framed

_ in such broad language that the Court found that it au-

thorized the exclusion of healthy persons not of that descrip-

tion. It was one of the many statutes framed with the in-

tention of excluding Chinese and other aliens, whose pres-

ence it was admitted was detrimental to the welfare and the

morals of the citizens of the State. In the course of an able

opinion, the Court said :

“But whilst conceding the authority of the State to enact

police and sanitary regulations for preserving the health

and morals of the people, counsel insists that it is neither

one or the other so far as it operates upon persons who at

the time of landing are neither paupers, vagabonds, or

criminals, or affected with any mental or bodily infirmity,

but on the contrary are perfectly sound in body and mind

and in every way fitted to earn a support. It is said the”

police and sanitary regulations can have no just application

to persons of this description, and that it is an abuse of terms

to say that they are proper subjects for such regulations

> because possibly they may at some future day become

paupers, vagabonds, or criminals, or sick, infirm, or other-

wise disabled. This view of the question appears to me to

* be unanswerable. It is a misnomer to call that a police

regulation, in the sense in which that term is here applied, .

in so far as it operates upon persons of good morals and.

upright character, and who are no more likely than the

average of mankind to become paupers, vagabonds, or

criminals; and it is equally a misnomer to term that a

sanitary regulation which applies only to persons in good

health and sound mind, and who are not more liable than

other persons hereafter to become a public charge from

sickness or infirmity. The power to make police and sani-

. tary regulations, prescribing the terms on Which certain

classes of persons shall be admitted into this State, neces-

sarily includes the power to exclude them altogether, if

they fail to comply with the prescribed conditions. If a

criminal from a penal colony should be required to pay

$100 upon his entrance into this State, he might be excluded

altogether if he refused to pay the required sum; or a

pauper from a foreign almshouse might be refused permis-

sion to land in this State on any terms, or might be re-

ceived on any terms the State might prescribe. These

27

would be merely police regulations in the proper and

just sense of that term. But if the State, under pretense

‘ of police or health regulations, should enact that no person

should hereafter enter this State unless he would first pay

a sum of money, or give a bond with sureties for his future

behavior, or conditional that he would not become

« public charge during his sojourn in this State, this could

in no just sense be termed a police or sanitary regulation,

in so far as it would be applicable to persons of good-char-

acter and morals, and who were sound in body and mind.

If the State could exercise such a power as this under the

pretense of preserving the public health and morals, it is

obvious that it might destroy the entire passenger

traffic between this State and foreign countries, and

even with our sister States. It might for the same reason

prohibit the importation of all merchandise from foreign

countries for fear that it might be infected with some secret

cause of disease, which in the future might possibly en-

danger the health of the community. ‘Whilst the Legisla-

ture may exercise a wide discretion as to the proper sub-

’ jects of police and sanitary regulations, and as to the proper

mode of preserving health and morals of the com-

‘munity by means of these regulations, it cannot under

color of this power enact laws which in no _proxi-

mate degree are germane to the subject. I am, therefore,

of the opinion that a statute which obstructs the entrance

into the State of persons who are neither paupers, vagabonds,

nor criminals, or in anywise unsound or infirm in body or

mind, is not a valid exercise of the police power of the

State in any just sense of the word.”

To the same effect, see Scott vs. Donald, 165 U. 8. 58; In

re Schollenberger, 171 U. 8. 1; Henderson vs. Mayor, 92 U.

8. 259.

In the case at bar, it is not pretended that these persons

were infected with any disease that was liable to be com-

‘municated to the community, or that they were paupers or

criminals, but on the contrary each and all of them had ad-

BRE ace ne

“Sd

a

mittedly come from a healthy port, had remained in good

health on the voyage, and when inspected and examined

by the officers of the defendant Board at the quarantine

station, had been given certificates of good health. In the

resolution thereafter directing their exclusion (Trans. pp.

17-18) there is even no intimation or claim that they were

not immunes from the disease said to be prevalent, or that

’ they for any reason were more likely than other persons to

be afflicted after their arrival, but. the action seems to be

based solely upon the number of them. Under this reso-

tion, they might all have entered the State singly, but not

as a body. But admitting for the sake of the argument

that the physicians constituting the Board really believed,

for any reason, that these persons, if permitted to land,

would be likely to become infected by the disease alleged

to exist in the State, and thus possibly cause a spread of

the disease, nevertheless that would not have justified

their exclusion. Being perfectly healthy, they were

legitimate subjects of transportation, and under the

protection of the Constitution, the plaintiff had the

Tight to bring and disembark them there, free

of all restraints except such as the National Gov-

_ ernment may have prescribed. The State was bound

to permit them to enter, and could not justly have exclud-

ed them upon the theory that possibly at some future

time their presence might prove injurious to its citizens.

The State’s remedy was not in excluding them, but in en-

forcing, after they ceased being subjects of international

commerce, and had become subject to its jurisdiction, such

sanitary rules and regulations in regard tv them as seemed

best. The fact that the State did not see fit to undertake

v4

29

this task, or that it could or would not enforce its sanitary

laws after the landing of these people is no defense for at-

tempting to deny them rights secured under the supreme

law of the land. If the State or its officers believe that a

person, whose character is such that his right to enter its

borders is guaranteed by the Constitution, will, for any

reason, thereafter become dangerous to public health,

morals or order by a disregard of its police or sanitary

laws, such tendency could be readily checked by a proper

enforcement of its laws. To permit the exclusion of any

person then unobjectionable, upon the ground that, in the

opinion or judgment of some official or officials, he might

possibly contract at some future day some disease and

thereby spread it among the community, or that he would

become vicious and thereafter injure public morals or af-

fect the public safety, would open the door to all sorts of

oppression.

In the case of Ah Fong, 3 Sawyer, 144 (1 Fed. Cases

213), decided on Circuit by Mr. Justice Field, and

subsequently followed by the Supreme Court in Chy Lung

vs. Freeman, 92 U. 8. 275, a statute of California, directed

to the exclusion of Chinese from that State, was passed

upon. It was contended in support of the validity of the

law that the Chinese were of such low moral character, op-

posed to our system of government, unwilling to adapt

themselves to our laws, criminals by nature, and generally

dangerous to the public health and morals of our citizens,

that the State, therefore, in the exercise of its police

power, had the right to exclude such persons from its

borders. But the learned Justice said :

“But the extent of the power of the State to exclude a

,

30

foreigner from its territory is limited by the right in which

it has its origin, the right of self-defense. Whatever out-

side of the legitimate exercise of this right affects the inter-

course of foreigners with our people, their immigration to

this country and residence therein is exclusively within

the jurisdiction of the general government, and is not sub-

ject to State control or interference. To that government

the treaty-making power is confided; also, the power to

regulate commerce with foreign nations, which includes in-

tercourse with them as well as traffic; also the power to

prescribe the conditions of migration or importation of

persons, and rules of naturalization; whilst the States are

forbidden to enter into any treaty, alliance, or confedera-

tion with other nations.

“I am aware that the right of the State to exclude from

its limits any persons whom it may deem dangerous or in-

jurious to the interests and welfare of its citizens has been

asserted by eminent judges of the Supreme Court of the

United States. Mr. Chief Justice Taney maintained the

existence of this right in his dissenting opinion in the

Passenger Cases, and asserted that the power had been

recognized in previous decisions of the Court. The lan-

guage of the opinion in the case of the City of New York

vs. Miin, 11 Pet. (36 U. 8.) 141, would seem to sustain this

doctrine. But neither in the Passenger Cases nor in the

case of the Oity of New York vs. Miln, did the decision of

the Court require any consideration of the power of ex-

clusion, which the State possessed ; and all that was said

by the eminent judges in those cases upon that subject was

argumentative and not necessary and authoritative.

“But independent of this consideration, we cannot shut

our eyes to the fact that much which was formerly said

upon the power of the State in this respect, grew out of

the necessity which the Southern States; in which the in-

stitution of slavery existed, felt of excluding free negroes

from their limits. As in some States negroes were citizens,

the right to exclude them from the slave States could only

be maintained by the assertion of a power to exclude all

persons whom they might deem dangerous or injurious to

31

their interests. But at this day no such power would be

asserted, or, if asserted, allowed, in any Federal court. And

the most serious consequences affecting the relations of the

nation with other countries might, and undoubtedly would,

follow from any attempt at its exercise. Its maintenance

would enable any State to involve the nation in’ war, how-

ever disposed to peace the people at large might be.

“Where the evil apprehended by the State from the

ingress of foreigners is, that such foreigners will disregard

the laws of the State, and thus be injurious to its peace, the

remedy lies in the more vigorous enforcement of the laws,

not in the exclusion of the parties. Gambling is consid-

/. ered by most States to be injurious to the morals of their

people, and is made a public offense. It would hardly be

considered as a legitimate exercise of the police power of

the States to prevent a foreigner who had been a gambler

in his own country from landing in ours. If, after land-

ing, he pursues his former occupation, fine him, and if he

persists in it imprison him, and the evil will be remedied.

In some States the manufacture and sale of spirituous and

intoxicating liquors are forbidden and punished as a mis-

demeanor. If the foreigner coming to our shore is a man-

ufacturer or dealer in such liquors, it would be deemed an

illegitimate exercise of the police power to exclude him, on

account of his calling, from the State. The remedy against

any apprehended manufacture and sale would lie in such

case in the enforcement of the penal laws of the State. So

if lewd women, or lewd men, even if the latter be of that

baser sort, who, when Paul preached at Thessalonica, set

all the city in an uproar (Acts xvii, verse 5), land on our

shores, the remedy against any subsequent lewd conduct

on their part must be found in good laws or good muni-

cipal regulations and a vigorous police. It is evident that

if the possible violation of the laws of the State by an im-

migrant, or the supposed immorality. of his past life or

profession, where that immorality has not already resulted

in a conviction for a felony, is to determine his right to

land and to reside in the State, or to pass through other

and interior States, a door will be open to all sorts of op-

32.

pression. The doctrine now asserted by counsel for the

‘commissioner of immigration, if maintained, would cer-

tainly be invoked, and at no distant day, when other par-

ties besides low and despised Chinese women, are the sub-

jects of its application, and would then be seen to be a

grievous departure from principle.”

