Appendix — Washington v. United States

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. 981026 DEC 2 21998

Nos. : :

In The OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Supreme Court

Of The

United States

October Term, 1998

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., Respondents.

PUGET SOUND SHELLFISH GROWERS, Petitioners,

¥.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., Respondents.

LARRY B. AND SHIRLEE ALEXANDER, ET AL., AND

WILLIAM AND CHARMOND ADKINS, ET AL., Petitioners,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., Respondents.

26 TIDELAND AND UPLAND PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNERS

(“UPOW”), Petitioners,

¥.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX TO PETITIONS

FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE P.O. Box 40100

Attorney General Olympia, WA 98504-0100

Jay D. Geck* Telephone: (360) 586-2697

William Berggren Collins Attorneys for State of Washington

Assistant Attorneys General

(Names of Attorneys continued on inside of cover.)

*Counsel of Record

Michael Himes*

Albert Gidari, Jr

Perkins Coie LLP

1201 3rd Avenue

Seattle, WA 98101-3099

Telephone: (206) 583-8888

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Malcolm Edwards

Edwards Sieh Smith & 221 Ist Avenue W

Sth Avenue #7170 eattle, WA 98119

attle, WA 98104 lephone: (206

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FABLE OF CONTENTS

nited States v. Washington (Shellfish U1)

157 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1998)........

nited States v. Washington (Shellfish 1)

73 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1994)

States v. Washington (Shellfish I)

898 F. Supp 1453 (W.D. Wash. 199

1 States v. Washington

909 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. W

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157 F.3d 630

UNITED STATES of America;

Muckleshoot Tribe; Nooksack; Upper Skagit; Squaxin Island;

|. ummi Indian Tribe; Makah Tribe; Tulalip Tribe; Swinomish Indian

Tribal Community; Quileute Indian Tribe; Puyallup Tribe, Hoh

Indian Tribe; Suquamish Tribe; Quinault Indian Nation;

Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation;

Nisqually Indian Tribe, Jamestown Tribe: Lower Elwha Klallam

rribe: Port Gamble Bands; Skokomish Tribe; Sauk-Suiattle Tribe:

Stillaguamish Tribe,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Vv.

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America;

Muckleshoot Tribe; Nooksack, Upper Skagit; Squaxin Island;

|.ummi Indian Tribe; Makah Tribe; Tulalip Tribe; Swinomish Indian

Tribal Community; Quileute Indian Tribe, Puyallup Tribe; Hoh

Indian Tribe; Suquamish Tribe; Quinault Indian Nation;

Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation;

Nisqually Indian Tribe; Jamestown Tribe; Lower Elwha Klailam

rribe: Port Gamble Bands; Skokomish Tribe; Sauk-Suiattle Tribe;

Stillaguamish Tribe,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

LP

STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.

Defendants,

and

26 Upland and Tideland Private Property Owners, (Dan Buehler,

Robert L. Davis, Bruce I. Fielding, Arthur J. Gerdes, Joe Hoots,

Keith C. Huetson, Commander J.C. James, Richard Sayre Koch,

Elaine C. Lefler, Joan Lemonds-Roush, John S. Lewis,

Steven L. Luke, Edward R. McMillan, Robert F. Newman, Mark A

Nysether, Arthur I. Price, Ray D. Randall, Cynthia Ramussen,

Robert G. Shanks, Axel Strakeljahn, Leana Tracy,

Stuart W. Turner, George B. Usnick, Lee S. Vincent, Joan Walker

and William E. Whitney, Jr.),

Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants.

te

UNITED STATES of America;

Muckleshoot Tribe; Nooksack; Upper Skagit; Squaxin Island;

Lummi Indian Tribe; Makah Tribe; Tulalip Tribe; Swinomish Indian

Tribal Community; Quileute Indian Tribe; Puyallup Tribe; Hoh

Indian Tribe; Suquamish Tribe; Quinault Indian Nation;

Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation;

Nisqually Indian Tribe; Jamestown Tribe; Lower Elwha

Klallam Tribe; Port Gamble Bands; Skokomish Tribe; Sauk-Suiattle

Tribe; Stillaguamish Tribe,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

V.

STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al..

Defendants,

and

James Hadley; James Carter; Ann Carter; Charmond Adkins;

Larry Alexander; Shirlee Alexander; Grace Boyd; Pierce Davis;

Rosemary Duncan; May Davis; James C. Johnston; Sarah Johnston;

W.K. Kirch; Jo Ann Kirch; David Mitchell; Louis Nawrot, Jr.; Boon

Ho Woo; Harold Bauer; Billie Bauer; William Chase; Frances

Fellows; George Grader; Earl Hunsperger; Millicent Hunsperger;

Edward Krenz; Eleanor Krenz; H.J. Merrick; Moss Gordon;

Margaret Moss; Sewall Reynolds; Emma Reynolds; John Riach;

Alva Hazel Robb; Irene Smith; Providence Worley,

Defendants-Intervenors- Appellants.

UNITED STATES of America, et al..

Plaintiff,

and

Lummi Tribe; Muckleshoot Tribe; Nooksack; Upper Skagit;

Squaxin Island; Makah Tribe; Swinomish Indian Tribal Community;

Tulalip Tribe; Puyallup Tribe; Quileute Indian Tribe; Hoh Indian

Fribe;-Suquamistr fribe; Nisqually Indian Tribe; Jamestown Tribe;

Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe;

Port Gamble Bands; Skokomish Tribe; Sauk-Suiattle Tribe;

Stillaguamish Tribe,

Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellants,

and

3

Quinault Indian Nation;

Confederated Tribes & Bands of The Yakima Indian Nation.

Plaintiffs-Intervenors,

V.

STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

UNITED STATES of America, et al.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

and

Muckleshoot Tribe; Nooksack; Upper Skagit; Squaxin Island;

Lummi Indian Tribe; Makah Tribe; Tulalip Tribe;

Swinomish Indian Tribal Community; Puyallup Tribe;

Quileute Indian Tribe; Hoh Indian Tribe; Suquamish Tribe;

Quinault Indian Nation; Confederated Tribes & Bands of the

Yakima Indian Nation; Nisqually Indian Tribe; Jamestown Tribe;

Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe; Port Gamble Bands; Skokomish Tribe;

Sauk-Suiattle Tribe; Stillaguamish Tribe,

Plaintiffs-Intervenors,

Ve

STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.,

Defendant-Appellee.

UNITED STATES of America,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

and

Lummi Indian Tribe; Muckleshoot Tribe; Nooksack; Upper Skagit:

Squaxin Island; Makah Tribe; Swinomish Indian Tribal Community;

Tulalip Tribe; Puyallup Tribe; Quileute Indian Tribe; Hoh Indian

Tribe; Suquamish Tribe; Quinault Indian Nation; Confederated

Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation; Nisqually Indian

Tribe; Jamestown Tribe;

Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe; Port Gamble Bands; Skokomish Tribe:

Sauk-Suiattle Tribe; Stillaguamish Tribe,

Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellees,

V.

STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.,

Defendant,

and

Puget Sound Shellfish Growers,

Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants.

Nos. 96-35014, 96-35082, 96-35142, 96-35196,

96-35200, 96-35223.

United States Court of Appeals,

Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 5, 1997.

Decided Jan. 28, 1998.

Amended Sept. 25, 1998.

Phillip E. Katzen (Argued), Allen H. Sanders, Columbia

Legal Services, Seattle, WA, for Jamestown, Lower Elwha, Port

Gamble Bands of S'Klallams, Nisqually, Nooksack, Sauk-Suiattle,

Skokomish, Squaxin Island, Stillaguamish, Upper Skagit Tribes,

Indian Tribes.

Evelyn S. Ying (Argued), Ann C. Juliano, Martin W.

Matzen, Peter C. Monson, Attorneys, United States Department of

Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division, Washington,

DC, for United States.

Jay D. Geck (Argued), Fronda Woods, and Robert C.

Hargreaves, Assistant Attorneys General, John W. Hough, Senior

Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General's Office, State of

Washington, Olympia, WA, for | defendants-appellants-

cross-appellees.

James M. Johnson (Argued), Olympia, WA, for, 26

lideland and Upland Private Property Owners ("UPOW").

Howard M. Goodfriend (Argued) and Malcolm L. Edwards,

Edwards, Sieh, Hathaway, Smith & Goodfriend, Seattle, WA, for

Private Owners.

Michael Himes (Argued), Albert Gidari, Jr., Perkins Coie,

Seattle, WA, for Puget Sound Shellfish Growers.

Eric Richter, Skeel Henke, Evenson & Roberts, Seattle,

WA, for Adkins, et. al.

Mason D. Morisset, Seattle, WA, for Tulalip Tribes. Riyaz

A. Kanji, Williams and Connolly, Washington, DC, for Jamestown,

Lower Elwha, Port Gamble Bands of S'Klallams, Nisqually,

Nooksack, Sauk-Suiattle, Skokomish, Squaxin Island, Stillaguamish

and Upper Skagit Tribes, Indian Tribes.

John Sledd, Mary Linda Pearson, for the Suquamish Tribe

Daniel A. Raas, Harry L. Johnsen, for the Lummi Tribe

Richard Berley, John Arum, Mark Slonim, for the Makah

[Tribe

Bill Tobin, Christina Berg, for the Nisqually Tribe

Annette M. Klapstein, John Howard Bell, Debra S. O'Gara.

for the Puyallup Tribe.

Kevin R. Lyon, Ronald Whitener, for the Squaxin Island

lribe

Robert L. Otsea, for the Muckleshoot Tribe

Kathryn Nelson, Amy C. Lewis, co-counsel for the Port

Gamble, Lower Elwha, Jamestown Bands of S'Klallams and the

Skokomish Tribe.

Leslie Barnhart, Lori Salzarulo, Ruth Kennedy for the

Quileute Tribe.

Nettie Alvarez, Richard Ralston, for the Hoh Tribe

Jeffrey Jon Bode, co-counsel for the Nooksack Tribe

Edward G. Maloney, co-counsel for the Upper Skagit Tribe

Harold Chesnin, co-counsel for the Upper Skagit

[ribe.Allan E. Olson, for the Swinomish Indian Community

Daniel W. Wyckoff, Olympia, WA, Tom D. Tobin, Winner,

SD, for amicus curiae Inner Sound Crab Association and

Washington Dungeness Crab Fishermen's Association

Stephanie L. Striffler, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,

OR, for amicus curiae State of Oregon.

Nancie Marzulla, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae

Defenders of Property Rights.

Robin Rivett, Sacramento CA, John M. Groen, Bellevue,

Washington, for amicus curiae Pacific Legal Foundation.

Toby Thaler, Seattle, WA, for amicus curiae Washington

Environmental Councit.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Washington Edward Rafeedie, District Judge,

Presiding. D.C. No. CV-89-00003-ER.

Before: LAY,” BEEZER and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

Order Amending Opinion And Denying Petition For

Rehearing And Rejecting Suggestion For Rehearing En Bane And

Amended Opinion

OPINION

PROTT, Circuit Judge.

ORDER

The Opinion filed January 28, 1998, slip op. 783, and

appearing at 135 F.3d 618 (9th Cir.1998), is amended as follows:

1. At slip op. 829, last sentence of the first full paragraph;

135 F.3d at 640, first full sentence on the page beginning with "All

Grower beds ..."; delete the sentence and replace it with, "The other

Grower beds will be subject to the allocation analysis below."

2. At slip op. 830, first full paragraph; 135 F.3d at 640, third

full paragraph beginning with "We therefore apply ... "; delete the

entire paragraph and replace it with a new paragraph and revised

footnote as follows:

* The Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge for the Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation

7

"We therefore apply the following analysis to

Grower beds where the Growers, or their predecessors,

began their enhancement efforts on a natural bed. For

such natural beds, the Growers shall demonstrate what

portion of their harvest is due to their labor, as opposed

to what portion would exist absent the Growers’

enhancement. See Shellfish II., 898 F.Supp. at 1462. For

such enhanced natural beds, the Tribes shall be entitled

to fifty percent of the pre-enhanced sustainable shellfish

production from those beds.!2 Of course, this

allocation analysis does not apply to artificial beds, that

is, to Grower beds that did not support a sustainable

commercial density of shellfish prior to cultivation. As

the Tribes have acknowledged, the Tribes have no right

to harvest such beds. 898 F.Supp. at 1460-61."

12 For example, if ten clams per square foot were a density

sufficient to support a commercial livelihood at the time that

enhancement began, and if a 100 square foot Grower's bed yielded

ten clams per square foot prior to the Grower's efforts to enhance the

output (1,000 clams), and that same bed now produces fifty clams

per square foot as a result of the Grower's labor (5,000 clams), the

Tribes would be entitled to fifty percent of the 1,000 clams or 500

clams.

3. At slip op. 834, third full paragraph carrying over to p.

835; 135 F.3d at 642, third full paragraph beginning with "The

Tribes argue ..."; delete the paragraph and replace it with five

paragraphs as follows:

"Of particular concern to the Tribes is the

restriction that allows the Growers to control access to

natural clams by choosing not to harvest them in favor

of the oysters under which the clams are found. The

Tribes describe this restriction as a "gaping loophole"

that has the capacity-at the Growers’ discretion to deny

to them the very rights to natural clams which our

holding confirms.

The Growers’ counter with the argument from

the record that the process of harvesting natural clams

from underneath the oyster beds can seriously disrupt

and suffocate their oysters.

On reflection, the Tribes' concerns although

certainly not fanciful-are based at this point on

speculation as to what might happen in the future. The

Growers, for example, represent that “where there are

substantial economic benefits to a Grower from

harvesting clams, the Grower will do so." And, "[a]s

soon as. the Grower does, the trial court's

implementation plan provides that the Tribes have the

right to a share of those clams." The Growers say that

they are "commercial farmers-if there is money to be

made. the resource assuredly will be exploited.”

Under the circumstances. we believe that the

district court's restrictions do not amount at this time to

an abuse of discretion. The district court attempted to

fashion a prospective solution to a difficult situation by

balancing the parties’ respective interests. The district

court's restrictions safeguard the Tribes’ right of access

to the ancient fisheries, but also protect the interests o!

the Growers and Private Owners. Importantly, in this

aspect of the court's decision the court did not use equity

as the basis for its interpretation of the decision, but

nly as a way to implement its correctly reasoned

interpretation of the Proviso. While the Tribes may not

be happy with the limits imposed on their harvesting,

they are still able to effectuate their allocation under the

Treaties and are not excluded from their ancient

fisheries

We are confident that any future practices by

the Growers that trench inappropriately upon the Tribes’

rights as confirmed in this opinion will be adequately

jealt with by the district court. The district court is the

best place to manage any wrinkles that might crop up

The best way to avoid such problems, of course, is for

the parties constructively to work together to respect

each others’ rights."

4

4. At slip op. 839, concurring opinion of Judge Beezer:

With these amendments, the panel has voted unanimously

ny the petition for rehearing and to reject the suggestion

ehearing en banc

34 at 644: withdraw the entire opinion and replace with a new

ncurring opinion as reflected in the amended opinion filed

herewith

i

The full court has been advised of the suggestion fot

ehearing en banc and no judge of the court has requested a vote o1

it. Fed. R. App. P. 35(b).

The petition for rehearing is DENIED and the suggestion fo

rehearing en banc is REJECTED.

I. OVERVIEW

[he State a Washington, groups of private tideland

yroperty owners "Private Owners" ) and commercial shellfish

growers ("Growe rs’ ( (collectively, "Appellants" ) appeal the district

court's judgment following two bench trials in an action brought by

numerous Indian Tribes! (the "Tribes") and the United States (on

the Tribes’ behalf) seeking a declaration of rights to shellfish under

the Stevens Treaties ("Treaties"). The U nited States and the Tribes

ss-appeal the district court's order implementing the Tribe

rights

In 1855. the United States negotiated five Treaties with t

lribes in the Western Washington Territory. The Tribes ceded Aves

tes lands to the United States for settlement, receiving in

exchang exclusive title to defined lands, free medical care, schools

jar ynal training, and annuity payments. The Treaties 7

re sounoal to the Tribes the "right of taking fish, at all usual <

ee grounds and stations ... in common with all citizens

» Territory...." In a series of decisions beginning in 197: federa

urts, including the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, held th

this treaty language entitles the Tribes to take fifty percent of the

almon and other free-swimming fish in the waters controlled |

Washington State. The Tribes’ rights to shellfish under the Tre ati€

wwever, are limited by the following proviso (the "Shell

|

viso") Provided. however, That they shall not take she

| ‘ 14 j 4 "

taked or cultivated by citizens

the followin tne iulailt ruyail

Muckleshoot, Upper Skagit, Nooksack, Nisqually, Lummt Skokomis!

