Appendix — Washington v. United States
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. 981026 DEC 2 21998
Nos. : :
In The OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Supreme Court
Of The
United States
October Term, 1998
STATE OF WASHINGTON, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., Respondents.
PUGET SOUND SHELLFISH GROWERS, Petitioners,
¥.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., Respondents.
LARRY B. AND SHIRLEE ALEXANDER, ET AL., AND
WILLIAM AND CHARMOND ADKINS, ET AL., Petitioners,
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., Respondents.
26 TIDELAND AND UPLAND PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNERS
(“UPOW”), Petitioners,
¥.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
APPENDIX TO PETITIONS
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE P.O. Box 40100
Attorney General Olympia, WA 98504-0100
Jay D. Geck* Telephone: (360) 586-2697
William Berggren Collins Attorneys for State of Washington
Assistant Attorneys General
(Names of Attorneys continued on inside of cover.)
*Counsel of Record
Michael Himes*
Albert Gidari, Jr
Perkins Coie LLP
1201 3rd Avenue
Seattle, WA 98101-3099
Telephone: (206) 583-8888
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rowers
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Malcolm Edwards
Edwards Sieh Smith & 221 Ist Avenue W
Sth Avenue #7170 eattle, WA 98119
attle, WA 98104 lephone: (206
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FABLE OF CONTENTS
nited States v. Washington (Shellfish U1)
157 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1998)........
nited States v. Washington (Shellfish 1)
73 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
States v. Washington (Shellfish I)
898 F. Supp 1453 (W.D. Wash. 199
1 States v. Washington
909 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. W
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Herring Fisher
157 F.3d 630
UNITED STATES of America;
Muckleshoot Tribe; Nooksack; Upper Skagit; Squaxin Island;
|. ummi Indian Tribe; Makah Tribe; Tulalip Tribe; Swinomish Indian
Tribal Community; Quileute Indian Tribe; Puyallup Tribe, Hoh
Indian Tribe; Suquamish Tribe; Quinault Indian Nation;
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation;
Nisqually Indian Tribe, Jamestown Tribe: Lower Elwha Klallam
rribe: Port Gamble Bands; Skokomish Tribe; Sauk-Suiattle Tribe:
Stillaguamish Tribe,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Vv.
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES of America;
Muckleshoot Tribe; Nooksack, Upper Skagit; Squaxin Island;
|.ummi Indian Tribe; Makah Tribe; Tulalip Tribe; Swinomish Indian
Tribal Community; Quileute Indian Tribe, Puyallup Tribe; Hoh
Indian Tribe; Suquamish Tribe; Quinault Indian Nation;
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation;
Nisqually Indian Tribe; Jamestown Tribe; Lower Elwha Klailam
rribe: Port Gamble Bands; Skokomish Tribe; Sauk-Suiattle Tribe;
Stillaguamish Tribe,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
LP
STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.
Defendants,
and
26 Upland and Tideland Private Property Owners, (Dan Buehler,
Robert L. Davis, Bruce I. Fielding, Arthur J. Gerdes, Joe Hoots,
Keith C. Huetson, Commander J.C. James, Richard Sayre Koch,
Elaine C. Lefler, Joan Lemonds-Roush, John S. Lewis,
Steven L. Luke, Edward R. McMillan, Robert F. Newman, Mark A
Nysether, Arthur I. Price, Ray D. Randall, Cynthia Ramussen,
Robert G. Shanks, Axel Strakeljahn, Leana Tracy,
Stuart W. Turner, George B. Usnick, Lee S. Vincent, Joan Walker
and William E. Whitney, Jr.),
Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants.
te
UNITED STATES of America;
Muckleshoot Tribe; Nooksack; Upper Skagit; Squaxin Island;
Lummi Indian Tribe; Makah Tribe; Tulalip Tribe; Swinomish Indian
Tribal Community; Quileute Indian Tribe; Puyallup Tribe; Hoh
Indian Tribe; Suquamish Tribe; Quinault Indian Nation;
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation;
Nisqually Indian Tribe; Jamestown Tribe; Lower Elwha
Klallam Tribe; Port Gamble Bands; Skokomish Tribe; Sauk-Suiattle
Tribe; Stillaguamish Tribe,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al..
Defendants,
and
James Hadley; James Carter; Ann Carter; Charmond Adkins;
Larry Alexander; Shirlee Alexander; Grace Boyd; Pierce Davis;
Rosemary Duncan; May Davis; James C. Johnston; Sarah Johnston;
W.K. Kirch; Jo Ann Kirch; David Mitchell; Louis Nawrot, Jr.; Boon
Ho Woo; Harold Bauer; Billie Bauer; William Chase; Frances
Fellows; George Grader; Earl Hunsperger; Millicent Hunsperger;
Edward Krenz; Eleanor Krenz; H.J. Merrick; Moss Gordon;
Margaret Moss; Sewall Reynolds; Emma Reynolds; John Riach;
Alva Hazel Robb; Irene Smith; Providence Worley,
Defendants-Intervenors- Appellants.
UNITED STATES of America, et al..
Plaintiff,
and
Lummi Tribe; Muckleshoot Tribe; Nooksack; Upper Skagit;
Squaxin Island; Makah Tribe; Swinomish Indian Tribal Community;
Tulalip Tribe; Puyallup Tribe; Quileute Indian Tribe; Hoh Indian
Fribe;-Suquamistr fribe; Nisqually Indian Tribe; Jamestown Tribe;
Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe;
Port Gamble Bands; Skokomish Tribe; Sauk-Suiattle Tribe;
Stillaguamish Tribe,
Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellants,
and
3
Quinault Indian Nation;
Confederated Tribes & Bands of The Yakima Indian Nation.
Plaintiffs-Intervenors,
V.
STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
UNITED STATES of America, et al.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
Muckleshoot Tribe; Nooksack; Upper Skagit; Squaxin Island;
Lummi Indian Tribe; Makah Tribe; Tulalip Tribe;
Swinomish Indian Tribal Community; Puyallup Tribe;
Quileute Indian Tribe; Hoh Indian Tribe; Suquamish Tribe;
Quinault Indian Nation; Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation; Nisqually Indian Tribe; Jamestown Tribe;
Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe; Port Gamble Bands; Skokomish Tribe;
Sauk-Suiattle Tribe; Stillaguamish Tribe,
Plaintiffs-Intervenors,
Ve
STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.,
Defendant-Appellee.
UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
and
Lummi Indian Tribe; Muckleshoot Tribe; Nooksack; Upper Skagit:
Squaxin Island; Makah Tribe; Swinomish Indian Tribal Community;
Tulalip Tribe; Puyallup Tribe; Quileute Indian Tribe; Hoh Indian
Tribe; Suquamish Tribe; Quinault Indian Nation; Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation; Nisqually Indian
Tribe; Jamestown Tribe;
Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe; Port Gamble Bands; Skokomish Tribe:
Sauk-Suiattle Tribe; Stillaguamish Tribe,
Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellees,
V.
STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.,
Defendant,
and
Puget Sound Shellfish Growers,
Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants.
Nos. 96-35014, 96-35082, 96-35142, 96-35196,
96-35200, 96-35223.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted May 5, 1997.
Decided Jan. 28, 1998.
Amended Sept. 25, 1998.
Phillip E. Katzen (Argued), Allen H. Sanders, Columbia
Legal Services, Seattle, WA, for Jamestown, Lower Elwha, Port
Gamble Bands of S'Klallams, Nisqually, Nooksack, Sauk-Suiattle,
Skokomish, Squaxin Island, Stillaguamish, Upper Skagit Tribes,
Indian Tribes.
Evelyn S. Ying (Argued), Ann C. Juliano, Martin W.
Matzen, Peter C. Monson, Attorneys, United States Department of
Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division, Washington,
DC, for United States.
Jay D. Geck (Argued), Fronda Woods, and Robert C.
Hargreaves, Assistant Attorneys General, John W. Hough, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General's Office, State of
Washington, Olympia, WA, for | defendants-appellants-
cross-appellees.
James M. Johnson (Argued), Olympia, WA, for, 26
lideland and Upland Private Property Owners ("UPOW").
Howard M. Goodfriend (Argued) and Malcolm L. Edwards,
Edwards, Sieh, Hathaway, Smith & Goodfriend, Seattle, WA, for
Private Owners.
Michael Himes (Argued), Albert Gidari, Jr., Perkins Coie,
Seattle, WA, for Puget Sound Shellfish Growers.
Eric Richter, Skeel Henke, Evenson & Roberts, Seattle,
WA, for Adkins, et. al.
Mason D. Morisset, Seattle, WA, for Tulalip Tribes. Riyaz
A. Kanji, Williams and Connolly, Washington, DC, for Jamestown,
Lower Elwha, Port Gamble Bands of S'Klallams, Nisqually,
Nooksack, Sauk-Suiattle, Skokomish, Squaxin Island, Stillaguamish
and Upper Skagit Tribes, Indian Tribes.
John Sledd, Mary Linda Pearson, for the Suquamish Tribe
Daniel A. Raas, Harry L. Johnsen, for the Lummi Tribe
Richard Berley, John Arum, Mark Slonim, for the Makah
[Tribe
Bill Tobin, Christina Berg, for the Nisqually Tribe
Annette M. Klapstein, John Howard Bell, Debra S. O'Gara.
for the Puyallup Tribe.
Kevin R. Lyon, Ronald Whitener, for the Squaxin Island
lribe
Robert L. Otsea, for the Muckleshoot Tribe
Kathryn Nelson, Amy C. Lewis, co-counsel for the Port
Gamble, Lower Elwha, Jamestown Bands of S'Klallams and the
Skokomish Tribe.
Leslie Barnhart, Lori Salzarulo, Ruth Kennedy for the
Quileute Tribe.
Nettie Alvarez, Richard Ralston, for the Hoh Tribe
Jeffrey Jon Bode, co-counsel for the Nooksack Tribe
Edward G. Maloney, co-counsel for the Upper Skagit Tribe
Harold Chesnin, co-counsel for the Upper Skagit
[ribe.Allan E. Olson, for the Swinomish Indian Community
Daniel W. Wyckoff, Olympia, WA, Tom D. Tobin, Winner,
SD, for amicus curiae Inner Sound Crab Association and
Washington Dungeness Crab Fishermen's Association
Stephanie L. Striffler, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
OR, for amicus curiae State of Oregon.
Nancie Marzulla, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae
Defenders of Property Rights.
Robin Rivett, Sacramento CA, John M. Groen, Bellevue,
Washington, for amicus curiae Pacific Legal Foundation.
Toby Thaler, Seattle, WA, for amicus curiae Washington
Environmental Councit.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington Edward Rafeedie, District Judge,
Presiding. D.C. No. CV-89-00003-ER.
Before: LAY,” BEEZER and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
Order Amending Opinion And Denying Petition For
Rehearing And Rejecting Suggestion For Rehearing En Bane And
Amended Opinion
OPINION
PROTT, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
The Opinion filed January 28, 1998, slip op. 783, and
appearing at 135 F.3d 618 (9th Cir.1998), is amended as follows:
1. At slip op. 829, last sentence of the first full paragraph;
135 F.3d at 640, first full sentence on the page beginning with "All
Grower beds ..."; delete the sentence and replace it with, "The other
Grower beds will be subject to the allocation analysis below."
2. At slip op. 830, first full paragraph; 135 F.3d at 640, third
full paragraph beginning with "We therefore apply ... "; delete the
entire paragraph and replace it with a new paragraph and revised
footnote as follows:
* The Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge for the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation
7
"We therefore apply the following analysis to
Grower beds where the Growers, or their predecessors,
began their enhancement efforts on a natural bed. For
such natural beds, the Growers shall demonstrate what
portion of their harvest is due to their labor, as opposed
to what portion would exist absent the Growers’
enhancement. See Shellfish II., 898 F.Supp. at 1462. For
such enhanced natural beds, the Tribes shall be entitled
to fifty percent of the pre-enhanced sustainable shellfish
production from those beds.!2 Of course, this
allocation analysis does not apply to artificial beds, that
is, to Grower beds that did not support a sustainable
commercial density of shellfish prior to cultivation. As
the Tribes have acknowledged, the Tribes have no right
to harvest such beds. 898 F.Supp. at 1460-61."
12 For example, if ten clams per square foot were a density
sufficient to support a commercial livelihood at the time that
enhancement began, and if a 100 square foot Grower's bed yielded
ten clams per square foot prior to the Grower's efforts to enhance the
output (1,000 clams), and that same bed now produces fifty clams
per square foot as a result of the Grower's labor (5,000 clams), the
Tribes would be entitled to fifty percent of the 1,000 clams or 500
clams.
3. At slip op. 834, third full paragraph carrying over to p.
835; 135 F.3d at 642, third full paragraph beginning with "The
Tribes argue ..."; delete the paragraph and replace it with five
paragraphs as follows:
"Of particular concern to the Tribes is the
restriction that allows the Growers to control access to
natural clams by choosing not to harvest them in favor
of the oysters under which the clams are found. The
Tribes describe this restriction as a "gaping loophole"
that has the capacity-at the Growers’ discretion to deny
to them the very rights to natural clams which our
holding confirms.
The Growers’ counter with the argument from
the record that the process of harvesting natural clams
from underneath the oyster beds can seriously disrupt
and suffocate their oysters.
On reflection, the Tribes' concerns although
certainly not fanciful-are based at this point on
speculation as to what might happen in the future. The
Growers, for example, represent that “where there are
substantial economic benefits to a Grower from
harvesting clams, the Grower will do so." And, "[a]s
soon as. the Grower does, the trial court's
implementation plan provides that the Tribes have the
right to a share of those clams." The Growers say that
they are "commercial farmers-if there is money to be
made. the resource assuredly will be exploited.”
Under the circumstances. we believe that the
district court's restrictions do not amount at this time to
an abuse of discretion. The district court attempted to
fashion a prospective solution to a difficult situation by
balancing the parties’ respective interests. The district
court's restrictions safeguard the Tribes’ right of access
to the ancient fisheries, but also protect the interests o!
the Growers and Private Owners. Importantly, in this
aspect of the court's decision the court did not use equity
as the basis for its interpretation of the decision, but
nly as a way to implement its correctly reasoned
interpretation of the Proviso. While the Tribes may not
be happy with the limits imposed on their harvesting,
they are still able to effectuate their allocation under the
Treaties and are not excluded from their ancient
fisheries
We are confident that any future practices by
the Growers that trench inappropriately upon the Tribes’
rights as confirmed in this opinion will be adequately
jealt with by the district court. The district court is the
best place to manage any wrinkles that might crop up
The best way to avoid such problems, of course, is for
the parties constructively to work together to respect
each others’ rights."
4
4. At slip op. 839, concurring opinion of Judge Beezer:
With these amendments, the panel has voted unanimously
ny the petition for rehearing and to reject the suggestion
ehearing en banc
34 at 644: withdraw the entire opinion and replace with a new
ncurring opinion as reflected in the amended opinion filed
herewith
i
The full court has been advised of the suggestion fot
ehearing en banc and no judge of the court has requested a vote o1
it. Fed. R. App. P. 35(b).
The petition for rehearing is DENIED and the suggestion fo
rehearing en banc is REJECTED.
I. OVERVIEW
[he State a Washington, groups of private tideland
yroperty owners "Private Owners" ) and commercial shellfish
growers ("Growe rs’ ( (collectively, "Appellants" ) appeal the district
court's judgment following two bench trials in an action brought by
numerous Indian Tribes! (the "Tribes") and the United States (on
the Tribes’ behalf) seeking a declaration of rights to shellfish under
the Stevens Treaties ("Treaties"). The U nited States and the Tribes
ss-appeal the district court's order implementing the Tribe
rights
In 1855. the United States negotiated five Treaties with t
lribes in the Western Washington Territory. The Tribes ceded Aves
tes lands to the United States for settlement, receiving in
exchang exclusive title to defined lands, free medical care, schools
jar ynal training, and annuity payments. The Treaties 7
re sounoal to the Tribes the "right of taking fish, at all usual <
ee grounds and stations ... in common with all citizens
» Territory...." In a series of decisions beginning in 197: federa
urts, including the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, held th
this treaty language entitles the Tribes to take fifty percent of the
almon and other free-swimming fish in the waters controlled |
Washington State. The Tribes’ rights to shellfish under the Tre ati€
wwever, are limited by the following proviso (the "Shell
|
viso") Provided. however, That they shall not take she
| ‘ 14 j 4 "
taked or cultivated by citizens
the followin tne iulailt ruyail
Muckleshoot, Upper Skagit, Nooksack, Nisqually, Lummt Skokomis!