If the construction of this statute by the Supreme Court

_ of Louisiana is correct, then the power to act as they did

was surely vested by the State in the Board of Health.

This statute is a most remarkable one, and certainly, if

- yalid, a most unusual extension of the police power. As

we have seen, by its terms, the State Board of Health has

the jurisdiction and power to declare: (1) what are in-

fectious or contagious diseases ; (2) what shall constitute

infection ; (3) what extent of territory is infected ; (4) what

extent of territory shall be quarantined or closed to inter-

course; (5) what shall be the duration of such non-inter-

course; and (6) what persons may or may not be permitted

to enter such infected territory.

Being a special tribunal for the determination of these

questions, and being vested with absolute discretion, their

findings would not be subject to review,

Nishi Mura vs. United States, 142 U. 8. 660.

Martin vs. Mott, 12 Wheat. 21. .

Philadelphia vs. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 458.

In re Oteiza, 136 U. 8. 330.

' Hellon vs. Merritt, 110 U. 8. 97.

Benson vs. McMahon, 127 U. 8. 457.

How many contagious or infectious diseases there are,

we are unable to say, but they vary in virulence from bu-

bonic plague to-measles and mumps and grippe. To each

of these extensive classes of diseases, certain classes of

33

people are more susceptible than others. Some one or more

of these diseases are always prevalent in different commu-

nities in this State. So that under the authority given this

Board by the State, it could declare that the whole or any

part of the State was infected with one or more such

- diseases, and that in its opinion the introduction of persons

from places above certain degrees of latitude would tend to

spread the disease, and thereupon prevent intercourse with

all States or countries beyond that parallel. To illustrate

further. Your Honors are, no doubt, aware that ‘it is

claimed that there never has been any yellow fever in Texas

for a great many years, due to its excellent quarantine sys-

tem, so that it is plain the people of Texas are not im-

munes; whereas, there have been frequent occurrences of

fever of late in Louisiana and Mississippi, in fact by some

it is claimed that the disease is endemic in this State, so

that most of the people in the latter States are immunes.

On the occurrence of the fever in New Orleans, the

Board of Health could promply declare it infected,

and state that in its judgment none but im-

munes should be allowed to enter the city. As

the citizens of Texas are not immunes, and the cit-

izens of Mississippi are, an embargo is placed on the

former while intercourse is unrestricted as to the latter. If,

therefore, it became the policy of Louisiana to cease inter-

course with any State, it would have in its Board of Health

a ready and powerful mechanism with which to accomplish

that end.

It is well known that of late years Italian immigration

has been exceedingly heavy into Louisiana. By many

Italians are considered an undesirable class of citizens. Lf

34

at any time public sentiment becarre strong in that belief

_so that it became the policy of the State to stop that immigra-

’ tion, just as it became the policy of California in reference

to Chinese, it would be an easy matter to put an end to it

through the action of the Board of Health in declaring that

verious infectious and contagious diseases existed, and that

tue presence of these unacclimated foreigners would tend to

spread them in the community. Small-pox is a disease to

which negroes are particularly susceptible. It prevails to-day

among them throughout the State, and under its alleged |

powers, this Board could prohibit anyone of negro blood

from entering the State on the theory it would be “adding

fuel to the flame.”

In this case the State Courts, as well as the other State

authorities, were misled by a metaphor. Their general

idea was that there was illness in New Orleans and that

the importation of healthy people froma healthy foreign

port “would add fuel to the flame.’’ Inspired by this

figure of rhetoric, they concluded that the police power of

the State of Louisiana would justify the interference with

international commerce, as shown by this record. It seems

to us that such reasoning is dangerous and fallacious. If

pushed to its logical extent it easily leads to the reductio ad

absurdum. We will all agree that the police power extends

to the protection of the morals as well as the health of the

community which is within the sphere of its jurisdiction.

Now, there can be no doubt that a certain amount of vice

is found in the City of New Orleans. We do not claim a

larger share than Chicago, for example, in proportion to

our population, but everyone will admit that there is a

large amount of immorality in our City, and that the police

35

power of the State and of the municipality may be exer-

cised to reduce and if possible to extirpate vice and crime

and disorder. But, suppose the State of Louisiana, through

its legislative, executive and judicial departments, should

declare that, in order to effect this worthy object, it was

necessary to forbid the transportation of any more passen-

gers from any European port to our City. Let us further

suppose a European city of a highly moral character con-

cerning which nothing could be said against the principles

or habits of its people; and let us suppose a steamship

coming to New Orleans from that highly moral foreign

port with a number of passengers of excellent moral char-

acter. Let us further suppose this steamship was stopped

at the mouth of the Mississippi and gravely told by the

State authorities that the advent of the passengers she was

carrying “would add fuel to the flame ;” that as soon as

these virtuous people should be landed in our City they

would become demoralized, they would enter upon a career

of wild dissipation and debauchery; and that, therefore,

the local authorities had a perfect right to put a stop to

international commerce of this kind.

It might be further supposed that the authorities at New

Orleans under the same conditions might arrest and send

away a party of theological students coming by steamship

from New York, and thus interfere with interstate trans-

portation of passengers, upon the pretext that the guileless

youths might become demoralized by the frivolities of our

City and add fuel to the fame of vice which is constantly

burning in our slums. Is it not thus plain that we arrive

at the reductio ad absurdum?

Passenger Cases, 7 How., at page 407.

It is no answer to say that this statute operates equally

upon all persons, resident as well as non-resident (Mr. Jus-

tice Harlan in Minnesota vs. Barber, 136 U.S. 326, citing

Robbins vs. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489; State

Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232), or that the Board will not

abuse the wide authority given them by the statute. It is

a conclusive presumption that when authority is conferred

‘it will be exercised to its full limit: it was conferred for no

other parpose than to be exercised at the discretion of the

Beard. It is idle to szy that officials clothed with this

arbitrary and unrestricted authority will not abuse it, or

that the material interests of the State will prevent it being

used oppressively. In the language of Mr_Justice Field in

Gloucester vs. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. at pages 205-6:

“Those engaged in foreign and interstate commerce are

ee en Sedation: fo thee

> - ma ¥ on

power of Congress to prevent any interference A oe the State

It is a canon of construction in testing the constitatics-

ality of a statute that its natural and reasonable effect

should be regarded (Chy Lung vs. Freeman, 92 U. S. 279:

Railway vs. Husen, 95 U. S. 465), and so tested the effect of

this statute is to west three of a board of seven physi-

cians with unrestrained power and discretion to determine

how, when and where, citizens of other States, and foreigners,

untainted by disease or crime, may enter the State of Lou-

isiana. Is attempts to give them an authority which can

only be exercised by Congress.

The statute in question in this case is in many respects

similar to the one considered in Chy Lung vs. Freeman, 92

37

U.S. 275. In that case the statute authorized the Commis-

sioner of Immigration te satisfy himself whether or not any

passenger, who should arrive from any foreign port, was

insane, deaf, dumb, blind, a convicted criminal, or a lewd

or debauched woman, etc., and any persons found to belong

to these classes should be excluded, unless a bond be given

by the master of the ship to secure their support or good

behavior, eve. The Court declared it a most extraordinary

statute (p. 277), placing, as it did, the power in the hands

of the Commissioner to prevent en(irely vessels engaged in

a foreign trade from carrying passengers, by enabling him

simply to declare a ship’s passengers to be of the prohibited

classes, and thereupon to require the master to give bonds

for them all. This statute did not in terms authorize the

Commissioner to exclude such persons as he might decide

to belong to the prohibited classes, as the statute in this

case does, but the power to impose conditions on admission

implies a power to exclude, and the Court found no diffi-

culty in that such statute vested the officer with power to

interfere with foreign commerce, and held it void.

How much more forcibly the reasoning of the Court in

that case applies to the facts in the instant one, when the

power of exclusion of healthy persons coming from healthy

countries is expressly conferred?

Vv.

SECORD POINT.

That portion of Section 8 of Act 192 of the General As-

sembly of Louisiana of 1898, relied on by the defendants in

error, is void on its face, and void as construed by the Su-

Preme Court of Louisiana, and as applied by the said defend-

38

ants in error herein. On its face it contains a grant of power

that is illegal; and as construed and applied it is operated to

deprive the plaintiff in error of its liberty and property with-

out due process of law and to deny it the equal protection of

the laws in contravention of Section 1 of the 14th Article of

Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

We may first properly dispose of certain preliminary

questions before discussing the merits of the foregoing

proposition.

(a) There can be no doubt as to the power of this Court

to entertain and decide the issue whether the rights of the

plaintiff in error under the 14th Amendment had been

invadee or infringed. In the Assignment of Errors filed

in the Supreme Court of Louisiana before hearing and de~

cision, it was insisted that the judgment of the lower court

had denied the rights of the plaintiff in error under the

said Amendment ; and the merits of this contention the Su-

preme Court of Louisiana considered and denied, saying

that the contention was “utterly untenable.’ (Record, page

25). Oxley Stave Co. vs. Butler County, 166 U. 8., pages

. 648 and 656, and authorities cited; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.

vs. Chicago, 164 U. S. 454-457; Manell vs. Newbold, 18 How.

