Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Union Oil Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment-California

Supreme Court brief1997

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Text

a

ans S

No. 96-

orFict. OF THE CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA,

Petitioner

V.

CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT

CALIFORNIA, ET AL.,

Respondents

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TIMOTHY R. THOMAS

MARK SMITH

Law Department

Union Oil Company

of California

Santa Ana, CA 92799

(714) 428-7600

JOHN F. BARG

Counsel of Record

SANFORD SVETCOV

R. CHRISTOPHER LOCKE

Landels Ripley &

Diamond, LLP

350 The Embarcadero

San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 512-8700

ANDREW L. FREY

Mayer, Brown & Platt

2000 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 778-0602

Counsel for Petitioner

96 747 NOV 1 3 19%

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Clean Water Act authorizes citizen suits in federal

court for violations of NPDES permit limitations. 33 U.S.C.

§1365(a)(1). Citizen suits are barred, however, when they

allege violations “with respect to which a State has

commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under a

State law comparable to this subsection, or * * * the State has

issued a final order * * * and the violator has paid a penalty

assessed under * * * such comparable State law.” 33 U.S.C.

§1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) and (iii).

In this case, the State of California, acting through its

Regional Water Quality Control Board, initiated enforcement

proceedings against oil refiners, including Unocal, who were

unable, due to the absence of environmentally acceptable

control technology, to meet the permit limit of 50 ppb for

selenium. Following negotiations, petitioner Unocal and two

other refiners reached a settlement with the Regional Board

under which they paid the State $2 million and, pursuant to

a cease and desist order, undertook extensive and costly

development of selenium control technologies. In exchange,

the Board agreed to defer for four and a half years the date

for compliance with the 50 ppb selenium limit. The

following question is presented:

Whether the Clean Water Act bars a citizen suit

alleging violations that were resolved by a State

administrative order and settlement payment under a

State statutory scheme comparable to the Clean

Water Act, as the First and Eighth Circuits have

held, or whether the bar arises only if the State

agency proceeded under the specific penalty

provision that corresponds to section 309(g) of the

Act, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case.

‘i

LIST OF PARTIES

1. UNOCAL CORPORATION is the parent company

of Union Oil Company of California.

2. UNION EXPLORATION PARTNERS, LTD. is a

partnership involving Union Oil Company of California.

3. 76 PRODUCTS COMPANY is a wholly-owned

subsidiary of Union Oil Company of California.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EEG aa cr a ]

I er ee ]

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED ........ ]

samsmpannt: GF THE CASS .........5..... 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .... 7

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Impermissibly Allows

Citizen Suits To Intrude Upon State Enforcement

Discretion Under The Clean Water Act, Contrary To

This Court’s Decision In Gwalmey ......... 10

B. The Decision Below Violates The Section 309(g) Bar

On Citizen Suits, Offends The Strong Public Policy

Favoring Settlements, And Conflicts With Decisions

Of The First And Eighth Circuits........... 14

1. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the

“comparable State law” provision conflicts with

decisions of the First and Eighth Circuits .... 15

2. The Ninth Circuit’s “comparability” rationale is

contrary to the plain language of the Act and is

contrary to the intent of the Act ........ 17

3. The Ninth Circuit decision misconstrues the

“penalty assessed” provision of the statute by

excluding payments made to settle state enforce-

a 19

4. The Ninth Circuit’s decision violates strong

public policy favoring settlements ...... . 23

C. The Issue Presented Is A Recurring One Of National

Ie Cae er Gn ee cS 25

le oe ee 27

en

iV

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

| Page

APPENDIX

A. Opinion of the Court of Appeals ....... la-l7a

B. Opinion of the District Court.......... 18a-65a

C. Order of the Court of Appeals denying

Unocal’s petition for rehearing en banc....... 66a

>. - Ce Ie I 6k ee Ree 68a

E. Final Cease and Desist Order of the

oe ee es ee oe ee 69a-81a

F. Stipulation for Settlement and Dismissal of

Action in State Comst. 2... ccc eee ne 82a-88a

a aT

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,

415 U.S. 36, 94S.C. 1041 (1974) ........ 24

Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI

Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376

(8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,

U.S. , 11S 5.Ce 108 9938) ww passim

Atlantic States Legal Foundation Inc. v.

Universal Tool & Stamping Co.,

735 F.Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990) ......... 8

Boise Cascade Corp. v. U.S.E.P.A.,

ae Wao $427 (te Cir, 1991)... 2 ws. 19

California Sportfishing v. City of

W. Sacramento, 905 F.Supp. 792

I i RN 8 ea ae a 8

City of Detroit v. Murray Corp.,

Foe is GO I 6 ao be wo ee bcs Seb: 21

Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v.

Remington Arms Co., 777 F.Supp. 173

(D. Conn. 1991); aff'd in part rev’d

in part 989 F.2d 1305 (2nd Cir. 1991) ...... 8

Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay

Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) ........... Passim

Knee Deep Cattle Co., Inc. v. Bindana

Inv. Co. Ltd., 94 F.3d 514 -

OE eee hon es ve otis 8, 26

Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Investments Co.,

904 Supp. 1177 (D. Or. 1995) ......... 26

Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc.,

P98 F.24 1279 (th Cir. 1986) 2... 2

ee

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Pages

Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.

National Sea Clammers Ass’n,

S55 Um. 3, FO FAR Pere Ue) ce be Soe es 12

Molokai Chamber of Commerce v. Kukui, Inc. ,

891 F.Supp. 1389 (D. Hawaii 1995) ......... 8

Natural Resources Defense Counsel v. Vygen Corp.,

803 F.Supp. 97 (N.D. Ohio 1992) .......... 8

North and South Rivers Watershed Assoc. v.

Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991) ..... Passim

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,

DE Gas CREED 93 60nd BS MOA SS 18

Saboe v. Oregon, 819 F.Supp. 914

EE cela ko Oe wk a 6 Rk 24

Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,

Se a A A Es TD 6 ks te ke 11

Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co. .,

338 F.Supp. 1428 (D. Col. 1993) .. 1... ew ee 8

Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v.

The Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 1320

SU EE oe a Ae yk 6 he eee 16

United States v. Cannons ene Corp..,

2 & gi gs | Be reer 25

Washington Public Interest Research Group v.

Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d 883

ee a. Rv aS ke hae fe Reece 8 8, 16

Williams v. First National Bank,

ane Ue. Soe, mr OA SEL ISI. 6 ec a os 24

ne

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Pages

FEDERAL STATUTES

: 28 U.S.C.

eR ahaiac nic ae re 1

| aa ae eee 1, 6

| 33 U.S.C.

| ME gr Ae ea ae 19

SS oo oh ee ey 3

Re gt gg ke a ae ie ll

ss oa cc dl el ons ee 11

ge 18, 23

ies Bre 23

a3 DEX) ae ee a Oe OR ow ees passim

RS os 6 a he Whee ones 25

$1365(a)(1) ve erat Wee ee 5, 11

SUI Sg wo, ccs eas il

40 C.F.R.

SS ita Marae aha be 18

Ree ee 18, 20

DE he are 3

STATE STATUTES

Cal. Water Code

Ree oe ae 8 7, 15, 18, 22

De Se en es ee 18

| er, at ene as ces ne 7

te cr eee ee 5, 13

. Ee ee 7

| NGL < 5, 13

| 2s a pe eee 7

Woe ee 7, 15, 2, 2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Pages

SLE 4 eA SOK URE ee eee 11

DET Kh 5 aka ok etn he oh 0n' ta DRESS 23

SUMED KRDO SPE Ree ke eee 22

OTHER SOURCES

Sen. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong. Ist Sess. 64 (1971) . 19

137 Cong.Rec. $5902 (May 15, 1991) .......... 2

BNA, Environmental Citizen Suits: Confronting

pee gt. err eee ae 8

PURGE SED hw heh oh ek eer 6

fF ee A ee eee re La 6

re ge History of Water Quality Act of 1987

(“Leg. Hist”).

eo SB Oo: ree ee 17

SEGe. Me. GIR TIPO. wo cas ve ties 18, 20, 22

Si ie A. cis 17

ys. C=

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Union Oil Company of California (“Unocal”) respectfully

petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment and

opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a-17a) is

reported at 83 F.3d 1111 (1996). The opinion of the district

court (App., infra, 18a-65a) is reported at 861 F.Supp. 889

(N.D. Cal. 1994),

JURISDICTION

The order of the district court denying petitioner’s motion

to dismiss was certified and accepted for interlocutory appeal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). The decision of the court of

appeals, as amended, was rendered on July 16, 1996. App.,

infra, la. A timely petition for rehearing was denied on August

15, 1996. Id. at 66a-67a. The petition for writ of certiorari is

due November 13, 1996. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 309(g)(6)(A) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §

1319(g)(6)(A) provides, in relevant part:

* * * any violation -

(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced and

is diligently prosecuting an action under a State law

comparable to this subsection, or

(iii) for which the Administrator, the Secretary, or the

State has issued a final order not subject to further

judicial review and the violator has paid a penalty

assessed under this subsection, or such comparable

State law, as the case may be,

2

shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action under

subsection (d) of this section or section 1321(b) of this

title or section 1365 of this title.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE!

1. Like more than 75,000 other companies and municipali-

ties nationwide, Unocal discharges wastewater under an NPDES

permit: Unocal owns and operates a petroleum refinery near

Rodeo, California. (ER 4) Treated wastewater discharged from

the refinery is subject to the requirements of Unocal’s National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit,

issued and enforced by the California Regional Water Quality

Contro! Board (“Regional Board”) pursuant to the provisions of

the Clean Water Act. (ER 9) There are more than 75,000

active NPDES permits nationwide (http://www.epa.gov:80),

held by businesses, municipalities and other entities. See also

137 Cong.Rec. $5902, $5928 (May 15, 1991).

Discharge of wastewater containing selenium, an element

naturally occurring in crude oil, is regulated by Regional Board

orders issued under the NPDES permit. (ER 9-10) On June 19,

1991, the Regional Board amended the NPDES permits for six

Bay Area refiners, including Unocal. The Board set a “final”

selenium mass emission rate of .85 pounds per day and a

concentration limit of 50 parts per billion (“ppb”) for Unocal’s

wastewater discharge, to be effective December 12, 1993. (ER

375) In the meantime, the Board required Unocal to comply

with an interim limit of 5.6 pounds per day. (ER 376)

' The facts summarized below are not in dispute and are based

on the complaint as well as documents offered by the parties from

State agency proceedings that were judicially noticed by the district

court. (Excerpts of Record (“ER”) 40, 98, 251, 297, 364n.2) On

a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, the courts may judicially notice

agency records. Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798

F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986).

3

2. Unocal and other refiners sue the Regional Board in

State court to set aside the selenium discharge limits: On

September 16, 1992, the State Water Resources Control Board

(“State Board”) denied the refiners’ administrative appeal of the

Regional Board order adopting the interim and final selenium

limits. (ER 242 413) On October 16, 1992, the Western States

Petroleum Association (“WSPA”) and all six refiners petitioned

in California state court for a writ of mandate to set aside the

selenium limits. (ER 235) The petition contended that, with

respect to selenium, Section 304(1) of the Clean Water Act (33

U.S.C. §1314(1)), does not apply to San Francisco Bay or the

six refineries because the concentrations of selenium in the Bay

do not exceed the “applicable [water quality] standard” for

selenium. (ER 239-245; see ER 64 46-7, 368 410) The applic-

able United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)

water quality standard for selenium is 71 ppb in salt water, and

5 ppb in fresh water. 40 C.F.R. §131.36(d)(10). (ER 63 q3)

Ambient concentrations of selenium in San Francisco Bay waters

are consistently below 0.3 ppb, less than one tenth of even the

more stringent fresh water standard. (ER 244 416)

3. The Regional Board initiates an administrative action

to enforce its selenium limits: In July 1993, while the state court

writ proceedings were pending, the Regional Board announced

that it intended to commence an administrative enforcement

action against refiners that failed to meet the 50 ppb final

selenium discharge limit by the December 12, 1993 deadline.

(ER 54, 369 411) In response to the Board’s threatened action,

and with the WSPA litigation pending in state court, Unocal and

two other refiners, Exxon and Shell, entered into negotiations

with the Board. Those negotiations resulted in a Stipulation for

Settlement and Dismissal of Action (“Settlement”) and the

Board’s issuance of a tentative Cease and Desist Order

(“Order”). The Order and Settlement were presented to

Regional Board members on November 9, 1993 and issued for

public comment the following day. (ER 44-53, 54-60, 369-370)

The Order proposed to defer the date for compliance with

the final selenium limit from December 12, 1993, to July 31,

4

1998. (ER 55, 59) In it, the Board explicitly found that

technology did not currently exist to enable the refiners to

achieve compliance with the 50 ppb final limit:

despite extensive research and testing by the six Bay Area

refiners at a cost exceeding $5 million, at present there is

no known technology that is capable of removing selenium

from refinery wastewater in a manner that does not produce

large quantities of hazardous waste.

(ER 57 49)’ Based on this finding, the tentative Order required

Unocal, Exxon and Shell to undertake a multi-million dollar

project to identify a technology capable of removing selenium in

an environmentally acceptable manner, to carry out pilot studies

of candidate technologies, and to implement a removal technolo-

gy or other control strategy to meet the final limits by the new

1998 compliance date. In the meantime, the refiners were obli-

gated to continue to comply with the interim selenium discharge

limit. (ER 58-59 41-6)’ As the second key feature of the

negotiated disposition, the proposed Order and Settlement

required Unocal, Exxon and Shell to pay $2 million to the State

penalty fund and Selenium Mitigation Fund, in two installments

of $1 million each. Unocal’s share was $780,000. (ER 57 414,

50-51 44)

4. The Regional Board enters into a Settlement and issues

an Order requiring Unocal to make a substantial payment to the

State, develop control technology, and meet a revised compli-

ance schedule: The Regional Board conducted noticed public

hearings on the proposed Order and Settlement on December 15,

1993 and January 19, 1994. Testimony and written comments

were received from respondent Citizens for a Better Environ-

ment (“CBE”) and other members of the public. (ER 113-152)

? The Board also found that the only two existing technologies

that showed “any promise” did not reduce selenium below the final

50 ppb limit “on a consistent basis.” (ER 57 449-10, 369 412)

> It is undisputed that Unocal has consistently complied with the

“interim” selenium limit set by the Board. (ER 292)

5

In response to testimony by a CBE representative suggesting that

the $2 million payment by the refiners was not a penalty (ER

137-138), a member of the Regional Board stated the payments

were “penalties, that’s plain and simple what it is.” (ER 140:5)

No other Board member disagreed.

In its written comments on the proposed Order and Settle-

ment, EPA expressed enthusiastic support: “We support a

settlement of the [state court] lawsuit since it may be the most

effective approach for expediting a reduction in selenium

discharges. The [Regional Board] staff have worked diligently

to resolve selenium issues in San Francisco Bay ... We are also

happy to see the [Board] take enforcement action with the

proposed Cease and Desist Order (CDO) ... According to the

settlement the refineries will pay a $2 million penalty that will

fund: [studies, projects and research].” (ER 253-254, 371 416)

Following the January 19, 1994, public hearing, the Board

adopted the final Order and Settlement. App., infra, 69a-88a.

In accordance with the Order and Settlement, Unocal and the

other refiners dismissed their state court writ petition challenging

the selenium limits, the Board deferred the final selenium limit

until July 1998, and Unocal, Exxon and Shell made the initia]

$1 million payment within 30 days. The remaining $1 million

was paid on January 31, 1995. Unocal timely paid its $780,000

share of the required payments. (ER 68, 79, 95-97)

Although state law (Cal. Water Code §§13320, 13330)

authorized administrative and judicial review of the Regional

Board Order and Settlement, neither CBE nor any other person

sought review by the State Board, or by filing an action in state

court. (ER 371-372 4418-19)

5. The district court refuses to dismiss CBE’s Clean Water

Act citizen suit for the same alleged violations: On March y

1994, CBE filed this Clean Water Act citizen suit under

33 U.S.C. §1365(a)(1), seeking civil penalties and an injunction

for alleged violations of the 50 ppb selenium discharge limit that

had been deferred until 1998 by the Regional Board in accord-

ance with the Order and Settlement. (ER 1-2) (ER 2)

6

Unocal moved to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6), contending that the complaint failed to state a cogniza-

ble legal claim and that the district court lacked jurisdiction over

this citizen suit. Because the Regional Board had already

diligently prosecuted an enforcement action against Unocal for

the same violations of the final selenium limits alleged in the

complaint, Unocal argued that CBE’s citizen suit was barred by

section 309 of the Act on the ground that the State’s action had

been taken under “a State law comparable to” section 309(g) and

Unocal had “paid a penalty assessed under * * * such compar-

able State law * * *.” 33 U.S.C. §1319(g)(6)(iii). (ER 29-23)

The district court denied Unocal’s motion to dismiss,

concluding that the Regional Board’s enforcement action was not

a bar to this citizen suit because (i) the Board’s action was not

taken pursuant to a “provision” of California law comparable to

section 309(g), and (ii) the payment made by Unocal did not

constitute a “penalty” because the Order and Settlement did not

label it as such. App., infra, 42a-60a.

