Appendix — Conway v. McQueary

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APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A: Opinion, United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

BO ge i 3 re la

Appendix B: Opinion and Order, United States

District Court, Eastern District of

Kentucky, Central Division at

Frankfort

(SUNG ZG, GUUS) 6. wc cree cess BOG

Appendix C: Judgment, United States District

Court, Eastern .District of

Kentucky, Central Division at

Frankfort

52a

(July 14, 2009) .

APPENDIX A

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT

PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-5807

[Filed July 29, 2010]

BART McaQt SEARY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

JACK CONWAY, Attorney General of the

Commonwealth of Kentucky,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal] from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Frankfort.

No. 06-00024—Karen K. Caldwell, District Judge.

Argued: April 22, 2010

Decided and Filed: July 29, 2010

Before: GUY, BOGGS and SUTTON, Circuit Judges

2a

COUNSEL

ARGUED: William E. Sharp, AMERICAN CIVIL

LIBERTIES UNION OF KENTUCKY, Louisville,

Kentucky, for Appellant. Tad Thomas, OFFICE OF

THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL, Frankfort,

Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William E. Sharp,

David A. Friedman, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION OF KENTUCKY, Louisville, Kentucky, for

Appellant. Tad Thomas, Lisa K. Lang, OFFICE OF

THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL, Frankfort,

Kentucky, for Appellee.

OPINION

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. In 2006, Bart McQueary

challenged the validity of a Kentucky law placing

limits on protests at military funerals, claiming that

the law violated his free-speech rights under the First

and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court

granted McQueary’s motion to enjoin enforcement of

the law on a preliminary basis, soon after which

Kentucky repealed the relevant provisions of the

statute. The Commonwealth’s voluntary repeal of the

law, the parties now agree, mooted McQueary’s § 1983

action. Yet the parties take sides over whether, in the

aftermath of the Commonwealth’s repeal of the law,

McQueary is a “prevailing party” eligible for attorney's

fees under § 1988.

In March 2006, the Kentucky legislature added

three misdemeanors to its criminal code, all designed

to discourage protests by the Westboro Baptist

Church, whose members have become known for

staging anti-homosexual protests at military

funerals—a _ practice that McQueary’s attorney

acknowledges is “controversial (and offensive to

many), R.43 at 7. See 2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 50-51;

Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211-12 (4th Cir. 2009),

cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010). In full, the three

new misdemeanors read as follows:

A person is guilty of disorderly conduct in the

first degree when he or she:

(a) In a public place and with intent to cause

public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm,

or wantonly creating a risk thereof:

l. Engages in fighting or in violent,

tumultuous, or threatening behavior;

2. Makes unreasonable noise; or

3. Creates a hazardous or physically

offensive condition by any act that serves

no legitimate purpose; and

(b) Acts in a way described in paragraph (a)

of this subsection within three hundred (300)

feet of a:

1. Cemetery during a funeral or burial;

2. Funeral home during the viewing of a

deceased person;

3. Funeral procession;

a

4. Funeral or memoria! service; and

(c) Knows that he or she is within three

hundred (300) feet of an occasion described

In paragraph (b) of this subsection

2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 50 § 1(1), codified as amended at

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 525.055(1)

A person is guilty of disrupting meetings and

processions in the first degree when, with intent

to prevent or disrupt a funeral or burial, funeral

home viewing of a deceased person, funeral

procession, or funeral or memorial service for a

deceased person, he or she does any act tending

to obstruct or interfere with it physically or

makes any utterance, gesture, or display

designed to outrage the sensibilities of the

group attending the occasion

2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 50 § 3,

§ 525.145(1)

codified at Ky. Rev. Stat

A person 1s guilty of interference with a funeral

when he or she at any time on any day

(a) Blocks, impedes, inhibits, or in any other

manner obstructs or interferes with access

into or from any building or parking lot of a

building in which a funeral, wake, memoria!

service, or burial is being conducted, or any

burial plot or the parking lot of the cemetery

in which a funeral, wake, memorial service,

or burial is being conducted;

(b) Congregates, pickets, patrols, aem

onstrates, or enters on that portion of a

public right-of-way or private property that

is within three hundred (300) feet of an

event specified in paragraph (a) of thi

subsection: or

(c) Without authorization from the family of

the deceased or person conducting the

service, during a funeral, wake, memorial

service, or burial

1. Sings, chants, whistles, shouts, yells

or uses a bullhorn, auto horn, sound

amplification equipment, or other sounds

or images observable to or within earshot

of participants in the funeral, wake

memorial service, or burial: o1

2. Distributes literature or any othe

item

2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 5065

Roughly one month after the passage of these law:

sart McQueary, a Kentucky resident who had joined

these protests in the past and wanted to do so again,

filed a lawsuit against Kentucky’s Attorney General in

federal court. See R.1. McQueary claimed that §§ 5(b)

and 5(c) of the March 2006 Act, located in the third of

the new laws, violated his First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights in several ways. He wanted to