S'Klallam. Lower Elwha S'Klallam, Jamestown 5 Klallam, Suquan

10

[his case concerns the nature and extent of the Tribes'

shellfishing rights under the Treaties. The district court concluded

in a thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion that the term "fish," as

used in the Stevens Treaties, includes shellfish. The court then

concluded that the Tribes have a right to take one half of the

harvestable shellfish of every species found anywhere within their

usual and accustomed fishing areas, except as expressly limited by

the Shellfish Proviso. The court interpreted the Shellfish Proviso

“only to exclude Indians from artificial, or planted shellfish beds;

[the parties to the Treaties] neither contemplated nor desired that the

Indians would be excluded from natural shellfish beds." United

States v. Washington, 873 F.Supp. 1422, 1441 (W.D. Wash. 1994)

[he court's conclusions substantially reflect the position of the

[ribes and of the United States, which the court found to be

overwhelmingly" supported by the historical evidence of the intent

{ the signatory parties to the Treaties.

After its decision interpreting the Treaties, the district court

‘Id a second trial to determine a plan for implementing the Tribes

shellfishing rights ("Implementation Plan"). Employing principles

of equity, the court refined its definition of "cultivated" under the

Proviso and precluded the Tribes from harvesting shellfish on most

of the commercial Growers' property. In addition, the court placed

time, place, and manner restrictions on the Tribes’ ability to harvest

from privately-owned land. Finally, the court devised a system for

the appointment and removal of Special Masters to resolve disputes

irising from the Implementation Plan. These consolidated appeals

followed

We have jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affin

4

1

ind reverse in part

Il. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Stevens ireaties

[he record contains extensive persuasive evidence

erning the Tribes’ reliance on fish and shellfish for commercial,

nibsintente. and ceremonial purposes. Fishing was "not much iess

necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they

breathed." United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381, 25 S.Ct

662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905). The United States Treaty negotiators,

under the leadership of Governor Isaac Stevens, were well aware of

the Tribes’ use and reliance on a wide variety of fish, including

"The United States’ primary purpose [in entering the

lreaties] was to extinguish the Indians' title to the lands in Western

Washington, thereby clearing the way for settlement by Europeans."

United States v. Washington, 873 F.Supp. 1422, 1436 (W.D

Wash.1994) [hereinafter "Shellfish I"|]. Because of the Tribes’

extensive reliance on fish, however, "(t]he United States was aware

that ... it was clearly necessary to preserve the Indians’ fishing

rights." Jd. "Whatever land concessions [the Tribes] made, the

Indians viewed a guarantee of permanent fishing rights as an

absolute predicate to entering into a treaty with the United States

Id. at 1437.

At the time of the Treaties, a shellfish-cultivation industry

had begun to develop at Shoalwater Bay in the Washington

ferritory. The United States treaty negotiators were familiar wit!

the practices of that industry, which was modeled after the large:

older, and more developed shellfish industry on the East Coast of the

United States. /d. at 1434. Shellfish farmers created "cultivated"

beds (ones on which shellfish spawn would not naturally set) by

removing oysters from their natural beds to areas where they could

grow more rapidly, or by placing shells or other material to harder

the bottom and thereby facilitate the setting of the oysters. In

addition to creating cultivated beds, shellfish farmers frequently

"staked" beds of shellfish by storing market-sized shellfish removed

from other beds until they could be shipped to market. These staked

beds did not naturally contain shellfish of the type being stored, and

their boundaries were marked for identification purposes with stake

xtending above the surface of the water at high tide. /d. at 1432

Fish, including shellfish, were exceptionally abundant a1

ynsidered inexhaustible at treaty time. /d. at 1438. Hence, tl

nited States negotiators believed that preserving Indian fishi

ights would not interfere with the rights of citizen Tr

negotiators were aware of the thriving shellfish industry

fully-developed East Coast cities, and likely assumed based on th

examples that development in the Puget Sound and on the wester

shore would not interfere with the Indians’ exercise of their tre

hing rights." Id.

In light of the above, the United States negotiated

ities with Indian Tribes of the Western Washington Territor

ona? - . :

and 1855.“ Through each of these Treaties, in substant!

2 I ict Ol in I ribes nv [

OFr-iIn-il I to oO Tr or tt t } ‘

12

identical language, the Tribes secured their preexisting right to take

fish:

The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed

grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians,

in common with all citizens of the Territory, and of

erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing,

together with the privilege of hunting, gathering roots

and berries, and pasturing their horses on open and

unclaimed lands: Provided, however, That they shall not

take shell fish from any beds staked or cultivated by

citizens...

[reaty of Medicine Creek, supra, Art. III.

B. Post-Treaty Developments

In the years immediately following the Treaties, the Indians

harvested the majority of the shellfish resource. In 1879, however,

the territorial legislature passed a law that, for the first time, allowed

citizens the exclusive right to use and harvest natural oyster beds.

Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1440. "Washington became a state in

1889, and in 1895 it passed legislation (the 'Bush' and 'Callow’ Acts)

for private purchase of tidelands, even when those tidelands

contained natural shellfish beds." Jd. Since that time, the State has

sold off the "vast majority" of its tidelands to private owners. /2. ai

1439.

Uncontradicted evidence at trial showed that native shellfish

populations have declined dramatically and have been replaced to a

large extent by foreign species introduced into the area after the

[reaties. For example, native littleneck clams have been replaced

by the introduced species, manila clams, which comprised over

eighty percent of the total clam harvest in the Puget Sound from

1988-90. This litigation—initiated by the Tribes and United States—is

the consequence of the increasing competition for, and depletion of,

the shellfish resource.

Stat. 927; Treaty of Point No Point, January 26, 1855, 12 Stat. 933; Treaty with the

Makah, January 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939; Treaty of Olympia, July 1, 1855, 12 Stat

971

I]. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[In 1970, the United States and the Tribes brought suit

against the State of Washington seeking an interpretation of the

Treaties and an injunction to enforce the Tribes' fishing rights. See

United States v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. 312, 327 (W.D.

Wash.1974) [hereinafter "Washington I".

In Washington I, Senior Judge Boldt determined the nature

and extent of the Tribes’ off-reservation fishing rights with respect to

anadromous fish.3 That decision established the locations of the

Tribes’ usual and accustomed grounds and stations and found that

the Tribes were entitled to take fifty percent of the harvestable fish

from those grounds and stations. We affirmed in United States v.

Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.1976) [hereinafter "Washington

IT"). The Supreme Court substantially affirmed that decision,

concluding that the trial court had correctly adjudicated the nature

and extent of the Tribes’ fishing rights. Washington v. Washington

State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 99

S.Ct. 3055, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (1979) [hereinafter "Fishing Vessel").

The Supreme Court's decision in Fishing Vessel marks the seventh

time that the Supreme Court has addressed the fishing clause of the

Stevens Treaties.4

The district court in Washington I reserved jurisdiction to

hear future unresolved issues arising out of the Treaties. Under the

court's procedures, the Tribes must bring a request for adjudication

of their fishing rights to the court's attention through the filing of a

"Request for Determination." Washington I, 384 F.Supp. at 419

> Anadromous fish are fish that migrate up rivers from the sea to breed |

fresh water (1.e., salmon)

4 The other six cases are: United States v Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 25 S.Ct

662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905); Seufert Bros Co. v United States, 249 U.S. 194, 39

S.Ct. 203, 63 L.Ed. 555 (1919); Tulee v Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 62 S.Ct. 862

86 L.Ed. 1115 (1942); Puyallup Tribe v Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 88

S.Ct. 1725, 20 L.Ed.2d 689 (1968); Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414

U.S. 44, 94 S.Ct. 330, 38 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of

Game, 433 U.S. 165, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977). None of these cases

involved interpretation of the Shellfish Proviso

a

ee ee

14

In 1989, pursuant to the above procedure, sixteen Indian

Tribes, later joined by the United States, filed an action in the

district court seeking a declaration of the nature and extent of their

shellfishing rights.2 The district court's decision in Shellfish I

interpreted the Treaties to award fifty percent of the shellfish harvest

in Washington waters to the Tribes.

After announcing its decision in Shellfish I, the court

conducted a six-day “implementation trial." The purpose of the

implementation trial was to receive evidence regarding proposed

plans to implement Shellfish J. Parties submitted competing plans.

On August 28, 1995, the district court announced its Implementation

Plan. United States v. Washington, 898 F.Supp. 1453 (W.D.

Wash.1995) [hereinafter "Shellfish IT"|. In Shellfish IT, the district

court noted that "[t]he Shellfish Growers and Private Property

Owners are, effectively, innocent purchasers who had no notice of

the Tribes' Treaty fishing right when they acquired their property."

Id. at 1457. “Consequently, it is incumbent upon this Court to use

its equitable powers to effect a balance between the Tribes' Treaty

shellfishing right and the Growers’ and Owners’ interest in the

peaceful enjoyment and/or commercial development of their

property." /d. The district court then made several important

rulings.

First, the court ruled that, when the State acts on behalf of

its citizens by developing artificial @kellfish beds for recreational

shellfishing on state-owned tidelands, it is a "citizen" within the

scope of the shellfish proviso, which exempts tribal harvesting from

"beds staked or cultivated by citizens." Jd. at 1459-60. The effect of

this ruling is to exclude the Tribes from shellfishing in state-created

artificial beds.

Second, the court clarified the definition of a “natural

shellfish bed" which may not be "staked or cultivated" in the future

5 The action was originally filed against only Washington. The following

groups sequently intervened in the proceeding: the Puget Sound Shellfish

Growers, representing commercial shellfish growers; the Alexander group and

Adkins group of private tideland owners; and a group of private property owners

affiliated with the United Property Owners of Washington ("UPOW"). The district

court denied motions to intervene filed by the Inner Sound Crab Association,

Dungeness Crab Harvesters Association, and the Washington Harvest Divers

Association. That ruling was recently affirmed by this Court. See United States v

Washington, 86 F.3d 1499 (9th Cir. 1996).

by the Growers. The court concluded that a "natural shellfish bed"

is a "bed which is capable of sustaining a yield of shellfish that will

support a commercial livelihood." /d. at 1461. The court then found

that the minimum density of manila clams that will support a

commercial livelihood is 0.5 pounds of mature clams per square

foot.

Third, the court redefined "artificial beds," which are

exempted by the Shellfish Proviso from the reach of the Tribes’

shellfishing rights. The court believed that it would be "very

difficult" to determine whether beds on Growers’ properties were

“artificial” or "natural" and that the Tribes should not benefit from

the Growers’ efforts to enhance the shellfish resource on their own

properties. Jd. at 1461-62. The court therefore modified the

definition of "cultivated" to encompass the "wide range of

techniques used by the Growers to enhance production of shellfish

on their property." /d. The court referred to these bec's as "de facto

artificial beds." Jd. at 1462 & n. 18. Under the court's ruling, only

"those beds whose existence is entirely due to the natural

propagation of the species" are subject to the Tribes’ Treaty rights.

Id. at 1462.

Fourth, the court imposed "time, place, and manner’

restrictions on the Tribes’ right to shellfish on private properties. /d

at 1470-73. One such restriction was a blanket ban on upland access

across private property absent consent by the owner.

The court also set forth dispute resolution procedures,

calling for a panel of four special masters: one selected by the

lribes, one by the Growers, one by the Private Owners, and one by

the State. Jd at 1475-76. A single master, drawn from the four,

determines each dispute. Under the court's decision, the masters

have the power to award damages against Tribes who violate the

[mplementation Plan. Id.

In response to motions to reconsider its decision in Shellfish

II, the district court amended its decision on December 18, 1995.

United States v. Washington, 909 F.Supp. 787 (W.D. Wash.1995)

[hereinafter "Shellfish III"). \n Shellfish III, the court revised its ban

on upland tribal access to shellfish beds absent consent of the

landowner by allowing tribes to cross private land after a showing of

"the absence of access by boat, public road, or public right-of-way."

Id. at 793. Disputes over access must be presented to a special

master. Jd. at 791-93. The court also changed its decision allowing

ee

eT nT

16

the special master to award damages against the Tribes. The master

is still able to award damages against individual tribal members who

damage private property during exercise of fishing rights, but he or

she cannot award damages against the Tribes themselves. /d. at

793-94.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

All parties agree that the meaning of the Treaty language is

ultimately a question of law reviewed de novo. United States v.

Washington, 969 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir.1992). Although several

Private Owner groups assert that the district court's findings

regarding the "negotiators' intentions and expectations" are mixed

issues of law and fact reviewed de novo, we have previously

reviewed a district court's findings of parties' intent in entering

Indian Treaties "(u]nder the highly deferential clear error standard."

See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian Reservation v.

Washington, 96 F.3d 334, 343 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -

—, 117 S.Ct. 1432, 137 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997). We therefore review for

clear error all of the district court's findings of historical fact,

including its findings regarding the treaty negotiators’ intentions.

We then review de novo whether the district court reached the

proper conclusion as to the meaning of the Shellfish Proviso given

those findings.

We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's

equitable orders. The district court abuses its discretion when its

equitable decision is based on an error of law or a clearly erroneous

factual finding. Foster v. Skinner, 70 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th

Cir.1995).

V. CANONS OF TREATY CONSTRUCTION

"{A]ll Treaties made, ... under the Authority of the United

States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land and the Judges in every

State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws

of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. Art. VI,

cl. 2. The goal of treaty interpretation is to determine what the

parties meant by the treaty terms. Shoshone Indians v. United

States, 324 U.S. 335, 353, 65 S.Ct. 690, 89 L.Ed. 985 (1945). "[I]t is

the intention of the parties ... that must control any attempt to

interpret the treaties." Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675. This

analysis of the parties’ intentions "begin[s] with the text of the treaty

and the context in which the written words are used." Eastern

Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113

L.Ed.2d 569 (1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

"(T]reaties are constructed more liberally than private agreements,

and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond written words to

the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical

'

construction adopted by the parties." /d. at 535 (quoting Choctaw

Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32, 63 S.Ct.

672, 87 L.Ed. 877 (1943)).

The Shellfish Proviso is an exception to the Tribes’ broad

fishing rights. "A proviso is strictly construed, and only those

subjects expressly restricted are freed from the operation of the

statute." Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 20.22, at 110 (Sth

ed.1992).

Courts have uniformly held that treaties must be liberally

construed in favor of establishing Indian rights. Confederated

Tribes of Chehalis, 96 F.3d at 340. "Any ambiguities in

construction must be resolved in favor of the Indians." /d. (citation

omitted). "These rules of construction ‘are rooted in the unique trust

relationship between the United States and the Indians."" /d

(quoting Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,

247, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985)).

VI. DISCUSSION

\ EXCEPT AS LIMITED BY THE SHELLFISH PROVISO,

THE RIGHT OF TAKING SHELLFISH UNDER THI

TREATIES IS COEXTENSIVE WITH THE RIGHT Ol!

PTAKING FISH.

The district court held that the Treaties grant the Tribes a

right to take shellfish of every species found anywhere within the

lribes' usual and accustomed fishing areas, except as expressly

limited by the Shellfish Proviso. We agree.

[he Tribes' shellfish rights are not limited by

species.

he State of Washington argues that the Tribes’ right to take

shellfish is limited to those species of fish actually harvested by the

18

Tribes prior to the signing of the Treaties.© Specifically,

Washington contends that the tribes have no Treaty right to certain

"deep-water" species’ of shellfish that were not historically

harvested in shallower waters and on tidelands. We respectfully

reject this contention because it is plainly inconsistent with the

language of the Treaties, the law of the case, and the intent and

understanding of the signatory parties. See Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp.

at 1430.

With all deference to the State, there is no language in the

Treaties to support its position: the Treaties make no mention of

any species-specific or technology-based restrictions on the Tribes’

rights. The district court aptly noted that, had the Treaty parties

intended to limit the harvestable species, the parties would not have

chosen the word "fish." The word "fish" has "perhaps the widest

sweep of any word the drafters could have chosen." /d. Thus, the

district court correctly chose not to "deviate from [the Treaties']

plain meaning.” /d.

Washington's position is also contrary to the law-of-the-case

doctrine. In 1974, Judge Boldt rejected an argument similar to

Washington's current position, stating: "The right secured by the

treaties to the Plaintiff tribes is not limited as to species of fish, the

origin of fish, the purpose or use or the time or manner of taking...."