511. .

(6) There is equally little doubt that the plaintiff in

error is a person within the meaning and scope of the 14th

Amendment.

“It is now settled that corporations are persons within

the meaning of the constitutional provisions forbidding the

deprivation of property without due process of law as well

as a denial of the equal protection of the laws.”

ton Turnpike Co. vs. Sanford, 164 U. 3. 578-592; Santa

Clara Co. vs. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 118 U. 3. 394.

39

- “The rights and securities granted to persons by that in-

strument cannot be disregarded in respect to those arti-

ficial entities, called corporations, any more than they are

in respect to the individuals, who are the equitable owners

of the property belonging to such corporations. A State

has no more power to deny to corporations the equal pro-

tection of the laws than it has to the individual citizen.”

Santa Fe Ry. Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U. 8. 150 and 154; Allgeyer

vs. La., 165 U. 8.578; Pembina Mining Co. vs. Penn, 119

U. 8. 110, 119. c

(c) It is further settled that the word person includes

an alien and that the amendment entitles him to protec-

tion of liberty and property. Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.

S. 356; Re Hoover, 30 Federal Reporter, 51; Re Tiburcio

Parrott, 1 Federal Reporter, 481, 497; U. 8. vs. Wong Dep

~ Ken, 57 Fed. Rep. 206; Ah Kow vs. Nunan, 5 Sawyer, 552;

Ah Fong, 3 Sawyer, 154, 157.

(d) It, therefore, follows that the plaintiff in error is

person within the meaning of the constitutional pro-

visions.

(e) It is further clear that the plaintiff in error is not

‘only within that category of the amendment which forbids

any State to “deprige any person of life, liberty, or prop-

erty without due process of law ;” but also within that cat-

egory which forbids any State to “deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Act 149 of the General Assembly of Louisiana of 1890

(Appendix B)} provides that all corporations domiciled

outside of the State, except mercantile corporations, shall

file with the Secretary of State a declaration of domicile,

and shall designate an agent upon whom service of legal

process shall be made ; and that service of process on such

agent shall suffice to bring the corporation into court.

It appears from the petitions in this case and the excep-

tion. admits that the plaintiff in error is doing a non-

mercantile business in the State of Louisiana, and that

Sawers & Sons are, for the purposes of its business, its

agents in the City of New Orleans. It is a fact, and the

Court will presume, that the plaintiff in error has complied

with the statute above mentioned, and that it is pursuing

its said business under the license, and with the permission

of the State; and therefore no suggestion can lie that the

plaintiff in error is not “within the jurisdiction” of the

State of Louisiana so as to be entitled to the equal protec-

tion of its laws.

(f) The right of the plaintiff in error to freely enter the

Port of New Orleans with its ships, and to lawfully trade

there free of damaging and arbitrary interference by the

State of Louisiana or any agency thereof, is granted alike

by the Constitution, the treaty of the United States with

France and the legislation of Congress. U. 8. Revised

Statutes, Secs. 1977 and 709.

This right is property under every definition of that

term, and its deprivation or curtailment constitutes a

taking of property and an infringement of liberty.

“The 14th Amendment * * * undoubtedly intended

that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or

liberty, or the arbitrary spoliation of property, but that

equal protection and security should be given to all under

like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and

civil rights; that all persons should be equally entitled to

pursue their: happiness and to acquire and enjoy property ;

that they should have like access to the Courts of the

Country for the protection of their persons and property,

the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement

of contracts ; that noimpediment should be interposed to the

41

.

pursuits of anyone except as applied to the same pursuits

of others under like circumstances; that no greater burdens

should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the

same a and condition.” Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.

8.27, 31.

“The main guarantee of private rights against unjust

legislation is found in that memorable clause of the Bill of

Rights, that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty or

property, without due process oflaw. This guaranty is not

construed in any narrow or technical sense. The right to

life may be invaded without its destruction. One may be

deprived of his liberty in a constitutional sense without

putting his body in confinement. Property may be taken

without manual interference therewith, or its physical de-

struction.” Bertholf vs. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509, Tiedeman

Lims. Police Power, Sec. 3.

The deprivation and taking are admitted, and the sole

question is, whether such deprivation and taking were

lawful.

(g) We need not go far afield to seek either the history

and reasons which preceded and led to the adoption of the

provision which we attack, or the extent of the power in-

tended to beconferred thereby. The former is conveniently

afforded, and the latter defined in strict harmony with the

legislative intention, by the opinion of the Supreme Court

of Louisiana. Speaking of the Board, defendant in error

here, and the power conferred by Section 8 of Act 192 of

1898, the Court says:

“Tt is very clear that the General Assembly intended to

grant additional powers to the Board, and this very power

was, beyond question, one of them.

“During the fall of 1897, and during the existence of an

epidemic, a vessel arrived in the Mississippi River with

immigrants aboard, under conditions similar to those under

which the Britannia reached the same stream in 1898.

“The excited public discussion at the time as to the

right of the State Board under the then existing law to

prevent the landing of the immigrants, and as to its duty

in the premises, was so extended as to authorize us to take

judicial notice of the fact, and in our opiniow the clause

in the present Act, which covers that precise matter, was

_inserted therein for the express purpose of placing the

particular question outside of the circumstances of con-

troversy.

“For a number of years past, immigrants had been

coming into New Orleans in the autumn from Italy.

“There was a probability, when the General Assembly

met in 1898, that the epidemic of 1897 might be repeated

and a great probability that immigrants would seek to

enter as they had done the year before, to the great danger,

not only of the people of Louisiana, but of the immigrants

themselves.

“Tndependently of this, there was great danger to be ap-

prehended from the increasing intercourse between New

Orleans and the West India Islands in consequence of

a war with Spain.

“It was to ward off these dangers that this particular

provision was inserted in the Act of 1898.”

This language contains the gist of the matter. The State

Board of Health is to have power, and unlimited power, to

prohibit the entrance into or through the State of Louis-

iana of any person or bodies of persons whatsoever on the

theory that the entrance or passage of such«persons would

be (to use the phrase of the Supreme Court of Louisiana)

the addition of new “fuel to the flame” of any disease,

previously declared by the Board to exist and to be of the

character designated as infectious or contagious.

Italian immigration in the fall of the year, however law-

ful under the existing treaties, is to be the especial object

of prevention and was the especial object of prevention in

the case at bar.

43

- We think it demonstrable both by reason and authority

that this grant of power is void on its face. And if it is

void, the defendants are liable, for they have never pretended

to act under-any other.

By the provisions of Act 192 of 1898, the State Board of.

Health is given the power to declare the existence of in-

fectious or contagious diseases in any portion of the State, .

and then to declare the same in quarantine. What diseases

shall be considered infectious or contagious, and to what *

extent a particular disease must prevail to warrant action

on the part of the Board, are matters necessarily and

properly left to the discretion of the Board itself. The

‘exercise of this discretion to the extent above indicated

could not, and would not be reviewed by any tribunal. If

measles, in the opinion of the Board, was an infectious

and contagious disease, it is not likely that any court

would undertake to say that it was not.

So far, the statute is unobjectionable. But having first

exercised its discretion in declaring the existence and nature

of some disease and having declared “a portion of the

State’’ to be infected with such disease, what limit is there

upon the power of the Board? We submit there is none.

It cannot be denied that the phrase, “persons acclimated,

unacclimated or said to be immune,” is exhaustive. There

is no human being who is not embraced by it; prince,

pauper, citizen, alien, healthy, diseased, old, young, from

whatever spot on the globe, seeking entrance into Louisiana

under whatever circumstances and for whatever purpose,

each, any or all may be met with the Board’s prohibition

of entrance. It is not the mere residence of a healthy

person in some narrowly defined infected locality that may

be thus prohibited. It is his “introduction” into an unde-

fined infected locality for whatever purpose, whether as a

traveler desiring mere passage, or a trader the mere time

to transact his business and depart. Again, this introduc-

‘tion is made to depend in nowise upon the likelihood of

danger. If the Board has declared the City of New Orleans

_to be infected .by reason of the existence of five cases of

yellow fever in the lower portion of the City, a passenger

from Europe may not disembark ten miles away in the

upper portion for the purpose of taking a train to Wash-

ington or Kansas City. He is paternally considered “fresh

fuel’’ and not allowed to risk himself. On the same

theory, if a tenement on the outskirts of the City should

take fire, the delivery of a fifty pound package of gun-

powder in another portion five miles away may be for-

bidden. The danger is no more remote in the one case

than in the other.

And why, after all, may not a healthy person who desires

to do so, take his chances of contracting a disease some of

which prevails in a locality of large dimensions? What

injustice is done to the rest of the community?

_ Surely, no more than is done every day in the course of

nature by the birth of children in that locality. These

children are “fresh fuel’’ and peculiarly liable to add to the

“flame ;’’ and yet the wildest germicide would not dream of

proposing to isolate them or take them away from their

parents. Every citizen of Louisiana who returned from West,

East, or North, from Boston, Chicago, Paris, or Hong Kong,

and came to New Orleans in the fall of 1898, was “fresh

fuel.” Every train that entered the city in that fall brought

“fresh fuel.’’ It is not pretended, and the contrary is

45

alleged, that this “fresh fuel’? was stopped by the Board

of Health, defendants in error here. Its failure to do this

subjected the plaintiff in error to a gross and oppressive

discrimination. But the question now in hand is, could

the entry of all this “fresh fuel” have been lawfully pre-

vented?