“congregate||, picket||” and “demonstrate||” in a non

disruptive way on public rights-of-way within 300 feet

of funerals, yet the 2006 Act appeared to prevent him

from doing so. 2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 50 § 5(b). He wanted

lo make sounds and display images “observable to or

within earshot of” funerals without permission from

the family of the deceased and without disrupting the

funeral, yet the 2006 Act appeared to prevent him

from doing so. 2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 50 § 5(c). And he

wished to “distribute|| literature” during his funeral

protests, yet the 2006 Act appeared to prohibit him

from doing so 2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 50 & Sic) MecQueary

asked the district court to declare 8&& 5(b) and 5(

unconstitutional on their face and to enjoin thei

enforcement

[In Septemb«e r 2006, the district court preliminarih

enjoined enforcement of §§ 5(b) and 5(c), finding it

likely that the provisions were unconstitutionally

overbroad. See McQueary v. Stumbo (McQueary 1), 453

lh. Supp. 2d 975, 997 (E.D. Ky. 2006). Six months later

in March 2007, the Kentucky legislature repealed

these two subsections of the 2006 Act. See 2007 Ky

Laws Ch. 10783

After Kentucky repealed the challenged provision

the district court dismissed the lawsuit as moot. Se

McQueary v. Conway (McQueary I1), 634 F. Supp. 2d

$21, $30 (.D. Ky. 2009). In the same order, the court

denied McQueary’s request for attorney’s fees. The

court reasoned that McQueary did not directly benefit

from the preliminary injunction because the central

premise of its likelihood of SUCCES! conclusion

overbreadth—did not necessarily establish that

McQueary could picket the way he wanted to. See id

at 832-33. And because McQueary did not challeng:

other provisions of the 2006 Act prohibiting “violent

tumultuous, or threatening behavior” near funeral!

> ‘>F

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 525.055, the court thought it

likely that even after the court preliminary

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8a

“[Plrevailing party” is a “legal term of art,”

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603, one that two recent

decisions of the Supreme Court help to define. In

Buckhannen, the plaintiff sought an injunction barring

enforcement of a West Virginia statute and obtained a

court-ordered preliminary injunction, though one to

which West Virginia consented. See id. at 601. Two

months after the district court rejected the State’s

sovereign immunity defense and one menth after it

denied the State’s motion for summary judgment, the

State repealed the statute, after which the district

court dismissed the case as mooxw and denied the

plaintiffs request for attorney’s fees. See id. The

Supreme Court affirmed the denial of fees, rejecting

the “catalyst theory” for awarding fees, under which a

plaintiff “prevailed” if he “achieveld] the desired result

because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change

in the defendant’s conduct,” such as a legislative

repeal of a challenged statutory provision. Jd. at

601-02. That theury, the Court reasoned, overlooks the

legal reality that “prevailing party” covers only parties

“in whose favor a judgment is rendered.” Jd. at 603

(internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant’s

voluntary change, even one precipitated by litigation,

does not amount to “a court-ordered change in the

legal relationship” between the plaintiff and

defendant, as required to establish prevailing-party

status. Id. at 604.

In Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 86 (2007), the Court

established that the “court-ordered change in the legal

relationship” between a plaintiff and defendant must

be “enduring” and irrevocable. Jd. That did not happen

in Sole because the trial court dissolved the

preliminary injunction it entered in favor of the

claimant. A preliminary injunction, the Court held,

Qa

does not establish prevailing-party status if it is

“reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final

decision in the same case,” because § 1988 requires

lasting relief, not the temporary, “fleeting success”

such an injunction represents. Jd. at 83; see also id. at

82 n.3. Sole, however, reserved the question presented

here: “whether, in the absence of a final decision on the

merits ..., Success 1n gaining a preliminary injunction

may sometimes warrant an award of counsel fees.” Jd.

at 86. See also Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760

(1987) (rejecting fee request for “interlocutory” victory

and explaining that “{rlespect for ordinary language

requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on

the merits of his claim before he can be said to

prevail”).

After Buckhannon but before Sole, our court

considered whether the winner of a_ preliminary

injunction was a “prevailing party.” In Dubuc v. Green

Oak Township, 312 F.3d 736 (6th Cir. 2002), a

landowner filed a lawsuit against a township, charging

the township with refusing to permit him to divide his

lot in retaliation for his exercise of free-speech rights.

Early in the lawsuit, the claimant obtained a

preliminary injunction ordering the township to issue

him a temporary certificate of occupancy as long as he

complied with seven conditions. Jd. at 753. The district

court denied the request for “interim fees,” and we

affirmed. See id. at 753-54. In the context of a

preliminary injunction, we reasoned, “there is only

prevailing party status if the injunction represents ‘an

unambiguous indication of probable success on the

merits, and not merely a maintenance of the status

quo ordered because the balance of equities greatly

favors the plaintiff.” Jd. at 753 (quoting Webster v.

Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 1988)). Because

10a

the injunction was not a “clear victory” for the

claimant and was issued only in connection with

several “conditions” imposed on the claimant, Dubuc

upheld the district court’s denial of fees. Id. at 754.

The claimant’s objective in the lawsuit, we concluded,

was not to obtain a temporary certificate of occupancy,

which is all that the preliminary injunction provided,

but to obtain damages for alleged violations of his

constitutional rights, which the court ultimately

denied. Jd. (Because Dubuc predates Sole, the court

never addressed a more basic reason for denying that

particular fee request: A claimant may not obtain

interim attorney’s fees for a preliminary injunction

that is later dissolved. See Sole, 551 U.S. at 83.)

There are two more threads to the prevailing-party

inquiry. One, to be a prevailing party, the plaintiff

must obtain a “material” change in the legal

relationship between himself and the defendant. Sole,

551 U.S. at 82, 86 (internal quotation marks and

modifications omitted). A material change “directly

benefit[s]” a plaintiff by modifying the defendant’s

behavior toward him. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103,

111 (1992); see also Tex. State Teachers Ass'n uv.

Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989).

Absent a direct benefit, the plaintiff achieves only a

symbolic victory, which § 1988(b) does not compensate.

See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 118; Tex. State Teachers Ass’n,

489 U.S. at 792.

Two, the idea behind § 1988 is to award fees to

deserving parties, not to generate “satellite” disputes

over fees, City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557,

566 (1992); see Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610, which

prompt “a second major litigation,” Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). In assessing fee

lla

requests, the Court thus tends to eschew fact-based

and speculative inquiries into why government bodies

altered their conduct because they (1) tend to

“distract{] . . . from,” not further, § 1988's goal of

encouraging adequate representation for civil rights

plaintiffs, Tex. State Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 791,

and (2) waste scarce judicial resources on questions

“which [are] almost impossible to answer,” id.; see

Dague, 505 U.S. at 566.

That is all well and good. But none of this readily

resolves today’s case: McQueary does not invoke the

“catalyst” theory; he did not ultimately lose on the

merits; the preliminary injunction, as we will explain

shortly, materially changed the relationship between

the parties; and the preliminary injunction turned at

least in part on the district court’s assessment of the

merits. Keeping in mind the Court’s admonishment

that fee inquiries should not generate satellite

litigation, are there any other considerations that

might clarify the inquiry? Several possibilities come to

mind:

* Perhaps, in view of the nature of a preliminary

injunction, success on this type of interim relief never

suffices. The statute after all refers to “the” prevailing

party, not “a” prevailing party, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b),

suggesting that the only court-ordered change in the

legal relationship between the parties that matters

should be a lasting one, namely the change that

culminates in a final judgment. Otherwise, individuals

and States—both “prevailing” parties at times who

“may” obtain fees—might seek fees for all manner of

interim victories whenever for one reason or another

the case does not proceed to final judgment. Cf, Hewitt,

482 U.S. at 760 (surviving a motion to dismiss “is not

12:

the stuff of which legal victories are made”). Adding

force to the idea that a “preliminary” victor is never a

prevailing party is this reality: Our review of a

preliminary injunction ruling, even one that turns on

the merits and even one that is resolved through a

published opinion, is not binding on the panel that

reviews the ultimate final injunction decision. See

Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981);

Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v.

Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2007); Smuth

Wholesale Co., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477

F.3d 854, 873 n.13 (6th Cir. 2007).

But this approach, clear as it might be, fails to

account for fact patterns in which the claimant

receives everything it asked for in the lawsuit, and all

that moots the case is court-ordered success and the

passage of time. When protesters seek an injunction to

exercise their First Amendment rights at a specific

time and place—say to demonstrate at a Saturday

parade—a preliminary injunction wil] give them all

the court-ordered relief they need and the end of the

parade will moot the case. In what way are such

claimants not prevailing parties? We think they are.

See Young v. City of Chicago, 202 F.3d 1000, 1000 (7th

Cir. 2000) (awarding fees to protestors who obtained a

preliminary injunction to protest at the 1996

Democratic National Convention, which was the only

relief sought). The same is true of a government

employee who seeks to exclude an unconstitutionally

obtained report from an administrative hearing and

obtains a preliminary injunction that irrevocably

excludes the report. See Watson v. County of Riverside,

300 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2002). So also for a

plaintiff who seeks to delay enforcement of a statute

until a certain event occurs—-say a scheduled public

13a

referendum—and the preliminary injunction brings

about that result. Cf Thomas v. Nat'l Sct. Found. , 330

F.3d 486, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

Not all preliminary injunctions, as these examples

show, have merely a catalytic effect. The defendants in

these cases did not voluntarily change their conduct.

An immediately enforceable preliminary injunction

compelled them to. And in each instance, the plaintiffs

obtained all of the relief they requested once the

preliminary injunction served its purpose. See N.

Cheyenne Tribe v. Jackson, 433 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th

Cir. 2006); Watson, 300 F.3d at 1096.

The plaintiffs in all of these cases, it is true, might

have avoided the “preliminary” label attached to their

victories by asking the courts to convert their motions

for a preliminary injunction into motions for a final

injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). Yet Rule 65 is

not the Rosetta Stone to prevailing-party inquiries. A

district court may, but it does not have to, grant Rule

65 requests, and nothing about the nature of the

prevailing-party inquiry suggests that it should turn

on whether a district court happens to embrace this

administrative streamlining device. In the final

analysis, the preliminary nature of the relief does not

by itself provide a ground for never granting fees.

* Perhaps preliminary-injunction winners are

never eligible for fees for a different reason. In Sole,

the Court held that a preliminary injunction does not

establish prevailing-party status if it is “reversed,

dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in

the same case.” 551 U.S. at 83. When a case becomes

moot, courts often vacate their earlier rulings on the

theory that a ruling should not stand when the party

l4a

opposing it is deprived of a chance to obtain a final

ruling on the issue or to seek appellate review of

it—due to events outside of the party’s control, such as

the defendant’s voluntary cessation of conduct. See

Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. __, 1380 S. Ct. 576, 581

(2009); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S.

36, 40 (1950); cf U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V.,

590 F.3d 1091, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2010) (collecting

cases holding that preliminary injunctions

automatically dissolve upon final judgment).

The Munsingwear doctrine suggests a potentially

straightforward approach to the fees question: Sole

says that “dissolved” or “otherwise undone”

preliminary injunctions do not warrant fees; mootness

generally requires a court to vacate its earlier rulings,

including any preliminary injunction granted in the

case; fees for preliminary injunctions therefore are not

permitted under Sole. But this approach again fails to

account for the instances in which a party has

prevailed by every measure of victory, as illustrated

above. The Munsingwear rule, moreover, is not as

clear as day: It has exceptions of its own, see, e.g., U.S.

Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S.

18, 24 (1994) (Munsingwear does not apply to

voluntary settlements), and vexing issues often arise

over whether a case is moot in the first place, see, e.g.,

Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),

Inc. , 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (a defendant’s voluntary

change in conduct moots a case only if it is “absolutely

clear” alleged wrongdoing is unlikely to recur); Honig

v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318 (1988) (a case avoids

mootness if “capable of repetition, yet evading

review’). All of these exceptions have little to do with

the status of a party’s victory, precluding us from

l5a

saying that preliminary-injunction winners are never

eligible for prevailing-party status on this basis alone.

* Perhaps instead preliminary-injunction winners

are always eligible for fees. Buckhannon says that “a

court-ordered change in the legal relationship”

between the plaintiff and defendant suffices to

establish prevailing-party status, 532 U.S. at 604, and

the granting of a preliminary injunction assuredly

changes the legal relationship between the parties,

permitting the claimant to do something that the

defendant previously resisted. Rather than doing too

little, however, this approach does too much. Some

preliminary injunctions have nothing to do with the

merits, offering no insight into whether one party or

the other will prevail at the end of the case. Some

initial injunctions, sometimes called stay-put or status

quo injunctions, turn more on the grave risks of

irreparable harm to one party or to the public interest

than on the legal virtues of the parties’ positions. See

Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir

1988) (denying fees to a plaintiff who obtained an

injunction “because the balance of the equities greatly

favor|ed]” maintaining “the status quo”).

Several courts have rejected fee requests for

obtaining such injunctions. See Dearmore v. City of

Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 524 (5th Cir. 2008) (granting

fees only if the claimant obtains “an unambiguous

indication of probable success on the merits”); N.

Cheyenne Tribe v. Jackson, 433 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th

Cir. 2006) (denying fees where injunction “granted

only interim relief that preserved the status quo”);

Thomas, 330 F.3d at 493 (denying fees where

injunction “merely preserved the status quo”); John T.

ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318

l6a

F.3d 545, 558 (3d Cir. 2003) (denying fees where

injunction was “not based on the merits of [the

plaintiff's] claims”); Race v. Toledo-Davila, 291 F.3d

857, 858-59 (1st Cir. 2002) (denying fees where

injunction merely safeguarded claimant’s rights during

the litigation). No court to our knowledge holds that

the victors of such holding-pattern injunctions and

nothing more automatically receive fees, though one

court comes close. Cf. Richard S. v. Dep't of

Developmental Servs. of Cal., 317 F.3d 1080, 1088-89

(9th Cir. 2003).

A similar defect defeats a related intuition,

permitting fees whenever the nature of the victory is

one that Congress has permitted the losing party to

appeal. That would be true of final judgments, see 28

U.S.C. § 1291, and of the granting or the denial of

preliminary injunctions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). But

that rule, too, picks up orders that have nothing to do

with success on the merits. Even aside from the stay-

put injunctions identified above, it would extend to

class certification orders, which Congress has

permitted parties immediately to appeal (with the

permission of the court of appeais). See Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(f). “A procedural victory that may be a way station

to utter substantive defeat creates no right to fees.”

Richardson v. Penfold, 900 F.2d 116, 119 (7th Cir.

1990); see Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.,

No. 09-448, 560 U.S. ___, slip op. at 11-12 (May 24,

2010) (holding that “purely procedural victorlies]” do

not qualify for fees even under standards “less

stringent” than the prevailing-party requirement).

All of this leaves us with a contextual and case-

specific inquiry, one that does not permit us to say that

preliminary-injunction winners always are, or never

17a

are, “prevailing parties.” In the aftermath of

Buckhannon and Sole, however, we can say that the

“preliminary” nature of the relief—together with the

requirement that a prevailing-party victory must

create a lasting change in the legal relationship

between the parties and not merely “catalyze” the

defendant to voluntary action—will generally counsel

against fees in the context of preliminary injunctions.

With these considerations in mind, we turn to the

district court’s explanation for denying McQueary’s fee

request.

First, the court denied fees on the ground that

McQueary did not “directly benefit[}” from the 2006

preliminary injunction. That is not so, however. Before

the injunction, Kentucky could prosecute McQueary

for holding a large, controversial sign on a public

sidewalk near a funeral, see 2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 50

§§ 5(b), (c); it could prosecute him for quietly

distributing anti-military literature to mourners

entering a funeral home, see id. § 5(c); and it could

prosecute him for singing songs of protest that the

funeral party could hear but that did not disrupt the

funeral, see id. After the injunction, McQueary could

do all of these things without fear of prosecution under

these laws. No one disputes that Kentucky would have

prosecuted McQueary in the absence of an injunction,

establishing that this court-ordered freedom

materially changed Kentucky’s behavior toward

him—at least temporarily. See DiLaura v. Township of

Ann Arbor, 471 F.3d 660, 670 (6th Cir. 2006); Berger v.

City of Mayfield Heights, 265 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir.

2001).

