Appendix — Lawson v. United States
Supreme Court brief1997
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Nos. 94-6508/6509
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ...... Appellee
v.
SPANISH COVE SANITATION, INC.,
and FOND. LA Wa uk os hea tee eens Appellants
On Appeal From the United States District Court For
The Western District of Kentucky
CR 93-00015-01-L(F)
Before: NELSON and BOGGS, Circuit Judges, and
GILMORE, District Judge.
DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge. This is a
consolidated appeal from convictions and sentences in
criminal proceedings brought under the Federal Clean
Water Act. The defendants, Spanish Cove Sanitation, Inc.,
and its president and owner, John Lawson, were found to
have discharged pollutants from a sewage treatment plant
into the navigable waters of the United States in violation
of 33 U.S.C §$§1311(a) and 1319(c)(1)(A). On appeal,
both defendants argue (1) that they were impermissibly
singled out for prosecution; (2) that the trial court erred
by not allowing the introduction of evidence concerning
'The Honorable Horace W. Gilmore, United States
District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting
by designation.
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violations by other sewage treatment plants; (3) that the
federal government lacked authority to prosecute the
defendants criminally for violations of the Clean Water
Act; (4) that the trial court should have granted a mistrial
because of prejudicial statements made by a prosecution
witness; (5) that the government failed to prove that the
Stream into which the pollutants were discharged
constituted "navigable waters;" and (6) that the trial court
improperly found that the defendants’ motion for a new
trial was not timely filed. Spanish Cove also argues that
the trial court erred by imposing a fine which the company
cannot pay, while Mr. Lawson contends that the trial court
erred in its application of the sentencing guidelines.
We shall affirm both the conviction and the
sentence of Mr. Lawson and the conviction of Spanish
Cove. In light of the financial data contained in the
record that we recently received from the district court,
however, we are of the opinion that the fine imposed on
Spanish Cove was excessive. We shall therefore remand
the company’s case to the district court for
redetermination of the fine.
I
Spanish Cove owns and operates a small sewage
treatment plant in Jefferson County, Kentucky. Mr.
Lawson built the plant in the 1970s to serve a subdivision
he had developed. The plant treats wastewater -- through
aeration and chlorination, primarily -- and then discharges
the effluent into a watercourse known as Fern Creek.
The defendants were charged with twelve
misdemeanor and five felony violations of the Clean
Water Act. The misdemeanor counts alleged that the
defendants negligently discharged pollutants into Fern
Creek. These charges were based upon "discharge
App-2
ORE OL we FON AS IRE mS en
monitoring reports" that Spanish Cove was required to
prepare under the Act. An independent laboratory --
functioning under contract with Spanish Cove -- collected
samples of effluent discharged from the plant, tested the
effluent, completed the reports, and returned the reports
to Spanish Cove for signature and forwarding to the
Kentucky Department of Water. The reports showed that
on the dates named in the indictment Spanish Cove
exceeded permissible levels for certain pollutants.
The felony counts of the indictment charged the
defendants with knowing discharge of pollutants. Three of
the felony counts involved an incident in which Mr.
Lawson pumped water from a lagoon on the facility into
the creek despite written instructions from the county
health department not to do so. The water that was
discharged contained fecal coliform bacteria in excess of
the legal limits. The other two felony counts involved
subsequent inspections in which the defendants were also
found to have been discharging effluent containing
excessive amounts of fecal coliform bacteria. On one of
these occasions no chlorine tablets -- tablets that are
necessary to treat the wastewater -- could be found at the
plant.
A jury found the defendants guilty on all five of the
felony counts and nine of the twelve misdemeanor counts.
The verdicts were returned and filed on April 13, 1994,
and were entered on the district court’s docket the
following day. A motion for a new trial was denied as
untimely. Spanish Cove was sentenced to pay a fine of
$35,000 and was ordered to pay a special assessment of
$2,125. Mr. Lawson was ordered to pay a special
assessment of $475 and was sentenced to imprisonment for
a term of six months. Both defendants perfected timely
appeals. Because of the pendency of certain post-trial
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motions in the district court, however, the record was not
transmitted to our court until March 27, 1996.
II
The defendants first argue that the district court
should have dismissed the case on selective prosecution
grounds. A prima facie case of selective prosecution
requires a showing that (1) others who engaged in the
same conduct were not prosecuted, and (2) the
government singled out the defendant for prosecution
based upon "such impermissible considerations as race,
religion, or the desire to prevent the exercise of his
constitutional rights." United States v. Bustamante, 805
F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1986), quoting (with minor
changes) United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d
Cir. 1974). We must take special care in assessing a claim
of selective prosecution because such a claim "asks a court
to exercise judicial ‘power over a ‘special province’ of the
Executive." United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480,
1486 (1996), quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821
(1985). We review for "clear error," United States v.
Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 600 (6th Cir. 1990), bearing in
mind the Supreme Court’s admonition that "{t]he
presumption of regularity supports’ [] prosecutorial
decisions and ‘in the absence of clear evidence to the
contrary, courts presume [prosecutors] have properly
discharged their official duties." Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at
1486, quoting United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926).