6. Unocal appeals: On Unocal’s application, the district

court certified its decision for interlocutory appeal, finding that

“there is substantial ground for difference of opinion” on the

correctness of its ruling of this potentially case-dispositive issue.

(ER 382) Two circuits had addressed the same issues and

reached conclusions in conflict with the district court’s decision.

North & South Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d 552

(1st Cir. 1991); Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Americas,

Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, US.

, 115 S.Ct. 1094 (1995). The Ninth Circuit accepted

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). (ER 384)

7. The Ninth Circuit affirms, acknowledging that its

decision conflicts with those of two other circuits: The Ninth

Circuit affirmed (App., infra, 1a), rejecting Unocal’s argument

that its payment of $780,000 to the State was a “penalty” under

a “comparable state law” within the meaning of section

309(g)(6)(A)(iii) of the Act. Instead, the court held that the

payment was not a “penalty” but “a settlement made to avoid an

7

enforcement action by the Regional Board.” App., infra, 9a.‘

It also rejected Unocal’s argument that the “comparable State

law” clause was satisfied because the Regional Board acted

pursuant to a statute (Water Code Section 13301) that was part

of a statutory scheme that included penalty provisions

comparable to section 309(g). Cal. Water Code §§13308,

13323-13328, 13350, 13385. Instead, the court held that to

preclude a citizen suit for the same violations, the comparability

Clause required the Regional Board to act pursuant to the specific

Statutory penalty provision that corresponded to the

administrative penalty provision in section 309(g). App., infra,

10a. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit

acknowledged that its view of the comparability clause was in

conflict with decisions of the First and Eighth Circuits in

Scituate and Arkansas Wildlife, each of which had held that the

Clause was satisfied if the State agency action was taken under

a Statutory scheme, comparable to the Act, that contains a

penalty provision like section 309(g). App., infra, 10a.

Unocal’s timely petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was

denied on August 15, 1996. Jd. at lla. Over CBE’s objection,

the Ninth Circuit granted Unocal’s motion for Stay of mandate

pending certiorari. Jd. at 68a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Petitioner Unocal respectfully petitions this Court to grant

certiorari in this case to resolve recurring and important

questions dividing the circuits as to the proper role of citizen

suits in enforcing the Clean Water Act.

* Although it is true that the Regional Board and Unocal reached

a settlement, the Regional Board characterized its Order as an

“enforcement action.” (ER 158) Moreover, EPA’s comment on

the proposed order applauded the Regional Board’s “enforcement

action.” (ER 253)

> In addition to this case, the following is a non-exhaustive list

of cases that have addressed section 309(g) of the Act, to (1) limit

citizen suits: Arkansas Wildlife, 29 F.3d at 381; Scituate, 949 F.2d

8

There are currently more than 75,000 NPDES permits in

existence, and there have been hundreds of citizen suits seeking

judicial enforcement of such permits or of the discharge limita-

tions of the Clean Water Act itself.° Many of those citizen

suits, like the one at issue here, involve situations in which there

is a pending or completed administrative enforcement proceed-

ing. The proper interpretation of Section 309(g)(6)(A) of the

Clean Water Act, the provision barring citizen suits in certain

circumstances in which there has been prior regulatory action

involving the same alleged violations, is thus a matter of vast

practical importance.

The question affects not only businesses, municipalities,

environmental regulators, and would-be citizen plaintiffs, but

also the federal courts. Under the narrow interpretation given

by the Ninth Circuit in this case to the provision barring certain

citizen suits, there is a real danger that the federal courts will be

called upon to displace state and federal environmental regulato-

ry agencies as primary enforcers of the Clean Water Act.

at 556; Saboe v. Oregon, 819 F.Supp. 914 (D. Ore. 1993);

Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co.,

777 F.Supp. 173 (D. Conn. 1991); aff'd in part rev’d in part 989

F.2d 1305 (2nd Cir. 1991); California Sportfishing v. City of W.

Sacramento, 905 F.Supp. 792 (E.D. Cal. 1995); Sierra Club v.

Colorado Refining Co., 838 F.Supp. 1428 (D. Col. 1993); or (2)

allow citizen suits: Knee Deep Cattle Co., Inc. v. Bindana Inv. Co.

Lid., 94 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1996); Washington Public Interest

Research Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d 883 (9th Cir.

1993); Molokai Chamber of Commerce v. Kukui, Inc. , 891 F.Supp.

1389 (D. Hawaii 1995); Atlantic States Legal Foundation Inc. v.

Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F.Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind.

1990); Natural Resources Defense Counsel v. Vygen Corp., 803

F.Supp. 97 (N.D. Ohio 1992).

° In 1988, a survey of 1,209 citizens suits revealed that 882 had

been filed under the Clean Water Act. BNA, Environmental

Citizen Suits: Confronting The Corporation (1988).

9

The principal underpinning of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling is

its conclusion that the “comparable State law” provision of

Section 309(g)(6)(A) requires not merely that the state law under

which the regulators have proceeded be generally comparable to

the enforcement provisions of the Clean Water Act, but that they

have proceeded specifically under a provision identical to

Section 309(g). This ruling is in direct and acknowledged

conflict with decisions of the First and Eighth Circuits (North &

South Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st

Cir. 1992); Arkansas Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29

F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, _U.S. Meare i Tse

1094 (1995)), which apply the bar to citizen suits so long as the

state regulatory proceeding has been conducted under a generally

comparable scheme that contains a penalty provision analogous

to Section 309, even if the enforcement action does not happen

to have been brought directly under the Section 309 analog.

In addition, the court below misconstrued the “penalty

assessed” requirement by treating the very substantial monetary

payment made to the State on account of the selenium discharges

as purely a settlement payment but not a penalty. This ruling

also conflicts with the Eighth Circuit’s Arkansas Wildlife

decision, which recognized that the citizen suit preclusion should

apply when “a compromise was reached.” 29 F.3d at 380.

Finally, as we discuss below, the Ninth Circuit’s allowance

of citizei. suits when state regulators have diligently proceeded

with and consummated enforcement proceedings subverts the

primacy that the Clean Water Act seeks to give to administrative

enforcement efforts and is in substantial tension with the prior

decision of this Court in Gwalmey of Smithfield v. Chesapeake

Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987), as well as with decisions

of lower courts. Review by this Court is needed in order to

clarify the uncertainties that now surround the availability of the

citizen suit to trump state enforcement efforts.

10

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Impermissibly Allows

Citizen Suits To Intrude Upon State Enforcement

Discretion Under The Clean Water Act, Contrary

To This Court’s Decision In Gwaltney

In 1987, this Court held that the role of a Clean Water Act

citizen suit was “to supplement rather than to supplant govern-

mental action.” Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 61, 108 S.Ct. at 383.

In rejecting a contention that a citizen suit could be brought for

wholly past violatiois, this Court offered an example that

appears plainly inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit decision here:

Permitting citizen suits for wholly past violations of the Act

could undermine the supplementary role envisioned for the

citizen suit. This danger is best illustrated by an example.

Suppose that the Administrator identified a violator of the

Act and issued a compliance order under § 309(a). Suppose

further that the Administrator agreed not to assess or

otherwise seek civil penalties on the condition that the

violator take some extreme corrective action, such as to

install particularly effective but expensive machinery, that

it otherwise would not be obligated to take. Jf citizens

could file suit, months or years later, in order to seek the

civil penalties that the Administrator chose to forego, then

the Administrator’s discretion to enforce the Act in the

public interest would be curtailed considerably. The same

might be said of the discretion of state enforcement authori-

ties. Respondents’ interpretation of the scope of the citizen

suit would change the nature of the citizens’ role from

interstitial to potentially intrusive. We cannot agree that

Congress intended such a result.

Id. at 61, 108 S.Ct. at 383 (emphasis added).

Congress indeed did not intend such a result. In fact, soon

after the Gwalmey decision, Congress further narrowed the

interstitial role’ of citizen suits by enacting the provision at

” The enforcement authority of the EPA and the states is broader

than that of a citizen under the Act. As this Court made clear in

1]

issue here, section 309(g)(6), which bars such suits when the

Administrator of EPA or the state regulator had initiated or

concluded administrative enforcement proceedings. Specifically,

this provision bars a citizen suit when (i) the Administrator has

commenced and is diligently prosecuting an administrative

penalty action, (ii) a State has commenced and is diligently

prosecuting an administrative action under a state law compara-

ble to Clean Water Act section 309(g), or (iii) the Administrator

or the State has issued “a final order not subject to further

judicial review and the violator has paid a penalty [under §

309(g)] or such comparable State law. ”*

In this case, the State of California, acting through its

Regional Water Quality Control Board, commenced an adminis-

trative enforcement action in 1993, alleging violations of new

final NPDES permit limits for selenium discharges. Following

negotiations with Unocal and other dischargers and noticed

public hearings, the Board issued a final Order pursuant to a

Settlement under which Unocal and two other oil refiners were

required to pay $2 million, undertake multi-million dollar

research efforts to develop selenium control technology, and

achieve compliance with the final selenium limits by July 1998,

all while maintaining compliance with interim selenium limits.°

Gwaltney, the government may seek penalties for both wholly past

violations and for ongoing violations of the Act pursuant to sections

309(d) and (g), but a citizen suit is limited under section 505(a) to

ongoing violations only. 33 U.S.C. $§ 1319(d), (g), 1365(a)(1);

Gwaliney, 484 U.S. at 56-59; 108 S.Ct. at 381-382; see Cal. Water

Code § 13385(a).

* Prior to 1987, a citizen suit was barred only by an EPA or

State action diligently prosecuted in court. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)-

(1)(B); Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517 (9th

Cir. 1987).

* Unocal has consistently and completely complied with the

Regional Board’s Order, having paid its share of the $2 million that

was ordered, pursued selenium control technology projects, and

12

The State’s administrative enforcement of the Clean Water

Act makes citizen enforcement both unnecessary and inappropri-

ate. Citizen enforcement is unnecessary because the Board had

already taken diligent enforcement action for the selenium

violations now alleged in the citizen suit. Citizen enforcement

is inappropriate because, as this Court contemplated in

Gwaltney, the government accomplished exactly what it intended

by initiating enforcement — it recovered money from the

dischargers, obtained commitments to develop a viable selenium

control technology, and established a schedule for compliance

with final selenium limits.

The citizen plaintiffs contend, however, that Unocal is

currently in violation of the final selenium limits, which the

Board deferred to July 1998 by the Order and Settlement. The

Ninth Circuit’s authorization of the citizen suit despite state

administrative enforcement has thus created the untenable result

that Unocal now has two selenium limits: (1) the interim 5.6

pounds per day limit that the Board Order required Unocal to

meet until July 1998, and (2) the deferred .85 pounds per day

(and 50 ppb) final limit. The Ninth Circuit has concluded that

this final limit can be a basis for a citizen suit now, before the

compliance date set by the Regional Board.

Moreover, the citizen suit seeks an award of civil penal-

ties — payable to the government’® — even though the State

consistently achieved 100 percent compliance with the mandated

interim selenium limits. (ER 95-97, 292)

'© The Clean Water Act did not create a private right of action

for citizens. The citizen suit may be brought for penalties payable

only to the government, not for damages to the citizen or citizen

group. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea

Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 11, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2621 (1981).

Where the government has either accepted an amount in

compromise, or agreed to forego civil penalties altogether, a

subsequent citizen suit undermines the enforcement discretion of the

Administrator or the State. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 61.

en ie tilt i al

SRE Dee ad, el POL 8 Se CR

cee ES AI ee Ce Ge le Ot

13

has already settled its civil penalty claims with the dischargers,

has collected $2 million, and has imposed significant and costly

compliance obligations.

If allowed to stand, the Ninth Circuit decision would create

the following Clean Water Act enforcement anomalies:

¢ Congress intended that the government have broad

enforcement authority and that citizen suits perform a

narrow “interstitial” role. In this case, neither the

EPA Administrator nor the state agency can enforce

final selenium limits until July 1998; yet the Ninth

Circuit has allowed a citizen suit to seek injunctive

relief to enforce those deferred final limits now.

¢ The State decided to resolve its civil penalty claims for

$2 million, plus selenium treatment technology projects

not otherwise required of the dischargers, and a final

selenium compliance schedule. EPA applauded the

State’s enforcement action, including the “penalty.”

Yet, the Ninth Circuit has allowed a citizen suit to seek

civil penalties payable to the government in an amount

greater than the government accepted as appropriate. '!

The result of the Ninth Circuit opinion is an expansion of

citizen suit enforcement beyond the supplemental role created by

Congress and described by this Court in Gwalmey, which role

was narrowed further by Congress in 1987. Under the Ninth

Circuit opinion, a citizen suit may be brought to seek penalties

" In the California Regional Board proceedings, CBE urged the

government to require /arger penalty payments from the discharg-

ers. (ER 137-138) California law afforded CBE a right of

administrative review of the Regional Board’s order by the State

Water Resources Control Board, and judicial review by the

California courts. Cal. Water Code §§13320, 13330. CBE chose

not to pursue any review of the Order under applicable state law,

including review of the amount that the dischargers were required

to pay. The Order became "final" for purposes of section 309(g)

after 30 days. Id.

is

the government has chosen to forego, and to seek injunctive

relief contrary to the terms of the State’s own compliance order,

regardless of how diligent and thorough the State’s enforcement

action has been.

B. The Decision Below Violates The Section 309(g) Bar

On Citizen Suits, Offends The Strong Public Policy

Favoring Settlements, And Conflicts With Decisions

Of The First And Eighth Circuits.

The Ninth Circuit held that “the fairest characterization of

the payment at issue is that it was, indeed, a settlement made to

avoid an enforcement action by the Regional Board” and “not a

penalty but, instead, the price of avoiding the stigma of a formal

enforcement action.” App., infra, 8a.'*

The Ninth Circuit’s unprecedented distinction between

payment of a civil penalty after a formally adjudicated, publicly

contested enforcement action and payment of a settlement

amount to resolve civil penalty liability after formal public

comment and hearings (1) is contrary to decisions of the First

and Eighth Circuits interpreting the “comparable State law”

provision of the Act, (2) is based on a narrow view of the

“comparable State law” provision that is at odds with the

language and intent of the Act, (3) misconstrues the “penalty

assessed” provision of the Act by excluding payments made to

settle state enforcement actions, and (4) undermines the strong

national policy favoring settlement rather than protracted

litigation of disputes.

% The Ninth Circuit wrote: “UNOCAL itself insisted on

characterizing the financial transfer as a ‘payment’ and not a

‘penalty’ at the time of the state action settlement.” App., infra,

8a. This not a fair characterization of the record. At the

December 15, 1993 administrative hearing before the Regional

Board, Unocal’s counsel said, “ * * * I think, for all practical

purposes, it is, in fact, a penalty. It’s viewed by EPA as a penalty

in its letter. I think the Board considers it a penalty.” (ER 150:15-

18)

15

1. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the

“comparable State law” provision conflicts with

decisions of the First and Eighth Circuits.

The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that California Water Code

section 13385, the State penalty provision, is comparable to

section 309(g). App., infra, 9a. But it concluded that Unocal’s

$780,000 payment was not assessed or paid under section

13385, and was instead the product of a settlement embodied in

the Cease and Desist Order issued under Water Code section

13301. Because section 13301 was cited by the Regional Board

(id. at 77a-78a) and because that specific section of the Water

Code does not contain a penalty provision, the Ninth Circuit

held that Unocal’s payment was not assessed under a law

comparable to section 309(g). App., infra, lla. The Ninth

Circuit acknowledged, however, that its view of comparability

was in conflict with that of the First and Eighth Circuits. Jbid.

