Reply Brief — City of New York v. Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade
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| | No. 10-618 S i
Sapte Cour, U.S.
FILED
FEB 8 ~ 201
Supreme Court of the United Stytes
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Petitioners,
METROPOLITAN TAXICAB
BOARD OF TRADE, et al.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CourT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF
MICHAEL A. CARDOZO
Of Counsel Corporation Counsel of the
City of New York
FRANCIS F. CapuTo LEONARD J. KOERNER*
SUSAN PAULSON 100 Church Street
ADAM STOLOROW New York, New York 10097
(212) 788-1010 or 1362
lkoerner@law.nyc.gov
* Counsel of Record
Counsel for Petitioners
February 8, 2011
234668 $
COUNSEL PRESS
(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859
;
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pag
TABLE OF CON Tiere ret bescceccccs
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ........... i}
REPLY ARGU Meme peas cecccccce l
yiagee a) | ee l
A. This Court Is Being Asked to Review
the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
Not the Decision of the District Court..... 3
B. This Case Presents an Urgent Question
of National Importance Requiring
Immediate Review ...........0ceeeeeee:
CONCLUSION 63 cus Eas oss cce 1]
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,
555 U.S. 70 (2008) ........ Trerre ry 5
Ass'n of Taxicab Operators, USA v
City of Dallas,
No. 3:10-C V-769-K, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
140240 (N. Dist. Tex. Aug. 30, 2010)..... 8
Associated Builders & Contractors v.
Mich. Dep't of Labor & Econ. Growth,
543 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 2008)............ 6
Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v
Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316 (1997) ........ ' 1,5, 6
Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v.
City & County of San Francisco,
546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008)... . 6
Green Alliance Taxi Cab Ass'n ‘
King County,
No. C08-1048RAJ, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72409 (W.D. Wash. June 29, 2010)... S
Lane v. Wilson,
307 U.S. 268 (1939) D
Cited Authoritr
Page
Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York,
633 F. Supp. 2d 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ....... 9 2
N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co..
514 U.S. 645 (1995) ......... a eo 5. 6, 10
Ophir v. City of Boston,
647 I. Supp. 2d 86 (D. Mass. 2009)...... TTT 8
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder.
475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007)....... af 6
STATUTES
49 U.S.C. § 32901(a)(6). 7
19 U.S.C. § 32919(a)..... ene ie
REGULATIONS
35 Rules of the City of New York § 1-78(a)(3)
(“Lease Cap Rules”)........... <eeeuasa Geen
35 RCNY § 3.03(c)(10)-(11) (repealed 2009)
(“25/30 MPG Rules”) ............ ) 1,5
REPLY ARGUMENT
Introduction
Respondents ignore Petitioners’ central point: this
Court should grant certiorari to confirm that when
Congress enacted the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(“iS PCA”) as the only statutory mechanism for establishing
fuel economy standards, it did not intend to preempt state
and local governments from adopting incentive programs
to promote the purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles.
Instead of responding to Petitioners’ arguments for
granting certiorari, and instead of addressing the decision
of tne Court of Appeals, Respondents oppose the grant
of certiorari essentially by defending the decision of the
District Court. The crux of Respondents’ argument in
opposition to Petitioners’ request for certiorar? is that
because the District Court determined that the challenged
regulations! are a de facto mandate to purchase hybrid
vehicles, and because Petitioners did not appeal from an
earlier District Court decision determining that prior
regulations mandating the purchase of vehicles achieving
specified mile-per-gallon standards’ are preempted by
EPCA (electing instead to re-draft their rules in an effort
to address the concerns of the court), the Court of Appeals
properly affirmed the District Court’s determination that
the challenged regulations are likely preempted by EPCA
as well.
1. 35 Rules of the City of New York (“RCNY”) § 1-78(a)(3)
(“Lease Cap Rules”).
2. See 85 RCNY § 3.03(¢)(10) (11) (repealed 2009) (“25/30
MPG Rules”).
2
The Court of Appeals decided the case, however, under
an entirely different framework of analysis than that
employed by the District Court. In the District Court, both
the parties and the Court assumed that the Lease Cap
Rules do not directly reference fuel economy standards
or incorporate those standards into the Lease Cap Rules’
operation. See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New
York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (UTBOT IT).
