Opposition Brief — Alexandria Historical Restoration & Preservation Commission v. Federal Highway Administration

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

(3) UD : 2000

No. 99-1947

Jn the Supreme Court of the finite

ALEXANDRIA HISTORICAL RESTORATION

AND PRESERVATION COMMISSION, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Uv.

FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

ROSALIND A. KNAPP

Acting General Counsel

PAUL M. GEIER

Assistant General Counsel

for Litigation

EDWARD V.A. KUSSY

Acting Chief Counsel

Federal Highway

Administration

Department of

Transportation

Washington, D.C. 20596

SETH P. WAXMAN

Soliciter General

Counsel of Record

LoIs J. SCHIFFER

Assistant Attorney General

JOHN A. BRYSON

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

202) 514-2217

$

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Federal Highway Administration, in the

preparation of an environmental impact statement for

the replacement of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge, made a

reasonable determination to eliminate from further

evaluation alternatives accommodating only ten lanes of

traffic, on the ground that such alternatives would not

adequately serve the project’s underlying purpose of

alleviating current and future traffic congestion and

improving safety.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

cos tts naga ea Ee RTT 1

NU Mlisiscladiasiniiclalcicsscsicse leis 1

I ehistits russian schcrtnsdauthcmsholickseidterceonZscsan sc 2

I PANN icteciceiinsashenstbctiigan Sieicicocsccsitss a 7

I AI asian ci Secpahicstehdahesgdeisiges Sa 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S.

RES NE SESS eo a 7

Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938

F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994

PIII Sis lisliledhaeitacbisiaahdhdtinitneteinsiansensacraaisisees acces... 10, 12

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir.

1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987) ceecccscecccssseeoocoes..... 8

City of Bridgeton v. FAA, 212 F.3d 448 (8th Cir.

INC Nib edioniesniecscnsienssscisdpiihsnanshioniniatnaiiesasssnsacecce «., 8, 10

City of New York v. Department of Transp., 715

F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.

IIT ilLiinitithetadeeesacradscsintinsannainndocansinnasarssesecioances... 8

Louisiana Wildlife Fed’n v. York, 761 F.2d 1044

EE SRE oO ca 8

North Buckhead Civic Ass’n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d

RR BOY ais csccscsasvcsennesoosceseansnerasecaonesce-«.<.. 8, 10, 12

Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm. v. EPA,

684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982) on... ccccccsccsssssssssssssssssssssesecccece 8

Simmons v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs

120 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 1997) oooeccccccccccccsccssecscoeeeoseecc.., 8, 10, 11, 12

Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.

Karlen, 444 U.S, 228 (1980) .0......ccsssesscssscssssssesscccossssssecccccc. 7

(IIT)

IV

Cases—Continued: Page

Van Abbema v. Fornell, 807 F.2d 633 (7th Cir.

RISIUED isiicessiiibescubikaninnicabaaieacsiaaiesepnopiapatciniaaiaabibiteipahiiiieaiibipii 10, 11

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435

ae ats NOU NF UID ensssesehniaipececnchacernsehddecnonbbcdhseaiiimaia itbaandiasaleenkalca 7,8

Statutes and regulations:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.B.C. TEOGENE) essisescssrseserercsseresesnnsivosees 5

Department of Transportation Act § 4(f), 49 U.S.C.

SIU Wiiclenpscchiciciacibhcaaiiccadeicitiinpapiianiitaieinaimaaiasanmaaiaiiiie: sino 4

National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321

QU... vsarvinensnnisssiasonsaspissiieatcsiaccaiaainetorninhacengsittinianaaiabiiiniiiiianinniai 2

OU as See sciennitennsicigtanimnnennhiceicgelaitaneillnnianiiniaiie 2

Be OF A. Be Srititecishnistinccanieiiaictiinnasinnbiahiianbiania 2

National Historic Preservation Act § 106, 16 U.S.C.