Second, in explaining its “direct benefit” ruling, the

court added that other Kentucky laws would prohibit

L&a

McQueary’s proposed protests. But why should we

assess McQueary’s prevailing-party status based on

statutes he never challenged? That is not the norm. In

considering whether a claimant directly benefitted

from litigation, we usually measure the plaintiff's gain

based on the relief requested in his complaint, not

based on the practical significance of the relief

obtained. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12; Hewitt, 482

U.S. at 760-61; DiLaura, 471 F.3d at 670. Even a

single dollar in nominal damages, the pinnacle of

worthless relief, qualifies as a direct benefit. See

Farrar, 506 U.S. at 112. In this instance, McQueary

asked the district court to enjoin Kentucky from

enforcing two provisions of Kentucky law, and the

preliminary injunction temporarily did so. That the

benefit came through a preliminary injunction may

make a difference in the end to the fees request. But

this aspect of the court’s direct benefit analysis does

not turn on that point: Its analysis defeats McQueary’s

request for fees no matter whether the court’s order of

relief comes in the form of a preliminary injunction or

a final one.

There is a good reason for focusing on the relief the

plaintiff requested, not the additional relief he might

have requested. “A request for attorney’s fees should

not result in a second major litigation,” Hensley, 461

U.S. at 437, yet an assessment of the practical

significance of the relief obtained almost always will

lead to collateral litigation over the relevance of these

other laws. Cf’ Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609-10

(raising similar concerns about looking outside the

litigation to assess whether a plaintiff prevailed). To

assess whether McQueary’s proposed protests would

violate other provisions of Kentucky law, the district

court would need to develop a factual record defining

LYa

the precise contours of McQueary’s proposed “non

disruptive” protests. Would he block access to funeral

homes’ driveways and doorways? See Ky. Rev. Stat

Ann. § 525.155. What precisely would he chant, sing or

shout near funerals and how loudly would he do so?

When does a noise become so loud or a sign so

offensive that it “prevent|s] or disrupt[{s] a funeral”?

See id. § 525.145. These factual inquiries are difficult

in and of themselves, but they are virtually impossible

when it comes to protests not yet undertaken, only

anticipated.

All of this would be prelude to a difficult legal

inquiry. The district court would have to decide

whether, under the “facts” of this hypothetical protest,

McQueary would violate any other provisions of

Kentucky law that the Attorney General might

uncover. And that would require the court to assess

any constitutional challenges McQueary might have to

those provisions. The possibility of prosecution under

an additional unconstitutional statute after all could

not undermine the practical significance of McQueary’s

success. To say that this would create a costly side

show divorced from the merits of the underlying

dispute is an understatement. To say that it would

lead to district court orders more in the nature of

advisory opinions than fee determinations is an

unvarnished reality. Cf. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48

(1969).

In defending the district court’s reasoning, the

Attorney General argues that we owe deference to the

court’s finding that other provisions—restrictions on

“violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior” and

“hazardous and physically offensive condition[s]” near

funerals, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 525.055—‘“hkely

prohibit VicQue ar, proposed contro

ACTIVILtK McQueary 11, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 832. But

the district court made no fact findings on this point

It issued the preliminary injunction and denied the fee

request based on the pleadings, leaving us nothing to

which we could defer. Jd.; McQueary /, 453 F. Supp

at Y/Y

Nol go VV « (¢ aitiy basi LOT concluding

McQueary’s proposed protests would violate other

unchallenged aspects of Kentucky law. McQueary

alleges that he wants to protest “in a non-disruptive

manner. K.1 4 15: see R.1 WY 13-14. To deny th

request for fees on the ground that his conduct would

violate valid restrictions on “violent, tumultuous, o1

threatening behavior,” we would have to do one of twe

things: assume that McQueary pleading

misre present how he planne d to behave or infer that

non-disruptive protests involve threatening behavio)

Kither approach would alter our normal practice of

accepting a complaint's factual allegations as true and

of drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff

favor when ruling without an evidentiary record. C/

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56]

(1992) (following that rule when assessing standing)

Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cis

2008) (ollowing that rule in evaluating a motion t

dism ss)

‘The Attorney General's argument is unavailing for

another reason. A plaintiff crosses the threshold to

“prevailing party” status by succeeding on a singk

claim, even if he loses on several others and even 1

that limited success does not grant him the “primary

relief” he sought. 7ex. State Teachers Ass'n, 489 U.S. at

790-91; see also Farra 06 US. at 111. Th

inilicance of the rehet obtaimed vor oniv to the

amount of fees. kchkerhart, 461 US. at 484-35. Had

MeQueary chalienged all of Kentucky's funeral protest

prohibitions as apple d to him. but succeeded only in

having SO S(b) and ble) enjommed ua VE rbroad, at

would still qualify as a prevailing party. The Attorne

General olfers no justilication—and we see nom i)

denying the fees request in toto because MeQueary

chose to challenge fewer rather than more provision

of Kentucky lav

fhird, the court justified it Tere lenmial on the

ground that the injunction W i premised On

overbreadth yround nol on the vround = that

MceQueary proposed COM MuUuUnICallon were

on tLitutionally protected ‘Thy Loe ms u theory that

hay nothing to do with the pre hminaryv nature of the

court relief; 1b would apply equally to permanent

myunctions. The theory does not work in cither setting

When a plaintiff obtains the greater victory (striking a

statute in all of its applications, t.¢., on its face) rather

than the more narrow victory (striking the statute a

apphed only to his communications), he does not

become less eligible for fees. “Prevailing parties” are

winning parties, and a party who succeeds in showin

that a law cannot be enforced in any of its application

due to overbreadth concerns is the epitome of a

prevailing party-—for he has won not just on behalf of

himself but on behalf of many others as well. One of

the justifications for § 1988 is that it allows individual

citizens to act as “private attorneylts| gyoneral Le

State Teachers Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 793, making it odd t

ay that the htigant who truly acts on behalf of othe:

citizens by bringing an overbreadth challenge is not

ert tied oO ta

Even if we focus on the effect of an overbreadth

ruling solely with respect to McQueary, at any rate,

how has he not prevailed? Whether premised on

overbreadth grounds or as-applied grounds, the effect

is the same: The injunction bars Kentucky from

prosecuting McQueary under §§ 5(b) and 5(c) and thus

alters the legal relationship between McQueary and

the State.

