Reply Brief — City of New York v. Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade

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| | No. 10-618 S i

Sapte Cour, U.S.

FILED

FEB 8 ~ 201

Supreme Court of the United Stytes

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,

Petitioners,

METROPOLITAN TAXICAB

BOARD OF TRADE, et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES CourT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF

MICHAEL A. CARDOZO

Of Counsel Corporation Counsel of the

City of New York

FRANCIS F. CapuTo LEONARD J. KOERNER*

SUSAN PAULSON 100 Church Street

ADAM STOLOROW New York, New York 10097

(212) 788-1010 or 1362

lkoerner@law.nyc.gov

* Counsel of Record

Counsel for Petitioners

February 8, 2011

234668 $

COUNSEL PRESS

(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859

;

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pag

TABLE OF CON Tiere ret bescceccccs

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ........... i}

REPLY ARGU Meme peas cecccccce l

yiagee a) | ee l

A. This Court Is Being Asked to Review

the Decision of the Court of Appeals,

Not the Decision of the District Court..... 3

B. This Case Presents an Urgent Question

of National Importance Requiring

Immediate Review ...........0ceeeeeee:

CONCLUSION 63 cus Eas oss cce 1]

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,

555 U.S. 70 (2008) ........ Trerre ry 5

Ass'n of Taxicab Operators, USA v

City of Dallas,

No. 3:10-C V-769-K, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

140240 (N. Dist. Tex. Aug. 30, 2010)..... 8

Associated Builders & Contractors v.

Mich. Dep't of Labor & Econ. Growth,

543 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 2008)............ 6

Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v

Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc.,

519 U.S. 316 (1997) ........ ' 1,5, 6

Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v.

City & County of San Francisco,

546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008)... . 6

Green Alliance Taxi Cab Ass'n ‘

King County,

No. C08-1048RAJ, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

72409 (W.D. Wash. June 29, 2010)... S

Lane v. Wilson,

307 U.S. 268 (1939) D

Cited Authoritr

Page

Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York,

633 F. Supp. 2d 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ....... 9 2

N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue

Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co..

514 U.S. 645 (1995) ......... a eo 5. 6, 10

Ophir v. City of Boston,

647 I. Supp. 2d 86 (D. Mass. 2009)...... TTT 8

Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder.

475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007)....... af 6

STATUTES

49 U.S.C. § 32901(a)(6). 7

19 U.S.C. § 32919(a)..... ene ie

REGULATIONS

35 Rules of the City of New York § 1-78(a)(3)

(“Lease Cap Rules”)........... <eeeuasa Geen

35 RCNY § 3.03(c)(10)-(11) (repealed 2009)

(“25/30 MPG Rules”) ............ ) 1,5

REPLY ARGUMENT

Introduction

Respondents ignore Petitioners’ central point: this

Court should grant certiorari to confirm that when

Congress enacted the Energy Policy and Conservation Act

(“iS PCA”) as the only statutory mechanism for establishing

fuel economy standards, it did not intend to preempt state

and local governments from adopting incentive programs

to promote the purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles.

Instead of responding to Petitioners’ arguments for

granting certiorari, and instead of addressing the decision

of tne Court of Appeals, Respondents oppose the grant

of certiorari essentially by defending the decision of the

District Court. The crux of Respondents’ argument in

opposition to Petitioners’ request for certiorar? is that

because the District Court determined that the challenged

regulations! are a de facto mandate to purchase hybrid

vehicles, and because Petitioners did not appeal from an

earlier District Court decision determining that prior

regulations mandating the purchase of vehicles achieving

specified mile-per-gallon standards’ are preempted by

EPCA (electing instead to re-draft their rules in an effort

to address the concerns of the court), the Court of Appeals

properly affirmed the District Court’s determination that

the challenged regulations are likely preempted by EPCA

as well.

1. 35 Rules of the City of New York (“RCNY”) § 1-78(a)(3)

(“Lease Cap Rules”).

2. See 85 RCNY § 3.03(¢)(10) (11) (repealed 2009) (“25/30

MPG Rules”).

2

The Court of Appeals decided the case, however, under

an entirely different framework of analysis than that

employed by the District Court. In the District Court, both

the parties and the Court assumed that the Lease Cap

Rules do not directly reference fuel economy standards

or incorporate those standards into the Lease Cap Rules’

operation. See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New

York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (UTBOT IT).