GS TNUE sinsaisvsinnczcinniscasiitstciianininnicaenitssiniinaamatisnaiiainasiitiaiianieaibhunetabas 4

23 U.S.C. 103(¢)(1)(B)G) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) ............6 3

23 U.S.C. 109(b) (1994 & Supp. TV 1998) .0......eseseseseeeseees 3

40 C.F.R.:

OUR IEE eiesnesineisntnsintncnenicmiaentnmalibitibinnanighitingein 2

SPORE TRIED cscirerschscreiicnincsireitinchilinsicniviinsalastgaitianativadin 8

SOREN TTT TID icccesnsatssonsessaitlinmnsbiesiasasinnibasaiiaslionsidpsceen 8

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 99-1947

ALEXANDRIA HISTORICAL RESTORATION

AND PRESERVATION COMMISSION, ET AL., PETITIONERS

VU.

FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet App. 1a-24a)

is reported at 198 F.3d 862. The opinion of the district

court (Pet. App. 27a-53a) is reported at 46 F. Supp. 2d

35.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

December 17, 1999. A petition for rehearing was

denied on March 7, 2000 (Pet. App. 25a). The petition

for a writ of certiorari was filed on June 5, 2000. The

jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

\ (1)

2

STATEMENT

1. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),

42 U.S.C. 4821 et seq., requires federal agencies to pre-

pare an environmental impact statement for all “major

Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment.” 42 U.S.C. 4832(C). As part of

that statement, the agency must “[r]igorously explore

and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives,

and for alternatives which were eliminated from de-

tailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having

been eliminated.” 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(a); see 42 U.S.C.

4332(C)(iil).

2. The Woodrow Wilson Bridge is a six-lane draw-

bridge that carries Interstate Highways I-495 (the

Capital Beltway) and 1-95. Pet. App. 27a. Although the

bridge was “originally intended to serve as a Washing-

ton bypass for interstate travelers, it became increas-

ingly used by commuters as the region’s population

grew.” Jd. at 2a. The bridge was opened to traffic in

1961 and was designed to accommodate approximately

75,000 vehicles per day. Jd: at 27a-28a. Traffic volume

has increased to approximately 160,000 vehicles per

day, however, with substantial further increases pro-

jected during the next 20 years. Jd. at 2a, 28a. As the

court of appeals explained,

congestion is particularly acute during peak hours,

where the configuration of an eight-lane Beltway

feeding into a six-lane bridge—in addition to stead-

ily increasing local traffic in the surrounding com-

munities—has produced one of the worst rush-hour

“bottlenecks” in the region. These congestion prob-

lems have created harmful collateral consequences:

the heavy volume on the Bridge has contributed to

an accident rate nearly double that of similar

a

3

facilities in the region, and has expedited the dete-

rioration of the Bridge’s structure to the point

where the Bridge is projected to be structurally

unsound by 2004.

Id. at 2a.

More than ten years ago, respondent Federal High-

way Administration (FHWA), in cooperation with

agencies of Maryland, Virginia, and the District of

Columbia, began to evaluate alternatives for replacing

the bridge. Pet. App. 2a. In 1997, the FHWA issued its

Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS). Jd. at

4a. The FEIS evaluated in detail a “no-build” and

seven “build” alternatives. Ibid. Each of the “build”

alternatives utilized a 12-lane design. bid. The FEIS

presented as the preferred alternative two parallel

drawbridges on the existing alignment with a 70-foot

clearance over the navigational channel. [bid.