At least four circuits agree that plaintiffs who

prevail on overbreadth grounds may collect attorney’s

fees. See Ways v. City of Lincoln, 274 F.3d 514, 520

(8th Cir. 2001); Phelps v. Hamilton, 120 F.3d 1126,

1130 (10th Cir. 1997) (vagueness challenge); Nash v.

Chandler, 848 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1988); Solomon

v. City of Gainesville, 796 F.2d 1464, 1466-67 (11th

Cir. 1986). No circuit to our knowledge disagrees, and

we are not prepared to be the first.

Fourth, the court briefly justified its denial of fees

on an alternative theory—that “special circumstances”

warrant the denial of fees. But the court never

explained what made the circumstances surrounding

this litigation “special” and thus has given us no basis

for assessing this theory for denying fees.

The “special circumstances” exception apparently

flows from dicta in Hensley v. Eckerhart, which says

that district courts may deny fees to a prevailing party

“in ‘special circumstances’ when an award would be

‘unjust.” 461 U.S. at 446. We have acknowledged the

doctrine on several occasions and have observed that

a non-prevailing party must make a “strong showing”

to establish special circumstances. Deja Vu v. Metro.

Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, 421 F.3d 417,

42? (6th Cir. 2005). But we have never (to our

4y*)

20a

knowledge) found a “special circumstance” justifying

the denial of fees. /d. (later developments in the law,

which would prevent a party from prevailing if case

were relitigated at time of fees determination, are not

special circumstances); see Wikol v. Birmingham Pub.

Schs. Bd. of Educ., 360 F.3d 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2004) (a

nee "'" “ é aca aai

prevailing party's “bad acts” during course of litigation

are not a special circumstance); Morscott, Inc. v. City

of Cleveland, 936 F.2d 271, 273 (6th Cir. 1991) (a

defendant’s good faith in enacting challenged provision

is not a special circumstance).

It is “extremely rare” to deny fees based on special

circumstances in other circuits as well. Saint John’s

Organic Farm v. Gem County Mosquito Abatement

Dist., 574 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted); but see Bateson v. Getsse,

857 F.2d 1300, 1306 (9th Cir. 1988) (denying fees

where court had to “engage in extensive supplemental

research” because of prevailing party’s woefully

inadequate briefing). On remand, the district court

remains free to explain why special circumstances

exist here.

So far, we have explained why the district court’:

explanations for denying fees in this difficult case do

not hold up. Yet we have not explained whether

McQueary should collect fees—and with good reason.

That question initially is for the district court, which

had a ring-side view of the underlying proceedings,

which is in the best position to make an initial cut at

whether McQueary deserves fees for this preliminary

injunction and which is given considerable deference

over most aspects of the fees inquiry. Buckhannon,

Sole and Dubuc make clear, we think, that, when a

claimant wins a preliminary tnjunction and nothing

24a

more, that usually will not suffice to obtain fees under

§ 1988. What remains unclear is when the occasional

exceptions to that rule should apply, a contextual and

case-specific inquiry that we ask the district court to

undertake in the first instance

IT]

Kor l~@SE TFeAaSONS, We Teverst and remand fot

further yroceedings

~—

25a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-5807

[Filed July 29, 2010]

BART MCQUEARY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

JACK CONWAY, Attorney General

of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,

Defendant - Appellee.

Before: GUY, BOGGS and SUTTON, Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Frankfort

THIS CAUSE was heard on the record from the

district court and was argued by counsel.

IN CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, itis ORDERED

that the judgment of the district court is REVERSED

and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings

consistent with the opinion of this court.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Leonard Green, Clerk

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

CENTRAL DIVISION AT FRANKFORT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-CV-24-KKC

[Filed June 26, 2009]

BART McQUEARY,

PLAINTIFF,

JACK CONWAY,

in his Official Capacity as Attorney General

of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,

DEFENDANT.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the parties’

briefs regarding the issues of mootness and the

plaintiffs entitlement to attorney’s fees. For the

following reasons, the Court finds that this matter is

moot and that the plaintiffis not entitled to attorney’s

fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988

I. Procedural History.

The Plaintiff commenced this action with a

complaint in which he charged that certain provisions

of House Bill 333 (HB 333) and Senate Bill 93 (SB 93)

(together, the “Act”), which former Kentucky Governor

Ernie Fletcher signed into law on March 27, 2006,

infringed upon his right to protest at funerals under

the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the

Constitution and were facially unconstitutional. (Rec.

No. 1, Complaint {¥ 1-2, 18).

On September 26, 2006, this Court granted the

Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction finding

he had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of

his claim that certain provisions of the Act violated the

First Amendment. McQueary v. Stumbo, 453

F Supp.2d 975 (k.D.Ky. 2006). After the Court’s ruling

on the preliminary injunction, the General Assembly

amended the Act to delete the challenged provisions

and the remaining provisions of the Act were codified

at KRS 525.055, KRS 525.145 and KRS 525.155.