To support their claim of selective prosecution, the
defendants rely primarily upon reports of a large number
of violations by the government-operated Louisville
Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD). The defendants point
out that MSD had 829 discharge monitoring report
App-4
violations between January 1989 and January 1993, but
was subjected only to civil, not criminal, enforcement
actions.
Although MSD did report numerous discharge
monitoring report violations at its 71 plants, there is
nothing to indicate that MSD engaged in the type of
willful violations upon which the felony charges against
Spanish Cove were predicated. Even if we were to
assume that the defendants were prosecuted for violations
of a type for which similar wrongdoers were not
prosecuted, moreover, there is absolutely no evidence that
the defendants were singled out based upon impermissible
motives.
The defendants also contend that the prosecution
was vindictive. They were prosecuted, the defendants
argue, because they refused to accept a government offer
allowing them to plead guilty to a single misdemeanor
charge. In "the ‘give and take’ of plea bargaining,”
however, there is no violation of the Due Process Clause
"so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the
prosecution’s offer." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
363 (1978). Here there is nothing to indicate that the
defendants were not completely free to accept the
government's offer. The claim of vindictive prosecution
must therefore fail as well.
Ill
At trial the defendants attempted to introduce
evidence of violations by other operators. The district
court refused to allow this evidence, believing it irrelevant
to the charges against the defendants. The defendants
argue on appeal that the evidence should have been
admitted as relevant to the standard of care. The
defendants did not make this argument below, however,
App-5
and they may not do so for the first time in this court.
IV
The defendants also argue that the State of
Kentucky has "primacy" to enforce the Clean Water Act,
and that federal prosecution violates both the Due Process
Clause and the intent of the Clean Water Act. The
defendants have cited no authority to support their
contention that the federal government is somehow
precluded from enforcing this federal statute, and we are
aware of no such authority.
Vv
At trial an inspector from the Jefferson County
Health Department, Michael Baugh, testified that he had
discovered unauthorized plastic pipes discharging waste
materials at the site. Mr. Baugh recounted that after
taking samples from the pipes, he had hurried to get away:
"I felt like I was, like here I was, I had
Stepped into something that I knew
obviously shouldn’t have been happening
and I was in the middle of a forested area
and I could just picture little, you know,
sounds going off and me being found in an
aeration tank."
The court immediately instructed the jury to disregard Mr.
Baugh’s comments. After Mr. Baugh completed his
testimony, the defense moved for a mistrial based upon
the alleged prejudicial effect of the statements. The court
denied the motion, noting that after the statement was
made “everybody was chuckling a little bit, and it was right
after he said something about [how he] thought your client
App-6
was a nice guy and so forth." In light of the trial judge’s
Opportunity to judge the manner in which the comments
were made and their effect on the jury, and given the
prompt curative instruction, we cannot say that the trial
court erred in not granting a mistrial.
VI
The defense also argues that the district court
should have dismissed the charges under Rule 29, Fed. R.
Crim. P., based upon insufficiency of the evidence. Most
significantly, in this regard, the defense argues that the
prosecution failed to demonstrate that Fern Creek
qualifies as "navigable waters.”
The Clean Water Act defines navigable waters as
"the waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas." 33 U.S.C. $1362(7). Regulations codified in the
Code of Federal Regulations and applied by the court in
United States v. Larkins, 852 F.2d 189, 190 n.1, n.3 (6th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1016 (1989), say that "the
waters of the United States" include:
"(a) All waters which are currently used,
were used in the past, or may be susceptible
to use in interstate or foreign commerce,
including all waters which are subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide;
(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes.
rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, and sandflats, ‘wetlands.’
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, play
App-7
lakes, or natural ponds the use, degradation,
or destruction of which would affect or
could affect interstate or foreign commerce
including any such waters;
(1) Which are or could be
used by interstate or foreign
travelers for recreational or
other purposes;
(2) From which fish or
shellfish are or could be taken
and sold in interstate or
foreign commerce; or
(3) Which are used or could
be used for industrial
purposes by industries in
interstate commerce;
(e) Tributaries of waters identified in
paragraphs (a) through (d) of this definition;
ow SU CIM: Gree
In United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504
F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974), this court surveyed the
~ legislative history of the Clean Water Act and concluded
that the term “navigable waters" should be given an
extremely broad construction. Congress, the court
explained, intended that the Act apply “to all water bodies,
including main streams and their tributaries.” /d. at 1325,
quoting comments of Congressman Dingell, relying upon
this broad definition, this court found that the Clean
App-8
Water Act applied where a pollutant had been discharged
into a non-navigable tributary of a non-navigable tributary
of a non-navigable tributary of a small navigable river. /d.
at 1320. See also /nternational Paper Co. v. Quellette, 479
U.S. 481, 486 n.6 (1987) (noting that the term "has been
construed expansively to cover waters that are not
navigable in the traditional sense"); National Wildlife Fed.
v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 589 (6th Cir. 1988)
(recognizing that it was "Congress’s intent...that the term
‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible
constitutional interpretation").