S'Klallam. Lower Elwha S'Klallam, Jamestown 5 Klallam, Suquan
10
[his case concerns the nature and extent of the Tribes'
shellfishing rights under the Treaties. The district court concluded
in a thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion that the term "fish," as
used in the Stevens Treaties, includes shellfish. The court then
concluded that the Tribes have a right to take one half of the
harvestable shellfish of every species found anywhere within their
usual and accustomed fishing areas, except as expressly limited by
the Shellfish Proviso. The court interpreted the Shellfish Proviso
“only to exclude Indians from artificial, or planted shellfish beds;
[the parties to the Treaties] neither contemplated nor desired that the
Indians would be excluded from natural shellfish beds." United
States v. Washington, 873 F.Supp. 1422, 1441 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
[he court's conclusions substantially reflect the position of the
[ribes and of the United States, which the court found to be
overwhelmingly" supported by the historical evidence of the intent
{ the signatory parties to the Treaties.
After its decision interpreting the Treaties, the district court
‘Id a second trial to determine a plan for implementing the Tribes
shellfishing rights ("Implementation Plan"). Employing principles
of equity, the court refined its definition of "cultivated" under the
Proviso and precluded the Tribes from harvesting shellfish on most
of the commercial Growers' property. In addition, the court placed
time, place, and manner restrictions on the Tribes’ ability to harvest
from privately-owned land. Finally, the court devised a system for
the appointment and removal of Special Masters to resolve disputes
irising from the Implementation Plan. These consolidated appeals
followed
We have jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affin
4
1
ind reverse in part
Il. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Stevens ireaties
[he record contains extensive persuasive evidence
erning the Tribes’ reliance on fish and shellfish for commercial,
nibsintente. and ceremonial purposes. Fishing was "not much iess
necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they
breathed." United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381, 25 S.Ct
662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905). The United States Treaty negotiators,
under the leadership of Governor Isaac Stevens, were well aware of
the Tribes’ use and reliance on a wide variety of fish, including
"The United States’ primary purpose [in entering the
lreaties] was to extinguish the Indians' title to the lands in Western
Washington, thereby clearing the way for settlement by Europeans."
United States v. Washington, 873 F.Supp. 1422, 1436 (W.D
Wash.1994) [hereinafter "Shellfish I"|]. Because of the Tribes’
extensive reliance on fish, however, "(t]he United States was aware
that ... it was clearly necessary to preserve the Indians’ fishing
rights." Jd. "Whatever land concessions [the Tribes] made, the
Indians viewed a guarantee of permanent fishing rights as an
absolute predicate to entering into a treaty with the United States
Id. at 1437.
At the time of the Treaties, a shellfish-cultivation industry
had begun to develop at Shoalwater Bay in the Washington
ferritory. The United States treaty negotiators were familiar wit!
the practices of that industry, which was modeled after the large:
older, and more developed shellfish industry on the East Coast of the
United States. /d. at 1434. Shellfish farmers created "cultivated"
beds (ones on which shellfish spawn would not naturally set) by
removing oysters from their natural beds to areas where they could
grow more rapidly, or by placing shells or other material to harder
the bottom and thereby facilitate the setting of the oysters. In
addition to creating cultivated beds, shellfish farmers frequently
"staked" beds of shellfish by storing market-sized shellfish removed
from other beds until they could be shipped to market. These staked
beds did not naturally contain shellfish of the type being stored, and
their boundaries were marked for identification purposes with stake
xtending above the surface of the water at high tide. /d. at 1432
Fish, including shellfish, were exceptionally abundant a1
ynsidered inexhaustible at treaty time. /d. at 1438. Hence, tl
nited States negotiators believed that preserving Indian fishi
ights would not interfere with the rights of citizen Tr
negotiators were aware of the thriving shellfish industry
fully-developed East Coast cities, and likely assumed based on th
examples that development in the Puget Sound and on the wester
shore would not interfere with the Indians’ exercise of their tre
hing rights." Id.
In light of the above, the United States negotiated
ities with Indian Tribes of the Western Washington Territor
ona? - . :
and 1855.“ Through each of these Treaties, in substant!
2 I ict Ol in I ribes nv [
OFr-iIn-il I to oO Tr or tt t } ‘
12
identical language, the Tribes secured their preexisting right to take
fish:
The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed
grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians,
in common with all citizens of the Territory, and of
erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing,
together with the privilege of hunting, gathering roots
and berries, and pasturing their horses on open and
unclaimed lands: Provided, however, That they shall not
take shell fish from any beds staked or cultivated by
citizens...
[reaty of Medicine Creek, supra, Art. III.
B. Post-Treaty Developments
In the years immediately following the Treaties, the Indians
harvested the majority of the shellfish resource. In 1879, however,
the territorial legislature passed a law that, for the first time, allowed
citizens the exclusive right to use and harvest natural oyster beds.
Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1440. "Washington became a state in
1889, and in 1895 it passed legislation (the 'Bush' and 'Callow’ Acts)
for private purchase of tidelands, even when those tidelands
contained natural shellfish beds." Jd. Since that time, the State has
sold off the "vast majority" of its tidelands to private owners. /2. ai
1439.
Uncontradicted evidence at trial showed that native shellfish
populations have declined dramatically and have been replaced to a
large extent by foreign species introduced into the area after the
[reaties. For example, native littleneck clams have been replaced
by the introduced species, manila clams, which comprised over
eighty percent of the total clam harvest in the Puget Sound from
1988-90. This litigation—initiated by the Tribes and United States—is
the consequence of the increasing competition for, and depletion of,
the shellfish resource.
Stat. 927; Treaty of Point No Point, January 26, 1855, 12 Stat. 933; Treaty with the
Makah, January 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939; Treaty of Olympia, July 1, 1855, 12 Stat
971
I]. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[In 1970, the United States and the Tribes brought suit
against the State of Washington seeking an interpretation of the
Treaties and an injunction to enforce the Tribes' fishing rights. See
United States v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. 312, 327 (W.D.
Wash.1974) [hereinafter "Washington I".
In Washington I, Senior Judge Boldt determined the nature
and extent of the Tribes’ off-reservation fishing rights with respect to
anadromous fish.3 That decision established the locations of the
Tribes’ usual and accustomed grounds and stations and found that
the Tribes were entitled to take fifty percent of the harvestable fish
from those grounds and stations. We affirmed in United States v.
Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.1976) [hereinafter "Washington
IT"). The Supreme Court substantially affirmed that decision,
concluding that the trial court had correctly adjudicated the nature
and extent of the Tribes’ fishing rights. Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 99
S.Ct. 3055, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (1979) [hereinafter "Fishing Vessel").
The Supreme Court's decision in Fishing Vessel marks the seventh
time that the Supreme Court has addressed the fishing clause of the
Stevens Treaties.4
The district court in Washington I reserved jurisdiction to
hear future unresolved issues arising out of the Treaties. Under the
court's procedures, the Tribes must bring a request for adjudication
of their fishing rights to the court's attention through the filing of a
"Request for Determination." Washington I, 384 F.Supp. at 419
> Anadromous fish are fish that migrate up rivers from the sea to breed |
fresh water (1.e., salmon)
4 The other six cases are: United States v Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 25 S.Ct
662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905); Seufert Bros Co. v United States, 249 U.S. 194, 39
S.Ct. 203, 63 L.Ed. 555 (1919); Tulee v Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 62 S.Ct. 862
86 L.Ed. 1115 (1942); Puyallup Tribe v Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 88
S.Ct. 1725, 20 L.Ed.2d 689 (1968); Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414
U.S. 44, 94 S.Ct. 330, 38 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of
Game, 433 U.S. 165, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977). None of these cases
involved interpretation of the Shellfish Proviso
a
ee ee
14
In 1989, pursuant to the above procedure, sixteen Indian
Tribes, later joined by the United States, filed an action in the
district court seeking a declaration of the nature and extent of their
shellfishing rights.2 The district court's decision in Shellfish I
interpreted the Treaties to award fifty percent of the shellfish harvest
in Washington waters to the Tribes.
After announcing its decision in Shellfish I, the court
conducted a six-day “implementation trial." The purpose of the
implementation trial was to receive evidence regarding proposed
plans to implement Shellfish J. Parties submitted competing plans.
On August 28, 1995, the district court announced its Implementation
Plan. United States v. Washington, 898 F.Supp. 1453 (W.D.
Wash.1995) [hereinafter "Shellfish IT"|. In Shellfish IT, the district
court noted that "[t]he Shellfish Growers and Private Property
Owners are, effectively, innocent purchasers who had no notice of
the Tribes' Treaty fishing right when they acquired their property."
Id. at 1457. “Consequently, it is incumbent upon this Court to use
its equitable powers to effect a balance between the Tribes' Treaty
shellfishing right and the Growers’ and Owners’ interest in the
peaceful enjoyment and/or commercial development of their
property." /d. The district court then made several important
rulings.
First, the court ruled that, when the State acts on behalf of
its citizens by developing artificial @kellfish beds for recreational
shellfishing on state-owned tidelands, it is a "citizen" within the
scope of the shellfish proviso, which exempts tribal harvesting from
"beds staked or cultivated by citizens." Jd. at 1459-60. The effect of
this ruling is to exclude the Tribes from shellfishing in state-created
artificial beds.
Second, the court clarified the definition of a “natural
shellfish bed" which may not be "staked or cultivated" in the future
5 The action was originally filed against only Washington. The following
groups sequently intervened in the proceeding: the Puget Sound Shellfish
Growers, representing commercial shellfish growers; the Alexander group and
Adkins group of private tideland owners; and a group of private property owners
affiliated with the United Property Owners of Washington ("UPOW"). The district
court denied motions to intervene filed by the Inner Sound Crab Association,
Dungeness Crab Harvesters Association, and the Washington Harvest Divers
Association. That ruling was recently affirmed by this Court. See United States v
Washington, 86 F.3d 1499 (9th Cir. 1996).
by the Growers. The court concluded that a "natural shellfish bed"
is a "bed which is capable of sustaining a yield of shellfish that will
support a commercial livelihood." /d. at 1461. The court then found
that the minimum density of manila clams that will support a
commercial livelihood is 0.5 pounds of mature clams per square
foot.
Third, the court redefined "artificial beds," which are
exempted by the Shellfish Proviso from the reach of the Tribes’
shellfishing rights. The court believed that it would be "very
difficult" to determine whether beds on Growers’ properties were
“artificial” or "natural" and that the Tribes should not benefit from
the Growers’ efforts to enhance the shellfish resource on their own
properties. Jd. at 1461-62. The court therefore modified the
definition of "cultivated" to encompass the "wide range of
techniques used by the Growers to enhance production of shellfish
on their property." /d. The court referred to these bec's as "de facto
artificial beds." Jd. at 1462 & n. 18. Under the court's ruling, only
"those beds whose existence is entirely due to the natural
propagation of the species" are subject to the Tribes’ Treaty rights.
Id. at 1462.
Fourth, the court imposed "time, place, and manner’
restrictions on the Tribes’ right to shellfish on private properties. /d
at 1470-73. One such restriction was a blanket ban on upland access
across private property absent consent by the owner.
The court also set forth dispute resolution procedures,
calling for a panel of four special masters: one selected by the
lribes, one by the Growers, one by the Private Owners, and one by
the State. Jd at 1475-76. A single master, drawn from the four,
determines each dispute. Under the court's decision, the masters
have the power to award damages against Tribes who violate the
[mplementation Plan. Id.
In response to motions to reconsider its decision in Shellfish
II, the district court amended its decision on December 18, 1995.
United States v. Washington, 909 F.Supp. 787 (W.D. Wash.1995)
[hereinafter "Shellfish III"). \n Shellfish III, the court revised its ban
on upland tribal access to shellfish beds absent consent of the
landowner by allowing tribes to cross private land after a showing of
"the absence of access by boat, public road, or public right-of-way."
Id. at 793. Disputes over access must be presented to a special
master. Jd. at 791-93. The court also changed its decision allowing
ee
eT nT
16
the special master to award damages against the Tribes. The master
is still able to award damages against individual tribal members who
damage private property during exercise of fishing rights, but he or
she cannot award damages against the Tribes themselves. /d. at
793-94.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
All parties agree that the meaning of the Treaty language is
ultimately a question of law reviewed de novo. United States v.
Washington, 969 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir.1992). Although several
Private Owner groups assert that the district court's findings
regarding the "negotiators' intentions and expectations" are mixed
issues of law and fact reviewed de novo, we have previously
reviewed a district court's findings of parties' intent in entering
Indian Treaties "(u]nder the highly deferential clear error standard."
See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian Reservation v.
Washington, 96 F.3d 334, 343 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -
—, 117 S.Ct. 1432, 137 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997). We therefore review for
clear error all of the district court's findings of historical fact,
including its findings regarding the treaty negotiators’ intentions.
We then review de novo whether the district court reached the
proper conclusion as to the meaning of the Shellfish Proviso given
those findings.
We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's
equitable orders. The district court abuses its discretion when its
equitable decision is based on an error of law or a clearly erroneous
factual finding. Foster v. Skinner, 70 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th
Cir.1995).
V. CANONS OF TREATY CONSTRUCTION
"{A]ll Treaties made, ... under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. Art. VI,
cl. 2. The goal of treaty interpretation is to determine what the
parties meant by the treaty terms. Shoshone Indians v. United
States, 324 U.S. 335, 353, 65 S.Ct. 690, 89 L.Ed. 985 (1945). "[I]t is
the intention of the parties ... that must control any attempt to
interpret the treaties." Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675. This
analysis of the parties’ intentions "begin[s] with the text of the treaty
and the context in which the written words are used." Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113
L.Ed.2d 569 (1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
"(T]reaties are constructed more liberally than private agreements,
and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond written words to
the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical
'
construction adopted by the parties." /d. at 535 (quoting Choctaw
Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32, 63 S.Ct.
672, 87 L.Ed. 877 (1943)).
The Shellfish Proviso is an exception to the Tribes’ broad
fishing rights. "A proviso is strictly construed, and only those
subjects expressly restricted are freed from the operation of the
statute." Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 20.22, at 110 (Sth
ed.1992).
Courts have uniformly held that treaties must be liberally
construed in favor of establishing Indian rights. Confederated
Tribes of Chehalis, 96 F.3d at 340. "Any ambiguities in
construction must be resolved in favor of the Indians." /d. (citation
omitted). "These rules of construction ‘are rooted in the unique trust
relationship between the United States and the Indians."" /d
(quoting Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,
247, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985)).
VI. DISCUSSION
\ EXCEPT AS LIMITED BY THE SHELLFISH PROVISO,
THE RIGHT OF TAKING SHELLFISH UNDER THI
TREATIES IS COEXTENSIVE WITH THE RIGHT Ol!
PTAKING FISH.
The district court held that the Treaties grant the Tribes a
right to take shellfish of every species found anywhere within the
lribes' usual and accustomed fishing areas, except as expressly
limited by the Shellfish Proviso. We agree.
[he Tribes' shellfish rights are not limited by
species.
he State of Washington argues that the Tribes’ right to take
shellfish is limited to those species of fish actually harvested by the
18
Tribes prior to the signing of the Treaties.© Specifically,
Washington contends that the tribes have no Treaty right to certain
"deep-water" species’ of shellfish that were not historically
harvested in shallower waters and on tidelands. We respectfully
reject this contention because it is plainly inconsistent with the
language of the Treaties, the law of the case, and the intent and
understanding of the signatory parties. See Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp.
at 1430.
With all deference to the State, there is no language in the
Treaties to support its position: the Treaties make no mention of
any species-specific or technology-based restrictions on the Tribes’
rights. The district court aptly noted that, had the Treaty parties
intended to limit the harvestable species, the parties would not have
chosen the word "fish." The word "fish" has "perhaps the widest
sweep of any word the drafters could have chosen." /d. Thus, the
district court correctly chose not to "deviate from [the Treaties']
plain meaning.” /d.
Washington's position is also contrary to the law-of-the-case
doctrine. In 1974, Judge Boldt rejected an argument similar to
Washington's current position, stating: "The right secured by the
treaties to the Plaintiff tribes is not limited as to species of fish, the
origin of fish, the purpose or use or the time or manner of taking...."
Washington I, 384 F.Supp. at 401. Moreover, the court determined
that the Treaties "do not prohibit or limit any specific manner,
method, or purpose of taking fish." /d. at 402. We previously
affirmed these conclusions "in all respects," Washington II, 520 F.2d
at 693, and we continue to believe they are correct.
