Appendix — BIC Corp. v. Carney
Supreme Court brief1997
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-3163.
ROBERT CARNEY; SHEILA CARNEY, *
Appellees, * Appeal From The
v. * United States
* District Court For
BIC CORPORATION, * The Eastern District
Appellant. * Of Missouri
*
Submitted: April 10, 1996
Decided: July 8, 1996.
Before McMILLIAN and FAGG, Circuit Judges, and BURNS,”
District Judge.
McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.
BIC Corporation (BIC) appeals from a final order entered in
the United States District Court! for the Eastern District of
Missouri remanding to Missouri state court for want of federal
jurisdiction the products liability action brought by Robert Carney
and Sheila Carney, husband and wife (collectively plaintiffs)
against BIC. Carney v. BIC Corp., No. 4:95CV417-DJS
(E.D.Mo. July 14, 1995) (Order). For reversal, BIC argues that
the district court erred in holding that it lacked removal
jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs’ action after th: stipulated
“The Honorable James M. Burns, United States District Judge for the
District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
'The Honorable Donald J. Stohr, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Missouri.
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dismissal of defendant Clifford Massie, d/b/a Massie One Stop
(Massie), pursuant to Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.762. For the reasons
discussed below, we dismiss the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d) for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Background
The underlying facts are not in dispute. Plaintiffs’ two-year-old
son died on January 30, 1992, because of injuries sustained while
attempting to use a butane lighter manufactured by BIC. On July
28, 1994, plaintiffs filed the present wrongful death and personal
injury action in the Circuit Court of the city of St. Louis against
BIC and Massie, a commercial retailer who had sold the lighter
to plaintiffs. BIC is incorporated in New York and has its
principal place of business in Connecticut. At the time the
present action was commenced, however, plaintiffs and Massie
were residents of the State of Missouri. Therefore, diversity of
citizenship did not exist between the parties when plaintiffs filed
their complaint against BIC and Massie.
On January 11, 1995, Massie filed a motion seeking dismissal
from plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.762
(1987).* As required by § 537.762(3), Massie’s motion to
?Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.762 provides as follows: 537.762. Motion to
dismiss, defendant whose liability is as seller in stream of commerce,
requirements, procedure—order of dismissal.
1. A defendant whose liability is based solely on his status as a
seller in the stream of commerce may be dismissed from a products
liability claim as provided in this section.
2. This section shall apply to any products liability claim in which
another defendant, including the manufacturer, is properly before the
court and from whom total recovery may be had for plaintiffs’ claim.
3. A defendant may move for dismissal under this section within
the time for filing an answer or other responsive pleading unless
permitted by the court at later time shown.
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dismiss was accompanied by an affidavit stating that he was aware
of no facts or circumstances supporting his liability other than his
status as a seller in the stream of commerce. On February 23,
1995, plaintiffs and Massie entered into a stipulation of dismissal,
which provided that Massie “shall remain a party to this action
only for the purposes of venue and jurisdiction as provided in ...
§ 537.762(6) (1987).” App. 71.
On March 3, 1995, BIC removed the present case to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
alleging that the stipulated dismissal of Massie had created
diversity of citizenship between the parties. Upon motion by
plaintiffs, the district court entered an order remanding the case
4. The parties shall have sixty days in which to conduct discovery
on the issues raised in the motion and affidavit. The court for good
cause shown, may extend the time for discovery, and may enter a
protective order pursuant to the rules of civil procedure regarding the
scope of discovery on other issues.
5. Any party may move for a hearing on a motion to dismiss under
this section. If the requirements of subsections 2 and 3 of this
section are met, and no party comes forward at such hearing with
evidence of facts which would render the defendant seeking dismissal
under this section liable on some basis other than his status as a seller
in the stream of commerce, the court shall dismiss without prejudice
the claim as to that defendant.
6. No order of dismissal under this section shall operate to divest
a court of venue or jurisdiction otherwise proper at the time the
action was commenced. A defendant dismissed pursuant to this
section shall be considered to remain a party to such action only for
such purposes.
