Appendix — Conway v. McQueary
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APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Appendix A: Opinion, United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
BO ge i 3 re la
Appendix B: Opinion and Order, United States
District Court, Eastern District of
Kentucky, Central Division at
Frankfort
(SUNG ZG, GUUS) 6. wc cree cess BOG
Appendix C: Judgment, United States District
Court, Eastern .District of
Kentucky, Central Division at
Frankfort
52a
(July 14, 2009) .
APPENDIX A
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT
PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5807
[Filed July 29, 2010]
BART McaQt SEARY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
JACK CONWAY, Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal] from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Frankfort.
No. 06-00024—Karen K. Caldwell, District Judge.
Argued: April 22, 2010
Decided and Filed: July 29, 2010
Before: GUY, BOGGS and SUTTON, Circuit Judges
2a
COUNSEL
ARGUED: William E. Sharp, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION OF KENTUCKY, Louisville,
Kentucky, for Appellant. Tad Thomas, OFFICE OF
THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL, Frankfort,
Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William E. Sharp,
David A. Friedman, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION OF KENTUCKY, Louisville, Kentucky, for
Appellant. Tad Thomas, Lisa K. Lang, OFFICE OF
THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL, Frankfort,
Kentucky, for Appellee.
OPINION
SUTTON, Circuit Judge. In 2006, Bart McQueary
challenged the validity of a Kentucky law placing
limits on protests at military funerals, claiming that
the law violated his free-speech rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court
granted McQueary’s motion to enjoin enforcement of
the law on a preliminary basis, soon after which
Kentucky repealed the relevant provisions of the
statute. The Commonwealth’s voluntary repeal of the
law, the parties now agree, mooted McQueary’s § 1983
action. Yet the parties take sides over whether, in the
aftermath of the Commonwealth’s repeal of the law,
McQueary is a “prevailing party” eligible for attorney's
fees under § 1988.
In March 2006, the Kentucky legislature added
three misdemeanors to its criminal code, all designed
to discourage protests by the Westboro Baptist
Church, whose members have become known for
staging anti-homosexual protests at military
funerals—a _ practice that McQueary’s attorney
acknowledges is “controversial (and offensive to
many), R.43 at 7. See 2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 50-51;
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211-12 (4th Cir. 2009),
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010). In full, the three
new misdemeanors read as follows:
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct in the
first degree when he or she:
(a) In a public place and with intent to cause
public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm,
or wantonly creating a risk thereof:
l. Engages in fighting or in violent,
tumultuous, or threatening behavior;
2. Makes unreasonable noise; or
3. Creates a hazardous or physically
offensive condition by any act that serves
no legitimate purpose; and
(b) Acts in a way described in paragraph (a)
of this subsection within three hundred (300)
feet of a:
1. Cemetery during a funeral or burial;
2. Funeral home during the viewing of a
deceased person;
3. Funeral procession;
a
4. Funeral or memoria! service; and
(c) Knows that he or she is within three
hundred (300) feet of an occasion described
In paragraph (b) of this subsection
2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 50 § 1(1), codified as amended at
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 525.055(1)
A person is guilty of disrupting meetings and
processions in the first degree when, with intent
to prevent or disrupt a funeral or burial, funeral
home viewing of a deceased person, funeral
procession, or funeral or memorial service for a
deceased person, he or she does any act tending
to obstruct or interfere with it physically or
makes any utterance, gesture, or display
designed to outrage the sensibilities of the
group attending the occasion
2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 50 § 3,
§ 525.145(1)
codified at Ky. Rev. Stat
A person 1s guilty of interference with a funeral
when he or she at any time on any day
(a) Blocks, impedes, inhibits, or in any other
manner obstructs or interferes with access
into or from any building or parking lot of a
building in which a funeral, wake, memoria!
service, or burial is being conducted, or any
burial plot or the parking lot of the cemetery
in which a funeral, wake, memorial service,
or burial is being conducted;
(b) Congregates, pickets, patrols, aem
onstrates, or enters on that portion of a
public right-of-way or private property that
is within three hundred (300) feet of an
event specified in paragraph (a) of thi
subsection: or
(c) Without authorization from the family of
the deceased or person conducting the
service, during a funeral, wake, memorial
service, or burial
1. Sings, chants, whistles, shouts, yells
or uses a bullhorn, auto horn, sound
amplification equipment, or other sounds
or images observable to or within earshot
of participants in the funeral, wake
memorial service, or burial: o1
2. Distributes literature or any othe
item
2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 5065
Roughly one month after the passage of these law:
sart McQueary, a Kentucky resident who had joined
these protests in the past and wanted to do so again,
filed a lawsuit against Kentucky’s Attorney General in
federal court. See R.1. McQueary claimed that §§ 5(b)
and 5(c) of the March 2006 Act, located in the third of
the new laws, violated his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights in several ways. He wanted to
“congregate||, picket||” and “demonstrate||” in a non
disruptive way on public rights-of-way within 300 feet
of funerals, yet the 2006 Act appeared to prevent him
from doing so. 2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 50 § 5(b). He wanted
lo make sounds and display images “observable to or
within earshot of” funerals without permission from
the family of the deceased and without disrupting the
funeral, yet the 2006 Act appeared to prevent him
from doing so. 2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 50 § 5(c). And he
wished to “distribute|| literature” during his funeral
protests, yet the 2006 Act appeared to prohibit him
from doing so 2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 50 & Sic) MecQueary
asked the district court to declare 8&& 5(b) and 5(
unconstitutional on their face and to enjoin thei
enforcement
[In Septemb«e r 2006, the district court preliminarih
enjoined enforcement of §§ 5(b) and 5(c), finding it
likely that the provisions were unconstitutionally
overbroad. See McQueary v. Stumbo (McQueary 1), 453
lh. Supp. 2d 975, 997 (E.D. Ky. 2006). Six months later
in March 2007, the Kentucky legislature repealed
these two subsections of the 2006 Act. See 2007 Ky
Laws Ch. 10783
After Kentucky repealed the challenged provision
the district court dismissed the lawsuit as moot. Se
McQueary v. Conway (McQueary I1), 634 F. Supp. 2d
$21, $30 (.D. Ky. 2009). In the same order, the court
denied McQueary’s request for attorney’s fees. The
court reasoned that McQueary did not directly benefit
from the preliminary injunction because the central
premise of its likelihood of SUCCES! conclusion
overbreadth—did not necessarily establish that
McQueary could picket the way he wanted to. See id
at 832-33. And because McQueary did not challeng:
other provisions of the 2006 Act prohibiting “violent
tumultuous, or threatening behavior” near funeral!
> ‘>F
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 525.055, the court thought it
likely that even after the court preliminary
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8a
“[Plrevailing party” is a “legal term of art,”
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603, one that two recent
decisions of the Supreme Court help to define. In
Buckhannen, the plaintiff sought an injunction barring
enforcement of a West Virginia statute and obtained a
court-ordered preliminary injunction, though one to
which West Virginia consented. See id. at 601. Two
months after the district court rejected the State’s
sovereign immunity defense and one menth after it
denied the State’s motion for summary judgment, the
State repealed the statute, after which the district
court dismissed the case as mooxw and denied the
plaintiffs request for attorney’s fees. See id. The
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of fees, rejecting
the “catalyst theory” for awarding fees, under which a
plaintiff “prevailed” if he “achieveld] the desired result
because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change
in the defendant’s conduct,” such as a legislative
repeal of a challenged statutory provision. Jd. at
601-02. That theury, the Court reasoned, overlooks the
legal reality that “prevailing party” covers only parties
“in whose favor a judgment is rendered.” Jd. at 603
(internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant’s
voluntary change, even one precipitated by litigation,
does not amount to “a court-ordered change in the
legal relationship” between the plaintiff and
defendant, as required to establish prevailing-party
status. Id. at 604.
In Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 86 (2007), the Court
established that the “court-ordered change in the legal
relationship” between a plaintiff and defendant must
be “enduring” and irrevocable. Jd. That did not happen
in Sole because the trial court dissolved the
preliminary injunction it entered in favor of the
claimant. A preliminary injunction, the Court held,
Qa
does not establish prevailing-party status if it is
“reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final
decision in the same case,” because § 1988 requires
lasting relief, not the temporary, “fleeting success”
such an injunction represents. Jd. at 83; see also id. at
82 n.3. Sole, however, reserved the question presented
here: “whether, in the absence of a final decision on the
merits ..., Success 1n gaining a preliminary injunction
may sometimes warrant an award of counsel fees.” Jd.
at 86. See also Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760
(1987) (rejecting fee request for “interlocutory” victory
and explaining that “{rlespect for ordinary language
requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on
the merits of his claim before he can be said to
prevail”).
After Buckhannon but before Sole, our court
considered whether the winner of a_ preliminary
injunction was a “prevailing party.” In Dubuc v. Green
Oak Township, 312 F.3d 736 (6th Cir. 2002), a
landowner filed a lawsuit against a township, charging
the township with refusing to permit him to divide his
lot in retaliation for his exercise of free-speech rights.
Early in the lawsuit, the claimant obtained a
preliminary injunction ordering the township to issue
him a temporary certificate of occupancy as long as he
complied with seven conditions. Jd. at 753. The district
court denied the request for “interim fees,” and we
affirmed. See id. at 753-54. In the context of a
preliminary injunction, we reasoned, “there is only
prevailing party status if the injunction represents ‘an
unambiguous indication of probable success on the
merits, and not merely a maintenance of the status
quo ordered because the balance of equities greatly
favors the plaintiff.” Jd. at 753 (quoting Webster v.
Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 1988)). Because
10a
the injunction was not a “clear victory” for the
claimant and was issued only in connection with
several “conditions” imposed on the claimant, Dubuc
upheld the district court’s denial of fees. Id. at 754.
The claimant’s objective in the lawsuit, we concluded,
was not to obtain a temporary certificate of occupancy,
which is all that the preliminary injunction provided,
but to obtain damages for alleged violations of his
constitutional rights, which the court ultimately
denied. Jd. (Because Dubuc predates Sole, the court
never addressed a more basic reason for denying that
particular fee request: A claimant may not obtain
interim attorney’s fees for a preliminary injunction
that is later dissolved. See Sole, 551 U.S. at 83.)
There are two more threads to the prevailing-party
inquiry. One, to be a prevailing party, the plaintiff
must obtain a “material” change in the legal
relationship between himself and the defendant. Sole,
551 U.S. at 82, 86 (internal quotation marks and
modifications omitted). A material change “directly
benefit[s]” a plaintiff by modifying the defendant’s
behavior toward him. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103,
111 (1992); see also Tex. State Teachers Ass'n uv.
Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989).
Absent a direct benefit, the plaintiff achieves only a
symbolic victory, which § 1988(b) does not compensate.
See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 118; Tex. State Teachers Ass’n,
489 U.S. at 792.
Two, the idea behind § 1988 is to award fees to
deserving parties, not to generate “satellite” disputes
over fees, City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557,
566 (1992); see Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610, which
prompt “a second major litigation,” Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). In assessing fee
lla
requests, the Court thus tends to eschew fact-based
and speculative inquiries into why government bodies
altered their conduct because they (1) tend to
“distract{] . . . from,” not further, § 1988's goal of
encouraging adequate representation for civil rights
plaintiffs, Tex. State Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 791,
and (2) waste scarce judicial resources on questions
“which [are] almost impossible to answer,” id.; see
Dague, 505 U.S. at 566.
That is all well and good. But none of this readily
resolves today’s case: McQueary does not invoke the
“catalyst” theory; he did not ultimately lose on the
merits; the preliminary injunction, as we will explain
shortly, materially changed the relationship between
the parties; and the preliminary injunction turned at
least in part on the district court’s assessment of the
merits. Keeping in mind the Court’s admonishment
that fee inquiries should not generate satellite
litigation, are there any other considerations that
might clarify the inquiry? Several possibilities come to
mind:
* Perhaps, in view of the nature of a preliminary
injunction, success on this type of interim relief never
suffices. The statute after all refers to “the” prevailing
party, not “a” prevailing party, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b),
suggesting that the only court-ordered change in the
legal relationship between the parties that matters
should be a lasting one, namely the change that
culminates in a final judgment. Otherwise, individuals
and States—both “prevailing” parties at times who
“may” obtain fees—might seek fees for all manner of
interim victories whenever for one reason or another
the case does not proceed to final judgment. Cf, Hewitt,
482 U.S. at 760 (surviving a motion to dismiss “is not
12:
the stuff of which legal victories are made”). Adding
force to the idea that a “preliminary” victor is never a
prevailing party is this reality: Our review of a
preliminary injunction ruling, even one that turns on
the merits and even one that is resolved through a
published opinion, is not binding on the panel that
reviews the ultimate final injunction decision. See
Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981);
Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v.
Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2007); Smuth
Wholesale Co., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477
F.3d 854, 873 n.13 (6th Cir. 2007).
But this approach, clear as it might be, fails to
account for fact patterns in which the claimant
receives everything it asked for in the lawsuit, and all
that moots the case is court-ordered success and the
passage of time. When protesters seek an injunction to
exercise their First Amendment rights at a specific
time and place—say to demonstrate at a Saturday
parade—a preliminary injunction wil] give them all
the court-ordered relief they need and the end of the
parade will moot the case. In what way are such
claimants not prevailing parties? We think they are.
See Young v. City of Chicago, 202 F.3d 1000, 1000 (7th
Cir. 2000) (awarding fees to protestors who obtained a
preliminary injunction to protest at the 1996
Democratic National Convention, which was the only
relief sought). The same is true of a government
employee who seeks to exclude an unconstitutionally
obtained report from an administrative hearing and
obtains a preliminary injunction that irrevocably
excludes the report. See Watson v. County of Riverside,
300 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2002). So also for a
plaintiff who seeks to delay enforcement of a statute
until a certain event occurs—-say a scheduled public
13a
referendum—and the preliminary injunction brings
about that result. Cf Thomas v. Nat'l Sct. Found. , 330
F.3d 486, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Not all preliminary injunctions, as these examples
show, have merely a catalytic effect. The defendants in
these cases did not voluntarily change their conduct.
An immediately enforceable preliminary injunction
compelled them to. And in each instance, the plaintiffs
obtained all of the relief they requested once the
preliminary injunction served its purpose. See N.
Cheyenne Tribe v. Jackson, 433 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th
Cir. 2006); Watson, 300 F.3d at 1096.