“Although the [FEIS] discussed narrower eight- and

ten-lane options, it did not afford them full treatment as

formal ‘alternatives’ because the [FHWA] concluded,

on the basis of traffic projections, that narrower river

crossings would fall short of meeting the Bridge’s long-

term traffic needs.” Pet. App. 4a.’ In particular, the

FHWA’s traffic analyses showed that petitioners’ pre-

ferred ten-lane configuration “would be able to accom-

modate less than half of the per-hour capacity of the

[FHWA’s] preferred alternative, causing peak-hour

traffic queues of significantly greater length and ex-

tended duration.” Jd. at 1la. The FHWA’s studies also

' The FHWA is required to design Interstate highwa JS So as to

be able to “handle the type and volumes of traffic anticipated for

[a] twenty year period.” 23 U.S.C. 103(c)(1)(B)(i) (1994 & Supp. IV

1998); 23 U.S.C. 109(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).

4

projected that accident rates would be “markedly

higher on a ten-lane structure.” Jbid.

3. The City of Alexandria filed suit in federal district

court, challenging the FHWA’s decision. Pet. App. 5a.

Petitioners intervened as plaintiffs and continued to

prosecute the suit after the City settled its claims. /bid.

The district court granted petitioners’ motion for

summary judgment. /d. at 27a-53a.

The district court held, inter alia, that the FHWA’s

failure to consider a ten-lane project violated its

obligation under NEPA to consider all “reasonable

alternatives.” Pet. App. 39a-45a. The court stated that

the limited analysis the FHWA did on a ten-lane

alternative demonstrates that it could possibly pro-

vide a partial solution to the problem. The FHWA’s

own traffic analysis of a ten-lane alternative demon-

strates that it can handle up to 295,000 vehicles per

day. This is close to total satisfaction of the

estimated maximum 300,000 vehicles per day which

will cross the river in 2020. To eliminate all ten-lane

alternatives from “rigorous” consideration simply

because they fall short of the total future estimated

demand by 2 percent does not stand up to the rule of

reason which must guide the agency in making its

determination.

Id. at 44a.

2 The district court found that the FHWA had committed an

additional NEPA violation by failing to undertake a sufficient

analysis of the construction impacts of the preferred alternative.

Pet. App. 45a-47a. The court also held that the FHWA’s approval

of the preferred alternative violated Section 106 of the National

Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 470f, and Section 4(f) of the

Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 303, which require

the agency to identify historic and other protected properties that

5

4. The court of appeals reversed. Pet. App. la-24a.

The court explained that the “reasonable alterna-

tives” for which detailed study is required under NEPA

are identified

in light of the objectives of the federal action * * *.

But that approach of course requires that [the court]

first consider whether the agency has reasonably

identified and defined its objectives. * * * [The

court] engage[s] in both of these inquiries—whether

an agency’s objectives are reasonable, and whether

a particular alternative is reasonable in light of

these objectives—with considerable deference to the

agency’s expertise and policy-making role.

Pet. App. 9a. The court held that the FHWA’s “stated

objectives were reasonable,” observing that “it is not

unreasonable in articulating its objectives for an agency

to focus primarily on transportation and safety issues

when replacing a massively congested and structurally

unsound bridge.” Jd. at 10a (internal quotation marks

omitted). The court also upheld the FHWA’s conclu-

sion that a ten-lane alternative was not “reasonable” in

light of the stated objectives of the highway project.

Id. at 10a-1la. The court explained that the agency had

“focused specifically * * * on the traffic needs that

will exist twenty years after the project’s approval, and

may be affected by a highway project. See Pet. App. 47a-5la. The

court of appeals reversed those rulings, see id. at 14a-24a, and

petitioners do not press those claims in this Court.

The district court also held that the FHWA had failed to ensure

that the project would conform to regional air quality standards, as

required by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(2). See Pet. App.

36a-39a. The FHWA did not appeal that aspect of the district

court’s decision, but chose instead to conduct a revised conformity

analysis. See id. at 5a n.2.

6

its analyses based on 2020 traffic projections demon-

strate that a ten-lane bridge would be insufficient.”

Ibid.