In Arkansas Wildlife, the Eighth Circuit considered whether

section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii)'® of the Act barred a citizen suit

alleging violations embraced within a State administrative

settlement and consent order that provided for a compliance

schedule and $2,500 in negotiated penalties. The citizen suit

plaintiff argued that the administrative order was issued under a

provision of State law that was not comparable to section 309(g).

The Eighth Circuit rejected plaintiff's argument, holding that the

State administrative order precluded a citizen suit for the same

violations that had been settled because the State had taken

diligent enforcement action under a State law scheme that was

comparable to section 309(g). Arkansas Wildlife, 29 F.3d at

381-382. It observed that “the states are afforded some latitude

in selecting the specific mechanisms of their enforcement

program.” Jd. at 380. The court accordingly held that

“comparability” is satisfied when the state’s “overall regulatory

'° This case concerns section 309(g)(6)(A)(iii), not section

309(g)(6)(A)(ii), addressed in the First and Eighth Circuit cases.

However, the plain language and structure of the statute shows that

the “comparability” inquiry is the same under both subsections.

16

scheme” under which the agency acted: (1) “contains

comparable penalty provisions,” (2) has “the same overall

enforcement goals,” and (3) provides citizens “a meaningful

opportunity to participate” in the decision-making process so as

to safeguard their interests. Jd. at 381.

Similarly, the First Circuit in Scituate rejected the plaintiff's

argument in that case that to be “comparable” to section 309(g)

and thereby preclude a citizen suit, it is necessary that “the

precise statutory section under which the State issued its

Administrative Order contains penalty provisions comparable to

the Federal Act.” Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556. The First Circuit

reasoned instead that “comparability” under subsection (A)(ii)

was Satisfied when the overall state statutory scheme contained

a penalty provision comparable to the Act and the State agency

was diligently prosecuting an enforcement action under that

scheme. From that premise, the First Circuit held that a citizen

suit was barred whether or not the state agency actually imposed

a “penalty.” Scituate, 949 F.2d at 555-557; accord Supporters

to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. The Heritage Group, 973 F.2d

1320, 1324 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Scituate with approval in a

RCRA citizens suit). The First Circuit further reasoned that

because Congress amended the Act for the express purpose of

precluding duplicative citizen suits after a state agency has

already taken enforcement action, deference to diligent state

administrative action is required whether or not the penalty

provision is employed in any particular case. Scituate, 949 F.2d

at 556.'*

* The Ninth Circuit rejected Scituate by relying on its earlier

decision in Pendleton, 11 F.3d at 885. App., infra, 11a. In fact,

Pendleton is not controlling here because it did not address citizen

suit preclusion by State enforcement action. Rather, Pendleton

addressed very different language in subsection (A)(i) precluding

citizen suits when EPA prosecutes an action “under this

subsection.” Pendleton, 11 F.3d at 886. “Comparability” was not

an issue in Pendleton.

;

.

4

5

17

Unocal’s case is far more compelling not only because the

Board acted pursuant to a California statutory scheme that the

Ninth Circuit acknowledged contains a “comparable” penalty

provision but also required Unocal to pay $780,000, commit to

a multi-million dollar research and development effort to

implement an environmentally-acceptable selenium control

technology, and agree to achieve compliance with the final

selenium limit by July 1998 and to comply with the interim

selenium limit until that date. (ER 68)

2. The Ninth Circuit’s “comparability” rationale

is not required by the plain language of the Act

and is contrary to the intent of the Act.

None of the three reasons cited by the Ninth Circuit to

support its narrow view of “comparability” withstands analysis.

First, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s grudging view, it is

not clear that requiring State agency reliance on the precise

provision in State law authorizing administrative penalties “is the

plainest reading” of the words “comparable State law.” App.,

infra, 12a. Congress explicitly stated that comparable means

“similar” or “analogous,” not identical. 1 Legislative History

of Water Quality Act of 1987, at 367 (“Leg. Hist.”).

In fact, an earlier version of the 1987 legislation contained

a provision requiring the State agency to be “diligently pursuing

assessment of a civil penalty under section 309(g) of this Act.”

2 Leg. Hist. 1103, 1174 (1987). That more specific provision

was deleted and the more general “comparable State law”

language was enacted instead. As the concurring opinion in

Scituate aptly reasoned, requiring the State agency to recite

precisely the State law penalty provision which was the source

of its action would “Balkanize” the intended uniform application

of the Act by having comparability turn on semantics rather than

substance. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 559 (concurring opinion).

Second, the Ninth Circuit found comparability lacking

because settlements might not be subject to public notice, com-

ment and assessment procedures applicable to penalties to ensure

the amount is of sufficient “magnitude.” App., infra, 12a. The

' 18

hypothetical concern about the need for public scrutiny is not

supported by the law or the record of this case. The California

statutory scheme governing the Order and Settlement, consistent

with the federal regulations, requires public scrutiny that

matches the requirements of the federal statute, specifically

including notice, public comment and a public hearing. Cal.

Water Code §§13301, 13302; 40 CFR §123.27(d)(2)(iii). CBE

actively participated in all aspects of this public review process,

including two public hearings. (ER 43-60, 113-159) Both

Scituate and Arkansas Wildlife held that to be comparable, the

review proceedings under the state statutory scheme need not be

identical to federal law, but only must ensure a similar level of

public participation. That standard was plainly exceeded in this

case.

Similarly, the “amount” or “magnitude” of the payment

does not determine whether the settlement was a penalty; these

words do not appear in section 309(g)(6)(A)(iii). In fact, a

proposal to require that the amount of “the State imposed

penalty is appropriate” was deleted from the 1987 amendments

of the Act. Compare, 2 Leg. Hist. 828 and 1162 (1987). That

deletion indicates that no such requirement exists. Russello v.

United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24, 104 S.Ct. 296, 300-301

(1983).

In any event, the amount paid by Unocal, $780,000, not

only far exceeded the $2,500 penalty upheld by the Eighth

Circuit in Arkansas Wildlife, but is five times the $125,000

maximum penalty that EPA could have imposed under the

federal statute. 33 U.S.C. §1319(g)(2)(B). Thus, by any

standard, the amount paid by Unocal is plainly “comparable” to

any penalty authorized by the federal statute. If EPA believed

that the Settlement was inadequate, it could have filed its own

penalty action. 40 CFR §123.27(c). Instead, EPA blessed the

Settlement, including the “penalty” paid. (ER 253-254)

Third, the Ninth Circuit thought it would be “anomalous”

to conclude that State agency enforcement actions “would more

broadly preclude citizen suits” than EPA enforcement actions.

App., infra, 12a. In fact, the language and structure of the Act

19

does provide for broader preclusion based on State agency

actions. Section 1251(b) expressly states: “[i]t is the policy of

the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary

responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and

eliminate pollution.” 33 U.S.C. §1251(b) (emphasis added).

And the Ninth Circuit has elsewhere recognized that section

1251(b) expresses the intent of the Act to “afford states as much

control as possible over implementation and enforcement of

pollution controls.” Boise Cascade Corp. v. U.S.E.P.A., 942

F.2d 1427, 1433 (9th Cir. 1991).

The legislative history of the Act likewise makes clear the

primacy of State agency enforcement and that such primacy is

grounded in federalism: “The Committee again, however, notes

that the authority of the federal government should be used

judiciously by the Administrator in those cases [that] deserve

federal action because of their national character, scope or

seriousness. The Committee intends the great volume of

enforcement actions be brought by the State.” Sen. Rep. No.

92-414, 92d Cong. Ist Sess., p. 64 (1971).

Citing this Congressional history, this Court concluded that

citizen suits are proper only when State agencies fail to exercise

their enforcement responsibility. Gwalmey, 484 U.S. at 60. In

this case, the Regional Board took vigorous enforcement action,

so the duplicative citizen suit seeking to have the federal courts

second-guess that action is unnecessary and should be barred.

3. The Ninth Circuit decision misconstrues the

“penalty assessed” provision of the statute by

excluding payments made to settle state enforce-

ment actions.

Section 309(g)(6)(A)(iii) of the Act provides that a citizen

Suit is barred when “the State has issued a final order not subject

to further judicial review and the violator has paid a penalty

assessed under this subsection, or such comparable State law, as

the case may be * * *.” 33 U.S.C. §1319(g)(6}{A)(iii).

The Ninth Circuit’s decision draws an unwarranted and

unnecessary distinction between civil penalties imposed follow-

20

ing an adjudicated enforcement proceeding and amounts paid in

settlement to resolve the state’s civil penalty claims in adminis-

trative enforcement proceedings. The Regional Board did take

administrative enforcement action against Unocal (App., infra,

69a-81a), and it settled that enforcement action following an

open public process that included notice, public comment, and

hearings in which CBE actively participated. (ER 43-60, 113-

152, 153-159, 253-255). The settlement required, among other

things, substantial payments by Unocal and others to resolve the

State’s civil penalty claims.

For purposes of the citizen suit bar, it should make no

difference whether Unocal paid something formally denominated

a “penalty” following administrative adjudication, or whether

Unocal paid to settle the civil penalty claims asserted by the

state. Congress intended to encourage, not discourage, settle-

ment of penalty actions as a means of funding environmental

protection projects and thus furthering the goals of the Act. 2

Leg. Hist. 828. EPA regulations interpreting the Act likewise

provide for “settlement of a State enforcement action” following

notice and public comment on the proposed settlement. 40

C.F.R. §123.27(d)(2)(iii).

In direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit

observed that “it would be unreasonable and inappropriate to

find failure to diligently prosecute simply because [the discharg-

ers] prevailed in some fashion or because a compromise was

reached.” Arkansas Wildlife, 29 F.3d at 380. The court

rejected an argument that the State had negotiated and accepted

"insignificant amounts of civil penalties" in comparison to the

maximum penalties that could have been assessed. Jd. Thus,

the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning recognizes that a payment in

settlement qualifies as a “penalty assessed” under the statute.

By contrast, the Ninth Circuit constructed an artificial

distinction between a “penalty” resulting from a “formal

enforcement action” by the State and a settlement paid to the

State to resolve civil “penalty” liability. App., infra, 9a. Both

should be viewed as a “penalty assessed” for purposes of the

citizen suit bar in_ section 309(g). 33.—Ss«€U«S..C.

;

E |

i

;

i

ce SRI) PURER 20

21

§1319(g)(6)(A)(iii). However, under the Ninth Circuit’s view,

a settlement would apparently never constitute “a penalty

assessed” under the Act, even if the word “penalty” were used

to describe a payment made by a discharger to resolve its

potential penalty liability.’

In fact, the Ninth Circuit opinion fails to mention that the

EPA and the Regional Board did consider the settlement

payment to be a “penalty.” EPA stated: “We are also happy

to see the RWQCB take enforcement action with the proposed

Cease and Desist Order * * *. According to the settlement, the

refineries will pay a $2 million penalty that will fund * * *

consultants to oversee the treatment technology research.”

(ER 253-54, emphasis added)'® Similarly, a Regional Board

member stated at one of the two public hearings: “It is penal-

ties, that’s plain and simple what it is.” (ER 140:5, emphasis

added) No other Board member disagreed.

Apart from the stated beliefs of the two agencies charged

with enforcement of the Act, Unocal’s $780,000 payment was

a penalty in substance and as a matter of law. There is nothing

else it could have been; no other civil payment is contemplated

by State law or the Act. Indeed, ten percent of the payment was

specifically earmarked for deposit in the account designated for

'S Although the payment was not labelled a “penalty” in the

Settlement (App., infra, 84a-85a) this Court has recognized that the

“label” used is not controlling; it is the “substance” of the action

that is relevant. City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489,

492-493 (1958). In fact, the specific section of state law that the

Ninth Circuit and CBE agree is a “comparable” penalty provision,

Water Code section 13385, does not use the label “penalty” but

rather the term “civil liability.”

‘© After filing its citizen suit, CBE asked EPA to “clarify” its

position. EPA responded: “Although the comment letter describes

the payment of money by the refineries as a ‘penalty,’ this term

was not used with any intention of describing the preclusive effect

of that payment under section 309(g)(6).” (ER 299)

22

civil penalties by State law. App., infra, 84a-85a. Cal. Water

Code §13385(i). The remainder of the payment went to a new

State Selenium Mitigation Fund, consistent with the intent of

Congress that “settlements of fines and penalties” be “used to

fund research, development and other related projects which

further the goals of the Act.” 2 Leg. Hist. 828 (1987).

The Ninth Circuit also reasoned that the $780,000 payment

was not a “penalty” because, in considering its enforcement

options, the Regional Board declined to invoke its administrative

penalty authority under Water Code section 13385. App., infra,

7a. Instead, the Board invoked the cease and desist order

provision, Water Code section 13301, stating: “the Regional

Board has determined that the most appropriate course of action

is settlement of the litigation and issuance of a cease and desist

order.” App., infra, 77a-78a.

The flaw in the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is that there was

no need for the Regional Board to invoke the state penalty

statute because the refiners, including Unocal, had already

agreed to settle their penalty liability with a $2 million payment.

The Board cited section 13301 because that statute provided

legal authority for issuing the cease and desist order and

undertaking the remainder of the settlement: (1) requiring the

refiners to study, develop, and implement selenium control

technology, and (2) deferring compliance with the final selenium

limit to 1998. App., infra, 78a-80a. See Cal. Water Code

§13301 (empowering Board to issue cease and desist orders

requiring “appropriate remedial or preventive action” and

directing the discharger to “comply in accordance with a time

schedule set by the Board”).

The Order issued by the Regional Board and the Settlement

were fully consistent with the Clean Water Act and this Court’s

interpretation of the Act in Gwalmney. This Court held that state

and federal authorities have discretion “not to assess or other-

wise seek civil penalties on the condition that the violator take

some extreme corrective action.” Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61,

108, S.Ct.~at 383. In this case, Unocal was ordered to under-

take groundbreaking selenium control technology, an expensive

~

23

project (App., infra, 72a-73a), because the Board recognized

that no such technology existed. Jd. at 72a-76a. The Board

also collected $2 million as part of the settlement..’

In sum, a payment “assessed” by the State should be

considered a penalty for purposes of section 309(g) of the Act

whether it is the result of a formal administrative adjudication

proceeding or a negotiated settlement. A penalty that is the

product of a settlement of an administrative enforcement

proceeding by a state agency is no less a product of the enforce-

ment authority that gives rise to the citizen suit bar than a

penalty paid following adjudication of the State’s administrative

claims. Congress drew no distinction between adjudicated

penalties and penalties paid in settlement, and the courts should

not do so either.

4. The Ninth Circuit’s decision violates strong

public policy favoring settlements.

The Ninth Circuit held that a discharger who settles an

administrative penalty action brought by the government does so

at the peril of confronting a subsequent citizen suit for the same

claims that were settled.

Carried.to its logical conclusion, the Ninth Circuit decision

will dissuade NPDES dischargers from settling Clean Water Act

'” The Ninth Circuit mistakenly accepted the assertion of the

United States, as amicus curiae, that the Board’s failure to invoke

the state penalty statute allowed Unocal to avoid review of the

amount of the penalty pursuant to the penalty assessment factors in

the state statute, Water Code section 13385(e), analogous to those

in section 1319(g)(3) of the Act. App., infra, 8a-9a. In fact, there

can be no plausible claim that the penalty was inadequate. The

Board was presumably aware of the assessment factors, but it was

not required to address them expressly because the amount was

determined by settlement, not by a contested enforcement

proceeding. Indeed, the amount collected from Unocal, $780,000,

far exceeded the $125,000 maximum penalty EPA can assess even

using the statutory factors. 33 U.S.C. §1319(g)(2)(B).

24

administrative claims brought by federal or state agencies. As

courts have recognized, “It is doubtful that an alleged violator

would fully cooperate with [the State agency] to resolve [certain

violations] if they lacked assurance that the same violation would

not be the subject of a citizens suit in federal court at some later

time.” Saboe v. Oregon, 819 F.Supp. 914, 918 (D.Or. 1993).