The plaintiffs in all of these cases, it is true, might
have avoided the “preliminary” label attached to their
victories by asking the courts to convert their motions
for a preliminary injunction into motions for a final
injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). Yet Rule 65 is
not the Rosetta Stone to prevailing-party inquiries. A
district court may, but it does not have to, grant Rule
65 requests, and nothing about the nature of the
prevailing-party inquiry suggests that it should turn
on whether a district court happens to embrace this
administrative streamlining device. In the final
analysis, the preliminary nature of the relief does not
by itself provide a ground for never granting fees.
* Perhaps preliminary-injunction winners are
never eligible for fees for a different reason. In Sole,
the Court held that a preliminary injunction does not
establish prevailing-party status if it is “reversed,
dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in
the same case.” 551 U.S. at 83. When a case becomes
moot, courts often vacate their earlier rulings on the
theory that a ruling should not stand when the party
l4a
opposing it is deprived of a chance to obtain a final
ruling on the issue or to seek appellate review of
it—due to events outside of the party’s control, such as
the defendant’s voluntary cessation of conduct. See
Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. __, 1380 S. Ct. 576, 581
(2009); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S.
36, 40 (1950); cf U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V.,
590 F.3d 1091, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2010) (collecting
cases holding that preliminary injunctions
automatically dissolve upon final judgment).
The Munsingwear doctrine suggests a potentially
straightforward approach to the fees question: Sole
says that “dissolved” or “otherwise undone”
preliminary injunctions do not warrant fees; mootness
generally requires a court to vacate its earlier rulings,
including any preliminary injunction granted in the
case; fees for preliminary injunctions therefore are not
permitted under Sole. But this approach again fails to
account for the instances in which a party has
prevailed by every measure of victory, as illustrated
above. The Munsingwear rule, moreover, is not as
clear as day: It has exceptions of its own, see, e.g., U.S.
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S.
18, 24 (1994) (Munsingwear does not apply to
voluntary settlements), and vexing issues often arise
over whether a case is moot in the first place, see, e.g.,
Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc. , 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (a defendant’s voluntary
change in conduct moots a case only if it is “absolutely
clear” alleged wrongdoing is unlikely to recur); Honig
v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318 (1988) (a case avoids
mootness if “capable of repetition, yet evading
review’). All of these exceptions have little to do with
the status of a party’s victory, precluding us from
l5a
saying that preliminary-injunction winners are never
eligible for prevailing-party status on this basis alone.
* Perhaps instead preliminary-injunction winners
are always eligible for fees. Buckhannon says that “a
court-ordered change in the legal relationship”
between the plaintiff and defendant suffices to
establish prevailing-party status, 532 U.S. at 604, and
the granting of a preliminary injunction assuredly
changes the legal relationship between the parties,
permitting the claimant to do something that the
defendant previously resisted. Rather than doing too
little, however, this approach does too much. Some
preliminary injunctions have nothing to do with the
merits, offering no insight into whether one party or
the other will prevail at the end of the case. Some
initial injunctions, sometimes called stay-put or status
quo injunctions, turn more on the grave risks of
irreparable harm to one party or to the public interest
than on the legal virtues of the parties’ positions. See
Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir
1988) (denying fees to a plaintiff who obtained an
injunction “because the balance of the equities greatly
favor|ed]” maintaining “the status quo”).
Several courts have rejected fee requests for
obtaining such injunctions. See Dearmore v. City of
Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 524 (5th Cir. 2008) (granting
fees only if the claimant obtains “an unambiguous
indication of probable success on the merits”); N.
Cheyenne Tribe v. Jackson, 433 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th
Cir. 2006) (denying fees where injunction “granted
only interim relief that preserved the status quo”);
Thomas, 330 F.3d at 493 (denying fees where
injunction “merely preserved the status quo”); John T.
ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318
l6a
F.3d 545, 558 (3d Cir. 2003) (denying fees where
injunction was “not based on the merits of [the
plaintiff's] claims”); Race v. Toledo-Davila, 291 F.3d
857, 858-59 (1st Cir. 2002) (denying fees where
injunction merely safeguarded claimant’s rights during
the litigation). No court to our knowledge holds that
the victors of such holding-pattern injunctions and
nothing more automatically receive fees, though one
court comes close. Cf. Richard S. v. Dep't of
Developmental Servs. of Cal., 317 F.3d 1080, 1088-89
(9th Cir. 2003).
A similar defect defeats a related intuition,
permitting fees whenever the nature of the victory is
one that Congress has permitted the losing party to
appeal. That would be true of final judgments, see 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and of the granting or the denial of
preliminary injunctions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). But
that rule, too, picks up orders that have nothing to do
with success on the merits. Even aside from the stay-
put injunctions identified above, it would extend to
class certification orders, which Congress has
permitted parties immediately to appeal (with the
permission of the court of appeais). See Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(f). “A procedural victory that may be a way station
to utter substantive defeat creates no right to fees.”
Richardson v. Penfold, 900 F.2d 116, 119 (7th Cir.
1990); see Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.,
No. 09-448, 560 U.S. ___, slip op. at 11-12 (May 24,
2010) (holding that “purely procedural victorlies]” do
not qualify for fees even under standards “less
stringent” than the prevailing-party requirement).
All of this leaves us with a contextual and case-
specific inquiry, one that does not permit us to say that
preliminary-injunction winners always are, or never
17a
are, “prevailing parties.” In the aftermath of
Buckhannon and Sole, however, we can say that the
“preliminary” nature of the relief—together with the
requirement that a prevailing-party victory must
create a lasting change in the legal relationship
between the parties and not merely “catalyze” the
defendant to voluntary action—will generally counsel
against fees in the context of preliminary injunctions.
With these considerations in mind, we turn to the
district court’s explanation for denying McQueary’s fee
request.
First, the court denied fees on the ground that
McQueary did not “directly benefit[}” from the 2006
preliminary injunction. That is not so, however. Before
the injunction, Kentucky could prosecute McQueary
for holding a large, controversial sign on a public
sidewalk near a funeral, see 2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 50
§§ 5(b), (c); it could prosecute him for quietly
distributing anti-military literature to mourners
entering a funeral home, see id. § 5(c); and it could
prosecute him for singing songs of protest that the
funeral party could hear but that did not disrupt the
funeral, see id. After the injunction, McQueary could
do all of these things without fear of prosecution under
these laws. No one disputes that Kentucky would have
prosecuted McQueary in the absence of an injunction,
establishing that this court-ordered freedom
materially changed Kentucky’s behavior toward
him—at least temporarily. See DiLaura v. Township of
Ann Arbor, 471 F.3d 660, 670 (6th Cir. 2006); Berger v.
City of Mayfield Heights, 265 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir.
2001).
Second, in explaining its “direct benefit” ruling, the
court added that other Kentucky laws would prohibit
L&a
McQueary’s proposed protests. But why should we
assess McQueary’s prevailing-party status based on
statutes he never challenged? That is not the norm. In
considering whether a claimant directly benefitted
from litigation, we usually measure the plaintiff's gain
based on the relief requested in his complaint, not
based on the practical significance of the relief
obtained. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12; Hewitt, 482
U.S. at 760-61; DiLaura, 471 F.3d at 670. Even a
single dollar in nominal damages, the pinnacle of
worthless relief, qualifies as a direct benefit. See
Farrar, 506 U.S. at 112. In this instance, McQueary
asked the district court to enjoin Kentucky from
enforcing two provisions of Kentucky law, and the
preliminary injunction temporarily did so. That the
benefit came through a preliminary injunction may
make a difference in the end to the fees request. But
this aspect of the court’s direct benefit analysis does
not turn on that point: Its analysis defeats McQueary’s
request for fees no matter whether the court’s order of
relief comes in the form of a preliminary injunction or
a final one.