The proposition of the defendants in error really comes

to this: that instead. of being limited to the isolation of

those persons who are found to have or are suspected of

having disease, they have and should have the power to

isolate thé rest of the healthy world from any territory over

or in which they may allow such cases of disease to remain

scattered. :

Instead of setting apart any ten or fifty patients that

may be discovered with fever in New Orleans in a special

portion of the City or elsewhere—in other words, instead

of prescribing reasonable regulations governing intercourse

with disease actually discovered—the ten or fifty cases

are to remain wherever the stricken persons may be, and

everyone else, no matter what his health, is to be excluded

from all portions of the City because perchance someone

may contract the disease. and then pass it on to a citizen

who has been daily exposed to the same or greater danger,

according to his discretion, his state of health, whether he

has met this person or that, been here or there—according

to an infinite number of circumstances.

-To sum up, the Board has an uncontrolled power and an

unreviewable discretion to pronounce at any time, and pro-

long for any period the existence of any disease, ane *~

stamp it with thecharacter of infectious or contagious ; it may

declare and determine at will the extent of the territory in

46

which such disease exists at any time without limitation and

without respect to the facts; it may select any person or

persons whatsoever as likely to increase the prevalence of

the disease, and prohibit his or their entrance without re-

gard to the health of those persons, or the health of the

places from which they come, or the likelihood or unlikeli-

hood of their being diseased, and it may then deny to the

person or persons so selected any entrance into, or passage

through, the portions of the State previously declared to be

infected.

This is power absolute, imperial, transcending all law.

It will not do to say that the condition precedent to the

exercise of the power of the Board is the existence of an

infectious or contagious disease in some portion of the

State. The creation of this condition precedent to the ex-

ercise of its power of exclusion depends wholly on the will

of the Board itself. It may say to-day that an infectious

disease exists in a certain locality, and thereupon exercise

against A its power of exclusion, and to-morrow it may say

that the disease no longer exists in that locality, and there-

upon permit B to enter. How little the Board would

hesitate in the future to create and declare this condition

in order to give room for any desired action on its part

may be judged by the facts of the present case.

Subsequent to the passage of the resolution attached to

the original petition of the plaintiff in error and the notice

thereof, the agents of said plaintiff in error at New Orleans

were notified that if they attempted to land the Britannia’s

passengers at any place in the State of Louisiana, quaran-

tine would at once be established and enforced there. It

was hot pretended, and it was not a fact, that the whole

47

State was infected ; but the Board desired to exclude im-

migration from Italy in the fall of 1898. The power to ex-

clude had been given it, and it exercised that power to the

fullest and most oppressive extent. It made no difference

that the end to be attained was to be attained by the dec-

laration of a non-existent fact. The statute put this in the

power of the Board, and it used its power.

It is well settled in this Court that the effect of a State

statute may be considered in testing its constitutionality,

and “if deductions from the face of the ordinance as to its

necessary tendency and ultimate actual operation” (Mr. Jus-

tice Matthews, in Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. &., ‘at page

373), results in a conclusion of unconstitutionality, then it

seems such unconstitutionality may be declared. Yick Wo vs.

Hopkins, 118 U. 8. 356; Chy Lung vs. Freeman, 92 U. 8.

279; Henderson vs. Mayor, 92 U. 8. 268; City of Baltimore

vs. Radecke, 49 Md. 217.

* The necessary tendency and ultimate actual operation”

of the statute at bar, quite apart from the facts of this

case, are easy to detect. The State of Louisiana has cre-

ated in its State Board of Health a machinery perfectly

adapted to set at naught the Constitution, laws and treat-

ies of the United States, and to put at the mercy of indi-

vidual caprice the most sacred rights of the individual.

Under the guise of police regulation, the State, through

- this Board, may dictate a separate commercial policy and

may regulate immigration into its borders at pleasure.

The Board may discriminate against the ships or subjects

- of any State or Kingdom, or against the ships of any cor-

poration or individual. It may say to 100 British subjects :

_ An epidemic of grippe prevails in the Port of New Orleans.

You shall not come in. It may say this to one British

subject and allow 99 others to enter. It may create, at

will, oceasions for the exclusion of all British subjects,

whatsoever, and have no such occasion when the entrance

of French subjects is at issue. Jt may select any person

or any steamship or railway line for ruin and any other

for enrichment. There ic nota conceivable right that may

not be infringed, invaded or destroyed by such a power.

It is not enough to say that the evil use of the power

granted is improbable. No one is bound to trust that

an illegal power will be legally and moderately used.

Gloucester Ferry Co. vs. Penn, 114 U. 8. 205; Hen-

derson vs. Mayor, 92 U. 8. 268. Power granted must

be presumed to be granted for use, and what instance

can be pointed to where arbitrary power was slow

to exert itself? The history of civil liberty is the history

of mankind’s attempts to so limit and define power by

written laws, charters, and constitutions, that every man

may know what rights he has and what duties he owes.

If arbitrary power be given, it.is not law, for “law is the

definition and limitation of power” (Mr. Justice Matthews,

in Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. 8., at page 370); and if the

power so given be exercised, there is no due process of law,

neither is there equal protection of the laws afforded, for

there can be no equality of operation in a law which fur-

nishes no rule of action save such as may reside in the will

of the individual charged with its execution.

If the “necessary tendency and ultimate actual opera-

tion” of the statute here attacked be such as we have

argued, no citation, or certainly no extended citation, of

authority can be necessary to demonstrate its entire in-

49

validity. The case at bar cannot be distinguished from

the cases of Chy Lung vs. Freeman, 92 U. 8. 277, and Hen-

derson vs. Mayor, 92 U. 8. 259.

We, therefore, submit that that portion of the statute

under which the defendants in error acted is void on its

face, and is void as construed by the Supreme Court of

Louisiana ; and that, as applied by the defendants in error,

it has subjected the plaintiff in error to an arbitrary taking,

and invasion of its rights, and an oppressive discrimina-

tion, and has deprived it of the rights secured to it by the

14th Article of Amendment.

VI.

THIRD POINT.

The statute as applied and construed is void, for the

reason that it is in conflict with treaties between the United

States on the one part and the Republic of France and the

Kingdom of Italy on the other parts, guaranteeing certain

rights, privileges and immunities to the citizens and subjects

of said countries.

Article VIII of the treaty between the United States and

France, concluded April 30, 1803 (see “Official Compila-

tious of Treaties in Force, 1899,” page 177), whereby the

Territory of Louisiana was ceded to the United States,

provides :

“In future and forever after the expiration of the twelve

years, the ships of France shall be treated upon the footing

of the most favored nation in the ports above mentioned”

(that is to say, the ports in the ceded territory, including

the port of New Orleans).

Articles I, II, III and IV of the treaty of commerce and

navigation between the United States and the Kingdom of

es.

Italy, concluded February 26, 1871 (Off. Comp., pages 310,

311), provide as follows:

“Article I. There shall be between the territories of the

high contracting parties a reciprocal liberty of commerce

and navigation.

“Italian citizens in the United States and citizens of the

United States in Italy shall mutually have liberty to enter

with their ships and cargoes all the ports of the United

States and Italy respectively which may be open to foreign

commerce.

“They shall also have liberty to sojourn and reside in all

ports whatsoever of said Territories. They shall enjoy

respectively within the States and possessions of either

party the same rights, privileges, favors, immunities and

exemptions for their commerce and navigation as the

natives of the country wherein they reside without paying

other or higher duties or charges than are paid by the

natives on condition of their submitting to the laws and

ordinances there prevailing.

“War vessels of the two countries shall receive in their

respective ports the treatment of those of the most favored

nation.

“Article II. The citizens of each of the high contracting

parties shall have liberty to travel in the States and Terri-

tories of the other; to carry on trade, wholesale and retail ;

to hire and occupy houses and warehouses; to employ

agents of their choice; and generally to do anything inci-

dent to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as the

natives of the country submit themselves to the laws there

established.

“Article III. The citizens of each of the high con-

tracting parties shall receive in the States and Territories

of the other the most constant protection and security for

their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect

the same rights and privileges as are, or shall be, granted

to the natives upon their submitting themselves to the con-

ditions imposed upon the natives.

“They shall, however, be exempt in their respective Ter-

51

ritories from compulsory military service, either on land or

sea, in the regular forces or in the national guard or in the

militia.

“They shall likewise be exempt from any judicial or

municipal office, and from any contribution whatever, in

kind or in money, to be levied in compensation for personal

service.

“Article IV. The citizens of neither of the contracting

parties shall be liable in the States and Territories of the

other to any embargo; nor shall they be detained with

their vessels, cargoes, merchandise, or effects for any mili-

tary expedition nor for any public or private purpose what-

ever, without allowing to those interested a sufficient in-

demnification previously agreed upon when possible.”

Article I of the treaty of commerce and navigation

between the United States and Great Britain, concluded

July 5, 1815 (Off. Comp., page 216), provides as follows :

“Article 1. There shall be between the Territories of

the United States of America and all the Territories of her

Britannick Majesty in Europe a reciprocal liberty of com-

merce. The inhabitants of the two countries respectively

shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their

ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers in the

Territories aforesaid in which other persons are permitted

to come; to enter the same and to remain and reside in

any port of said Territories respectively ; also to hire and

occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their

commerce, and generally the merchants and traders of each

nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection

and security for their commerce ; but subject always to the

lows and statutes of the two countries respectively.”

The treaty of commerce and navigation between the

Kingdom of Greece and the United States, concluded Dec.