Accordingly, the District Court addressed whether the
Rules effectively mandate the use of fuel-efficient vehicles
through their economic impact, and concluded that they
do. /d. Petitioners contested, not conceded, this conclusion
of the District Court.*
On appeal, Petitioners argued that the Lease Cap
Rules do not constitute a preempted mandate and
Respondents argued that they do. The Court of Appeals
rejected the District Court’s framework of analysis
outright, finding that “[t]his attention to economic impact
was misguided.” App. 12a. Thus, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the injunction on grounds not argued or decided
below, i.e., “because the rules in question directly regulate
the relevant preempted subject matter.” App. 12a. Because
Respondents’ arguments fail to endorse the reasoning
in the decision of the Court of Appeals, their arguments
contribute nothing to this Court’s consideration of whether
to grant certiorari review.
This Court shoulc grant certiorari to reverse the
Court of Appeals’ judgment, which rests upon an erroneous
3. The suggestion that Petitioners have “conceded” that
the Lease Cap Rules constitute a preempted mandate and that
the Court of Appeals left this finding “undisturbed” are blatant
misrepresentations of the procedural and factual background of
this case. See Brief in Opposition, at 3, 32.
3
application of this Court’s preemption jurisprudence,
conflicts with the analysis of “related to” preemption
language applied by other Courts of Appeals, and results
in the improper displacement of state law.
A. This Court Is Being Asked to Review the Decision
of the Court of Appeals, Not the Decision of the
District Court.
Respondents’ attempt to shift the focus from the
decision of the Court of Appeals to the District Court
decision that it superseded is understandable, as the
Court of Appeals’ decision cannot be squared with this
Court’s precedents governing the scope of the preemptive
language at issue. By reading the “related to” language
in EPCA’s preemption clause over-broadly, the Court of
Appeals ignored this Court’s instructions and arrived at
an erroneous result. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
(“Pet.”) at 13-14.
EPCA does not preempt every law that relates to
fuel economy; it preempts laws that are related to “fuel
economy standards or average fuel economy standards.”
49 U.S.C. § 32919(a). See Pet. at 12-13. The Lease Cap
Rules do not directly regulate fuel economy standards,
but rather, taxicab lease rates, a field traditionally
occupied by local government.‘ Nor do the Rules contain
4. Because, as Respondents concede, the regulation of taxicab
services is a traditionally local matter, the Court of Appeals’
analysis of the scope of EPCA preemption should have begun with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress. See Altr/1 Group, Inc. v. Good,
555 U.S. 70, 1298. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (“When addressing questions
of express or implied pre-emption, we begin our analysis with the
4
an impermissible reference to fuel economy standards,
as the existence of federal fuel economy standards is
not essential to their operation. See Cal. Div. of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997). The Court of Appeals reached its
contrary conclusion by reading the word “standard” out of
EPCA’s preemption clause. See Brief of City of Chicago, et
al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (“Chicago
Brief”) at pp. 18-17 (Court of Appeals both misidentified
the preempted subject matter and mischaracterized the
Lease Cap Rules). Because, under the reasoning of the
Court of Appeals, any regulation of taxicab size, shape,
weight, engine technology, or equipment will inevitably
have some impact on fleet fuel economy, see Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, MTBOT II (No.
09-2901) (““U.S. Amicus Brief”), any taxicab regulation
affecting a taxicab owner’s choice of vehicles would be
preempted by EPCA.
Rather than defending the analysis that led the Court
of Appeals to its overly broad application of “related
to,” Respondents contend that the Lease Cap Rules
are preempted on the alternative theory that they are
“identical in purpose and effect” to the City’s preempted
MPG regulations and thus, the Court of Appeals did not
have to conduct a fresh analysis of the Lease Cap Rules in
assumption that the historic police powers of the States are not to
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.”); Pet. at 11-13; Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 11, MTBOT I] (No. 09-2901) (“Neither
before or since the enactment of EPCA has Congress sought to
bring the taxicab industry under federal regulatory control”).
5
order to find preemption.° See Brief in Opposition (“Opp.”)
at 21. This argument suffers from two fatal flaws. First,
the Court of Appeals did not rely on an examination of
either the purpose or effect of the Rules, let alone find
that the two sets of rules were “identical.” Respondents
thus defend the District Court’s decision while misstating
the grounds for the Court of Appeals’ decision. Second,
the obvious differences between the two sets of rules
demonstrate the fallacy of this point. The 25/30 MPG
Rules had the purpose of requiring that 100 percent of
new taxicabs across the industry (with the exception of
handicap-accessible taxis) meet a mandatory performance
standard. The Lease Cap Rules, by contrast, only apply
to fleet owners, who comprise roughly 30 percent of the
industry.® The explicit intent of the Lease Cap Rules, as
recognized by the Court of Appeals, is to effectively shift
fuel costs from fleet drivers to fleet owners, exposing
5. Citing to a 1939 voting rights case, Respondents also
argue that the Lease Cap Rules are invalid as a “circumvention”
of the federal court’s invalidation of the 25/30 MPG Rules. Opp.