There is a good reason for focusing on the relief the
plaintiff requested, not the additional relief he might
have requested. “A request for attorney’s fees should
not result in a second major litigation,” Hensley, 461
U.S. at 437, yet an assessment of the practical
significance of the relief obtained almost always will
lead to collateral litigation over the relevance of these
other laws. Cf’ Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609-10
(raising similar concerns about looking outside the
litigation to assess whether a plaintiff prevailed). To
assess whether McQueary’s proposed protests would
violate other provisions of Kentucky law, the district
court would need to develop a factual record defining
LYa
the precise contours of McQueary’s proposed “non
disruptive” protests. Would he block access to funeral
homes’ driveways and doorways? See Ky. Rev. Stat
Ann. § 525.155. What precisely would he chant, sing or
shout near funerals and how loudly would he do so?
When does a noise become so loud or a sign so
offensive that it “prevent|s] or disrupt[{s] a funeral”?
See id. § 525.145. These factual inquiries are difficult
in and of themselves, but they are virtually impossible
when it comes to protests not yet undertaken, only
anticipated.
All of this would be prelude to a difficult legal
inquiry. The district court would have to decide
whether, under the “facts” of this hypothetical protest,
McQueary would violate any other provisions of
Kentucky law that the Attorney General might
uncover. And that would require the court to assess
any constitutional challenges McQueary might have to
those provisions. The possibility of prosecution under
an additional unconstitutional statute after all could
not undermine the practical significance of McQueary’s
success. To say that this would create a costly side
show divorced from the merits of the underlying
dispute is an understatement. To say that it would
lead to district court orders more in the nature of
advisory opinions than fee determinations is an
unvarnished reality. Cf. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48
(1969).
In defending the district court’s reasoning, the
Attorney General argues that we owe deference to the
court’s finding that other provisions—restrictions on
“violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior” and
“hazardous and physically offensive condition[s]” near
funerals, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 525.055—‘“hkely
prohibit VicQue ar, proposed contro
ACTIVILtK McQueary 11, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 832. But
the district court made no fact findings on this point
It issued the preliminary injunction and denied the fee
request based on the pleadings, leaving us nothing to
which we could defer. Jd.; McQueary /, 453 F. Supp
at Y/Y
Nol go VV « (¢ aitiy basi LOT concluding
McQueary’s proposed protests would violate other
unchallenged aspects of Kentucky law. McQueary
alleges that he wants to protest “in a non-disruptive
manner. K.1 4 15: see R.1 WY 13-14. To deny th
request for fees on the ground that his conduct would
violate valid restrictions on “violent, tumultuous, o1
threatening behavior,” we would have to do one of twe
things: assume that McQueary pleading
misre present how he planne d to behave or infer that
non-disruptive protests involve threatening behavio)
Kither approach would alter our normal practice of
accepting a complaint's factual allegations as true and
of drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff
favor when ruling without an evidentiary record. C/
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56]
(1992) (following that rule when assessing standing)
Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cis
2008) (ollowing that rule in evaluating a motion t
dism ss)
‘The Attorney General's argument is unavailing for
another reason. A plaintiff crosses the threshold to
“prevailing party” status by succeeding on a singk
claim, even if he loses on several others and even 1
that limited success does not grant him the “primary
relief” he sought. 7ex. State Teachers Ass'n, 489 U.S. at
790-91; see also Farra 06 US. at 111. Th
inilicance of the rehet obtaimed vor oniv to the
amount of fees. kchkerhart, 461 US. at 484-35. Had
MeQueary chalienged all of Kentucky's funeral protest
prohibitions as apple d to him. but succeeded only in
having SO S(b) and ble) enjommed ua VE rbroad, at
would still qualify as a prevailing party. The Attorne
General olfers no justilication—and we see nom i)
denying the fees request in toto because MeQueary
chose to challenge fewer rather than more provision
of Kentucky lav
fhird, the court justified it Tere lenmial on the
ground that the injunction W i premised On
overbreadth yround nol on the vround = that
MceQueary proposed COM MuUuUnICallon were
on tLitutionally protected ‘Thy Loe ms u theory that
hay nothing to do with the pre hminaryv nature of the
court relief; 1b would apply equally to permanent
myunctions. The theory does not work in cither setting
When a plaintiff obtains the greater victory (striking a
statute in all of its applications, t.¢., on its face) rather
than the more narrow victory (striking the statute a
apphed only to his communications), he does not
become less eligible for fees. “Prevailing parties” are
winning parties, and a party who succeeds in showin
that a law cannot be enforced in any of its application
due to overbreadth concerns is the epitome of a
prevailing party-—for he has won not just on behalf of
himself but on behalf of many others as well. One of
the justifications for § 1988 is that it allows individual
citizens to act as “private attorneylts| gyoneral Le
State Teachers Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 793, making it odd t
ay that the htigant who truly acts on behalf of othe:
citizens by bringing an overbreadth challenge is not
ert tied oO ta
Even if we focus on the effect of an overbreadth
ruling solely with respect to McQueary, at any rate,
how has he not prevailed? Whether premised on
overbreadth grounds or as-applied grounds, the effect
is the same: The injunction bars Kentucky from
prosecuting McQueary under §§ 5(b) and 5(c) and thus
alters the legal relationship between McQueary and
the State.
At least four circuits agree that plaintiffs who
prevail on overbreadth grounds may collect attorney’s
fees. See Ways v. City of Lincoln, 274 F.3d 514, 520
(8th Cir. 2001); Phelps v. Hamilton, 120 F.3d 1126,
1130 (10th Cir. 1997) (vagueness challenge); Nash v.
Chandler, 848 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1988); Solomon
v. City of Gainesville, 796 F.2d 1464, 1466-67 (11th
Cir. 1986). No circuit to our knowledge disagrees, and
we are not prepared to be the first.
Fourth, the court briefly justified its denial of fees
on an alternative theory—that “special circumstances”
warrant the denial of fees. But the court never
explained what made the circumstances surrounding
this litigation “special” and thus has given us no basis
for assessing this theory for denying fees.
The “special circumstances” exception apparently
flows from dicta in Hensley v. Eckerhart, which says
that district courts may deny fees to a prevailing party
“in ‘special circumstances’ when an award would be
‘unjust.” 461 U.S. at 446. We have acknowledged the
doctrine on several occasions and have observed that
a non-prevailing party must make a “strong showing”
to establish special circumstances. Deja Vu v. Metro.
Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, 421 F.3d 417,
42? (6th Cir. 2005). But we have never (to our
4y*)
20a
knowledge) found a “special circumstance” justifying
the denial of fees. /d. (later developments in the law,
which would prevent a party from prevailing if case
were relitigated at time of fees determination, are not
special circumstances); see Wikol v. Birmingham Pub.
Schs. Bd. of Educ., 360 F.3d 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2004) (a
nee "'" “ é aca aai
prevailing party's “bad acts” during course of litigation
are not a special circumstance); Morscott, Inc. v. City
of Cleveland, 936 F.2d 271, 273 (6th Cir. 1991) (a
defendant’s good faith in enacting challenged provision
is not a special circumstance).
