Appendix — Lawson v. United States

Supreme Court brief1997

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Nos. 94-6508/6509

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ...... Appellee

v.

SPANISH COVE SANITATION, INC.,

and FOND. LA Wa uk os hea tee eens Appellants

On Appeal From the United States District Court For

The Western District of Kentucky

CR 93-00015-01-L(F)

Before: NELSON and BOGGS, Circuit Judges, and

GILMORE, District Judge.

DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge. This is a

consolidated appeal from convictions and sentences in

criminal proceedings brought under the Federal Clean

Water Act. The defendants, Spanish Cove Sanitation, Inc.,

and its president and owner, John Lawson, were found to

have discharged pollutants from a sewage treatment plant

into the navigable waters of the United States in violation

of 33 U.S.C §$§1311(a) and 1319(c)(1)(A). On appeal,

both defendants argue (1) that they were impermissibly

singled out for prosecution; (2) that the trial court erred

by not allowing the introduction of evidence concerning

'The Honorable Horace W. Gilmore, United States

District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting

by designation.

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violations by other sewage treatment plants; (3) that the

federal government lacked authority to prosecute the

defendants criminally for violations of the Clean Water

Act; (4) that the trial court should have granted a mistrial

because of prejudicial statements made by a prosecution

witness; (5) that the government failed to prove that the

Stream into which the pollutants were discharged

constituted "navigable waters;" and (6) that the trial court

improperly found that the defendants’ motion for a new

trial was not timely filed. Spanish Cove also argues that

the trial court erred by imposing a fine which the company

cannot pay, while Mr. Lawson contends that the trial court

erred in its application of the sentencing guidelines.

We shall affirm both the conviction and the

sentence of Mr. Lawson and the conviction of Spanish

Cove. In light of the financial data contained in the

record that we recently received from the district court,

however, we are of the opinion that the fine imposed on

Spanish Cove was excessive. We shall therefore remand

the company’s case to the district court for

redetermination of the fine.

I

Spanish Cove owns and operates a small sewage

treatment plant in Jefferson County, Kentucky. Mr.

Lawson built the plant in the 1970s to serve a subdivision

he had developed. The plant treats wastewater -- through

aeration and chlorination, primarily -- and then discharges

the effluent into a watercourse known as Fern Creek.

The defendants were charged with twelve

misdemeanor and five felony violations of the Clean

Water Act. The misdemeanor counts alleged that the

defendants negligently discharged pollutants into Fern

Creek. These charges were based upon "discharge

App-2

ORE OL we FON AS IRE mS en

monitoring reports" that Spanish Cove was required to

prepare under the Act. An independent laboratory --

functioning under contract with Spanish Cove -- collected

samples of effluent discharged from the plant, tested the

effluent, completed the reports, and returned the reports

to Spanish Cove for signature and forwarding to the

Kentucky Department of Water. The reports showed that

on the dates named in the indictment Spanish Cove

exceeded permissible levels for certain pollutants.

The felony counts of the indictment charged the

defendants with knowing discharge of pollutants. Three of

the felony counts involved an incident in which Mr.

Lawson pumped water from a lagoon on the facility into

the creek despite written instructions from the county

health department not to do so. The water that was

discharged contained fecal coliform bacteria in excess of

the legal limits. The other two felony counts involved

subsequent inspections in which the defendants were also

found to have been discharging effluent containing

excessive amounts of fecal coliform bacteria. On one of

these occasions no chlorine tablets -- tablets that are

necessary to treat the wastewater -- could be found at the

plant.

A jury found the defendants guilty on all five of the

felony counts and nine of the twelve misdemeanor counts.

The verdicts were returned and filed on April 13, 1994,

and were entered on the district court’s docket the

following day. A motion for a new trial was denied as

untimely. Spanish Cove was sentenced to pay a fine of

$35,000 and was ordered to pay a special assessment of

$2,125. Mr. Lawson was ordered to pay a special

assessment of $475 and was sentenced to imprisonment for

a term of six months. Both defendants perfected timely

appeals. Because of the pendency of certain post-trial

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motions in the district court, however, the record was not

transmitted to our court until March 27, 1996.

II

The defendants first argue that the district court

should have dismissed the case on selective prosecution

grounds. A prima facie case of selective prosecution

requires a showing that (1) others who engaged in the

same conduct were not prosecuted, and (2) the

government singled out the defendant for prosecution

based upon "such impermissible considerations as race,

religion, or the desire to prevent the exercise of his

constitutional rights." United States v. Bustamante, 805

F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1986), quoting (with minor

changes) United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d

Cir. 1974). We must take special care in assessing a claim

of selective prosecution because such a claim "asks a court

to exercise judicial ‘power over a ‘special province’ of the

Executive." United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480,

1486 (1996), quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821

(1985). We review for "clear error," United States v.

Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 600 (6th Cir. 1990), bearing in

mind the Supreme Court’s admonition that "{t]he

presumption of regularity supports’ [] prosecutorial

decisions and ‘in the absence of clear evidence to the

contrary, courts presume [prosecutors] have properly

discharged their official duties." Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at

1486, quoting United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272

U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926).