22,1837 (Otf. Comp. p. 268), provides for reciprocal free-

dom of trade and intercourse, and the Article XV (p. 273)

provides as follows :

— ae

52

“Article XV. It is agreed that vessels arriving directly

from the United States of America at a port within the

dominion of His Majesty the King of Greece, or from the

Kingdom of Greece at a port of the United States of Amer.

ica, and provided with a bill of health granted by an officer

having competent power to that effect at the port whencts

such vessel shall have sailed; setting forth that no malig. “

nant or contagious diseases prevailed in that port, shall de

subjected to no other quarantine than such as may be nee.

essary for the visit of the health officer uf the port where

such vessel shall have arrived, after which said vessels

shall be allowed immediately to enter and unload their

cargoes—Provided always that there shall be on board no

person who, during the voyage, shall have been attacked

with any malignant or contagious disease ; that such vessel

shall not, during the passage, have communicated with any

vessel liable itself to undergo quarantine; and that the

country whence they came shall not at that time be so far

infected or suspected that, before their arrival, an ordin-

ance had been issued in consequence of which all vessels

coming from that country should be considered as sus-

pected and consequently subject to quarantine.”’

Article XVI of the treaty of commerce and naviga-

tion between the Kingdom of Sweden and Norway and

the United States, concluded July 4, 1827 (Off. Comp.

616), contains a provision couched in exactly similar

language.

The treaties above quoted are in no proper sense reci-

procity treaties, and as the treaty with France quoted above

contains the most favored nation clause, each and every

one of the stipulations quoted above from the treaties of

the United States with Italy, Great Britain, Greece, and

Sweden-Norway become a part of the treaty between the

United States and the Republic of France, and the citizens

of France are entitled to all the privileges and immunities

53

thereby granted to the same extent as though same were

specifically granted in terms by the French treaty.

The right was thus conferred, under the circumstances

mentioned in the treaties with Greece and with Sweden-

Norway, upon French citizens to come with their vessels

to any port in the United States and to discharge the same

“with no other quarantine than such as may be necessary

for the visit of the health officer of the port where such

vessels shall have arrived.’’ The benefit of these treaty

stipulations to the orderly and expeditious transaction of

commercial affairs, without, however, adding to the risk to

the public health, is so evident that it was but natural that

Congress should have enacted general legislation along the

same lines. And, in fact, it might justly be said that the

legislation of Congress, to which we are about to refer, was

but legislation to make effective the treaty obligations

assumed by the United States in its conventions, for by

reason of the fact that most, if not all, of the treaties of

this country contain the most favored nation clause, the

stipulations in the treaties with Greece and Sweden-Norway

became of universal application in the relations of the

United States with other nations.

Thus we find that by an Act approved February 15, 1893

(27 Statutes at Large, 449), entitled “An Act granting addi-

tional quarantine powers and imposing additional duties

upon the Marine Hospital Service,” it is by the first section

declared unlawful for any merchant ship, or other vessel,

from any foreign port or place to enter any port of the

United States, except in accordance with the provisions of

‘that act and with such rules and regulations of State and

54

municipal health authorities as may be made in pursuance

of or consistent with that act.

By section 2 of that act it is provided “that any vessel,

at any foreign port, clearing for any port or place in the

United States, shall be required to obtain from the consul,

vice-consul, or other consular officer of the United States,

at the port of departure, or from the medical officer where

such officer has been detailed by the President for that

purpose, a bill of health in duplicate in the form prescribed

by the Secretary of the Treasury, setting forth the sanitary

history and condition of the vessel and that it has in ail

respects complied with the rules and regulations in such

eases prescribed for securing the best sanitary condition of

said vessel with its cargo, passengers, and crew; and said

consular or medical officer is required before granting such

duplicate bill of health to be satisfied that the matters and

things therein stated are true. * * *”

Heavy penalties are imposed by the same section upon

any vessel sailing for the United States without this con-

sular bill of health.

By Section 5 it is provided, ““* * * and it shall not

be lawful for any vessel to enter said port to discharge its

cargo or land its passengers except upon a certificate of the

health officer at such quarantine station certifying that

said rules and regulations have in all respects been ob-

served and complied with as well on his part as on the

part of said vessel and its master in respect to the same

and to its cargo, passengers and crew; and the master of

every such vessel shall produce and deliver to the Collector

of Customs at said port of entry, together with the other

papers of the vessel, the said bills of health required to be

obtained at the port of departure and the certificate herein

required to be obtained from the health officer at the port

of entry; and that the bills of health herein prescribed shall

be considered as part of the ship’s papers, and when duly cer-

tified to by the proper consular officer or other officer of the

United States over his aforesaid signature and seal shall be

vo

accepted as evidence of the statement therein contained ia

anv court of the United States.”

Pursuant to the directions of this statute, the Secretary

of the Treasury has made elaborate rules and regulations

covering the inspection of all vessels with cargo and pas-

‘sengers clearing at a foreign port for a port in the United

States; providing for complete reports by consular officers

concerning the health of the port from which the vessel is

about to sail, the condition of crew, passengers, etc., and

prescribing minute regulations for the preservation of the

good sanitary condition of the ship and cargo and health

of the crew and passengers while at sea. We append to

this brief the regulations of the Treasury Department

covering the bills of health whieh such vessels must obtain

from the consular agents before sailing, as Appendix

me. ?

In addition to these regulations, when any of the pas-

sengers of the ship are immigrants, by Section 2 of Act

approved March 3, 1893, entitled “An act to facilitate the

enforcement of the immigration and contract labor laws of

the United States” (27 Statutes at Large, 569), it is pro-

vided that the immigrants shall be listed in convenient

groups and no one list or manifest shall contain more than

thirty mames. To each immigrant or head of a family

shall be given a ticket on which shall be written his name,

a number or letter designating the list, and his number on

the list for convenience of identification on arrival. Each

list or manifest shall be verified by the signature and the

oath or affirmation of the master or commanding officer, or

of the officer first or second below him in command, taken

before the United States Consul or Consular Agent at the

56

port of departure before the sailing of the vessel, to the

effect that he has made a personal examination of each

and all of the passengers named therein, and that he has

caused the surgeon of said vessel sailing therewith to

make a physical examination of each of said passengers,

and that from his personal inspection, and the report of

said surgeon, he believes that no one of said passengers js

an idiot or insane person, or a pauper, or likely to become

a public charge, or suffering from a loathsome or danger.

ous contagious disease, or a person who has been convicted

of felony, or of infamous crime or misdemeanor involving

moral turpitude, or under a contract or agreement, express

or implied, to perform labor in the United States; and

that also, according to the best of his knowledge and belief,

the information in said list or manifest concerning each of

said passengers named therein is correct and true.

The third Section of the same act provides that the

surgeon sailing with the vessel shall also sign and make

oath to said lists or manifests, stating his professional

experience and qualifications as a physician and surgeon,

and that he has made a personal examination of each pas-

senger on said lists, and that, according to the best of his

knowledge and belief, the statements contained therein are

true.

It is plain from an examination of these provisions that

a compliance with the requirements of this legislation and

the regulations of the Treasury Department made in pur-

suance thereof satisfies the conditions expressed in the

treaties above referred to with Greece and Sweden-Norway

and entitles the ship owner to enter and discharge his ship

without any other quarantine or detention than such as

5

7

may be necessary to permit the health officer to make an

examination.

The plaintiff in error specifically alleges in its supple-

mental and amended petition (Trans. pages 6 and 7) com-

pliance with these laws and regulations, and was, therefore,

entitled, after its vessel, cargo, crew and passengers had

been inspected by the health officers of the defendant

Board and found free of infectious or contagious diseases,

to proceed to New Orleans and there discharge her cargo

and passengers ; and in excluding the Britannia after such

inspection had disclosed compliance with said laws and

reguiations, after the health officer at the Quarantine Sta-

tion had given her a clean bill of health, the defendants in

error deprived the plaintiff in error of privileges and im-

munities secured to it by and under the treaty with France.

It follows, then, that as the Constitution, and the laws

and treaties made in pursuance thereof, are the supreme

law of the land, this statute which the Supreme Court of

Louisiana holds is a valid exercise of legislative power and

vests the State Board of Health with authority to act as

they did in this case, must be void, unless for some reason

the treatv-making power of the Government exceeded its

limitations,

We cannot conceive, however, in what respect it has

done so in concluding the treaties referred to above. The

power to make treaties is conferred by the Constitution

upon the general Government without any express limita-

tions or restrictions whatever. Impliedly, however, it is

restricted to securing those objects for which the Govern-

ment and the Constitution were created, and it cannot be

ee

58

exercised so as to destroy any of the powers otherwise

granted or secured by that instrument.

It might not be so exercised, perhaps, as to deprive the

several States of the right of preserving the health and

morals of its citizens by excluding convicted felons,

paupers, and diseased persons and things from their bor-

ders, but beyond this exception in relation to the ingress

and egress and the status of foreigner: in this country, we

know of no limitation upon the treaty-making power con-

ferred by the Constitution.

Mr. Justice Field, in the case of Ho Ah Kow vs. Nunan, 5

Sawyer, 552, had occasion to pass upon the validity of cer-

tain articles of the Constitution of California and statutes

made in pursuance thereof having as their object the ex-

clusion of Chinese. In passing upon the validity of these

statutes and in discussing the extent and scope of the

treaty-making power, the learned Justice said :

“To that government belongs exclusively the treaty.

making power, and the power to regulate commerce with

foreign nations, which includes intercourse as well as

traffic, and with the exceptions presently mentioned, the

power to prescribe the conditions of immigration or im-

portation of persons. The State in these particulars, with

those exceptions, is powerless, and nothing is gained by

the attempted assertion of a control which can never be

admitted. The State may exclude from its limits paupers,

and convicts of other countries, persons incurably diseased,

and others likely to become a burden upon its resources.

