Opposition Brief — Alexandria Historical Restoration & Preservation Commission v. Federal Highway Administration
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Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
(3) UD : 2000
No. 99-1947
Jn the Supreme Court of the finite
ALEXANDRIA HISTORICAL RESTORATION
AND PRESERVATION COMMISSION, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Uv.
FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
ROSALIND A. KNAPP
Acting General Counsel
PAUL M. GEIER
Assistant General Counsel
for Litigation
EDWARD V.A. KUSSY
Acting Chief Counsel
Federal Highway
Administration
Department of
Transportation
Washington, D.C. 20596
SETH P. WAXMAN
Soliciter General
Counsel of Record
LoIs J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
JOHN A. BRYSON
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
202) 514-2217
$
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Federal Highway Administration, in the
preparation of an environmental impact statement for
the replacement of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge, made a
reasonable determination to eliminate from further
evaluation alternatives accommodating only ten lanes of
traffic, on the ground that such alternatives would not
adequately serve the project’s underlying purpose of
alleviating current and future traffic congestion and
improving safety.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
cos tts naga ea Ee RTT 1
NU Mlisiscladiasiniiclalcicsscsicse leis 1
I ehistits russian schcrtnsdauthcmsholickseidterceonZscsan sc 2
I PANN icteciceiinsashenstbctiigan Sieicicocsccsitss a 7
I AI asian ci Secpahicstehdahesgdeisiges Sa 13
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S.
RES NE SESS eo a 7
Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938
F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994
PIII Sis lisliledhaeitacbisiaahdhdtinitneteinsiansensacraaisisees acces... 10, 12
City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987) ceecccscecccssseeoocoes..... 8
City of Bridgeton v. FAA, 212 F.3d 448 (8th Cir.
INC Nib edioniesniecscnsienssscisdpiihsnanshioniniatnaiiesasssnsacecce «., 8, 10
City of New York v. Department of Transp., 715
F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
IIT ilLiinitithetadeeesacradscsintinsannainndocansinnasarssesecioances... 8
Louisiana Wildlife Fed’n v. York, 761 F.2d 1044
EE SRE oO ca 8
North Buckhead Civic Ass’n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d
RR BOY ais csccscsasvcsennesoosceseansnerasecaonesce-«.<.. 8, 10, 12
Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm. v. EPA,
684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982) on... ccccccsccsssssssssssssssssssssesecccece 8
Simmons v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs
120 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 1997) oooeccccccccccccsccssecscoeeeoseecc.., 8, 10, 11, 12
Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen, 444 U.S, 228 (1980) .0......ccsssesscssscssssssesscccossssssecccccc. 7
(IIT)
IV
Cases—Continued: Page
Van Abbema v. Fornell, 807 F.2d 633 (7th Cir.
RISIUED isiicessiiibescubikaninnicabaaieacsiaaiesepnopiapatciniaaiaabibiteipahiiiieaiibipii 10, 11
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435
ae ats NOU NF UID ensssesehniaipececnchacernsehddecnonbbcdhseaiiimaia itbaandiasaleenkalca 7,8
Statutes and regulations:
Clean Air Act, 42 U.B.C. TEOGENE) essisescssrseserercsseresesnnsivosees 5
Department of Transportation Act § 4(f), 49 U.S.C.
SIU Wiiclenpscchiciciacibhcaaiiccadeicitiinpapiianiitaieinaimaaiasanmaaiaiiiie: sino 4
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321
QU... vsarvinensnnisssiasonsaspissiieatcsiaccaiaainetorninhacengsittinianaaiabiiiniiiiianinniai 2
OU as See sciennitennsicigtanimnnennhiceicgelaitaneillnnianiiniaiie 2
Be OF A. Be Srititecishnistinccanieiiaictiinnasinnbiahiianbiania 2
National Historic Preservation Act § 106, 16 U.S.C.
GS TNUE sinsaisvsinnczcinniscasiitstciianininnicaenitssiniinaamatisnaiiainasiitiaiianieaibhunetabas 4
23 U.S.C. 103(¢)(1)(B)G) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) ............6 3
23 U.S.C. 109(b) (1994 & Supp. TV 1998) .0......eseseseseeeseees 3
40 C.F.R.:
OUR IEE eiesnesineisntnsintncnenicmiaentnmalibitibinnanighitingein 2
SPORE TRIED cscirerschscreiicnincsireitinchilinsicniviinsalastgaitianativadin 8
SOREN TTT TID icccesnsatssonsessaitlinmnsbiesiasasinnibasaiiaslionsidpsceen 8
Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
No. 99-1947
ALEXANDRIA HISTORICAL RESTORATION
AND PRESERVATION COMMISSION, ET AL., PETITIONERS
VU.
FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet App. 1a-24a)
is reported at 198 F.3d 862. The opinion of the district
court (Pet. App. 27a-53a) is reported at 46 F. Supp. 2d
35.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
December 17, 1999. A petition for rehearing was
denied on March 7, 2000 (Pet. App. 25a). The petition
for a writ of certiorari was filed on June 5, 2000. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
\ (1)
2
STATEMENT
1. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
42 U.S.C. 4821 et seq., requires federal agencies to pre-
pare an environmental impact statement for all “major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.” 42 U.S.C. 4832(C). As part of
that statement, the agency must “[r]igorously explore
and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives,
and for alternatives which were eliminated from de-
tailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having
been eliminated.” 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(a); see 42 U.S.C.
4332(C)(iil).
2. The Woodrow Wilson Bridge is a six-lane draw-
bridge that carries Interstate Highways I-495 (the
Capital Beltway) and 1-95. Pet. App. 27a. Although the
bridge was “originally intended to serve as a Washing-
ton bypass for interstate travelers, it became increas-
ingly used by commuters as the region’s population
grew.” Jd. at 2a. The bridge was opened to traffic in
1961 and was designed to accommodate approximately
75,000 vehicles per day. Jd: at 27a-28a. Traffic volume
has increased to approximately 160,000 vehicles per
day, however, with substantial further increases pro-
jected during the next 20 years. Jd. at 2a, 28a. As the
court of appeals explained,
congestion is particularly acute during peak hours,
where the configuration of an eight-lane Beltway
feeding into a six-lane bridge—in addition to stead-
ily increasing local traffic in the surrounding com-
munities—has produced one of the worst rush-hour
“bottlenecks” in the region. These congestion prob-
lems have created harmful collateral consequences:
the heavy volume on the Bridge has contributed to
an accident rate nearly double that of similar
a
3
facilities in the region, and has expedited the dete-
rioration of the Bridge’s structure to the point
where the Bridge is projected to be structurally
unsound by 2004.
Id. at 2a.
More than ten years ago, respondent Federal High-
way Administration (FHWA), in cooperation with
agencies of Maryland, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia, began to evaluate alternatives for replacing
the bridge. Pet. App. 2a. In 1997, the FHWA issued its
Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS). Jd. at
4a. The FEIS evaluated in detail a “no-build” and
seven “build” alternatives. Ibid. Each of the “build”
alternatives utilized a 12-lane design. bid. The FEIS
presented as the preferred alternative two parallel
drawbridges on the existing alignment with a 70-foot
clearance over the navigational channel. [bid.
“Although the [FEIS] discussed narrower eight- and
ten-lane options, it did not afford them full treatment as
formal ‘alternatives’ because the [FHWA] concluded,
on the basis of traffic projections, that narrower river
crossings would fall short of meeting the Bridge’s long-
term traffic needs.” Pet. App. 4a.’ In particular, the
FHWA’s traffic analyses showed that petitioners’ pre-
ferred ten-lane configuration “would be able to accom-
modate less than half of the per-hour capacity of the
[FHWA’s] preferred alternative, causing peak-hour
traffic queues of significantly greater length and ex-
tended duration.” Jd. at 1la. The FHWA’s studies also
' The FHWA is required to design Interstate highwa JS So as to
be able to “handle the type and volumes of traffic anticipated for
[a] twenty year period.” 23 U.S.C. 103(c)(1)(B)(i) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998); 23 U.S.C. 109(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
4
projected that accident rates would be “markedly
higher on a ten-lane structure.” Jbid.
3. The City of Alexandria filed suit in federal district
court, challenging the FHWA’s decision. Pet. App. 5a.
Petitioners intervened as plaintiffs and continued to
prosecute the suit after the City settled its claims. /bid.
The district court granted petitioners’ motion for
summary judgment. /d. at 27a-53a.
The district court held, inter alia, that the FHWA’s
failure to consider a ten-lane project violated its
obligation under NEPA to consider all “reasonable
alternatives.” Pet. App. 39a-45a. The court stated that
the limited analysis the FHWA did on a ten-lane
alternative demonstrates that it could possibly pro-
vide a partial solution to the problem. The FHWA’s
own traffic analysis of a ten-lane alternative demon-
strates that it can handle up to 295,000 vehicles per
day. This is close to total satisfaction of the
estimated maximum 300,000 vehicles per day which
will cross the river in 2020. To eliminate all ten-lane
alternatives from “rigorous” consideration simply
because they fall short of the total future estimated
demand by 2 percent does not stand up to the rule of
reason which must guide the agency in making its
determination.