To support their claim of selective prosecution, the

defendants rely primarily upon reports of a large number

of violations by the government-operated Louisville

Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD). The defendants point

out that MSD had 829 discharge monitoring report

App-4

violations between January 1989 and January 1993, but

was subjected only to civil, not criminal, enforcement

actions.

Although MSD did report numerous discharge

monitoring report violations at its 71 plants, there is

nothing to indicate that MSD engaged in the type of

willful violations upon which the felony charges against

Spanish Cove were predicated. Even if we were to

assume that the defendants were prosecuted for violations

of a type for which similar wrongdoers were not

prosecuted, moreover, there is absolutely no evidence that

the defendants were singled out based upon impermissible

motives.

The defendants also contend that the prosecution

was vindictive. They were prosecuted, the defendants

argue, because they refused to accept a government offer

allowing them to plead guilty to a single misdemeanor

charge. In "the ‘give and take’ of plea bargaining,”

however, there is no violation of the Due Process Clause

"so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the

prosecution’s offer." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,

363 (1978). Here there is nothing to indicate that the

defendants were not completely free to accept the

government's offer. The claim of vindictive prosecution

must therefore fail as well.

Ill

At trial the defendants attempted to introduce

evidence of violations by other operators. The district

court refused to allow this evidence, believing it irrelevant

to the charges against the defendants. The defendants

argue on appeal that the evidence should have been

admitted as relevant to the standard of care. The

defendants did not make this argument below, however,

App-5

and they may not do so for the first time in this court.

IV

The defendants also argue that the State of

Kentucky has "primacy" to enforce the Clean Water Act,

and that federal prosecution violates both the Due Process

Clause and the intent of the Clean Water Act. The

defendants have cited no authority to support their

contention that the federal government is somehow

precluded from enforcing this federal statute, and we are

aware of no such authority.

Vv

At trial an inspector from the Jefferson County

Health Department, Michael Baugh, testified that he had

discovered unauthorized plastic pipes discharging waste

materials at the site. Mr. Baugh recounted that after

taking samples from the pipes, he had hurried to get away:

"I felt like I was, like here I was, I had

Stepped into something that I knew

obviously shouldn’t have been happening

and I was in the middle of a forested area

and I could just picture little, you know,

sounds going off and me being found in an

aeration tank."

The court immediately instructed the jury to disregard Mr.

Baugh’s comments. After Mr. Baugh completed his

testimony, the defense moved for a mistrial based upon

the alleged prejudicial effect of the statements. The court

denied the motion, noting that after the statement was

made “everybody was chuckling a little bit, and it was right

after he said something about [how he] thought your client

App-6

was a nice guy and so forth." In light of the trial judge’s

Opportunity to judge the manner in which the comments

were made and their effect on the jury, and given the

prompt curative instruction, we cannot say that the trial

court erred in not granting a mistrial.

VI

The defense also argues that the district court

should have dismissed the charges under Rule 29, Fed. R.

Crim. P., based upon insufficiency of the evidence. Most

significantly, in this regard, the defense argues that the

prosecution failed to demonstrate that Fern Creek

qualifies as "navigable waters.”

The Clean Water Act defines navigable waters as

"the waters of the United States, including the territorial

seas." 33 U.S.C. $1362(7). Regulations codified in the

Code of Federal Regulations and applied by the court in

United States v. Larkins, 852 F.2d 189, 190 n.1, n.3 (6th

Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1016 (1989), say that "the

waters of the United States" include:

"(a) All waters which are currently used,

were used in the past, or may be susceptible

to use in interstate or foreign commerce,

including all waters which are subject to the

ebb and flow of the tide;

(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes.

rivers, streams (including intermittent

streams), mudflats, and sandflats, ‘wetlands.’

sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, play

App-7

lakes, or natural ponds the use, degradation,

or destruction of which would affect or

could affect interstate or foreign commerce

including any such waters;

(1) Which are or could be

used by interstate or foreign

travelers for recreational or

other purposes;

(2) From which fish or

shellfish are or could be taken

and sold in interstate or

foreign commerce; or

(3) Which are used or could

be used for industrial

purposes by industries in

interstate commerce;

(e) Tributaries of waters identified in

paragraphs (a) through (d) of this definition;

ow SU CIM: Gree

In United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504

F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974), this court surveyed the

~ legislative history of the Clean Water Act and concluded

that the term “navigable waters" should be given an

extremely broad construction. Congress, the court

explained, intended that the Act apply “to all water bodies,

including main streams and their tributaries.” /d. at 1325,

quoting comments of Congressman Dingell, relying upon

this broad definition, this court found that the Clean

App-8

Water Act applied where a pollutant had been discharged

into a non-navigable tributary of a non-navigable tributary

of a non-navigable tributary of a small navigable river. /d.

at 1320. See also /nternational Paper Co. v. Quellette, 479

U.S. 481, 486 n.6 (1987) (noting that the term "has been

construed expansively to cover waters that are not

navigable in the traditional sense"); National Wildlife Fed.

v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 589 (6th Cir. 1988)

(recognizing that it was "Congress’s intent...that the term

‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible

constitutional interpretation").