It may, perhaps, also exclude persons whose presence would

be dangerous to its established government. Whatever is

done by way of exclusion beyond this must come from the

general Government. That Government alone can de-

termine what aliens shall be permitted to land within the

59

United States, and upon what conditions they shall be per-

mitted toremain. * * *”

See Baker vs. Portland, 5 Sawy. 566.

In re Parrott, 1 Fed. 481, by Sawyer & Hoffman, J. J.

Nishi Mura vs. United Slates, 142 U. 8. 651.

Head Money Cases, 112 U. 8. 580.

In re Ah Fong, 3 Sawyer, 144 (Justice Field).

Under the Constitution of the United States, no State

has a right to enter ingo any treaty or convention with

any foreign nation, and the power to make treaties and to

hoid relations with foreign nations is exclusively vested in

the Federal Government. As the right of visitation and

intercourse by foreigners with this country is within the

jurisdiction of the treaty-making power, it follows that the

power to fix the conditions upon which foreigners may

visit or reside in the United States is vested in the Federal

Government; and it follows that whenever the Federal

Government in the exercise of its treaty-making power has

entered into a convention with any foreign nation fixing

the status of the subjects of such nation in the United

States and regulating the conditions when and under which

they may enter the United States, such treaty becomes

obligatory upon all of the States, and it is not within the

power of any of them to deny such persons the rights and

privileges which such treaty confers upon them. The only

limitation we believe to which such rights and privileges

so conferred might be subject is the power of the State to

protect itself against criminals, paupers, and diseased

persons, though it may even be doubted whether the recog-

nized police power of the State could even in such a case

prevail. But in this case, it is not necessary to consider

60

the result of such a conflict, as admittedly, these persons

were not of the character mentioned, nor were in their

nature any more dangerous to the health and safety of the

community than any other class of people. The order and

the law excluding them would have applied equally as wel]

to a body of the healthiest and most respectable citizens of

any State of the Union or of any foreign nation. It would

have applied to any foreign ambassador and his official

and personal suite, or to a visiting prince or sovereign just

as clearly as to these immigrants.

To permit the exercise of such a power by the State of

Louisiana would be to authorize it to nullify every treaty

of commerce and navigation made by the general govern-

ment; to involve it in difficulties which might lead to war

or to the suspension of intercourse with foreign nations;

and would authorize it to pass laws whose enforcement

would render the general government liable to just reclam-

ations which it must answer, while the State, for whose

acts it was thus so responsible, would not suffer in any

respect whatsoever.

The fulfilment of the most sacred treaty obligations of

this government to the nations of the world would be sub-

ject to the discretion and judgment of three physicians, a

quorum of this Board. Such an assertion of power can

never be admitted.

VII.

FOURTH POINT.

This Statute as applied is void for the reason that it is in

conflict with the laws of the United States relating to foreign

immigration into the United States.

By Acts approved March 3, 1875, Chap. 141; August 3,

_— iD«e

61

1882, Chap. 376; June 26, 1884, Chap. 121; Feb. 26. 1885,

Chap. 164; March 28, 1887, Chap. 120; and March 3, 1891,

Chap. 551; and the regulations of the Treasury Depart-

ment made in pursuance thereof, the national government

has minutely provided the terms and conditions upon

which, and regulated the manner in which, immigrants

may enter the United States, and this legislation fully

covers the entire field of the subject confided exclusively to

the national government. By the Act approved March 3,

1891, Congress has provided for the exclusion of all

paupers, criminais, and diseased or afflicted persons, or

others who would probably prove undesirable citizens,

from the United States, and from the fact that it imposes no

restrictions on persons not of such character, but, on the

contrary, by naturalization laws, has actually encouraged

them to enter the United States and become citizens, it is

perfectly manifest that it is the desire of the national gov-

ernment that such persons should freely and unrestrictedly

enter the country; and we submit that any legislation by

a State which vests any Board with power to exclude such

persons as the immigrants brought to the port of New

Orleans by the Steamship Britannia, was and is in contra-

vention of these Statutes.

Vir.

In conclusion, we submit that the section of the act com-

plained of is unconstitutional; it is not a law; it confers

no rights; it imposes no duty; it affords no protection ; it

is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had

never been passed.

Norton vs. Shelby Co., 118 U. 8. 425 at 442.

62

The case stands, in such event, as if the members of the

Board had acted without sanction of law, and they must

respond for the damages occasioned by their illegal acts,

Beer vs. Board of Health et als., 35 La. An. 1132.

Whatever may be the effect of a judgment against the

Board, which is an agency created by the State, with power

to sue and be sued, a judgment is enforceable by the or-

dinary process against the individuals comprising it, who

wronged the plaintiff in error. As an injunction, as well

as damages, was asked for, the Board was a necessary party

to the suit.

We submit there was error in the judgment below, and

the decree of the Supreme Court of Louisiana should be

reversed, with directions to reverse the judgment of the Civil

District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Division C, and to

overrule the exception of no cause of action filed by the

defendants, and remand the case for further proceedings.

W. W. HOWE,

W. B. SPENCER,

Of Counsel for Plaintiff in Error.

APPENDIX.

e¢ Aa?

Extract from Act 192 of 1898 of the General Assembly of

Louisiana.

Section 8. Be it further enacted, etc., That in the event

that any case shall be reported to, or come to the knowl-

edge of any local board, which is either deemed to be a

case of contagious or infectious disease, or suspected of so

being, the local board shall immediately isolate the same

and communicate the fact by the most expeditious means

at hand to the State Board of Health, together with the

information as to what steps have been taken by the local

board to isolate and care for the same, and shall from time

to time communicate the progress of the case and disease

to the State Board of Health. On receipt of such informa-

tion by the said State Board of Health, the President of

said Board shall, if he deem the emergency sufficient and

necessary, send expert physicians to be selected by him to

examine and diagnose the disease, and if on such examina-

tion and diagnosis the experts shall declare the case to be

one of obnoxious or infectious nature, liable to spread, or to

become dangerous to the general public health of the State,

the State Board of Health or its President shall instruct

the health officer of the Board of Health of the parish, city

or town, as to what additional steps, if any, shall be taken

to isolate the case, and prevent the spread of the contagion

or infection therefrom and shall require that the local

health officers shall immediately conform thereto, and put

the same in operation. In the event that said local au-

thorities shall fail to do so in a manner satisfactory to the

State Board or its President, the State Board or its Presi-

dent shall take charge of the case and manage the same,

through its own officers or employes.

——

ll

All expenses, costs and charges incurred in the manage.

ment, control and supervision in such cases shall be borne

and paid by the parish, town or city in which the case

may be, and on the failure of the parish or municipality to

reimburse the State Board the amount of its expenditures

incurred in such cases, the State Board of Health shall

have the right to proceed by writ of mandamus in any

court of competent jurisdiction to compel the payment of

the same.

In case that any parish, town or city, or any portion

thereof, shall become infected with any contagious or jn.

fectious disease, to such an extent as to threaten the spread

of such disease to the other portions of the State, the State

Board of Health shall issue its proclamation declaring the

facts and ordering it in quarantine, and shall order the

local boards of health in other parishes, town and cities, to

quarantine against said locality, and shall establish and

promulgate the rules and regulations, terms and conditions

on which intercourse with said infected locality shall be

permitted, and shall issue to the other local sanitary au-

thorities instructions as to the measures adopted in quar-

antining against persons, goods, or other property coming

from said infected localities, and these rules and regula-

tions, terms and conditions shall be observed and obeyed

by all other health authorities, provided that should any

other of the non-infected portion of the State desire to add

to the regulations and rules, terms and conditions already

imposed by the State Board, they do so. on approval of the

State Board of Health. The State Board of Health may, in

its discretion, prohibit the introduction into any infected

portion of the State, persons acclimated, unacclimated or

said to be immune, when in its judgment the introduction of

such persons would add to or increase the prevalence of the

disease. The State Board of Health shall render to the

local boards of health all the assistance in their power and

which the condition of their finances will permit.

ii

e6 B bb]

Act No. 149 of the General Assembly of Louisiana for 1890.

Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of

the State of Louisiana, That it shall be the duty of all cor-

porations, domiciled out of the State, doing business in the

State, excepting mercantile corporations, to file in the office

of the Secretary of State a declaration of the place or local-

ity of its domicile, together with the name of its agent or

officer in the State representing said corporation upon

whom service of process can be made.

Section 2. Be it further enacted, ete., Whenever any

such corporation shall do any business of any nature what-

soever in this State, without having complied with the re-

quirements of section one of this act, it may be sued upon

any cause of action in the parish where the right or cause

of action arose, and service of process may be made upon

the person or persons, firm or company, acting or transact-

ing such business for such corporation, and each person or

persons, company or firm shall be deemed the agent of

said corporation upon whom service can be made.

66 Cc 99

Quarantine Regulations to be Observed at Foreign Ports and

at Sea.

ARTICLE I.—Bixts oF HEALTH.

Par. 1. Masters of vessels departing from any foreign

port for a port in the United States must obtain a bill of

health in duplicate signed by the proper officer or officers

of the United States as provided for by law, except as pro-

vided for in par. 5.

The following form is prescribed :

Par. 2. Bill of health:

NSC a a ea eae aa

lV

Form No. 193la.

UNITED STATES BILL OF HEALTH.

Name of vessel, Nationality, ——. Rig, <nu

Master, Tonnage, gross; net, Iron or wood.

Number of compartments for cargo, ; for steerage

passengers, ; for crew,

Name of medical officer,

Number of officers, ‘

Number of members of officers’ families,

Number of crew, including petty officers,

Number of passengers, cabin,

Number of passengers, steerage, .