Id. at 44a.
2 The district court found that the FHWA had committed an
additional NEPA violation by failing to undertake a sufficient
analysis of the construction impacts of the preferred alternative.
Pet. App. 45a-47a. The court also held that the FHWA’s approval
of the preferred alternative violated Section 106 of the National
Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 470f, and Section 4(f) of the
Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 303, which require
the agency to identify historic and other protected properties that
5
4. The court of appeals reversed. Pet. App. la-24a.
The court explained that the “reasonable alterna-
tives” for which detailed study is required under NEPA
are identified
in light of the objectives of the federal action * * *.
But that approach of course requires that [the court]
first consider whether the agency has reasonably
identified and defined its objectives. * * * [The
court] engage[s] in both of these inquiries—whether
an agency’s objectives are reasonable, and whether
a particular alternative is reasonable in light of
these objectives—with considerable deference to the
agency’s expertise and policy-making role.
Pet. App. 9a. The court held that the FHWA’s “stated
objectives were reasonable,” observing that “it is not
unreasonable in articulating its objectives for an agency
to focus primarily on transportation and safety issues
when replacing a massively congested and structurally
unsound bridge.” Jd. at 10a (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court also upheld the FHWA’s conclu-
sion that a ten-lane alternative was not “reasonable” in
light of the stated objectives of the highway project.
Id. at 10a-1la. The court explained that the agency had
“focused specifically * * * on the traffic needs that
will exist twenty years after the project’s approval, and
may be affected by a highway project. See Pet. App. 47a-5la. The
court of appeals reversed those rulings, see id. at 14a-24a, and
petitioners do not press those claims in this Court.
The district court also held that the FHWA had failed to ensure
that the project would conform to regional air quality standards, as
required by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(2). See Pet. App.
36a-39a. The FHWA did not appeal that aspect of the district
court’s decision, but chose instead to conduct a revised conformity
analysis. See id. at 5a n.2.
6
its analyses based on 2020 traffic projections demon-
strate that a ten-lane bridge would be insufficient.”
Ibid.
As we explain above (see p. 4, supra), the district
court placed substantial reliance on an FHWA study
“showing that a ten-lane bridge would be able to
accommodate up to 295,000 vehicles per day, a number
only slightly smaller than the projected daily traffic
flow on the Bridge in 2020.” Pet. App. lla. The court
of appeals found the district court’s reliance on the daily
capacity figure, in isolation, to be unwarranted. The
court of appeals explained that the study “apparently
assumed an even flow of traffic throughout the day
(which, of course, is unrealistic). Whatever the total
number of vehicles that will cross in a 24-hour period,
the relevant question is how long during peak com-
muting hours it will take to cross the bridge.” Jbid.
With respect to that question, the court of appeals
credited agency studies showing that petitioners’ pre-
ferred ten-lane design “would be able to accommodate
less than half of the per-hour capacity of the [FHWA’s]
preferred alternative, causing peak-hour traffic queues
of significantly greater length and extended duration.”
Ibid.
Finally, the court of appeals rejected petitioners’
contention that a ten-lane project could be regarded as
a “reasonable alternative” even if it would “not offer a
complete solution to the problem” that the new con-
struction was intended to address. Pet. App. lla. The
court explained that
within the context of a coordinated effort to solve a
problem of national scope, a solution that lies out-
side of an agency’s jurisdiction might be a “rea-
sonable alternative”; so might an alternative within
7
that agency’s jurisdiction that solves only a portion
of the problem, given that other agencies might be
able to provide the remainder of the solution. Such
a holistic definition of “reasonable alternatives”
would, however, make little sense for a discrete
project within the jurisdiction of one federal agency
* * *. Concerned with severe traffic conditions in
the Capital Region, Congress has authorized the
[FHWA] to replace the Woodrow Wilson Memorial
Bridge. The [FHWA] has sole responsibility for
solving this problem; were it to build a ten-lane
bridge, no one else would step in and alleviate the
congestion that would result. In this context, it is
simply a non sequitur to call a proposal that does
not “offer a complete solution to the problem” a
“reasonable alternative.”
Id. at 12a-13a (footnotes omitted).
ARGUMENT
The decision of the court of appeals in this case is
correct and does not conflict with any decision of this
Court or of any other court of appeals. Further review
is not warranted.
1. As the court of appeals recognized (Pet. App. 9a-
10a), although NEPA establishes “‘significant substan-
tive goals for the Nation,’ [the duties it] imposes upon
agencies * * * are ‘essentially procedural.’” Stry-
cker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444
U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 485 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).