In the case at bar the prosecution presented

evidence that Fern Creek waters "would migrate to the

Ohio River." There is no dispute that the Ohio River is

used in an interstate commerce. Accordingly, we believe

there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury

could have found that the defendants discharged pollutants

into "navigable waters."

VII

The district court denied the defendants’ motion for

a new trial as not having been filed within the time

prescribed by Rule 33, Fed. R. Crim. P. The rule provides

that such a motion, where not based on newly discovered

evidence, "shall be made within 7 days after verdict..."

The defendants argue that the district court erred by

counting the time from the date on which the jury

returned its verdict, rather than the date on which the

verdict was entered in the docket. But the date of entry

is not the date of the verdict. The time runs from the

date on which the jury returns its verdict, not the date on

which the clerk enters the verdict in the docket. See

United States v. DeRocco, 320 F. 2d 58, 59 (6th Cir. 1963).

App-9

VII

Mr. Lawson argues that his sentencing guidelines

offense level should have been reduced for acceptance of

responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3E1.1. At trial,

however, Mr. Lawson denied the factual elements of guilt.

He contended, for example, that the samples upon which

the misdemeanor counts were predicated had not been

taken from the proper location and had not been properly

tested. At no point in the proceedings did he admit that

he had engaged in the conduct with which he was charged.

The district court was therefore within its discretion in not

adjusting the offense level downward for acceptance of

responsibility.

IX

Nor do we find error in the district court’s decision

to adjust Mr. Lawson’s offense level upward on the ground

that the violation "involved a discharge without a permit

or in violation of a permit." Mr. Lawson argues that even

though the discharges exceeded permissible levels, they

were not in violation of the permit because the permit

merely required that he keep records and monitor

pollutant levels in the effluent. Be that as it may, Mr.

Lawson admitted on the stand that he had discharged

pollutants from four points of discharge when he only had

a permit for one. This certainly constitutes a discharge

without a permit.

X

Spanish Cove argues that the district court erred in

imposing a fine which the company does not have the

ability to pay. U.S.S.G. §8C3.3(b) allows a court to

impose a fine in an amount less than otherwise would be

required where "the court finds that the organization is not

App- 10

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able, and even with the use of a reasonable installment

schedule, is not likely to become able to pay the minimum

fine." For the purposes of the guidelines, an organization

is not able to pay the minimum fine, where, even with an

installment schedule, "the payment of that fine would

substantially jeopardize the continued existence of the

organization." U.S.S.G. §8C3.3, Application Note 1.

In this case the court imposed a fine of $35,000 on

Spanish Cove after making a specific finding that the

company had the ability to pay a fine in that amount.

Spanish Cove filed a motion for reconsideration, and the

district court stayed payment of the fine pending appeal.

There is persuasive evidence that Spanish Cove

cannot pay a $35,000 fine -- at least not in one installment.

The company’s latest balance sheet reflects virtually no

liquid assets, and the record indicates that virtually all

corporate income (roughly $2,050 per month) is used to

cover expenses. The company’s federal tax returns

indicate that prior to utilizing a net operating loss

deduction Spanish Cove had net income of only $2,243.53

in 1993, $23,988 in 1992’, a loss of $12,496 in 1991, a loss

of $8,122 in 1990, and a loss of $7,207 in 1989. The

company’s financial situation looks a little better when we

consider that a portion of its deductions from income --

$6,635 in 1993, $6,197 in 1992, $8,552 in 1991, $8,552 in

1990, and $8,552 in 1989 -- constituted depreciation for

plant and plant equipment. Presumably the capital

investments in question were made in prior years, and thus

Spanish Cove’s taxable income is not entirely indicative of

) * . . .

‘This was largely due to income realized from

forgiveness of a $20,840 debt.

App-11

its ability to pay. Even if these sums were treated as part

of Spanish Cove’s annual income, however, it would not

appear that the corporation could manage a single $35,000

payment.

A review of the company’s balance sheets supports

this conclusion. The most recent balance sheet (1994)

shows assets of $60,844 and labilities of $177,853. (Of the

liabilities, $147,353 represents loans from "John Lawson

Realty Co., Inc.") The assets consist almost entirely of the

sewer plant, the equipment necessary to run the plant, and

the land on which the plant sits.

The financial records thus demonstrate that the

corporation barely receives enough funds each year to

keep the sewer plant in operation, and that the

corporation has no assets other than those necessary to

operate the facility. This assessment of the financial

health of Spanish Cove is supported by a determination of

the United States trustee in Mr. Lawson’s personal

bankruptcy proceeding. The trustee formally abandoned

"[a]ny interest the estate may have in Spanish Cove

Sanitation, Inc....because it appears...that Spanish Cove []

is insolvent and of no value to the estate." The

abandonment was approved by the bankruptcy judge.

The district court’s determination that Spanish

Cove is able to pay a $35,000 fine in a single payment was

clearly erroneous, in-our view. The fine against Spanish

Cove is therefore VACATED, the Spanish Cove judgment

is AFFIRMED in all other respects, and the case appealed

to us as No. 94-6508 is REMANDED for redetermination

of the fine. The judgment entered against Mr. Lawson in

the case appealed to us as No. 94-6509 is AFFIRMED.