In the case at bar the prosecution presented
evidence that Fern Creek waters "would migrate to the
Ohio River." There is no dispute that the Ohio River is
used in an interstate commerce. Accordingly, we believe
there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury
could have found that the defendants discharged pollutants
into "navigable waters."
VII
The district court denied the defendants’ motion for
a new trial as not having been filed within the time
prescribed by Rule 33, Fed. R. Crim. P. The rule provides
that such a motion, where not based on newly discovered
evidence, "shall be made within 7 days after verdict..."
The defendants argue that the district court erred by
counting the time from the date on which the jury
returned its verdict, rather than the date on which the
verdict was entered in the docket. But the date of entry
is not the date of the verdict. The time runs from the
date on which the jury returns its verdict, not the date on
which the clerk enters the verdict in the docket. See
United States v. DeRocco, 320 F. 2d 58, 59 (6th Cir. 1963).
App-9
VII
Mr. Lawson argues that his sentencing guidelines
offense level should have been reduced for acceptance of
responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3E1.1. At trial,
however, Mr. Lawson denied the factual elements of guilt.
He contended, for example, that the samples upon which
the misdemeanor counts were predicated had not been
taken from the proper location and had not been properly
tested. At no point in the proceedings did he admit that
he had engaged in the conduct with which he was charged.
The district court was therefore within its discretion in not
adjusting the offense level downward for acceptance of
responsibility.
IX
Nor do we find error in the district court’s decision
to adjust Mr. Lawson’s offense level upward on the ground
that the violation "involved a discharge without a permit
or in violation of a permit." Mr. Lawson argues that even
though the discharges exceeded permissible levels, they
were not in violation of the permit because the permit
merely required that he keep records and monitor
pollutant levels in the effluent. Be that as it may, Mr.
Lawson admitted on the stand that he had discharged
pollutants from four points of discharge when he only had
a permit for one. This certainly constitutes a discharge
without a permit.
X
Spanish Cove argues that the district court erred in
imposing a fine which the company does not have the
ability to pay. U.S.S.G. §8C3.3(b) allows a court to
impose a fine in an amount less than otherwise would be
required where "the court finds that the organization is not
App- 10
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able, and even with the use of a reasonable installment
schedule, is not likely to become able to pay the minimum
fine." For the purposes of the guidelines, an organization
is not able to pay the minimum fine, where, even with an
installment schedule, "the payment of that fine would
substantially jeopardize the continued existence of the
organization." U.S.S.G. §8C3.3, Application Note 1.
In this case the court imposed a fine of $35,000 on
Spanish Cove after making a specific finding that the
company had the ability to pay a fine in that amount.
Spanish Cove filed a motion for reconsideration, and the
district court stayed payment of the fine pending appeal.
There is persuasive evidence that Spanish Cove
cannot pay a $35,000 fine -- at least not in one installment.
The company’s latest balance sheet reflects virtually no
liquid assets, and the record indicates that virtually all
corporate income (roughly $2,050 per month) is used to
cover expenses. The company’s federal tax returns
indicate that prior to utilizing a net operating loss
deduction Spanish Cove had net income of only $2,243.53
in 1993, $23,988 in 1992’, a loss of $12,496 in 1991, a loss
of $8,122 in 1990, and a loss of $7,207 in 1989. The
company’s financial situation looks a little better when we
consider that a portion of its deductions from income --
$6,635 in 1993, $6,197 in 1992, $8,552 in 1991, $8,552 in
1990, and $8,552 in 1989 -- constituted depreciation for
plant and plant equipment. Presumably the capital
investments in question were made in prior years, and thus
Spanish Cove’s taxable income is not entirely indicative of
) * . . .
‘This was largely due to income realized from
forgiveness of a $20,840 debt.
App-11
its ability to pay. Even if these sums were treated as part
of Spanish Cove’s annual income, however, it would not
appear that the corporation could manage a single $35,000
payment.
A review of the company’s balance sheets supports
this conclusion. The most recent balance sheet (1994)
shows assets of $60,844 and labilities of $177,853. (Of the
liabilities, $147,353 represents loans from "John Lawson
Realty Co., Inc.") The assets consist almost entirely of the
sewer plant, the equipment necessary to run the plant, and
the land on which the plant sits.
The financial records thus demonstrate that the
corporation barely receives enough funds each year to
keep the sewer plant in operation, and that the
corporation has no assets other than those necessary to
operate the facility. This assessment of the financial
health of Spanish Cove is supported by a determination of
the United States trustee in Mr. Lawson’s personal
bankruptcy proceeding. The trustee formally abandoned
"[a]ny interest the estate may have in Spanish Cove
Sanitation, Inc....because it appears...that Spanish Cove []
is insolvent and of no value to the estate." The
abandonment was approved by the bankruptcy judge.
The district court’s determination that Spanish
Cove is able to pay a $35,000 fine in a single payment was
clearly erroneous, in-our view. The fine against Spanish
Cove is therefore VACATED, the Spanish Cove judgment
is AFFIRMED in all other respects, and the case appealed
to us as No. 94-6508 is REMANDED for redetermination
of the fine. The judgment entered against Mr. Lawson in
the case appealed to us as No. 94-6509 is AFFIRMED.