As we explain above (see p. 4, supra), the district

court placed substantial reliance on an FHWA study

“showing that a ten-lane bridge would be able to

accommodate up to 295,000 vehicles per day, a number

only slightly smaller than the projected daily traffic

flow on the Bridge in 2020.” Pet. App. lla. The court

of appeals found the district court’s reliance on the daily

capacity figure, in isolation, to be unwarranted. The

court of appeals explained that the study “apparently

assumed an even flow of traffic throughout the day

(which, of course, is unrealistic). Whatever the total

number of vehicles that will cross in a 24-hour period,

the relevant question is how long during peak com-

muting hours it will take to cross the bridge.” Jbid.

With respect to that question, the court of appeals

credited agency studies showing that petitioners’ pre-

ferred ten-lane design “would be able to accommodate

less than half of the per-hour capacity of the [FHWA’s]

preferred alternative, causing peak-hour traffic queues

of significantly greater length and extended duration.”

Ibid.

Finally, the court of appeals rejected petitioners’

contention that a ten-lane project could be regarded as

a “reasonable alternative” even if it would “not offer a

complete solution to the problem” that the new con-

struction was intended to address. Pet. App. lla. The

court explained that

within the context of a coordinated effort to solve a

problem of national scope, a solution that lies out-

side of an agency’s jurisdiction might be a “rea-

sonable alternative”; so might an alternative within

7

that agency’s jurisdiction that solves only a portion

of the problem, given that other agencies might be

able to provide the remainder of the solution. Such

a holistic definition of “reasonable alternatives”

would, however, make little sense for a discrete

project within the jurisdiction of one federal agency

* * *. Concerned with severe traffic conditions in

the Capital Region, Congress has authorized the

[FHWA] to replace the Woodrow Wilson Memorial

Bridge. The [FHWA] has sole responsibility for

solving this problem; were it to build a ten-lane

bridge, no one else would step in and alleviate the

congestion that would result. In this context, it is

simply a non sequitur to call a proposal that does

not “offer a complete solution to the problem” a

“reasonable alternative.”

Id. at 12a-13a (footnotes omitted).

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals in this case is

correct and does not conflict with any decision of this

Court or of any other court of appeals. Further review

is not warranted.

1. As the court of appeals recognized (Pet. App. 9a-

10a), although NEPA establishes “‘significant substan-

tive goals for the Nation,’ [the duties it] imposes upon

agencies * * * are ‘essentially procedural.’” Stry-

cker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444

U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear

Power Corp. v. NRDC, 485 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).

NEPA does not require federal agencies to elevate en-

vironmental concerns over other appropriate considera-

tions in the decision-making process. Baltimore Gas &

Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).

8

The EIS required by NEPA must discuss, inter

alia, “alternatives to the proposed action.” 42 U.S.C.

4332(C)(iii). Because the consideration of alternatives

is intended to inform both the public and the agency

decision-maker, “the concept of alternatives must be

bounded by some notion of feasibility.” Vermont

Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551. “Common sense also teaches

us that the ‘detailed statement of alternatives’ cannot

be found wanting simply because the agency failed to

include every device and thought conceivable to the

mind of man.” J/bid.; see 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(a)-(c),

1508.25(b)(2).. The courts of appeals have uniformly

recognized that the identification of “reasonable

alternatives” requires consideration of the purposes or

goals of the proposal before the agency. See, e.g., Pet.

App. 9a; City of Bridgeton v. FAA, 212 F.3d 448, 455-

456 (8th Cir. 2000); Simmons v. United States Army

Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1997); City

of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1986),

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987); Louisiana Wildlife

Fed’n v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1048 (5th Cir. 1985) (per

‘euriam); City of New York v. Department of Transp.,

715 F.2d 732, 742-743 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465

U.S. 1055 (1984); Roosevelt Campobello Int’l Park

Comm. v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1047 (1st Cir. 1982).