It is “extremely rare” to deny fees based on special
circumstances in other circuits as well. Saint John’s
Organic Farm v. Gem County Mosquito Abatement
Dist., 574 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted); but see Bateson v. Getsse,
857 F.2d 1300, 1306 (9th Cir. 1988) (denying fees
where court had to “engage in extensive supplemental
research” because of prevailing party’s woefully
inadequate briefing). On remand, the district court
remains free to explain why special circumstances
exist here.
So far, we have explained why the district court’:
explanations for denying fees in this difficult case do
not hold up. Yet we have not explained whether
McQueary should collect fees—and with good reason.
That question initially is for the district court, which
had a ring-side view of the underlying proceedings,
which is in the best position to make an initial cut at
whether McQueary deserves fees for this preliminary
injunction and which is given considerable deference
over most aspects of the fees inquiry. Buckhannon,
Sole and Dubuc make clear, we think, that, when a
claimant wins a preliminary tnjunction and nothing
24a
more, that usually will not suffice to obtain fees under
§ 1988. What remains unclear is when the occasional
exceptions to that rule should apply, a contextual and
case-specific inquiry that we ask the district court to
undertake in the first instance
IT]
Kor l~@SE TFeAaSONS, We Teverst and remand fot
further yroceedings
~—
25a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5807
[Filed July 29, 2010]
BART MCQUEARY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
JACK CONWAY, Attorney General
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Defendant - Appellee.
Before: GUY, BOGGS and SUTTON, Circuit Judges
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Frankfort
THIS CAUSE was heard on the record from the
district court and was argued by counsel.
IN CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, itis ORDERED
that the judgment of the district court is REVERSED
and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with the opinion of this court.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
Leonard Green, Clerk
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION AT FRANKFORT
CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-CV-24-KKC
[Filed June 26, 2009]
BART McQUEARY,
PLAINTIFF,
JACK CONWAY,
in his Official Capacity as Attorney General
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
DEFENDANT.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the parties’
briefs regarding the issues of mootness and the
plaintiffs entitlement to attorney’s fees. For the
following reasons, the Court finds that this matter is
moot and that the plaintiffis not entitled to attorney’s
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
I. Procedural History.
The Plaintiff commenced this action with a
complaint in which he charged that certain provisions
of House Bill 333 (HB 333) and Senate Bill 93 (SB 93)
(together, the “Act”), which former Kentucky Governor
Ernie Fletcher signed into law on March 27, 2006,
infringed upon his right to protest at funerals under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution and were facially unconstitutional. (Rec.
No. 1, Complaint {¥ 1-2, 18).
On September 26, 2006, this Court granted the
Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction finding
he had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of
his claim that certain provisions of the Act violated the
First Amendment. McQueary v. Stumbo, 453
F Supp.2d 975 (k.D.Ky. 2006). After the Court’s ruling
on the preliminary injunction, the General Assembly
amended the Act to delete the challenged provisions
and the remaining provisions of the Act were codified
at KRS 525.055, KRS 525.145 and KRS 525.155.
The issues now before the Court are whether this
matter has been mooted by the Kentucky General
Assembly’s amendment of the Act and whether the
Plaintiffis entitled to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing
party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
A. Current Kentucky Law.
The provisions of the Act that were not challenged
by the Plaintiff and are currently in effect prevent
certain disorderly and disruptive conduct at funerals
and certain conduct interfering with a funeral.
28a
1) KRS 525.055 - Disorderly Conduct.
KRS 525.055 provides that a person is guilty of
disorderly conduct in the first degree when he or she:
(a) In a public place and with intent to cause
public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm,
or wantonly creating a risk thereof:
lL. Engages in fighting or in_ violent,
tumultuous, or threatening behavior;
Makes unreasonable noise: or
3. Creates a hazardous or physically
offensive condition by any act that serves
no legitimate purpose; and
(b) Acts in a way described in paragraph (a) of
this subsection within three hundred (300)
feet of a:
1. Cemetery during a funeral or burial;
: 5
2. Funeral home during the viewing of a
deceased person;
3. Funeral procession;
4. Funeral or memorial service; or
1
5. Building in which a funeral or memorial
service is being conducted; and
(c) Acts in a way described in paragraph (a) of
this subsection at any point in time between
29a
one (1) hour prior to the commencement of
an event specified in paragraph (b) of this
subsection and one (1) hour following its
conclusion; and
(d) Knows that he or she is within three
hundred (300) feet of an occasion described
in paragraph (b) of this subsection.
2) KRS 525.145 - Disrupting a Funeral.
KRS 525.145 provides that a person is guilty of
disrupting meetings and processions in the first degree
when:
with intent to prevent or disrupt a funeral or
burial, funeral home viewing of a deceased
person, funeral procession, or funeral or
memorial service for a deceased person, he or
she does any act tending to obstruct or interfere
with it physically or makes any utterance,
gesture, or display designed to outrage the
sensibilities of the group attending the occasion.
Id.
3) KRS 525.155 - Interference with a
Funeral.
KRS 525.155 provides that a person is guilty of
interference with a funeral when:
at any point in time between one (1) hour prior
to the commencement of an event specified in
this subsection and one (1) hour following its
conclusion, he or she blocks, impedes, inhibits,
30a
or in any other manner obstructs or interferes
with access into or from any building or parking
lot of a building in which a funeral, wake,
memorial service, or burial is being conducted,
or any burial plot or the parking lot of the
cemetery in which a funeral, wake, memorial
service, or burial is being conducted.
B. The Provisions Subject to this Court’s
Opinion and Order.
The Plaintiff challenged only Sections 5(1)(b) and
(c) of the Act. Those provisions provided the following:
(1) A person is guilty of interference with a
funeral when he or she at any time on any
day:
(b) Congregates, pickets, patrols, dem
onstrates, or enters on that portion of a
public right-of-way or private property
that is within three hundred (300) feet of
la funeral, wake, memorial service, or
burial or any burial plot or the parking
lot of the cemetery in which a funeral,
wake, memorial services, or burial is
being conducted]; or
Without authorization from the family of
the deceased or person conducting the
service, during a funeral, wake, memorial
service, or burial
dla
Sings, chants, whistles, shouts,
yells, or uses a bullhorn, auto
horn, sound amplification
equipment or other sounds or
images observable to or within
earshot of participants in the
funeral, wake, memorial
service, or burial; or
Distributes literature or any
other item
The Plaintiff asserted that Sections 5(1)(b) and (c)
were unconstitutional prior restraints on speech and
were not narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest and did not leave open alternative
channels for communication. (Rec. No. 1, Complaint
{ 17). He further asserted that Sections 5(1)(b) and (c)
were overbroad. (Rec. No. 1, Complaint 9419-20, 24)
Finally, he asserted that Section 5(1)(c)
unconstitutionally made speech on public property
contingent upon the approval of a private party. (Rec
No. 1, Complaint J 22).
C. The Plaintiff's Proposed Communications,
[In his Complaint, the Plaintiff asserted that he had
picketed funerals with the Westboro Baptist Church
three times in Kentucky. (Rec. No. 1, Complaint {| 10)
He stated that such protests are an effective way to
convey the church’s message. (Rec. No. 1, Complaint
{ 11). He stated he waned to protest at future funerals
but feared he would be prosecuted for violating
Sections 5 (1)(b) and (c) of the Act. (Rec. No. l,
Complaint { 12)
The Plaintiff stated that he wished to congregate,
picket, or demonstrate on that portion of a public
right-of-way that is within 300 feet of a funeral, wake,
memorial service or burial’ in a manner that does not,
and is not intended to disrupt the event. (Rec. No. 1,
Complaint 7 13).