App-12

Case Nos.: 94-6508 & 94-6509

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ORDER

FILED

AUG 20 1996

LEONARD GREEN, Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

SPANISH COVE SANITATION, INC.;

JOHN LAWSON

Defendants - Appellants

BEFORE: NELSON and BOGGS, Circuit Judges, and

GILMORE, District Judge.*

Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing

filed by the appellants,

It is ORDERED that the petition for rehearing be,

and it hereby is, DENIED.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

App-13

[Signed by Leonard Green]

Leonard Green, Clerk

*The Honorable Horace W. Gilmore, United

States District Judge for the Eastern District of

Michigan, sitting by designation.

App-1!4

33 U.S.C, § 1319(c)(1)(A)

33. U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A)

§ 1319. Enforcement

(c) Criminal Penalties

(1) Negligent violations

Any person who -

(A) negligently violates section 1311, 1312, 1316,

1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345 of this title,

or any permit condition or limitation implementing

any of such sections in a permit issued under

section 1342 of this title by the Administrator or by

a State, or any requirement imposed in a

pretreatment program” approved under section

1342(a)(3) or (b)(8) of this title or in a permit

issued under section 1344 of this title by the

Secretary of the Army or by a State; or

shall be punished by a fine of not less that $2,500 nor

more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by

imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or by both. Ifa

conviction of a person is for a violation committed after a

first conviction of such person under this paragraph,

punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $50,000

per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than

2 years, or by both.

(2) Knowing violations

Any person who -

(A) knowing violates section 1311, 1312, 1316,

App-15

1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345 of this title, or any

permit condition or limitation implementing any of such

sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title

by the Administrator or by a State, or any requirement

imposed in a pretreatment program approved under

section 1342(a)(3) or (b)(8) of this title or in a permit

issued under section 1344 of this title by the Secretary of

the Army or by a State; or

shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor

more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by

imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or by both. Ifa

conviction of a person is for a violation committed after a

first conviction of such person under this paragraph,

punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $100,000

per day of violation, or by imprisonment of not more than

6 years, or by both.

(B) Any person who knowingly makes any false

Statement, representation or certification in any

application, record, report, plan, or other document filed

or required to be maintained under this chapter or who

falsifies, tampers with, or knowingly renders inaccurate any

monitoring device or method required to be maintained

under this chapter, shall upon conviction, be punished by

a fine of not more than $10,000, or by imprisonment for

not more than six months, or by both.

(C) For the purposes of this subsection, the term

"person" shall mean, in addition to the definition contained

in section 1362(5) of this title, any responsible corporate

officer.

[FRL-5184-4]

Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure

Interim Policy Statement

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Interim policy statement and request for

comment.

SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) announces and requests comment on an interim

policy to provide incentives for regulated entities that

conduct voluntary compliance evaluations and also disclose

and correct violations. These incentives include

eliminating or substantially reducing the = gravity

component of civil penalties and not referring cases for

criminal prosecution where specified conditions are met.

The policy also states that EPA will not request voluntary

audit reports to trigger enforcement investigations. This

interim policy was developed in close consultation with

EPA’s regional offices and the Department of Justice, and

will be applied uniformly by the Agency’s enforcement

programs.

DATES: This interim policy statement is effective as

interim guidance 15 days after publication, in order to give

the Agency time to coordinate implementation of the

policy throughout EPA Headquarters and the Regions.

EPA urges interested parties to comment on this interim

policy in writing. Comments must be received by EPA at

the address below by June 2, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Submit three copies of comments to the

U.S. EPA Air Docket, Mail Code 6102, 401 M. Street.

SW, Washington, DC 20460, attention: Docket #C-94-01

App-17

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Additional

documentation relating to the development of this interim

policy is contained in the environmental auditing public

docket. Documents from the docket may be requested by

calling (202) 260-7548, requesting an index to docket #C-

94-01, and faxing document requests to (202) 260-4400.

Hours of operation are 8 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Monday

through Friday, except legal holidays. Additional contacts

are Geoff Garver or Brian Riedel, at (202) 564-4187.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

A. Introduction

One of the Environmental Protection Agency’s

most important responsibilities is obtaining compliance

with federal laws that protect public health and safeguard

the environment. That goal can be achieved only with the

voluntary cooperation of thousands of businesses and

other regulated entities subject to these requirements.

Today, EPA is announcing incentives for those who take

responsibility for voluntarily evaluating, disclosing and

correcting violations. These incentives, developed after

nine months of public meetings and empirical analysis, are

set forth in detail below and take effect in 15 days. At the

same time, EPA expects to continue a dialogue with

stakeholders and consider further refinements to this

interim policy. The incentives that EPA is offering fall

into three distinct categories.