The issues now before the Court are whether this

matter has been mooted by the Kentucky General

Assembly’s amendment of the Act and whether the

Plaintiffis entitled to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing

party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

A. Current Kentucky Law.

The provisions of the Act that were not challenged

by the Plaintiff and are currently in effect prevent

certain disorderly and disruptive conduct at funerals

and certain conduct interfering with a funeral.

28a

1) KRS 525.055 - Disorderly Conduct.

KRS 525.055 provides that a person is guilty of

disorderly conduct in the first degree when he or she:

(a) In a public place and with intent to cause

public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm,

or wantonly creating a risk thereof:

lL. Engages in fighting or in_ violent,

tumultuous, or threatening behavior;

Makes unreasonable noise: or

3. Creates a hazardous or physically

offensive condition by any act that serves

no legitimate purpose; and

(b) Acts in a way described in paragraph (a) of

this subsection within three hundred (300)

feet of a:

1. Cemetery during a funeral or burial;

: 5

2. Funeral home during the viewing of a

deceased person;

3. Funeral procession;

4. Funeral or memorial service; or

1

5. Building in which a funeral or memorial

service is being conducted; and

(c) Acts in a way described in paragraph (a) of

this subsection at any point in time between

29a

one (1) hour prior to the commencement of

an event specified in paragraph (b) of this

subsection and one (1) hour following its

conclusion; and

(d) Knows that he or she is within three

hundred (300) feet of an occasion described

in paragraph (b) of this subsection.

2) KRS 525.145 - Disrupting a Funeral.

KRS 525.145 provides that a person is guilty of

disrupting meetings and processions in the first degree

when:

with intent to prevent or disrupt a funeral or

burial, funeral home viewing of a deceased

person, funeral procession, or funeral or

memorial service for a deceased person, he or

she does any act tending to obstruct or interfere

with it physically or makes any utterance,

gesture, or display designed to outrage the

sensibilities of the group attending the occasion.

Id.

3) KRS 525.155 - Interference with a

Funeral.

KRS 525.155 provides that a person is guilty of

interference with a funeral when:

at any point in time between one (1) hour prior

to the commencement of an event specified in

this subsection and one (1) hour following its

conclusion, he or she blocks, impedes, inhibits,

30a

or in any other manner obstructs or interferes

with access into or from any building or parking

lot of a building in which a funeral, wake,

memorial service, or burial is being conducted,

or any burial plot or the parking lot of the

cemetery in which a funeral, wake, memorial

service, or burial is being conducted.

B. The Provisions Subject to this Court’s

Opinion and Order.

The Plaintiff challenged only Sections 5(1)(b) and

(c) of the Act. Those provisions provided the following:

(1) A person is guilty of interference with a

funeral when he or she at any time on any

day:

(b) Congregates, pickets, patrols, dem

onstrates, or enters on that portion of a

public right-of-way or private property

that is within three hundred (300) feet of

la funeral, wake, memorial service, or

burial or any burial plot or the parking

lot of the cemetery in which a funeral,

wake, memorial services, or burial is

being conducted]; or

Without authorization from the family of

the deceased or person conducting the

service, during a funeral, wake, memorial

service, or burial

dla

Sings, chants, whistles, shouts,

yells, or uses a bullhorn, auto

horn, sound amplification

equipment or other sounds or

images observable to or within

earshot of participants in the

funeral, wake, memorial

service, or burial; or

Distributes literature or any

other item

The Plaintiff asserted that Sections 5(1)(b) and (c)

were unconstitutional prior restraints on speech and

were not narrowly tailored to serve a significant

government interest and did not leave open alternative

channels for communication. (Rec. No. 1, Complaint

{ 17). He further asserted that Sections 5(1)(b) and (c)

were overbroad. (Rec. No. 1, Complaint 9419-20, 24)

Finally, he asserted that Section 5(1)(c)

unconstitutionally made speech on public property

contingent upon the approval of a private party. (Rec

No. 1, Complaint J 22).

C. The Plaintiff's Proposed Communications,

[In his Complaint, the Plaintiff asserted that he had

picketed funerals with the Westboro Baptist Church

three times in Kentucky. (Rec. No. 1, Complaint {| 10)

He stated that such protests are an effective way to

convey the church’s message. (Rec. No. 1, Complaint

{ 11). He stated he waned to protest at future funerals

but feared he would be prosecuted for violating

Sections 5 (1)(b) and (c) of the Act. (Rec. No. l,

Complaint { 12)

The Plaintiff stated that he wished to congregate,

picket, or demonstrate on that portion of a public

right-of-way that is within 300 feet of a funeral, wake,

memorial service or burial’ in a manner that does not,

and is not intended to disrupt the event. (Rec. No. 1,

Complaint 7 13).

The Plaintiff further stated he wished to make

sounds and display images observable to or within

earshot of funeral participants, in a manner that does

not, and is not intended to, disrupt the funeral. The

Plaintiff wished to make these sounds and display

these images without seeking or obtaining

authorization from the family of the deceased or

person conducting the funeral. (Rec. No. 1, Complaint

4 14). The Plaintiff stated that he also wished to

distribute literature in a non-disruptive manner

without first obtaining the permission of the family of

the deceased or person conducting the funeral. (Rec

No. 1, Complaint | 15)

DD). The Preliminary Injunction.