Washington relies heavily on the Supreme Court's statement
in Fishing Vessel that "securing" fishing rights is "synonymous with
‘reserving’ rights previously exercised." 443 U.S. at 678 (emphasis
added). Washington's contention, however, is contrary to the
recognized principle that the Treaties involved a grant of rights from
the Indians to the United States. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.
371, 380-81, 25 S.Ct. 662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905). In Winans, the
6 The State of Oregon has filed an amicus brief joining Washington in
this argument
“ a
[he deep-water species include: geoduck (pronounced "gooey duck
a kind of giant clam), sea urchin, sea cucumber, and certain species of crab and
shrimp
Supreme Court upheld the Indians’ right of access over private
property in order to fish in the Columbia River. /d. at 384. The
Court construed the fishing rights in the Stevens Treaty as “not a
grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a
reservation of those not granted". Jd. As the district court explained:
At [Treaty] time, ... the Tribes had the absolute right to
harvest any species they desired, consistent with their
aboriginal title.... The fact that some species were not
taken before treaty time-either because they were
inaccessible or the Indians chose not to take them-does
not mean that their right to take such fish was limited.
Because the "right of taking fish" must be read as a
reservation of the Indians’ pre-existing rights, and
because the right to take any species, without limit,
pre-existed the Stevens Treaties, the Court must read the
"right of taking fish" without any species limitation
Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1430 (citation omitted). A more
restrictive reading of the Treaties would be contrary to the Supreme
Court's definitive conclusion that the Treaties are a "grant of rights
from" the Tribes. Winans, 198 U.S. at 380. We therefore reject
Washington's argument that the Tribes are limited in the species of
shellfish they harvest.
2 lhe "usual and accustomed grounds and stations" di
not vary by species of fish.
Appellants argue that the district court erred in holding that
the right of taking fish within "all usual and accustomed grounds and
stations" of a Tribe does not vary by species of fish. They contend
that the Tribes' "usual and accustomed" fishing grounds for shellfish
are not coextensive with the usual and accustomed grounds for the
taking of other fish, the boundaries of which were determined in
Washington I. They suggest that the Tribes must establish their
usual and accustomed grounds for each species of fish. We
respectfully disagree.
In Washington I, the court found that "every fishing location
where members of a tribe customarily fished ... is a usual and
accustomed ground or station at which the treaty tribe reserved, and
its members presently have, the right to fish." 384 F.Supp. at 332
That court heard extensive evidence and made findings with respect
to each Tribes’ usual and accustomed fishing grounds. /d. at 359-82
Since the time Judge Boldt made these findings, courts considering
20
fishing disputes under the Treaties have never required
species-specific findings of usual and accustomed fishing grounds.
In fact, the district court in a prior proceeding on a related Stevens
Treaties case found that the usual and accustomed grounds and
stations for herring (a non-anadromous fish) were co-extensive with
those previously adjudicated for salmon (an anadromous fish).
United States v. Washington, 459 F.Supp. 1020, 1049 (W.D.
Wash.1978) (ruling that the tribes may take herring at all of its usual
and accustomed fishing places to the same extent and subject to the
same terms and conditions as specified in Washington I).
Moreover, it would be extremely burdensome and perhaps
impossible for the Tribes to prove their usual and accustomed
grounds on a species-specific basis. "Little documentation of Indian
fishing locations in and around 1855 exists today." 459 F.Supp. at
1059. If each Tribe were required to prove its usual and accustomed
grounds for every species of fish and shellfish, the time and cost to
the court and parties would be unreasonably burdensome.
In light of the above, the district court was correct in
concluding that the Tribes’ usual and accustomed grounds for
shellfish are co-extensive with the Tribes' usual and accustomed
fishing grounds, which have been previously decided by the courts.
3 The Equal Footing Doctrine does not preclude tribal
harvesting.
Appellants contend that the "Equal Footing Doctrine" and
the "Shively presumption" preclude tribal harvesting on the
tidelands. “Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, every new state is
entitled to entrance into the Union free of any encumbrance on its
land, so that it stands on ‘equal footing’ with the other states."
Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1442-43 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 14 S.Ct. 548, 38 L.Ed. 331 (1894)). "The ‘Shivel)
presumption’ is an outgrowth of this doctrine, and holds that any
pre-statehood grant of property does not include tidelands unless the
grant clearly indicated that tidelands were included." Jd. at 1443
(citation omitted). We conclude that the language of the Treaties,
the law of this case, and the Supreme Court's prior applications of
the Equal Footing Doctrine all counsel against its application in the
instant case.
In short, Appellants contend that any treaty right to harvest
shellfish would amount to a property interest in the tidelands, and
because the Treaties do not clearly specify an intent to grant a
property interest in the tidelands, the Treaties cannot be construed as
providing rights to harvest shellfish. The district court rejected this
argument and interpreted the Treaties "without regard to the Equal
Footing Doctrine or the Shively presumption." /d. We agree with
the district court's interpretation.
Appellants rely primarily on two cases, United States v. Holt
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 46 S.Ct. 197, 70 L.Ed. 465 (1926), and
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d
493 (1981). Both cases involved disputes over Indian title rights to
lands underlying navigable waters. In both cases, the Supreme
Court applied the Shively presumption and concluded that the
treaties at issue "did not by [their] terms formally convey any land to
the Indians at all." Montana, 450 U.S. at 553. In Holt State Bank,
the Court concluded "there was nothing in [the treaties] which even
approaches a grant of rights in lands underlying navigable waters."
270 US. at 58.
In the instant case, however, "the Tribes possess the
disputed rights [to harvest shellfish] pre-treaty, and the treaty
simply effects a reservation of rights." 873 F.Supp. at 1443. As the
district court stated:
It is settled under Washington II that the fishing rights at
issue in this case predated the Stevens Treaties, and the
Treaties simply effected a reservation of those rights.
Similarly, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
reservation in Fishing Vessel: "The fishing clause
speaks of ‘securing’ certain fishing rights, a term the
Court has previously interpreted as synonymous with
‘reserving’ rights previously exercised." Fishing Vessel,
443 U.S. at 678. Because the Stevens Treaties must be
construed as a reservation of rights by the Tribes, not a
granting of rights by the United States, the Shively
presumption and the Equal Footing Doctrine cannot play
a role in the evaluating the existence or scope of the
rights.
Id. at 1443-44 (citation omitted). We adopt the district court's
persuasive reasons for rejecting the application of the Shively
presumption to defeat the Tribes’ shellfishing rights.
We note that "the Supreme Court has applied the Equal
Footing Doctrine in one context only, namely when evaluating a
I iacceiaieieaeiiiaiiiealll
Se a
22
claim of right to lands beneath navigable waters based upon an
alleged conveyance or retention of fee simple ownership by the
United States prior to statehood." /d. at 1444 (citing cases); see
Montana, 450 U.S. at 550-51 ("The question is whether the United
States conveyed beneficial ownership of the riverbed to the Crow
Tribe by the Treaties of 1851 or 1868."); Holt State Bank, 270 U.S.
at 57 (adjudicating the question of "whether the lands under the lake
were disposed of by the United States before Minnesota became a
state"); Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 204,
107 S.Ct. 2318, 96 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987) (The United States answered
in the district court that title to the lakebed remained in federal
ownership by selection of the lake as a reservoir site prior to Utah's
statehood). Unlike the above cases, the instant case does not involve
ownership of tidelands. The Tribes do not claim ownership of the
tidelands; the Tribes merely assert their right to harvest shellfish
within the tidelands, regardless of ownership.
Moreover, application of the Equal Footing Doctrine has
already been rejected in the context of the Stevens Treaties fishing
rights. First, the Supreme Court in Winans noted:
[I]t is contended that the State acquired, by its admission
into the Union "upon an equal footing with the original
States," the power to grant rights in or to dispose of the
shore lands upon navigable streams, and such power is
subject only to the paramount authority of Congress
with regard to public navigation and commerce. The
United States, therefore, it is contended, could neither
grant nor retain rights in the shore or to the lands under
water.
* * *
The extinguishment of the Indian title, opening the land
for settlement and preparing the way for future States,
were appropriate to the objects for which the United
States held the Territory. And surely it was within the
competency of the Nation to secure to the Indians such a
remnant of the great rights they possessed as "taking
fish at all usual and accustomed places."
198 U.S. at 382-84. Similarly, Appellants’ Equal Footing arguments
have been rejected in this case:
Admission of the State of Washington into the Union
upon an equal footing with the original states had no
effect upon the treaty rights of the Plaintiff tribes. Such
admission imposed upon the State, equally with other
states, the obligation to observe and carry out the
provisions of treaties of the United States.
Washington I, 384 F.Supp. at 401. Thus, we can identify no reason
or rule that would mandate the application of the Equal Footing
Doctrine to limit the Tribes’ fishing rights in this case. The language
of the Treaties, the law of this case, and the Supreme Court's prior
applications of the Equal Footing Doctrine all preclude its
application here.
4. The Tribes are entitled to harvest shellfish on
privately-owned tidelands.
The Private Owners contend that the Tribes' right to take
shellfish does not include the right to take shellfish found on
privately-owned tidelands. The Private Owners argue that the
lreaties gave the Tribes the same common right to harvest shellfish
as that enjoyed by non-Indian citizens, and that this common right
was diminished by the conveyance of the property into private
ownership. They contend also that the Treaties only allow the
lribes to take the common resources of "public water and public
lands," not to take shellfish on private lands. We reject these
contentions.
First, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected arguments
to the effect that Indian treaties reserve to the Indians no more
fishing rights than those enjoyed by non-Indian citizens. See
Winans, 198 U.S. at 380 (rejecting lower court ruling that Indians
had no more rights than any inhabitant of the Territory); Fishing
Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676-77 & n. 22 (rejecting argument that Indians
only possessed rights in common with other citizens).
Second, as the Supreme Court explained in Winans, the
Tribes were promised "the right of taking fish at all usual and
accustomed places" and the right "of erecting temporary buildings
for curing them." 198 U.S. at 381. "The contingency of future
ownership of the lands, therefore, was foreseen and provided for"
and, "in other words, the Indians were given a right in the land." Jd.
Winans directly contradicts the Private Owners' argument:
the Supreme Court has made clear that the Tribes' fishing rights in
their usual and accustomed places are not diminished by private
I ee ea eR a
24
ownership of those lands. In fact, the Court noted that the Treaties
"imposed a servitude upon every piece of land as though described
therein.” Id.
Moreover, in Fishing Vessel, the Supreme Court explicitly
recognized that the "[T]reaties provide Indians with certain rights—
l.e., the right ... to cross private lands—that non-Indians do not
have." Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676 n. 22. The district court
acknowledged this right in Shellfish II] and correctly concluded that:
[U]pon proper showing of the need for land access, the
Tribes would be entitled under Winans to cross private
property in order to exercise their fishing rights.
Resolving the issue of Tribal access across private
property requires the balancing of competing interests,
and the Court emphasizes that land access is not to be
granted unless there is a proper showing of the need for
such.
909 F.Supp. at 792.
This case is not the first Stevens Treaties case to implicate
private property rights. The previous fishing rights cases, upheld in
Fishing Vessel, noted that the Treaties "include[ | the right to use
private tidelands for beach seines, tidal impoundment traps, stake
nets and reef nets." Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1444; see Washington
/, 384 F.Supp. at 360-61, 378. Appellants’ attempts to distinguish the
anadromous fishing rights from the shellfishing rights are not
persuasive. The Supreme Court has said that "[i]t is absolutely
clear, as Governor Stevens himself said, that neither he nor the
Indians intended that the latter should be excluded from their ancient
fisheries, and it is accordingly inconceivable that either party
deliberately agreed to authorize future settlers to crowd the Indians
out of any meaningful use of their accustomed places to fish."
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676.
The Private Owners also contend that shellfish are different
than anadromous fish because they have traditionally been held to be
a part of the land. The district court rejected this contention, stating
that "the uniform common law at treaty time held that private
ownership of a parcel of tideland did not include private rights to the
shellfish on that parcel." Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1439. In
support of this proposition, the district court cited Joseph Angell's
1847 Treatise on the Right of Property in Tide Waters, which states
that "[t]here is no doubt, that the public have a right to take shellfish
on the shore, though the right of soil in the shore happens to be
private property.”
On appeal, both the Tribes and the Private Owners cite
several cases in support of their respective contentions that the right
to harvest shellfish from private property was (or was not) permitted
at Treaty time. See Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 74-75.
15 L.Ed. 269 (1855) (stating that "the enjoyment of certain public
rights" included "the common liberty of taking fish, as well shellfish
as floating fish"); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413-14,
10 L.Ed. 997 (1842) (noting that public rights applied "as well for
shell-fish and floating fish"). But see Den v. The Jersey Co., 56 U.S
426, 432-33, 15 How. 426, 14 L.Ed. 757 (1853) ("Clams ordinarily
live in the soil under the waters, and not within the waters.... They
therefore, in a very material sense, belong with the land.")
Regardless of whether shellfish were a private or public resource at
treaty time, or today, the Treaties secured the Tribes' right to fish at
their usual and accustomed grounds and stations. The Tribes
therefore acquired the right to take shellfish from the tidelands
within their usual and accustomed grounds, without regard to the
public or private nature of their ownership. As the district court
stated in Washington I, "[b]ecause the right of each treaty tribe to
take anadromous fish arises from a treaty with the United States,
that right is reserved and protected under the supreme law of the
land, does not depend on state law, is distinct from rights or
privileges held by others, and may not be qualified by any action o!
the state." 384 F.Supp. at 402. Thus, whatever the status of the state
law at the time of the Treaties or today, the Treaties represent the
supreme law of the land and give to the Tribes the right to take
shellfish from private tidelands. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 682
(stating that "neither party to the treaties may rely on the State's
regulatory powers or on property law concepts to defeat the other's
right to a ‘fairly apportioned’ share of each covered run ol
harvestable anadromous fish") (emphasis added).
In light of Winans, Fishing Vessel, and the Treaties’
language and power as the supreme law of the land, the district court
correctly determined that the Tribes have a right to harvest shellfish
on private tidelands.
B. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED
THE MEANING OF THE SHELLFISH PROVISO.
The Treaties’ fishing clauses were expressly limited by the
Shellfish Proviso, which prohibited the Tribes from taking shellfish
from "any beds staked or cultivated by citizens." The district court
"interpret{ed] the terms 'staked' and ‘cultivated’ as the terms were
defined and used in the shellfishing industry at and before treaty
time." 873 F.Supp. at 1441. The district court concluded that, when
the signatory parties used those terms in the Proviso, "they intended
only to exclude Indians from artificial, or planted, shellfish beds;
they neither contemplated nor desired that the Indians would be
excluded from natural shellfish beds." Jd. "Therefore, the words
‘any beds staked or cultivated by citizens,’ describe artificial
shellfish beds created by private citizens." Id.
The Growers offered the district court an alternative
definition of staked or cultivated that "starts and ends with the
treaty-time dictionary." /d. at 1431. The district court noted that
under the Growers’ theory, "any shellfish bed extant today that is
surrounded by stakes, or in some fashion improved by human labor,
would be off limits to the Indians." Jd. The Private Owners make a
similar contention, arguing that "'staked'’ should be interpreted in its
‘frontier’ context and thus should be regarded as a synonym for
‘claimed as private property.’ Therefore, all privately-owned
tideland, whether or not surrounded by stakes, would be protected
by the Shellfish Proviso." Jd. The district court rejected the
Growers’ and Private Owners' definitions, analyzing the Shellfish
Proviso in light of: (1) the surrounding treaty words, (2) the record
of the treaty negotiations, (3) the historical circumstances that gave
rise to the Stevens Treaties, (4) the possible alternative formulations
of the Shellfish Proviso, and (5) the post-treaty conduct of both
parties. Jd. at 1435. In short, the court found that "the Tribes
presented compelling evidence that only artificial beds were ‘staked’
or ‘cultivated’ at treaty time." /d. at 1431-42. Given the deferential
standard by which we review the district court's findings of
historical fact and its findings regarding the intentions of the parties’
negotiators, we conclude the district court did not err in interpreting
the Proviso and we adopt its analysis as our own. Moreover, we
believe that the district court's reasoned analysis of the Proviso is
correct. We emphasize three additional points.