Instead of focusing their resources on negotiated environmental

research and corrective action, dischargers would have to engage

in protracted and expensive litigation.

Thus, the Ninth Circuit decision deters the very kind of

dispute resolution the law should encourage: an arm’s-length,

good-faith settlement between the agency and the regulated

party, arrived at on threat of formal action, but resolved with

concessions by both sides before formal adversary proceedings

became necessary. Settlement allows the parties to focus their

resources on developing technology to improve water quality

rather than on litigation. Such agreements, especially when

subject to public scrutiny and blessed by EPA, must be upheld

not undermined.

Under the Ninth Circuit’s narrow view of the Act, such

timely, negotiated resolutions of enforcement actions will be

insufficient to preclude unnecessary, duplicative citizen suits,

even when the agency has given the public and EPA ample

opportunity for scrutiny and comment and State law affords the

right to judicial review of the agency action. Nothing in the Act

justifies the Ninth Circuit’s counter-productive conclusion.

Such an outcome not only cannot be what Congress

intended but also violates this nations’s strong public policy

favoring the settlement of disputes to avoid protracted and

wasteful litigation. This Court has consistently recognized that

settlement of disputes is strongly favored and should be encour-

aged to preserve scarce judicial resources and ease crowded

court dockets. E.g., Williams v. First National Bank, 216 U.S.

582, 595, 30 S.Ct. 441, 445 (1910); Alexander v. Gardner-

Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1017 (1974).

As this Court recognized in Gwalmey, duplicative and

unnecessary citizen suits that simply replicate diligent state

a =

25

administrative enforcement actions that have been resolved by

settlement undermine important national environmental policies.

484 U.S. at 60-61. Without the authority to enter into a settle-

ment that bars a citizen suit, the state loses a crucial weapon in

its arsenal for achieving the Act’s water quality goals, directing

its effort at environmental corrective action rather than litigation,

with its attendant costs and delay. The policy favoring

settlement “has particular force” where an agency “has pulled

the laboring oar” to reach agreement that will “promote early

completion of cleanup activities.” United States v. Cannons

Engineering Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84, 90-91 (1st Cir. 1990).

The Ninth Circuit’s holding that a settlement payment

cannot be a penalty subverts the structure of the Act and invites

pointless litigation. In the Ninth Circuit, a permittee now must

fight rather than settle in order to avoid a citizen Suit. Such a

result is contrary to public policy and this Court’s decision in

Gwaltney.

In sum, this Court should grant certiorari to resolve the

nationally significant issues created by the Ninth Circuit’s

narrow view of both the “penalty assessed” provision and the

“comparabie State law” requirement. The Ninth Circuit’s

approach should be rejected in favor of the better founded

decisions of the First and Eighth Circuits precluding citizen suits

when state regulatory action leads to a settlement, and finding

comparability based on the overall Statutory scheme under which

the State agency acted.

C. The Issue Presented Is A Recurring One Of National

Significance.

Under the Clean Water Act, every discharger of wastewater

to the waters of the United States must have an NPDES permit.

33 U.S.C. §1342. There are more than 75,000 active NPDES

permits nationally. All such dischargers must deal either with

a State agency or EPA on compliance issues every time a permit

Standard is arguably exceeded. Under the Ninth Circuit

decision, even if the agency and the discharger agree on a

compliance or enforcement solution, the discharger may be

26

subject to a costly citizen suit second-guessing and potentially

undermining the agency determination.

For example, based on the decision in this case, another

Ninth Circuit panel recently held that a citizen suit is not barred

under section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii) even though the State agency had

initiated an enforcement action, but then settled with the

discharger for (1) payment of a $1,400 penalty, (2) a stipulated

order requiring a sewage treatment plant upgrade at a cost of

$175,000 to $200,000, and (3) compliance with interim dis-

charge limits during construction, in exchange for foregoing

further penalties. Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co.,

Lid., 94 F.3d 514, 515 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit

overturned a well-reasoned district court decision applauding the

State agency for acting “to eliminate pollution through a

settlement agreement” under which “defendants are building a

new sewage treatment plant.” Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana

Investments Co., 904 F.Supp. 1177, 1183 @. Or. 1995).

Applying its decision in this case, the Ninth Circuit held that,

despite the settlement and order, the Oregon agency was not

diligently prosecuting an action for penalties under a state law

comparable to section 309(g). Knee Deep, 94 F.3d at 516-517.

Allowing such a duplicative and unnecessary citizen suit that

alleges the same violations resolved by state administrative

enforcement contravenes this Court’s teaching in Gwalmey.

Until the issues presented by this case are resolved national-

ly by this Court, companies and municipalities with NPDES

permits in the First and Eighth Circuits will be treated different-

ly and able to operate with more certainty — the certainty to

which they are entitled — than those in the Ninth Circuit.

Those in other circuits will remain in limbo as to which

standards may apply in their jurisdiction: (1) the view of the

Ninth Circuit that allows citizen suits to second-guess state

action, or (2) the views of the First and Eighth Circuits that,

consistent with Gwalmey, preclude unnecessary and duplicative

citizen suits where the state has taken enforcement action. This

uncertainty is bound to disrupt and complicate state regulatory

efforts and needlessly burden federal courts.

27

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

TIMoTHY R. THOMAS JOHN F. BARG

MARK SMITH Counsel of Record

Law Department SANFORD SVETCOV

Union Oil Company R. CHRISTOPHER LOCKE

of California Landels Ripley &

Santa Ana, CA 92799 Diamond, LLP

(714) 428-7600 350 The Embarcadero

San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 512-8700

ANDREW L. FREY

Mayer, Brown & Platt

2000 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 778-0602

Counsel for Petitioner

NOVEMBER 13, 1996

APPENDIX A

CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT

CALIFORNIA, San Francisco Baykeeper, Save San

Francisco Bay Association, The Bay Institute of San

Francisco, Santa Clara Valley Audubon Society, Kalon

Wofford and Anthony Willis, Plaintiffs- Appellees,

Vv.

UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA,

a corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-15139.

United States Court of Appeals,

Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 8, 1996.

Decided May 13, 1996.

As Amended July 16, 1996.

7

Before: BROWNING and JOHN T. NOONAN, Jr.,

Circuit Judges, and MERHIGE, Senior District Judge.*

MERHIGE, Senior District Judge:

This case arises under the federal Water Pollution

Control Act (the “Clean Water Act”), 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et

seq. The Appellees, Citizens for a Better Environment, et al.

(“CBE”), brought this action in the federal district court for

the Northern District of California pursuant to the citizen suit

provision of that Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365. In the Complaint,

CBE asserted a claim for violations of the Clean Water Act

effluent standards, a claim for violations of Clean Water Act

water quality standards, and a state law claim. Although the

* The Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr., Senior United States

District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by

designation.

2a

district court granted the motion of the Appellant, Union Oil

Company of California (“UNOCAL”), to dismiss as to the

water quality standards claim, the district court denied

UNOCAL’s motion to dismiss, premised on 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) and (iii), as to the effluent standards claim

and the dependent state law claim. The district court certified

its order denying UNOCAL’s motion to dismiss for

immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

I.

The Clean Water Act regulates the discharge of pollutants

into navigable waters. The Act prohibits all discharge of

pollutants except inasmuch as one of several enumerated

statutory exceptions applies. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). One such

exception is where the polluter has been issued a National

Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit.

33 U.S.C. § 1342. The effluent discharge standards or

limitations specified in an NPDES permit define the scope of

the authorized exception to the prohibition in § 1311(a).

Authority to administer the NPDES permit system may be

delegated to a state or regional agency where the state or

regional regulatory scheme meets certain criteria. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(b). The entity responsible for issuing permits in the

San Francisco Bay area of California is the California

Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Francisco Region

(the “Regional Board”). Private citizens may bring suit

pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365 to enforce effluent standards or

limitations, which are defined as including violations of 33

U.S.C. § 1311(a). 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(1).

UNOCAL owns and operates a petroleum refinery in the

San Francisco Bay area of California. Wastewater from the

refinery is subject to UNOCAL’s NPDES permit issued by

the Regional Board. On February 20, 1991 the Regional

Board issued Order No. 91-026, which amended the

UNOCAL’s NPDES permit for the San Francisco Bay area

refinery. The order set a “final” concentration limit on

selenium discharges of 50 parts per billion (“ppb”) and a

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3a

mass emission rate of .85 pounds per day, calculated on a

running annual average. The final selenium limitation was to

take effect December 12, 1993. On June 16, 1991 the

Regional Board issued Order No. 91-099 amending

UNOCAL’s NPDES permit to include an “interim limit” less

stringent than the final limit which took effect immediately

and which was to remain in force until the final limit came

into effect. UNOCAL is in substantial compliance with the

interim limit but is not in compliance with the final limit.

The Regional Board issued these orders pursuant to 33

U.S.C. § 1314(d of the Clean Water Act, which required the

Regional Board to adopt individual control Strategies for

discharges into waters determined by the United States

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) or the state to be

impaired. The Regional Board listed San Francisco Bay asa

“hot spot” under § 1314(J on the ground that it failed to

meet the “applicable water quality standard” of the Clean

Water Act “due entirely or substantially to discharges from

point sources of any toxic pollutants.” See 33 U.S.C.

§ 1314()(1)).

The state water board denied an appeal by UNOCAL and

other refiners challenging the selenium discharge limits.

Shortly thereafter, on October 12, 1992, UNOCAL and

others filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Solano

County Superior Court of California seeking to set aside the

interim and final limits on the grounds that the Regional

Board’s listing of the San Francisco Bay as a “hot spot”

violated the Clean Water Act and _ its implementing

regulations.

Over the course of 1993, UNOCAL and others were in

settlement discussions with the Regional Board. Although

other refiners in the area became able to meet the final limits,

UNOCAL and other refiners maintained their inability, due

to technological constraints, to meet the final selenium limits.

On November 8, 1993, UNOCAL, along with other refiners,

reached a settlement agreement whereby UNOCAL and others

4a

would dismiss the state lawsuit and the Regional Board would

adopt a proposed cease and desist order (“CDO”). The

parties dispute whether the settlement agreement and proposed

CDO were released for public comment on November 9,

1993 or November 12, 1993. On November 19, 1993 and

December 15, 1993 public hearings were held on the

proposed CDO at which CBE participated. The Regional

Board, with some minor modifications, issued the CDO on

January 19, 1994 as Order No. 94-015.

The principal elements of the settlement agreement and

the CDO were that UNOCAL and the other refiners

dismissed their state court lawsuit without prejudice,

UNOCAL and others paid the state a total of $2 million

($780,000 of which was contributed by UNOCAL), and the

Regional Board issued the CDO which, among other things,

relieves UNOCAL and others from meeting the final selenium

limit until July 31, 1998. The CDO states, with respect to

the latter element, that:

Compliance with this Order shall be in accordance with

the following tasks and time schedules:

c. The dischargers shall implement a _ removal

technology or technologies, or an alternate control

strategy, which has been determined by the dischargers

to be capable of achieving compliance with the discharge

limitations as specified in [the NPDES permits] and shall

comply with these limits, no later than July 31, 1998.

CBE filed this lawsuit on March 2, 1994. On July 8,

1994, the district court dismissed the water quality standards

claim. The district court subsequently certified the question

of its denial of the motions to dismiss as to the other claims

for immediate appeai pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Sa

Il.

UNOCAL asserts two arguments as to why dismissal of

the effluent standards claim is proper. First, UNOCAL

argues that dismissal is warranted because the citizen suit is

barred under § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) and § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii).

Second,—UNOCAL urges that dismissal for failure to state

a claim is appropriate because the CDO issued by the

Regional Board had the effect of extending until 1998 the

deadline for complying with the final selenium limits

specified in the NPDES permit and, thus, there is no effluent

standards violation. The Court reviews each of these

questions of law de novo. Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel.,

872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989).

A. Is the Citizen Suit Barred Under 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) or § 1319(g)(6)(A) (iii)?

33 U.S.C. § 1365 generally authorizes private citizens to

sue those violating, among other things, “an effluent standard

or limitation” under the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(g)(6) sets out certain instances where these citizen

suits are barred. The provisions of § 1319(g)(6)(A) are

precisely designed to preclude citizen suits which would be

duplicative of an “administrative penalty action.” See

Washington Public Interest Research Group v. Pendleton

Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 1993).

The citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. § 1365, provides, in relevant part:

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and

section 1319(g)(6) of this title, any citizen may

commence a civil action on his own behalf—

(1) against any person ... who is alleged to be in

violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation

under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the

Administrator [of the EPA] or a State with respect to

such a standard or limitation....

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6a

The district courts shall have jurisdiction ... to enforce

such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order,

as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil

penalties under section 1319(d) of this title.

33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).

Section 1319(g)(6) provides, in relevant part:

[A]ny violation—

(i) with respect to which the Administrator [of the

EPA] or the Secretary [of the Army] has commenced

and is diligently prosecuting an action under this

subsection,

(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced

and is diligently prosecuting an action under a State

law comparable to this subsection, or

(iii) for which the Administrator, the Secretary, or

the State has issued a final order not subject to

further judicial review and the violator has paid a

penalty assessed under this subsection, or such

comparable State law, as the case may be,

Shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action under

subsection (d) of this section or section 1321(b) of this

title or section 1365 of this title.

33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A).

1. Applicability of § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii)

§ 1319(g)(6)(A) (iii) precludes this citizen suit if the CDO

at issue in this case is a “final order not subject to further

judicial review,” and if UNOCAL has paid a “penalty” that

was “assessed under this subsection, or such comparable State

law.” Because UNOCAL has not paid a “penalty” “assessed

under ... comparable State law” the Court concludes that

CBE’s suit is not barred by § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii).

Ta

a. “penalty”

UNOCAL maintains that the $780,000 it paid to the

Regional Board constituted a “penalty” within the meaning of

§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii). The district court concluded that the $2

million payment, of which UNOCAL’s payment was a part,

was not a penalty but “was simply settling the refineries’ state

court lawsuit.” The district court noted that the CDO refers

to a “payment” not a “penalty” and that the CDO clearly

Stated that it was issued pursuant to the Regional Board’s

authority under California Water Code § 13301, governing

cease and desist orders. The district court also noted that in

the CDO the Regional Board “expressly declined to invoke its

[California Water Code] § 13385 authority” to impose a civil

penalty.’

UNOCAL argues, essentially, that it has paid out over

$780,000 (10% of which went into the California Water

Pollution Cleanup and Abatement Account that is the

repository of fines levied pursuant to § 13385, and 90% into

' The CDO states, in part, that:

[t]he Regional Board has considered the various

enforcement and penalty options available to it regarding the

violation [of the NPDES permit], including the issuance of

a cease and desist order or a cleanup or abatement order,

imposition of an administrative civil penalty and referral to

the Attorney General for civil prosecution. Under the

circumstances detailed in the Findings set forth above, the

Regional Board has determined that the most appropriate

course of action is settlement of the litigation and issuance

of a cease and desist order.

8a

a “Selenium Mitigation Fund”) and that it elevates form

over substance to call this anything other than a “penalty.”

In support of the formal reasoning of the district court,

CBE asserts two additional reasons why UNOCAL may not

characterize the payment as a penalty. First, UNOCAL itself

insisted on characterizing the financial transfer as a

“payment” and not a “penalty” at the time of the state action

settlement. CBE notes that counsel for UNOCAL stated at

the hearing on the motion to dismiss at the district court that

UNOCAL would not, at the time of the settlement of the state

lawsuit, “sign on to paperwork that characterized it as a

penalty, because of the punitive and bad conduct implications

that the general public takes from that term.” CBE,

appropriately, in the Court’s view, argues that UNOCAL

simply “cannot have it both ways” and that the fairest

characterization of the $780,000 payment is that it was not a

penaity but, instead, the price of avoiding the stigma of a

formal enforcement action.

Second, CBE argues that there are other significant

advantages that were obtained by UNOCAL by making a

payment independent of the state statutory provision,

California Water Act § 13385, that is analogous to the

administrative penalty provision of the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. § 1319(g). California Water Code § 13385 sets out

formal procedures to be followed and specific factors to be

considered in setting a penalty. Thus, asserts CBE, by

‘making a payment outside the context of § 13385, UNOCAL

avoided a significant level of scrutiny as to the nature and

amount of a penalty. For example, the United States, as

amicus curiae, notes that there was no formal scrutiny of the

economic benefits to UNOCAL of non-compliance and thus

* The Appellees argue, however, that this cuts against the

Appellant because § 13385 requires all penalties to be paid into

the California Water Pollution Cleanup and Abatement Account.