2. The court of appeals correctly held both that the

FHWA had defined its objectives in a reasonable

manner, and that the agency had reasonably excluded

any ten-lane alternative from full consideration in the

final FEIS in light of the purpose and need for the

project. With respect to the first point, the court held

that the FHWA had acted reasonably in focusing on the

extent to which alternative designs would accommodate

peak-hour traffic demand. Pet. App. lla. With respect

to the second, the court held that the FHWA had

9

reasonably relied on traffic studies showing that a ten-

lane design “would be able to accommodate less than

half of the [FHWA’s] preferred alternative, causing

peak-hour traffic queues of significantly greater length

and extended duration.” Jbid. The court referred as-

well to FHWA analyses indicating that “accident rates

would also be markedly higher on a ten-lane structure.”

Ibid. Petitioners do not attempt to show that the

FHWA acted unreasonably in focusing on peak-hour

demand. Nor do they contest the agency’s determina-

tion that traffic congestion during peak commuting

hours would be much more severe, and accident rates

significantly higher, under the ten-lane alternative.

Petitioners contend instead that the FHWA was

required to undertake a detailed analysis of the envi-

ronmental impacts of a ten-lane design even if such an

alternative would fail to solve the traffic and safety

problems that the highway project is intended to

address. The court of appeals correctly rejected that

contention. See Pet. App. lla-13a. The court acknowl-

edged that “within the context of a coordinated effort to

solve a problem of national scope,” an alternative that

does not offer a complete solution to an identified

problem may still be reasonable, since “other agencies

might be able to provide the remainder of the sclution.”

Id. at 12a. The court explained, however, that such a

conception of “reasonable alternatives” would “make

little sense for a discrete project within the jurisdiction

of one federal agency.” Jbid. If the project ultimately

approved and constructed by the FHWA had insuffi-

cient capacity to accommodate peak-hour traffic de-

mand, “no one else would step in and alleviate the con-

gestion that would result. In this context, it is simply a

non sequitur to call a proposal that does not ‘offer a

10

complete solution to the problem’ a ‘reasonable alterna-

tive.’” Id. at 18a.

3. Petitioners contend (Pet. 8-13) that the court of

appeals’ decision conflicts with decisions of the Seventh

and Eleventh Circuits. That claim is incorrect. The

Seventh, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits

agree that an agency must reasonably define the objec-

tive of a proposed project and that the agency’s choice

of alternatives must be reasonable in light of the

objective. See Pet. App. 9a; Simmons v. United States

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F.3d 664, 668-669 (7th Cir.

1997); North Buckhead Civic Ass’n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d

1533, 1541-1542 (11th Cir. 1990); Van Abbema v.

Fornell, 807 F.2d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 1986). Those courts

also recognize that an agency may not evade its

obligations under NEPA through an artificially narrow

definition of project objectives. See Simmons, 120 F.3d

at 666; Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938

F.2d 190, 196 (D.C. Cir.) (Thomas, J.), cert. denied, 502

U.S. 994 (1991); North Buckhead Civic Ass’n, 903 F.2d

at 1542.°

None of the decisions on which petitioners rely

supports their contention that this case would have

been resolved differently in the Seventh or Eleventh

Circuit. In Simmons, the court held that the Army

Corps of Engineers had failed to consider an acceptable

range of alternatives to a proposed dam and reservoir

that was intended to supply water to the City of

Marion, Illinois, and the Lake of Egypt Water District.

3 Although petitioners also rely (Pet. 14) on the dissenting opin-_

ion in City of Bridgeton v. Federal Aviation Administration, 212

F.3d 448, 465 (8th Cir. 2000) (R. Arnold, J., dissenting), the major-

ity opinion in that case is fully consistent with the decisions cited

above. See 212 F.3d at 455.