NEPA does not require federal agencies to elevate en-
vironmental concerns over other appropriate considera-
tions in the decision-making process. Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).
8
The EIS required by NEPA must discuss, inter
alia, “alternatives to the proposed action.” 42 U.S.C.
4332(C)(iii). Because the consideration of alternatives
is intended to inform both the public and the agency
decision-maker, “the concept of alternatives must be
bounded by some notion of feasibility.” Vermont
Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551. “Common sense also teaches
us that the ‘detailed statement of alternatives’ cannot
be found wanting simply because the agency failed to
include every device and thought conceivable to the
mind of man.” J/bid.; see 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(a)-(c),
1508.25(b)(2).. The courts of appeals have uniformly
recognized that the identification of “reasonable
alternatives” requires consideration of the purposes or
goals of the proposal before the agency. See, e.g., Pet.
App. 9a; City of Bridgeton v. FAA, 212 F.3d 448, 455-
456 (8th Cir. 2000); Simmons v. United States Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1997); City
of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987); Louisiana Wildlife
Fed’n v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1048 (5th Cir. 1985) (per
‘euriam); City of New York v. Department of Transp.,
715 F.2d 732, 742-743 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1055 (1984); Roosevelt Campobello Int’l Park
Comm. v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1047 (1st Cir. 1982).
2. The court of appeals correctly held both that the
FHWA had defined its objectives in a reasonable
manner, and that the agency had reasonably excluded
any ten-lane alternative from full consideration in the
final FEIS in light of the purpose and need for the
project. With respect to the first point, the court held
that the FHWA had acted reasonably in focusing on the
extent to which alternative designs would accommodate
peak-hour traffic demand. Pet. App. lla. With respect
to the second, the court held that the FHWA had
9
reasonably relied on traffic studies showing that a ten-
lane design “would be able to accommodate less than
half of the [FHWA’s] preferred alternative, causing
peak-hour traffic queues of significantly greater length
and extended duration.” Jbid. The court referred as-
well to FHWA analyses indicating that “accident rates
would also be markedly higher on a ten-lane structure.”
Ibid. Petitioners do not attempt to show that the
FHWA acted unreasonably in focusing on peak-hour
demand. Nor do they contest the agency’s determina-
tion that traffic congestion during peak commuting
hours would be much more severe, and accident rates
significantly higher, under the ten-lane alternative.
Petitioners contend instead that the FHWA was
required to undertake a detailed analysis of the envi-
ronmental impacts of a ten-lane design even if such an
alternative would fail to solve the traffic and safety
problems that the highway project is intended to
address. The court of appeals correctly rejected that
contention. See Pet. App. lla-13a. The court acknowl-
edged that “within the context of a coordinated effort to
solve a problem of national scope,” an alternative that
does not offer a complete solution to an identified
problem may still be reasonable, since “other agencies
might be able to provide the remainder of the sclution.”
Id. at 12a. The court explained, however, that such a
conception of “reasonable alternatives” would “make
little sense for a discrete project within the jurisdiction
of one federal agency.” Jbid. If the project ultimately
approved and constructed by the FHWA had insuffi-
cient capacity to accommodate peak-hour traffic de-
mand, “no one else would step in and alleviate the con-
gestion that would result. In this context, it is simply a
non sequitur to call a proposal that does not ‘offer a
10
complete solution to the problem’ a ‘reasonable alterna-
tive.’” Id. at 18a.
3. Petitioners contend (Pet. 8-13) that the court of
appeals’ decision conflicts with decisions of the Seventh
and Eleventh Circuits. That claim is incorrect. The
Seventh, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits
agree that an agency must reasonably define the objec-
tive of a proposed project and that the agency’s choice
of alternatives must be reasonable in light of the
objective. See Pet. App. 9a; Simmons v. United States
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F.3d 664, 668-669 (7th Cir.
1997); North Buckhead Civic Ass’n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d
1533, 1541-1542 (11th Cir. 1990); Van Abbema v.
Fornell, 807 F.2d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 1986). Those courts
also recognize that an agency may not evade its
obligations under NEPA through an artificially narrow
definition of project objectives. See Simmons, 120 F.3d
at 666; Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938
F.2d 190, 196 (D.C. Cir.) (Thomas, J.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 994 (1991); North Buckhead Civic Ass’n, 903 F.2d
at 1542.°
None of the decisions on which petitioners rely
supports their contention that this case would have
been resolved differently in the Seventh or Eleventh
Circuit. In Simmons, the court held that the Army
Corps of Engineers had failed to consider an acceptable
range of alternatives to a proposed dam and reservoir
that was intended to supply water to the City of
Marion, Illinois, and the Lake of Egypt Water District.