9a

no assurance that UNOCAL has fully disgorged the benefit it

receives from violating effluent standards. CBE also notes

that while payment of an administrative penalty must be made

within 30 days of being imposed, California Water Code

§ 13323(d), UNOCAL was not required to make half of its

payment until a year after the settlement was entered into.

The Court determines that the fairest characterization of

the payment at issue is that it was, indeed, a settlement made

to avoid an enforcement action by the Regional Board.

Accordingly, because UNOCAL has not paid a “penalty,” the

§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii) bar to citizen suits does not apply. This

conclusion that § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii) is not implicated is

buttressed by the Court’s interpretation of the term

“comparable state law,” discussed below.

b. “comparable state law”

Having determined that the payment at issue was not a

“penalty,” the district court also concluded that the payment

was not “assessed under this subsection, or such comparable

State law” within the meaning of § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii). It is

undisputed that the penalty provision in § 13385 of the

California Water Code is comparable to the federal Clean

Water Act penalty provision of 33 U.S.C. § 1319. It is also

not disputed that the payment at issue in this case was not

levied pursuant to California Water Code § 13385.° The key

issue, therefore, is whether a penalty assessed not in

accordance with § 13385 but, instead, under the aegis of a

related provision of the California statutory scheme is

“assessed under this subsection, or such comparable State

law.” UNOCAL argues, as it did in the district court, that

although the CDO states that it was issued under the authority

* Although the parties dispute the degree of similarity to the

requirements of § 13385 of the procedures and factors that were

actually taken and considered in this case, Appellant cedes that

the specific requirements of § 13385 were not adhered to.

10a

of California Water Code § 13301, because § 13301 is within

the same statutory scheme as § 13385 a penalty assessed

under the former provision is assessed under a “comparable

State law” within the meaning of 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii).

The district court held that the “comparability assessment

‘= conducted by examining the state statutory enforcement

provision involved,” here California Water Code § 13301,

and “not the state statutory enforcement scheme as a whole.”

Because California Water Code § 13301 is not comparable to

the federal penalty provision in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g),

reasoned the district court, a penalty assessed under § 13301

does not implicate the § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii) bar on citizen

suits. In reaching this conclusion the district court

specifically rejected the reasoning of the First Circuit in North

and South Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Scituate interpreting the

term “comparable” in § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii). 949 F.2d 552,

555-556 (ist Cir. 1991).

In Scituate the First Circuit held that the comparability

requirement of § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) is met where the state

“statutory scheme” contains a penalty provision comparable

to the federal penalty provision and that a state’s decision not

to utilize the comparable state law penalty provision in any

particular case does not negate the “comparability” of the

state action. Jd.; accord, Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI

Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 382-383 (8th Cir. 1994). The

Scituate Court reasoned:

The State’s decision not to utilize the penalty provisions

does not alter the comparability of the State Act’s

statutory scheme to the scheme found in the Federal Act.

While the specific statutory section under which the State

issued its Order does not, itself, contain a penalty

provision, another section of the same statute does

contain penalty provisions. These two coordinate parts

are cogs in the same statutory scheme implemented by

the State for the protection of its waterways.

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Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556, (internal citations omitted). Thus,

“[iJt is enough that the [state] statutory scheme ... contains

penalty assessment provisions comparable to the Federal Act,

that the State is authorized to assess those penalties, and that

the overall scheme of the two acts is aimed at correcting the

same violations, thereby achieving the same goals.” Id.

Furthermore, according to the Scituate Court, “[s]o long as

the provisions in the State Act adequately safeguard the

substantive interests of citizens in enforcement actions, the

rights of notice and public participation found in the State Act

are satisfactorily comparable to those found in the Federal

Act.” Id.

In Washington Public Interest Research Group v.

Pendleton Woolen Mills this Court interpreted the terms of 33

U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(@i). 11 F.3d 883 (9th Cir.1993). The

Court noted that § 1319(g) deals only with administrative

penalty actions. Jd. at 885. The Court then concluded that

when determining whether the EPA was “diligently

prosecuting an action under this subsection,” the phrase

“under this subsection” could mean only that the EPA was

prosecuting an administrative penalty action. Jd. at 886. The

§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(i) bar to citizen suits, therefore, was not

implicated “in the face of an administrative compliance

order.” Jd. The Court specifically noted that it was not

persuaded by the reasoning underlying the Scituate Court’s

interpretation of § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) which was grounded in

that court’s concern that the discretion of enforcement

authorities to choose enforcement methods be preserved. Id.

This Court noted the language of the statute was clear and

that there was no evidence in the legislative history that

suggested that Congress intended to extend the bar on citizen

Suits to a context beyond administrative penalty actions. Id.

at 885-886. This Court also noted that had Congress intended

that administrative compliance orders preclude citizen suits,

it could have done so—as it has in other instances. Id. at

886.

{

12a

The Court concludes that the requirement in

§ 1319(g)(6)(A) (iii) that any penalty be “assessed under this

subsection, or such comparable State law” before it precludes

citizen suits means that the penalty at issue must have been

assessed under that provision of state law that is comparable

to § 1319(g). There are several reasons for this conclusion.

First, this is the plainest reading of the statutory language.‘

Second, § 1319(g) mandates various public notice and

comment procedures as well as penalty assessment factors.

Unless any penalty is assessed according to the particular

provision of state law that is comparable to § 1319(g), there

is no guarantee that the public will be given the requisite

opportunity to participate or that the penalty assessed is of the

proper magnitude. Third, as noted by the United States in its

amicus brief, the holding of Scituate leads to the anomalous

conclusion that state administrative enforcement actions would

more broadly preclude citizen suits than the administrative

enforcement actions of the EPA. Nothing in the language and

structure of the § 1319(g)(6)(A) in any way suggests that

Congress intended such a dichotomy. Nor has the UNOCAL

pointed to any legislative history that would indicate that

Congress intended that state administrative actions be given

* As the Supreme Court has stated, “the starting point for

interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.”

Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 56, 108 S.Ct. at 381, quoting Consumer

Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,

108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). “Absent

a Clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that

language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” GT7E

Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. at 108, 100 S.Ct. at 2056. “If the

intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the

court ... must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent

of Congress.” Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 81

L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).

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13a

broader preclusive effect than the administrative actions of the

EPA.

2. Applicability of § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii)

§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) precludes this citizen suit if the State

“has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under

a State law comparable to this subsection.”

The district court concluded that the § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii)

bar was inapplicable for two reasons. First, the district court

concluded that the action at issue was not taken “under a

State law comparable to this subsection.” Additionally, the

district court concluded that “because of the entry of the

settlement agreement and the CDO, the Regional Board’s

enforcement action is no longer still being ‘prosecuted’ within

the meaning of § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii).”

UNOCAL has made no contention in its briefs as to why

the district court erred in concluding that the action was no

longer being “prosecuted” within the meaning of

§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii).° It seems plain that no action is being

prosecuted at this time. Thus, § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) is

inapplicable. Furthermore, the Court concludes, for the

reasons discussed above with respect to § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii),

that the district court did not err in concluding that the

Regional Board’s action was not taken “under a State law

comparable to this subsection.”

B. Did the Regional Board’s Cease and Desist Order

Effectively Defer the Compliance Date for Selenium

Discharges so that UNOCAL is not “in Violation” of

an Effluent Standard or Limitation?

UNOCAL asserts that CBE has failed to State a claim

because the facts it alleges do not constitute a “violation of an

* Indeed, the Appellant raised this provision in the district

court only in a footnote of its briefs and it was dealt with by the

district court in a footnote to its decision.

= iii,

14a

effluent standard or limitation” within the meaning of

§ 1365(a)(1)(A) because the CDO issued by the Regional

Board had the effect of modifying UNOCAL’s NPDES permit

to extend until 1998 the deadline for complying with the final

selenium limit.

33 U.S.C. § 1365 generally authorizes private citizens to

sue those violating, among other things, “an effluent standard

or limitation” under the Clean Water Act.° “Effluent

standard or limitation” means “an effluent limitation or other

limitation under section 1311” or “a permit or conditions

thereof issued under section 1342 [the NPDES provision] of

this title.” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f). Thus, violation of the

limits specified in an NPDES permit is a violation of “an

effluent standard or limitation” within the meaning of § 1365.

The district court concluded that the issuance by the

Regional Board of the CDO extending the compliance

schedule was akin to an exercise of prosecutorial discretion

and did not suspend the limits and deadlines contained in the

NPDES permit or shield UNOCAL from this citizen suit.

While UNOCAL concedes that the CDO did not purport to

modify the NPDES permit and did not constitute a formal

®° Section 1365 provides, in part, that:

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and

section 1319(g)(6) of this title, any citizen may commence

a civil action on his own behalf—

(1) against any person ... who is alleged to be in

violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under

this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator

[of the EPA] or a State with respect to such a standard

or limitation....

33 U.S.C. § 1365.

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15a

amendment or modification of the NPDES permit,’ it argues

that the CDO did have the practical effect of modifying the

compliance date contained in the NPDES permit. For the

first time on appeal, UNOCAL also argues that the district

court was foreclosed, under either the doctrine of exhaustion

of remedies or the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.

37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), from addressing

the argument that the CDO issued by the Regional Board

failed to effectively modify the NPDES compliance date

because California law provided CBE a right, of which they

did not avail themselves, to review of the CDO by appeal to

the state water board or by judicial review in state court.

California Water Code §§ 13320, 13330.

The Court concludes that the federal courts are not

precluded from addressing the issue of whether the CDO

effectively modified the NPDES compliance date. While it

is true that there, were procedures available for CBE to

appeal the CDO within the state system, this action does not

challenge the validity of the CDO but rather seeks to enforce

the requirements of the Clean Water Act. Furthermore, 33

U.S.C. § 1365 makes no mention of exhaustion of state

remedies as a prerequisite for bringing a citizen suit.

Similarly, Younger abstention is not appropriate. There are

three requirements for the invocation of Younger—ongoing

state proceedings, implication of an important state interest in

the state proceedings, and an adequate opportunity to raise

federal questions in the proceedings. World Famous Drinking

Emporium v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1987).

While failure to exhaust state appellate remedies may satisfy

the requirement that there be ongoing state proceedings, Id.,

” There are specific, mandatory procedure for NPDES permit

modification. Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 23, § 2235; 40 C.F.R.

§ 122.62. See also Ackels v. U.S.E.P.A., 7 F.3d 862, 864, n.1

(9th Cir. 1993). It is undisputed that these procedures were not

followed in this case.

16a

the doctrine is simply not relevant where the federal action is

not seeking a ruling on the validity of the state action.

The Court further concludes that the CDO at issue did

not modify, effectively or otherwise, the terms of UNOCAL’s

NPDES permit. This conclusion is appropriate for the

following reasons.

First, the CDO does not purport to modify the NPDES

permit. In the Findings to the CDO, the Regional Board

states in paragraph 4 that “[t]he effluent limitations imposed

under Order No. 91-026 [amending the NPDES permit to

include the finai selenium limits] become effective on

December 12, 1993.... The Regional Board is adopting this

Order to enforce the provisions of Order No. 91-026.” Thus,

the Regional Board did not intend to modify the Permit but

instead worked out a compliance schedule wherein, according

to paragraph 7 of the CDO, if “the dischargers have failed to

comply with the provisions of this Order [the official may ...]

request the Attorney General to take appropriate action

against the dischargers, including injunctive and civil

remedies, if appropriate, or to issue a Complaint for Board

consideration of Administrative Civil Liabilities.” Thus, the

language of the CDO itself fits with the conclusion that the

CDO was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

Second, as noted above, federal and state regulations

govern the modification of NPDES permits. It is not disputed

that these regulations were not followed in this case. These

regulations, both procedural and substantive, ensure that the

standards embodied in an NPDES permit cannot be evaded

with the cooperation of compliant state regulatory authorities.

For instance, there are public notice requirements for a

permit modification process that are different than those

required in an enforcement action. Further, there is a five

year duration on the life of an NPDES permit that the

“effective modification” asserted here would violate.

§ 1342(6)(1)(B).

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Third, even if the CDO were to be construed as having

effectively extended the compliance date in the NPDES

permit, such a modification would likely run afoul of the

substantive constraint on the ability of regulators to modify

permits found in 33 U.S.C. § 1342(0) (the “anti-backsliding”

provision). This provision prohibits, with certain narrow

exceptions,* any modified permit from containing “effluent

limitations which are less stringent than the comparable

effluent limitations in the previous permit.” UNOCAL asserts

that the “effective” modification of the permit under

consideration would not violate the anti-backsliding provision

because the permit contained interim limits which would

remain in full effect until the final limits actually took effect.

Essentially, argues UNOCAL, the final limits have never

taken effect so they cannot be backslided on. This argument

seems to assume that effluent standards are not effectively

part of the NPDES permit until they take effect. It appears

to the Court, however, that a modified NPDES permit that

does not contain a strict effluent limitation that had been

about to come into effect is, indeed, “less stringent” than the

previous, unmodified NPDES permit—regardless of whether

the limitation had yet taken effect.

Ill.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of

UNOCAL’s motion to dismiss is AFFIRMED.

* Appellant has asserted that two such exceptions are

applicable. Appellant asserts that “new information is available”

that “would have justified” a less stringent standard under

§ 1342(0)(2)(B)(i) and that there is no “reasonably available

remedy” under § 1342(0)(2)(C). Because it is not necessary so

to do, the Court does not comment on the applicability of these

exceptions.

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18a

APPENDIX B

CITIZENS FOR A BETTER

ENVIRONMENT-CALIFORNIA, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant.

CITIZENS FOR A BETTER

ENVIRONMENT-CALIFORNIA, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

EXXON COMPANY USA, Defendant.

Nos. C 94-0712 TEH, C 94-0713 TEH.

United States District Court,

N.D. California.

July 8, 1994.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THELTON E. HENDERSON, Chief Judge.

The two above-captioned related cases are identical

citizen suits brought by non-governmental environmental

conservation organizations against defendant oil companies.

The suits challenge each defendant’s discharge into portions

of the San Francisco Bay of waste water containing the

chemical selenium from oil refineries owned by each

defendant located in the San Francisco Bay area. The first

suit is brought against defendant Union Oil Company of

California (“Unocal”) and concerns Unocal’s refinery at

Rodeo, California, which discharges waste water containing

selenium into the San Pablo Bay. The second is against the

Exxon Corporation (“Exxon”) and concerns Exxon’s refinery

at Benicia, California, which discharges selenium into Suisan

Bay. Plaintiffs allege that the selenium levels in the effluent

19a

discharged from Unocal and Exxon’s refineries violate the

federal Water Pollution Control Act (“Clean Water Act” or

“Act”), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 ef Seq.

Defendants Unocal and Exxon have moved to dismiss the

suits on several grounds. In addition, Exxon has moved that

the suit against it be dismissed on the ground that venue over

that case properly lies in the U.S. District Court for the

Eastern District of California. Oral argument on these

motions was heard by the Court on June 6, 1994. After

consideration of the parties’ written and oral arguments, the

Court rules that venue in the suit against Exxon, Citizens for

a Better Environment-California v. Exxon, No. C 94-0713

TEH, indeed lies in the Eastern District and therefore

ORDERS that the case be TRANSFERRED from this Court

to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of

California. As for the suit against Unocal, the Court

DENIES Unocal’s motion to dismiss. The reasons for these

rulings are set forth in the memorandum opinion and order

that follows.

I. BACKGROUND

In these two actions brought pursuant to the citizen suit

provision of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, the

plaintiff environmental groups seek to enforce effluent

discharge standards and deadlines contained in certain

pollution permits issued to defendants Unocal and Exxon

pursuant to the Clean Water Act. These suits are undertaken

in the face of an administrative order, issued by a state

agency charged with enforcing the Clean Water Act, which

purports to grant defendants a five-year extension of the

deadline by which they must come into compliance with the

pollution discharge standards contained in their permits. The

issue central to these motions is what effect the state

administrative order has on the enforceability of the standards

contained in defendants’ pollution permits.