Washington I, 384 F.Supp. at 401. Moreover, the court determined

that the Treaties "do not prohibit or limit any specific manner,

method, or purpose of taking fish." /d. at 402. We previously

affirmed these conclusions "in all respects," Washington II, 520 F.2d

at 693, and we continue to believe they are correct.

Washington relies heavily on the Supreme Court's statement

in Fishing Vessel that "securing" fishing rights is "synonymous with

‘reserving’ rights previously exercised." 443 U.S. at 678 (emphasis

added). Washington's contention, however, is contrary to the

recognized principle that the Treaties involved a grant of rights from

the Indians to the United States. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.

371, 380-81, 25 S.Ct. 662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905). In Winans, the

6 The State of Oregon has filed an amicus brief joining Washington in

this argument

“ a

[he deep-water species include: geoduck (pronounced "gooey duck

a kind of giant clam), sea urchin, sea cucumber, and certain species of crab and

shrimp

Supreme Court upheld the Indians’ right of access over private

property in order to fish in the Columbia River. /d. at 384. The

Court construed the fishing rights in the Stevens Treaty as “not a

grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a

reservation of those not granted". Jd. As the district court explained:

At [Treaty] time, ... the Tribes had the absolute right to

harvest any species they desired, consistent with their

aboriginal title.... The fact that some species were not

taken before treaty time-either because they were

inaccessible or the Indians chose not to take them-does

not mean that their right to take such fish was limited.

Because the "right of taking fish" must be read as a

reservation of the Indians’ pre-existing rights, and

because the right to take any species, without limit,

pre-existed the Stevens Treaties, the Court must read the

"right of taking fish" without any species limitation

Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1430 (citation omitted). A more

restrictive reading of the Treaties would be contrary to the Supreme

Court's definitive conclusion that the Treaties are a "grant of rights

from" the Tribes. Winans, 198 U.S. at 380. We therefore reject

Washington's argument that the Tribes are limited in the species of

shellfish they harvest.

2 lhe "usual and accustomed grounds and stations" di

not vary by species of fish.

Appellants argue that the district court erred in holding that

the right of taking fish within "all usual and accustomed grounds and

stations" of a Tribe does not vary by species of fish. They contend

that the Tribes' "usual and accustomed" fishing grounds for shellfish

are not coextensive with the usual and accustomed grounds for the

taking of other fish, the boundaries of which were determined in

Washington I. They suggest that the Tribes must establish their

usual and accustomed grounds for each species of fish. We

respectfully disagree.

In Washington I, the court found that "every fishing location

where members of a tribe customarily fished ... is a usual and

accustomed ground or station at which the treaty tribe reserved, and

its members presently have, the right to fish." 384 F.Supp. at 332

That court heard extensive evidence and made findings with respect

to each Tribes’ usual and accustomed fishing grounds. /d. at 359-82

Since the time Judge Boldt made these findings, courts considering

20

fishing disputes under the Treaties have never required

species-specific findings of usual and accustomed fishing grounds.

In fact, the district court in a prior proceeding on a related Stevens

Treaties case found that the usual and accustomed grounds and

stations for herring (a non-anadromous fish) were co-extensive with

those previously adjudicated for salmon (an anadromous fish).

United States v. Washington, 459 F.Supp. 1020, 1049 (W.D.

Wash.1978) (ruling that the tribes may take herring at all of its usual

and accustomed fishing places to the same extent and subject to the

same terms and conditions as specified in Washington I).

Moreover, it would be extremely burdensome and perhaps

impossible for the Tribes to prove their usual and accustomed

grounds on a species-specific basis. "Little documentation of Indian

fishing locations in and around 1855 exists today." 459 F.Supp. at

1059. If each Tribe were required to prove its usual and accustomed

grounds for every species of fish and shellfish, the time and cost to

the court and parties would be unreasonably burdensome.

In light of the above, the district court was correct in

concluding that the Tribes’ usual and accustomed grounds for

shellfish are co-extensive with the Tribes' usual and accustomed

fishing grounds, which have been previously decided by the courts.

3 The Equal Footing Doctrine does not preclude tribal

harvesting.

Appellants contend that the "Equal Footing Doctrine" and

the "Shively presumption" preclude tribal harvesting on the

tidelands. “Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, every new state is

entitled to entrance into the Union free of any encumbrance on its

land, so that it stands on ‘equal footing’ with the other states."

Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1442-43 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152

U.S. 1, 14 S.Ct. 548, 38 L.Ed. 331 (1894)). "The ‘Shivel)

presumption’ is an outgrowth of this doctrine, and holds that any

pre-statehood grant of property does not include tidelands unless the

grant clearly indicated that tidelands were included." Jd. at 1443

(citation omitted). We conclude that the language of the Treaties,

the law of this case, and the Supreme Court's prior applications of

the Equal Footing Doctrine all counsel against its application in the

instant case.

In short, Appellants contend that any treaty right to harvest

shellfish would amount to a property interest in the tidelands, and

because the Treaties do not clearly specify an intent to grant a

property interest in the tidelands, the Treaties cannot be construed as

providing rights to harvest shellfish. The district court rejected this

argument and interpreted the Treaties "without regard to the Equal

Footing Doctrine or the Shively presumption." /d. We agree with

the district court's interpretation.

Appellants rely primarily on two cases, United States v. Holt

State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 46 S.Ct. 197, 70 L.Ed. 465 (1926), and

Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d

493 (1981). Both cases involved disputes over Indian title rights to

lands underlying navigable waters. In both cases, the Supreme

Court applied the Shively presumption and concluded that the

treaties at issue "did not by [their] terms formally convey any land to

the Indians at all." Montana, 450 U.S. at 553. In Holt State Bank,

the Court concluded "there was nothing in [the treaties] which even

approaches a grant of rights in lands underlying navigable waters."

270 US. at 58.

In the instant case, however, "the Tribes possess the

disputed rights [to harvest shellfish] pre-treaty, and the treaty

simply effects a reservation of rights." 873 F.Supp. at 1443. As the

district court stated:

It is settled under Washington II that the fishing rights at

issue in this case predated the Stevens Treaties, and the

Treaties simply effected a reservation of those rights.

Similarly, the Supreme Court acknowledged the

reservation in Fishing Vessel: "The fishing clause

speaks of ‘securing’ certain fishing rights, a term the

Court has previously interpreted as synonymous with

‘reserving’ rights previously exercised." Fishing Vessel,

443 U.S. at 678. Because the Stevens Treaties must be

construed as a reservation of rights by the Tribes, not a

granting of rights by the United States, the Shively

presumption and the Equal Footing Doctrine cannot play

a role in the evaluating the existence or scope of the

rights.

Id. at 1443-44 (citation omitted). We adopt the district court's

persuasive reasons for rejecting the application of the Shively

presumption to defeat the Tribes’ shellfishing rights.

We note that "the Supreme Court has applied the Equal

Footing Doctrine in one context only, namely when evaluating a

I iacceiaieieaeiiiaiiiealll

Se a

22

claim of right to lands beneath navigable waters based upon an

alleged conveyance or retention of fee simple ownership by the

United States prior to statehood." /d. at 1444 (citing cases); see

Montana, 450 U.S. at 550-51 ("The question is whether the United

States conveyed beneficial ownership of the riverbed to the Crow

Tribe by the Treaties of 1851 or 1868."); Holt State Bank, 270 U.S.

at 57 (adjudicating the question of "whether the lands under the lake

were disposed of by the United States before Minnesota became a

state"); Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 204,

107 S.Ct. 2318, 96 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987) (The United States answered

in the district court that title to the lakebed remained in federal

ownership by selection of the lake as a reservoir site prior to Utah's

statehood). Unlike the above cases, the instant case does not involve

ownership of tidelands. The Tribes do not claim ownership of the

tidelands; the Tribes merely assert their right to harvest shellfish

within the tidelands, regardless of ownership.

Moreover, application of the Equal Footing Doctrine has

already been rejected in the context of the Stevens Treaties fishing

rights. First, the Supreme Court in Winans noted:

[I]t is contended that the State acquired, by its admission

into the Union "upon an equal footing with the original

States," the power to grant rights in or to dispose of the

shore lands upon navigable streams, and such power is

subject only to the paramount authority of Congress

with regard to public navigation and commerce. The

United States, therefore, it is contended, could neither

grant nor retain rights in the shore or to the lands under

water.

* * *

The extinguishment of the Indian title, opening the land

for settlement and preparing the way for future States,

were appropriate to the objects for which the United

States held the Territory. And surely it was within the

competency of the Nation to secure to the Indians such a

remnant of the great rights they possessed as "taking

fish at all usual and accustomed places."

198 U.S. at 382-84. Similarly, Appellants’ Equal Footing arguments

have been rejected in this case:

Admission of the State of Washington into the Union

upon an equal footing with the original states had no

effect upon the treaty rights of the Plaintiff tribes. Such

admission imposed upon the State, equally with other

states, the obligation to observe and carry out the

provisions of treaties of the United States.

Washington I, 384 F.Supp. at 401. Thus, we can identify no reason

or rule that would mandate the application of the Equal Footing

Doctrine to limit the Tribes’ fishing rights in this case. The language

of the Treaties, the law of this case, and the Supreme Court's prior

applications of the Equal Footing Doctrine all preclude its

application here.

4. The Tribes are entitled to harvest shellfish on

privately-owned tidelands.

The Private Owners contend that the Tribes' right to take

shellfish does not include the right to take shellfish found on

privately-owned tidelands. The Private Owners argue that the

lreaties gave the Tribes the same common right to harvest shellfish

as that enjoyed by non-Indian citizens, and that this common right

was diminished by the conveyance of the property into private

ownership. They contend also that the Treaties only allow the

lribes to take the common resources of "public water and public

lands," not to take shellfish on private lands. We reject these

contentions.

First, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected arguments

to the effect that Indian treaties reserve to the Indians no more

fishing rights than those enjoyed by non-Indian citizens. See

Winans, 198 U.S. at 380 (rejecting lower court ruling that Indians

had no more rights than any inhabitant of the Territory); Fishing

Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676-77 & n. 22 (rejecting argument that Indians

only possessed rights in common with other citizens).

Second, as the Supreme Court explained in Winans, the

Tribes were promised "the right of taking fish at all usual and

accustomed places" and the right "of erecting temporary buildings

for curing them." 198 U.S. at 381. "The contingency of future

ownership of the lands, therefore, was foreseen and provided for"

and, "in other words, the Indians were given a right in the land." Jd.

Winans directly contradicts the Private Owners' argument:

the Supreme Court has made clear that the Tribes' fishing rights in

their usual and accustomed places are not diminished by private

I ee ea eR a

24

ownership of those lands. In fact, the Court noted that the Treaties

"imposed a servitude upon every piece of land as though described

therein.” Id.

Moreover, in Fishing Vessel, the Supreme Court explicitly

recognized that the "[T]reaties provide Indians with certain rights—

l.e., the right ... to cross private lands—that non-Indians do not

have." Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676 n. 22. The district court

acknowledged this right in Shellfish II] and correctly concluded that:

[U]pon proper showing of the need for land access, the

Tribes would be entitled under Winans to cross private

property in order to exercise their fishing rights.

Resolving the issue of Tribal access across private

property requires the balancing of competing interests,

and the Court emphasizes that land access is not to be

granted unless there is a proper showing of the need for

such.

909 F.Supp. at 792.

This case is not the first Stevens Treaties case to implicate

private property rights. The previous fishing rights cases, upheld in

Fishing Vessel, noted that the Treaties "include[ | the right to use

private tidelands for beach seines, tidal impoundment traps, stake

nets and reef nets." Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1444; see Washington

/, 384 F.Supp. at 360-61, 378. Appellants’ attempts to distinguish the

anadromous fishing rights from the shellfishing rights are not

persuasive. The Supreme Court has said that "[i]t is absolutely

clear, as Governor Stevens himself said, that neither he nor the

Indians intended that the latter should be excluded from their ancient

fisheries, and it is accordingly inconceivable that either party

deliberately agreed to authorize future settlers to crowd the Indians

out of any meaningful use of their accustomed places to fish."

Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676.

The Private Owners also contend that shellfish are different

than anadromous fish because they have traditionally been held to be

a part of the land. The district court rejected this contention, stating

that "the uniform common law at treaty time held that private

ownership of a parcel of tideland did not include private rights to the

shellfish on that parcel." Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1439. In

support of this proposition, the district court cited Joseph Angell's

1847 Treatise on the Right of Property in Tide Waters, which states

that "[t]here is no doubt, that the public have a right to take shellfish

on the shore, though the right of soil in the shore happens to be

private property.”

On appeal, both the Tribes and the Private Owners cite

several cases in support of their respective contentions that the right

to harvest shellfish from private property was (or was not) permitted

at Treaty time. See Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 74-75.

15 L.Ed. 269 (1855) (stating that "the enjoyment of certain public

rights" included "the common liberty of taking fish, as well shellfish

as floating fish"); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413-14,

10 L.Ed. 997 (1842) (noting that public rights applied "as well for

shell-fish and floating fish"). But see Den v. The Jersey Co., 56 U.S

426, 432-33, 15 How. 426, 14 L.Ed. 757 (1853) ("Clams ordinarily

live in the soil under the waters, and not within the waters.... They

therefore, in a very material sense, belong with the land.")

Regardless of whether shellfish were a private or public resource at

treaty time, or today, the Treaties secured the Tribes' right to fish at

their usual and accustomed grounds and stations. The Tribes

therefore acquired the right to take shellfish from the tidelands

within their usual and accustomed grounds, without regard to the

public or private nature of their ownership. As the district court

stated in Washington I, "[b]ecause the right of each treaty tribe to

take anadromous fish arises from a treaty with the United States,

that right is reserved and protected under the supreme law of the

land, does not depend on state law, is distinct from rights or

privileges held by others, and may not be qualified by any action o!

the state." 384 F.Supp. at 402. Thus, whatever the status of the state

law at the time of the Treaties or today, the Treaties represent the

supreme law of the land and give to the Tribes the right to take

shellfish from private tidelands. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 682

(stating that "neither party to the treaties may rely on the State's

regulatory powers or on property law concepts to defeat the other's

right to a ‘fairly apportioned’ share of each covered run ol

harvestable anadromous fish") (emphasis added).

In light of Winans, Fishing Vessel, and the Treaties’

language and power as the supreme law of the land, the district court

correctly determined that the Tribes have a right to harvest shellfish

on private tidelands.

B. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED

THE MEANING OF THE SHELLFISH PROVISO.

The Treaties’ fishing clauses were expressly limited by the

Shellfish Proviso, which prohibited the Tribes from taking shellfish

from "any beds staked or cultivated by citizens." The district court

"interpret{ed] the terms 'staked' and ‘cultivated’ as the terms were

defined and used in the shellfishing industry at and before treaty

time." 873 F.Supp. at 1441. The district court concluded that, when

the signatory parties used those terms in the Proviso, "they intended

only to exclude Indians from artificial, or planted, shellfish beds;

they neither contemplated nor desired that the Indians would be

excluded from natural shellfish beds." Jd. "Therefore, the words

‘any beds staked or cultivated by citizens,’ describe artificial

shellfish beds created by private citizens." Id.

The Growers offered the district court an alternative

definition of staked or cultivated that "starts and ends with the

treaty-time dictionary." /d. at 1431. The district court noted that

under the Growers’ theory, "any shellfish bed extant today that is

surrounded by stakes, or in some fashion improved by human labor,

would be off limits to the Indians." Jd. The Private Owners make a

similar contention, arguing that "'staked'’ should be interpreted in its

‘frontier’ context and thus should be regarded as a synonym for

‘claimed as private property.’ Therefore, all privately-owned

tideland, whether or not surrounded by stakes, would be protected

by the Shellfish Proviso." Jd. The district court rejected the

Growers’ and Private Owners' definitions, analyzing the Shellfish

Proviso in light of: (1) the surrounding treaty words, (2) the record

of the treaty negotiations, (3) the historical circumstances that gave

rise to the Stevens Treaties, (4) the possible alternative formulations

of the Shellfish Proviso, and (5) the post-treaty conduct of both

parties. Jd. at 1435. In short, the court found that "the Tribes

presented compelling evidence that only artificial beds were ‘staked’

or ‘cultivated’ at treaty time." /d. at 1431-42. Given the deferential

standard by which we review the district court's findings of

historical fact and its findings regarding the intentions of the parties’

negotiators, we conclude the district court did not err in interpreting

the Proviso and we adopt its analysis as our own. Moreover, we

believe that the district court's reasoned analysis of the Proviso is

correct. We emphasize three additional points.