First, the Growers' and Private Owners' interpretations are
not based on the common understanding of the phrase "beds staked
or cultivated" within the context of the shellfishing industry at treaty
time. The district court made a factual finding that the treaty
negotiators drew the language of the Shellfish Proviso from terms
commonly used in the fledgling shellfishing industry. Although the
Growers may have presented evidence to the contrary, none of this
evidence leaves us with a "definite and firm conviction" that a
mistake has been committed. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333,
346 n. 14, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992). It was therefore
not clear error for the district court to have rejected Appellants’
interpretation and to have adopted the Tribes' position.
Second, the Growers' interpretation is totally inconsistent
with the "United States’ avowed intention to preserve for the Indians
their ancient fisheries." Jd. at 1437. The Growers' and Private
Owners' interpretations would read the Proviso to effectively
eliminate the Tribes’ right to take shellfish under the Treaties.
Surely, Governor Stevens would not have intended such a result,
especially in light of the historical circumstances surrounding the
Treaties’ negotiations. In fact, the benevolent approach taken by the
United States treaty negotiators was noted by the Supreme Court in
Fishing Vessel:
Governor Stevens made the following statement to the
Indians gathered at Point-No-Point to negotiate the
treaty bearing that name: "Are you not my children and
also children of the Great Father? What will I not do for
my children, and what will you not for yours? Would
you not die for them? This paper is such as a man
would give to his children and I will tell you why. This
paper gives you a home. Does not a father give his
children a home? ... This paper secures your fish. Does
not a father give food to his children?"
443 U.S. at 667 n.11 (emphasis added). Likewise, the district court
in this case aptly noted:
The one significant promise for purposes of this
litigation is the promise by the United States to the
Indians that they would enjoy a permanent right to fish
as they always had. This right was promised as a sacred
entitlement, one which the United States had a moral
obligation to protect. The Indians were repeatedly
assured that they would continue to enjoy the right to
fish as they always had, in the places where they had
always fished. There is no indication in the minutes of
the treaty proceedings that the Indians were ever told
that they would be excluded from any of their ancient
fisheries.
Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1435. Were we to adopt the Growers'
definition of staked or cultivated, we would be providing "an
28
impotent outcome to negotiations and a convention which seemed to
promise more, and give the word of the nation for more." Winans,
198 U.S. at 380.
Third, the Appellants’ interpretation of the Proviso casts
aside black-letter canons of statutory construction and treaty
interpretation. The Shellfish Proviso is an exception to the Tribes'
otherwise broad fishing rights. "A proviso is strictly construed, and
only those subjects expressly restricted are freed from the operation
of the statute." Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 20.22, at
110 (Sth ed.1992). Moreover, courts have uniformly held that
treaties must be liberally construed in favor of the Indians.
Confederated Tribes of Chehalis, 96 F.3d at 340. "These rules of
construction ‘are rooted in the unique trus* relationship between the
United States and the Indians.'" Jd. (quotitig Oneida County v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84
L.Ed.2d 169 (1985)). The Appellants’ interpretation of the Proviso
would render meaningless the above canons of construction and
interpretation.
ae THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY REJECTED
APPELLANTS' AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES.
The Growers contend that we should apply the doctrine of
laches to defeat the Tribes’ claim to shellfish. The doctrine of laches
is defined as "neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken together
with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to [the]
adverse party, operates as [a] bar in [a] court of equity." Black's
Law Dictionary 875 (6th ed.1990). In urging us to apply laches, the
Growers argue that "this is an extraordinary case.... These
extraordinary facts call for new law." Growers’ Opening Brief at 44.
The Growers ask for new law simply because current law
precludes their argument. In Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712, 718
(9th Cir.1983), we held that "laches or estoppel is not available to
defeat Indian treaty rights." Although the equities do weigh heavily
in favor of the Growers’ argument—the Tribes waited 135 years to
assert their shellfishing rights—the law does not support their claim.
See Board of County Comm'rs vy. United States, 308 U.S. 343,
350-51, 60 S.Ct. 285, 84 L.Ed. 313 (1939) (defenses based on delay
in bringing claims such as laches and estoppel are inapplicable to
claims to enforce Indian rights). Once again, we reiterate that we are
interpreting a treaty, and that treaties enjoy a unique position in our
law.
————————_
29
UPOW's argument that the Tribes’ treaty rights were
extinguished by the Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U.S.C. § 70
(repealed 1978), is without merit. Judge Boldt rejected this theory
over twenty years ago, see United States v. Washington, 459 F.Supp.
1020, 1039-42 (W.D. Wash.1978), and we reject it here for the same
reasons.
D. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
LIMITING THE TRIBES' RIGHT TO HARVEST
SHELLFISH FROM CERTAIN AREAS BECAUSE THE
DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER REDEFINED THE TERMS
OF THE TREATY.
In their cross-appeal, the Tribes and the United States
contend that, in its implementation decision (Shellfish I/), the district
court disregarded its own admonition in its first decision that it
lacked authority to rewrite or interpret the terms of the treaties to
avoid hardship to any party based on its own notions of the equities.
The implementation decision, the Tribes contend, erroneously
redefined the terms of the treaties in abrogation of the Tribes’ right
to take shellfish. For example, the district court refined its
definition of the word "cultivated" in the Proviso and imposed "time,
place, and manner" restrictions on the Tribes’ ability to harvest
shellfish.
We hold that the district court impermissibly employed
equitable powers to rewrite the Treaties’ terms. However, we also
hold that allocating {fifty percent of the commercial Growers’
shellfish harvest to the Tribes would unjustly enrich them. Such an
allocation would simply not comport with Fishing Vessels concept
of giving the Tribes a "fair share" of the harvest.
l. The district court improperly limited the Tribes’
right to take shellfish from the Growers’ shellfish
beds.
In Shellfish II, the district court declared that "it is
incumbent upon this Court to use its equitable powers to effect a
balance between the Tribes' Treaty shelifishing right and the
Growers’ and Owners' interest in the peaceful enjoyment and/or
commercial development of their property." /d. Using these
"equitable powers," the district court formulated a "broader"
definition of a "cultivated" shellfish bed that applies only to "the
existing beds on property owned or leased by Growers licensed by
the State of Washington." /d. at 1461. The court then deemed
natural shellfish beds that have been enhanced by human means "de
facto artificial beds" upon which the Tribes may not take shellfish.8
Id. at 1462. "Permitting the Tribes to harvest fifty percent of the
shellfish from de facto artificial beds would confer a windfall on the
Tribes, and would neither protect nor encourage the growth of the
shellfish industry." Id.
In support of its use of equitable principles, the district court
and Appellants primarily rely on five cases: Yankton Sioux Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 272 U.S. 351, 357, 47 S.Ct. 142, 71 L.Ed.
294 (1926) (awarding Indians monetary payment rather than ejecting
"innumerable innocent purchasers" from tribal land); South Carolina
v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 519 n.5, 106 S.Ct.
2039, 90 L.Ed.2d 490 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing
Yankton and acknowledging that equitable considerations might
have limited the remedies available had the plaintiff tribe prevailed
on its claim to 144,000 acres of land); County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 260, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (urging that laches be applied to bar
Indians’ claim to lands); Brooks v. Nez Perce County, Idaho, 670
F.2d 835 (9th Cir.1982) (in an action to quiet title to a parcel of land,
equitable considerations would not bar the ciaim to the land entirely,
but "[ljack of diligence by the government in exercising its role as
trustee may be weighed by the district court in calculating damages"
for several decades of loss of use of the land); United States v.
Imperial Irrigation Dist., 799 F.Supp. 1052 (S.D.Cal.1992)
(employing tort-law equitable principles to award monetary
damages to the plaintiff Indians, rather than restoring tribal land to
them).
None of the above cases, however, involve the use of
equitable considerations in interpreting Indian treaties. At best, they
condone the use of equity as a tool to calculate damages.
The majority in Oneida, 470 U.S. at 244, stated that "it is far from
8 The court declared that only "those beds whose existence is entirely due
to the natural propagation of the species" are subject to the Tribes’ Treaty rights.
This declaration excluded from Tribal harvest: 1) beds created from scratch;
2) beds enhanced by planting, netting or seeding pre existing shellfish beds; 3) beds
enhanced by using predator control or rototilling in or around preexisting beds;
and 4) "beds whose existence is due to the Grower's efforts, albeit passively, such as
the ‘natural’ migration of shellfish from an artificial bed to a new spot." Shellfish II,
898 F.Supp. at 1462.
31
clear that [laches] is available in suits such as this one" to restore
Indian lands to Indians pursuant to treaty rights. In fact, in the terse
three-page Brooks opinion, the court concluded that laches was not a
valid bar to the Indians fifty-four-year-old complaint for a parcel of
land. 670 F.2d at 837. Brooks had nothing to do with interpretation
of an Indian treaty, but merely concluded that the lengthy delay in
pursuing the action could be used in "calculating damages." Here,
by contrast, the district court is using equitable principies to assist in
fashioning the remedy and in interpreting the Treaty.
The Tribes, on the other hand, cite persuasive and
unambiguous Supreme Court authority. The district court's
re-interpretation violates the Supreme Court's admonition in United
States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 532-33, 21 S.Ct. 149, 45
L.Ed. 291 (1900), a seminal Indian treaty interpretation case:
But in no case has it been adjudged that the courts could
by mere interpretation or in deference to its view as to
what was right under all the circumstances, incorporate
into an Indian treaty something that was inconsistent
with the clear import of its words.... We are not at
liberty to dispense with any of the conditions or
requirements of the treaty, or to take away any
qualification or integral part of any stipulation, upon any
notion of equity or general convenience, or substantial
justice.
(emphasis added; quotation and citation omitted). The district court
itself recognized in Shellfish I:
In reaching its decision, the Court may not rewrite the
Treaties or interpret the Treaties in a way contrary to
settled law simply to avoid or minimize any hardship to
the public or to the intervenors. Indeed, the Court has
no such power. Rather, amelioration from such
hardships should be sought from Congress, which has
the power to abrogate the treaty....
873 F.Supp. at 1429. See also Choctaw, 179 U.S. at 531-32 (citing
cases in support of rule that "the language used in treaties with the
9 The Imperial Irrigation District case provides little support for the
Appellants. First, it is currently pending on appeal. Second, it is stayed pending
settlement discussions. See 799 F.Supp. at 1068.
=
Indians should never be construed to their prejudice" and that words
should be construed as they “were understood by this unlettered
people, rather than their critical meaning"). Under these rules of
construction, the Choctaw precedent, and the district court's own
statements in Shellfish I, the district court abused its discretion by
applying notions of equity to redefine the term "cultivate."
It does not follow from the above, however, that the district
court is without the ability to use equity in implementing its Treaty
interpretation. As laid out below, we believe the district court
should have used its equitable powers only to limit the take of the
Tribes—not the location—so as to avoid any unjust enrichment.
2. The district court improperly allocated to the Tribes
a fifty-percent share of shellfish from the Growers’
beds.
Appellants contend that Tribes' allocation of fifty-percent of
the shellfish resource exceeded their "fair share." Appellants
suggest that the district court should have considered "equitable
factors" and that it improperly applied the "moderate living"
analysis suggested by the Supreme Court in Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S.
at 684-686. Although we conclude that the district court correctly
applied Fishing Vessel 's moderate living analysis, we hold that the
district court should have used equitable principles to limit the
Tribe's shellfish harvest from the Growers’ beds to a "fair share."
“~e
In Fishing Vessel, the Court stated that an equitable measure
of the common right should initially divide the harvestable portion
of each run that passes through a “usual and accustomed" place into
approximately equal treaty and non- treaty shares, and should then
reduce the treaty share if tribal needs may be satisfied by a lesser
amount. 443 U.S. at 685. The Court elaborated on this concept:
[T]he central principle here must be that Indian treaty
rights to a natural resource that once was thoroughly and
exclusively exploited by the Indians secures so much as,
but no more than is necessary to provide the Indians
with a livelihood-that is to say, a moderate living... If,
for example, a tribe should dwindle to just a few
members, or if it should find other sources of support
that lead it to abandon its fisheries, a 45% or 50%
allocation of an entire run that passes through its
customary fishing grounds would be manifestly
inappropriate because the livelihood of the tribe under
33
those circumstances could not reasonably require an
allotment of a large number of fish.
Id. at 686-87. Appellants contend that the district court's allocation
of fifty percent of the shellfish resource goes beyond what is
necessary to afford the Tribes a "moderate living.”
The district court, however, heard evidence as to the Tribes’
living standards presented by both sides and concluded that
Appellants’ experts’ analyses were "flawed."!0 The district court
made the following finding:
The uncontroverted evidence presented at trial is that the
Tribes lag significantly behind other residents of the
State of Washington in their overall standard of living.
For example, approximately one in_ three Tribal
members live below the poverty level; Indians in the
State of Washington endure health circumstances
characterized by the State as “very poor," tribal
members have per capita incomes that are less than one
half the per capita income of non-tribal residents of the
State; and tribal members suffer from unemployment
rates at least three times greater than that of all
non-tribal residents of the State of Washington.
Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1446. This finding is not clearly
erroneous. |! |
However, Fishing Vessel instructs us to give the Tribes a
"fair share" and to “fairly apportion" the fish. Fishing Vessel, 443
US. at 682, 686. With respect to the Growers’ shellfish beds, we
conclude that it would contravene such notions of fairness if the
Tribes were permitted to take fifty percent of the Growers’ enhanced
harvest. Many of the Growers have spent decades developing and
10 UPOW's expert, Dr. Thomas, relied solely on what he called “tribal
household income" and compared it to a moderate living standard by reference to
the Bureau of the Census income data for non-Indian households. 873 F.Supp. at
1446. The district court concluded that this analysis was flawed because it relied
only on income, making it a "single-indicator" analysis. /d.
11 Even if we were to consider Tribal income from casino operations—as
the Appellants ask us to do—we would not be left with a "definite and firm
conviction” that the district court's findings were erroncous.
34
enhancing production on their shellfish beds, investing their
valuable time, energy, and considerable resources. We therefore
hold that only those Growers’ beds that exist solely by virtue of the
natural propagation of the species are subject to a full fifty-percent
harvest allocation. The other Grower beds will be subject to the
allocation analysis below.
————
Our decision here is consistent with our previous decision in
United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1358-59 (9th Cir.1985)
(en banc), where we concluded that hatchery fish are subject to
Treaty allocation. In that decision, several "equitable
considerations" favored the Tribes’ position, including "the lack of
State ownership of the fish once released" and "the lack of any
unjust enrichment of the Tribes." Jd. Here, however, those same
equitable considerations do not support the Tribes’ allocation of fifty
percent of the Growers’ shellfish. First, unlike hatchery fish—which
are replacement fish that are released into the water when grown—
shellfish on the Growers' beds remain on the Growers’ beds until
they are harvested. Second, in the instant case, the Tribes would be
unjustly enriched if they were entitled to a full fifty percent of the
Growers’ shellfish. The Tribes candidly admitted as much at oral
argument when they conceded that equity should permit a Grower to
protect his enhanced harvest "for a couple of years." We believe not
for a couple of years, but forever.
Our conclusion squares with one of the purposes of the
Proviso, which was "to protect the fledgling oyster industry['s]"
efforts to create a harvest where there was none, or where it was
insufficient to support a commercial livelihood. Shellfish I, 873
F.Supp. at 1437-38; see also id. ("To the extent [the Proviso]
prohibited Indians from taking shellfish from both artificial and
natural shellfish beds where settlers were engaging in fruitful
harvesting, [the Proviso] would aid the development of the
industry."). Moreover, the Tribes are not excluded from their
ancient fisheries; they are merely precluded from taking an unfair
share.
We therefore apply the following analysis to Grower beds
where the Growers, or their predecessors, began their enhancement
efforts on a natural bed. For such natural beds, the Growers shall
demonstrate what portion of their harvest is due to their labor, as
opposed to what portion would exist absent the Growers’
enhancement. See Shellfish II.,.898 F.Supp. at 1462. For such
enhanced natural beds, the Tribes shall be entitled to fifty percent of
the pre-enhanced sustainable shellfish production from those
€
*
“
2
35
beds.12 Of course, this allocation analysis does not apply to
artificial beds, that is, to Grower beds that did not support a
sustainable commercial density of shellfish prior to cultivation. As
the Tribes have acknowledged, the Tribes have no right to harvest
such beds. 898 F.Supp. at 1460-61.!2
We place the burden of proving pre-enhancement harvest
versus post-enhancement harvest on the Growers—for the Growers
are best able to prove such a calculation.!3 We remand to the
district court for a determination as to the best manner to implement
this allocation. We emphasize that this "enhanced allocation"
analysis applies only to the Commercial Shellfish Growers’ beds.