20a

A. THE REGULATORY FRAME-WORK

The Clean Water Act regulates the discharge of pollutants

into navigable waters. The statute is structured such that all

discharge of pollutants is prohibited except insofar as one of

several enumerated statutory exceptions applies. See 33

U.S.C. § 1311(a). One such exception obtains where a

polluter has been issued a permit pursuant to the National

Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES permit” or

“permit”), authorizing it to discharge designated pollutants at

certain levels subject to certain conditions. See 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342. The effluent discharge standards or limitations

specified in an NPDES permit define the scope of the

authorized exception to the 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) prohibition,

such that violation of a permit limit places a polluter in

violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Private parties may bring

citizen suits pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365 to enforce effluent

standards or limitations, which are defined as including

violations of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(1).

The Act provides that, in any given state or region,

authority to administer the NPDES permitting system can be

delegated by the federal Environmental Protection Agency

(“EPA”) to a state or regional regulatory agency, provided

that the applicable state or regional regulatory scheme under

which the local agency operates satisfies certain criteria. See

33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). In California, EPA has granted

authorization to a state regulatory apparatus, comprised of the

State Water Resources Control Board (“State Board”) and

several subsidiary Regional Water Quality Control Boards, to

issue NPDES permits. The entity responsible for issuing

NPDES permits and otherwise regulating discharges in the

region at issue in these cases is the California Regional Water

Quality Control Board, San Francisco Region (“Regional

Board” or “Board”).

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B. HISTORY OF UNOCAL AND EXXON’S NPDES

PERMITS

Exercising its delegated authority under the Clean Water

Act, the Regional Board in 1989 and 1990 issued NPDES

permits for Unocal, Exxon, and four other Bay Area oil

refineries, specifying certain limits on the amount of

pollutants that the refineries could discharge into the San

Francisco Bay and its estuary (“Bay”). Selenium, a toxic

element, occurs in high concentrations in the relatively low

grade crude oil from the San Joaquin Valley that is refined at

the six Bay Area refineries. Selenium passes through the

refineries and is present in the wastes that they discharge into

the Bay.

The 1987 Amendments to the Clean Water Act required

states to identify a list of navigable waters for which water

quality standards established under the Act were unlikely to

be achieved “due entirely or substantially to discharges from

point sources of any toxic pollutants listed pursuant to [33

U.S.C. § 1317(a)].”_ 33 U.S.C. § 1314()(1)(B). Selenium

has been listed by EPA as a toxic pollutant pursuant to this

code section. See 40 C.F.R. § 401.15. As part of such

listing, the state must identify the point sources causing

selenium pollution in the listed waters and develop an

“individual control strategy” (“ICS”) to control each point

source so as to achieve the water quality objectives for such

waters “as soon as possible, but not later than 3 years after

the date of the establishment of such Strategy.” 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1314()(1)(C), (D).

On February 3, 1989, when the California Water

Resources Controi Board published its list required pursuant

to the 1987 Clean Water Act Amendments, the State Board

did not identify several portions of the upper San Francisco

Bay Estuary—San Pablo Bay, Carquinez Strait, and Suisan

Bay—as “toxic hot spots” for selenium, nor did it specify oil

refinery selenium discharges as a substantial cause of

selenium pollution in the Bay. EPA took issue with these

22a

omissions, among other things. Exercising its regulatory

authority under the Clean Water Act, EPA issued a final

listing on September 28, 1990, designating these portions of

the Bay as “impaired waters” due to selenium pollution, and

attributing that selenium substantially to the discharges from

the six Bay Area refineries: Unocal’s refinery in Rodeo,

Exxon’s refinery in Benicia, Shell Oil Company’s

manufacturing complex in Martinez, Tosco Corporation’s

refinery in Avon, Chevron U.S.A.’s refinery in Richmond,

and Pacific Refining Company’s facility in Hercules. EPA

stated that it disapproved of the ICS’s then in effect for

Unocal, Exxon, and the other dischargers, and made known

its intention to issue its own ICS’s not later than December

31, 1990, which would require compliance with specified

effluent limits, calculated based on state water quality

standards, within three years of the date of issuance.

Responding to EPA’s rebuke, on February 20, 1991, the

Board issued an order listing San Pablo Bay, Carquinez

Strait, and Suisan Bay as “hot spots” under 33 U.S.C.

§ 1314(), and amending Unocal, Exxon, and the other

refineries’ NPDES permits to specify certain concentration-

and mass-based limits on the amount of selenium that each

refinery could discharge. By the terms of the amended

permits, these new limits (“final limits”) would become

effective on December 12, 1993. On June 16, 1991, the

Board issued an additional order, amending the permits of

Unocal, Exxon, and the other refineries to include interim

selenium discharge limits (“interim limits”), significantly less

stringent than the final limits. The interim limits went into

effect immediately on that date and were to remain in force

until the final limits took effect.

C. STATE COURT LAWSUIT BY REFINERIES

Unocal, Exxon, and the other Bay Area refineries sought

unsuccessfully to challenge the Regional Board’s listing of

San Pablo Bay, Carquinez Strait, and Suisan Bay as impaired

waters, each filing applications for review with the State

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23a

Water Resources Control Board. On October 16, 1992,

shortly after those applications were dismissed by the State

Board, the Bay Area refineries and their trade association, the

Western States Petroleum Association (“WSPA”), filed a

petition for writ of mandate in Solano County Superior Court

seeking to set aside the Regional Board’s orders imposing the

final limits and the interim limits on the ground that the

listing of the above-noted regions of the Bay as impaired

bodies of water was in violation of various provisions of the

Clean Water Act and of EPA administrative regulations

promulgated under the Act.

D. SETTLEMENT OF LAWSUIT AND REGIONAL

BOARD ENFORCEMENT ACTION

The refineries and WSPA did not press for a hearing on

the merits of their state court suit but instead initiated

settlement negotiations with the Regional Board and the

California Attorney General’s Office, which proceeded over

the course of 1993. Three of the Bay Area refineries,

Chevron, Tosco, and Pacific Refining, reduced their

discharge levels, such that they would be in compliance with

the final limits when they took effect. Unocal, Exxon, and

Shell, however, contended that they could not comply with

the final limits. Although the other three refineries had

succeeded in reducing their effluent levels to meet the final

limits, Unocal, Exxon, and Shell maintained that, due to

technological constraints, they could not reduce their selenium

discharge levels sufficiently to comply with the final limits

scheduled to take effect on December 12, 1993.

On November 8, 1993, the six refineries, the state, and

the Regional Board agreed on a settlement pursuant to which

the refineries and WSPA would consent to dismissal of their

State court action, and the Board would issue a Cease and

Desist Order (“CDO”). The Board published the proposed

settlement and CDO in the days that followed, and noticed

public hearings on them.

24a

The principal terms of the settlement were that the three

refineries that had not complied with their final selenium

limits—Unocal, Exxon, and Shell—would receive a nearly

five year extension until July 31, 1998 of their deadline for

complying with their final limits, and in exchange would pay

the state $2 million and, along with the other refineries,

would drop their state court action. Oddly, however, neither

the settlement agreement nor the CDO expressly state that

Unocal, Exxon, and Shell are relieved from having to comply

with the final limits contained in their NPDES permits until

July 31, 1998. Rather, the CDO effects this purported

extension by providing that Unocal, Exxon, and Shell

shall cease and desist from discharging waste in violation

of [their NPDES permits] by complying with the

following:

* K * * bad Sd

3. Compliance with this Order shall be in accordance

with the following tasks and time schedules:

* * * * * *

c. The dischargers shall implement a removal

technology or technologies, or an alternate control

Strategy, which has been determined by the

dischargers to be capable of achieving compliance

with the discharge limitations as specified in [the

NPDES permits] and shall comply with these limits,

no later than July 31, 1998.

CDO at 7. The settlement agreement stated that the

above-quoted provision of the CDO “effectively modified”

the deadlines specified in defendants’ NPDES permits for

complying with the final selenium limits. The CDO also

provided that Unocal, Exxon, and Shell would implement a

study to identify technologies for reducing selenium discharge

levels, and would carry out pilot tests and source reduction

studies.

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25a

The terms of the settlement agreement dismissing the

refineries’ state court suit specified that the dismissal was to

be “without prejudice” and expressly provided that nothing in

the agreement waived the refineries’ right to challenge the

validity of the final limits contained in their NPDES permits.

The refineries agreed only to refrain from challenging the

final limits unless and until the refineries should find in 1998

that they are unable to identify or implement a workable

removal technology or other control strategy that would

enable them to meet the limits, and the Board declines to

extend the July 31, 1998 deadline further. Thus, in effect,

the refineries merely agreed to drop their challenge to the

final limits so long as the limits are not being enforced, but

retained the right to challenge them once they are.

On November 19, 1993, and December 15, 1993, public

hearings on the CDO were held at which the instant plaintiffs

and other members of the public testified. The Board made

some minor modifications to the CDO in response to

comments received from the public and from EPA, and issued

a final CDO on January 19, 1994. Plaintiffs filed these

lawsuits on March 2, 1994.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”)

12(b)(6) when a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. The Court must accept as

true the factual allegations of the complaint and indulge all

reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, construing the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Dodd

v. Spokane County, 393 F.2d 330, 334 (9th Cir. 1968); NL

Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.

1986). Unless the Court converts the Rule 12(b)(6) motion

into a motion for summary judgment, the court may not

consider material outside of the complaint. Powe v. City of

Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1981). However, “on

a motion to dismiss a court may properly look beyond the

complaint to matters of public record and doing so does not

26a

convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary

judgment.” Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc. , 798

F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). Matters of public record

include court and agency orders and agency regulations. Id.

Thus, this Court may take judicial notice on this motion of

rulings and regulations issued or published by the Regional

Board or by EPA, regardless whether such documents were

filed as attachments to the complaint.

The Court must construe the complaint liberally, and

dismissal should not be granted unless “it appears to a

certainty that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Intake Water

Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm’n, 769 F.2d 568,

569 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163, 106 S. Ct.

2288, 90 L.Ed.2d 729 (1986). However, legal issues on

which the actionability of the claim depends can and should

be resolved at this stage. Dismissal is appropriate if, as a

consequence of such resolution, the court determines that, as

a matter of law, the complaint’s allegations fail to state a

claim.

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(3) where venue

in a case does not properly lie in the court in which it is

filed. However, where the court deems it to be “in the

interest of justice,” the court may instead transfer an

improperly venued case to a court in which it could have been

brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

WI. DISCUSSION

In their complaints in each of these two related cases,

plaintiffs allege three causes of action: that defendant has not

complied with an applicable effluent standard or limitation—to

wit, the final selenium limits and accompanying compliance

deadline contained in their NPDES permits—in violation of

the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); that defendant has

not complied with an applicable water quality standard, also

in violation of the Clean Water Act; and that defendant has

27a

engaged in an unfair business practice in violation of

California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.

As to the first cause of action, defendants contend that

the CDO issued by the Regional Board properly extended the

deadline by which defendants are required to comply with the

selenium discharge limits specified in their NPDES permits,

such that their present failure to meet that limit does not

violate the federal Clean Water Act. Alternatively,

defendants argue that, in any event, plaintiffs may not bring

a citizen suit to enforce the effluent standards specified in

defendants’ NPDES permits because the Regional Board has

already taken enforcement action as to that violation and

defendants have paid a penalty, thereby precluding a parallel

citizen enforcement suit under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii).

Finally, defendants charge that plaintiffs’ suits are barred for

failure to satisfy the notice requirements imposed under 33

U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) for citizen suits.

As to the second cause of action, defendants urge that

water quality standards—as distinct from _ effluent

standards—are not enforceable in citizen suits under the Clean

Water Act and that the count must consequently be dismissed.

As for the third cause of action, defendants contend that

dismissal of the first two claims necessitates dismissal of the

third state law claim as well. Finally, defendant Exxon

charges that the suit against it must be dismissed for improper

venue since its refinery is not located within the geographic

area for which venue properly lies in this Court.

A. VENUE IN CITIZENS FOR A_ BETTER

ENVIRONMENT V. EXXON

The citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. § 1365, under which plaintiffs have brought these

suits, contains a special venue provision stating that

Any action respecting a violation by a discharge source

of an effluent standard or limitation or an order

respecting such standard or limitation may be brought

"

28a

under this section only in the judicial district in which

such source is located.

33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(1) (emphasis added). As is clear on the

face of the complaint, Exxon’s refinery is located in the City

of Benicia, see Complaint ¢ 9, which is within the County of

Solano. Solano County is in the geographic region covered

by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of

California, not this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 84(b). The Eastern

District is therefore the only district in which venue is proper

under the Act. On this basis, Exxon urges that the Court

dismiss the suit for improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

Conceding this venue error in their opposition papers,

plaintiffs urge that the Court transfer the case to the Eastern

District rather than dismiss it.

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) instructs that:

The district court of a district in which is filed a case

laying venue in the wrong ... district shall dismiss, or if

it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any

district ... in which it could have been brought.

Whether the interest of justice militates in favor of transfer

rather than dismissal is a judgment committed to the sound

discretion of the district court. “[T]ransfer is generally ...

consistent with the ‘interest of justice’ ... because it

eliminates the delay and additional expense associated with

reinstituting suit in another forum.” Banque de la

Mediterranee-France, S.A. v. Thergen, Inc. , 780 F.Supp. 92,

95 (D.R.I. 1992). On the facts of this case, the Court holds

that transfer rather than dismissal is appropriate.

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Citizens for a Better

Environment-California v. Exxon, No. C 94-0713 TEH, shall

be TRANSFERRED FORTHWITH from this Court to the

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. In

view of this ruling, the remainder of this opinion and order

shall address only the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant

in the Unocal case.

29a

B. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: VIOLATION OF

EFFLUENT STANDARD OR LIMITATION

Under the Clean Water Act, dischargers are strictly liable

for any violation of the terms of an NPDES permit.

California Public Interest Research Group v. Shell, 840 F.

Supp. 712, 714 (N.D. Cal. 1993). As explained above, the

Act authorizes private parties to bring citizen suit enforcement

actions, and provides, in pertinent part, that such actions may

be brought against

any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of ... an

effluent standard or limitation under [the Act].

33 U.S.C. § 1365. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f) (defining

“effluent standard or limitation”). As noted above, the

definition of “effluent standard[s] or limitation[s]” for which

violations are actionable under this section includes effluent

standards or limits prescribed in NPDES permits, since

violation of such limits places a polluter in violation of 33

U.S.C. §1311(a). Additionally, violations of terms

contained in NPDES permits are generally enforceable of

their own accord in citizen suits. See 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(f)(6).

There is no dispute that on December 12, 1993—the date

the final selenium limits took effect under Unocal’s NPDES

permit—and every day since then, Unocal’s discharges of

selenium have exceeded the daily limits under its NPDES

permit. Rather, Unocal contends that plaintiffs’ citizen suit

should be dismissed on the grounds: (1) that the CDO issued

by the Regional Board properly extended the deadline hy

which defendant is required to comply with the final selenium

discharge limits specified in its NPDES permit, such that the

deadline specified in its permit is no longer in effect; (2) that,

in any event, the citizen suit is barred under 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii) because the state agency charged with

enforcing the Act, acting pursuant to a “comparable” state

law, has already issued a “final order” regarding the

30a

violation, assessing a “penalty” against Unocal which Unocal

has paid; and (3) that plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the

notice requirements for a citizen suit. Each of these

objections, if correct, would provide an independently

adequate basis for dismissing plaintiffs’ suit. Thus, in order

to avoid dismissal, plaintiffs must establish that none of these

objections is well-founded.

1. WHETHER, ON THE MERITS, THERE IS NO

VIOLATION OF UNOCAL’S NPDES PERMIT

BECAUSE THE REGIONAL BOARD’S CDO

VALIDLY EXTENDED THE COMPLIANCE

DEADLINE CONTAINED IN UNOCAL’S

PERMIT

Unocal’s first argument for dismissing plaintiffs’ claim

under the Clean Water Act seeking to enforce compliance

with an effluent standard or limitation—plaintiffs’ first cause

of action—is that, on the merits, Unocal has not violated its

NPDES permit because the CDO issued by the Regional

Board validly extended until 1998 the deadline for complying

with the final selenium limit specified in the NPDES permit.’