First, the Growers' and Private Owners' interpretations are

not based on the common understanding of the phrase "beds staked

or cultivated" within the context of the shellfishing industry at treaty

time. The district court made a factual finding that the treaty

negotiators drew the language of the Shellfish Proviso from terms

commonly used in the fledgling shellfishing industry. Although the

Growers may have presented evidence to the contrary, none of this

evidence leaves us with a "definite and firm conviction" that a

mistake has been committed. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333,

346 n. 14, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992). It was therefore

not clear error for the district court to have rejected Appellants’

interpretation and to have adopted the Tribes' position.

Second, the Growers' interpretation is totally inconsistent

with the "United States’ avowed intention to preserve for the Indians

their ancient fisheries." Jd. at 1437. The Growers' and Private

Owners' interpretations would read the Proviso to effectively

eliminate the Tribes’ right to take shellfish under the Treaties.

Surely, Governor Stevens would not have intended such a result,

especially in light of the historical circumstances surrounding the

Treaties’ negotiations. In fact, the benevolent approach taken by the

United States treaty negotiators was noted by the Supreme Court in

Fishing Vessel:

Governor Stevens made the following statement to the

Indians gathered at Point-No-Point to negotiate the

treaty bearing that name: "Are you not my children and

also children of the Great Father? What will I not do for

my children, and what will you not for yours? Would

you not die for them? This paper is such as a man

would give to his children and I will tell you why. This

paper gives you a home. Does not a father give his

children a home? ... This paper secures your fish. Does

not a father give food to his children?"

443 U.S. at 667 n.11 (emphasis added). Likewise, the district court

in this case aptly noted:

The one significant promise for purposes of this

litigation is the promise by the United States to the

Indians that they would enjoy a permanent right to fish

as they always had. This right was promised as a sacred

entitlement, one which the United States had a moral

obligation to protect. The Indians were repeatedly

assured that they would continue to enjoy the right to

fish as they always had, in the places where they had

always fished. There is no indication in the minutes of

the treaty proceedings that the Indians were ever told

that they would be excluded from any of their ancient

fisheries.

Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1435. Were we to adopt the Growers'

definition of staked or cultivated, we would be providing "an

28

impotent outcome to negotiations and a convention which seemed to

promise more, and give the word of the nation for more." Winans,

198 U.S. at 380.

Third, the Appellants’ interpretation of the Proviso casts

aside black-letter canons of statutory construction and treaty

interpretation. The Shellfish Proviso is an exception to the Tribes'

otherwise broad fishing rights. "A proviso is strictly construed, and

only those subjects expressly restricted are freed from the operation

of the statute." Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 20.22, at

110 (Sth ed.1992). Moreover, courts have uniformly held that

treaties must be liberally construed in favor of the Indians.

Confederated Tribes of Chehalis, 96 F.3d at 340. "These rules of

construction ‘are rooted in the unique trus* relationship between the

United States and the Indians.'" Jd. (quotitig Oneida County v.

Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84

L.Ed.2d 169 (1985)). The Appellants’ interpretation of the Proviso

would render meaningless the above canons of construction and

interpretation.

ae THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY REJECTED

APPELLANTS' AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES.

The Growers contend that we should apply the doctrine of

laches to defeat the Tribes’ claim to shellfish. The doctrine of laches

is defined as "neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken together

with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to [the]

adverse party, operates as [a] bar in [a] court of equity." Black's

Law Dictionary 875 (6th ed.1990). In urging us to apply laches, the

Growers argue that "this is an extraordinary case.... These

extraordinary facts call for new law." Growers’ Opening Brief at 44.

The Growers ask for new law simply because current law

precludes their argument. In Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712, 718

(9th Cir.1983), we held that "laches or estoppel is not available to

defeat Indian treaty rights." Although the equities do weigh heavily

in favor of the Growers’ argument—the Tribes waited 135 years to

assert their shellfishing rights—the law does not support their claim.

See Board of County Comm'rs vy. United States, 308 U.S. 343,

350-51, 60 S.Ct. 285, 84 L.Ed. 313 (1939) (defenses based on delay

in bringing claims such as laches and estoppel are inapplicable to

claims to enforce Indian rights). Once again, we reiterate that we are

interpreting a treaty, and that treaties enjoy a unique position in our

law.

————————_

29

UPOW's argument that the Tribes’ treaty rights were

extinguished by the Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U.S.C. § 70

(repealed 1978), is without merit. Judge Boldt rejected this theory

over twenty years ago, see United States v. Washington, 459 F.Supp.

1020, 1039-42 (W.D. Wash.1978), and we reject it here for the same

reasons.

D. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

LIMITING THE TRIBES' RIGHT TO HARVEST

SHELLFISH FROM CERTAIN AREAS BECAUSE THE

DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER REDEFINED THE TERMS

OF THE TREATY.

In their cross-appeal, the Tribes and the United States

contend that, in its implementation decision (Shellfish I/), the district

court disregarded its own admonition in its first decision that it

lacked authority to rewrite or interpret the terms of the treaties to

avoid hardship to any party based on its own notions of the equities.

The implementation decision, the Tribes contend, erroneously

redefined the terms of the treaties in abrogation of the Tribes’ right

to take shellfish. For example, the district court refined its

definition of the word "cultivated" in the Proviso and imposed "time,

place, and manner" restrictions on the Tribes’ ability to harvest

shellfish.

We hold that the district court impermissibly employed

equitable powers to rewrite the Treaties’ terms. However, we also

hold that allocating {fifty percent of the commercial Growers’

shellfish harvest to the Tribes would unjustly enrich them. Such an

allocation would simply not comport with Fishing Vessels concept

of giving the Tribes a "fair share" of the harvest.

l. The district court improperly limited the Tribes’

right to take shellfish from the Growers’ shellfish

beds.

In Shellfish II, the district court declared that "it is

incumbent upon this Court to use its equitable powers to effect a

balance between the Tribes' Treaty shelifishing right and the

Growers’ and Owners' interest in the peaceful enjoyment and/or

commercial development of their property." /d. Using these

"equitable powers," the district court formulated a "broader"

definition of a "cultivated" shellfish bed that applies only to "the

existing beds on property owned or leased by Growers licensed by

the State of Washington." /d. at 1461. The court then deemed

natural shellfish beds that have been enhanced by human means "de

facto artificial beds" upon which the Tribes may not take shellfish.8

Id. at 1462. "Permitting the Tribes to harvest fifty percent of the

shellfish from de facto artificial beds would confer a windfall on the

Tribes, and would neither protect nor encourage the growth of the

shellfish industry." Id.

In support of its use of equitable principles, the district court

and Appellants primarily rely on five cases: Yankton Sioux Tribe of

Indians v. United States, 272 U.S. 351, 357, 47 S.Ct. 142, 71 L.Ed.

294 (1926) (awarding Indians monetary payment rather than ejecting

"innumerable innocent purchasers" from tribal land); South Carolina

v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 519 n.5, 106 S.Ct.

2039, 90 L.Ed.2d 490 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing

Yankton and acknowledging that equitable considerations might

have limited the remedies available had the plaintiff tribe prevailed

on its claim to 144,000 acres of land); County of Oneida v. Oneida

Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 260, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169

(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (urging that laches be applied to bar

Indians’ claim to lands); Brooks v. Nez Perce County, Idaho, 670

F.2d 835 (9th Cir.1982) (in an action to quiet title to a parcel of land,

equitable considerations would not bar the ciaim to the land entirely,

but "[ljack of diligence by the government in exercising its role as

trustee may be weighed by the district court in calculating damages"

for several decades of loss of use of the land); United States v.

Imperial Irrigation Dist., 799 F.Supp. 1052 (S.D.Cal.1992)

(employing tort-law equitable principles to award monetary

damages to the plaintiff Indians, rather than restoring tribal land to

them).

None of the above cases, however, involve the use of

equitable considerations in interpreting Indian treaties. At best, they

condone the use of equity as a tool to calculate damages.

The majority in Oneida, 470 U.S. at 244, stated that "it is far from

8 The court declared that only "those beds whose existence is entirely due

to the natural propagation of the species" are subject to the Tribes’ Treaty rights.

This declaration excluded from Tribal harvest: 1) beds created from scratch;

2) beds enhanced by planting, netting or seeding pre existing shellfish beds; 3) beds

enhanced by using predator control or rototilling in or around preexisting beds;

and 4) "beds whose existence is due to the Grower's efforts, albeit passively, such as

the ‘natural’ migration of shellfish from an artificial bed to a new spot." Shellfish II,

898 F.Supp. at 1462.

31

clear that [laches] is available in suits such as this one" to restore

Indian lands to Indians pursuant to treaty rights. In fact, in the terse

three-page Brooks opinion, the court concluded that laches was not a

valid bar to the Indians fifty-four-year-old complaint for a parcel of

land. 670 F.2d at 837. Brooks had nothing to do with interpretation

of an Indian treaty, but merely concluded that the lengthy delay in

pursuing the action could be used in "calculating damages." Here,

by contrast, the district court is using equitable principies to assist in

fashioning the remedy and in interpreting the Treaty.

The Tribes, on the other hand, cite persuasive and

unambiguous Supreme Court authority. The district court's

re-interpretation violates the Supreme Court's admonition in United

States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 532-33, 21 S.Ct. 149, 45

L.Ed. 291 (1900), a seminal Indian treaty interpretation case:

But in no case has it been adjudged that the courts could

by mere interpretation or in deference to its view as to

what was right under all the circumstances, incorporate

into an Indian treaty something that was inconsistent

with the clear import of its words.... We are not at

liberty to dispense with any of the conditions or

requirements of the treaty, or to take away any

qualification or integral part of any stipulation, upon any

notion of equity or general convenience, or substantial

justice.

(emphasis added; quotation and citation omitted). The district court

itself recognized in Shellfish I:

In reaching its decision, the Court may not rewrite the

Treaties or interpret the Treaties in a way contrary to

settled law simply to avoid or minimize any hardship to

the public or to the intervenors. Indeed, the Court has

no such power. Rather, amelioration from such

hardships should be sought from Congress, which has

the power to abrogate the treaty....

873 F.Supp. at 1429. See also Choctaw, 179 U.S. at 531-32 (citing

cases in support of rule that "the language used in treaties with the

9 The Imperial Irrigation District case provides little support for the

Appellants. First, it is currently pending on appeal. Second, it is stayed pending

settlement discussions. See 799 F.Supp. at 1068.

=

Indians should never be construed to their prejudice" and that words

should be construed as they “were understood by this unlettered

people, rather than their critical meaning"). Under these rules of

construction, the Choctaw precedent, and the district court's own

statements in Shellfish I, the district court abused its discretion by

applying notions of equity to redefine the term "cultivate."

It does not follow from the above, however, that the district

court is without the ability to use equity in implementing its Treaty

interpretation. As laid out below, we believe the district court

should have used its equitable powers only to limit the take of the

Tribes—not the location—so as to avoid any unjust enrichment.

2. The district court improperly allocated to the Tribes

a fifty-percent share of shellfish from the Growers’

beds.

Appellants contend that Tribes' allocation of fifty-percent of

the shellfish resource exceeded their "fair share." Appellants

suggest that the district court should have considered "equitable

factors" and that it improperly applied the "moderate living"

analysis suggested by the Supreme Court in Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S.

at 684-686. Although we conclude that the district court correctly

applied Fishing Vessel 's moderate living analysis, we hold that the

district court should have used equitable principles to limit the

Tribe's shellfish harvest from the Growers’ beds to a "fair share."

“~e

In Fishing Vessel, the Court stated that an equitable measure

of the common right should initially divide the harvestable portion

of each run that passes through a “usual and accustomed" place into

approximately equal treaty and non- treaty shares, and should then

reduce the treaty share if tribal needs may be satisfied by a lesser

amount. 443 U.S. at 685. The Court elaborated on this concept:

[T]he central principle here must be that Indian treaty

rights to a natural resource that once was thoroughly and

exclusively exploited by the Indians secures so much as,

but no more than is necessary to provide the Indians

with a livelihood-that is to say, a moderate living... If,

for example, a tribe should dwindle to just a few

members, or if it should find other sources of support

that lead it to abandon its fisheries, a 45% or 50%

allocation of an entire run that passes through its

customary fishing grounds would be manifestly

inappropriate because the livelihood of the tribe under

33

those circumstances could not reasonably require an

allotment of a large number of fish.

Id. at 686-87. Appellants contend that the district court's allocation

of fifty percent of the shellfish resource goes beyond what is

necessary to afford the Tribes a "moderate living.”

The district court, however, heard evidence as to the Tribes’

living standards presented by both sides and concluded that

Appellants’ experts’ analyses were "flawed."!0 The district court

made the following finding:

The uncontroverted evidence presented at trial is that the

Tribes lag significantly behind other residents of the

State of Washington in their overall standard of living.

For example, approximately one in_ three Tribal

members live below the poverty level; Indians in the

State of Washington endure health circumstances

characterized by the State as “very poor," tribal

members have per capita incomes that are less than one

half the per capita income of non-tribal residents of the

State; and tribal members suffer from unemployment

rates at least three times greater than that of all

non-tribal residents of the State of Washington.

Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1446. This finding is not clearly

erroneous. |! |

However, Fishing Vessel instructs us to give the Tribes a

"fair share" and to “fairly apportion" the fish. Fishing Vessel, 443

US. at 682, 686. With respect to the Growers’ shellfish beds, we

conclude that it would contravene such notions of fairness if the

Tribes were permitted to take fifty percent of the Growers’ enhanced

harvest. Many of the Growers have spent decades developing and

10 UPOW's expert, Dr. Thomas, relied solely on what he called “tribal

household income" and compared it to a moderate living standard by reference to

the Bureau of the Census income data for non-Indian households. 873 F.Supp. at

1446. The district court concluded that this analysis was flawed because it relied

only on income, making it a "single-indicator" analysis. /d.

11 Even if we were to consider Tribal income from casino operations—as

the Appellants ask us to do—we would not be left with a "definite and firm

conviction” that the district court's findings were erroncous.

34

enhancing production on their shellfish beds, investing their

valuable time, energy, and considerable resources. We therefore

hold that only those Growers’ beds that exist solely by virtue of the

natural propagation of the species are subject to a full fifty-percent

harvest allocation. The other Grower beds will be subject to the

allocation analysis below.

————

Our decision here is consistent with our previous decision in

United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1358-59 (9th Cir.1985)

(en banc), where we concluded that hatchery fish are subject to

Treaty allocation. In that decision, several "equitable

considerations" favored the Tribes’ position, including "the lack of

State ownership of the fish once released" and "the lack of any

unjust enrichment of the Tribes." Jd. Here, however, those same

equitable considerations do not support the Tribes’ allocation of fifty

percent of the Growers’ shellfish. First, unlike hatchery fish—which

are replacement fish that are released into the water when grown—

shellfish on the Growers' beds remain on the Growers’ beds until

they are harvested. Second, in the instant case, the Tribes would be

unjustly enriched if they were entitled to a full fifty percent of the

Growers’ shellfish. The Tribes candidly admitted as much at oral

argument when they conceded that equity should permit a Grower to

protect his enhanced harvest "for a couple of years." We believe not

for a couple of years, but forever.

Our conclusion squares with one of the purposes of the

Proviso, which was "to protect the fledgling oyster industry['s]"

efforts to create a harvest where there was none, or where it was

insufficient to support a commercial livelihood. Shellfish I, 873

F.Supp. at 1437-38; see also id. ("To the extent [the Proviso]

prohibited Indians from taking shellfish from both artificial and

natural shellfish beds where settlers were engaging in fruitful

harvesting, [the Proviso] would aid the development of the

industry."). Moreover, the Tribes are not excluded from their

ancient fisheries; they are merely precluded from taking an unfair

share.

We therefore apply the following analysis to Grower beds

where the Growers, or their predecessors, began their enhancement

efforts on a natural bed. For such natural beds, the Growers shall

demonstrate what portion of their harvest is due to their labor, as

opposed to what portion would exist absent the Growers’

enhancement. See Shellfish II.,.898 F.Supp. at 1462. For such

enhanced natural beds, the Tribes shall be entitled to fifty percent of

the pre-enhanced sustainable shellfish production from those

€

*

“

2

35

beds.12 Of course, this allocation analysis does not apply to

artificial beds, that is, to Grower beds that did not support a

sustainable commercial density of shellfish prior to cultivation. As

the Tribes have acknowledged, the Tribes have no right to harvest

such beds. 898 F.Supp. at 1460-61.!2

We place the burden of proving pre-enhancement harvest

versus post-enhancement harvest on the Growers—for the Growers

are best able to prove such a calculation.!3 We remand to the

district court for a determination as to the best manner to implement

this allocation. We emphasize that this "enhanced allocation"

analysis applies only to the Commercial Shellfish Growers’ beds.