2. The district court erred by concluding that the State
of Washington is a "citizen."
The district court determined that the term "citizens" in the
Shellfish Proviso, "includes the State of Washington, when the State
acts on behalf of the public." /d. at 1459-60. The court noted that
"the five million residents of the State are blameless in this
controversy, and the Court believes that the benefits and efficiencies
of permitting the State to act on their behalf in growing the State's
shellfish resource far outweigh any interest the tribes have in
limiting the artificial bed exclusion to natural persons." Id. n. 11.
The court therefore concluded that "to the extent the State hereafter
creates artificial shellfish beds on public property, those beds shall
be deemed 'staked or cultivated by citizens' and thus excluded under
the Shellfish Proviso from the Tribes’ Treaty right." Jd. Because the
court once again improperly invoked equitable principles in its
interpretation of the Treaty, and there is no support in the law for the
proposition that a state can be a "citizen," we reverse this aspect of
the district court's decision.
12 For example, if ten clams per square foot were a density sufficient to
support a commercial livelihood at the time that enhancement began, and if a 100
square foot Grower's bed yielded ten clams per square foot prior to the Grower's
efforts to enhance the output (1,000 clams), and that same bed now produces fifty
clams per square foot as a result of the Grower's labor (5,000 clams), the Tribes
would be entitled to fifty percent of the 1,000 clams or 500 clams.
13 One way to do this would be to compare a Grower's bed's earliest
shellfish production figures with the bed's current output. This could serve as one
of the bases by which to calculate the proper allocation amount.
36
In the State of Washington's brief and at oral argument, it
was unable to cite a single case to support its proposition that a State
can be "citizen." We note that it took an act of Congress to enable a
corporation to be considew:d a citizen for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We therefore reverse that
portion of the district court's decision which deems the Stace of
Washington a "citizen" for purposes of the Shellfish Proviso.
4, The district court committed clear error in finding
that 0.5 pounds of mature clams per square foot is
the minimum density necessary to establish a
natural bed.
In Shellfish IT, the district court concluded that "in light of
the practices and understandings in the shellfish industry that existed
at treaty time, it is clear that a quantitative definition of a natural bed
is appropriate.” 898 F.Supp. at 1461. The court defined a "natural
shellfish bed" as a "bed capable of sustaining a yield of shellfish that
will support a commercial livelihood." Jd. The Tribes do not dispute
these findings, but contend that the district court committed clear
error when it found that the minimum quantity of manila clams that
will support a commercial livelihood is 0.5 pounds of mature clams
per square foot. Manila clams are the only species for which the
district court made such a finding. Because there is insufficient
evidence in the record to support the district court's finding, we
conclude that the district court clearly erred.
No witness gave an opinion as to the density of manila
clams necessary for a successful commercial harvest. No document
in the record sets forth any analysis of what density is necessary for
commercial success. There is a document in the record which
purports to show the densities of twelve manila clam beds leased
from the State of Washington, but twelve beds is far too small and
unrepresentative a sample of commercial beds to support a reliable
finding of fact. See, e.g., National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416,
434 n. 52 (D.C.Cir.1980) (recognizing problems with generalizing
"from an extremely limited sample when a broader sample ... can be
readily obtained and when no showing of the representativeness of
the sample is made") (citations omitted). Moreover, there is no
14 Because we conclude that the district court clearly erred, we do not
address the Tribes’ contention that they were unfairly surprised and unable to
present evidence on this issue. On remand, the Tribes will have an opportunity to
present such evidence.
37
indication that these bed samples included only mature clams in
their density calculation. Significantly, two of the twelve beds
appear to have densities of less than .26 pounds per square foot.
In light of the above, we reverse the district court's finding
that the minimum quantity of manila clams that will support a
commercial livelihood is 0.5 pounds of mature clams per square
foot. We remand to the district court for a new hearing on this issue.
5. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
limiting the Tribes’ ability to cross private uplands.
The district court prohibited tribal access across privately
owned upland property to reach shellfishing areas unless
"specifically requested from and granted by a Special Master," with
permission to be refused unless "tribal members can demonstrate the
absence of access by boat, public road, or public right of way."!5
Shellfish III, 909 F.Supp. at 793. The Tribes contend that this
decision is "an unprecedented limitation on Tribes’ treaty fishing
rights."
The Supreme Court has already determined that the Tribes
are entitled to a right of access across private lands to invoke their
Treaty fishing rights. Winans, 198 U.S. at 383. Winans recognized
that the Treaties "imposed a servitude upon every piece of land as
though described therein." /d. at 381. Rather than completely
eliminating the Tribes’ rights to cross private land, which it could
not do under Winans, the district court engaged in a careful
balancing of hardships in fashioning its remedy. Although we have
held that the district court cannot use equitable principles in
interpreting the Treaties, it can use them in deciding how to
implement the Treaties (i.e., how the tribes will be allowed to
exercise their previously interpreted rights). Such a use of equities
is permissible under the circumstances of this case. See Yankton, 272
U.S. at 357 (allowing monetary damages to Indians in lieu of
ejectment of innocent land purchasers in order to avoid a "great
15 This decision amended the court's decision in Shellfish I], which
originally held that the Tribes had no right of private upland access at all. 989
F.Supp. at 1473.
38
injustice").16 We therefore conclude that the district court did not
err by requiring the Tribes to prove the unavailability of other forms
of access before allowing them to cross private land.
6. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing time, place, and manner restrictions on the
Tribes' ability to harvest shellfish.
The district court also invoked equitable principles to
subject the Tribes' Treaty shellfishing right to reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions when the right is exercised on the Growers'
or Owners' property. As discussed directly above, the time, place,
and manner restrictions present a proper use of the court's equitable
powers.
The court imposed the following restrictions on the Tribes’
ability to harvest shellfish: 1) the Tribes' harvest is limited to five
days per year, with some increase on larger lots, for any private
beach not controlled by a Grower, 898 F.Supp. at 1473; 2) if a
Grower decides that a Tribe's proposed harvest plan is not
"compatible with the Growers' farming operation," the Grower may
unilaterally modify the plan, and have "the final word on how a
tribal harvest will be conducted," id. at 1470; 3) the Grower may
entirely prohibit harvest of natural clams underneath areas cultivated
for oysters, even when no oysters are then present, id. at 1471; 4) no
harvest may occur on non-Grower private tidelands without a survey
"to determine the existence of shellfish populations," id. at 1472;
and 5) the "manner and method" of such a survey must be "of the
type currently in use by the State." Jd.
Of particular concern to the Tribes is the restriction that
allows the Growers to control access to natural clams by choosing
not to harvest them in favor of the oysters under which the clams are
found. The Tribes describe this restriction as a "gaping loophole"
that has the capacity at the Growers' discretion to deny to them the
very rights to natural clams which our holding confirms.
16 The Tribes and the United States also urge us to read into the absence
of upland access showing a "reasonableness" requirement. We decline to do so, but
we direct the district court, upon remand, to clarify its order with regard to this
issue.
39
The Growers' counter with the argument from the record
that the process of harvesting natural clams from underneath the
oyster beds can seriously disrupt and suffocate their oysters.
On reflection, the Tribes’ concerns although certainly not
fanciful-are based at this point on speculation as to what might
happen in the future. The Growers, for example, represent that
"where there are substantial economic benefits to a Grower from
harvesting clams, the Grower will do so." And, "{a]s soon as the
Grower does, the trial court's implementation plan provides that the
Tribes have the right to a share of those clams." The Growers say
that they are "commercial farmers-if there is money to be made, the
resource assuredly will be exploited."
Under the circumstances, we believe that the district court's
restrictions do not amount at this time to an abuse of discretion. The
district court attempted to fashion a prospective solution to a
difficult situation by balancing the parties' respective interests. The
district court's restrictions safeguard the Tribes' right of access to the
ancient fisheries, but also protect the interests of the Growers and
Private Owners. Importantly, in this aspect of the court's decision
the court did not use equity as the basis for its interpretation of the
decision, but only as a way to implement its correctly reasoned
interpretation of the Proviso. While the Tribes may not be happy
with the limits imposed on their harvesting, they are still able to
effectuate their allocation under the Treaties and are not excluded
from their ancient fisheries.
We are confident that any future practices by the Growers
that trench inappropriately upon the Tribes’ rights as confirmed in
this opinion will be adequately dealt with by the district court. The
district court is the best place to manage any wrinkles that might
crop up. The best way to avoid such problems, of course, is for the
parties constructively to work together to respect each others’ rights.
We reject the Tribes' contention that the restrictions are
contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Puyallup Tribe v.
Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 88 S.Ct. 1725, 20 L.Ed.2d 689
(1968). Puyallup arose because a series of Washington state court
decisions and state regulations imposed discriminatory restrictions
on the Tribes. The Supreme Court held "the manner of fishing, the
size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like
may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation,
provided the regulation meets appropriate standards and does not
discriminate against the Indians.’ Id. at 398 (emphasis added). The
40
Tribes cite no persuasive authority, however, to support the
application of these standards to an implementation order
promulgated by a Federal District Court. Puyallup applies to
restrictions imposed "by the State," not the Federal Courts. The
district court drafted the implementation order to interpret and to
enforce the Tribes’ rights under the Treaties, not to restrict those
rights. The motivation underlying the Court's decision in
Puyallup—state discrimination against tribal fisheries—is simply
not a factor when a district court imposes equitable restrictions of
the type present in this case.
he The district court's procedures for selecting and
disqualifying special masters deny due process.
Shellfish III established a panel of four special masters, with
one to be randomly selected to hear each dispute. 909 F.Supp. at
793. The Tribes object to two aspects of the plan: 1) Appellants’
right to designate three of the four panel members; and 2) the
designating parties’ ability to remove special masters at will and
without court approval. The district court rejected the first objection
outright, noting that the two parties to a dispute each have a
twenty-five percent chance of having their own special master
selected. The Tribes contend that Appellants have almost identical
interests: therefore, the odds are 3-1 in Appellants' favor. In fact, the
district court made a finding that "each of the other parties is adverse
to the Tribes, but not necessarily aligned with the others." Shellfish
III, 909 F.Supp. at 790. Given the district court's finding that the
Appellants are "adverse to the Tribes," we conclude that due process
is violated if there is a seventy-five percent chance that Appellants’
master will be selected. We therefore vacate this aspect of the
implementation plan, and remand to the district court to reconfigure
the appointment of Special Masters.
The Tribes also argue that allowing the parties to appoint
and remove the master at will compromises the independence of the
special master. Because the district court must approve the
appointment of the Masters, see Shellfish III, 909 F.Supp. at 794, we
find no merit in this argument.
8. The district court did not err in authorizing a special
master to award damages against Tribal members.
The Tribes argue that Shellfish III's provision allowing the
special master to award damages against Tribal members is legally
flawed. In addition, they contend that Shellfish JI erroneously
41
contains a provision allowing damages against the Tribes
themselves. In Shellfish III, the district court amended its decision
to preclude damage awards against the Tribes because Tribes cannot
be sued without their unequivocal consent. See Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509, 111 S.Ct.
905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991). The district court, and the Tribes in
their motion for reconsideration, apparently overlooked section 6.2
of Shellfish I's implementation order. Section 6.2 also allows
special masters to award damages against the Tribes. We therefore
vacate the portion of section 6.2 that allows for a special master to
award damages against the Tribes. As set forth below, however, the
special master can award damages against individual Tribal
members.
The Tribes concede that individuals may be bound by orders
affecting their "common public rights as citizens" in litigation to
which their sovereign is a party. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of
Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 341, 78 S.Ct. 1209, 2 L.Ed.2d 1345 (1958).
A similar issue arose in Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 692 n. 32, where
the Court concluded that non-party fishermen could be enjoined
from actions interfering with the judgment of the district court. "[A]
court clearly may order them to obey that judgment." /d The
Tribes’ assertion that "the contemplated claims against tribal
members have nothing to do with the common rights of state or
tribal citizens" therefore is without merit. On the contrary, if tribal
members damage private property while exercising their fishing
rights, they directly implicate their sovereigns’ interests and the
district court's judgment.
Similarly, the Tribes' argument that claims for trampled
shrubs, damaged docks, or littered beaches "would raise no federal
question" is also without merit. If the damages arise out of the
exercise of fishing rights based on the district court's interpretation
of the Stevens Treaties, the district court has the authority to hear
such a dispute. Moreover, the dispute would arise from the same
"nucleus of operative facts," affording the court supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
We therefore affirm the. special master's ability to
recommend damages against individual Tribal members, but vacate
section 6.2's provision allowing damages against the Tribes.
42
9. The district court did not err in determining that the
Tribes are not entitled to attorney's fees.
The Trives request attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
The Tribes’ request is foreclosed: by United States v. Washington,
813 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir.1987) (concluding Tribes not entitled to
attorney's fees in entire United States v. Washington series of
litigation). We therefore affirm the district court's denial of fees.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM IN PART and
REVERSE IN PART the district court's decisions in Shellfish I,
Shellfish I], and Shellfish ITI. We REMAND this case to the district
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. In so doing, we
compliment the district court for the clarity of its opinions
previously rendered.
We recognize the enormous impact our decision will have
on the thousands of homeowners, Tribal members, and commercial
fishermen in the Puget Sound region. It must be remembered that
we are a court of limited jurisdiction. Moreover, we are bound by
the Constitution's Supremacy Clause which accords special standing
to treaties. We do not have the power simply to "rewrite the
Treaties or interpret the Treaties in a way contrary to settled law
simply to avoid or minimize any hardship" to any of the parties in
this case. Shellfish I, 873 F.Supp. at 1429. This case has come a
long way since the 1970's when a "total lack of meaningful
communication" led to "deep distrust" between the parties. 384
F.Supp. at 329-30. The parties have apparently made sincere efforts
to settle this dispute; we hope that our decision assists and renews
that effort.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
The parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal.
BEEZER, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
I specially concur in the opinion of the court. I express my
views concerning the interpretation of the Stevens Treaties and the
appointment of special masters.
eins ee wT
roe
43
The Stevens Treaties provide:
The right of taking fish, at all usual and
accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to
said Indians, in common with all citizens of the
Territory, and of erecting temporary houses for the
purpose of curing, together with the privilege of
hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their
horses on open and unclaimed lands: Provided,
however, that they shall not take shell fish from any
beds staked or cultivated by citizens.
Treaty of Medicine Creek, December 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132, Art
[II (it is undisputed that this clause is substantively identical in all
subject treaties).
The United States asks us to hold that shellfish beds,
unharvested in the nineteenth century, were "usual and accustomed"
tribal fishing grounds in 1854. This argument strains even the
deferential canons of Indian treaty interpretation. It is, however, the
law of this case and of the Supreme Court that the reserved fishing
right makes no distinctions between migratory fish and shellfish or
between fish runs and static fishing grounds. The origin of this rule
of law is perplexing.
In 1974, Judge Boldt concluded that the Indian Tribes had
treaty fishing rights which entitled them to harvest up to fifty
percent of fish passing through the tribes’ fishing grounds. United
States v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. 312 (W.D.Wash.1974) ("Boldt
Decision"), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1086 (1976). The Supreme Court "substantially upheld" the Boldt
Decision in Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 99
S.Ct. 3055, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (1978). United States v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 901 F.2d 772, 773 (9th Cir.1990). The Boldt Decision
held that the fishing right is "not limited as to species of fish." Boldt
Decision, 384 F.Supp. at 401.
Fishing Vessel held that tribes have a right to equal amounts
of fish "taken from runs of fish that pass through the Indians’ usual
and accustomed fishing grounds." Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 689.
A tribe's rights are defined in case law by the grounds the tribe
fished and not the particular species taken. The Indians reserved the
"right to take a share of each run of fish that passes through tribal
fishing areas." Id. at 679. Implicit in the Fishing Vessel opinion is
the principle that to limit access strictly to historical fishing grounds
and species would render the right to fish a nullity because citizens
44
cemeeereerrameaaa es mans nia
could harvest all fish downstream. Similarly, in United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 25 S.Ct. 662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905), the
Court determined that the issuance of a license to erect a fishing
wheel where the device deprived Indians of the run oi fish that
passed through their usual and accustomed fishing grounds was
impermissible.
The underpinning of the Court's interpretation of the Stevens
Treaties should not apply to shellfish because they are, with the
exception of crustaceans, immobile. There can be no device that
prevents the migration of immobile shellfish to, through or from the
tribes' usual and accustomed fishing grounds.