7. An order of dismissal under this section shall be interlocutory
until final disposition of plaintiff's claim by settlement or judgment
and may be set aside for good cause shown at anytime prior to such
disposition.
Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.762 (1987) (emphasis added).
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to the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis on July 14, 1995.
This appeal followed.’
II. Discussion
The district court determined that a remand order was appro-
priate in the present case because the dismissal of Massie did not
create removal jurisdiction based upon the diversity of the parties.
In reaching this conclusion, the district court noted that the stipu-
lation of dismissal expressly stated that Massie would remain a
party to the action for the purpose of venue and jurisdiction, in
accordance with § 537.762(6). The district court also held that
§ 537.762 was not, as BIC argued, an “impermissible attempt by
state law to defeat removal jurisdiction.” Slip op. at 2.
On appeal, BIC contends that the district court erred in
remanding the present action to Missouri state court, because (1)
§ 537.762 does not apply where a co-defendant is dismissed by
stipulation rather than by order and (2) § 537.762 was never
intended to affect federal diversity jurisdiction, or alternatively,
the statute is invalid to the extent that it limits diversity jurisdic-
tion. We may not address the merits, however, unless we deter-
mine that we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s
remand order. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) provides that, with the
exception of civil rights case, “[aJn order remanding a case to the
State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on
appeal or otherwise.” In Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermans-
dorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 346, 96 S.Ct. 584, 590, 46 L.Ed.2d 542
(1976) (Thermtron), the Supreme Court clarified that “only
remand orders issued under § 1447(c)* and invoking the grounds
BIC also filed a petition for writ of mandamus on August 21, 1995.
This court denied the petition on November 2, 1995.
*28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) currently provides in pertinent part: “If at any
time it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the
case shall be remanded.” At the time the Supreme Court decided
Thermtron, however, § 1447(c) stated that “[i]f at any time before final
judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and
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specified therein ... are immune from review under § 1447(d)”.
Id. In Thermtron, the district court had remanded an otherwise
proper diversity action solely because of its crowded docket.
Concluding that the district court had exceeded its statutorily
defined power by remanding the case on a basis not specified in
§ 1447(c), the Supreme Court held that a writ of mandamus was
the appropriate remedy to compel the district court to entertain the
action. Id. at 352-53, 96 S.Ct. at 593-95.
BIC contends that the present case falls within the 7hermtron
exception because the district court’s remand order was not based
upon a ground specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)—i.e., the lack of
subject matter jurisdiction—but rather, was premised upon
Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.762(6), which provides that retailers who
have been dismissed from products liability actions on the basis
that their liability stems solely from their status as sellers in the
stream of commerce shall remain defendants for purposes of
venue and jurisdiction. In addition to Thermtron, BIC relies on
Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New York Convention Center Dev.
Corp., 838 F.2d 656, 658-59 (2d Cir. 1988) (Karl Koch). In
Karl Koch, the Second Circuit held that a remand order based on
the district court’s interpretation of a forum selection clause was
reviewable because the district court had gone beyond the juris-
dictional determination and made a decision affecting the merits
of the case. See id. (reasoning that the policy underlying 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d)—preventing protracted litigation of jurisdic-
tional questions—was inapplicable to remand orders based upon
interpretation of forum selection clause); see also Pelleport
Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273,
277 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that remand order based on enforce-
ability of forum selection clause was reviewable).
In response, plaintiffs argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) foreclos-
es review of the remand order, because the order was based upon
the district court’s determination that, in light of Mo.Rev.Stat.
§ 537.762(6), it lacked removal jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs’
without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case.”
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action. Plaintiffs also maintain that the present case more closely
resembles Hansen v. Blue Cross, 891 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir.
