Appendix — BIC Corp. v. Carney

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-3163.

ROBERT CARNEY; SHEILA CARNEY, *

Appellees, * Appeal From The

v. * United States

* District Court For

BIC CORPORATION, * The Eastern District

Appellant. * Of Missouri

*

Submitted: April 10, 1996

Decided: July 8, 1996.

Before McMILLIAN and FAGG, Circuit Judges, and BURNS,”

District Judge.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

BIC Corporation (BIC) appeals from a final order entered in

the United States District Court! for the Eastern District of

Missouri remanding to Missouri state court for want of federal

jurisdiction the products liability action brought by Robert Carney

and Sheila Carney, husband and wife (collectively plaintiffs)

against BIC. Carney v. BIC Corp., No. 4:95CV417-DJS

(E.D.Mo. July 14, 1995) (Order). For reversal, BIC argues that

the district court erred in holding that it lacked removal

jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs’ action after th: stipulated

“The Honorable James M. Burns, United States District Judge for the

District of Oregon, sitting by designation.

'The Honorable Donald J. Stohr, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

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dismissal of defendant Clifford Massie, d/b/a Massie One Stop

(Massie), pursuant to Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.762. For the reasons

discussed below, we dismiss the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(d) for lack of jurisdiction.

I. Background

The underlying facts are not in dispute. Plaintiffs’ two-year-old

son died on January 30, 1992, because of injuries sustained while

attempting to use a butane lighter manufactured by BIC. On July

28, 1994, plaintiffs filed the present wrongful death and personal

injury action in the Circuit Court of the city of St. Louis against

BIC and Massie, a commercial retailer who had sold the lighter

to plaintiffs. BIC is incorporated in New York and has its

principal place of business in Connecticut. At the time the

present action was commenced, however, plaintiffs and Massie

were residents of the State of Missouri. Therefore, diversity of

citizenship did not exist between the parties when plaintiffs filed

their complaint against BIC and Massie.

On January 11, 1995, Massie filed a motion seeking dismissal

from plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.762

(1987).* As required by § 537.762(3), Massie’s motion to

?Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.762 provides as follows: 537.762. Motion to

dismiss, defendant whose liability is as seller in stream of commerce,

requirements, procedure—order of dismissal.

1. A defendant whose liability is based solely on his status as a

seller in the stream of commerce may be dismissed from a products

liability claim as provided in this section.

2. This section shall apply to any products liability claim in which

another defendant, including the manufacturer, is properly before the

court and from whom total recovery may be had for plaintiffs’ claim.

3. A defendant may move for dismissal under this section within

the time for filing an answer or other responsive pleading unless

permitted by the court at later time shown.

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dismiss was accompanied by an affidavit stating that he was aware

of no facts or circumstances supporting his liability other than his

status as a seller in the stream of commerce. On February 23,

1995, plaintiffs and Massie entered into a stipulation of dismissal,

which provided that Massie “shall remain a party to this action

only for the purposes of venue and jurisdiction as provided in ...

§ 537.762(6) (1987).” App. 71.

On March 3, 1995, BIC removed the present case to the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,

alleging that the stipulated dismissal of Massie had created

diversity of citizenship between the parties. Upon motion by

plaintiffs, the district court entered an order remanding the case

4. The parties shall have sixty days in which to conduct discovery

on the issues raised in the motion and affidavit. The court for good

cause shown, may extend the time for discovery, and may enter a

protective order pursuant to the rules of civil procedure regarding the

scope of discovery on other issues.

5. Any party may move for a hearing on a motion to dismiss under

this section. If the requirements of subsections 2 and 3 of this

section are met, and no party comes forward at such hearing with

evidence of facts which would render the defendant seeking dismissal

under this section liable on some basis other than his status as a seller

in the stream of commerce, the court shall dismiss without prejudice

the claim as to that defendant.

6. No order of dismissal under this section shall operate to divest

a court of venue or jurisdiction otherwise proper at the time the

action was commenced. A defendant dismissed pursuant to this

section shall be considered to remain a party to such action only for

such purposes.