at 4, 21 (citing Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939)). Respondents’
argument urges the absurd result that government agencies be
foreclosed from pursuing legitimate objectives whenever earlier
regulations of the subject matter have been fourd invalid. Yet,
this Court has recognized that even a regulation that acts upon a
preempted subject matter may be permissible. See Dillingham,
519 U.S. at 334; N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658-59 (1995)
(recognizing distinction between state laws that act as incentives
and those that are actual or de facto mandates).
6. Thus, even if the Lease Cap Rules were found to create a
de facto mandate, they are not likely to have a significant impact
on the overall federal regulation of the average fuel economy of
automobile manufacturers. See U.S. Amicus Brief at 14.
6
fleet owners (the vehicle purchasers) to roughly the same
economic pressures (cost of fuel per shift) faced by owners
who drive their own taxis. App. 2a, 5a. Thus the purpose
of the Lease Cap Rules is to incentivize fleet owners’
purchase of hybrid vehicles at rates consistent with the
rest of the industry. See Joint Appendix (“JA”) 502-503.”
Ultimately, because the Lease Cap Rules contain no
reference to or essential incorporation of fuel economy
standards, the Court of Appeals was required to examine
whether the Rules mandate, or effectively mandate,
something within the area that Congress intended to
control. This is the approach that this Court took in
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 334, and Travelers, 514 U.S. at
658-59, both of which recognize the distinction between
state laws that act as incentives and those that are actual
or de facto mandates. Other Courts of Appeals have
applied this approach in other preemption cases. See
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th
Cir. 2007); Associated Builders & Contractors v. Mich.
Dep't of Labor & Econ. Growth, 543 F.3d 275 (6th Cir.
2008); Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & County of San
Francisco, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, unlike the
“reference to” prong, where the magnitude of the statute’s
effect is not an issue, under the “connection with” prong,
the court must measure the challenged law’s supposed
effect upon the preempted subject matter to determine
whether the effect is sufficiently disruptive to merit
preemption. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 559-60.
7. In 2009, hybrid and clean diesel vehicles accounted for
roughly 40 percent of new taxicab purchases by owner-drivers
while accounting for only 28 percent of purchases by flect owners.
JA509.
7
Here, the Court of Appeals erroneously departed
from the analysis of its sister circuits in failing to examine
whether the Lease Cap Rules’ indirect effect on fuel
economy constitutes a preempted mandate. See Pet.
at 18-19. Congress’s intent was not to foreclose every
state action with an effect on fuel economy, but rather
to maintain exclusive federal control over the regulation
of manufacturers’ maudatory fucl economy standards.
See 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901(a)(6), 32919(a). Where the Lease
Cap Rules do not control or supersede EPCA’s central
function of regulating the corporate average fuel economy
standards applicable to manufacturers of automobiles,
they do not have the connection to fuel economy standards
forbidden by EPCA.
B. This Case Presents an Urgent Question of National
Importance Requiring Immediate Review.
While Respondents attempt to reassure this Court
that the Court of Appeals’ ruling is nirrow and will not
place other incentive programs at risk, they fail to address
the fact that the overly broad language of the ruling
below has already had a chilling effect on other local
vovernments’ efforts to promote fuel-efficient taxicabs. As
noted by municipal amici, both Minneapolis and Seattle
have already curtailed their experimentation with fuel-
efficient taxicab regulations in direct response to the
ruling in this case. Chicago Brief at pp. 28-29. Thirteen
additional cities, the United States Conference of Mayors,
the Nationai League of Cities, and the internationai
Municipal Lawyers Association all joined with Chicago
to argue that the Court of Appeals’ ruling will impede
their efforts to implement forward-thinking incentive
programs.