\

11

120 F.3d at 666. The Corps had “defined the project’s

purpose as supplying two users-(Marion and the Water

District) from a single source.” Id. at 667. The court of

appeals found that purpose to be unreasonably narrow

because the Corps had neither considered nor explained

why it was preferable that both users be supplied from

a single source. See ibid. (“At no time has the Corps

studied whether this single-source idea is the best one

—-or even a good one.”); id. at 668 (“Why the Corps

assumed the imperative of a single-source project

* * * remained unexplained.”). In the instant case, by

contrast, the FHWA amply justified its decision to

focus on future peak-hour traffic demand, rather than

on the theoretical ability of various design alternatives

to accommodate the projected daily volume of traffic.

See Pet. App. 10a-11a.‘ \

The court in Van Abbema stated that “the evaluation

of ‘alternatives’ mandated by NEPA is to be an evalua-

tion of alternative means to accomplish the general goal

of an action; it is not an evaluation of the alternative

means by which a particular applicant can reach his

goals.” 807 F.2d at 638. As the second clause of the

quoted passage makes clear, the Seventh Circuit’s

analysis was directed at the situation where a federal

agency is called upon to assess a private entity’s permit

application. The Seventh Circuit held that the agency,

in conducting NEPA analysis, may be required to treat

* The court of appeals in this case did not suggest, for example,

that the FHWA could justify its refusal to give extensive consid-

eration to a ten-lane alternative simply by defining its objective as

the construction of a 12-lane bridge. Such an approach would

surely constitute the sort of artificial narrowing of agency objec-

tives that the Simmons court warned-against. See 120 F.3d at 666.

Here, by contrast, the FHWA’'s focus on accommodating future

peak-hour traffic demand reflects intensely practical concerns.

12

as “reasonable alternatives” measures that a particular

permit applicant is incapable of implementing. See ibid.

(“The fact that this applicant does not own an alter-

native site is only marginally relevant (if it is relevant

at all) to whether feasible alternatives exist to the

applicant’s proposal.”). Because the instant case in-

volves a highway project initiated by the federal gov-

ernment rather than by a private permit applicant, Van

Abbema is largely irrelevant here.°

Finally, in Nortk Buckhead Civic Association, the

Eleventh Circuit stated in dicta that “an alternative

partially satisfying the need and purpose of the pro-

posed project may or may not need to be considered

depending on whether it can be considered a ‘reason-

able alternative.’” 903 F.2d at 1542. The court held in

that case, however, that the FHWA was not required

to undertake a detailed analysis of the plaintiffs’ pre-

ferred “no build/heavy rail alternative.” See id. at 1543.

The court explained that while the plaintiffs’ preferred

approach “would provide additional transportation

capacity in the corridor, the problems of surface street

congestion would remain completely unresolved.” bid.

° In Citizens Against Burlington, the District of Columbia

Circuit expressed concern that the Van Abbema court’s reference

to “the general goal of an action” might imply that the reviewing

court is itself to define the relevant goal. See 938 F.2d at 199. The

court explained that “[(lJeft unanswered in Van Abbema * * * is

why and how to distinguish general goals from specific ones and

just who does the distinguishing. Someone has to define the

purpose of the agency action. Implicit in Van Abbema is that the

body responsible is the reviewing court.” Jbid. The Seventh Cir-

cuit has since recognized, however, that in determining a federal

agency’s compliance with the requirements of NEPA, a reviewing

court owes deference to the agency’s definition of a project’s goal.

See Simmons, 120 F.3d at 668-669.

13

There is consequently no reason to Suppose that the

Eleventh Circuit would have treated a ten-lane replace-

ment for the Wilson Bridge as a “reasonable alterna-

tive” requiring extensive NEPA analysis.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

SETH P. WAXMAN

Solicitor General

Lois J. SCHIFFER

Assistant Attorney General

JOHN A. BRYSON

Attorney

ROSALIND A. KNAPP

Acting General Counsel

PAUL M. GEIER

Assistant General Counsel

for Litigation

EDWARD V.A. Kussy

Acting Chief Counsel

Federal Highway \

Administration

Department of

Transportation

AUGUST 2000

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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