7. An order of dismissal under this section shall be interlocutory

until final disposition of plaintiff's claim by settlement or judgment

and may be set aside for good cause shown at anytime prior to such

disposition.

Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.762 (1987) (emphasis added).

a.

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to the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis on July 14, 1995.

This appeal followed.’

II. Discussion

The district court determined that a remand order was appro-

priate in the present case because the dismissal of Massie did not

create removal jurisdiction based upon the diversity of the parties.

In reaching this conclusion, the district court noted that the stipu-

lation of dismissal expressly stated that Massie would remain a

party to the action for the purpose of venue and jurisdiction, in

accordance with § 537.762(6). The district court also held that

§ 537.762 was not, as BIC argued, an “impermissible attempt by

state law to defeat removal jurisdiction.” Slip op. at 2.

On appeal, BIC contends that the district court erred in

remanding the present action to Missouri state court, because (1)

§ 537.762 does not apply where a co-defendant is dismissed by

stipulation rather than by order and (2) § 537.762 was never

intended to affect federal diversity jurisdiction, or alternatively,

the statute is invalid to the extent that it limits diversity jurisdic-

tion. We may not address the merits, however, unless we deter-

mine that we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s

remand order. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) provides that, with the

exception of civil rights case, “[aJn order remanding a case to the

State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on

appeal or otherwise.” In Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermans-

dorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 346, 96 S.Ct. 584, 590, 46 L.Ed.2d 542

(1976) (Thermtron), the Supreme Court clarified that “only

remand orders issued under § 1447(c)* and invoking the grounds

BIC also filed a petition for writ of mandamus on August 21, 1995.

This court denied the petition on November 2, 1995.

*28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) currently provides in pertinent part: “If at any

time it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the

case shall be remanded.” At the time the Supreme Court decided

Thermtron, however, § 1447(c) stated that “[i]f at any time before final

judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and

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specified therein ... are immune from review under § 1447(d)”.

Id. In Thermtron, the district court had remanded an otherwise

proper diversity action solely because of its crowded docket.

Concluding that the district court had exceeded its statutorily

defined power by remanding the case on a basis not specified in

§ 1447(c), the Supreme Court held that a writ of mandamus was

the appropriate remedy to compel the district court to entertain the

action. Id. at 352-53, 96 S.Ct. at 593-95.

BIC contends that the present case falls within the 7hermtron

exception because the district court’s remand order was not based

upon a ground specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)—i.e., the lack of

subject matter jurisdiction—but rather, was premised upon

Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.762(6), which provides that retailers who

have been dismissed from products liability actions on the basis

that their liability stems solely from their status as sellers in the

stream of commerce shall remain defendants for purposes of

venue and jurisdiction. In addition to Thermtron, BIC relies on

Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New York Convention Center Dev.

Corp., 838 F.2d 656, 658-59 (2d Cir. 1988) (Karl Koch). In

Karl Koch, the Second Circuit held that a remand order based on

the district court’s interpretation of a forum selection clause was

reviewable because the district court had gone beyond the juris-

dictional determination and made a decision affecting the merits

of the case. See id. (reasoning that the policy underlying 28

U.S.C. § 1447(d)—preventing protracted litigation of jurisdic-

tional questions—was inapplicable to remand orders based upon

interpretation of forum selection clause); see also Pelleport

Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273,

277 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that remand order based on enforce-

ability of forum selection clause was reviewable).

In response, plaintiffs argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) foreclos-

es review of the remand order, because the order was based upon

the district court’s determination that, in light of Mo.Rev.Stat.

§ 537.762(6), it lacked removal jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs’

without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case.”

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action. Plaintiffs also maintain that the present case more closely

resembles Hansen v. Blue Cross, 891 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir.