2. The district court erred by concluding that the State

of Washington is a "citizen."

The district court determined that the term "citizens" in the

Shellfish Proviso, "includes the State of Washington, when the State

acts on behalf of the public." /d. at 1459-60. The court noted that

"the five million residents of the State are blameless in this

controversy, and the Court believes that the benefits and efficiencies

of permitting the State to act on their behalf in growing the State's

shellfish resource far outweigh any interest the tribes have in

limiting the artificial bed exclusion to natural persons." Id. n. 11.

The court therefore concluded that "to the extent the State hereafter

creates artificial shellfish beds on public property, those beds shall

be deemed 'staked or cultivated by citizens' and thus excluded under

the Shellfish Proviso from the Tribes’ Treaty right." Jd. Because the

court once again improperly invoked equitable principles in its

interpretation of the Treaty, and there is no support in the law for the

proposition that a state can be a "citizen," we reverse this aspect of

the district court's decision.

12 For example, if ten clams per square foot were a density sufficient to

support a commercial livelihood at the time that enhancement began, and if a 100

square foot Grower's bed yielded ten clams per square foot prior to the Grower's

efforts to enhance the output (1,000 clams), and that same bed now produces fifty

clams per square foot as a result of the Grower's labor (5,000 clams), the Tribes

would be entitled to fifty percent of the 1,000 clams or 500 clams.

13 One way to do this would be to compare a Grower's bed's earliest

shellfish production figures with the bed's current output. This could serve as one

of the bases by which to calculate the proper allocation amount.

36

In the State of Washington's brief and at oral argument, it

was unable to cite a single case to support its proposition that a State

can be "citizen." We note that it took an act of Congress to enable a

corporation to be considew:d a citizen for purposes of diversity

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We therefore reverse that

portion of the district court's decision which deems the Stace of

Washington a "citizen" for purposes of the Shellfish Proviso.

4, The district court committed clear error in finding

that 0.5 pounds of mature clams per square foot is

the minimum density necessary to establish a

natural bed.

In Shellfish IT, the district court concluded that "in light of

the practices and understandings in the shellfish industry that existed

at treaty time, it is clear that a quantitative definition of a natural bed

is appropriate.” 898 F.Supp. at 1461. The court defined a "natural

shellfish bed" as a "bed capable of sustaining a yield of shellfish that

will support a commercial livelihood." Jd. The Tribes do not dispute

these findings, but contend that the district court committed clear

error when it found that the minimum quantity of manila clams that

will support a commercial livelihood is 0.5 pounds of mature clams

per square foot. Manila clams are the only species for which the

district court made such a finding. Because there is insufficient

evidence in the record to support the district court's finding, we

conclude that the district court clearly erred.

No witness gave an opinion as to the density of manila

clams necessary for a successful commercial harvest. No document

in the record sets forth any analysis of what density is necessary for

commercial success. There is a document in the record which

purports to show the densities of twelve manila clam beds leased

from the State of Washington, but twelve beds is far too small and

unrepresentative a sample of commercial beds to support a reliable

finding of fact. See, e.g., National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416,

434 n. 52 (D.C.Cir.1980) (recognizing problems with generalizing

"from an extremely limited sample when a broader sample ... can be

readily obtained and when no showing of the representativeness of

the sample is made") (citations omitted). Moreover, there is no

14 Because we conclude that the district court clearly erred, we do not

address the Tribes’ contention that they were unfairly surprised and unable to

present evidence on this issue. On remand, the Tribes will have an opportunity to

present such evidence.

37

indication that these bed samples included only mature clams in

their density calculation. Significantly, two of the twelve beds

appear to have densities of less than .26 pounds per square foot.

In light of the above, we reverse the district court's finding

that the minimum quantity of manila clams that will support a

commercial livelihood is 0.5 pounds of mature clams per square

foot. We remand to the district court for a new hearing on this issue.

5. The district court did not abuse its discretion by

limiting the Tribes’ ability to cross private uplands.

The district court prohibited tribal access across privately

owned upland property to reach shellfishing areas unless

"specifically requested from and granted by a Special Master," with

permission to be refused unless "tribal members can demonstrate the

absence of access by boat, public road, or public right of way."!5

Shellfish III, 909 F.Supp. at 793. The Tribes contend that this

decision is "an unprecedented limitation on Tribes’ treaty fishing

rights."

The Supreme Court has already determined that the Tribes

are entitled to a right of access across private lands to invoke their

Treaty fishing rights. Winans, 198 U.S. at 383. Winans recognized

that the Treaties "imposed a servitude upon every piece of land as

though described therein." /d. at 381. Rather than completely

eliminating the Tribes’ rights to cross private land, which it could

not do under Winans, the district court engaged in a careful

balancing of hardships in fashioning its remedy. Although we have

held that the district court cannot use equitable principles in

interpreting the Treaties, it can use them in deciding how to

implement the Treaties (i.e., how the tribes will be allowed to

exercise their previously interpreted rights). Such a use of equities

is permissible under the circumstances of this case. See Yankton, 272

U.S. at 357 (allowing monetary damages to Indians in lieu of

ejectment of innocent land purchasers in order to avoid a "great

15 This decision amended the court's decision in Shellfish I], which

originally held that the Tribes had no right of private upland access at all. 989

F.Supp. at 1473.

38

injustice").16 We therefore conclude that the district court did not

err by requiring the Tribes to prove the unavailability of other forms

of access before allowing them to cross private land.

6. The district court did not abuse its discretion in

imposing time, place, and manner restrictions on the

Tribes' ability to harvest shellfish.

The district court also invoked equitable principles to

subject the Tribes' Treaty shellfishing right to reasonable time, place

and manner restrictions when the right is exercised on the Growers'

or Owners' property. As discussed directly above, the time, place,

and manner restrictions present a proper use of the court's equitable

powers.

The court imposed the following restrictions on the Tribes’

ability to harvest shellfish: 1) the Tribes' harvest is limited to five

days per year, with some increase on larger lots, for any private

beach not controlled by a Grower, 898 F.Supp. at 1473; 2) if a

Grower decides that a Tribe's proposed harvest plan is not

"compatible with the Growers' farming operation," the Grower may

unilaterally modify the plan, and have "the final word on how a

tribal harvest will be conducted," id. at 1470; 3) the Grower may

entirely prohibit harvest of natural clams underneath areas cultivated

for oysters, even when no oysters are then present, id. at 1471; 4) no

harvest may occur on non-Grower private tidelands without a survey

"to determine the existence of shellfish populations," id. at 1472;

and 5) the "manner and method" of such a survey must be "of the

type currently in use by the State." Jd.

Of particular concern to the Tribes is the restriction that

allows the Growers to control access to natural clams by choosing

not to harvest them in favor of the oysters under which the clams are

found. The Tribes describe this restriction as a "gaping loophole"

that has the capacity at the Growers' discretion to deny to them the

very rights to natural clams which our holding confirms.

16 The Tribes and the United States also urge us to read into the absence

of upland access showing a "reasonableness" requirement. We decline to do so, but

we direct the district court, upon remand, to clarify its order with regard to this

issue.

39

The Growers' counter with the argument from the record

that the process of harvesting natural clams from underneath the

oyster beds can seriously disrupt and suffocate their oysters.

On reflection, the Tribes’ concerns although certainly not

fanciful-are based at this point on speculation as to what might

happen in the future. The Growers, for example, represent that

"where there are substantial economic benefits to a Grower from

harvesting clams, the Grower will do so." And, "{a]s soon as the

Grower does, the trial court's implementation plan provides that the

Tribes have the right to a share of those clams." The Growers say

that they are "commercial farmers-if there is money to be made, the

resource assuredly will be exploited."

Under the circumstances, we believe that the district court's

restrictions do not amount at this time to an abuse of discretion. The

district court attempted to fashion a prospective solution to a

difficult situation by balancing the parties' respective interests. The

district court's restrictions safeguard the Tribes' right of access to the

ancient fisheries, but also protect the interests of the Growers and

Private Owners. Importantly, in this aspect of the court's decision

the court did not use equity as the basis for its interpretation of the

decision, but only as a way to implement its correctly reasoned

interpretation of the Proviso. While the Tribes may not be happy

with the limits imposed on their harvesting, they are still able to

effectuate their allocation under the Treaties and are not excluded

from their ancient fisheries.

We are confident that any future practices by the Growers

that trench inappropriately upon the Tribes’ rights as confirmed in

this opinion will be adequately dealt with by the district court. The

district court is the best place to manage any wrinkles that might

crop up. The best way to avoid such problems, of course, is for the

parties constructively to work together to respect each others’ rights.

We reject the Tribes' contention that the restrictions are

contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Puyallup Tribe v.

Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 88 S.Ct. 1725, 20 L.Ed.2d 689

(1968). Puyallup arose because a series of Washington state court

decisions and state regulations imposed discriminatory restrictions

on the Tribes. The Supreme Court held "the manner of fishing, the

size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like

may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation,

provided the regulation meets appropriate standards and does not

discriminate against the Indians.’ Id. at 398 (emphasis added). The

40

Tribes cite no persuasive authority, however, to support the

application of these standards to an implementation order

promulgated by a Federal District Court. Puyallup applies to

restrictions imposed "by the State," not the Federal Courts. The

district court drafted the implementation order to interpret and to

enforce the Tribes’ rights under the Treaties, not to restrict those

rights. The motivation underlying the Court's decision in

Puyallup—state discrimination against tribal fisheries—is simply

not a factor when a district court imposes equitable restrictions of

the type present in this case.

he The district court's procedures for selecting and

disqualifying special masters deny due process.

Shellfish III established a panel of four special masters, with

one to be randomly selected to hear each dispute. 909 F.Supp. at

793. The Tribes object to two aspects of the plan: 1) Appellants’

right to designate three of the four panel members; and 2) the

designating parties’ ability to remove special masters at will and

without court approval. The district court rejected the first objection

outright, noting that the two parties to a dispute each have a

twenty-five percent chance of having their own special master

selected. The Tribes contend that Appellants have almost identical

interests: therefore, the odds are 3-1 in Appellants' favor. In fact, the

district court made a finding that "each of the other parties is adverse

to the Tribes, but not necessarily aligned with the others." Shellfish

III, 909 F.Supp. at 790. Given the district court's finding that the

Appellants are "adverse to the Tribes," we conclude that due process

is violated if there is a seventy-five percent chance that Appellants’

master will be selected. We therefore vacate this aspect of the

implementation plan, and remand to the district court to reconfigure

the appointment of Special Masters.

The Tribes also argue that allowing the parties to appoint

and remove the master at will compromises the independence of the

special master. Because the district court must approve the

appointment of the Masters, see Shellfish III, 909 F.Supp. at 794, we

find no merit in this argument.

8. The district court did not err in authorizing a special

master to award damages against Tribal members.

The Tribes argue that Shellfish III's provision allowing the

special master to award damages against Tribal members is legally

flawed. In addition, they contend that Shellfish JI erroneously

41

contains a provision allowing damages against the Tribes

themselves. In Shellfish III, the district court amended its decision

to preclude damage awards against the Tribes because Tribes cannot

be sued without their unequivocal consent. See Oklahoma Tax

Comm'n v. Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509, 111 S.Ct.

905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991). The district court, and the Tribes in

their motion for reconsideration, apparently overlooked section 6.2

of Shellfish I's implementation order. Section 6.2 also allows

special masters to award damages against the Tribes. We therefore

vacate the portion of section 6.2 that allows for a special master to

award damages against the Tribes. As set forth below, however, the

special master can award damages against individual Tribal

members.

The Tribes concede that individuals may be bound by orders

affecting their "common public rights as citizens" in litigation to

which their sovereign is a party. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of

Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 341, 78 S.Ct. 1209, 2 L.Ed.2d 1345 (1958).

A similar issue arose in Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 692 n. 32, where

the Court concluded that non-party fishermen could be enjoined

from actions interfering with the judgment of the district court. "[A]

court clearly may order them to obey that judgment." /d The

Tribes’ assertion that "the contemplated claims against tribal

members have nothing to do with the common rights of state or

tribal citizens" therefore is without merit. On the contrary, if tribal

members damage private property while exercising their fishing

rights, they directly implicate their sovereigns’ interests and the

district court's judgment.

Similarly, the Tribes' argument that claims for trampled

shrubs, damaged docks, or littered beaches "would raise no federal

question" is also without merit. If the damages arise out of the

exercise of fishing rights based on the district court's interpretation

of the Stevens Treaties, the district court has the authority to hear

such a dispute. Moreover, the dispute would arise from the same

"nucleus of operative facts," affording the court supplemental

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

We therefore affirm the. special master's ability to

recommend damages against individual Tribal members, but vacate

section 6.2's provision allowing damages against the Tribes.

42

9. The district court did not err in determining that the

Tribes are not entitled to attorney's fees.

The Trives request attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

The Tribes’ request is foreclosed: by United States v. Washington,

813 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir.1987) (concluding Tribes not entitled to

attorney's fees in entire United States v. Washington series of

litigation). We therefore affirm the district court's denial of fees.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM IN PART and

REVERSE IN PART the district court's decisions in Shellfish I,

Shellfish I], and Shellfish ITI. We REMAND this case to the district

court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. In so doing, we

compliment the district court for the clarity of its opinions

previously rendered.

We recognize the enormous impact our decision will have

on the thousands of homeowners, Tribal members, and commercial

fishermen in the Puget Sound region. It must be remembered that

we are a court of limited jurisdiction. Moreover, we are bound by

the Constitution's Supremacy Clause which accords special standing

to treaties. We do not have the power simply to "rewrite the

Treaties or interpret the Treaties in a way contrary to settled law

simply to avoid or minimize any hardship" to any of the parties in

this case. Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1429. This case has come a

long way since the 1970's when a "total lack of meaningful

communication" led to "deep distrust" between the parties. 384

F.Supp. at 329-30. The parties have apparently made sincere efforts

to settle this dispute; we hope that our decision assists and renews

that effort.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED

FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

The parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal.

BEEZER, Circuit Judge, Concurring:

I specially concur in the opinion of the court. I express my

views concerning the interpretation of the Stevens Treaties and the

appointment of special masters.

eins ee wT

roe

43

The Stevens Treaties provide:

The right of taking fish, at all usual and

accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to

said Indians, in common with all citizens of the

Territory, and of erecting temporary houses for the

purpose of curing, together with the privilege of

hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their

horses on open and unclaimed lands: Provided,

however, that they shall not take shell fish from any

beds staked or cultivated by citizens.

Treaty of Medicine Creek, December 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132, Art

[II (it is undisputed that this clause is substantively identical in all

subject treaties).

The United States asks us to hold that shellfish beds,

unharvested in the nineteenth century, were "usual and accustomed"

tribal fishing grounds in 1854. This argument strains even the

deferential canons of Indian treaty interpretation. It is, however, the

law of this case and of the Supreme Court that the reserved fishing

right makes no distinctions between migratory fish and shellfish or

between fish runs and static fishing grounds. The origin of this rule

of law is perplexing.

In 1974, Judge Boldt concluded that the Indian Tribes had

treaty fishing rights which entitled them to harvest up to fifty

percent of fish passing through the tribes’ fishing grounds. United

States v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. 312 (W.D.Wash.1974) ("Boldt

Decision"), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.

1086 (1976). The Supreme Court "substantially upheld" the Boldt

Decision in Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 99

S.Ct. 3055, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (1978). United States v. Suquamish

Indian Tribe, 901 F.2d 772, 773 (9th Cir.1990). The Boldt Decision

held that the fishing right is "not limited as to species of fish." Boldt

Decision, 384 F.Supp. at 401.

Fishing Vessel held that tribes have a right to equal amounts

of fish "taken from runs of fish that pass through the Indians’ usual

and accustomed fishing grounds." Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 689.

A tribe's rights are defined in case law by the grounds the tribe

fished and not the particular species taken. The Indians reserved the

"right to take a share of each run of fish that passes through tribal

fishing areas." Id. at 679. Implicit in the Fishing Vessel opinion is

the principle that to limit access strictly to historical fishing grounds

and species would render the right to fish a nullity because citizens

44

cemeeereerrameaaa es mans nia

could harvest all fish downstream. Similarly, in United States v.

Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 25 S.Ct. 662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905), the

Court determined that the issuance of a license to erect a fishing

wheel where the device deprived Indians of the run oi fish that

passed through their usual and accustomed fishing grounds was

impermissible.