The burden imposed by our opinion cannot be overstated.
The record in this case makes abundantly clear that since treaty
times a vibrant shellfish industry has developed in the State of
Washington along the saltwater beaches of the Pacific Ocean and
along tidelands adjoining the inland waters of Puget Sound.
The labors of a modern day shellfish producer are vividly
recounted in The Seattle Times, May 1, 1997, p. B-1, as follows:
After all, one of the first skills he found
necessary was the patience to stare for 10 hours at a
time at a leathery, slithering geoduck neck sticking out
of a plastic bucket full of sand--waiting to catch the
unlovely bivalve in its private, and very erratic, act of
spawning. Complicating the task is the fact that
geoducks must spawn before hatchery breeders, such as
Dahman, can tell the males from the females.
"It's maddening stuff. These geoducks can make
a long day of it for you," says Dahman. His tattered
logger's clothing and irreverent rants about biologists
and bureaucrats belie the mix of genetics, mechanical
engineering, global marketing and money going into this
venture.
"The idea here is to grow geoducks where we've
never been able to grow anything before. We're still
crawling at all this."
For Dahman, the first baby steps will come this
fall when he harvests the initial crop of hatchery-reared
geoducks planted on his south Puget Sound tidelands
outside of Shelton four years ago.
Ae eat a ea es
45
Dahman Shellfish and its neighbor, Taylor United,
one of the state's biggest shellfish growers, are believed to
be the first in the U.S. commercially raising geoducks--a
forerunner, predict aquaculture experts, to eventually
breeding such edible if weird-looking creatures as sea
cucumbers and sea urchins in the lab.
Citizens--as well as tribal members and the state--have long
set aside suitable tidelands acquired by purchase, by inclusion in
reservation boundaries or by dedications adjoining state lands to the
cultivation of clams, oysters and other species of shellfish. The
opinion we file today will open these tidelands to the harvest of
commercially valuable shellfish by the Tribes in common with the
citizens as a matter of treaty right.
It is now clear that the Tribes are granted access to tidelands
which contain cultivated shellfish produced by the Growers. The
details of how much and when the Tribes may harvest shellfish from
such lands remains unresolved. We assign the Growers "the burden
of proving pre-enhancement harvest versus post- enhancement
harvest." The district court will be faced with the application of this
scheme. Our suggestion shifts the law that the party asserting a
treaty right must prove that right. See, e.g., United States v. Lummi
Indian Tribe, 841 F.2d 317, 318 (9th Cir.1988) (a tribe asserting
usual and accustomed fishing grounds has the burden to produce
evidence that a particular location was customarily used at treaty
time). The assignment of the burden of proof is critical. The district
court, after hearing testimony, determined that it "would be very
difficult--if not impossible--to develop a ‘snapshot’ of existing
shellfish beds at the time commercial development commenced on
the Growers’ property." Shellfish II, 898 F.Supp. at 1462. Where a
disputed fact cannot be proven, the placement of the burden of proof
is dispositive. The Growers’ burden is heavy and the district court's
assignment is daunting.
The tension between grower and Indian under treaty
provisions is clear. One will not grow shellfish on lands bearing
natural shellfish to provide subsistence to the other without
compensation for the damage occurring to the cultivated shellfish.
The majority asks the parties to "constructively ... work together to
respect each others’ rights." I fear the time for that has passed. The
fact that the Tribes are concerned about the Growers’ "gaping
loophole" to deny them access to naturally occurring shellfish by
never allowing their beds to be free of oyster crops evidences the
tension between the parties. Burden of proof and access issues that
46 ;
remain unresolved in the opinion we file today guarantee continuing
disputes between the tribes and the citizens of Washington State.
Property rights, which have been undisturbed for
generations, are encumbered by our decision today. In Vanhorne's
Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 304, 310, 1 L.Ed. 391
(Cir.Ct.Pa.Dist.1795), Justice Patterson observed:
From these passages it is evident; that the right of acquiring
and possessing property, and having it protected, is one of
the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man. Men
have a sense of property: Property is necessary to their
subsistence and correspondent to their natural wants and
desires; its security was one of the objects, that induced
them to unite in society. No man would become a member
of a community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his
honest labour and industry. The preservation of property
then is a primary object of the social compact, and, by the
late Constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamental
law.
Property rights, so fundamental to American government,
need not be trampled upon. Exclusive use of private tidelands by
commercial growers should not deprive the Tribes of their treaty
share of shellfish; the Tribes could be allocated half of the naturally
occurring shellfish without disturbing the hard-earned and long-held
property rights of private growers. Shares of the shellfish taken, of
course, need not be determined by the place where the shellfish are
taken. | Thus, a tribal share of shellfish could come from reservation
land, government land or private tidelands acquired by the tribe.
Survival of Washington's shellfish industry depends upon
the growers’ ability to dedicate tidelands to exclusive use. This
cannot be done under existing case law interpretation of the Stevens
Treaties. We are, however, bound, by the authority of the Supreme
Court and the law of the case, to that interpretation. Exclusive use of
tidelands will be possible ifthe Supreme Court recognizes the
shellfish proviso with respect to "cultivation" and makes clear the
distinctions between migratory fish and shellfish; between fish runs
and static fishing grounds; and between natural shellfish and
cultivated shellfish.
| Fishing Vessel makes this point clear. The Court held that "fish taken by
treaty fisherman off the reservations and at locations other than ‘usual and accustomed’
sites ... [are] to be counted as part of the Indians’ [treaty] share." Fishing Vessel, 443
U.S. at 687 n. 29.
ORR er
osc?
FROM N REDE Cae ASB PEE
ee
47
il
The district court held that, upon proper showing and
subject to time, place and manner restrictions, the Tribes are entitled
to cross private property in order to exercise their shellfishing rights.
United States v. Washington, 909 F.Supp. 787, 792
(W.D.Wash.1995). If a dispute arises between a property owner and
a Treaty Tribe, concerning the exercise of the Shellfish Treaty right,
the matter is to be resolved by a special master. Id. The Tribes, the
State of Washington, the Shellfish Growers and the Private Property
Owners each are permitted to designate a special master, one of
which is to be selected at random to resolve a pending dispute. Id. at
793-94. The special master is to issue a written report and
recommendation subject to approval and adoption by the district
court. Id. at 794. The opinion filed today holds that "due process is
violated" because “there is a seventy-five percent chance that
Appellants’ master will be selected." We vacate and remand to the
district court to reconfigure the appointment of special masters.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(a), which governs the appointment of
special masters, states in pertinent part, "(t]he court in which any
action is pending may appoint a special master therein." Reference
to a master "shall be the exception and not the rule" and shall be
made "upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it."
Burlington Northern v. Dep't of Revenue, 934 F.2d 1064, 1071 (9th
Cir.1991) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(b)). "The use of masters is ‘to
aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may
arise in the progress of a cause,’ and not to displace the court." La
Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256, 77 S.Ct. 309, |
L.Ed.2d 290 (1956) (quoting Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 40
S.Ct. 543, 64 L.Ed. 919 (1920)). "Litigants are entitled to a trial by
the court, in every suit, save where exceptional circumstances are
shown." Id. at 258. "Congestion in itself is not such an exceptional
circumstance as to warrant a reference to a master." Id. at 259; see
also Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d §
2601 (1995) (the appointment of a master is for the purpose of
assisting the court to obtain facts). "The Courts have tended to read
Rule 53 narrowly, closely circumscribing the range of circumstances
in which reference to a master is appropriate.” Burlington Northern,
934 F.2d 1071 (quoting In re Armco, 770 F.2d 103, 105 (8th
Cir.1985)).
Referral to a special master is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Burlington Northern, 934 F.2d at 1071 (citing United
States v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 901 F.2d 772, 774 (9th
48
Cir.1990)). We have affirmed the use of special masters repeatedly
in the Stevens Treaty cases. See, e.g., Suquamish Indian Tribe, 901
F.2d at 775 (noting that we could "not think of a more
comprehensive and complex case than" the Boldt decision and its
successors); see also United States v. Washington, 730 F.2d 1314
(9th Cir.1984). In the present matter, however, the district court
made no finding that disputes regarding whether tribes must pass
over private land to harvest shellfish is complex or extraordinary.
Indeed, disputes are likely to present straightforward trespass and
property questions. Because the district court did not make a finding
of complexity or exceptional circumstance as required under Rule
53, referral to a special master is not yet appropriate.
Neutrality of the special master is also a paramount concern.
In the Stevens Treaty cases, prior referrals have been to a magistrate
judge, not a master selected by the parties. See, e.g., United States v.
Washington, 626 F.Supp. 1401 (W.D.Wash.1985). The Supreme
Court has long held that "due process implies a tribunal both
impartial and mentally competent to afford a hearing." Jordan v.
Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176, 32 S.Ct. 651, 56 L.Ed. 1038
(1912); see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100
S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980) ("The Due Process Clause
entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both
civil and criminal cases."). The neutrality requirement helps
guarantee that life, liberty or property will not be taken on the basis
of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law and
preserves the appearance and reality of fairness. Marshall, 446 U.S.
at 242. A party may establish that he has been denied his
constitutional right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal by a
showing of actual bias or the adjudicator's pecuniary or personal
interest in the outcome. Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732 (9th
Cir.1995). In addition to the constraints of due process, Canon | of
the Code of Conduct for United States Judges sets the integrity and
independence of the judiciary as an indispensable goal.
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Code of Judicial Conduct for
United States Judges (1997).
The masters here are selected by the parties, presumably
because the candidates are likely to rule favorably. Whether each
side is permitted to designate one or many potential candidates, the
result is a master that is chosen because of a real or perceived bias.
Even if the district court ultimately approves the selection of the
master and adopts the master's report and recommendation, that does
not cure the error. A property owner subject to an unforeseen access
easement or a tribe denied access to a harvest will find little solace
in the judge's signature adopting the special master's findings.
I would hold that the special master selection process
adopted by the district court violates due process. I would remand to
the district court to make findings supporting the necessity for a
master; to appoint an independent special master and to give special
consideration to the appointment of a magistrate judge.
50
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51
873 F. Supp. 1422
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
et al., ) No. CV 9213
)
Plaintiffs, ) Sub-proceeding
v. ) NO. 8903
)
) MEMORANDUM
) OPINION
) AND ORDER
STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.,
Defendants.
)
December 20, 1994
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
RAFEEDIE, District Judge
INTRODUCTION
A. History of the Case
This sub-proceeding, filed by the United States and 16
Indian Tribes, ! involves the Stevens Treaties? which were
interpreted in United States v. State of Washington, 384 F.Supp.
| The Tribes active in this sub-proceeding are the following: the
Tulalip, Puyallup, Squaxin Island, Makah, Muckleshoot, Upper Skagit,
Nooksack, Nisqually, Lummi, Skokomish, Port Gamble S'Klallam, Lower Elwha
S'Klallam, Jamestown S'Kiallam, Suquamish, Yakama, and the Swinomish
(hereinafter "The Tribes"). The Quinault, Quileute, and Hoh Tribes, all coastal
Tribes, made appearances in the action; however, they were not active
participants, and they sought no relief.
2 The treaties are called the "Stevens Treaties" because of the
participation in the negotiations of all of the treaties by Territorial Governor Isaac
Stevens. Each of the Tribes involved in this sub-proceeding are the successors in
interest to one or more of the following treaties: Treaty of Medicine Creek,
December 26, 1854 (10 Stat. 1132); Treaty of Point Elliott, January 26, 1855, (12
Stat. 927); Treaty of Point No Point, January 26, 1855 (12 Stat. 933); Treaty with
the Makah, January 31, 1855 (12 Stat. 939). Hereinafier "The Treaties."
52
312 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (hereinafter Washington I); aff'd, 573
F.2d 1123 (1978) (hereinafter Washington II); aff'd in substantial
part, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). The parties filed this action seeking a
declaration of the nature and extent of tribal off-reservation
shellfishing rights, an the extent to which such rights may be
affected by the following limiting provision ("the Shellfish
Proviso"): "The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed
grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in
common with all citizens of the territory . . . Provided, however,
that they shall not take shellfish from any beds staked or
cultivated by citizens."3
Washington I was decided in 1974. At that time, the
Court reserved jurisdiction to hear other unresolved issues arising
out of the Stevens Treaties. In Washington I, the issue before the
Court was the nature and extent of the treaty Tribes’ off-
reservation fishing rights with respect to anadromous fish. That
decision established the locations of the Tribes’ usual and
accustomed grounds and stations and found that the Tribes were
entitled to take 50% of the harvestable fish from those grounds
and stations. Subsequently, the Supreme Court substantially
affirmed the decision finding that the trial court had correctly
adjudicated the nature and extent of the Tribes’ fishing rights.
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (hereinafter Fishing Vessel).
Thus, the treaty Tribes’ rights with respect to anadromous
fish in the Puget Sound are is the law of the land. Finally, on
September 2, 1993, consistent with Washington I and Fishing
Vessel, this Court ruled that "shellfish" are "fish," within the
meaning of the Treaties. Thus, the treaty Tribes' right to take
shellfish is limited, if at all, only by the Shellfish Proviso in the
Treaties or to the extent that the Court finds the Moderate Living
Doctrine to be applicable from the evidence and the law.
B. The Parties' Contentions
In this action, the tribal plaintiffs seek the following
declaratory relief: (1) that they have the right to take 50% of all of
the species of harvestable shellfish that may be safely harvested
within their usual and accustomed grounds and stations; (2) that
3 This language is taken from the Treaty of Medicine Creek; however,
the parties admitted that all of the Stevens Treaties contain substantially similar
language.
53
the usual and accustomed grounds and stations are those
previously adjudicated in Washington I; (3) that the phrase
"staked or cultivated by citizens" in the Shellfish Proviso be
interpreted to mean only those non-natural beds that have been
staked or cultivated; (4) that the right to take shellfish extends to
natural clam beds that exist under the artificial shellfish beds; (5)
that the Tribes' authority to regulate the harvest be confirmed; (6)
that the. Court order co-management of the resource between the
Tribe and the State; (7) that the Court enjoin the application and
enforcement of specific state statutes which the Tribes ciaim
would be discriminatory in practice; (8) that the Upper Skagit
Tribe is the successor to the Nuwha'ha and the Bsigwigwilts and is
therefore entitled to take shellfish at the usual and accustomed
grounds and stations of the Nuwha'ha and Bsigwigwilts; and (9)
that the Yakama Nation has not established any usual and
accustomed grounds and stations and thus is not entitled to take
shellfish.
Because the Court has found that shellfish are fish, only a
limited issue is currently before the Court, namely the effect of the
Shellfish Proviso and the nature and scope of the remedy to be
granted.
Opposing the plaintiffs are the State of Washington and
the intervenors+ who contend that the "staked or cultivated"
provision protects state and private property from shellfishing by
the Tribes. Alternatively, but in a similar vein, the intervening
shellfish growers argue that the lands which they own or occupy
and upon which they conduct the business of shellfish growing
have been "staked or cultivated" within the meaning of the
Treaties’ Shellfish Proviso, hence they conclude that those lands
should be exempted from tribal shellfishing under the treaties.
C Canons of Interpretation
In interpreting the Shellfish Proviso, in general, the Court
is bound by both general rules of interpretation, and thespecific
rules handed down by the Supreme Court which appiy when
Indian Tribes assert treaty rights. In particular, the Court must use
4 The action was filed originally against the State of Washington. Later
in the proceeding the following groups intervened as defendants: the Puget
Sound Growers Association; UPOW, the United Property Owners of
Washington; and the "Adkins Party,” a group of about 20 private property
owners. The main representative of the "Adkins Party" are Adkins, Carter, and
Alexander.
special canons of construction to determine the meaning of Indian
treaties, all of which amount to the same _ proposition:
"[A]mbiguities occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of
the Indians." Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
Similarly, treaties with Indians "are to be construed, so far as
possible, in the sense in which the Indians understood them, and
‘in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this
nation to protect the interests of a dependent people." Choctaw
Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1443)
(quoting Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942)).
These canons of construction, however, do not give the
court license to interpret a treaty according to the Indians’
preferences. The Supreme Court has left no doubt that "even
Indian treaties cannot be re-written or expanded beyond their clear
terms to remedy a claimed injustice or to achieve the asserted
understanding of the parties." Choctaw Nation, 318 U.S. at 432.