' Unocal labels this argument a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), reasoning that if

the NPDES limits are effectively suspended such that Unocal has

not violated an effluent limit, then this Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction, for 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) confers jurisdiction

over citizen suits against polluters only where violations of

effluent standards or other orders exist. However, the Supreme

Court has held that, generally, assertion of a claim under a

federal statute “alone is sufficient to empower the District Court

to assume jurisdiction over the case and determine whether, in

fact, the [statute] does provide the claimed rights.” Romero v.

International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359, 79

S.Ct. 468, 473, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959). In such cases, a finding

of no statutory violation results in dismissal for failure to state

(continued...)

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As recounted above, pursuant to the settlement reached by the

Regional Board, the State Attorney General’s Office, and the

Bay Area oil refineries in late 1993, the Regional Board

issued a CDO containing several terms that had been agreed

to in the settlement. The CDO provided, in pertinent part:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Section 13301

of the California Water Code, that Shell Oil Company,

Union Oil Company of California, and Exxon Company,

U.S.A. shall cease and desist from discharging waste in

violation of Order No. 91-026 [—the order amending the

refineries’ NPDES permits to impose final selenium

discharge limits—] by complying with the following:

cad * * * * aK

3. Compliance with this Order shall be in accordance

with the following tasks and time schedules:

* * * * a cad

c. The dischargers shall implement a removal

technology or technologies, or an alternate control

Strategy, which has been determined by the

dischargers to be capable of achieving compliance

with the discharge limits specified in Order No.

91-026 and shall comply with these limits, no later

than July 31, 1998.

' (...continued)

a claim rather than for lack of jurisdiction. The Court will

therefore treat Unocal’s argument here as a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim. Ultimately, however, the label

affixed to the motion is unimportant. Regardless whether

dismissal on such grounds is correctly characterized as based on

absence of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim, in both cases

it hinges on the same legal question: whether the Board’s

action, as a matter of law, suspended the final limits and

deadline contained in Unocal’s NPDES permit.

32a

CDO at 7.

Unocal concedes both (1) that the CDO did not purport

to modify Unocal’s NPDES permit, and (2) that even if it did

purport to do so, such a modification would not have been

valid. Any such putative modification would have been

invalid for three reasons. First, modifications to NPDES

permits must be implemented in accordance with standards

and procedures specified in federal agency regulations which

were not followed here.? Second, even if a purported

modification had been procedurally proper, it would have

* The procedures for NPDES permit modification are

mandatory. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23, § 2235; 40 C.F.R.

§ 123.25(a)(22); Ackels v. U.S. E.P.A., 7 F.3d 862, 864 n.1

(9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Metropolitan District

Commission, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. 20621, 20624, 1985 WL 9071

(D. Mass. 1985). Unless properly modified in accordance with

these procedures, the permit as originally issued remains in

effect, and violations of the permit may be subject to a citizen

enforcement suit. Public Interest Research Group v. Yates

Industries, 757 F.Supp. 438, 445 (D.N.J.1991); Metropolitan

District Commission, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20624, 1985 WL

9071.

First, the enforcement agency modifying the permit must

make a finding of cause appropriate for modifying the permit.

40 C.F.R. §§ 122.41(f), 122.62, 122.63. The Regional Board

made no such finding in this case. Second, the enforcement

agency must prepare a draft permit and issue a fact sheet setting

forth the significant factual, legal, methodological, and policy

questions considered in preparing the draft permit, or take other

mandatory steps to ensure careful assessment of alternatives. 40

C.F.R. §§ 124.6, 124.8(a), 124.10, 124.11, 124.12, 124.56.

The Regional Board did not follow these procedures in this case.

Furthermore, the Board’s notice of hearing on the CDO makes

no reference to a permit modification, further indicating that the

Board did not purport to be modifying the refineries’ permits.

Ae arms mene hCtie i EULA TN, ea Is ba eee a Beaty

Di aids cao a iti ah ta, Selle SA

33a

violated a substantive requirement of the 1987 Clean Water

Act Amendments which establish a three-year deadline for a

polluter’s coming into compliance with water quality

standards imposed pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1314()(1)(D),

such as those contained in Unocal’s NPDES permit.’ The

three-year deadline for Unocal and the other refineries’

permits was triggered, at the very latest, on February 20,

1991, when the Board issued its order amending the NPDES

permits to include the final selenium limits. In light of that

fact, any ruling purporting to extend the compliance deadline

beyond February 20, 1994 would violate the statutory

three-year deadline. Third, any purported modification to

Unocal’s permit would have violated another substantive

requirement of the 1987 Clean Water Act Amendments, the

“anti-backsliding” provision, which forbids permits of the

type held by Unocal from being “renewed, reissued, or

modified to contain effluent limitations which are less

stringent than the comparable effluent limitations in the

previous permit,” subject to certain exceptions. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(0)(1).*

> As discussed above, 33 U.S.C. § 1314()(1)(D) requires that

individual control strategies (ICS’s) be adopted in order to

achieve reduction in pollution levels in certain waters designated

pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1314()(1)(D). An ICS must impose

limits on toxic pollutants sufficient to attain water quality

standards within three years. 33 U.S.C. § 1314()(1)(D); 40

C.F.R. § 123.46; Westvaco Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 899 F.2d

1383, 1385 (4th Cir. 1990). To that end, Unocal’s NPDES

permit compelled it to reduce selenium discharges to meet

certain limits by December 12, 1993, which was within three

years of the February 20, 1991 issuance of the Board’s order

amending the permit to impose the final selenium limits.

* In the case of effluent limitations established on the basis of

section 1311(b)(1)(C) of this title or section 1313(d) or (e)

(continued...)

7"

34a

Rather than contending that its permit was “modified” by

the CDO, Unocal argues instead that a deadline for

complying with effluent standards specified in an NPDES

permit may permissibly be extended through an administrative

enforcement order issued by the state agency that issued the

permit. Unocal makes the novel argument that though such

an enforcement action cannot “modify” a permit, an

extension granted under such an order constitutes a valid

authorization that has the legal effect of suspending the effect

of the permit requirements such that a polluter is shielded

from citizen suits seeking to enforce compliance with the

permit’s original deadline and limits.

It is clear that California law authorizes Regional Boards

to issue CDO’s that purport to grant polluters an extended

time schedule within which to come into compliance with

discharge limits. See Cal. Water Code § 13301.° However,

* (...continued)

of the title [all concerning water quality standards], a permit

may not be renewed, reissued, or modified to contain

effluent limitations which are less stringent than the

comparable effluent limitations in the previous permit....

33 U.S.C. § 1342(0)(1). See New Jersey Public Interest

Research Group v. New Jersey Expressway Auth. , 822 F.Supp.

174, 185 (D.N.J. 1992).

| * When a regional board finds that a discharge of waste is

taking place or threatening to take place in violation of

requirements or discharge prohibitions prescribed by the

regional board or the state board, the board may issue an

order to cease and desist and direct that those persons not

complying with the requirements or discharge prohibitions

(a) comply forthwith, (b) comply in accordance with a time

schedule set by the board, or (c) in the event of a

threatened violation, take appropriate remedial or

(continued...)

ae ot

35a

Unocal can point to no case where a federal court has held

that a state enforcement action that does not satisfy the

requirements to qualify as a valid “modification” of an

effluent standard or limit contained in an NPDES permit, can

nonetheless suspend the permit limit, shielding the polluter

from having the terms of the permit enforced against it

through a citizen suit.© Indeed, the only analogous case cited

by the parties indicates the opposite. That case, United States

v. Bedford, 1987 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 16103 (N.D. Ohio 1987),

adopted, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18612 (N.D. Ohio 1988),

held that a state enforcement action that purported to suspend

the terms of an NPDES permit, but which did not qualify as

a valid “modification” of the permit, did not prevent the

federal government from bringing a civil enforcement action

in federal court pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) to enforce

the terms of the permit. 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16103, at

*10-*12. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) authorizes the U.S. Attorney

General to bring suit to enforce compliance with, inter alia,

effluent limits imposed under NPDES permits. Since the

instant citizen suit also seeks enforcement of permit limits,’

> (...continued)

preventative action. ....

Cal. Water Code § 13301.

° Again, this argument by Unocal is distinct from its separate

argument that, even if the final limits contained in Unocal’s

NPDES permit did, in theory, take effect on December 12,

1993, and are still in force today, enforcement of those limits

through a citizen suit is precluded under 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii). That separate argument is addressed by the

Court later in this opinion. See infra Part III.B.2.

7 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), the enforcement provision involved in

Bedford, authorizes the Attorney General to sue polluters whoa

(continued...)

|

36a

Bedford is authority for the proposition that the Regional

Board’s CDO did not suspend the final limits and deadline

contained in Unocal’s NPDES permit such that those terms

may not still be enforced against it.

Unocal attempts to draw support for its position from

language found in Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co. , 838

F.Supp. 1428, 1436 (D. Colo. 1993). However, Colorado

Refining Co. concerned only whether a state enforcement

action erected a 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A) preclusive bar

against a citizen suit, and expressed no opinion on Unocal’s

instant argument. Unocal’s_ citations to Northwest

Environmental Advocates v. Portland, 11 F.3d 900, 906-11

(9th Cir. 1993), and this Court’s recent opinion in the related

case of California Public Interest Research Group v. Shell Oil

Co., 840 F.Supp. 712 (N.D. Cal. 1993), are similarly

inapposite. Portland, as discussed later in this opinion,

involved entirely different issues. Similarly, the language

quoted from Shell stating that “any challenge to effluent limits

in an NPDES permit presents a matter for the Water Board,

not this Court, to address,” 840 F.Supp. at 712, concerns just

7 (...continued)

violate, inter alia, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 33 U.S.C. §§ 319(a),

(b). As noted above, violation of effluent limits imposed under

an NPDES permit places a permit-holder in violation of 33

U.S.C. § 1311(a). See discussion supra Part I.A. As also

noted above, citizen suits may be brought under 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365 for violations of, inter alia, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 33

U.S.C. § 1365(f)(1). Thus, NPDES permit limits that are

enforceable by the federal government under 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(b) are also enforceable through citizen suits. The only

exception to this proposition obtains where a citizen suit is

precluded under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A) by a pending or

final state or federal enforcement action. This separate bar to

citizen suits is discussed later in the opinion. See infra Part

I1.B.2.

~

37a

what it says: the circumstances under which a discharger

may bring suit in federal court to challenge limits contained

in an NPDES permit promulgated by a state enforcement

agency. Sheil in no way addresses the entirely separate issue

of citizen suits to enforce permit limits.

In its reply papers, Unocal also cites an administrative

ruling issued by the Environmental Appeals Board of EPA,

In the Matter of Star-Kist Caribe, Inc., NPDES Appeal No.

88-5, 1990 NPDES LEXIS 4 (April 16, 1990), as supporting

their argument that a non-modification can nonetheless excuse

noncompliance with an NPDES permit. The language from

Star-Kist cited by Unocal simply states that EPA has

authority, under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a), to issue compliance

orders that extend the deadlines for polluters to come into

compliance with their NPDES permit requirements. That

proposition is non-controversial. Star-Kist does not address

the subtly but significantly different issue of the effect of such

extensions: whether EPA compliance orders extending

NPDES permit deadlines suspend the effect of the permit

requirements such that polluters are shielded against citizen

suits seeking to enforce compliance with the permit limits.

Nor does Star-Kist address the analogous issue that is

presented on this motion: whether state compliance orders

extending NPDES permit deadlines can suspend the effect of

permits such that their terms may no longer be enforced

through citizen suits.

At first blush, it may not appear obvious how to assemble

the different component parts of the statutory scheme at issue

here into a coherent whole. First, there exist the very

stringent procedures and substantive rules limiting the

circumstances under which enforcement agencies may

“modify” the terms of NPDES permits. Second, there exists

authorization for enforcement agencies to bring civil penalty

actions, see 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g), pursuant to which

compliance schedules may, de facto, be extended, since such

actions preclude citizen suits to enforce the NPDES permits.

38a

See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii).* Third, there exists

authorization for enforcement agencies to bring non-penalty

civil compliance actions, see 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a),° pursuant

to which compliance schedules may be extended, Star-Kist,

1990 NPDES LEXIS 4, at *21, but which nonetheless do not

bar citizen suits to enforce the terms of the original NPDES

permits. Washington Public Interest Research Group v.

Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1993).

The element of the scheme the role of which may at first

appear difficult to reconcile is the non-penalty civil

compliance action. On the one hand, it is clear that such

actions cannot amend NPDES permits to postpone compliance

deadlines, Star-Kist, 1990 NPDES LEXIS 4, at *6, and do

not trigger the statutory preclusive bar against citizen suit

enforcement of limits contained in NPDES permits.

Pendleton, 11 F.3d 883. On the other hand, however, it is

also clear that EPA can authorize extended compliance

schedules in the course of such compliance actions, Star-Kist,

1990 NPDES LEXIS 4, at *6, and that Regional Water

Quality Control Boards can do the same under California law.

Cal. Water Code § 13301. If such extended compliance

schedules do not suspend the effect of limits and deadlines

contained in NPDES permits such that the permit terms may

* Although 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) authorizes only federal civil

penalty actions brought by EPA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii)

provides that penalty actions brought by state agencies under

comparable state laws trigger the same preclusive bar against

citizen suits to enforce NPDES permits.

° Although 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) authorizes only federal

non-penalty civil compliance actions brought by EPA, as noted

above, California Water Code § 13301 authorizes regional water

boards to bring non-penalty civil compliance actions pursuant to

which a revised compliance time-tables may be established. See

supra note 5.

OOO

39a

still be enforced against the polluter through citizen suits,

then what good are compliance actions and what meaning do

their extended timetables have? The answer to this question

is that such orders constitute agreements by the issuing

enforcement authority on how the authority—be it EPA or a

state agency—plans to exercise its prosecutorial discretion.

Given that such authorities are vested with enforcement

powers broader in some respects than those conferred on

private citizens under the citizen suit provision, and that in

the vast majority of cases there exists no serious threat of

citizen suit enforcement, assurances regarding authorities’

intended exercise of their enforcement discretion carry great

real-world significance. See Shell, 840 F.Supp. at 716-17

(construing language in NPDES permit as an assurance as to

how the Regional Board intended to exercise its prosecutorial

discretion, and not as a term modifying and weakening the

permit’s effluent limit). Thus, even if they cannot shield

polluters from citizen suits brought to enforce the terms of

NPDES permits, such actions still serve a meaningful role in

the Clean Water Act enforcement scheme.