The underpinning of the Court's interpretation of the Stevens

Treaties should not apply to shellfish because they are, with the

exception of crustaceans, immobile. There can be no device that

prevents the migration of immobile shellfish to, through or from the

tribes' usual and accustomed fishing grounds.

The burden imposed by our opinion cannot be overstated.

The record in this case makes abundantly clear that since treaty

times a vibrant shellfish industry has developed in the State of

Washington along the saltwater beaches of the Pacific Ocean and

along tidelands adjoining the inland waters of Puget Sound.

The labors of a modern day shellfish producer are vividly

recounted in The Seattle Times, May 1, 1997, p. B-1, as follows:

After all, one of the first skills he found

necessary was the patience to stare for 10 hours at a

time at a leathery, slithering geoduck neck sticking out

of a plastic bucket full of sand--waiting to catch the

unlovely bivalve in its private, and very erratic, act of

spawning. Complicating the task is the fact that

geoducks must spawn before hatchery breeders, such as

Dahman, can tell the males from the females.

"It's maddening stuff. These geoducks can make

a long day of it for you," says Dahman. His tattered

logger's clothing and irreverent rants about biologists

and bureaucrats belie the mix of genetics, mechanical

engineering, global marketing and money going into this

venture.

"The idea here is to grow geoducks where we've

never been able to grow anything before. We're still

crawling at all this."

For Dahman, the first baby steps will come this

fall when he harvests the initial crop of hatchery-reared

geoducks planted on his south Puget Sound tidelands

outside of Shelton four years ago.

Ae eat a ea es

45

Dahman Shellfish and its neighbor, Taylor United,

one of the state's biggest shellfish growers, are believed to

be the first in the U.S. commercially raising geoducks--a

forerunner, predict aquaculture experts, to eventually

breeding such edible if weird-looking creatures as sea

cucumbers and sea urchins in the lab.

Citizens--as well as tribal members and the state--have long

set aside suitable tidelands acquired by purchase, by inclusion in

reservation boundaries or by dedications adjoining state lands to the

cultivation of clams, oysters and other species of shellfish. The

opinion we file today will open these tidelands to the harvest of

commercially valuable shellfish by the Tribes in common with the

citizens as a matter of treaty right.

It is now clear that the Tribes are granted access to tidelands

which contain cultivated shellfish produced by the Growers. The

details of how much and when the Tribes may harvest shellfish from

such lands remains unresolved. We assign the Growers "the burden

of proving pre-enhancement harvest versus post- enhancement

harvest." The district court will be faced with the application of this

scheme. Our suggestion shifts the law that the party asserting a

treaty right must prove that right. See, e.g., United States v. Lummi

Indian Tribe, 841 F.2d 317, 318 (9th Cir.1988) (a tribe asserting

usual and accustomed fishing grounds has the burden to produce

evidence that a particular location was customarily used at treaty

time). The assignment of the burden of proof is critical. The district

court, after hearing testimony, determined that it "would be very

difficult--if not impossible--to develop a ‘snapshot’ of existing

shellfish beds at the time commercial development commenced on

the Growers’ property." Shellfish II, 898 F.Supp. at 1462. Where a

disputed fact cannot be proven, the placement of the burden of proof

is dispositive. The Growers’ burden is heavy and the district court's

assignment is daunting.

The tension between grower and Indian under treaty

provisions is clear. One will not grow shellfish on lands bearing

natural shellfish to provide subsistence to the other without

compensation for the damage occurring to the cultivated shellfish.

The majority asks the parties to "constructively ... work together to

respect each others’ rights." I fear the time for that has passed. The

fact that the Tribes are concerned about the Growers’ "gaping

loophole" to deny them access to naturally occurring shellfish by

never allowing their beds to be free of oyster crops evidences the

tension between the parties. Burden of proof and access issues that

46 ;

remain unresolved in the opinion we file today guarantee continuing

disputes between the tribes and the citizens of Washington State.

Property rights, which have been undisturbed for

generations, are encumbered by our decision today. In Vanhorne's

Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 304, 310, 1 L.Ed. 391

(Cir.Ct.Pa.Dist.1795), Justice Patterson observed:

From these passages it is evident; that the right of acquiring

and possessing property, and having it protected, is one of

the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man. Men

have a sense of property: Property is necessary to their

subsistence and correspondent to their natural wants and

desires; its security was one of the objects, that induced

them to unite in society. No man would become a member

of a community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his

honest labour and industry. The preservation of property

then is a primary object of the social compact, and, by the

late Constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamental

law.

Property rights, so fundamental to American government,

need not be trampled upon. Exclusive use of private tidelands by

commercial growers should not deprive the Tribes of their treaty

share of shellfish; the Tribes could be allocated half of the naturally

occurring shellfish without disturbing the hard-earned and long-held

property rights of private growers. Shares of the shellfish taken, of

course, need not be determined by the place where the shellfish are

taken. | Thus, a tribal share of shellfish could come from reservation

land, government land or private tidelands acquired by the tribe.

Survival of Washington's shellfish industry depends upon

the growers’ ability to dedicate tidelands to exclusive use. This

cannot be done under existing case law interpretation of the Stevens

Treaties. We are, however, bound, by the authority of the Supreme

Court and the law of the case, to that interpretation. Exclusive use of

tidelands will be possible ifthe Supreme Court recognizes the

shellfish proviso with respect to "cultivation" and makes clear the

distinctions between migratory fish and shellfish; between fish runs

and static fishing grounds; and between natural shellfish and

cultivated shellfish.

| Fishing Vessel makes this point clear. The Court held that "fish taken by

treaty fisherman off the reservations and at locations other than ‘usual and accustomed’

sites ... [are] to be counted as part of the Indians’ [treaty] share." Fishing Vessel, 443

U.S. at 687 n. 29.

ORR er

osc?

FROM N REDE Cae ASB PEE

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47

il

The district court held that, upon proper showing and

subject to time, place and manner restrictions, the Tribes are entitled

to cross private property in order to exercise their shellfishing rights.

United States v. Washington, 909 F.Supp. 787, 792

(W.D.Wash.1995). If a dispute arises between a property owner and

a Treaty Tribe, concerning the exercise of the Shellfish Treaty right,

the matter is to be resolved by a special master. Id. The Tribes, the

State of Washington, the Shellfish Growers and the Private Property

Owners each are permitted to designate a special master, one of

which is to be selected at random to resolve a pending dispute. Id. at

793-94. The special master is to issue a written report and

recommendation subject to approval and adoption by the district

court. Id. at 794. The opinion filed today holds that "due process is

violated" because “there is a seventy-five percent chance that

Appellants’ master will be selected." We vacate and remand to the

district court to reconfigure the appointment of special masters.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(a), which governs the appointment of

special masters, states in pertinent part, "(t]he court in which any

action is pending may appoint a special master therein." Reference

to a master "shall be the exception and not the rule" and shall be

made "upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it."

Burlington Northern v. Dep't of Revenue, 934 F.2d 1064, 1071 (9th

Cir.1991) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(b)). "The use of masters is ‘to

aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may

arise in the progress of a cause,’ and not to displace the court." La

Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256, 77 S.Ct. 309, |

L.Ed.2d 290 (1956) (quoting Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 40

S.Ct. 543, 64 L.Ed. 919 (1920)). "Litigants are entitled to a trial by

the court, in every suit, save where exceptional circumstances are

shown." Id. at 258. "Congestion in itself is not such an exceptional

circumstance as to warrant a reference to a master." Id. at 259; see

also Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d §

2601 (1995) (the appointment of a master is for the purpose of

assisting the court to obtain facts). "The Courts have tended to read

Rule 53 narrowly, closely circumscribing the range of circumstances

in which reference to a master is appropriate.” Burlington Northern,

934 F.2d 1071 (quoting In re Armco, 770 F.2d 103, 105 (8th

Cir.1985)).

Referral to a special master is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. Burlington Northern, 934 F.2d at 1071 (citing United

States v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 901 F.2d 772, 774 (9th

48

Cir.1990)). We have affirmed the use of special masters repeatedly

in the Stevens Treaty cases. See, e.g., Suquamish Indian Tribe, 901

F.2d at 775 (noting that we could "not think of a more

comprehensive and complex case than" the Boldt decision and its

successors); see also United States v. Washington, 730 F.2d 1314

(9th Cir.1984). In the present matter, however, the district court

made no finding that disputes regarding whether tribes must pass

over private land to harvest shellfish is complex or extraordinary.

Indeed, disputes are likely to present straightforward trespass and

property questions. Because the district court did not make a finding

of complexity or exceptional circumstance as required under Rule

53, referral to a special master is not yet appropriate.

Neutrality of the special master is also a paramount concern.

In the Stevens Treaty cases, prior referrals have been to a magistrate

judge, not a master selected by the parties. See, e.g., United States v.

Washington, 626 F.Supp. 1401 (W.D.Wash.1985). The Supreme

Court has long held that "due process implies a tribunal both

impartial and mentally competent to afford a hearing." Jordan v.

Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176, 32 S.Ct. 651, 56 L.Ed. 1038

(1912); see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100

S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980) ("The Due Process Clause

entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both

civil and criminal cases."). The neutrality requirement helps

guarantee that life, liberty or property will not be taken on the basis

of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law and

preserves the appearance and reality of fairness. Marshall, 446 U.S.

at 242. A party may establish that he has been denied his

constitutional right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal by a

showing of actual bias or the adjudicator's pecuniary or personal

interest in the outcome. Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732 (9th

Cir.1995). In addition to the constraints of due process, Canon | of

the Code of Conduct for United States Judges sets the integrity and

independence of the judiciary as an indispensable goal.

Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Code of Judicial Conduct for

United States Judges (1997).

The masters here are selected by the parties, presumably

because the candidates are likely to rule favorably. Whether each

side is permitted to designate one or many potential candidates, the

result is a master that is chosen because of a real or perceived bias.

Even if the district court ultimately approves the selection of the

master and adopts the master's report and recommendation, that does

not cure the error. A property owner subject to an unforeseen access

easement or a tribe denied access to a harvest will find little solace

in the judge's signature adopting the special master's findings.

I would hold that the special master selection process

adopted by the district court violates due process. I would remand to

the district court to make findings supporting the necessity for a

master; to appoint an independent special master and to give special

consideration to the appointment of a magistrate judge.

50

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51

873 F. Supp. 1422

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

et al., ) No. CV 9213

)

Plaintiffs, ) Sub-proceeding

v. ) NO. 8903

)

) MEMORANDUM

) OPINION

) AND ORDER

STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.,

Defendants.

)

December 20, 1994

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RAFEEDIE, District Judge

INTRODUCTION

A. History of the Case

This sub-proceeding, filed by the United States and 16

Indian Tribes, ! involves the Stevens Treaties? which were

interpreted in United States v. State of Washington, 384 F.Supp.

| The Tribes active in this sub-proceeding are the following: the

Tulalip, Puyallup, Squaxin Island, Makah, Muckleshoot, Upper Skagit,

Nooksack, Nisqually, Lummi, Skokomish, Port Gamble S'Klallam, Lower Elwha

S'Klallam, Jamestown S'Kiallam, Suquamish, Yakama, and the Swinomish

(hereinafter "The Tribes"). The Quinault, Quileute, and Hoh Tribes, all coastal

Tribes, made appearances in the action; however, they were not active

participants, and they sought no relief.

2 The treaties are called the "Stevens Treaties" because of the

participation in the negotiations of all of the treaties by Territorial Governor Isaac

Stevens. Each of the Tribes involved in this sub-proceeding are the successors in

interest to one or more of the following treaties: Treaty of Medicine Creek,

December 26, 1854 (10 Stat. 1132); Treaty of Point Elliott, January 26, 1855, (12

Stat. 927); Treaty of Point No Point, January 26, 1855 (12 Stat. 933); Treaty with

the Makah, January 31, 1855 (12 Stat. 939). Hereinafier "The Treaties."

52

312 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (hereinafter Washington I); aff'd, 573

F.2d 1123 (1978) (hereinafter Washington II); aff'd in substantial

part, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). The parties filed this action seeking a

declaration of the nature and extent of tribal off-reservation

shellfishing rights, an the extent to which such rights may be

affected by the following limiting provision ("the Shellfish

Proviso"): "The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed

grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in

common with all citizens of the territory . . . Provided, however,

that they shall not take shellfish from any beds staked or

cultivated by citizens."3

Washington I was decided in 1974. At that time, the

Court reserved jurisdiction to hear other unresolved issues arising

out of the Stevens Treaties. In Washington I, the issue before the

Court was the nature and extent of the treaty Tribes’ off-

reservation fishing rights with respect to anadromous fish. That

decision established the locations of the Tribes’ usual and

accustomed grounds and stations and found that the Tribes were

entitled to take 50% of the harvestable fish from those grounds

and stations. Subsequently, the Supreme Court substantially

affirmed the decision finding that the trial court had correctly

adjudicated the nature and extent of the Tribes’ fishing rights.

Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing

Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (hereinafter Fishing Vessel).

Thus, the treaty Tribes’ rights with respect to anadromous

fish in the Puget Sound are is the law of the land. Finally, on

September 2, 1993, consistent with Washington I and Fishing

Vessel, this Court ruled that "shellfish" are "fish," within the

meaning of the Treaties. Thus, the treaty Tribes' right to take

shellfish is limited, if at all, only by the Shellfish Proviso in the

Treaties or to the extent that the Court finds the Moderate Living

Doctrine to be applicable from the evidence and the law.

B. The Parties' Contentions

In this action, the tribal plaintiffs seek the following

declaratory relief: (1) that they have the right to take 50% of all of

the species of harvestable shellfish that may be safely harvested

within their usual and accustomed grounds and stations; (2) that

3 This language is taken from the Treaty of Medicine Creek; however,

the parties admitted that all of the Stevens Treaties contain substantially similar

language.

53

the usual and accustomed grounds and stations are those

previously adjudicated in Washington I; (3) that the phrase

"staked or cultivated by citizens" in the Shellfish Proviso be

interpreted to mean only those non-natural beds that have been

staked or cultivated; (4) that the right to take shellfish extends to

natural clam beds that exist under the artificial shellfish beds; (5)

that the Tribes' authority to regulate the harvest be confirmed; (6)

that the. Court order co-management of the resource between the

Tribe and the State; (7) that the Court enjoin the application and

enforcement of specific state statutes which the Tribes ciaim

would be discriminatory in practice; (8) that the Upper Skagit

Tribe is the successor to the Nuwha'ha and the Bsigwigwilts and is

therefore entitled to take shellfish at the usual and accustomed

grounds and stations of the Nuwha'ha and Bsigwigwilts; and (9)

that the Yakama Nation has not established any usual and

accustomed grounds and stations and thus is not entitled to take

shellfish.

Because the Court has found that shellfish are fish, only a

limited issue is currently before the Court, namely the effect of the

Shellfish Proviso and the nature and scope of the remedy to be

granted.

Opposing the plaintiffs are the State of Washington and

the intervenors+ who contend that the "staked or cultivated"

provision protects state and private property from shellfishing by

the Tribes. Alternatively, but in a similar vein, the intervening

shellfish growers argue that the lands which they own or occupy

and upon which they conduct the business of shellfish growing

have been "staked or cultivated" within the meaning of the

Treaties’ Shellfish Proviso, hence they conclude that those lands

should be exempted from tribal shellfishing under the treaties.

C Canons of Interpretation

In interpreting the Shellfish Proviso, in general, the Court

is bound by both general rules of interpretation, and thespecific

rules handed down by the Supreme Court which appiy when

Indian Tribes assert treaty rights. In particular, the Court must use

4 The action was filed originally against the State of Washington. Later

in the proceeding the following groups intervened as defendants: the Puget

Sound Growers Association; UPOW, the United Property Owners of

Washington; and the "Adkins Party,” a group of about 20 private property

owners. The main representative of the "Adkins Party" are Adkins, Carter, and

Alexander.

special canons of construction to determine the meaning of Indian

treaties, all of which amount to the same _ proposition:

"[A]mbiguities occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of

the Indians." Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).

Similarly, treaties with Indians "are to be construed, so far as

possible, in the sense in which the Indians understood them, and

‘in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this

nation to protect the interests of a dependent people." Choctaw

Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1443)

(quoting Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942)).

These canons of construction, however, do not give the

court license to interpret a treaty according to the Indians’

preferences. The Supreme Court has left no doubt that "even

Indian treaties cannot be re-written or expanded beyond their clear

terms to remedy a claimed injustice or to achieve the asserted

understanding of the parties." Choctaw Nation, 318 U.S. at 432.