Such an exercise "would be an intrusion upon the domain
committed by the Constitution to the political departments of the
government." Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations v. United States,
179 U.S. 494, 532 (1900).
Finally, in United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905),
the Supreme Court adopted a "reservation of rights" approach in
interpreting treaties with Indian Tribes. In Winans, the
controversy arose when the settlers, who owned the land fronting
the Columbia River, denied Indians access to the river abutting
their land and by exercising their rights under state licenses to
operate "fish wheels." The fish wheels, as admitted by the parties,
gave the landowner "exclusive possession of the fishing places"
by obstructing the Indians’ access to the fishing areas. /d. at 382.
Rejecting the landowner's arguments, the Supreme Court
established a new theory of treaty interpretation: a treaty is not a
grant of rights fo the Indians, but a grant of rights from them,
thereby implicitly containing a reservation of those rights not
explicitly granted. Further, the Supreme Court found that such
reservations of rights encompassed all the territory subject to the
treaty, thereby imposing a "servitude upon every piece of land."
Id. at 381. Thus, the Court concluded that the starting point for
analysis of the treaty is the Indians’ pre-existing rights.
With respect to general canons of treaty construction, the
Court beings with the premise that the parties’ intentions dictate
the interpretation of a treaty. Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations, 179
U.S. at 531. In determining those intentions, the Court must
55
interpret words in a treaty according to their natural and ordinary
meanings, when the words are unambiguous. /d. It is only when
a court finds a word to be ambiguous that it may resort to extrinsic
evidence. /d.
In addition, treaties may, when necessary, be interpreted
in light of the surrounding historical circumstances. Choctaw
Nation y. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943). Thus, the Court
looks to the historical context surrounding the negotiations of the
Stevens Treaties. The Court also finds the following canons of
construction instructive: (1) a treaty should not be interpreted so
as to render one part inoperative, Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379, 392 (1979); (2) when the parties could have more easily
expressed a particular intent by an alternative choice of words, the
chosen words can be interpreted NOT to express that intent,
Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations vy. United States, 179 U.S. 494,
538 (1900); and (3) that the practical construction adopted by the
parties, namely post-treaty conduct, may be viewed to help
determine the meaning of the treaty. Choctaw Nation v. United
States, 318 U.S. 423, 434 (1943).
Following these canons of construction, the Court finds
that, when signing the Treaties at issue, the Tribes reserved the
right to take shellfish from their usual and accustomed grounds
and stations, subject only to the Shellfish Proviso. Furthermore,
the words "staked or cultivated" in the proviso are ambiguous, and
the Court concludes that the Shellfish Proviso does not apply to a
natural or native beds and that, under the Shellfish Proviso,
artificial beds may be staked or cultivated, notwithstanding their
location in private tidal lands. The Court interprets these relevant
words in this way because of the reservation of rights by the
Tribes, the historical context of the treaties, and the rules favoring
the resolution of ambiguities in favor of Indian Tribes; in addition,
the Court finds the plaintiffs' evidence as to the meaning of these
words to be much more compelling and persuasive than the
evidence opposed to it.
D. Interpretation of the Proviso and Allegations of
I 2
Hardship
In this sub-proceeding, the Court was not asked to
determine which tidelands or marine areas contain natural beds
open to Indian fishing, and which contain artificial beds, those
staked or cultivated beds not open to Indian fishing; thus this
decision does not resolve those issues. Rather, this decision is
meant only to determine the meaning of the Shellfish Proviso in
56
the Stevens Treaties and what effect it has on the tribal right to
take shellfish.
In reaching its decision, the Court may not rewrite the
Treaties or interpret the Treaties in a way contrary to settled law
simply to avoid or minimize any hardship to the public or to the
intervenors. Indeed, the Court has no such power. Rather,
amelioration from such hardships should be sought from
Congress, which has the power to abrogate the treaty, or from the
State of Washington, which sold the public tidelands without
notice to the buyers of the pre-existing tribal fishing rights, and
indeed the United States, which permitted such sales to occur
without taking steps to secure such fishing rights.
II. INTERPRETATION OF TERMS IN THE STEVENS
TREATIES
The resolution of the parties’ contentions in this sub-
proceeding depends on the interpretation of the Stevens Treaties.
The Court had occasion to interpret some of the relevant language
in Washington I, and finds those interpretations binding in this
action. The language of the Shellfish Proviso however, has not
been interpreted by the Court; thus, an extensive discussion of
language and the meaning of the language is necessary.
A. Prior holdings
z. The Right of Taking Fish Includes the Right to
Take Shellfish
The Court held on September 2, 1993, that the "right of
taking fish" in the Stevens Treaties includes the right to take
shellfish. The Court reached this conclusion without reference to
the canons of constructions favoring Indians. Indeed, this
interpretation is compelled by the plain language of the Treaties.
As previously discussed, the Shellfish Proviso limits the
Tribes’ right to take shellfish to those beds not "staked or
cultivated" by citizens. This Proviso, plainly read, constitutes an
exception to the right of taking shellfish at particular locations. It
inevitable follows that shellfish were included in the "right of
taking fish" referred to in the first sentence.» This interpretation
5 The Court does not believe that such a right can be found in the
provisions reserving the Indians’ right to hunt, gather roots and berries, and
pasture horses.
baal
57
is consistent with the principle that a treaty "should be interpreted
so as not to render one part inoperative." Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379, 392 (1979). If the right of taking "fish" did not include
shellfish, the entire shellfish proviso would serve no purpose.
2. The Right to Take Fish is not Limited to any
Particular Species of Fish
Defendant and the intervenors have argued that the "right
of taking fish" must be limited to those species of fish the Tribes
actually took prior to the signing of the Stevens Treaties. At that
time, however, the Tribes had the absolute right to harvest any
species they desired, consistent with their aboriginal title. See Lac
Court Oreilles Band, Etc. v. Voigt, 700 F.2d at 352. The fact that
some species were not taken before treaty time--either because
they were inaccessible or the Indians chose not to take them--does
not mean that their right to take such fish was limited. Because
the "right of taking fish" must be read as a reservation of the
Indians’ pre-existing rights, and because the right to take any
species, without limit, pre-existed the Stevens Treaties, the Court
must read the "right of taking fish" without any species limitation.
The effort by the defendants to read a species limitation
into the "right of taking fish" must fail in light of the canons of
construction favoring Indians. Defendant and the intervenors ask
the court to impose a limit on the "right of taking fish" without
pointing to any treaty language in support of that interpretation.
This is impermissible under Winters and Choctaw Nation.
Moreover, had the parties to the Stevens Treaties intended to so
limit the right, they would not have chosen the word "fish," a
word which fairly encompasses every form of aquatic animal life.
"Fish" has perhaps the widest sweep of any word the drafters
could have chosen, and the Court will not deviate from its plain
meaning.
3. "All Usual and Accustomed Grounds and
Stations"
Washington I made a series of determinations as to the
meaning and import of the phase "usual and accustomed grounds
and stations," in the context of adjudicating where the plaintiff
Tribes enjoyed the right to fish for salmon and steelhead. No
party to this sub-proceeding has challenged these determinations,
and the Court finds, as explained-below, that they are the usual
and accustomed grounds and stations for shellfishing.
en
At trial, the Tribes presented evidence establishing areas
in which they historically sought shellfish. However, before
considering this evidence, the Court must resolve a preliminary
issue of treaty interpretation: whether the usual and accustomed
areas for shellfish can, as a matter of law, differ from the areas
adjudicated in Washington I for salmon and steelhead. If the
Court determines that they cannot, then the areas established in
Washington I control this sub-proceeding as well.
The Court finds that, as a matter of treaty interpretation,
the Tribes’ usual and accustomed grounds and stations cannot vary
with the species of fish. This conclusion is consistent with the
Court's prior ruling finding the Tribes’ usual and accustomed
grounds and stations for herring as co-extensive with those for
salmon and steelhead. See Post-Trial Decisions, 459 F.Supp. at
1048-50. Indeed, the Court has never focused on a particular
species of fish in determining the Tribes’ usual and accustomed
grounds and stations. See e.g., Washington I, 384 F.Supp. at 360,
364, 372; Post-Trial Orders, 626 F.Supp at 1467, 1528-29.
Therefore, the Tribes have the right to take shellfish at
those usual and accustomed grounds and stations adjudicated in
Washington I, including all bedlands and tidelands under or
adjacent to those areas. In addition, however, the Upper Skagit
Tribe, seeks to establish its usual and accustomed grounds and
stations as those of the Nuwha'ha and the, Bsigwigwilts, as well as
other predecessor tribes. See infra Part VII. Other than the
evidence put on by the Upper Skagit, the Tribes have stipulated in
this sub-proceeding not to present evidence proving usual and
accustomed grounds and stations beyond the prior-adjudicated
grounds and stations.
4. "In Common With All Citizens"
The meaning of the term "in common with all citizens" is
well-settled. "Both sides have a right, secured by treaty, to take a
fair share of the available fish." Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at
684-85. According to the Supreme Court, to determine this "fair
share" a court should “initially divide the harvestable portion of
each run . . . into approximately equal treaty and non-treaty
shares, and should then reduce the treaty share if tribal needs may
be satisfied by a lesser amount." Jd. at 685. The lower
boundary--this "lesser amount"-- is determined by analyzing the
tribes’ "moderate living" needs. See infra Part 1V. The important
59
concept here, however, is that the "in common with" language
guarantees the Tribes a share of the fish and an "equal
opportunity" to catch the fish. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at
679.
B. The Shellfish Proviso: "Any Beds Staked or
Cultivated by Citizens"
A Interpretations Proposed by the Parties
The intervening growers’ proposed interpretation of the
Shellfish Proviso starts and ends with the treaty-time dictionary.
They argue that the Court should interpret "staked" and
"cultivated" according to their dictionary definitions; essentially,
this would mean that any shellfish bed extant today that is
surrounded by stakes, or in some fashion improved by human
labor, would be off limits to the Indians. The Tribes do not
dispute that, under the definition of the treaty words advanced by
the growers, all of the tideland owned or leased by the Growers
falls within the Shellfish Proviso.
The intervening property owners depart to some extent
from this literal approach arguing that "staked" should be
interpreted in its "frontier" context and thus should be regarded as
a synonym for "claimed as private property." Therefore, all
privately-owned tideland, whether or not surrounded by stakes,
would be protected by the Shellfish Proviso.
The Plaintiff Tribes’ argue first that the terms "staked"
and "cultivated" must be interpreted as they were used in the
shellfishing industry at treaty time. This usage of the terms
"staked" and "cultivated" by the shellfishing industry has two
elements: the doctrinal definition and the empirical definition of
the words, which is informed not by a dictionary, but by the actual
practices of the shellfishing industry. Thus, while the doctrinal
definition of the words might contemplate a broad set of activities,
the empirical definition captures that narrower subset of activities
that were actually performed at treaty time.
As will be shown below, the Tribes presented compelling
evidence that only artificial beds were "staked" and "cultivated" at
treaty time.
60
2. "Doctrinal Definition" of Shellfish Proviso Terms
Within Shellfishing Industry
a. "BEDS"
The intervening growers presented evidence at trial that
shellfish "beds," as that term was used at treaty time, included
both natural and artificial shellfish deposits. Ingersoll's Glossary
of Shellfish Terms ("Ingersoll's") defines "bed" as "The bank, reef
or deposit of oysters in the water, either growing naturally or
artificially, original or transplanted." The Tribes have not
disputed Ingersoll's as the appropriate definition, and the court
will rely upon that definition in its analysis.
b. "STAKED"
The parties agree that the words "stake" and "staked"
were commonly used in the shellfishing industry at treaty time. To
"stake" a shellfish bed meant to plant stakes or other markers to
indicate the boundaries of the bed.
¢ "CULTIVATED"
Within the shellfishing industry at treaty time, the
meaning of the terms "cultivate" and "cultivated" was quite
narrow. Ingersoll's defines "cultivate" as "to raise oysters
artificially from spawn, or from transplanted young.”
The defendant and the intervenors have presented no
evidence to directly contradict Ingersoll's definition of "cultivate."
The intervening growers have shown that nineteenth-century
oyster farmers performed a variety of activities to improve their
harvest. Indeed, Moore states in his treatise that "all methods of
oyster culture depend for their success upon the modification of
the natural conditions in such a manner as to bring about one or
several of the following results," such as the increase in the
number of eggs and the increase in the surfaces available for
fixation.
Reading Ingersoll's and Moore together, cultivation is the
“modification of natural conditions" occurring after the oysters
have been planted or transplanted in an artificial bed.
61
3. “Empirical Definition" of the Terms "Staked" and
"Cultivated" as They Were Used in the
Shellfishing Industry
At trial, the Tribes presented substantial evidence of the
actual use of the terms "staked" and "cultivated" within the
shellfish industry. This evidence falls into two categories. First,
the Tribes attempted to reconstruct, state-by-state, the legal
landscape governing the shellfish industry. The Tribes argue that
at the time the Treaties were negotiated, the shellfishing laws
almost universally prohibited the "staking" or "cultivating" of
natural shellfish beds. Second, the Tribes presented evidence of
actual shellfish industry practices, both on the East Coast and in
Shoalwater Bay, Washing.on. The Tribes maintain that these
practices, as might be expected, conformed to the laws governing
the industry, thus no actual "staking" or "cultivating" of natural
beds occurred at that time.
a. Laws Governing Shellfishing Practices
As part of an 1876 report, "On the Oyster Industries of the
United States," Lieutenant Paul DeBroca authored a chapter
entitled "Oyster Culture," in which he described "American
ostriculture" as consisting of the "planting of mollusks on those
parts of the coast where the submarine soil is best fitted by its
nature to fatten them and promote their growth."© In this chapter,
DeBroca makes the following critical observation:
Whatever may be the locality chosen by the
planters, they can in no case pursue their industry
on the natural banks of oysters, the common
property of the people, or in any way interfere
with the free exercise of navigation.
DeBroca defines "natural bank" as a "conglomeration of mollusca
presenting a character of continuity, constituting what is usually
called an oyster-bed."8
© PL-237 at 296
7 Id. at 297
8 Id. at 297. DeBroca elaborates:
The natural bank may be single or formed of several small banks,
separated by greater or less spaces, but always sufficiently connected to
be considered parts of one whole. As to places where, through
ee
62
DeBroca's_ characterization of the legal landscape
regarding natural shellfish beds is supported by the statutes and
case law in force during the mid to late nineteenth-century.?
For example, a series of laws were enacted in the
Washington territory concerning oysters and oyster cultivation
after the signing of the Stevens Treaties.!9 Despite the fact that
accidental circumstances, isolated oysters have developed, they are not
classed among the natural beds, since, if this were the case, the largest
part of the submarine soil of the coast would be under interdiction and
oyster culture would be impossible. However protective the American
laws may be in what concerns public property, they are careful not to
interfere with private enterprise by a too rigorous interpretation of the
term public property.
DeBroca at PL-297.
9 See also Angell, Treatise on the Right of Property in Tidewater
(1847), PL-428 at 139 ("Oysters . .. . may be taken and thus become the property
of him who takes them, and if he plants them in a new place flowed by tide water,
visibly denoted, and where there are none naturally, and for his own particularly
benefit, it is not regarded as an abandonment of his property in them," (emphasis
added)
10 The following laws were passed in the Washington Territory:
(1) An Act for the Preservation of Oysters in Shoalwater Bay,
January 13, 1855:
And be it enacted, that it shall not be lawful from and after the first day
of June, until the first day of August, yearly, and every year, for any
person or persons to rake, scrape, or gather any oysters from any of the
oyster beds in Shoalwater Bay under any pretense, whatsoever;
Provided, that nothing in this section shall be so construed as to
prohibit any persons from taking oysters from beds planted out by him
or them.
r An Act to Encourage the cultivation of Oysters, January 16,
1861
Be it enacted .. . . That any person, being a citizen of this Territory,
who has planted, or who hereafter may plant oysters in any bay or arm
of the sea, where there are no natural beds of oysters, within or
bordering upon this Territory, may acquire, by conforming to the
requirements of this act, an exclusive right for such a purpose... .
Pit tecnica
63
the laws post-date the Treaties, the court nevertheless considers
them important. First, each of these enactments, including the law
related to Oyster preservation in Shoalwater Bay, provides
separate treatment of natural and planted oyster beds. Second, the
legislation, beginning with the 1861 Act to Encourage the
Cultivation of Oysters, conforms exactly to DeBroca's
characterization and permits the planting of oysters in areas except
where natural oyster beds exist. Finally, these post-treaty
enactments, by specifically recognizing property rights in planted
oyster beds, imply that there was no common law property rights
in planted beds, let alone natural beds, at or before treaty time.