App-12
Case Nos.: 94-6508 & 94-6509
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
ORDER
FILED
AUG 20 1996
LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
SPANISH COVE SANITATION, INC.;
JOHN LAWSON
Defendants - Appellants
BEFORE: NELSON and BOGGS, Circuit Judges, and
GILMORE, District Judge.*
Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing
filed by the appellants,
It is ORDERED that the petition for rehearing be,
and it hereby is, DENIED.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
App-13
[Signed by Leonard Green]
Leonard Green, Clerk
*The Honorable Horace W. Gilmore, United
States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Michigan, sitting by designation.
App-1!4
33 U.S.C, § 1319(c)(1)(A)
33. U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A)
§ 1319. Enforcement
(c) Criminal Penalties
(1) Negligent violations
Any person who -
(A) negligently violates section 1311, 1312, 1316,
1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345 of this title,
or any permit condition or limitation implementing
any of such sections in a permit issued under
section 1342 of this title by the Administrator or by
a State, or any requirement imposed in a
pretreatment program” approved under section
1342(a)(3) or (b)(8) of this title or in a permit
issued under section 1344 of this title by the
Secretary of the Army or by a State; or
shall be punished by a fine of not less that $2,500 nor
more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by
imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or by both. Ifa
conviction of a person is for a violation committed after a
first conviction of such person under this paragraph,
punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $50,000
per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than
2 years, or by both.
(2) Knowing violations
Any person who -
(A) knowing violates section 1311, 1312, 1316,
App-15
1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345 of this title, or any
permit condition or limitation implementing any of such
sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title
by the Administrator or by a State, or any requirement
imposed in a pretreatment program approved under
section 1342(a)(3) or (b)(8) of this title or in a permit
issued under section 1344 of this title by the Secretary of
the Army or by a State; or
shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor
more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by
imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or by both. Ifa
conviction of a person is for a violation committed after a
first conviction of such person under this paragraph,
punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $100,000
per day of violation, or by imprisonment of not more than
6 years, or by both.
(B) Any person who knowingly makes any false
Statement, representation or certification in any
application, record, report, plan, or other document filed
or required to be maintained under this chapter or who
falsifies, tampers with, or knowingly renders inaccurate any
monitoring device or method required to be maintained
under this chapter, shall upon conviction, be punished by
a fine of not more than $10,000, or by imprisonment for
not more than six months, or by both.
(C) For the purposes of this subsection, the term
"person" shall mean, in addition to the definition contained
in section 1362(5) of this title, any responsible corporate
officer.
[FRL-5184-4]
Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure
Interim Policy Statement
AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Interim policy statement and request for
comment.
SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) announces and requests comment on an interim
policy to provide incentives for regulated entities that
conduct voluntary compliance evaluations and also disclose
and correct violations. These incentives include
eliminating or substantially reducing the = gravity
component of civil penalties and not referring cases for
criminal prosecution where specified conditions are met.
The policy also states that EPA will not request voluntary
audit reports to trigger enforcement investigations. This
interim policy was developed in close consultation with
EPA’s regional offices and the Department of Justice, and
will be applied uniformly by the Agency’s enforcement
programs.
DATES: This interim policy statement is effective as
interim guidance 15 days after publication, in order to give
the Agency time to coordinate implementation of the
policy throughout EPA Headquarters and the Regions.
EPA urges interested parties to comment on this interim
policy in writing. Comments must be received by EPA at
the address below by June 2, 1995.
ADDRESSES: Submit three copies of comments to the
U.S. EPA Air Docket, Mail Code 6102, 401 M. Street.
SW, Washington, DC 20460, attention: Docket #C-94-01
App-17
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Additional
documentation relating to the development of this interim
policy is contained in the environmental auditing public
docket. Documents from the docket may be requested by
calling (202) 260-7548, requesting an index to docket #C-
94-01, and faxing document requests to (202) 260-4400.
Hours of operation are 8 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except legal holidays. Additional contacts
are Geoff Garver or Brian Riedel, at (202) 564-4187.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
A. Introduction
One of the Environmental Protection Agency’s
most important responsibilities is obtaining compliance
with federal laws that protect public health and safeguard
the environment. That goal can be achieved only with the
voluntary cooperation of thousands of businesses and
other regulated entities subject to these requirements.
Today, EPA is announcing incentives for those who take
responsibility for voluntarily evaluating, disclosing and
correcting violations. These incentives, developed after
nine months of public meetings and empirical analysis, are
set forth in detail below and take effect in 15 days. At the
same time, EPA expects to continue a dialogue with
stakeholders and consider further refinements to this
interim policy. The incentives that EPA is offering fall
into three distinct categories.