Such an exercise "would be an intrusion upon the domain

committed by the Constitution to the political departments of the

government." Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations v. United States,

179 U.S. 494, 532 (1900).

Finally, in United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905),

the Supreme Court adopted a "reservation of rights" approach in

interpreting treaties with Indian Tribes. In Winans, the

controversy arose when the settlers, who owned the land fronting

the Columbia River, denied Indians access to the river abutting

their land and by exercising their rights under state licenses to

operate "fish wheels." The fish wheels, as admitted by the parties,

gave the landowner "exclusive possession of the fishing places"

by obstructing the Indians’ access to the fishing areas. /d. at 382.

Rejecting the landowner's arguments, the Supreme Court

established a new theory of treaty interpretation: a treaty is not a

grant of rights fo the Indians, but a grant of rights from them,

thereby implicitly containing a reservation of those rights not

explicitly granted. Further, the Supreme Court found that such

reservations of rights encompassed all the territory subject to the

treaty, thereby imposing a "servitude upon every piece of land."

Id. at 381. Thus, the Court concluded that the starting point for

analysis of the treaty is the Indians’ pre-existing rights.

With respect to general canons of treaty construction, the

Court beings with the premise that the parties’ intentions dictate

the interpretation of a treaty. Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations, 179

U.S. at 531. In determining those intentions, the Court must

55

interpret words in a treaty according to their natural and ordinary

meanings, when the words are unambiguous. /d. It is only when

a court finds a word to be ambiguous that it may resort to extrinsic

evidence. /d.

In addition, treaties may, when necessary, be interpreted

in light of the surrounding historical circumstances. Choctaw

Nation y. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943). Thus, the Court

looks to the historical context surrounding the negotiations of the

Stevens Treaties. The Court also finds the following canons of

construction instructive: (1) a treaty should not be interpreted so

as to render one part inoperative, Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.

379, 392 (1979); (2) when the parties could have more easily

expressed a particular intent by an alternative choice of words, the

chosen words can be interpreted NOT to express that intent,

Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations vy. United States, 179 U.S. 494,

538 (1900); and (3) that the practical construction adopted by the

parties, namely post-treaty conduct, may be viewed to help

determine the meaning of the treaty. Choctaw Nation v. United

States, 318 U.S. 423, 434 (1943).

Following these canons of construction, the Court finds

that, when signing the Treaties at issue, the Tribes reserved the

right to take shellfish from their usual and accustomed grounds

and stations, subject only to the Shellfish Proviso. Furthermore,

the words "staked or cultivated" in the proviso are ambiguous, and

the Court concludes that the Shellfish Proviso does not apply to a

natural or native beds and that, under the Shellfish Proviso,

artificial beds may be staked or cultivated, notwithstanding their

location in private tidal lands. The Court interprets these relevant

words in this way because of the reservation of rights by the

Tribes, the historical context of the treaties, and the rules favoring

the resolution of ambiguities in favor of Indian Tribes; in addition,

the Court finds the plaintiffs' evidence as to the meaning of these

words to be much more compelling and persuasive than the

evidence opposed to it.

D. Interpretation of the Proviso and Allegations of

I 2

Hardship

In this sub-proceeding, the Court was not asked to

determine which tidelands or marine areas contain natural beds

open to Indian fishing, and which contain artificial beds, those

staked or cultivated beds not open to Indian fishing; thus this

decision does not resolve those issues. Rather, this decision is

meant only to determine the meaning of the Shellfish Proviso in

56

the Stevens Treaties and what effect it has on the tribal right to

take shellfish.

In reaching its decision, the Court may not rewrite the

Treaties or interpret the Treaties in a way contrary to settled law

simply to avoid or minimize any hardship to the public or to the

intervenors. Indeed, the Court has no such power. Rather,

amelioration from such hardships should be sought from

Congress, which has the power to abrogate the treaty, or from the

State of Washington, which sold the public tidelands without

notice to the buyers of the pre-existing tribal fishing rights, and

indeed the United States, which permitted such sales to occur

without taking steps to secure such fishing rights.

II. INTERPRETATION OF TERMS IN THE STEVENS

TREATIES

The resolution of the parties’ contentions in this sub-

proceeding depends on the interpretation of the Stevens Treaties.

The Court had occasion to interpret some of the relevant language

in Washington I, and finds those interpretations binding in this

action. The language of the Shellfish Proviso however, has not

been interpreted by the Court; thus, an extensive discussion of

language and the meaning of the language is necessary.

A. Prior holdings

z. The Right of Taking Fish Includes the Right to

Take Shellfish

The Court held on September 2, 1993, that the "right of

taking fish" in the Stevens Treaties includes the right to take

shellfish. The Court reached this conclusion without reference to

the canons of constructions favoring Indians. Indeed, this

interpretation is compelled by the plain language of the Treaties.

As previously discussed, the Shellfish Proviso limits the

Tribes’ right to take shellfish to those beds not "staked or

cultivated" by citizens. This Proviso, plainly read, constitutes an

exception to the right of taking shellfish at particular locations. It

inevitable follows that shellfish were included in the "right of

taking fish" referred to in the first sentence.» This interpretation

5 The Court does not believe that such a right can be found in the

provisions reserving the Indians’ right to hunt, gather roots and berries, and

pasture horses.

baal

57

is consistent with the principle that a treaty "should be interpreted

so as not to render one part inoperative." Colautti v. Franklin, 439

U.S. 379, 392 (1979). If the right of taking "fish" did not include

shellfish, the entire shellfish proviso would serve no purpose.

2. The Right to Take Fish is not Limited to any

Particular Species of Fish

Defendant and the intervenors have argued that the "right

of taking fish" must be limited to those species of fish the Tribes

actually took prior to the signing of the Stevens Treaties. At that

time, however, the Tribes had the absolute right to harvest any

species they desired, consistent with their aboriginal title. See Lac

Court Oreilles Band, Etc. v. Voigt, 700 F.2d at 352. The fact that

some species were not taken before treaty time--either because

they were inaccessible or the Indians chose not to take them--does

not mean that their right to take such fish was limited. Because

the "right of taking fish" must be read as a reservation of the

Indians’ pre-existing rights, and because the right to take any

species, without limit, pre-existed the Stevens Treaties, the Court

must read the "right of taking fish" without any species limitation.

The effort by the defendants to read a species limitation

into the "right of taking fish" must fail in light of the canons of

construction favoring Indians. Defendant and the intervenors ask

the court to impose a limit on the "right of taking fish" without

pointing to any treaty language in support of that interpretation.

This is impermissible under Winters and Choctaw Nation.

Moreover, had the parties to the Stevens Treaties intended to so

limit the right, they would not have chosen the word "fish," a

word which fairly encompasses every form of aquatic animal life.

"Fish" has perhaps the widest sweep of any word the drafters

could have chosen, and the Court will not deviate from its plain

meaning.

3. "All Usual and Accustomed Grounds and

Stations"

Washington I made a series of determinations as to the

meaning and import of the phase "usual and accustomed grounds

and stations," in the context of adjudicating where the plaintiff

Tribes enjoyed the right to fish for salmon and steelhead. No

party to this sub-proceeding has challenged these determinations,

and the Court finds, as explained-below, that they are the usual

and accustomed grounds and stations for shellfishing.

en

At trial, the Tribes presented evidence establishing areas

in which they historically sought shellfish. However, before

considering this evidence, the Court must resolve a preliminary

issue of treaty interpretation: whether the usual and accustomed

areas for shellfish can, as a matter of law, differ from the areas

adjudicated in Washington I for salmon and steelhead. If the

Court determines that they cannot, then the areas established in

Washington I control this sub-proceeding as well.

The Court finds that, as a matter of treaty interpretation,

the Tribes’ usual and accustomed grounds and stations cannot vary

with the species of fish. This conclusion is consistent with the

Court's prior ruling finding the Tribes’ usual and accustomed

grounds and stations for herring as co-extensive with those for

salmon and steelhead. See Post-Trial Decisions, 459 F.Supp. at

1048-50. Indeed, the Court has never focused on a particular

species of fish in determining the Tribes’ usual and accustomed

grounds and stations. See e.g., Washington I, 384 F.Supp. at 360,

364, 372; Post-Trial Orders, 626 F.Supp at 1467, 1528-29.

Therefore, the Tribes have the right to take shellfish at

those usual and accustomed grounds and stations adjudicated in

Washington I, including all bedlands and tidelands under or

adjacent to those areas. In addition, however, the Upper Skagit

Tribe, seeks to establish its usual and accustomed grounds and

stations as those of the Nuwha'ha and the, Bsigwigwilts, as well as

other predecessor tribes. See infra Part VII. Other than the

evidence put on by the Upper Skagit, the Tribes have stipulated in

this sub-proceeding not to present evidence proving usual and

accustomed grounds and stations beyond the prior-adjudicated

grounds and stations.

4. "In Common With All Citizens"

The meaning of the term "in common with all citizens" is

well-settled. "Both sides have a right, secured by treaty, to take a

fair share of the available fish." Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at

684-85. According to the Supreme Court, to determine this "fair

share" a court should “initially divide the harvestable portion of

each run . . . into approximately equal treaty and non-treaty

shares, and should then reduce the treaty share if tribal needs may

be satisfied by a lesser amount." Jd. at 685. The lower

boundary--this "lesser amount"-- is determined by analyzing the

tribes’ "moderate living" needs. See infra Part 1V. The important

59

concept here, however, is that the "in common with" language

guarantees the Tribes a share of the fish and an "equal

opportunity" to catch the fish. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at

679.

B. The Shellfish Proviso: "Any Beds Staked or

Cultivated by Citizens"

A Interpretations Proposed by the Parties

The intervening growers’ proposed interpretation of the

Shellfish Proviso starts and ends with the treaty-time dictionary.

They argue that the Court should interpret "staked" and

"cultivated" according to their dictionary definitions; essentially,

this would mean that any shellfish bed extant today that is

surrounded by stakes, or in some fashion improved by human

labor, would be off limits to the Indians. The Tribes do not

dispute that, under the definition of the treaty words advanced by

the growers, all of the tideland owned or leased by the Growers

falls within the Shellfish Proviso.

The intervening property owners depart to some extent

from this literal approach arguing that "staked" should be

interpreted in its "frontier" context and thus should be regarded as

a synonym for "claimed as private property." Therefore, all

privately-owned tideland, whether or not surrounded by stakes,

would be protected by the Shellfish Proviso.

The Plaintiff Tribes’ argue first that the terms "staked"

and "cultivated" must be interpreted as they were used in the

shellfishing industry at treaty time. This usage of the terms

"staked" and "cultivated" by the shellfishing industry has two

elements: the doctrinal definition and the empirical definition of

the words, which is informed not by a dictionary, but by the actual

practices of the shellfishing industry. Thus, while the doctrinal

definition of the words might contemplate a broad set of activities,

the empirical definition captures that narrower subset of activities

that were actually performed at treaty time.

As will be shown below, the Tribes presented compelling

evidence that only artificial beds were "staked" and "cultivated" at

treaty time.

60

2. "Doctrinal Definition" of Shellfish Proviso Terms

Within Shellfishing Industry

a. "BEDS"

The intervening growers presented evidence at trial that

shellfish "beds," as that term was used at treaty time, included

both natural and artificial shellfish deposits. Ingersoll's Glossary

of Shellfish Terms ("Ingersoll's") defines "bed" as "The bank, reef

or deposit of oysters in the water, either growing naturally or

artificially, original or transplanted." The Tribes have not

disputed Ingersoll's as the appropriate definition, and the court

will rely upon that definition in its analysis.

b. "STAKED"

The parties agree that the words "stake" and "staked"

were commonly used in the shellfishing industry at treaty time. To

"stake" a shellfish bed meant to plant stakes or other markers to

indicate the boundaries of the bed.

¢ "CULTIVATED"

Within the shellfishing industry at treaty time, the

meaning of the terms "cultivate" and "cultivated" was quite

narrow. Ingersoll's defines "cultivate" as "to raise oysters

artificially from spawn, or from transplanted young.”

The defendant and the intervenors have presented no

evidence to directly contradict Ingersoll's definition of "cultivate."

The intervening growers have shown that nineteenth-century

oyster farmers performed a variety of activities to improve their

harvest. Indeed, Moore states in his treatise that "all methods of

oyster culture depend for their success upon the modification of

the natural conditions in such a manner as to bring about one or

several of the following results," such as the increase in the

number of eggs and the increase in the surfaces available for

fixation.

Reading Ingersoll's and Moore together, cultivation is the

“modification of natural conditions" occurring after the oysters

have been planted or transplanted in an artificial bed.

61

3. “Empirical Definition" of the Terms "Staked" and

"Cultivated" as They Were Used in the

Shellfishing Industry

At trial, the Tribes presented substantial evidence of the

actual use of the terms "staked" and "cultivated" within the

shellfish industry. This evidence falls into two categories. First,

the Tribes attempted to reconstruct, state-by-state, the legal

landscape governing the shellfish industry. The Tribes argue that

at the time the Treaties were negotiated, the shellfishing laws

almost universally prohibited the "staking" or "cultivating" of

natural shellfish beds. Second, the Tribes presented evidence of

actual shellfish industry practices, both on the East Coast and in

Shoalwater Bay, Washing.on. The Tribes maintain that these

practices, as might be expected, conformed to the laws governing

the industry, thus no actual "staking" or "cultivating" of natural

beds occurred at that time.

a. Laws Governing Shellfishing Practices

As part of an 1876 report, "On the Oyster Industries of the

United States," Lieutenant Paul DeBroca authored a chapter

entitled "Oyster Culture," in which he described "American

ostriculture" as consisting of the "planting of mollusks on those

parts of the coast where the submarine soil is best fitted by its

nature to fatten them and promote their growth."© In this chapter,

DeBroca makes the following critical observation:

Whatever may be the locality chosen by the

planters, they can in no case pursue their industry

on the natural banks of oysters, the common

property of the people, or in any way interfere

with the free exercise of navigation.

DeBroca defines "natural bank" as a "conglomeration of mollusca

presenting a character of continuity, constituting what is usually

called an oyster-bed."8

© PL-237 at 296

7 Id. at 297

8 Id. at 297. DeBroca elaborates:

The natural bank may be single or formed of several small banks,

separated by greater or less spaces, but always sufficiently connected to

be considered parts of one whole. As to places where, through

ee

62

DeBroca's_ characterization of the legal landscape

regarding natural shellfish beds is supported by the statutes and

case law in force during the mid to late nineteenth-century.?

For example, a series of laws were enacted in the

Washington territory concerning oysters and oyster cultivation

after the signing of the Stevens Treaties.!9 Despite the fact that

accidental circumstances, isolated oysters have developed, they are not

classed among the natural beds, since, if this were the case, the largest

part of the submarine soil of the coast would be under interdiction and

oyster culture would be impossible. However protective the American

laws may be in what concerns public property, they are careful not to

interfere with private enterprise by a too rigorous interpretation of the

term public property.

DeBroca at PL-297.

9 See also Angell, Treatise on the Right of Property in Tidewater

(1847), PL-428 at 139 ("Oysters . .. . may be taken and thus become the property

of him who takes them, and if he plants them in a new place flowed by tide water,

visibly denoted, and where there are none naturally, and for his own particularly

benefit, it is not regarded as an abandonment of his property in them," (emphasis

added)

10 The following laws were passed in the Washington Territory:

(1) An Act for the Preservation of Oysters in Shoalwater Bay,

January 13, 1855:

And be it enacted, that it shall not be lawful from and after the first day

of June, until the first day of August, yearly, and every year, for any

person or persons to rake, scrape, or gather any oysters from any of the

oyster beds in Shoalwater Bay under any pretense, whatsoever;

Provided, that nothing in this section shall be so construed as to

prohibit any persons from taking oysters from beds planted out by him

or them.

r An Act to Encourage the cultivation of Oysters, January 16,

1861

Be it enacted .. . . That any person, being a citizen of this Territory,

who has planted, or who hereafter may plant oysters in any bay or arm

of the sea, where there are no natural beds of oysters, within or

bordering upon this Territory, may acquire, by conforming to the

requirements of this act, an exclusive right for such a purpose... .

Pit tecnica

63

the laws post-date the Treaties, the court nevertheless considers

them important. First, each of these enactments, including the law

related to Oyster preservation in Shoalwater Bay, provides

separate treatment of natural and planted oyster beds. Second, the

legislation, beginning with the 1861 Act to Encourage the

Cultivation of Oysters, conforms exactly to DeBroca's

characterization and permits the planting of oysters in areas except

where natural oyster beds exist. Finally, these post-treaty

enactments, by specifically recognizing property rights in planted

oyster beds, imply that there was no common law property rights

in planted beds, let alone natural beds, at or before treaty time.