1989) (Hansen), than Karl Koch. In Hansen, the Ninth Circuit
held unreviewable a remand order based upon the district court’s
determination that the insurance plan at issue was not subject to
ERISA. Jd. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the remand order did
not fall within the 7hermtron exception because “[t]he district
court’s decision that Hansen’s plan was not subject to ERISA,
rather than being apart from the question of subject matter
jurisdiction, was necessary to determine whether such jurisdiction
existed.” Jd. Plaintiffs argue that the reasoning of Hansen also
applies in the present case. We agree and hold that the district
court’s remand order is not reviewable on appeal.
We are bound by the general rule of non-reviewability of
remand orders set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). The remand
order in the present case does not come within the Thermtron
exception, because it was based on a ground specified in 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c)—the district court’s determination that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action. After noting that
the stipulated dismissal provided that, in accordance with
Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.762(6), Massie would remain a party in the
action for purposes of venue and jurisdiction, the district court
concluded that the dismissal of Massie did not create removal
| jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship and remanded the
| present case to Missouri state court. Thus, the remand order was
| based solely upon the district court’s conclusion that removal
jurisdiction did not exist. Although the district court applied
Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.762(6) in reaching this conclusion, its
| consideration of § 537.762(6) was in no way separate from the
jurisdictional determination. Therefore, the present case is
distinguishable from Karl Koch, in which the remand order at
issue was based upon a matter affecting the merits of the case.
By contrast, the district court in the present case made no
determinations concerning the substantive rights of the parties.
Thus, the remand order falls squarely within 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
and is foreclosed from appellate review.
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Ill. Conclusion
We hold that the district court’s order remanding the present
case to the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis is unreviewable
on appeal.° Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d) for lack of jurisdiction.
* Thus, we do not reach the merits of BIC’s challenge to the remand
order.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ROBERT CARNEY and SHEILA CARNEY,
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
)
vs. ) No. 4:95CV
) 417-DJS
)
BIC CORPORATION and CLIFFORD )
MASSIE d/b/a MASSIE ONE STOP, )
)
)
Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiffs filed the instant product liability action in the Circuit
Court of the City of St. Louis against the manufacturer and
retailer of a BIC butane lighter, seeking damages relating to the
death of their two-year-old son. Section 537.762 R.S.Mo.
provides for the dismissal from a product liability action of a
defendant “whose liability is based solely on his status as a seller
in the stream of commerce” so long as there remains a claim
against “another defendant, including the manufacturer, ...from
whom total recovery may be had for plaintiff's claim.” Follow-
ing dismissal of defendant Clifford Massie pursuant to § 537.762,
defendant BIC Corporation removed the action to this Court on
the basis of diversity. The matter is now before the Court on
plaintiffs’ motion to remand.
The propriety of removal turns on interpretation of subsection
6 and 7 of § 537.762, which provide as follows:
6. No order of dismissal under this section shall operate to
divest a court of venue or jurisdiction otherwise proper at
the time the action was commenced. A defendant dismissed
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pursuant to this section shall be considered to remain a
party to such action only for such purposes.
7. An order of dismissal under this section shall be
interlocutory until final disposition of plaintiff's claim by
settlement or judgment and may be set aside for good cause
shown at any time prior to such disposition.
Defendant Massie’s dismissal in this case was pursuant to a
stipulation of the parties which reads in pertinent part:
By consent of the undersigned parties, Defendant Clifford
Massie d/b/a Massie One Stop is hereby voluntarily dis-
missed from this action as provided in and pursuant to
R.S.Mo. § 537.762 (1987) and shall remain a party to such
action only for the purpose of venue and jurisdiction as
provided in R.S.Mo. § 537.762(6) (1987).
The Court is not persuaded by BIC’s contention that § 537.762.6
is an impermissible attempt by state law to defeat removal
jurisdiction, analogous to those attempts which have been rejected
in the case law upon which BIC relies. Furthermore, the Court
concludes that the interlocutory nature of the dismissal pursuant
to § 537.762 renders the voluntary-involuntary dismissal distinc-
tion insignificant in this context and makes a removal relying on
the dismissal improper. The Court’s construction and application
of the Missouri statute is also in accordance with the general
principle that the federal courts’ removal jurisdiction is to be
narrowly construed and any doubts should be resolved in favor of
remand. See, e.g., 14A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal
Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3721 (1985).