1989) (Hansen), than Karl Koch. In Hansen, the Ninth Circuit

held unreviewable a remand order based upon the district court’s

determination that the insurance plan at issue was not subject to

ERISA. Jd. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the remand order did

not fall within the 7hermtron exception because “[t]he district

court’s decision that Hansen’s plan was not subject to ERISA,

rather than being apart from the question of subject matter

jurisdiction, was necessary to determine whether such jurisdiction

existed.” Jd. Plaintiffs argue that the reasoning of Hansen also

applies in the present case. We agree and hold that the district

court’s remand order is not reviewable on appeal.

We are bound by the general rule of non-reviewability of

remand orders set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). The remand

order in the present case does not come within the Thermtron

exception, because it was based on a ground specified in 28

U.S.C. § 1447(c)—the district court’s determination that it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action. After noting that

the stipulated dismissal provided that, in accordance with

Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.762(6), Massie would remain a party in the

action for purposes of venue and jurisdiction, the district court

concluded that the dismissal of Massie did not create removal

| jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship and remanded the

| present case to Missouri state court. Thus, the remand order was

| based solely upon the district court’s conclusion that removal

jurisdiction did not exist. Although the district court applied

Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.762(6) in reaching this conclusion, its

| consideration of § 537.762(6) was in no way separate from the

jurisdictional determination. Therefore, the present case is

distinguishable from Karl Koch, in which the remand order at

issue was based upon a matter affecting the merits of the case.

By contrast, the district court in the present case made no

determinations concerning the substantive rights of the parties.

Thus, the remand order falls squarely within 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)

and is foreclosed from appellate review.

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Ill. Conclusion

We hold that the district court’s order remanding the present

case to the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis is unreviewable

on appeal.° Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1447(d) for lack of jurisdiction.

* Thus, we do not reach the merits of BIC’s challenge to the remand

order.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT CARNEY and SHEILA CARNEY,

Plaintiff,

)

)

)

)

vs. ) No. 4:95CV

) 417-DJS

)

BIC CORPORATION and CLIFFORD )

MASSIE d/b/a MASSIE ONE STOP, )

)

)

Defendants.

ORDER

Plaintiffs filed the instant product liability action in the Circuit

Court of the City of St. Louis against the manufacturer and

retailer of a BIC butane lighter, seeking damages relating to the

death of their two-year-old son. Section 537.762 R.S.Mo.

provides for the dismissal from a product liability action of a

defendant “whose liability is based solely on his status as a seller

in the stream of commerce” so long as there remains a claim

against “another defendant, including the manufacturer, ...from

whom total recovery may be had for plaintiff's claim.” Follow-

ing dismissal of defendant Clifford Massie pursuant to § 537.762,

defendant BIC Corporation removed the action to this Court on

the basis of diversity. The matter is now before the Court on

plaintiffs’ motion to remand.

The propriety of removal turns on interpretation of subsection

6 and 7 of § 537.762, which provide as follows:

6. No order of dismissal under this section shall operate to

divest a court of venue or jurisdiction otherwise proper at

the time the action was commenced. A defendant dismissed

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pursuant to this section shall be considered to remain a

party to such action only for such purposes.

7. An order of dismissal under this section shall be

interlocutory until final disposition of plaintiff's claim by

settlement or judgment and may be set aside for good cause

shown at any time prior to such disposition.

Defendant Massie’s dismissal in this case was pursuant to a

stipulation of the parties which reads in pertinent part:

By consent of the undersigned parties, Defendant Clifford

Massie d/b/a Massie One Stop is hereby voluntarily dis-

missed from this action as provided in and pursuant to

R.S.Mo. § 537.762 (1987) and shall remain a party to such

action only for the purpose of venue and jurisdiction as

provided in R.S.Mo. § 537.762(6) (1987).

The Court is not persuaded by BIC’s contention that § 537.762.6

is an impermissible attempt by state law to defeat removal

jurisdiction, analogous to those attempts which have been rejected

in the case law upon which BIC relies. Furthermore, the Court

concludes that the interlocutory nature of the dismissal pursuant

to § 537.762 renders the voluntary-involuntary dismissal distinc-

tion insignificant in this context and makes a removal relying on

the dismissal improper. The Court’s construction and application

of the Missouri statute is also in accordance with the general

principle that the federal courts’ removal jurisdiction is to be

narrowly construed and any doubts should be resolved in favor of

remand. See, e.g., 14A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal

Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3721 (1985).