First, the Agency will completely eliminate gravity-

based (or "punitive") penalties for companies or public

agencies that voluntarily identify, disclose and correct

App-18

ee ol Pee ee ee ee, a es ee

violations according to the conditions outlined in this

policy. EPA will also reduce punitive penalties by up to

75% for companies that meet most, but not all, of these

conditions. Second, EPA will not recommend to the

Department of Justice that criminal charges be brought

against a company acting in good faith to identify, disclose,

and correct violations, so long as no serious actual harm

has occurred. Finally, the Agency will not request

voluntary environmental audits to trigger enforcement

investigations.

The incentives offered in this policy have been

structured above all to protect human health and the

environment. For example, even where the conditions for

mitigated enforcement were met, EPA will reserve the

right to collect full civil penalties for criminal conduct,

violations that present an imminent and substantial

endangerment or result in serious actual harm, or repeat

violations. Sources will not be allowed to gain an

economic advantage over their competitors by delaying

their investment in compliance. Nor will EPA hesitate to

bring a criminal action against individuals responsible for

criminal conduct.

EPA is considering additional incentives for

voluntary compliance beyond the benefits offered in the

policy today. On April 7, 1995, the Agency will announce

12 Environmental Leadership Program (ELP) pilot

projects with companies and public agencies to test criteria

for auditing and certification of voluntary compliance

programs. If successful, standards developed through

Environmental Leadership could lead to reduced

inspections and public recognition for companies or

agencies with state-of-the-art compliance programs. In

keeping with the President’s announcement on March 16,

1995, EPA also will shortly be announcing additional

App-19

compliance incentives for small businesses.

-The Agency is especially interested in comments

relating to whether this interim policy appropriately

defines the criteria for determining whether a self-audit,

self-evaluation or disclosure is voluntary; whether the

interim policy adequately preserves the Agency’s authority

to assess a gravity penalty component in appropriate cases;

and whether, and according to what criteria, the Agency

should consider giving credit against the economic benefit

component of a penalty for state-of-the-art environmental

management systems.

B. Public Process

In May 1994, the Administrator asked the Office of

Enforcement and Compliance Assurance to determine

whether additional incentives are needed to encourage

voluntary disclosure and correction of violations uncovered

during environmental audits and self-evaluations.

In developing this interim policy, the Agency held

a major two-day public meeting in July 1994 announced in

the Federal Register on June 20, 1994 (59 FR 31914);

published a Restatement of Policies Related to

Environmental Auditing in the Federal Register on July

28, 1994 (59 FR 38455); considered over 80 written

comments submitted to the environmental auditing policy

docket; held a focus group meeting in San Francisco on

January 19, 1995 with key stakeholders from industry,

trade groups, State environmental commissions, State

attorneys yeneral offices, district attorneys’ offices,

environmental and public interest groups, and professional

environmental auditing groups; and held a public comment

session in San Francisco on January 20, 1995.

App-20

In addition to considering opinion from

stakeholders, EPA conducted its own analysis of relevant

facts. For example, the Agency considered EPA and other

Federal policies relating to environmental auditing, self-

disclosure, and correction, as well as incentives suggested

by State and local policies and legislation, and by

applications submitted for the ELP pilot program. The

Agency also considered relevant Surveys on auditing

practices and incentives.

oe Purpose

This interim policy is intended to promote

environmental compliance by providing greater certainty

as to EPA’s enforcement response to voluntary self-

evaluations, and voluntary disclosure and prompt

correction of violations. The policy further provides

guidance for States and local authorities in encouraging

this behavior among regulated entities.

Federal laws and regulations set minimum

Standards for protecting human health and achieving

environmental protection goals such as clean air and clean

water. EPA will continue to uphold these laws through

vigorous enforcement actions that appropriately penalize

violators. Penalties help ensure a level playing field by

ensuring that violators do not obtain an unfair economic

advantage over their competitors who made the necessary

investment in compliance. Penalties also promote

protection of the environment and public health by

encouraging adoption of pollution prevention and recycling

practices that limit exposure to liability for pollutant

discharges and deterring future violations by the violator

and others.

At the same time, the Agency recognizes that we

cannot achieve maximum compliance without the

cooperation of a regulated community willing to act

responsibly by detecting, disclosing, and correcting

violations. Already, regulated entities have many

compelling incenuves to implement environmental

management/auditing systems, as noted in EPA’s 1986

auditing policy. Indeed, recent surveys show that the vast

majority of large companies engage in environmental

auditing and/or have environmental management systems

in place. Nonetheless, EPA has concluded that the

additional incentives in this interim policy will further

promote the regulated community’s commitment to

adopting systems for maximizing compliance.

D. Principles for Voluntary Compliance

The interim policy that EPA is announcing today is

based on seven principles:

l. Self-policing by regulated entities can play a

crucial role in finding, fixing and preventing violations.

Fi Violations discovered through self-policing

should be disclosed and promptly corrected.

x Regulated entities that self-police and that

voluntarily disclose and_ self-correct violations in

accordance with this policy should be assessed penalties

that are consistently and predictably lower than penatties

for those who do not.

4. Regulated entities that self-police and

voluntarily disclose and self-correct violations in

accordance with this policy should also not be

recommended for criminal prosecution.