Moreover, many laws from other states also demonstrate
the general rule of no staking or cultivating of natural beds. !2
The person desiring the benefits of the preceding section, shall cause
the place or portion he desires to claim, to be marked so far as is
practicable with stakes or other artificial marks at the corners. . . . and
shall make, before some officer qualified to administer oaths, an
affidavit that he has taken the premises so described, for the purpose of
planting oysters, and that he has planted, or is about to plant oysters
thereon, that said premises are not upon ad do not include any natural
bed of oysters ....
3. An Act to Encourage the Cultivation of Oysters, January 24,
1863. Contains same language as 1861 law.
4. An Act to Encourage the Cultivation of Oysters, November
5, 1873. Contains same language as 1861 law.
5. An act to Amend an Act Entitled An Act to Encourage the
Cultivation of Oysters, November 6, 1877. Contains same language as 1861 law
1! On the other hand, the Growers point out that in 1864, the
Washington Territorial Legislature passed "An Act to Authorize Wm. Horton,
Wm. N. Horton and Wm. A. Busey, their Heirs and Assigns to Plant, Cultivate
and Gather Oysters on Totten's Inlet.". This Act gave the named individuals "the
exclusive privilege to plant, cultivate and gather oysters in so much of Totten's
Inlet as lies within [designated limits].". Under the terms of this grant, it is
possible that the grantees would enjoy private property rights in natural oyster
beds. However, the Court does not consider this single grant to three individuals
to constitute a significant part of the legal landscape in the Washington Territory.
12 The following are laws and cases from other states that reflected the
general rule of no staking or cultivating of natural beds: An Act Concerning
Oysters, April 28, 1851 (Ca.); An Act Regulating and Protecting the Planting of
Oysters, June 23, 1855 (Conn.); An Actin Addition to an Act Entitled "An Act
64
This survey of laws and statutes, both from the East Coast and
California, is consistent with DeBroca's characterization of the
legal landscape, namely that one could not stake off and
appropriate for private use a natural oyster bed at or before treaty
time. Indeed, most of the statutes from these areas created new
private property rights in planted beds, thereby implying that
before passage of the legislation, no such rights existed.
b. Actual Shellfishing Practices
i. East Coast Practices
For the most part, the Court will assume that practices on
the East Coast conformed with the laws governing the industry.
Furthermore, the Angell treatise!3 and the DeBroca article!4
indicate that oyster farming, in practice, took place on artificial
beds in the nineteenth-century. !
i. West Coast and Shoalwater Bay
Practices
The evidence indicates that the practices at Shoalwater
Bay at and before treaty time were similar to those on the East
Coast. In bis 1854 "Report on a Reconnaissance of the Country
Lying Upon Shoalwater Bay and Puget Sound," George Gibbs
made the following remark:
for the Growing of Oysters," June 13, 1845 (Conn.); An Act to Encourage and
Protect the Planting of Oysters, August 15, 1849 (Maine); An Act Concerning the
Planting of Oysters, April 21, 1848 (Mass.); An Act Relative to the Fishery in
Certain Waters, 1813 (N.Y.); An Act concerning oysters and terrapins and the
penalties in regard to them, March 22, 1847 (Va.); Decker v Fisher, 4 Barb. 592,
595 (N.Y. 1848)
13 See PL-248 at 139
14 See PL-237 at 286. 297
15 For instance, the following item appeared in Ballou's Pictorial
Drawing Room Companion on September 9, 1855:
The oysters here are mostly brought in the spring from the coasts of
Virginia and Delaware and are planted about a mile from the shore, the
boundaries of each man's plantation being designated by stakes, as
shown in our engraving. PL-197.
65
The principal trade, so far, has been in oysters, which
abound on the flats. They are taken up, during the low
tides of summer, from their natural beds, separated, and
replanted, as in the States. !6
Similarly, on August 26, 1854, the Pioneer and
Democrat, a local newspaper, contained the following description
of the shellfishing practice at Shoalwater Bay:
The method of propagating oysters is to dig them up with
tongs ... When dug up, the oysters are separated from the
mass and buried about low-water mark, or even to
high-water mark, so that the tide may ebb and flow over
them. ... !7
In addition, on January 6, 1855, the following appeared:
We are credibly informed that there are some thirteen
streams emptying into Shoalwater Bay; that there are
thenat the present time a large community, who
are cultivating, in true Chesapeake Bay style, the
oyster... J
¢: How Shellfish Laws and Practices Lead
to an "Empirical Definition"
The shellfish laws and practices do give rise to an
“empirical definition" of "staked" and "cultivated." The Court can
ascertain an "empirical definition" of treaty words by viewing the
words as they would have been viewed by the parties who
participated in the treaty negotiations. In determining the parties’
understanding of the words, the Court must consider the parties’
actual experience with the words.
First of all, there is no doubt that the United States treaty
negotiators were generally familiar with the East Coast shellfish
industry and its practices. As outlined above, the East Coast
shellfish industry followed a set of laws and practices whereby
natural oyster beds were almost never "staked" or "cultivated."
Furthermore, the evidence indicates that both George Gibbs and
16 Gibbs, PL-186 at 465.
17 PL-236
13 pL-234
aii
66
members of the signatory Tribes were familiar with the
shellfishing practices occurring at Shoalwater Bay at treaty time.
Indeed, as discussed in the previous section, the practices at
Shoalwater Bay were modeled afier East Coast practice: oyster
farmers cultivated oysters by transplanting them to artificial beds
and under no circumstances did they "stake" or "cultivate" natural
beds. The "empirical definition" is one possible construction of
the terms "staked" and "cultivated."
4 Resolution of Meaning of "Any Beds Staked or
Cultivated"
The Court must interpret the Shellfish Proviso giving due
regard to both the canons of construction favoring the Indians and
the general principles of treaty interpretation. In this section, the
Court analyzes the Shellfish Proviso in light of: (1) the
surrounding treaty words, (2) the record of the treaty negotiations,
(3) the historical circumstances that gave rise to the Stevens
lreaties, (4) the possible alternative formulations of the Shellfish
Proviso, and (5) the post-treaty conduct of both parties.
Thereafter, the Court wiil conclude by presenting _ its
understanding of the correct interpretation of the Shellfish
Proviso.
a. The Shellfish Proviso Viewed in Light of
the Record of treaty Negotiations
The perspective and positions of the parties throughout
the negotiation process can also shed light on the meaning of the
shellfish proviso. To the extent that one party's statements--or
silence--reflect its understanding of the other side's proposals,
evidence of the negotiation process is persuasive evidence of the
Shellfish Proviso's intended meaning.
The parties agree that the minutes of the treaty
negotiations reflect no specific discussion of the Shellfish Proviso.
However, certain statements in the treaty minutes are instructive
as to the proper interpretation of the Shellfish Proviso, and the
absence of certain statements of discussions reveals the intentions
of the treating parties.
The most striking aspect of the treaty minutes is the
paternal pose struck by the United States negotiators, including
Governor Stevens himself. For example, Stevens made the
following statement to the Tribes during the negotiations:
67
[ think the paper is good and that the Great Father will
think so. Are you not my children and also children of
the Great Father? What will I not do for my children and
what will you not for yours? Would you not die for
them? This paper is such as a man would give to his
children and | will tell you why. This paper gives you a
home. Does not a father give his children a home? This
paper gives you a school’ Does not a father send his
children to school? It gives you mechanics and a Doctor
to teach and cure you. Is that not fatherly? This paper
secures your fish. Does not a father give food to his
children? Besides fish, you can hunt, gather roots and
berries. Besides it says you shall not drink whiskey and
does not a father prevent his children from drinking the
fire water?
There is no dispute that the United States negotiators intended to
act in good faith towards the Indians; thus, the court cannot view
the paternal tone as a strategic negotiating tactic, or as a form of
sharp dealing. And, in deed, there were specific, tangible
promises made by the United States to back up its paternal tone.
The one significant promise for purposes of this litigation
is the promise by the United States to the Indians that they would
enjoy a permanent right to fish as they always had. This right was
promised as a sacred entitlement, one which the United States had
a moral obligation to protect. The Indians were repeatedly
assured that they would continue to enjoy the right to fish as they
always had, in the places where they had always fished. There is
no indication in the mit... of the treaty proceedings that the
Indians were ever told that they would be excluded from any of
their ancient fisheries.
The second most striking aspect of the treaty minutes is
an absence of protest over the loss of shellfishing rights. It is clear
from the treaty minutes that with respect to fishing rights in
general, the guarantee of fishing rights was a sine qua non of the
Indians’ participation in the Treaties. The Indians repeatedly
raised concerns that they would not survive if they did not have
access to their ancient fisheries. Juxtaposed with these
expressions of concern, and demands for continued fishing rights,
is an absolute silence regarding the Shellfish Proviso. The
evidence indicates that the Treaties were read and explained
section by section to the Indians during the negotiation process.
Yet the minutes reveal no instance where the Indians resisted the
Shellfish Proviso.
68
Thus, the minutes of the treaty negotiations to some
extent undermine the interpretations offered by the Defendant and
the intervenors. Whether "staked" is taken literally to mean the
planting of stakes in the tideland, or taken figuratively as the
claiming of private property, it would provide a means for settlers
to exclude the indians from natural shellfish beds where the
Indians had always taken shellfish. This is simply inconsistent
with the statements made by the United States and the absence of
protest from the Tribes, both of which are reflected in the treaty
minutes.
If the Shellfish Proviso merely operated to exclude
Indians from artificial beds, it would not likely have been a
serious point of contention during the negotiation process. As a
result, this interpretation is perfectly consistent with the United
States’ solemn promise that the Indians would have a permanent
right to their ancient fisheries.
b. The Shellfish Proviso Viewed in Light of
the Historical Circumstances
Surrounding the Negotiation of the
Stevens Treaties
Just as the record of the treaty negotiations is direct
evidence of the parties’ intentions, the historical circumstances
surrounding the negotiation process are indirect evidence. These
circumstances provide the Court with additional information to
determine the meaning of the Shellfish Proviso.
i The United States' Purpose In
Entering Stevens Treaties
The United States' motivation for entering into the
Stevens Treaties was examined in Washington I, in Fishing
Vessel, and by this Court based upon the evidence presented in
this sub-proceeding. The United States’ primary purpose was to
extinguish the Indians’ title to the lands in Western Washington,
thereby clearing the way for settlement by Europeans. It was
hoped that, by moving the Indians onto reservations, the Treaties
would minimize the friction and permit amicable relations
between the settlers and the Indians. Of course, the United States
recognized that to achieve its primary purpose, it would have to
pay some price. Further complicating matters, however, was the
fact that the United States wanted to execute the Treaties as
quickly as possible.
69
The United States was aware that the Indians used and
relied on fish, including shellfish, for subsistence, ceremonial and
commercial purposes; thus it was clearly necessary to preserve the
Indians’ fishing rights. In fact, the United States viewed this
concession as serving its own interest to some extent: indeed, the
treaty negotiators did not want the Indians to become dependent
upon the United States for their subsistence and a reservation of
fishing rights would insure against this possibility. At the same
time, the United States believed that guaranteeing the Indians
fishing rights would "not in any manner interfere with the rights of
citizens." Finally, the United States intended to act honorably
towards the Indians, and the negotiators believed that it never
could have been the intention of Congress that the Indians should
be excluded from their ancient fisheries and expressed among
themselves the intention to preserve Indian fishing rights.
Overall, the Tribes’ interpretation of the Shellfish Proviso
is most consistent with the United States' purposes in entering the
Stevens Treaties. The interpretation does not in any way conflict
with the historical findings of fact concerning the United States’
purpose in entering the Treaties. The defendant and the
intervenors point to the potential conflict arising from enforcing
the Tribes' interpretation of the Shellfish Proviso, and on that basis
argue that the Tribes’ interpretation contradicts the United States'
intention to avoid conflict between Indians and settlers. The
United States, however, did not intend that the Indians would
relinquish their ancient fishing rights on demand by settlers.
Further, under the Tribes’ interpretation, there would be no
conflict between Indians and settlers, so long as the Indians
respected the settlers’ planted oyster beds and the settlers did not
stake out natural oyster beds where the Indians took fish.
The Defendants' and intervenors' proposed interpretations
are also generally consistent with the United States’ purposes in
entering the Treaties, except in one important respect: neither of
these interpretations is consistent with the United States’ avowed
intention to preserve for the Indians their ancient fisheries.
Whether "staked" is viewed literally or in its frontier sense, it
permits the gradual exclusion of Indians from natural shellfish
beds, a result clearly unwanted and unintended by the parties to
the Treaties.
ii. The Tribes' Purpose In Entering
Stevens Treaties
The evidence indicates that the Tribes’ purpose in entering
the Stevens Treaties was to secure land and livelihood for their
members who faced an aggressive waive of European settlement.
Tribal leaders and members believed that without recourse to their
ancient fisheries, they would perish. Whatever land concessions
they made, the Indians viewed a guarantee of permanent fishing
rights as an absolute predicate to entering into a treaty with the
United States.
Under the Tribes’ interpretation the Indians would have a
permanent right of access to their ancient fisheries. Conversely,
the defendant's and intervenors' proposed interpretations of the
treaty simply do not recognize that the Indians were bargaining
for a permanent right; rather, they seem to rely on the proposition
that the Indians believed that their need for shellfish would
diminish over time. This supposition, however, lacks any
evidentiary support and is contradicted by the overall weight of
the evidence. Accordingly, the Tribes’ position is more consistent
with this facet of the Treaties’ historical context.
lil. The United States' Vision for the
Washington Territory
The parties agree that Governor Stevens was not a
short-term thinker who was motivated solely by considerations of
expediency. Both sides characterize Stevens as a self-conscious °
historical actor who proceeded cautiously, guided by a vision for
the future of the Washington Territory. The parties even agree on
some aspects of the substance of Stevens’ vision for the
Washington Territory; not surprisingly however, on other aspects,
they sharply disagree. The Court must resolve these differences in
its attempt to recreate Stevens' vision as part of the overall context
in which to interpret the Shellfish Proviso.
A. Shellfish Industry in _ the
Washington Territory
First, the parties agree that Stevens envisioned the
development of a thriving oyster farming industry in the Puget
Sound. Dr. Richards, an expert for the defendant and intervenors,
gave the following testimony at trial:
Q. Do you have any opinion as to whether or not
Stevens and his treaty commissions envisioned similar
industries [as to those in Shoalwater Bay] developing in
the Puget Sound area?
A. I'm sure they did. The newspapers, particularly
the Pioneer and Democrat, mentioned the possibility of
71
this occurring and in fact reflected some dismay that it
had not occurred already.
But certainly I think it is safe to say that they
envisioned the shellfish industry as well as many other
industries appearing in the territory on the Sound.
The Tribes' interpretation is most consistent with this
vision. The oyster farming industry, as constituted at treaty time,
was built on artificial beds. As previously discussed,
transplanting oysters from natural beds and seeding artificial beds
were the principal method of oyster culture at treaty time, both on
the East Coast and at Shoalwater Bay. Stevens’ vision of the
oyster industry most likely conformed to existing practices;
indeed, the record is devoid of any evidence that Stevens or any of
the United States’ negotiators held any ideas of reforming industry
practices. Thus, to protect the fledgling oyster industry, Stevens
might have felt it necessary to exempt artificial beds from the
Indians’ treaty right to take fish. Under the Tribes' interpretation,
the Shellfish Proviso is narrowly tailored to do just that.
Under the competing interpretations, the Shellfish Proviso
is not designed specifically to protect the Oyster industry;
depending on the circumstances, it could either aid or hinder the
industry's development. To the extent it prohibited Indians from
taking shellfish from both artificial and natural shellfish beds
where settlers were engaging in fruitful harvesting, it would aid
the development of the industry. However, both the literal and
figurative interpretation of "staked" advanced by defendants and
the intervenors protect act'vities, such as tideland ownership,
wholly unrelated to the oyster industry. Under either
interpretation, a settler--either by placing stakes or by claiming
ownership to a tideland parcel--could preclude Indians and
non-Indians from taking shellfish from natural beds located on
that parcel. The settler could then ail to harvest the shellfish, and
the Indians would be forbidden from fishing there. Under these
circumstances, it would not foster, but instead undermine. the
development of an oyster industry. Accordingly, the Tribes'
proposed interpretation is preferable because it is wholly
consistent with the notion of fostering the shellfish industry.
B. Tideland Development in the
Washington Territory
The parties also agree that the United States negotiators
anticipated industrial and ur
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