The Plaintiff further stated he wished to make
sounds and display images observable to or within
earshot of funeral participants, in a manner that does
not, and is not intended to, disrupt the funeral. The
Plaintiff wished to make these sounds and display
these images without seeking or obtaining
authorization from the family of the deceased or
person conducting the funeral. (Rec. No. 1, Complaint
4 14). The Plaintiff stated that he also wished to
distribute literature in a non-disruptive manner
without first obtaining the permission of the family of
the deceased or person conducting the funeral. (Rec
No. 1, Complaint | 15)
DD). The Preliminary Injunction.
The Plaintiff moved tor a preliminary injunction
(Rec. No. 2) enjoining the Attorney General from
enforcing Sections 5(1)(b) and (c). This Court granted
the motion, finding that the provisions were
content-neutral and, thus, were required to be
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest and to leave open ample alternative channels
of communication
Throughout this Opinion, the Court will refer to all of the event:
covered by Sections 5(1)(b) and (c) — funerals, wakes, memorial
services and burials — simply as “funerals.”
The Court assumed, for purposes of the preliminary
injunction motion, that the state had a significant
interest in protecting funeral attendees’ from
unwanted communications that are so obtrusive that
they are impractical to avoid. However, the Court
determined that the Plaintiff had established a
likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that
Sections 5(1)(b) and (c) burdened substantially more
speech than necessary to prevent interference with a
funeral or to protect funeral attendees from unwanted
obtrusive communications that are otherwis¢
impractical to avoid
The Court's reasoning is important to the current
motion for attorney’s fees and, thus, below isa lengthy
excerpt from the Opinion
section 5(1)(b) prohibits all congregating
picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering
on property within 300 feet of a funeral whether:
such activities interfere with the funeral or not
and whether such activities are authorized by
funeral attendees or not. It prohibits such
activity whether the persons involved in the
activities are visible to funeral participants o1
not and whether they are making any sound
that funeral participants can hear or not. Thus
in addition to prohibiting intrusive activities,
Section 5(1)(b), prohibits activity that would not
interfere with a funeral and_ prohibit:
communications that are neither necessarily
unwanted nor so obtrusive that they cannot bi
avoided by the funeral attendees
Further, the 300-foot buffer zone
substantially larger than the 36-foot buffer zone
upheld in Madsen, the 8-foot floating buffer:
prohibit on
rma vee oT
36a
lot of a building or cemetery where a funeral is
being conducted.
It is not reasonable to construe Sections
5(1)(b) and (c) as prohibiting precisely the same
kinds of activities that are already prohibited by
other sections of the Act. “It is ‘a cardinal
principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a
statute ought, upon the whole, to be so
construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause,
sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews,534 U.S
19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 5338
U.S. 167, 174(2001)). Unless Section 5(1)(b) and
(c) are superfluous, they must be intended to
restrict sounds that are less obtrusive and
disruptive than the “unreasonable noise”
already prohibited in Section One. Likewise,
Section 5(1)(b) and (c) must be intended to
restrict sounds and images that are less
obtrusive and disruptive than those “designed
to outrage the _ sensibilities” of funeral
participants already prohibited in Section
Three. Likewise, Section 5(1)(b) and (c) must be
aimed at communications that are less
obtrusive and disruptive than the acts that tend
to obstruct or interfere with a funeral that are
already prohibited by Section Three of the Act
and the acts that would obstruct or interfere
with ingress to and egress from a funeral
prohibited by Section 5(1)(a) of the Act.
McQueary, 453 F.Supp.2d at 996-97
37a
E. Current Issues.
After the Court’s order granting preliminary
injunction, by Agreed Order (DE 41), the parties
agreed to brief two issues. The first issue is whether
this case is now moot given that the General Assembly
amended the Act to delete the provisions that were
subject to the preliminary injunction. The second issue
is Whether the Plaintiff is a “prevailing party” entitled
to attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Il. ANALYSIS.
A. Mootness.
“Article III of the Constitution confines the power
of the federal courts to adjudication of ‘cases’ or
‘controversies. Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry,
108 F.3d 637, 644 (6 Cir. 1997) (citing U.S. Const. art
II], N 2: Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). “The
mootness doctrine, a subset of the Article Ill
justiciability requirements, demands a_ liv
case-or-controversy when a federal court decides a
case.” ld
In Kentucky Right to Life, the Sixth Circuit
addressed mootness in a case in which, like this one,
the Kentucky General Assembly amended the act at
issue while litigation regarding the constitutionality of
the act was pending. /d. at 639. As here, the state
argued that the statutory amendments mooted various
claims brought by the plaintiff. 7d. at 644. The
plaintiffs argued, as they also argue here, that the
claims were not moot “because the Kentucky General
Assembly remains free to reenact the prior statutory
scheme.” Jd. The Sixth Circuit stated that “[(lJegislative
38a
<
repeal or amendment of a challenged statute while a
case 1s pending on appeal usually eliminates [the]
requisite case-or-controversy because a statute must
be analyzed by the appellate court in its present form.”
Id. The Court determined that the Plaintiffs
challenges to several of the statutory provisions were
moot because of the statutory amendments. /d.
In doing so, the Sixth Circuit distinguished City of
Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982)
In that case, the district court declared that certain
language in a city ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague. /d. at 287-88. While the matter was pending on
appeal before the Fifth Circuit, the city revised the
ordinance to delete the language at issue. /d. at 288
The Supreme Court determined that the case was not
moot because “the city’s repeal of the objectionable
language would not preclude it from reenacting
precisely the same provision if the District Court’
judgement were vacated.’ /d. at 289
However, the Sixth Circuit noted in Kentucky Right
to Life, that, “|cjritical to the [Supreme] Court’s
decision [in Aladdin’s Castle] was the City’s
announced intention to reenact the unconstitutional
ordinance if the case was dismissed as moot.” Kentucky
Right to Life, 108 F.3d at 645. The Sixth Circuit found
this to be an “essential fact, which created the
case-or-controversy before the Supreme Court in
Aladdin's Castle.” Id.; see also Brandywine, Inc. v. City
of Richmond, 359 F.3d 830, 836 (6 Cir. 2004)
(“[c]ritical to the holding in [Al/adin’s Castle], however,
was the fact that legislators had publicly expressed an
intention to re-enact the offending legislation”).
39a
The Plaintiff argues that this Court should not
follow Kentucky Right to Life because it is no longer
good law in light of Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
(DE 43, Pf.’s Brief at 8 n.7; DE 44 Pf.’s Response at 3).
In that case, the Supreme Court held that a citizen
suitor’s claim for civil penalties under the Clean Water
Act did not necessarily become moot when, after the
litigation commenced, the defendant came _ into
compliance with its permit which imposed limitations
on the defendant's discharge of pollutants. Jd. at
lL i3-i4
The Court noted that, “[i]t is well settled that ‘a
defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged
practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to
determine the legality of the practice.” Jd. at 189
(quoting Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. at 289). This
is because, 1f a defendant can moot an action by
voluntarily ceasing the practice in question after
litigation has begun, then the defendant is “
return to his old ways.” Jd.
free to
The Court stated that, to prevent that from
happening, a case can become moot by a defendant's
voluntary conduct if “subsequent events made it
absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior
could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Jd. (quoting
United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn.,
393 U.S. 199,203 (1968). “The heavy burden of
persuading the court that the challenged conduct
cannot reasonably be expected to start up again lies
with the party asserting mootness.” /d. (international
quotations and brackets and citation omitted).