3 Providing predictable incentives for

voluntary disclosure and correction of violations identified

App-22

through self-policing offers a positive alternative to across-

the-board privileges and immunities that could be used to

Shield criminal misconduct, drive up litigation costs and

create an atmosphere of distrust between regulators,

industry and local communities.

6. EPA should not seek voluntary

environmental audit information to trigger an investigation

of a civil or criminal violation of environmental laws.

: A To preserve a level playing field, EPA

Should recover any economic benefit realized from

violations of environmental law.

E. Relationship to Emerging Standards

EPA also recognizes the development of and

growing reliance on international voluntary environmental

management standards in the U.S. and other countries.

These standards, if properly crafted and implemented, can

provide a powerful tool for organizations to improve their

overall compliance with environmental requirements and

move beyond compliance through innovative approaches

to pollution prevention. In addition to issuing this interim

policy, EPA will continue to pursue a dialogue with

interested parties and to pilot policy approaches through

programs such as the ELP to determine how EPA can

make use of and encourage these standards.

I. Interim Policy

A, Definitions

For purposes of this interim policy, the following

definitions apply:

App-23

"Environmental auditing" has the definition given to

it in EPA’s 1986 policy on environmental auditing, i.e. "a

systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by

regulated entities of facility operations and practices

related to meeting environmental requirements.”

"Environmental audit report" means all

documentation of information’ relating to an

environmental audit, but not including the factual

information underlying or testimonial evidence relating to

such information.

"Regulated entity" means any entity, including a

federal, state, and municipal facility, regulated under the

federal environmental laws that EPA administers.

"Self-evaluation" means an assessment, not

necessarily meeting all the criteria of a full environmental

audit, by a regulated entity of its compliance with one or

more environmental requirements.

"Voluntary" means not required by statute,

regulation, permit, order or agreement.

B. Conditions

The conditions for reducing civil penalties and not

making criminal referrals in accordance with Sections II.C.

and II.D. of this interim policy are as follows:

i Voluntary self-policing. The regulated entity

discovers a violation through a voluntary environmental

audit or voluntary self-evaluation appropriate to the size

and nature of the regulated entity; and

* Voluntary disclosure. The regulated entity

fully and voluntarily discloses the violation in writing to all

appropriate federal, state and local agencies as soon as it

is discovered (including a reasonable time to determine

that a violation exists), and prior to (1) the

App-24

commencement of a federal, state or local agency

inspection, investigation or information request; (2) notice

of a citizen suit; (3) legal complaint by a third party; or

(4) the regulated entity’s knowledge that the discovery of

the violation by a regulatory agency or third party was

imminent; and

a Prompt correction. The regulated entity

corrects the violation either within 60 days of discovering

the violation or, if more time is needed, as expeditiously

as practicable; and

4, Remediation of imminent and substantial

endangerment. The regulated entity expeditiously remedies

any condition that has created or may create an imminent

and substantial endangerment to human health or the

environment; and

3 Remediation of harm and prevention of repeat

violations. The regulated entity implements appropriate

measures to remedy any environmental harm due to the

violation and to prevent a recurrence of the violation: and

6. No lack of appropriate preventive measures.

The violation does not indicate that the regulated entity

has failed to take appropriate steps to avoid repeat or

recurring violations; and

vi Cooperation. The regulated entity

cooperates as required by EPA and provides such

information as is reasonably necessary and required by

EPA to determine applicability of this policy.

Cooperation may include providing all requested

documents and access to employees and assistance in any

further invesiigations into the violation.

Where appropriate, EPA may require that to Satisfy

any of these conditions, a regulated entity must enter into

a written agreement, administrative consent order or

judicial consent decree, particularly where compliance or

App-25

remedial measures are complex or a lengthy schedule for

attaining and maintaining compliance or remediating harm

is required.

G. Reduce Civil Penalties for Voluntarily Disclosed and

Promptly Corrected Violations

1. Incentive

Regulated entities will be eligible for the following

reductions in civil penalties:

a. EPA will eliminate all of the gravity

component of the penalty for violations by regulated

entities that meet conditions 1 through 7 outlined in

Section II.B., except for violations involving (i) criminal

conduct by the regulated entity or any of its employees, or

(ii) an imminent and substantial endangerment, or serious

actual harm, to human health or the environment.

b. EPA may mitigate up to 75% of the

unadjusted gravity component of the penalty, taking into

account any of the conditions 1-7 in Section II.B. that are

met, in the following cases:

(i) ‘cases in which most but not all of the

conditions in Section II.B. are met; or

(ii) cases involving an imminent and substantial

endangerment, but not serious actual harm, in which all

the conditions in Section II.B. are met; or

(iii) cases involving the disclosure of criminal

conduct in which all the conditions in Section II.B. are

met.

C. EPA will retain its full discretion to recover

any economic benefit gained as a result of noncompliance

to preserve a "level playing field" in which violators do not

gain a competitive advantage through noncompliance.

App-26

| | '

However, EPA may forgive the entire penalty for

violations which meet conditions 1 through 7 outlined in

Section II.B. and, in EPA’s discretion, do not merit any

penalty due to the insignificant amount of any economic

benefit.

ra Discussion

a. Providing a clear and significant reduction in

civil penalties for companies that assume responsibility for

finding, disclosing and correcting violations will create a

strong incentive for regulated entities to prevent or fix

violations before EPA expends enforcement resources.