3 Although petitioners also rely (Pet. 14) on the dissenting opin-_
ion in City of Bridgeton v. Federal Aviation Administration, 212
F.3d 448, 465 (8th Cir. 2000) (R. Arnold, J., dissenting), the major-
ity opinion in that case is fully consistent with the decisions cited
above. See 212 F.3d at 455.
\
11
120 F.3d at 666. The Corps had “defined the project’s
purpose as supplying two users-(Marion and the Water
District) from a single source.” Id. at 667. The court of
appeals found that purpose to be unreasonably narrow
because the Corps had neither considered nor explained
why it was preferable that both users be supplied from
a single source. See ibid. (“At no time has the Corps
studied whether this single-source idea is the best one
—-or even a good one.”); id. at 668 (“Why the Corps
assumed the imperative of a single-source project
* * * remained unexplained.”). In the instant case, by
contrast, the FHWA amply justified its decision to
focus on future peak-hour traffic demand, rather than
on the theoretical ability of various design alternatives
to accommodate the projected daily volume of traffic.
See Pet. App. 10a-11a.‘ \
The court in Van Abbema stated that “the evaluation
of ‘alternatives’ mandated by NEPA is to be an evalua-
tion of alternative means to accomplish the general goal
of an action; it is not an evaluation of the alternative
means by which a particular applicant can reach his
goals.” 807 F.2d at 638. As the second clause of the
quoted passage makes clear, the Seventh Circuit’s
analysis was directed at the situation where a federal
agency is called upon to assess a private entity’s permit
application. The Seventh Circuit held that the agency,
in conducting NEPA analysis, may be required to treat
* The court of appeals in this case did not suggest, for example,
that the FHWA could justify its refusal to give extensive consid-
eration to a ten-lane alternative simply by defining its objective as
the construction of a 12-lane bridge. Such an approach would
surely constitute the sort of artificial narrowing of agency objec-
tives that the Simmons court warned-against. See 120 F.3d at 666.
Here, by contrast, the FHWA’'s focus on accommodating future
peak-hour traffic demand reflects intensely practical concerns.
12
as “reasonable alternatives” measures that a particular
permit applicant is incapable of implementing. See ibid.
(“The fact that this applicant does not own an alter-
native site is only marginally relevant (if it is relevant
at all) to whether feasible alternatives exist to the
applicant’s proposal.”). Because the instant case in-
volves a highway project initiated by the federal gov-
ernment rather than by a private permit applicant, Van
Abbema is largely irrelevant here.°
Finally, in Nortk Buckhead Civic Association, the
Eleventh Circuit stated in dicta that “an alternative
partially satisfying the need and purpose of the pro-
posed project may or may not need to be considered
depending on whether it can be considered a ‘reason-
able alternative.’” 903 F.2d at 1542. The court held in
that case, however, that the FHWA was not required
to undertake a detailed analysis of the plaintiffs’ pre-
ferred “no build/heavy rail alternative.” See id. at 1543.
The court explained that while the plaintiffs’ preferred
approach “would provide additional transportation
capacity in the corridor, the problems of surface street
congestion would remain completely unresolved.” bid.
° In Citizens Against Burlington, the District of Columbia
Circuit expressed concern that the Van Abbema court’s reference
to “the general goal of an action” might imply that the reviewing
court is itself to define the relevant goal. See 938 F.2d at 199. The
court explained that “[(lJeft unanswered in Van Abbema * * * is
why and how to distinguish general goals from specific ones and
just who does the distinguishing. Someone has to define the
purpose of the agency action. Implicit in Van Abbema is that the
body responsible is the reviewing court.” Jbid. The Seventh Cir-
cuit has since recognized, however, that in determining a federal
agency’s compliance with the requirements of NEPA, a reviewing
court owes deference to the agency’s definition of a project’s goal.
See Simmons, 120 F.3d at 668-669.
13
There is consequently no reason to Suppose that the
Eleventh Circuit would have treated a ten-lane replace-
ment for the Wilson Bridge as a “reasonable alterna-
tive” requiring extensive NEPA analysis.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Lois J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
JOHN A. BRYSON
Attorney
ROSALIND A. KNAPP
Acting General Counsel
PAUL M. GEIER
Assistant General Counsel
for Litigation
EDWARD V.A. Kussy
Acting Chief Counsel
Federal Highway \
Administration
Department of
Transportation
AUGUST 2000
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.