First, the Agency will completely eliminate gravity-
based (or "punitive") penalties for companies or public
agencies that voluntarily identify, disclose and correct
App-18
ee ol Pee ee ee ee, a es ee
violations according to the conditions outlined in this
policy. EPA will also reduce punitive penalties by up to
75% for companies that meet most, but not all, of these
conditions. Second, EPA will not recommend to the
Department of Justice that criminal charges be brought
against a company acting in good faith to identify, disclose,
and correct violations, so long as no serious actual harm
has occurred. Finally, the Agency will not request
voluntary environmental audits to trigger enforcement
investigations.
The incentives offered in this policy have been
structured above all to protect human health and the
environment. For example, even where the conditions for
mitigated enforcement were met, EPA will reserve the
right to collect full civil penalties for criminal conduct,
violations that present an imminent and substantial
endangerment or result in serious actual harm, or repeat
violations. Sources will not be allowed to gain an
economic advantage over their competitors by delaying
their investment in compliance. Nor will EPA hesitate to
bring a criminal action against individuals responsible for
criminal conduct.
EPA is considering additional incentives for
voluntary compliance beyond the benefits offered in the
policy today. On April 7, 1995, the Agency will announce
12 Environmental Leadership Program (ELP) pilot
projects with companies and public agencies to test criteria
for auditing and certification of voluntary compliance
programs. If successful, standards developed through
Environmental Leadership could lead to reduced
inspections and public recognition for companies or
agencies with state-of-the-art compliance programs. In
keeping with the President’s announcement on March 16,
1995, EPA also will shortly be announcing additional
App-19
compliance incentives for small businesses.
-The Agency is especially interested in comments
relating to whether this interim policy appropriately
defines the criteria for determining whether a self-audit,
self-evaluation or disclosure is voluntary; whether the
interim policy adequately preserves the Agency’s authority
to assess a gravity penalty component in appropriate cases;
and whether, and according to what criteria, the Agency
should consider giving credit against the economic benefit
component of a penalty for state-of-the-art environmental
management systems.
B. Public Process
In May 1994, the Administrator asked the Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance to determine
whether additional incentives are needed to encourage
voluntary disclosure and correction of violations uncovered
during environmental audits and self-evaluations.
In developing this interim policy, the Agency held
a major two-day public meeting in July 1994 announced in
the Federal Register on June 20, 1994 (59 FR 31914);
published a Restatement of Policies Related to
Environmental Auditing in the Federal Register on July
28, 1994 (59 FR 38455); considered over 80 written
comments submitted to the environmental auditing policy
docket; held a focus group meeting in San Francisco on
January 19, 1995 with key stakeholders from industry,
trade groups, State environmental commissions, State
attorneys yeneral offices, district attorneys’ offices,
environmental and public interest groups, and professional
environmental auditing groups; and held a public comment
session in San Francisco on January 20, 1995.
App-20
In addition to considering opinion from
stakeholders, EPA conducted its own analysis of relevant
facts. For example, the Agency considered EPA and other
Federal policies relating to environmental auditing, self-
disclosure, and correction, as well as incentives suggested
by State and local policies and legislation, and by
applications submitted for the ELP pilot program. The
Agency also considered relevant Surveys on auditing
practices and incentives.
oe Purpose
This interim policy is intended to promote
environmental compliance by providing greater certainty
as to EPA’s enforcement response to voluntary self-
evaluations, and voluntary disclosure and prompt
correction of violations. The policy further provides
guidance for States and local authorities in encouraging
this behavior among regulated entities.
Federal laws and regulations set minimum
Standards for protecting human health and achieving
environmental protection goals such as clean air and clean
water. EPA will continue to uphold these laws through
vigorous enforcement actions that appropriately penalize
violators. Penalties help ensure a level playing field by
ensuring that violators do not obtain an unfair economic
advantage over their competitors who made the necessary
investment in compliance. Penalties also promote
protection of the environment and public health by
encouraging adoption of pollution prevention and recycling
practices that limit exposure to liability for pollutant
discharges and deterring future violations by the violator
and others.
At the same time, the Agency recognizes that we
cannot achieve maximum compliance without the
cooperation of a regulated community willing to act
responsibly by detecting, disclosing, and correcting
violations. Already, regulated entities have many
compelling incenuves to implement environmental
management/auditing systems, as noted in EPA’s 1986
auditing policy. Indeed, recent surveys show that the vast
majority of large companies engage in environmental
auditing and/or have environmental management systems
in place. Nonetheless, EPA has concluded that the
additional incentives in this interim policy will further
promote the regulated community’s commitment to
adopting systems for maximizing compliance.
D. Principles for Voluntary Compliance
The interim policy that EPA is announcing today is
based on seven principles:
l. Self-policing by regulated entities can play a
crucial role in finding, fixing and preventing violations.
Fi Violations discovered through self-policing
should be disclosed and promptly corrected.
x Regulated entities that self-police and that
voluntarily disclose and_ self-correct violations in
accordance with this policy should be assessed penalties
that are consistently and predictably lower than penatties
for those who do not.
4. Regulated entities that self-police and
voluntarily disclose and self-correct violations in
accordance with this policy should also not be
recommended for criminal prosecution.