The policy states clearly the conditions under which EPA

will forgive all or part of the gravity component of a

penalty for voluntary disclosure and correction:

b. The policy appropriately preserves the

concept of recovering economic benefit, except where it is

insignificant, as recommended by a broad spectrum of

commenters, including industry commenters;

c Retaining EPA’s discretion to collect the

gravity component of the penalty in appropriate cases,

such as where a violation involves criminal conduct, or

imminent and substantial endangerment, will help to deter

the most egregious environmental violations. At the same

time, by preserving flexibility to reduce the gravity element

by up to 75% for good faith efforts to disclose and

promptly comply even in those cases, the policy will retain

an appropriate compliance incentive.

D. Limit Criminal Referrals for Voluntary Disclosure and

Correction of Violations

i; Incentive

EPA will not recommend to the Department of

Justice that criminal charges be brought against a

regulated entity where EPA determines that conditions 1-7

in Section II.B. above for reduction of civil penalties are

met, and the violation does not demonstrate or involve (1)

a prevalent corporate management philosophy or practice

that concealed or condoned environmental violations; (2)

high-level corporate officials’ or managers’ conscious

involvement in or willful blindness to the violation; or (3)

serious actual harm to human health or the environment.

This policy does not apply to criminal acts of individual

managers or employees. Where EPA determines pursuant

to this Section that a criminal referral to the Department

of Justice is unwarranted, EPA may nonetheless proceed

with civil enforcement in accordance with Section II.C. of

this policy or other applicable enforcement response and

penalty policies.

2. Discussion

The policy will promote candid and thorough self-

policing by providing greater certainty as to how EPA will

exercise its criminal investigative discretion to encourage

voluntary disclosure and prompt correction by regulated

entities.

App-28

E. Eliminate Route Requests for Audit Reports in Pre-

Enforcement Proceedings

¥ Incentive

EPA will not request a voluntary environmental

audit report to trigger a civil or criminal investigation.

For example, EPA will not request an audit in routine

inspections. Once the Agency has reason to believe a

violation has been committed, EPA may seek through an

investigation or enforcement action any information

relevant to identifying violations or determining liability or

extent of harm.

Zz Discussion

a. This policy makes clear that EPA will not

routinely request audit reports. At the same time, the

policy in no way limits the right of regulated entities to

claim common law privileges (e.g., attorney-client and

work product) as appropriate. EPA believes that this

clarification, along with the other incentives in this interim

policy, should greatly reduce any perception that

environmental audits may be used unfairly in

environmental enforcement.

b. With respect to federal facilities, although

federal facility environmental audit reports may be

accessible to the public under the Freedom of Information

Act (FOIA) in certain circumstances, EPA cannot utilize

FOIA to request information from other federal agencies.

Thus, EPA will apply this policy on requests for audit

reports to federal (and state and municipal) facilities the

Same as it does for other regulated entities.

App-29

F. Applicability

This interim policy applies to violations under all of

the federal environmental statutes that EPA administers

and supersedes (unless otherwise noted) any conflicting or

inconsistent provisions in the media specific penalty or

enforcement response policies and EPA’s 1986

Environmental Auditing Policy Statement. Existing

enforcement policies will continue to apply in conjunction

with this interim policy, except where inconsistent with this

policy. In addition, where appropriate, EPA’s

Supplemental Environmental Project Policy may at EPA’s

discretion be applied in conjunction with this policy.

Ill. Favor These Incentives Over Broad Privileges and

Immunities

This interim policy offers a positive alternative to

across-the-board privileges and immunities that could be

used to shield criminal misconduct, drive up litigation

costs and create an atmosphere of distrust between

regulators, industry and local communities.

A. Discussion

l. Penalty immunity provisions for voluntary

disclosures of violations can give lawbreakers an economic

advantage over their law-abiding competitors. It makes

sense to give substantial penalty reductions for those who

come forward with their violations and promptly correct

them, but to maintain a level playing field, the federal and

state governments must be able to recoup the economic

benefit of violations.

App-30

2. A principal rationale for environmental audit

privileges and penalty immunities for voluntary disclosures

is to reduce the exposure of regulated entities and conduct

self-evaluations and act on the findings by immediately

correcting violations. EPA has addressed this concern with

the incentives for disclosure and correction outlined above.

a Privilege runs counter to efforts to open up

environmental decision making and encourage public

Participation in matters that affect people’s homes, work

places and communities.

4, An environmental audit privilege could be

misused to shield bad actors or to frustrate access to

crucial factual information.

8 Environmental audit privileges and penalty

immunities could encourage increased litigation as

opposing lawyers battle over what is privileged or immune

from penalties and what is not. Litigation over the scope

of the privileges and immunities could burden our already

taxed judicial system, drain government and private

resources, and in some cases prevent quick action to

address environmental emergencies.