Accordingly, the District Court addressed whether the

Rules effectively mandate the use of fuel-efficient vehicles

through their economic impact, and concluded that they

do. /d. Petitioners contested, not conceded, this conclusion

of the District Court.*

On appeal, Petitioners argued that the Lease Cap

Rules do not constitute a preempted mandate and

Respondents argued that they do. The Court of Appeals

rejected the District Court’s framework of analysis

outright, finding that “[t]his attention to economic impact

was misguided.” App. 12a. Thus, the Court of Appeals

affirmed the injunction on grounds not argued or decided

below, i.e., “because the rules in question directly regulate

the relevant preempted subject matter.” App. 12a. Because

Respondents’ arguments fail to endorse the reasoning

in the decision of the Court of Appeals, their arguments

contribute nothing to this Court’s consideration of whether

to grant certiorari review.

This Court shoulc grant certiorari to reverse the

Court of Appeals’ judgment, which rests upon an erroneous

3. The suggestion that Petitioners have “conceded” that

the Lease Cap Rules constitute a preempted mandate and that

the Court of Appeals left this finding “undisturbed” are blatant

misrepresentations of the procedural and factual background of

this case. See Brief in Opposition, at 3, 32.

3

application of this Court’s preemption jurisprudence,

conflicts with the analysis of “related to” preemption

language applied by other Courts of Appeals, and results

in the improper displacement of state law.

A. This Court Is Being Asked to Review the Decision

of the Court of Appeals, Not the Decision of the

District Court.

Respondents’ attempt to shift the focus from the

decision of the Court of Appeals to the District Court

decision that it superseded is understandable, as the

Court of Appeals’ decision cannot be squared with this

Court’s precedents governing the scope of the preemptive

language at issue. By reading the “related to” language

in EPCA’s preemption clause over-broadly, the Court of

Appeals ignored this Court’s instructions and arrived at

an erroneous result. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

(“Pet.”) at 13-14.

EPCA does not preempt every law that relates to

fuel economy; it preempts laws that are related to “fuel

economy standards or average fuel economy standards.”

49 U.S.C. § 32919(a). See Pet. at 12-13. The Lease Cap

Rules do not directly regulate fuel economy standards,

but rather, taxicab lease rates, a field traditionally

occupied by local government.‘ Nor do the Rules contain

4. Because, as Respondents concede, the regulation of taxicab

services is a traditionally local matter, the Court of Appeals’

analysis of the scope of EPCA preemption should have begun with

the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were

not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear

and manifest purpose of Congress. See Altr/1 Group, Inc. v. Good,

555 U.S. 70, 1298. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (“When addressing questions

of express or implied pre-emption, we begin our analysis with the

4

an impermissible reference to fuel economy standards,

as the existence of federal fuel economy standards is

not essential to their operation. See Cal. Div. of Labor

Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc.,

519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997). The Court of Appeals reached its

contrary conclusion by reading the word “standard” out of

EPCA’s preemption clause. See Brief of City of Chicago, et

al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (“Chicago

Brief”) at pp. 18-17 (Court of Appeals both misidentified

the preempted subject matter and mischaracterized the

Lease Cap Rules). Because, under the reasoning of the

Court of Appeals, any regulation of taxicab size, shape,

weight, engine technology, or equipment will inevitably

have some impact on fleet fuel economy, see Brief for the

United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, MTBOT II (No.

09-2901) (““U.S. Amicus Brief”), any taxicab regulation

affecting a taxicab owner’s choice of vehicles would be

preempted by EPCA.

Rather than defending the analysis that led the Court

of Appeals to its overly broad application of “related

to,” Respondents contend that the Lease Cap Rules

are preempted on the alternative theory that they are

“identical in purpose and effect” to the City’s preempted

MPG regulations and thus, the Court of Appeals did not

have to conduct a fresh analysis of the Lease Cap Rules in

assumption that the historic police powers of the States are not to

be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and

manifest purpose of Congress.”); Pet. at 11-13; Brief for the United

States as Amicus Curiae at 11, MTBOT I] (No. 09-2901) (“Neither

before or since the enactment of EPCA has Congress sought to

bring the taxicab industry under federal regulatory control”).

5

order to find preemption.° See Brief in Opposition (“Opp.”)

at 21. This argument suffers from two fatal flaws. First,

the Court of Appeals did not rely on an examination of

either the purpose or effect of the Rules, let alone find

that the two sets of rules were “identical.” Respondents

thus defend the District Court’s decision while misstating

the grounds for the Court of Appeals’ decision. Second,

the obvious differences between the two sets of rules

demonstrate the fallacy of this point. The 25/30 MPG

Rules had the purpose of requiring that 100 percent of

new taxicabs across the industry (with the exception of

handicap-accessible taxis) meet a mandatory performance

standard. The Lease Cap Rules, by contrast, only apply

to fleet owners, who comprise roughly 30 percent of the

industry.® The explicit intent of the Lease Cap Rules, as

recognized by the Court of Appeals, is to effectively shift

fuel costs from fleet drivers to fleet owners, exposing

5. Citing to a 1939 voting rights case, Respondents also

argue that the Lease Cap Rules are invalid as a “circumvention”

of the federal court’s invalidation of the 25/30 MPG Rules. Opp.