With this tension resolved, the Court concludes that,

when viewed as a whole, the structure of the Clean Water

Act clearly evidences a legislative intent on the part of its

drafters that disfavors the interpretation urged by Unocal

regarding the effect of deadline extensions contained in

administrative compliance orders. As explained above, the

statute imposes a variety of stringent conditions before

administrative actions can modify the terms of NPDES

permits. Moreover, as discussed in the next section, the

statute also expressly provides that citizen suits are barred

only in circumstances where certain specified types of agency

enforcement actions have been taken by state or federal

enforcement agencies. Unocal, in effect, contends that

administrative extensions of permit deadlines can bar citizen

suits to enforce permits even where the extensions neither (1)

qualify as “modifications,” nor (2) satisfy the requirements of

rae e en eT aie

——————— aa enn

40a

the provision that expressly bars citizen suits in some

circumstances. Recognition of such an unenumerated

category of administrative extension would render superfluous

the very specific requirements established by Congress for

permit modifications and preclusion of citizen suits. The

canon of statutory construction strongly disfavors such

interpretations that do not accord meaning to every word and

provision in a statute, or to statutory distinctions drawn by

Congress. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., ----

U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1015, 117 L.Ed.2d 181

(1992) (“[It is a] settled rule that a statute must, if possible,

be construed in such a fashion that every word has some

operative effect.”); In the Matter of Greystone III Joint

Venture, 948 F.2d 134, 138-39 (Sth Cir. 1991) (interpretation

of one statutory provision so as to render another provision

superfluous “is anathema to elementary principles of statutory

construction”). By writing these provisions out of the statute,

Unocal’s construction would create an enormous loophole,

elevating civil compliance orders to the status of de facto

modifications, thereby allowing dischargers to achieve, in

effect, modifications that would otherwise be illegal under the

Act. The existence of these specific provisions in the statute

creates a strong inference that Congress did not intend to

authorize unenumerated exceptions of the sort urged by Unocal.'°

'° Additional support for this conclusion can be inferred from

Washington Public Interest Research Group v. Pendleton Woolen

Mills, 11 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1993). In Pendleton, the EPA

issued an administrative compliance order to a polluter that had

violated the discharge limits specified in its NPDES permit. The

EPA order set an extended compliance schedule, and ordered the

polluter to make certain identified physical improvements

deemed to be necessary to bring about compliance, and

threatened sanctions if the polluter did not comply with the terms

of the compliance order. Subsequently, an environmental group

(continued...)

ws rete i eA ata

4la

In light of the above, the Court holds that, as a matter of

law, an administrative enforcement action by a state agency

charged with enforcing the Clean Water Act that purports to

extend a deadline specified in an NPDES permit for

complying with the permit’s discharge limits does not serve

to suspend the permit’s deadlines such that they may not be

enforced through a citizen suit. Such an extension, unless it

satisfies the requirements to qualify as a “modification,” is

simply a statement by the agency as to how it plans to

'© (...continued)

filed a citizen suit seeking, inter alia, an injunction requiring

immediate compliance with the discharge limits specified in the

permit. The Ninth Circuit held that because the type of

enforcement action that EPA had taken was not an administrative

penalty action under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) but rather an

administrative compliance action under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a), a

citizen suit could still be maintained to enforce the limits and

deadlines contained in the original permit. (As noted above and

discussed below, penalty actions can trigger the 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(g)(6)(A) preclusive bar against citizen suits.)

The Pendleton defendant apparently did not expressly raise

the argument made by Unocal that the administrative order

extending the compliance deadline suspended the effect of the

permit deadline such that it was not enforceable through a citizen

suit. However, in reversing, the Ninth Circuit implicitly

rejected this argument, for the argument would have afforded an

alternative basis for affirming the district court’s dismissal, and

the court of appeals will normally affirm so long as there exists

any alternative ground, fairly supported in the record, that would

justify the district court’s ruling. Golden Nugget, Inc. v.

American Stock Exch., Inc., 828 F.2d 586, 590 (9th Cir. 1987)

(affirmance on alternative ground appropriate where the record

adequately establishes material facts and issues are purely legal).

Thus, the Pendleton holding supports an inference that the Ninth

Circuit was not persuaded by Unocal’s argument.

Ae ieee

42a

exercise its prosecutorial discretion. Unocal’s motion to

dismiss plaintiffs’ first cause of action on this ground is

therefore DENIED.

2. WHETHER A CITIZEN SUIT IS PRECLUDED

UNDER THE 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii) BAR

As noted above, the Clean Water Act expressly provides

that citizen suits are barred in circumstances where certain

categories of agency enforcement action have either been

concluded or are pending with respect to an alleged violation.

Unocal contends that the CDO issued by the Regional Board

qualifies as an enforcement action that suffices to trigger a

preclusive bar against the instant citizen suit, thereby

requiring its dismissal.

33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A) provides:

[A]ny violation—

(i) with respect to which the Administrator [of the

EPA] or the Secretary [of the Army] has commenced

and is diligently prosecuting an action under [33

U.S.C. § 1319(g), which aliows EPA to assess civil

penalties],

(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced

and is diligently prosecuting an action under a State

law comparable to [33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)], or

(iii) for which the Administrator, the Secretary,

or the State has issued a final order not subject to

further judicial review and the violator has paid a

penalty assessed under [33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) ], or

such comparable State law, as the case may be,

shall not be subject to a civil penalty action under [33

U.S.C. § 1319(d)] or [33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)] or [a citizen

suit under 33 U.S.C. § 1365}.

(Emphasis added). Unocal contends that the CDO and the

settlement agreement constitute “a final order” under a state

Oe ANE I IO MO A gt Ned PS tt oR tow

SE eee oe Seed

43a

law “comparable” to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) for which the

violator has paid an assessed “penalty,” thereby triggering the

citizen suit bar under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii). In

order for dismissal on this ground to be appropriate, all of

these conditions must be met.

a. “Final Order”

Plaintiffs argue that the CDO and settlement agreement

do not constitute a “final order not subject to further judicial

review.” Under the settlement agreement, Unocal and the

other refineries expressly retained the right to challenge in

court in 1998 the final selenium limits specified in their

NPDES permits when, under the CDO, they are finally

obligated to comply with those limits.'' In light of this

provision, there indeed appears to be a substantial issue as to

whether the CDO is a “final order” within the meaning of 33

U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii). However, because this issue

was not well briefed by the parties and since there exist other

bases for denying dismissal on preclusion grounds, the Court

declines to reach this question.

b. “Comparable State Law”

The 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii) preclusive bar applies

only where “the violator has paid a penalty assessed under

[33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)], or such comparable State law.” In

evaluating whether this provision is satisfied in this case, the

Court must determine, first, what state law the putative

'! The settlement agreement provides that the refineries agree

not to challenge the final selenium limits in court in 1998 if they

are able to win an additional extension of the compliance

schedule pursuant to 4 5 of the CDO. However, that concession

is no concession at all, for if the refineries succeed in obtaining

such an additional extension of the compliance deadline, then,

of course, there will be no reason for them to challenge the

limits.

44a

penalty was assessed under and, second, whether that law is

“comparable” to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g).

i. The Regional Board’s Action Was Taken

under California Water Code § 13301

California law vests regional water boards with a variety

of different prosecutorial tools for enforcing compliance with

effluent limits or standards imposed under NPDES permits.

These include issuance of cease and desist orders under

California Water Code § 13301, issuance of cleanup or

abatement orders under California Water Code § 13304,

imposition of administrative civil penalties under California

Water Code § 13385, and referral to the California Attorney

General for civil prosecution.

It appears quite clear that in issuing the CDO, the

Regional Board was exercising its authority under California

Water Code § 13301, which empowers regional boards to

issue cease and desist orders pursuant to which such boards

may establish extended time-tables for compliance with

Board-imposed effluent limits. Cal. Water Code § 13301(b).

The CDO itself expressly states that it was issued “pursuant

to Section 13301 of the California Water Code.” CDO at 7.

Moreover, the CDO offers the following explanation of the

decisionmaking process that resulted in the settlement and

issuance of the CDO:

The Regional Board has considered the various

enforcement and penalty options available to it regarding

violation of [the NPDES permit], including the issuance

of a cease and desist order or a cleanup or abatement

order, imposition of an administrative civil penalty and

referral to the Attorney General for civil prosecution.

Under the circumstances detailed in the Findings set forth

above, the Regional Board has determined that the most

appropriate course of action is settlement of the litigation

and issuance of a cease and desist order.

CDO at 6.

a ee ee

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Tile Sih SS SS aly Selena eR AAS aid 22h ROCA CINIA bab ch: NATE ace bat

it uk O04 et.

ab at S yPaee

45a

Unocal appears to argue that since Unocal, Exxon, and

Shell agreed to make a $2 million payment to the state as part

of the settlement of which the CDO was a component, the

Regional Board’s enforcement action must be construed as a

civil penalty action under California Water Code § 13385.

Unocal speculates that if it, Exxon, and Shell had refused to

agree to the payment, the Regional Board would then have

instituted a civil penalty action under § 13385. However, as

noted above, the CDO expressly categorized the actions taken

as (1) entry of a cease-and-desist order under § 13301, and

(2) settlement of the refineries’ state court lawsuit. The fact

that the Board identified its actions as such after first noting

the different enforcement options available to it—including the

option of imposing of a civil penalty under § 13385—makes

Clear that the Board expressly declined to invoke its § 13385

authority in issuing the CDO and entering the settlement

agreement. The only mention of the $2 million payment in

the CDO is found in the “findings” section, where the

payments are described only as a “term” of the settlement of

the state court lawsuit, CDO at 6; no mention of the payment

appears in the “order” section of the CDO, and the document

does not purport to order payment of the sum.

This labeling clearly was not accidental. The CDO and

settlement agreement resulted from lengthy and detailed

negotiations among the parties. The Court sees no reason to

disregard the Regional Board and the parties’ deliberate

decision to label the Board action a cease-and-desist order,

and the accompanying document a settlement agreement. If

the Board and the parties had intended for the Board order

and settlement agreement to be deemed a settlement of a

threatened but unfiled civil penalty action, they could easily

have so indicated. The Court must conclude from their

failure to do so that they did not so intend. Since the

Regional Board is vested with authority to choose which of its

enforcement options to exercise, the Board’s categorization of

its action as a cease-and-desist action under § 13301 is

46a

dispositive of the question of what type of enforcement action

the Board attempted to take.

In light of the above, the Court concludes that, as a

matter of law, the CDO was issued in an exercise of the

Board’s administrative enforcement authority under California

Water Code § 13301 to issue cease and desist orders

establishing time-tables for compliance with Board-imposed

effluent limits. The Court further concludes that, as a matter

of law, the settlement agreement was just that—a settlement

of the refineries’ state court lawsuit. The Court rules that, as

a matter of law, neither instrument constituted an exercise of

the Board’s authority under California Water Code § 13385

to impose civil penalties.

ii. The “Comparability” Assessment Is

Conducted By Examining the Particular

State Statutory Enforcement Provision

Involved, Not the State Statutory

Enforcement Scheme as a Whole

The thrust of Unocal’s argument as to why the

“comparability” requirement is satisfied in this case focuses

not on the particular statutory power that the Board was

exercising in issuing the CDO and entering the settlement, but

rather on the California law enforcement scheme as a whole.

Unocal argues that even if the CDO was issued pursuant to

California Water Code § 13301 and even if, as the Court

concludes below, that enforcement provision is not

comparable to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g), the comparability

requirement is still satisfied because the comparability

assessment must be conducted by examining the state

Statutory enforcement scheme as a whole, not simply the

particular state statutory enforcement provision under which

the action in question was taken. Unocal argues that the

California scheme, when all of its various enforcement

provisions are considered, is comparable to 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(g), thereby satisfying the requirement.

——

47a

The issue here is whether the language “comparable state

law” should be interpreted to mean “comparable state

enforcement scheme” or “comparable state enforcement

provision.” While quite technical, this interpretive question

is an important one which has not yet been resolved by the

courts. Research has revealed only a single reported decision

discussing this question at any length. That case, North &

South Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st

Cir. 1991), did not construe the comparability requirement as

it applies under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii); rather it

interpreted it under a neighboring provision, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii), which reads:

[A]ny violation—

baad a * baad Saad ba

(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced

and is diligently prosecuting an action under a State

law comparable to [33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)]

shall not be subject to a civil penalty action under [33

U.S.C. § 1319(d)] or [33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)] or [a citizen

suit under 33 U.S.C. § 1365].

(Emphasis added). However, because the language in the two

provisions is parallel and the canon of statutory construction

presumes that when Congress uses a term in more than one

location in a statute, it is meant to have the same meaning,

see United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., --- U.S.

----, ---- n.5, 112 S.Ct. 2102, 2107 n. 5, 119 L.Ed.2d 308

(1992) (plurality opinion); Mississippi Poultry Ass’n, Inc. v.

Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1993), Scituate is

relevant to the instant question before this Court.

In Scituate, the state was prosecuting an enforcement

action under a provision of state law that would not result in

imposition of civil penalties against the Clean Water Act

violator. Arguing that the comparability assessment required

the court to compare the particular state enforcement

48a

provision used by the state with 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g), the

citizen suit plaintiff contended that the preclusive bar was not

triggered since the state was proceeding under a provision

that, unlike 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g), did not authorize

imposition of civil penalties. However, the Scituate court

concluded that, for policy reasons, the comparability

requirement should be applied to the state enforcement

scheme as a whole, not the particular enforcement provision

at issue. The court reasoned that provision-by-provision

analysis would mean that some state enforcement actions

would not trigger the bar against citizen suits, and would

thereby allow duplicative enforcement proceedings. The

Scituate court concluded that Congress meant for citizen suits

to be available only where the state is not addressing the

problem at all, and not simply wherever a state decides not to

seek civil penalties. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 555-56.

This Court is not persuaded by the reasoning of the

Scituate court. For several reasons, the Court concludes that

the comparability assessment must be made by looking to the

particular state enforcement provision at issue, not the state

scheme as a whole. First, the structure of § 1319(g) supports

an inference favoring this conclusion. The Clean Water Act

empowers EPA to respond to violations using any of a variety

of enforcement options. However, the statute specifies that

only where one specific type of EPA enforcement action —

a penalty action under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) — has been taken

are citizen suits precluded under 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii). Pendleton, 11 F.3d at 885-86. Since

whether an EPA enforcement action triggers the preclusive

bar depends on the particular enforcement provision under

which EPA proceeded, it would logically follow that the same

would hold for state laws: that only where a state has

proceeded (and assessed a penalty) under a state enforcement

provision comparable to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) is the

preclusive bar triggered. It would be odd indeed to construe

the statute as requiring courts to conduct a comparison

POOR ENS ete, ARE Ab et re ary

toe my

Se ay

49a

between the federal 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) enforcement

provision on the one hand, and the whole of the state

enforcement scheme on the other. Clearly, it is more natural

to read 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii) as requiring a

comparison between the specific state enforcement provision

actually used and the specified federal enforcement provision,

33 U.S.C. § 1319(g).

The interpretation urged by Unocal would introduce an

anomalous dichotomy into the statute, for state enforcement

actions would then enjoy much broader preclusive effects

against citizen suits than EPA actions. Any type of state

enforcement action would trigger the preclusive bar so long

as somewhere in the state’s enforcement scheme there existed

provisions comparable to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g). Penalties

imposed under enforcement provisions not affording

procedural safeguards comparable to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)

would bar citizen suits. Thus, nominal “penalties” imposed

under state provisions lacking penalty assessment factors

comparable to those enumerated in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3),

and without a right to public notice or opportunity for

participation comparable to those provided under 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(g)(4), would insulate polluters from citizen actions so

long as the state had at its disposal — although had declined

to use — other enforcement provisions that are comparable to

33 U.S.C. § 1319(g).

Although the federal enforcement scheme, of course,

contains all of these features, federal enforcement actions

trigger the preclusive bar only where they are taken under

one particular enforcement provision: 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g).

Surely the preclusive effect of state enforcement actions can

be no broader.

Construing the statute to require enforcement provision

comparability would not, as the Scituate court contended, be

inconsistent with sensible policy or with the goals of the

Clean Water Act. The Court can easily imagine that

Congress, realizing that state enforcement agencies can be

50a

susceptible to regulatory “capture” by the industries they

regulate, might have feared that state agencies might consent

to inappropriately lax compliance agreements. Congress might

therefore sensibly have decided that the safeguard

enforcement device of the citizen suit should be precluded

only where a state has taken an enforcement action that

approximates the rigor of a federal 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)

enforcement action.

The Court’s conclusion as to application of the

comparability requirement is also in accord with EPA’s own

administrative interpretation of the statute. See EPA

Guidance on State Action Preempting Civil Penalty Actions

Under the Federal Clean Water Act (1987); EPA

Supplemental! Guidance on Section 309(g)(6)(A) of the Clean

Water Act (1993). This interpretation of a provision of the

Clean Water Act by the federal agency charged with its

enforcement constitutes persuasive authority and further

buttresses the Court’s conclusion today.’

'2 Where a legislative intent regarding a particular statutory

issue is not evident from a statute’s text or legislative history,

courts will defer to the interpretation of the law favored by the

agency charged with its enforcement, so long as the agency

interpretation is not otherwise inconsistent with the plain

language of the statute or with other of its provisions. Chevron

U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467

U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).

However, this doctrine does not apply in this case, for the Court

infers from the statute’s text and structure a legislative intent

regarding the question at issue. Nonetheless, the agency’s

interpretation constitutes persuasive authority supporting the

Court’s conclusion.

EPA has argued in other cases that in order for a state law

to be comparable to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g), it must have been

certified as such by EPA pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). See

(continued...)

EE oe

S5la

iii. California Water Code § 13301

Is Not “Comparable” to 33

U.S.C. § 1319

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Union Oil Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment-California · 519 U.S. 1101 | Frix