40a
The Plaintiff argues that Friends of the Earth has
implicitly overturned Kentucky Right to Life. However,
in Brandywine, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 359 F.3d 830
(6 Cir. 2004), a case decided after Friends of the
Earth, the Sixth Circuit determined that the plaintiff's
claim for declaratory and injunctive relief was moot,
citing Kentucky Right to Life. Id. at 835-36. In that
case, the plaintiff asserted that the city’s zoning
ordinance was unconstitutional. After the plaintiff
filed the action, the city amended the ordinance. /d. at
833
The Sixth Circuit noted that the plaintiff asked the
court to declare the zoning ordinance unconstitutional]
and to prevent the city from enforcing it. Jd. at 836
The court determined these claims were moot because
the court could “neither declare unconstitutional nor
enjoin the enforcement of a provision that 1s no longer
in effect.” Jd. As to the plaintiffs claim for money
damages, however, the court determined that claim
was not moot because, despite the amendment, the
plaintiff could seek damages for any losses caused by
the enforcement of the challenged ordinance. Jd
Brandywine makes clear that Kentucky Right to
Life remains good law after Friends of the Earth.
Furthermore, Friends of the Earth 1S
distinguishable from this case in that the defendant in
that case was a private party who was charged with
The Plaintiff also argues that the Court should not follow
Kentucky Right to Life because its “rationale is flawed.” (DE 44,
Pf.’s Response at 7). However, because neither the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court has overruled Kentucky
Right to Life, this district court must follow it
4ia
not complying with the terms of its permit governing
the amount of treated water the defendant could
discharge into a nearby waterway. Friends of the
Earth, 528 U.S. at 175-177. The issue was whether
the case became moot by the actions of the private
party to bring itself into compliance with the law or
whether there was a reasonable expectation that the
private party would return to its “old ways.” /d. at 189.
The defendant in this case, however, like that in
Kentucky Right to Life, is a government official and the
issue, like that in Kentucky Right to Life, is whether
the case has become moot by the Kentucky Genera!
Assembly’s amendment of a statute.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that “cessation of the
allegedly illegal conduct by government officials has
been treated with more solicitude by the courts than
similar action by private parties... such self-correction
provides a secure foundation for a dismissal based on
mootness so long as it appears genuine.” Mosley v.
Hairston, 920 F.2d 409, 415 (6" Cir. 1990) (quoting
Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1365 (7? Cie.
1988)). See also Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 705
(6° Cir. 2003); Fed. of Adver. Indus. Representatives v.
Chicago, 326 F.3d 924, 929 (7th Cir.2003) (Friends of
the Earth standard “is the appropriate standard for
cases between private parties, but this is not the view
we have taken toward acts of voluntary cessation by
government officials ... we place a greater stock in
their acts of self-correction, so long as they appear
genuine.”); New England Reg'l Council of Carpenters
v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 18 (ist Cir.2002) (“{ulnder
circuit precedent. . .the City of Mesquite exception
applies ‘only where there is a reasonable expectation
that the challenged conduct will be repeated following
42a
dismissal of the case.”); Valero Terrestrial Corp. v
Paige, 211 F.3d 112, 116 (4th Cir.2000) (“we are
convinced that Mesquite is generally limited to the
circumstance. . .1In which a defendant openly
announced an intention to reenact ‘precisely the same
provision’ held unconstitutional below.”); Citizens for
Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v.
Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir.2000) (“the
repeal of a challenged statute is one of those events
that makes it ‘absolutely clear that the allegedly
wrongful behavior. . .could not reasonably be expected
to recur.”); Native Village of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38
F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir.1994) (same)
In support of his argument that this case is not
moot, the Plaintiff cites Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d
697 (6° Cir. 2003). In that case, the state Attorney
General issued a Notice of Intended Action (“NIA”) to
the plaintiff stating that the Attorney General may file
an enforcement action against the plaintiff under the
state Consumer Protection Act unless the plaintiff
ceased certain advertising activity. Jd. at 700-01. The
plaintiff filed suit, asserting that the state statute was
unconstitutional and preempted by federal law. Jd. at
701. While the case was pending before the district
court, the Attorney General withdrew the NIA stating
that it would not issue a new NIA unless certain
“changed circumstances occurred.” Jd at 702. The
district court then dismissed the action as moot. Id.
In determining whether the case was moot, the
Sixth Circuit noted that the Attorney General’s
withdrawal of the NIA “acknowledges that related
litigation is ongoing and might reasonably be expected
to lead to the ‘changed circumstances” which would
cause a new NIA to be issued. Jd. at 705. The Sixth
ma,
43a
Circuit determined that, because the withdrawal! did
not make it “absolutely clear that the enforcement
action 1s not reasonably likely to recur,” the case was
not moot. /d. at 705-06.
In this case, however, there is no indication that
the Kentucky General Assembly will reenact the
deleted provisions of the Act after this case is
dismissed. The Plaintiff argues that the fact that the
Act passed with overwhelming support in both houses
combined with the popular opposition to the WBC’s
funeral protests make it likely that the General
Assembly will reenact Sections 5(1)(b) and (c). The
Plaintiff also argues that the fact that the Attorney
General has made the argument that the provisions
were “necessary” is evidence that the Kentucky
General Assembly will reenact them. However, these
facts do not raise the likelihood of the reenactment of
the provisions above mere speculation, at best. There
is simply no reason to question the genuineness of the
Kentucky General Assembly’s amendment of the Act
The Plaintiff also cites Cam JI, Ine
Louisville/ Jefferson County Metro Govt., 460 F.3d 717
(6 Cir. 2006). However, in that case, the defendant
local government amended the local ordinance in a
way that “did not completely remove the alleged
harm.” /d. at 720. Thus, the Sixth Circuit found the
amendment did not moot the case because “where the
changes in the law arguably do not remove the harm
or threatened harm underlying the dispute, the case
remains alive and suitable for judicial determination.”
Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). In this
case, the Plaintiffonly challenged two provisions of the
Act and the amendment to the Act entirely omitted
tinose two provisions.
44a
The Plaintiff also cites Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d
1030 (6" Cir. 2004). At issue in that case were certain
regulations promulgated by the Michigan Department
of Corrections (“MDOC”) that were repealed while the
case was pending. The Sixth Circuit held that the
repeal did not moot the case for two reasons. First,
promulgation of the rules was “solely within the
discretion of the MDOC.” 7d. at 1035. Thus, the court
determined “there is no guarantee that MDOC will not
change back to its older, stricter Rule as soon as this
action terminates.” Jd. Second, and more importantly,
the plaintiffin that case had asserted claims for money
damages and the purging of their disciplinary record:
Id
This case differs from Akers in that reenactment of!