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Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to remand

is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter be remanded to

the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.

/s/ Donald J. Stohr

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: 7/14/95

[Filed Feb. 24, 1995]

THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS

STATE OF MISSOURI

ROBERT CARNEY and SHEILA CARNEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Cause No.

vs. ) 942-9338

) Division 1

BIC CORPORATION and CLIFFORD

MASSIE d/b/a MASSIE ONE STOP,

)

)

)

)

Defendants.

STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL

By consent of the undersigned parties, Defendant Clifford

Massie d/b/a Massie One Stop is hereby voluntarily dismissed

from this action as provided in and pursuant to R.S.Mo.

§ 537.762 (1987) and shall remain a party to such action only for

the purpose of venue and jurisdiction as provided in R.S.Mo.

§ 537.762(6) (1987).

/s/ Margaret A. Hesse /s/ Paul L. Redfearn

Margaret A. Hesse, #43059 Paul L. Redfearn, #27417

Hinshaw & Culbertson Redfearn & Brown, P.C.

1010 Market Street, Suite 350 1125 Grand Avenue, Suite 814

St. Louis, Missouri 63101 Kansas City, Missouri 64106

(314) 421-6168 (816) 421-5301

Attorneys for Defendant Attorneys for Plaintiff

Clifford Massie d/b/a Robert Carney and Sheila Carney

Massie One Stop

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-3163EMSL

ROBERT CARNEY; SHEILA CARNEY, *

Appellees, * Order Denying

* Petition for

v. * Rehearing and

* Suggestion for

BIC CORPORATION, * Rehearing En Banc

Appellant. ’

.

The suggestion for rehearing en banc is denied. The petition

for rehearing by the panel is also denied.

August 7, 1996

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

/s/ Michael E. Gans

Clerk, U.S.-Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-3084EMSL

In re:

Bic Corporation,

Petition for Writ of

Mandamus

Petitioner.

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JUDGEMENT

Petition for writ of mandamus has been considered by the

court and is denied.

November 2, 1995

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

/s/ Michael E. Gans

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

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RELEVANT MISSOURI STATUTE

537.762

Motion to dismiss, defendant whose only liability is as seller

in stream of commerce requirements, procedure — order of

dismissal to be interlocutory

1. A defendant whose liability is based solely on his status as

a seller in the stream of commerce may be dismissed from a

products liability claim as provided in this section.

2. This section shall apply to any products liability claim in

which another defendant, including the manufacturer, is properly

before the court and from whom total recovery may be had for

plaintiffs’ claim.

3. A defendant may move for dismissal under this section

within the time for filing an answer or other fesponsive pleading

unless permitted by the court at later time for good cause shown.

The motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit which shall be

made under oath and shall state that the defendant is aware of no

facts or circumstances upon which a verdict might be reached

against him, other than his status as a seller in the stream of

commerce.

4. The parties shall have sixty days in which to conduct

discovery on the issues raised in the motion and affidavit. The

court for good cause shown, may extend the time for discovery,

and may enter a protective order pursuant to the rules of civil

procedure regarding the scope of discovery on other issues.

5. Any party may move for a hearing on a motion to dismiss

under this section. If the requirements of subsections 2 and 3 of

this section are met, and no party comes forward at such a

hearing with evidence of facts which would render the defendant

seeking dismissal under this section liable on some basis other

| than his status as a seller in the stream of commerce, the court

| shall dismiss without prejudice the claim as to that defendant.

6. No order of dismissal under this section shall operate to |

divest a court of venue or jurisdiction otherwise proper at the time

the action was commenced. A defendant dismissed pursuant to

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this section shall be considered to remain a party to such action

only for such purposes.

7. An order of dismissal under this section shall be interlocu-

tory until final disposition of plaintiff's claim by settlement or

judgment and may be set aside for good cause shown at anytime

prior to such disposition.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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