3 Providing predictable incentives for
voluntary disclosure and correction of violations identified
App-22
through self-policing offers a positive alternative to across-
the-board privileges and immunities that could be used to
Shield criminal misconduct, drive up litigation costs and
create an atmosphere of distrust between regulators,
industry and local communities.
6. EPA should not seek voluntary
environmental audit information to trigger an investigation
of a civil or criminal violation of environmental laws.
: A To preserve a level playing field, EPA
Should recover any economic benefit realized from
violations of environmental law.
E. Relationship to Emerging Standards
EPA also recognizes the development of and
growing reliance on international voluntary environmental
management standards in the U.S. and other countries.
These standards, if properly crafted and implemented, can
provide a powerful tool for organizations to improve their
overall compliance with environmental requirements and
move beyond compliance through innovative approaches
to pollution prevention. In addition to issuing this interim
policy, EPA will continue to pursue a dialogue with
interested parties and to pilot policy approaches through
programs such as the ELP to determine how EPA can
make use of and encourage these standards.
I. Interim Policy
A, Definitions
For purposes of this interim policy, the following
definitions apply:
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"Environmental auditing" has the definition given to
it in EPA’s 1986 policy on environmental auditing, i.e. "a
systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by
regulated entities of facility operations and practices
related to meeting environmental requirements.”
"Environmental audit report" means all
documentation of information’ relating to an
environmental audit, but not including the factual
information underlying or testimonial evidence relating to
such information.
"Regulated entity" means any entity, including a
federal, state, and municipal facility, regulated under the
federal environmental laws that EPA administers.
"Self-evaluation" means an assessment, not
necessarily meeting all the criteria of a full environmental
audit, by a regulated entity of its compliance with one or
more environmental requirements.
"Voluntary" means not required by statute,
regulation, permit, order or agreement.
B. Conditions
The conditions for reducing civil penalties and not
making criminal referrals in accordance with Sections II.C.
and II.D. of this interim policy are as follows:
i Voluntary self-policing. The regulated entity
discovers a violation through a voluntary environmental
audit or voluntary self-evaluation appropriate to the size
and nature of the regulated entity; and
* Voluntary disclosure. The regulated entity
fully and voluntarily discloses the violation in writing to all
appropriate federal, state and local agencies as soon as it
is discovered (including a reasonable time to determine
that a violation exists), and prior to (1) the
App-24
commencement of a federal, state or local agency
inspection, investigation or information request; (2) notice
of a citizen suit; (3) legal complaint by a third party; or
(4) the regulated entity’s knowledge that the discovery of
the violation by a regulatory agency or third party was
imminent; and
a Prompt correction. The regulated entity
corrects the violation either within 60 days of discovering
the violation or, if more time is needed, as expeditiously
as practicable; and
4, Remediation of imminent and substantial
endangerment. The regulated entity expeditiously remedies
any condition that has created or may create an imminent
and substantial endangerment to human health or the
environment; and
3 Remediation of harm and prevention of repeat
violations. The regulated entity implements appropriate
measures to remedy any environmental harm due to the
violation and to prevent a recurrence of the violation: and
6. No lack of appropriate preventive measures.
The violation does not indicate that the regulated entity
has failed to take appropriate steps to avoid repeat or
recurring violations; and
vi Cooperation. The regulated entity
cooperates as required by EPA and provides such
information as is reasonably necessary and required by
EPA to determine applicability of this policy.
Cooperation may include providing all requested
documents and access to employees and assistance in any
further invesiigations into the violation.
Where appropriate, EPA may require that to Satisfy
any of these conditions, a regulated entity must enter into
a written agreement, administrative consent order or
judicial consent decree, particularly where compliance or
App-25
remedial measures are complex or a lengthy schedule for
attaining and maintaining compliance or remediating harm
is required.
G. Reduce Civil Penalties for Voluntarily Disclosed and
Promptly Corrected Violations
1. Incentive
Regulated entities will be eligible for the following
reductions in civil penalties:
a. EPA will eliminate all of the gravity
component of the penalty for violations by regulated
entities that meet conditions 1 through 7 outlined in
Section II.B., except for violations involving (i) criminal
conduct by the regulated entity or any of its employees, or
(ii) an imminent and substantial endangerment, or serious
actual harm, to human health or the environment.
b. EPA may mitigate up to 75% of the
unadjusted gravity component of the penalty, taking into
account any of the conditions 1-7 in Section II.B. that are
met, in the following cases:
(i) ‘cases in which most but not all of the
conditions in Section II.B. are met; or
(ii) cases involving an imminent and substantial
endangerment, but not serious actual harm, in which all
the conditions in Section II.B. are met; or
(iii) cases involving the disclosure of criminal
conduct in which all the conditions in Section II.B. are
met.
C. EPA will retain its full discretion to recover
any economic benefit gained as a result of noncompliance
to preserve a "level playing field" in which violators do not
gain a competitive advantage through noncompliance.