Number of persons on board, all told, ——.

Port of departure,

Where last from, z

Number of cases of sickness and character, during last

voyage, ‘

Vessel engaged in trade, and plies between — —

and ‘

Sanitary condition of vessel

Nature, sanitary history, and condition of cargo, —~.,

Source and wholesomeness of water supply,

Source and wholesomeness of food supply,

Sanitary history and health of officers and crew, ——.

Sanitary history and health of passengers, cabin, ——.

Sanitary history and health of passengers, steerage, ——.

Sanitary history and condition of their effects,

Prevailing diseases at port and vicinity,

Location of vessel while discharging and loading—open

bay or wharf,

Number of cases and deaths from the fullowing-named

diseases during the past two weeks:

Disease. No. of cases. No. of deaths.

I is Sas akc dew wee ——_

Mmiatie CROITS. ... ... oc cc cucn —

Cholera nostras or cholerine ... ——

NNO 2455s wads waeuh execu cd See

NUE ik vi sccewkakvcues. —_——

NEN Cane dk evkiccx eg views —

MERU RELoNaa eee ieean riot —-

4

Number of cases of sickness and character of same while

vessel was in this port. :

Any conditions affecting the public health existing in

the port of departure or vicinity to be here stated,

I certify that the vessel has complied with the rules and

regulations made under the Act of February 15, 1893, and

that the vessel leaves this port bound for , U.S.

of America, via

Given under my hand and seal this day of , 190

(Signature of consular officer) »

Par. 3. Vessels clearing from a foreign port for any

port in the United States, and entering or calling at inter-

mediate ports, must procure at all said ports a supple-

mental bill of health as provided in Article 1. If a quar-

antinable disease has appeared on board the vessel after

leaving the original port of departure, or other circum-

stances presumably render the vessel infected, the supple-

mental bill of health should be withheld until such sani-

tary measures have been taken as are necessary.

The following form is prescribed :

Par. 4.—

SUPPLEMENTAL BILL oF HEALTH.

Port oF

Vessel . bound from to , U.S.A.

Sanitary condition of port, :

State diseases prevailing at port and in surrounding

country,

Number of cases and the deaths from the following-

named diseases during the past two weeks:

Remarks.

Diseases. eases eath (Any condition affecting the public health ex-

' e “% isting in the port to be cated here.)

be een Mme eas

Asiatic cholera or

Gholerine......sJees ey eee

SEP EG Ered lee wenn

iy pp eERES OPE eee ee

PORNO. nis eeuseadiaeoetalcasssiuan

MP BIOOYs inc sae chdnenchalssnane eae

“=

vi

Number and sanitary condition of passengers and crew landed

at this port.

Cabin, No.—. Sanitary condition and history, —~,

Steerage, No—. Sanitary condition and history, —,

Crew, No.—. Sanitary condition and history, —~.

Sanitary condition of effects,

Note.—If disembarked on account of sickness state dis.

ease,

Number and sanitary condition of passengers and crew taken

on at this port, and sanitary condition of effects.

Cabin, No—. Sanitary condition and history, —~,

Steerage, No—. Sanitary condition and history, ——.,

Crew, No.—. Sanitary condition and history,

Sanitary condition of effects,

Sanitary history of vessel since leaving last port.

(Cancel Form A, B, or C, as the case requires.)

Form.

A.—To the best of my knowledge )

and belief—

(Form A will be used at intermediate : a

ports where the vessel does not no quarantinable dis

enter and clear.) ease has _ appeared

f aboard since leay-

B.—I have satisfied myself that— ing

(Form B will be used at interme iate

ports where the vessel enters and

clears.)

C.—Since leaving the following quarantinable disease

has appeared on board , and I certify that the neces-

sary Sanitary measures have been taken.

I certify also that with reference to the passengers, effects,

and cargo taken on at this port, the vessel has complied

with the rules and regulations made under the Act of Feb-

ruary 15, 1893.

Given under my hand and seal this ——day of —— 190

(Signature of consular officer) ;

_

vii

Par. 5. Under the Act of Congress approved August

18, 1894, vessels plying between Canadian ports on the St.

Croix River, the St. Lawrence River, the Niagara River,

the Detroit River, the St. Clair River, and the St. Marys

River, and adjacent ports of the United States on the same

waters ; also vessels plying between Canadian ports on the

following-named lakes, viz., Ontario, Erie, St. Clair, Huron,

Superior, Rainy Lake, Lake of the Woods, Lake Cham-

plain, and ports in the United States; also vessels plying

between Mexican ports on the Rio Grande River and adja-

cent ports in the United States, are exempt from the pro-

vision of section 2 of the act granting additional quaran-

tine powers and imposing additional duties upon the

Marine-Hospital Service, approved February 15, 1893,

which requires vessels clearing from a foreign port for a

port in the United States to obtain from the consular

officer a bill of health.

During the prevalence of any of the quarantinablo dis-

eases at the foreign port of departure, vessels above referred

to are hereby required to obtain from the consular officer

of the United States, or from the medical officer of the

United States, when such officer has been detailed by the

President for this purpose, a bill of health, in duplicate, in

the form prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury,

Quarantine Regulations of the United States, 1894.

ARTICLE II.—INspEcTION.

Par. 1. The officer issuing the bill of health will satisfy

himself, by inspection if necessary, that the conditions cer-

tified to therein are true.

Par. 2. Inspection is required of—

(a2) All vessels from ports at which cholera prevails, or

at which yellow fever, smallpox, or typhus fever prevails

in epidemic form.

(5) All vessels carrying steerage passengers.

But the inspection of this class may be limited to said

——n

Viii

passengers and their living apartments, if from a healthy

port.

Par. 3. Inspection of the vessel is such an examination

of the vessel, cargo, passengers, crew, personal effects of

same, and including examination of manifests and other

papers, food, and water supply, as will enable him to de-

termine if these regulations have been complied with.

Par. 4. When an inspection is required, it should be

made by daylight, as late as practicable before sailing.

The vessel should be inspected before the passengers go

aboard, the passengers just before embarkation, and the

crew on deck ; and no cargo or person should be allowed

to come aboard after such inspection except by permission

of the officer issuing the bill of health.

ARTICLE III.—ReEQUIREMENTS WITH REGARD TO VEssELs,

Par. 1. Vessels, prior to stowing cargo or receiving

passengers, shall be mechanically clean in all parts, espec-

ially the hold, forecastle, and steerage ; the bilges and lim-

bers free from odor and deposit. The air streaks should

be sufficient in number and open for ventilation. Disin-

fection of the vessel may be required by the medical officer

of the United States.

Par. 2. If any infectious disease has occurred during

the last voyage, the portions of the vessel liable to have

been infected should be disinfected. When required, this

should be done by one of the methods hereinafter described.

Par. 3. The air space and ventilation must comform to

the provisions of the Act of Congress approved August 2,

1882, entitled “An act to regulate the carriage of passen-

gers by sea.” *

Par. 4. The food and water supply skould be sufficient,

and water for drinking purposes, free from possibility of

pollution, should be easily accessible.

*Computation of air space in any steerage compartment must not include

the space taken up by bunks, mattresses, life-preservers, or personal effects.

1X

Par. 5. Vessels departing from a port where cholera

prevails should have two medical officers if more than 250

steerage passengers are carried.

Par. 6. All bedding provided for steerage passengers

must be destroyed or disinfected before being again used

or landed, and mattresses and pillows used by steerage

passengers shall not be landed.

Par. 7. The hospitals of vessels carrying steerage pas-

sengers should be located on the upper or second deck and

not in direct communication with any steerage com-

partment.

Par. 8. Excepting when absolutely required, no solid

partitions should be placed in any steerege compartment,

obstructing light and air.

ARTICLE IV. —Carago.

Par. 1. At ports infected with cholera, earth, sand, loam,

soft or porous rock, should not be taken as ballast. Nor at

ports infected with yellow fever should such ballast be

allowed on board vessels clearing for ports south of the

southern boundary of Maryland when better material, such

as hard rock, is obtainable, or when it is possible to use

water ballast.

Par. 2. Certain food products, viz., unsalted meats,

sausages, dressed poultry, dried and smoked meats, ren-

nets, fresh butter, fresh milk (unsterilized), fresh cheese,

fresh bread, fresh vegetables, coming from cholera-infected

localities or through such localitios, if exposed to infection

therein, should not be shipped.

Par. 3. Fresh fruits from districts where cholera pre-

vails shall be shipped only under such sanitary supervision

as will enable the inspector to certify that they have not

been exposed to infection.

Par. 4. Articles of merchandise, personal effects, and

bedding, coming from a district known to be infected, or

as to the origin of which no positive evidence can be

x

obtained, and which the consular or medical officer has

reason to believe are infected, should be subjected to disin.

fection prior to shipment by processes prescribed for arti-

cles according to their class.

Par. 5. New merchandise in general may be accepted

for shipment without question; and articles of new mer.

chandise, textile fabrics, and the like, which have been

packed or prepared for shipment in an infected port or

place, with a special view to protect the same from moist-

ure incident to the voyage, may be accepted and exempted

from disinfection.

Par. 6. All rags and all textile fabrics used in the

manufacture of paper, collected or packed in any foreign

port or place, must, prior to shipment to the United States,

be subjected to disinfection by one of the prescribed

methods. ,

(Old jute bags, old cotton bags, old rope, new cotton and

linen cuttings from factories, not included).

Par. 7. Rags, old jute, old gunny, old rope, and similar

articles, gathered or packed or handled in any port or

place where cholera or yellow fever prevails, or smallpox

or typhus fever prevails in epidemic form, should not be

shipped until the officer issuing the bill of health should

be satisfied that the port or place has been for thirty days

free from such infection, and after the disinfection of the

articles.