8
Moreover, Respondents’ argument that this Court
should not concern itself with the Court of Appeals’ error,
because future courts will distinguish Petitioners’ case on
the facts, is purely speculative. Of the decisions cited by
Respondents, only Association of Taxicab Owners, USA
v. City of Dallas was issued recently enough to cite the
Court of A} >eals’ ruling, and that case did not involve
EPCA. See Ass'n of Taxicab Operators, USA v. City
of Dalias, No. 3:10-CV-769-K, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
140240 (N. Dist. Tex. Aug. 30, 2010) (front-of-the-line
privileges awarded to compressed natural gas taxicabs
at Dallas Love Field airport challenged as preempted by
the Clean Air Act).* The Court of Appeals’ ruling informs
other courts that they need no longer concern themselves
with finding the line between true incentives and de facto
mandates.’ Respondents’ assurances that courts in other
circuits will apply their own definition of “related to”
misses the critical point that, in cases challenging hybrid
vehicle incentives, these courts will look to the Second
Circuit’s EPCA-specific interpretation of “related te”
8. The Boston and Seattle cases cited by Respondents were
decided before the Court of Appeals’ ruling, and thus cited the
decision of the District Court, not of the Court of Appeals, for
the distinction between an incentive and a de facto mandate. See
Ophir v. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D. Mass. 2009), Green
Alliance Taxi Cab Ass'n v. King County, No. CO8-1048RA,, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72409 (W.D. Wash. June 29, 2010).
9. Respondents posit four categories of incentives that
would be safe from preemption challenges, but fail to apply these
categories to any of the numerous state and local incentives cited
in the Petition. Opp. at 36. None of the cited incentives fall within
category (1) (own use) or (4) (market participant). Categories (2)
and (3) are Clean Air Act provisions of limited applicability to the
I’ PCA-based preemption challenges addressed here.
9
before considering what that phrase has meant in ERISA
cases. The Court of Appeals’ ruling both diverges from
existing preemption jurisprudence and sets a uniquely
bad precedent for future EPCA cases.
The Court of Appeals’ ruling is already working its
mischief, and this Court should act swiftly to correct it.
Kach incentive program that is stifled before it can be
implemented will decrease the likelihood that other courts
will be presented with this issue at all. The interlocutory
nature of this appeal should not prevent the Court from
taking this opportunity to address the proper scope of
preemption under EPCA. The factual record in this case is
well developed, and the Court of Appeals’ decision, resting
solely on the basis that Respondents had “demonstrated a
likelihood, indeed a certainty, of success on the merits” of
their preemption claim, presents this Court with a clean
and clearly decided issue worthy of review. App. 12a.
This Court should not heed Respondents’ attempts to
distort or obscure the question presented. Respondents’
decision not to challenge the $3 upward adjustment of
the lease cap at the preliminary injunction stage (they do
challenge it on the merits), does not mean that this case
is not about incentives. See Opp. at 30; see also App. 5a
(Court of Appeals noting that “[fJor obvious reasons, the
| Respondents] did not challenge the $3 upward adjustment
of the lease caps for hybrid taxis, which benefitted them’).
To the contrary, this case squarely presents the question
whether the City’s clean-vehicle incentive program creates
a preempted mandate. Both the $3 upward adjustment and
$12 downward adjustment provide financial incentives for
fleet owners te change their economic behavior. Neither
the Court of Appeals nor the District Court drew any
10
legal distinction between the upward and downward
adjustments.’® The Court of Appeals’ determination that
the incentive/mandate analysis is irrelevant does not mean
that its decision excludes incentives. On the contrary,
it is dangerously overbroad precisely because it erases
this critical distinction and sweeps both incentives and
mandates within its reach.
Finally, Respondents are wrong in ‘epeatedly
asserting that the Petition presents a hypothetical
case to this Court. See Opp. at 3, 15, 20, 24, 32. The
Lease Cap Rules have been invalidated by the Court of
Appeals on a preemption theory that does not square
with precedents of this Court, or with how other Courts
of Appeals have understood those precedents. The Court
should reverse and remand, and the Court of Appeals
should be required to decide this case in accord with this
Court’s precedents. Whether Petitioners will ultimately
prevail under the proper application of preemption law
is irrelevant to this Court’s determination whether to
grant this writ. This case raises an issue of considerable
and immediate importance, because few if any incentive
programs designed to encourage fuel-efficient vehicle use
will be able to escape the breadth of the Court of Appeals’
interpretation of preemption under EPCA.
10. Indeed, the entire purpose of the District Court's
evidentiary hearing, properly required under Travelers, was to
determine whether the downward adjustment was permissible as
an incentive or preempted as a de facto mandate. App. 34a-35a.
1]
CONCLUSION
or the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorar? should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL A. CarDozo
Of Counsel Corporation Counsel of the
City of New York
FRANCIS F. CApuTO LEONARD J. KOERNER*
SUSAN PAULSON 100 Church Street
ADAM STOLOROW New York, New York 10007
(212) 788-1010 or 1362
lkoerner@law.nyc.gov
* Counsel of Record
Counsel for Petitioners
February &, 2011
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