Sections 5(1)(b) and (c) is not solely within the
discretion of one government agency. Instead, it would
require action by two houses of the General Assembly,
neither of which has indicated a desire to do so. More
importantly, however, in this case, the Plaintiff doe
not seek monetary damages. Instead, he only asked
this Court to declare unconstitutional Sections 5(1)(b)
and (c) of the Act and to enjoin the state from enforcing
them. Because those provisions no longer exist, thi:
case will be dismissed as moot
B. Attorneys’ Fees.
The next issue 1s whether the Plaintiffis entitled to
attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. That statute
provides that, in any action to enforce 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party. ..areasonable attorney’s fees as part
of the costs... .” 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b). A prevailing
plaintiff “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee
unless special circumstances would render such an
award unjust.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429
(1983) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1611, p.4(1976)). “[Tlhe
fee applicant bears the burden ~ establishing
entitlement to an award ” Id. at
Plaintiffs are “prevailing parties for attorney fee
purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in
litigation which achieves some of the benefit the
parties sought in bringing suit.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506
U.S. 103, 109 (1992) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433
|A] plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merit
f his claim materially alters the legal relationship
between the partie: n way that directly benefit
the plaintiffs.” /d
be entitled 1
attorneys’ fees if ‘special circumstances would render
uch an award unjust.” Deja Vu v. Metropolitan
Government of Nashville, 421 F.3d 417, 422 (6% Ci
2005) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429
(1983)). “But little guidance has been provided by the
Supreme Court as to precisely what constitutes a
pecial circumstance that would defeat a fee award
and we have recently opted for a case-by-case approach
rather than adopting a ‘predetermined formula.” /d
“In that case-by-case inquiry, the burden is on the
non-prevailing party to make a strong showing that
‘special circumstances warrant a denial of fees.” /d
(quoting Morscott, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 936 F.2d
271, 273 (6th Cir.1991)
In Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v
Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532
U.S. 598 (2001), the Supreme Court held that
plaintiff is not a “prevailing party” where his lawsuit
7
caused a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct
if he does not also secure a judgment on the merits o1
urt ordere 1 Cor ent de ree Id at 600
after the plaintiff filed suit charging
that certain provisions of West Virginia state law
violated federal law, the state legislature enacted two
ills which eliminated the challenged provisions, /d. at
01. In holding that the plaintiff was not a “prevailing
the Supreme Court rejected the catalyst
int to which the plaintiff 1s deemed
revalling party if he “achieves the desired result
because le V 1U ed a voluntary change in thi
defendants conduct. Jd he Court determined that
‘atalyst theory was incorrect because it permitted
ittorney lee “where there I nojudicially anctioned
nang legal relationship / it
Later, in Sol Wyner, 127 S.Ct. 2188 (2007), the
Court determined that a plaintiff who obtain
preliminary injunction alter an abbreviated hearing 1
not entitled to attorney's fees where the court late!
denies a permanent injunction after a dispositive
adjudication on the merits. /d. at 2191. The Court held
that “la] plaintiff who achieves a transient victory at
the threshold of an action can gain no award under
that fee-shifting provision if, at the end of th
litigation, her initial success is undone and she leave
the courthouse emptyhanded.” /d. at 2192. The Court
noted that the fact that the eventual ruling on the
merits superseded the preliminary ruling was “{olf
controlling importance.” Jd. at 2195-96. The Court
expressly stated that it was not addressing whether a
plaintiff may sometimes be entitled to attorney's fee:
where he obtains a preliminary injunction and there |
no tinal dec I f Line rie | ’ ij] I
196
his case 1s dillerent Irom Buckhannon in th
Viaintilf in this case obtained a preliminary injunct
prior to the defendants voluntary cessation of tl
conduct And this case 1 liftferent from Sole in tha
the preliminary injunction was not dissolved before th
case became moot he Court has been unable t
locate any Sixth Circuit cases in which the plaint
was awarded attorney, rer where he obtained o
preliminary miunction Hbeltlore the c: Vil (] ai
Il | i the rT f ‘ ‘
Ihe Plaintiff re ( ‘ }
1 7326 (6° Coy (0) PVE?) P |
“an Cuircult ienied | plaintifl I |
ttorney fer hold vy thata plaintill
preliminary nyunctior mn only be consider
prevailing party r tne niunct represent
imbiguou na bi l probable Tee '
merit ind not mere yntenance f the ’
yuo Ordered becau tne balance yt ¢ itive
»T Live p yntiti / ! 4 { {}{) {
Weh Le if } if {
ne
in that Lhe | Lill charged tl
iefendant town hip and ts ollicials had violated
fMirst Amendment rights by retaliating against him 1
hling lawsuits with regard to certain “certificat
occupancy he had unsuc fully petit T
Lownship to } ic to him. fd L (42 }
ine district ! Le |
50a
The preliminary injunction did not, however,
amount to a ruling that the plaintiff was entitled to
engage in the communications that he proposed in his
Complaint. In fact, it appears that current Kentucky
law — which the Plaintiff never challenged — would
likely prohibit the activity in which the Plaintiff
proposed to engage. The Plaintiff proposed to
“congregate, picket, or demonstrate” within 300 feet of
a funeral, to make sounds and display images
observable or within earshot of funeral participants
and to distribute literature near a funeral. The
Plaintiff explains that these activities would be
conducted as part of a “campaign against
homosexuality” and the proposed communicetions are
controversial and offensive and target the funerals of
military personnel. (DE 48, Pf.’s Brief at 5, 7).
The Court’s ruling does not mean that the Plaintiff
can conduct these activities. The Plaintiff is
unambiguously prohibited under current Kentucky
law from engaging in tumultuous behavior, making
unreasonable noise, and creating a “physically
offensive” condition at a funeral. He is also prohibited
from making “any utterance, gesture, or display
designed to outrage the sensibilities of the group”
attending the funeral, if such acts are done with intent
to prevent or disrupt the funeral. The Plaintiff has not
even challenged these provisions of the Act.”
’ While Plaintiff professes in his Complaint that he has no
subjective intent to disrupt the funeral with his activities, his
liability for his proposed communications does not depend upon
his subjective intent. See, e.g., Little v. Commonwealth, 272
S.W.3d 180, 186 (Ky. 2008) (intent can be inferred from a
defendant’s conduct).
bla
For these reasons, the Court finds that the
preliminary injunction in this particular case does a
render the Plaintiffa prevailing party under 42 U.
§ 1988.
Moreover, even if he were to be considered a
“prevailing party’ ee 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the special
circumstances described above.’ a ke the denial of
attorney’s fees in this action. While the Plaintiff may
have obtained a preliminary injunction, the injunction
did not directly benefit him. Further, current
Kentucky law that was :n force throughout this
litigation and never challenged by the Plaintiff would
appear to likely prohibit much of the communications
proposed by the Plaintiff.
For all these reasons, the Plaintiff should not be
awarded attorney's fees.
Dated this 26" day of June, 2009
Karen K. Cc aldwell /s/ KKC
United States District Judge
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION AT FRANKFORT
CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-CV-24-KKC
[Filed July 14, 2009]
BART McQUEARY,
PLAINTIFF
JACK CONWAY,
in his Official Capacity as Attorney General
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky
DEFENDANT.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the opinion and order entered in
this matter on June 26, 2009, the Court HEREBY
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that:
this matter is DISMISSED as moot:
this judgment is FINAL and APPEALABLE,
and
3) this matter is STRICKEN from the active
docket of this Court.
Dated this 14" day of July, 2009
Signed By:
aN Karen K. Caldwell /s/ KKC
United States District Judge
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.