Par. 8. New feathers for bedding; human and other

hair, unmanufactured ; bristles ; wool ; hides nut chemically

cured, coming from a district where cholera prevails, shall

be refused shipment until thirty days have elapsed since

last exposure, unless unpacked and disinfected as herein-

after provided.

Feathers which have been used should be disinfected,

and invariably by steam.

Par. 9. The articles enumerated in the preceding par-

agraph coming from a district where yellow fever prevails,

— so L100

.

Xl

destined for ports or places south of the southern boundary

of Maryland during the quarantine season, or where small-

pox or typhus fever prevails in epidemic form, should be

refused shipment unless disinfected as hereinafter provided.

Par. 10. Articles such as gelatin, glue, glue-stock, fish

glue, fish bladders, fish skins, sausage casings, bladders,

dried blood, having been in any way liable to infection in

the process of preparation, gathering, or shipment, should

be disinfected.

Par. 11. Any covering, shipped from or through an

infected port or place, and which the consul or medical

officer has reason to believe infected, should be disinfected.

Par. 12. Any article presumably infected, which can

not be disinfected, should not be shipped.*

ARTICLE V.—PASSENGERS AND CREW.

Par. 1. Passengers, for the purposes of these regula-

tions, are divided into two classes, cabin and steerage.

Par. 2. No person suffering from a quarantinable dis-

ease, or scarlet fever, measles, or diphtheria, should be

allowed to ship.

Par. 3. Steerage passengers and crew, coming from dis-

tricts where smallpox prevails in epidemic form, or who

have been exposed to smallpox, shall be vaccinated before

embarkation, unless they show evidence of immunity to

smallpox by previous attack or recent successful vaccination.

Par. 4. Steerage passengers and crew who, in the opinion

of the inspecting officer, have been exposed to the infection

of typhus fever, should not be allowed to embark fora

period of at least fourteen days after such exposure and the

disinfection of their baggage.

Par. 5. When practicable, passengers should not ship

from an infected port. Steerage passengers coming from

*Upholstered furniture, sheepskins used as wearing apparel, bedding,

bones, horns and hoofs.

xii

cholera-infected districts must be detained five days in

suitable houses or barracks located where there is no

danger from infection, and all baggage disinfected as here.

inafter provided ; the said period of five days to begin only

after the bathing of the passengers, disinfection of all their

baggage and apparel, removal of all food brought with

them, and isolation from others not so treated.

Par. 6. Steerage passengers from districts not infected

with cholera, shipping at a port infected with cholera,

unless passed through without danger of infection and no

communication allowed between passengers and the in-

fected locality, should be treated as those in the last

paragraph.

Par. 7. Prior to sailing from ports infected with cholera,

each passenger of the cabin class should produce satisfac-

tory evidence as to his exact place of abode during the five

days immediately preceding embarkation, and if it appears

that he or his baggage has been exposed to contagion, such

passenger should be detained such length of time as shall

be deemed necessary by the inspecting officer, and the

baggage should be disinfected.

Par. 8. The rules prescribed for the disinfection of the

baggage and personal effects of passengers and crew coming

from cholera-infected ports should also be observed with

regard to passengers and crew coming from ports and

places where plague, yellow fever, typhus fever, or small-

pox is prevailing in an epidemic form.

Par. 9. Should cholera break out in the barracks or

houses in which the passengers are undergoing the five

days’ observation, no passenger from said house or barracks

should embark until five days’ isolation from the last

case and a repetition of the sanitary measures previously

taken.

Par. 10. All baggage of steerage passengers destined

for the United States shall be labeled. If the baggage has

been inspected and passed, the label shall be a red label

bearing the name of the port, the steamship on which the

xiii

baggage is to be carried, the word “inspected” in large type,

the date of inspection, and the seal or stamp of the con-

sular or medical officer of the United States. All baggage

that has been disinfected shall bear a yellow label, upon

which shall be printed the name of the port, the steamship

upon which the baggage is to be carried, the word “dis-

infected” in large type, the date of disinfection, and the seal

or stamp of the consular or medical officer of the United

States. It is understood, and it will be so printed on the

blank, that the label is not valid unless bearing the con-

sular or medical officer’s stamp or seal.

Par. 11. Each steerage passenger should be furnished

with an inspection card (see form below). This card,

stamped by the consular or medical officer, is to be issued

to every member of a family, as well as to the head thereof.

INSPECTION CARD.

{Immigrauts and steerage passengers.)

Port of departure .....++.see.eeees Date of departure,

Name of ship....ccccccccccccvcsces seccccccscccccccccsesscesesecess

Name of immigrant......-+.+.0+00+ Last permanent residence.........

Inspected and passed at

| Passed at quarantine, port of | Passed by Immigration

epcuadicn yen , United States; Bureau, port of.....

(Seal OF stamp Of COM)... ccccccccccnescccce i cccccccccccceccsccres

sular medical officer. |

[Date. } [Date.]

(The following to be filled in by ship's surgeon or agent prior to or afver embarkation.)

Ship's list or manifest

setecevvccuse No. on ship's list or manifest. ....

i a

Berth No. | 3 S

s

i$ | 3

A

4

punched

by ship's

surgeon at

daily in

apection

eonovwrwrterereegwacce an

--

VACCINATED.

[Signature or stamp.]

[Reverse Srpe.]

Keep this Card to avoid detention at Quarantine and

on Railroads in the United States.

Diese Karte muss aufbewahrt werden, um Aufen-

thalt an der Quarantiine, sowie auf den Ejisenbahnen

der Vereinigten Staaten zu vermeiden.

4

Cette carte doit étre conservée pour éviter une

détention 4 la Quarantaine, ainsi que sur les chemins

de fer des Etats-Unis.

Deze kaart moet bewaard worden, ten einde opon-

thoud aan de Quarantijn, alsook op de ijzeren wegen

der Vereenigde Staten te vermijden.

Conservate questo biglietto ande evitare detenzione

alla Quarantina e sulle Ferrovie degli Stati Uniti.

Tento listek musfte uschovati, nechcete-li ukaran-

tény (zastavenf ohledné zjisténi zdravi) neb na drize

ve spojenych statech zdrzenf byti.

Tuto kartocku treba trimat’ u sebe aby sa predeslo

zderzovanu v karantene aj na zeleznici ve Spojenych

Stitoch.

Par. 13. Cabin passengers from cholera-infected ports

or places should be given a special inspection card, on

which shall be printed the port of departure, name of pas-

senger, name of ship, date of departure, and an indicated

XV

space for the seal or stamp of the consular or medical

officer.

Par. 14. The baggage of such cabin passengers shall be

labeled in the same manner as steerage baggage.

Par. 15. In a port where cholera prevails, or where

yellow fever prevails in epidemic form, the crews of pas-

senger ships should remain on board during their stay.

Should additional men be shipped, the same precautions

should be observed with them as in the case of steerage

passengers. If it is considered necessary, the crews of

freight ships may be similarly treated at the discretion of

the medical officer.

Par. 16. Passengers and crews, merchandise and bag-

gage prior to shipment at non-infected port, but coming

from an infected locality, should be subject to the same

restrictions as are imposed in an infected port.

Par. 17. American vessels bound for the United States,

or for Porto Rico, or for Cuba, shall not ship men in ports

of Cuba or Porto Rico where smallpox or yellow fever

prevails, unless such men have been inspected and passed

by the quarantine officer.

ArTICLE VI.—REQUIREMENTS AT SEA.

Par. 1. The master of the vessel should cause the fol-

lowing rules (which comprise those recommended by the

International Conference of Rome, 1885) to be observed

during the voyage.

(2) The soiled body linen of passengers and crew suffer-

ing from infectious disease should be at once immersed in

boiling water or in a disinfecting solution.

(b) The water-closets should be washed and disinfected

twice a day.

(c) Rigorous cleanliness and free ventilation should be

maintained during the voyage on board all ships.

Par.2. An inspection of the vessel, including the

steerage, Should be made by the ship’s physician once each

day.

Xvi

Par. 3. Should cholera (or cholerine), yellow fever,

typhus fever, or smallpox appear on board a ship while at —

sea, those who first show symptoms of these diseases will —

be immediately sent to the hospital; the ship’s physician

will then immediately notify the captain, and all of the

effects liable to convey infection which have been in use

will be destroyed or disinfected.

Par. 4. The compartments occupied by those who fall

sick with infectious disease should be disinfected, and, as

far as possible, the compartments thus disinfected should

be freely exposed to the air. If the vessel is an iron

steamer and the compartments suitable, the entire com. —

partment should be disinfected by steam. The articles

liable to convey infection should remain in the compart

ments during the disinfection. After disinfection of the

compartments the bedding and clothing may be removed

and dried.

Par. 5. Patients with infectious disease should be ~

isolated.

Par. 6. The~-hospital should be disinfected as soon as

it becomes vacant.

Par. 7. The dead should be enveloped in a sheet sat-

urated with one of the strong disinfecting solutions, with-

out previous washing of the body, and at once placed ina

coffin hermetically sealed or buried at sea.

Par. 8. A clinical record should be kept on the pre

scribed form, by the ship’s surgeon, of all cases of sickness

on board, and delivered to the quarantine officer at the

port of arrival.

Par. 9. Under the foregoing paragraphs disinfecting

solutions are limited to the following: Strong: acid solu-

tion of bichloride of mercury (1 to 500); a 1 to 20 solution

of pure carbolic acid. Weak: acid solution of bichloride

of mercury (1 to 1000); pure carbolic acid, 1 to 40.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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