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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to remand
is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter be remanded to
the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.
/s/ Donald J. Stohr
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: 7/14/95
[Filed Feb. 24, 1995]
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS
STATE OF MISSOURI
ROBERT CARNEY and SHEILA CARNEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Cause No.
vs. ) 942-9338
) Division 1
BIC CORPORATION and CLIFFORD
MASSIE d/b/a MASSIE ONE STOP,
)
)
)
)
Defendants.
STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL
By consent of the undersigned parties, Defendant Clifford
Massie d/b/a Massie One Stop is hereby voluntarily dismissed
from this action as provided in and pursuant to R.S.Mo.
§ 537.762 (1987) and shall remain a party to such action only for
the purpose of venue and jurisdiction as provided in R.S.Mo.
§ 537.762(6) (1987).
/s/ Margaret A. Hesse /s/ Paul L. Redfearn
Margaret A. Hesse, #43059 Paul L. Redfearn, #27417
Hinshaw & Culbertson Redfearn & Brown, P.C.
1010 Market Street, Suite 350 1125 Grand Avenue, Suite 814
St. Louis, Missouri 63101 Kansas City, Missouri 64106
(314) 421-6168 (816) 421-5301
Attorneys for Defendant Attorneys for Plaintiff
Clifford Massie d/b/a Robert Carney and Sheila Carney
Massie One Stop
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-3163EMSL
ROBERT CARNEY; SHEILA CARNEY, *
Appellees, * Order Denying
* Petition for
v. * Rehearing and
* Suggestion for
BIC CORPORATION, * Rehearing En Banc
Appellant. ’
.
The suggestion for rehearing en banc is denied. The petition
for rehearing by the panel is also denied.
August 7, 1996
Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:
/s/ Michael E. Gans
Clerk, U.S.-Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-3084EMSL
In re:
Bic Corporation,
Petition for Writ of
Mandamus
Petitioner.
ee Se ee ee
JUDGEMENT
Petition for writ of mandamus has been considered by the
court and is denied.
November 2, 1995
Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:
/s/ Michael E. Gans
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.
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RELEVANT MISSOURI STATUTE
537.762
Motion to dismiss, defendant whose only liability is as seller
in stream of commerce requirements, procedure — order of
dismissal to be interlocutory
1. A defendant whose liability is based solely on his status as
a seller in the stream of commerce may be dismissed from a
products liability claim as provided in this section.
2. This section shall apply to any products liability claim in
which another defendant, including the manufacturer, is properly
before the court and from whom total recovery may be had for
plaintiffs’ claim.
3. A defendant may move for dismissal under this section
within the time for filing an answer or other fesponsive pleading
unless permitted by the court at later time for good cause shown.
The motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit which shall be
made under oath and shall state that the defendant is aware of no
facts or circumstances upon which a verdict might be reached
against him, other than his status as a seller in the stream of
commerce.
4. The parties shall have sixty days in which to conduct
discovery on the issues raised in the motion and affidavit. The
court for good cause shown, may extend the time for discovery,
and may enter a protective order pursuant to the rules of civil
procedure regarding the scope of discovery on other issues.
5. Any party may move for a hearing on a motion to dismiss
under this section. If the requirements of subsections 2 and 3 of
this section are met, and no party comes forward at such a
hearing with evidence of facts which would render the defendant
seeking dismissal under this section liable on some basis other
| than his status as a seller in the stream of commerce, the court
| shall dismiss without prejudice the claim as to that defendant.
6. No order of dismissal under this section shall operate to |
divest a court of venue or jurisdiction otherwise proper at the time
the action was commenced. A defendant dismissed pursuant to
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this section shall be considered to remain a party to such action
only for such purposes.
7. An order of dismissal under this section shall be interlocu-
tory until final disposition of plaintiff's claim by settlement or
judgment and may be set aside for good cause shown at anytime
prior to such disposition.
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