at 4, 21 (citing Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939)). Respondents’

argument urges the absurd result that government agencies be

foreclosed from pursuing legitimate objectives whenever earlier

regulations of the subject matter have been fourd invalid. Yet,

this Court has recognized that even a regulation that acts upon a

preempted subject matter may be permissible. See Dillingham,

519 U.S. at 334; N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue

Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658-59 (1995)

(recognizing distinction between state laws that act as incentives

and those that are actual or de facto mandates).

6. Thus, even if the Lease Cap Rules were found to create a

de facto mandate, they are not likely to have a significant impact

on the overall federal regulation of the average fuel economy of

automobile manufacturers. See U.S. Amicus Brief at 14.

6

fleet owners (the vehicle purchasers) to roughly the same

economic pressures (cost of fuel per shift) faced by owners

who drive their own taxis. App. 2a, 5a. Thus the purpose

of the Lease Cap Rules is to incentivize fleet owners’

purchase of hybrid vehicles at rates consistent with the

rest of the industry. See Joint Appendix (“JA”) 502-503.”

Ultimately, because the Lease Cap Rules contain no

reference to or essential incorporation of fuel economy

standards, the Court of Appeals was required to examine

whether the Rules mandate, or effectively mandate,

something within the area that Congress intended to

control. This is the approach that this Court took in

Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 334, and Travelers, 514 U.S. at

658-59, both of which recognize the distinction between

state laws that act as incentives and those that are actual

or de facto mandates. Other Courts of Appeals have

applied this approach in other preemption cases. See

Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th

Cir. 2007); Associated Builders & Contractors v. Mich.

Dep't of Labor & Econ. Growth, 543 F.3d 275 (6th Cir.

2008); Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & County of San

Francisco, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, unlike the

“reference to” prong, where the magnitude of the statute’s

effect is not an issue, under the “connection with” prong,

the court must measure the challenged law’s supposed

effect upon the preempted subject matter to determine

whether the effect is sufficiently disruptive to merit

preemption. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 559-60.

7. In 2009, hybrid and clean diesel vehicles accounted for

roughly 40 percent of new taxicab purchases by owner-drivers

while accounting for only 28 percent of purchases by flect owners.

JA509.

7

Here, the Court of Appeals erroneously departed

from the analysis of its sister circuits in failing to examine

whether the Lease Cap Rules’ indirect effect on fuel

economy constitutes a preempted mandate. See Pet.

at 18-19. Congress’s intent was not to foreclose every

state action with an effect on fuel economy, but rather

to maintain exclusive federal control over the regulation

of manufacturers’ maudatory fucl economy standards.

See 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901(a)(6), 32919(a). Where the Lease

Cap Rules do not control or supersede EPCA’s central

function of regulating the corporate average fuel economy

standards applicable to manufacturers of automobiles,

they do not have the connection to fuel economy standards

forbidden by EPCA.

B. This Case Presents an Urgent Question of National

Importance Requiring Immediate Review.

While Respondents attempt to reassure this Court

that the Court of Appeals’ ruling is nirrow and will not

place other incentive programs at risk, they fail to address

the fact that the overly broad language of the ruling

below has already had a chilling effect on other local

vovernments’ efforts to promote fuel-efficient taxicabs. As

noted by municipal amici, both Minneapolis and Seattle

have already curtailed their experimentation with fuel-

efficient taxicab regulations in direct response to the

ruling in this case. Chicago Brief at pp. 28-29. Thirteen

additional cities, the United States Conference of Mayors,

the Nationai League of Cities, and the internationai

Municipal Lawyers Association all joined with Chicago

to argue that the Court of Appeals’ ruling will impede

their efforts to implement forward-thinking incentive

programs.