App-26
| | '
However, EPA may forgive the entire penalty for
violations which meet conditions 1 through 7 outlined in
Section II.B. and, in EPA’s discretion, do not merit any
penalty due to the insignificant amount of any economic
benefit.
ra Discussion
a. Providing a clear and significant reduction in
civil penalties for companies that assume responsibility for
finding, disclosing and correcting violations will create a
strong incentive for regulated entities to prevent or fix
violations before EPA expends enforcement resources.
The policy states clearly the conditions under which EPA
will forgive all or part of the gravity component of a
penalty for voluntary disclosure and correction:
b. The policy appropriately preserves the
concept of recovering economic benefit, except where it is
insignificant, as recommended by a broad spectrum of
commenters, including industry commenters;
c Retaining EPA’s discretion to collect the
gravity component of the penalty in appropriate cases,
such as where a violation involves criminal conduct, or
imminent and substantial endangerment, will help to deter
the most egregious environmental violations. At the same
time, by preserving flexibility to reduce the gravity element
by up to 75% for good faith efforts to disclose and
promptly comply even in those cases, the policy will retain
an appropriate compliance incentive.
D. Limit Criminal Referrals for Voluntary Disclosure and
Correction of Violations
i; Incentive
EPA will not recommend to the Department of
Justice that criminal charges be brought against a
regulated entity where EPA determines that conditions 1-7
in Section II.B. above for reduction of civil penalties are
met, and the violation does not demonstrate or involve (1)
a prevalent corporate management philosophy or practice
that concealed or condoned environmental violations; (2)
high-level corporate officials’ or managers’ conscious
involvement in or willful blindness to the violation; or (3)
serious actual harm to human health or the environment.
This policy does not apply to criminal acts of individual
managers or employees. Where EPA determines pursuant
to this Section that a criminal referral to the Department
of Justice is unwarranted, EPA may nonetheless proceed
with civil enforcement in accordance with Section II.C. of
this policy or other applicable enforcement response and
penalty policies.
2. Discussion
The policy will promote candid and thorough self-
policing by providing greater certainty as to how EPA will
exercise its criminal investigative discretion to encourage
voluntary disclosure and prompt correction by regulated
entities.
App-28
E. Eliminate Route Requests for Audit Reports in Pre-
Enforcement Proceedings
¥ Incentive
EPA will not request a voluntary environmental
audit report to trigger a civil or criminal investigation.
For example, EPA will not request an audit in routine
inspections. Once the Agency has reason to believe a
violation has been committed, EPA may seek through an
investigation or enforcement action any information
relevant to identifying violations or determining liability or
extent of harm.
Zz Discussion
a. This policy makes clear that EPA will not
routinely request audit reports. At the same time, the
policy in no way limits the right of regulated entities to
claim common law privileges (e.g., attorney-client and
work product) as appropriate. EPA believes that this
clarification, along with the other incentives in this interim
policy, should greatly reduce any perception that
environmental audits may be used unfairly in
environmental enforcement.
b. With respect to federal facilities, although
federal facility environmental audit reports may be
accessible to the public under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) in certain circumstances, EPA cannot utilize
FOIA to request information from other federal agencies.
Thus, EPA will apply this policy on requests for audit
reports to federal (and state and municipal) facilities the
Same as it does for other regulated entities.
App-29
F. Applicability
This interim policy applies to violations under all of
the federal environmental statutes that EPA administers
and supersedes (unless otherwise noted) any conflicting or
inconsistent provisions in the media specific penalty or
enforcement response policies and EPA’s 1986
Environmental Auditing Policy Statement. Existing
enforcement policies will continue to apply in conjunction
with this interim policy, except where inconsistent with this
policy. In addition, where appropriate, EPA’s
Supplemental Environmental Project Policy may at EPA’s
discretion be applied in conjunction with this policy.
Ill. Favor These Incentives Over Broad Privileges and
Immunities
This interim policy offers a positive alternative to
across-the-board privileges and immunities that could be
used to shield criminal misconduct, drive up litigation
costs and create an atmosphere of distrust between
regulators, industry and local communities.
A. Discussion
l. Penalty immunity provisions for voluntary
disclosures of violations can give lawbreakers an economic
advantage over their law-abiding competitors. It makes
sense to give substantial penalty reductions for those who
come forward with their violations and promptly correct
them, but to maintain a level playing field, the federal and
state governments must be able to recoup the economic
benefit of violations.
App-30
2. A principal rationale for environmental audit
privileges and penalty immunities for voluntary disclosures
is to reduce the exposure of regulated entities and conduct
self-evaluations and act on the findings by immediately
correcting violations. EPA has addressed this concern with
the incentives for disclosure and correction outlined above.
a Privilege runs counter to efforts to open up
environmental decision making and encourage public
Participation in matters that affect people’s homes, work
places and communities.
4, An environmental audit privilege could be
misused to shield bad actors or to frustrate access to
crucial factual information.
8 Environmental audit privileges and penalty
immunities could encourage increased litigation as
opposing lawyers battle over what is privileged or immune
from penalties and what is not. Litigation over the scope
of the privileges and immunities could burden our already
taxed judicial system, drain government and private
resources, and in some cases prevent quick action to
address environmental emergencies.