Moreover, many laws from other states also demonstrate

the general rule of no staking or cultivating of natural beds. !2

The person desiring the benefits of the preceding section, shall cause

the place or portion he desires to claim, to be marked so far as is

practicable with stakes or other artificial marks at the corners. . . . and

shall make, before some officer qualified to administer oaths, an

affidavit that he has taken the premises so described, for the purpose of

planting oysters, and that he has planted, or is about to plant oysters

thereon, that said premises are not upon ad do not include any natural

bed of oysters ....

3. An Act to Encourage the Cultivation of Oysters, January 24,

1863. Contains same language as 1861 law.

4. An Act to Encourage the Cultivation of Oysters, November

5, 1873. Contains same language as 1861 law.

5. An act to Amend an Act Entitled An Act to Encourage the

Cultivation of Oysters, November 6, 1877. Contains same language as 1861 law

1! On the other hand, the Growers point out that in 1864, the

Washington Territorial Legislature passed "An Act to Authorize Wm. Horton,

Wm. N. Horton and Wm. A. Busey, their Heirs and Assigns to Plant, Cultivate

and Gather Oysters on Totten's Inlet.". This Act gave the named individuals "the

exclusive privilege to plant, cultivate and gather oysters in so much of Totten's

Inlet as lies within [designated limits].". Under the terms of this grant, it is

possible that the grantees would enjoy private property rights in natural oyster

beds. However, the Court does not consider this single grant to three individuals

to constitute a significant part of the legal landscape in the Washington Territory.

12 The following are laws and cases from other states that reflected the

general rule of no staking or cultivating of natural beds: An Act Concerning

Oysters, April 28, 1851 (Ca.); An Act Regulating and Protecting the Planting of

Oysters, June 23, 1855 (Conn.); An Actin Addition to an Act Entitled "An Act

64

This survey of laws and statutes, both from the East Coast and

California, is consistent with DeBroca's characterization of the

legal landscape, namely that one could not stake off and

appropriate for private use a natural oyster bed at or before treaty

time. Indeed, most of the statutes from these areas created new

private property rights in planted beds, thereby implying that

before passage of the legislation, no such rights existed.

b. Actual Shellfishing Practices

i. East Coast Practices

For the most part, the Court will assume that practices on

the East Coast conformed with the laws governing the industry.

Furthermore, the Angell treatise!3 and the DeBroca article!4

indicate that oyster farming, in practice, took place on artificial

beds in the nineteenth-century. !

i. West Coast and Shoalwater Bay

Practices

The evidence indicates that the practices at Shoalwater

Bay at and before treaty time were similar to those on the East

Coast. In bis 1854 "Report on a Reconnaissance of the Country

Lying Upon Shoalwater Bay and Puget Sound," George Gibbs

made the following remark:

for the Growing of Oysters," June 13, 1845 (Conn.); An Act to Encourage and

Protect the Planting of Oysters, August 15, 1849 (Maine); An Act Concerning the

Planting of Oysters, April 21, 1848 (Mass.); An Act Relative to the Fishery in

Certain Waters, 1813 (N.Y.); An Act concerning oysters and terrapins and the

penalties in regard to them, March 22, 1847 (Va.); Decker v Fisher, 4 Barb. 592,

595 (N.Y. 1848)

13 See PL-248 at 139

14 See PL-237 at 286. 297

15 For instance, the following item appeared in Ballou's Pictorial

Drawing Room Companion on September 9, 1855:

The oysters here are mostly brought in the spring from the coasts of

Virginia and Delaware and are planted about a mile from the shore, the

boundaries of each man's plantation being designated by stakes, as

shown in our engraving. PL-197.

65

The principal trade, so far, has been in oysters, which

abound on the flats. They are taken up, during the low

tides of summer, from their natural beds, separated, and

replanted, as in the States. !6

Similarly, on August 26, 1854, the Pioneer and

Democrat, a local newspaper, contained the following description

of the shellfishing practice at Shoalwater Bay:

The method of propagating oysters is to dig them up with

tongs ... When dug up, the oysters are separated from the

mass and buried about low-water mark, or even to

high-water mark, so that the tide may ebb and flow over

them. ... !7

In addition, on January 6, 1855, the following appeared:

We are credibly informed that there are some thirteen

streams emptying into Shoalwater Bay; that there are

thenat the present time a large community, who

are cultivating, in true Chesapeake Bay style, the

oyster... J

¢: How Shellfish Laws and Practices Lead

to an "Empirical Definition"

The shellfish laws and practices do give rise to an

“empirical definition" of "staked" and "cultivated." The Court can

ascertain an "empirical definition" of treaty words by viewing the

words as they would have been viewed by the parties who

participated in the treaty negotiations. In determining the parties’

understanding of the words, the Court must consider the parties’

actual experience with the words.

First of all, there is no doubt that the United States treaty

negotiators were generally familiar with the East Coast shellfish

industry and its practices. As outlined above, the East Coast

shellfish industry followed a set of laws and practices whereby

natural oyster beds were almost never "staked" or "cultivated."

Furthermore, the evidence indicates that both George Gibbs and

16 Gibbs, PL-186 at 465.

17 PL-236

13 pL-234

aii

66

members of the signatory Tribes were familiar with the

shellfishing practices occurring at Shoalwater Bay at treaty time.

Indeed, as discussed in the previous section, the practices at

Shoalwater Bay were modeled afier East Coast practice: oyster

farmers cultivated oysters by transplanting them to artificial beds

and under no circumstances did they "stake" or "cultivate" natural

beds. The "empirical definition" is one possible construction of

the terms "staked" and "cultivated."

4 Resolution of Meaning of "Any Beds Staked or

Cultivated"

The Court must interpret the Shellfish Proviso giving due

regard to both the canons of construction favoring the Indians and

the general principles of treaty interpretation. In this section, the

Court analyzes the Shellfish Proviso in light of: (1) the

surrounding treaty words, (2) the record of the treaty negotiations,

(3) the historical circumstances that gave rise to the Stevens

lreaties, (4) the possible alternative formulations of the Shellfish

Proviso, and (5) the post-treaty conduct of both parties.

Thereafter, the Court wiil conclude by presenting _ its

understanding of the correct interpretation of the Shellfish

Proviso.

a. The Shellfish Proviso Viewed in Light of

the Record of treaty Negotiations

The perspective and positions of the parties throughout

the negotiation process can also shed light on the meaning of the

shellfish proviso. To the extent that one party's statements--or

silence--reflect its understanding of the other side's proposals,

evidence of the negotiation process is persuasive evidence of the

Shellfish Proviso's intended meaning.

The parties agree that the minutes of the treaty

negotiations reflect no specific discussion of the Shellfish Proviso.

However, certain statements in the treaty minutes are instructive

as to the proper interpretation of the Shellfish Proviso, and the

absence of certain statements of discussions reveals the intentions

of the treating parties.

The most striking aspect of the treaty minutes is the

paternal pose struck by the United States negotiators, including

Governor Stevens himself. For example, Stevens made the

following statement to the Tribes during the negotiations:

67

[ think the paper is good and that the Great Father will

think so. Are you not my children and also children of

the Great Father? What will I not do for my children and

what will you not for yours? Would you not die for

them? This paper is such as a man would give to his

children and | will tell you why. This paper gives you a

home. Does not a father give his children a home? This

paper gives you a school’ Does not a father send his

children to school? It gives you mechanics and a Doctor

to teach and cure you. Is that not fatherly? This paper

secures your fish. Does not a father give food to his

children? Besides fish, you can hunt, gather roots and

berries. Besides it says you shall not drink whiskey and

does not a father prevent his children from drinking the

fire water?

There is no dispute that the United States negotiators intended to

act in good faith towards the Indians; thus, the court cannot view

the paternal tone as a strategic negotiating tactic, or as a form of

sharp dealing. And, in deed, there were specific, tangible

promises made by the United States to back up its paternal tone.

The one significant promise for purposes of this litigation

is the promise by the United States to the Indians that they would

enjoy a permanent right to fish as they always had. This right was

promised as a sacred entitlement, one which the United States had

a moral obligation to protect. The Indians were repeatedly

assured that they would continue to enjoy the right to fish as they

always had, in the places where they had always fished. There is

no indication in the mit... of the treaty proceedings that the

Indians were ever told that they would be excluded from any of

their ancient fisheries.

The second most striking aspect of the treaty minutes is

an absence of protest over the loss of shellfishing rights. It is clear

from the treaty minutes that with respect to fishing rights in

general, the guarantee of fishing rights was a sine qua non of the

Indians’ participation in the Treaties. The Indians repeatedly

raised concerns that they would not survive if they did not have

access to their ancient fisheries. Juxtaposed with these

expressions of concern, and demands for continued fishing rights,

is an absolute silence regarding the Shellfish Proviso. The

evidence indicates that the Treaties were read and explained

section by section to the Indians during the negotiation process.

Yet the minutes reveal no instance where the Indians resisted the

Shellfish Proviso.

68

Thus, the minutes of the treaty negotiations to some

extent undermine the interpretations offered by the Defendant and

the intervenors. Whether "staked" is taken literally to mean the

planting of stakes in the tideland, or taken figuratively as the

claiming of private property, it would provide a means for settlers

to exclude the indians from natural shellfish beds where the

Indians had always taken shellfish. This is simply inconsistent

with the statements made by the United States and the absence of

protest from the Tribes, both of which are reflected in the treaty

minutes.

If the Shellfish Proviso merely operated to exclude

Indians from artificial beds, it would not likely have been a

serious point of contention during the negotiation process. As a

result, this interpretation is perfectly consistent with the United

States’ solemn promise that the Indians would have a permanent

right to their ancient fisheries.

b. The Shellfish Proviso Viewed in Light of

the Historical Circumstances

Surrounding the Negotiation of the

Stevens Treaties

Just as the record of the treaty negotiations is direct

evidence of the parties’ intentions, the historical circumstances

surrounding the negotiation process are indirect evidence. These

circumstances provide the Court with additional information to

determine the meaning of the Shellfish Proviso.

i The United States' Purpose In

Entering Stevens Treaties

The United States' motivation for entering into the

Stevens Treaties was examined in Washington I, in Fishing

Vessel, and by this Court based upon the evidence presented in

this sub-proceeding. The United States’ primary purpose was to

extinguish the Indians’ title to the lands in Western Washington,

thereby clearing the way for settlement by Europeans. It was

hoped that, by moving the Indians onto reservations, the Treaties

would minimize the friction and permit amicable relations

between the settlers and the Indians. Of course, the United States

recognized that to achieve its primary purpose, it would have to

pay some price. Further complicating matters, however, was the

fact that the United States wanted to execute the Treaties as

quickly as possible.

69

The United States was aware that the Indians used and

relied on fish, including shellfish, for subsistence, ceremonial and

commercial purposes; thus it was clearly necessary to preserve the

Indians’ fishing rights. In fact, the United States viewed this

concession as serving its own interest to some extent: indeed, the

treaty negotiators did not want the Indians to become dependent

upon the United States for their subsistence and a reservation of

fishing rights would insure against this possibility. At the same

time, the United States believed that guaranteeing the Indians

fishing rights would "not in any manner interfere with the rights of

citizens." Finally, the United States intended to act honorably

towards the Indians, and the negotiators believed that it never

could have been the intention of Congress that the Indians should

be excluded from their ancient fisheries and expressed among

themselves the intention to preserve Indian fishing rights.

Overall, the Tribes’ interpretation of the Shellfish Proviso

is most consistent with the United States' purposes in entering the

Stevens Treaties. The interpretation does not in any way conflict

with the historical findings of fact concerning the United States’

purpose in entering the Treaties. The defendant and the

intervenors point to the potential conflict arising from enforcing

the Tribes' interpretation of the Shellfish Proviso, and on that basis

argue that the Tribes’ interpretation contradicts the United States'

intention to avoid conflict between Indians and settlers. The

United States, however, did not intend that the Indians would

relinquish their ancient fishing rights on demand by settlers.

Further, under the Tribes’ interpretation, there would be no

conflict between Indians and settlers, so long as the Indians

respected the settlers’ planted oyster beds and the settlers did not

stake out natural oyster beds where the Indians took fish.

The Defendants' and intervenors' proposed interpretations

are also generally consistent with the United States’ purposes in

entering the Treaties, except in one important respect: neither of

these interpretations is consistent with the United States’ avowed

intention to preserve for the Indians their ancient fisheries.

Whether "staked" is viewed literally or in its frontier sense, it

permits the gradual exclusion of Indians from natural shellfish

beds, a result clearly unwanted and unintended by the parties to

the Treaties.

ii. The Tribes' Purpose In Entering

Stevens Treaties

The evidence indicates that the Tribes’ purpose in entering

the Stevens Treaties was to secure land and livelihood for their

members who faced an aggressive waive of European settlement.

Tribal leaders and members believed that without recourse to their

ancient fisheries, they would perish. Whatever land concessions

they made, the Indians viewed a guarantee of permanent fishing

rights as an absolute predicate to entering into a treaty with the

United States.

Under the Tribes’ interpretation the Indians would have a

permanent right of access to their ancient fisheries. Conversely,

the defendant's and intervenors' proposed interpretations of the

treaty simply do not recognize that the Indians were bargaining

for a permanent right; rather, they seem to rely on the proposition

that the Indians believed that their need for shellfish would

diminish over time. This supposition, however, lacks any

evidentiary support and is contradicted by the overall weight of

the evidence. Accordingly, the Tribes’ position is more consistent

with this facet of the Treaties’ historical context.

lil. The United States' Vision for the

Washington Territory

The parties agree that Governor Stevens was not a

short-term thinker who was motivated solely by considerations of

expediency. Both sides characterize Stevens as a self-conscious °

historical actor who proceeded cautiously, guided by a vision for

the future of the Washington Territory. The parties even agree on

some aspects of the substance of Stevens’ vision for the

Washington Territory; not surprisingly however, on other aspects,

they sharply disagree. The Court must resolve these differences in

its attempt to recreate Stevens' vision as part of the overall context

in which to interpret the Shellfish Proviso.

A. Shellfish Industry in _ the

Washington Territory

First, the parties agree that Stevens envisioned the

development of a thriving oyster farming industry in the Puget

Sound. Dr. Richards, an expert for the defendant and intervenors,

gave the following testimony at trial:

Q. Do you have any opinion as to whether or not

Stevens and his treaty commissions envisioned similar

industries [as to those in Shoalwater Bay] developing in

the Puget Sound area?

A. I'm sure they did. The newspapers, particularly

the Pioneer and Democrat, mentioned the possibility of

71

this occurring and in fact reflected some dismay that it

had not occurred already.

But certainly I think it is safe to say that they

envisioned the shellfish industry as well as many other

industries appearing in the territory on the Sound.

The Tribes' interpretation is most consistent with this

vision. The oyster farming industry, as constituted at treaty time,

was built on artificial beds. As previously discussed,

transplanting oysters from natural beds and seeding artificial beds

were the principal method of oyster culture at treaty time, both on

the East Coast and at Shoalwater Bay. Stevens’ vision of the

oyster industry most likely conformed to existing practices;

indeed, the record is devoid of any evidence that Stevens or any of

the United States’ negotiators held any ideas of reforming industry

practices. Thus, to protect the fledgling oyster industry, Stevens

might have felt it necessary to exempt artificial beds from the

Indians’ treaty right to take fish. Under the Tribes' interpretation,

the Shellfish Proviso is narrowly tailored to do just that.

Under the competing interpretations, the Shellfish Proviso

is not designed specifically to protect the Oyster industry;

depending on the circumstances, it could either aid or hinder the

industry's development. To the extent it prohibited Indians from

taking shellfish from both artificial and natural shellfish beds

where settlers were engaging in fruitful harvesting, it would aid

the development of the industry. However, both the literal and

figurative interpretation of "staked" advanced by defendants and

the intervenors protect act'vities, such as tideland ownership,

wholly unrelated to the oyster industry. Under either

interpretation, a settler--either by placing stakes or by claiming

ownership to a tideland parcel--could preclude Indians and

non-Indians from taking shellfish from natural beds located on

that parcel. The settler could then ail to harvest the shellfish, and

the Indians would be forbidden from fishing there. Under these

circumstances, it would not foster, but instead undermine. the

development of an oyster industry. Accordingly, the Tribes'

proposed interpretation is preferable because it is wholly

consistent with the notion of fostering the shellfish industry.

B. Tideland Development in the

Washington Territory

The parties also agree that the United States negotiators

anticipated industrial and ur

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