8

Moreover, Respondents’ argument that this Court

should not concern itself with the Court of Appeals’ error,

because future courts will distinguish Petitioners’ case on

the facts, is purely speculative. Of the decisions cited by

Respondents, only Association of Taxicab Owners, USA

v. City of Dallas was issued recently enough to cite the

Court of A} >eals’ ruling, and that case did not involve

EPCA. See Ass'n of Taxicab Operators, USA v. City

of Dalias, No. 3:10-CV-769-K, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

140240 (N. Dist. Tex. Aug. 30, 2010) (front-of-the-line

privileges awarded to compressed natural gas taxicabs

at Dallas Love Field airport challenged as preempted by

the Clean Air Act).* The Court of Appeals’ ruling informs

other courts that they need no longer concern themselves

with finding the line between true incentives and de facto

mandates.’ Respondents’ assurances that courts in other

circuits will apply their own definition of “related to”

misses the critical point that, in cases challenging hybrid

vehicle incentives, these courts will look to the Second

Circuit’s EPCA-specific interpretation of “related te”

8. The Boston and Seattle cases cited by Respondents were

decided before the Court of Appeals’ ruling, and thus cited the

decision of the District Court, not of the Court of Appeals, for

the distinction between an incentive and a de facto mandate. See

Ophir v. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D. Mass. 2009), Green

Alliance Taxi Cab Ass'n v. King County, No. CO8-1048RA,, 2010

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72409 (W.D. Wash. June 29, 2010).

9. Respondents posit four categories of incentives that

would be safe from preemption challenges, but fail to apply these

categories to any of the numerous state and local incentives cited

in the Petition. Opp. at 36. None of the cited incentives fall within

category (1) (own use) or (4) (market participant). Categories (2)

and (3) are Clean Air Act provisions of limited applicability to the

I’ PCA-based preemption challenges addressed here.

9

before considering what that phrase has meant in ERISA

cases. The Court of Appeals’ ruling both diverges from

existing preemption jurisprudence and sets a uniquely

bad precedent for future EPCA cases.

The Court of Appeals’ ruling is already working its

mischief, and this Court should act swiftly to correct it.

Kach incentive program that is stifled before it can be

implemented will decrease the likelihood that other courts

will be presented with this issue at all. The interlocutory

nature of this appeal should not prevent the Court from

taking this opportunity to address the proper scope of

preemption under EPCA. The factual record in this case is

well developed, and the Court of Appeals’ decision, resting

solely on the basis that Respondents had “demonstrated a

likelihood, indeed a certainty, of success on the merits” of

their preemption claim, presents this Court with a clean

and clearly decided issue worthy of review. App. 12a.

This Court should not heed Respondents’ attempts to

distort or obscure the question presented. Respondents’

decision not to challenge the $3 upward adjustment of

the lease cap at the preliminary injunction stage (they do

challenge it on the merits), does not mean that this case

is not about incentives. See Opp. at 30; see also App. 5a

(Court of Appeals noting that “[fJor obvious reasons, the

| Respondents] did not challenge the $3 upward adjustment

of the lease caps for hybrid taxis, which benefitted them’).

To the contrary, this case squarely presents the question

whether the City’s clean-vehicle incentive program creates

a preempted mandate. Both the $3 upward adjustment and

$12 downward adjustment provide financial incentives for

fleet owners te change their economic behavior. Neither

the Court of Appeals nor the District Court drew any

10

legal distinction between the upward and downward

adjustments.’® The Court of Appeals’ determination that

the incentive/mandate analysis is irrelevant does not mean

that its decision excludes incentives. On the contrary,

it is dangerously overbroad precisely because it erases

this critical distinction and sweeps both incentives and

mandates within its reach.

Finally, Respondents are wrong in ‘epeatedly

asserting that the Petition presents a hypothetical

case to this Court. See Opp. at 3, 15, 20, 24, 32. The

Lease Cap Rules have been invalidated by the Court of

Appeals on a preemption theory that does not square

with precedents of this Court, or with how other Courts

of Appeals have understood those precedents. The Court

should reverse and remand, and the Court of Appeals

should be required to decide this case in accord with this

Court’s precedents. Whether Petitioners will ultimately

prevail under the proper application of preemption law

is irrelevant to this Court’s determination whether to

grant this writ. This case raises an issue of considerable

and immediate importance, because few if any incentive

programs designed to encourage fuel-efficient vehicle use

will be able to escape the breadth of the Court of Appeals’

interpretation of preemption under EPCA.

10. Indeed, the entire purpose of the District Court's

evidentiary hearing, properly required under Travelers, was to

determine whether the downward adjustment was permissible as

an incentive or preempted as a de facto mandate. App. 34a-35a.

1]

CONCLUSION

or the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

certiorar? should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL A. CarDozo

Of Counsel Corporation Counsel of the

City of New York

FRANCIS F. CApuTO LEONARD J. KOERNER*

SUSAN PAULSON 100 Church Street

ADAM STOLOROW New York, New York 10007

(212) 788-1010 or 1362

lkoerner@law.nyc.gov

* Counsel of Record

Counsel for Petitioners

February &, 2011

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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