6. The Supreme Court has noted, "privileges
are not lightly created nor expansively construed for they
are in derogation of the search for the truth." United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). Moreover, the
self-evaluation privilege has regularly and uniformly been
rejected by the courts in cases where documents were
sought by a governmental agency.
IV. Consequences for States
EPA recognizes that states are important partners
in federal enforcement, and that it is desirable to create a
climate in which states can be innovative. At the same
App-31
time, EPA is required to establish a certain minimum
consistency in federal enforcement, so that the sanctions
a business faces for violating federal law do not depend on
where the business is located.
Accordingly, to maintain national consistency:
A. EPA will scrutinize enforcement more
closely in states with audit privilege and/or penalty
immunity laws and may find it necessary to increase
federal enforcement where environmental self-evaluation
privileges or penalty immunities prevent a state from
obtaining:
1. information needed to establish criminal
liability;
2. facts needed to establish the nature and extent
of a violation;
3. appropriate penaities for imminent and
substantial endangerment or serious harm to human
health or the environment, or from recovering economic
benefit;
4. appropriate sanctions or penalties for criminal
conduct and repeat violations; or
5. prompt correction of violations, and expeditious
remediation of those that involve imminent and substantial
endangerment to human health or the environment.
B. EPA will bring to the state’s attention any
provisions of state audit privilege and/or penalty immunity
Statutes that raise any of the concerns outlined above, and
will work with the state to address those concerns and
ensure that federal requirements are satisfied.
V. Limitations on Applicability of This Policy
This interim policy sets forth internal guidelines
which amend EPA’s penalty polices in situations involving
App-32
| |
voluntary self-policing, disclosure and correction. In
conjunction with the applicable penalty policy, these
guidelines will aid EPA personnel in proposing
appropriate penalties or negotiating settlements in
administrative and judicial enforcement actions. The
interim policy also serves to structure the Agency’s
enforcement authority and states the Agency’s view as to
the proper allocation of its enforcement resources.
Deviations from these guidelines, where merited, are
authorized so long as the reasons for the deviations are
documented.
This interim policy is not final agency action, but is
intended solely as guidance. It is not intended, nor can it
be relied upon, to create any rights enforceable by any
party in litigation with the United States. EPA officials
may decide to follow the guidance provided in this interim
policy or to act at various with the guidance based on
analysis of case-specific facts and circumstances.
Application of this policy to the facts of any individual
case is at the sole discretion of EPA and is not subject to
review by any court. In addition, the policy has no effect
on the calculation of any cleanup costs, remedial costs,
nature resources damages or emergency response costs
associated with a violation. EPA reserves the right to
change this interim policy at any time without public
notice.
Dated: March 30, 1995.
Steven A. Herman,
Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance.
[FR Doc. 95-8218 Filed 3-31-95; 8:45 a.m.]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
App-33
U.S. Department of Justice
United States Attorney
Western District of Kentucky
502/582-5911
FTS/352-5911
Bank of Louisville Building
510 West Broadway
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
August 25, 1992
Hon. Michael R. Gosnell
Attorney at Law
Suite 160
Legal Arts Building
200 South Seventh Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Re: John Lawson, Spanish Cove Waste Water
Treatment Plant
Dear Mr. Gosnell:
This letter is to confirm our conversation of today’s date
and a meeting held in my office at which yourself, F.B.1.
Agent Wayne McAllister and I were present. Discussed
was a possible plea of guilty by Mr. Lawson to a
misdemeanor charge involving three unpermitted
discharges at the Spanish Cove Waste Water Treatment
App-34
Plant which occurred on December 30, 1991. The charges
would constitute violations of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. $1319.
In return for a plea to a single misdemeanor charge, the
recommendation of the United States would be a sentence
at the lowest end of the applicable sentencing guideline
range and a two-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility, should that be appropriate. A fine would
also be a part of our recommendation; however, we have
agreed to allow the amount of the fine to be
undetermined at the present time. To accomplish the goal
of setting an appropriate fine levei, I am enclosing a copy
of a United States Department of Justice Financial
Statement Form. I request that if this matter is to be
resolved by plea that the form be filled out and returned
to me.
In addition to the above conditions of a possible plea
agreement, we will request the following:
1. Clean up of the lagoon at Spanish Cove
within sixty days of entry of a plea:
ihe A redesign of the treatment plant with
approval by the Kentucky Division of Water:
S Establishment of a flow meter on the plant:
and
4, Requirement that a licensed operator be
responsible for the plant.
App-35
The above would be conditions of any probation or
supervised release imposed by the Court in the case.
Per your request, I will await a decision by Mr. Lawson on
the proposed agreement until close of business, Monday,
September 21, 1992. Unless the above is agreeable with
Mr. Lawson, this investigation will proceed subsequent to
that date with the possible presenting of felony charges to
the federal grand jury.
If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to
contact me.
Sincerely,
JOSEPH M. WHITTLE
United States Attorney
[S/
Randy Ream
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Enclosures
cc: S/A McAllister
App-36
I erates tes eee rence omnes
SU CS A PRE na re eee ae “ a
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