6. The Supreme Court has noted, "privileges

are not lightly created nor expansively construed for they

are in derogation of the search for the truth." United

States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). Moreover, the

self-evaluation privilege has regularly and uniformly been

rejected by the courts in cases where documents were

sought by a governmental agency.

IV. Consequences for States

EPA recognizes that states are important partners

in federal enforcement, and that it is desirable to create a

climate in which states can be innovative. At the same

App-31

time, EPA is required to establish a certain minimum

consistency in federal enforcement, so that the sanctions

a business faces for violating federal law do not depend on

where the business is located.

Accordingly, to maintain national consistency:

A. EPA will scrutinize enforcement more

closely in states with audit privilege and/or penalty

immunity laws and may find it necessary to increase

federal enforcement where environmental self-evaluation

privileges or penalty immunities prevent a state from

obtaining:

1. information needed to establish criminal

liability;

2. facts needed to establish the nature and extent

of a violation;

3. appropriate penaities for imminent and

substantial endangerment or serious harm to human

health or the environment, or from recovering economic

benefit;

4. appropriate sanctions or penalties for criminal

conduct and repeat violations; or

5. prompt correction of violations, and expeditious

remediation of those that involve imminent and substantial

endangerment to human health or the environment.

B. EPA will bring to the state’s attention any

provisions of state audit privilege and/or penalty immunity

Statutes that raise any of the concerns outlined above, and

will work with the state to address those concerns and

ensure that federal requirements are satisfied.

V. Limitations on Applicability of This Policy

This interim policy sets forth internal guidelines

which amend EPA’s penalty polices in situations involving

App-32

| |

voluntary self-policing, disclosure and correction. In

conjunction with the applicable penalty policy, these

guidelines will aid EPA personnel in proposing

appropriate penalties or negotiating settlements in

administrative and judicial enforcement actions. The

interim policy also serves to structure the Agency’s

enforcement authority and states the Agency’s view as to

the proper allocation of its enforcement resources.

Deviations from these guidelines, where merited, are

authorized so long as the reasons for the deviations are

documented.

This interim policy is not final agency action, but is

intended solely as guidance. It is not intended, nor can it

be relied upon, to create any rights enforceable by any

party in litigation with the United States. EPA officials

may decide to follow the guidance provided in this interim

policy or to act at various with the guidance based on

analysis of case-specific facts and circumstances.

Application of this policy to the facts of any individual

case is at the sole discretion of EPA and is not subject to

review by any court. In addition, the policy has no effect

on the calculation of any cleanup costs, remedial costs,

nature resources damages or emergency response costs

associated with a violation. EPA reserves the right to

change this interim policy at any time without public

notice.

Dated: March 30, 1995.

Steven A. Herman,

Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance

Assurance.

[FR Doc. 95-8218 Filed 3-31-95; 8:45 a.m.]

BILLING CODE 6560-50-P

App-33

U.S. Department of Justice

United States Attorney

Western District of Kentucky

502/582-5911

FTS/352-5911

Bank of Louisville Building

510 West Broadway

Louisville, Kentucky 40202

August 25, 1992

Hon. Michael R. Gosnell

Attorney at Law

Suite 160

Legal Arts Building

200 South Seventh Street

Louisville, Kentucky 40202

Re: John Lawson, Spanish Cove Waste Water

Treatment Plant

Dear Mr. Gosnell:

This letter is to confirm our conversation of today’s date

and a meeting held in my office at which yourself, F.B.1.

Agent Wayne McAllister and I were present. Discussed

was a possible plea of guilty by Mr. Lawson to a

misdemeanor charge involving three unpermitted

discharges at the Spanish Cove Waste Water Treatment

App-34

Plant which occurred on December 30, 1991. The charges

would constitute violations of the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. $1319.

In return for a plea to a single misdemeanor charge, the

recommendation of the United States would be a sentence

at the lowest end of the applicable sentencing guideline

range and a two-level reduction for acceptance of

responsibility, should that be appropriate. A fine would

also be a part of our recommendation; however, we have

agreed to allow the amount of the fine to be

undetermined at the present time. To accomplish the goal

of setting an appropriate fine levei, I am enclosing a copy

of a United States Department of Justice Financial

Statement Form. I request that if this matter is to be

resolved by plea that the form be filled out and returned

to me.

In addition to the above conditions of a possible plea

agreement, we will request the following:

1. Clean up of the lagoon at Spanish Cove

within sixty days of entry of a plea:

ihe A redesign of the treatment plant with

approval by the Kentucky Division of Water:

S Establishment of a flow meter on the plant:

and

4, Requirement that a licensed operator be

responsible for the plant.

App-35

The above would be conditions of any probation or

supervised release imposed by the Court in the case.

Per your request, I will await a decision by Mr. Lawson on

the proposed agreement until close of business, Monday,

September 21, 1992. Unless the above is agreeable with

Mr. Lawson, this investigation will proceed subsequent to

that date with the possible presenting of felony charges to

the federal grand jury.

If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to

contact me.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH M. WHITTLE

United States Attorney

[S/

Randy Ream

Assistant U.S. Attorney

Enclosures

cc: S/A McAllister

App-36

I erates tes eee rence omnes

SU CS A PRE na re eee ae “ a

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