The Plaintiff moved tor a preliminary injunction

(Rec. No. 2) enjoining the Attorney General from

enforcing Sections 5(1)(b) and (c). This Court granted

the motion, finding that the provisions were

content-neutral and, thus, were required to be

narrowly tailored to serve a significant government

interest and to leave open ample alternative channels

of communication

Throughout this Opinion, the Court will refer to all of the event:

covered by Sections 5(1)(b) and (c) — funerals, wakes, memorial

services and burials — simply as “funerals.”

The Court assumed, for purposes of the preliminary

injunction motion, that the state had a significant

interest in protecting funeral attendees’ from

unwanted communications that are so obtrusive that

they are impractical to avoid. However, the Court

determined that the Plaintiff had established a

likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that

Sections 5(1)(b) and (c) burdened substantially more

speech than necessary to prevent interference with a

funeral or to protect funeral attendees from unwanted

obtrusive communications that are otherwis¢

impractical to avoid

The Court's reasoning is important to the current

motion for attorney’s fees and, thus, below isa lengthy

excerpt from the Opinion

section 5(1)(b) prohibits all congregating

picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering

on property within 300 feet of a funeral whether:

such activities interfere with the funeral or not

and whether such activities are authorized by

funeral attendees or not. It prohibits such

activity whether the persons involved in the

activities are visible to funeral participants o1

not and whether they are making any sound

that funeral participants can hear or not. Thus

in addition to prohibiting intrusive activities,

Section 5(1)(b), prohibits activity that would not

interfere with a funeral and_ prohibit:

communications that are neither necessarily

unwanted nor so obtrusive that they cannot bi

avoided by the funeral attendees

Further, the 300-foot buffer zone

substantially larger than the 36-foot buffer zone

upheld in Madsen, the 8-foot floating buffer:

prohibit on

rma vee oT

36a

lot of a building or cemetery where a funeral is

being conducted.

It is not reasonable to construe Sections

5(1)(b) and (c) as prohibiting precisely the same

kinds of activities that are already prohibited by

other sections of the Act. “It is ‘a cardinal

principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a

statute ought, upon the whole, to be so

construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause,

sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or

insignificant.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews,534 U.S

19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 5338

U.S. 167, 174(2001)). Unless Section 5(1)(b) and

(c) are superfluous, they must be intended to

restrict sounds that are less obtrusive and

disruptive than the “unreasonable noise”

already prohibited in Section One. Likewise,

Section 5(1)(b) and (c) must be intended to

restrict sounds and images that are less

obtrusive and disruptive than those “designed

to outrage the _ sensibilities” of funeral

participants already prohibited in Section

Three. Likewise, Section 5(1)(b) and (c) must be

aimed at communications that are less

obtrusive and disruptive than the acts that tend

to obstruct or interfere with a funeral that are

already prohibited by Section Three of the Act

and the acts that would obstruct or interfere

with ingress to and egress from a funeral

prohibited by Section 5(1)(a) of the Act.

McQueary, 453 F.Supp.2d at 996-97

37a

E. Current Issues.

After the Court’s order granting preliminary

injunction, by Agreed Order (DE 41), the parties

agreed to brief two issues. The first issue is whether

this case is now moot given that the General Assembly

amended the Act to delete the provisions that were

subject to the preliminary injunction. The second issue

is Whether the Plaintiff is a “prevailing party” entitled

to attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Il. ANALYSIS.

A. Mootness.

“Article III of the Constitution confines the power

of the federal courts to adjudication of ‘cases’ or

‘controversies. Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry,

108 F.3d 637, 644 (6 Cir. 1997) (citing U.S. Const. art

II], N 2: Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). “The

mootness doctrine, a subset of the Article Ill

justiciability requirements, demands a_ liv

case-or-controversy when a federal court decides a

case.” ld

In Kentucky Right to Life, the Sixth Circuit

addressed mootness in a case in which, like this one,

the Kentucky General Assembly amended the act at

issue while litigation regarding the constitutionality of

the act was pending. /d. at 639. As here, the state

argued that the statutory amendments mooted various

claims brought by the plaintiff. 7d. at 644. The

plaintiffs argued, as they also argue here, that the

claims were not moot “because the Kentucky General

Assembly remains free to reenact the prior statutory

scheme.” Jd. The Sixth Circuit stated that “[(lJegislative

38a

<

repeal or amendment of a challenged statute while a

case 1s pending on appeal usually eliminates [the]

requisite case-or-controversy because a statute must

be analyzed by the appellate court in its present form.”

Id. The Court determined that the Plaintiffs

challenges to several of the statutory provisions were

moot because of the statutory amendments. /d.

In doing so, the Sixth Circuit distinguished City of

Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982)

In that case, the district court declared that certain

language in a city ordinance was unconstitutionally

vague. /d. at 287-88. While the matter was pending on

appeal before the Fifth Circuit, the city revised the

ordinance to delete the language at issue. /d. at 288

The Supreme Court determined that the case was not

moot because “the city’s repeal of the objectionable

language would not preclude it from reenacting

precisely the same provision if the District Court’

judgement were vacated.’ /d. at 289

However, the Sixth Circuit noted in Kentucky Right

to Life, that, “|cjritical to the [Supreme] Court’s

decision [in Aladdin’s Castle] was the City’s

announced intention to reenact the unconstitutional

ordinance if the case was dismissed as moot.” Kentucky

Right to Life, 108 F.3d at 645. The Sixth Circuit found

this to be an “essential fact, which created the

case-or-controversy before the Supreme Court in

Aladdin's Castle.” Id.; see also Brandywine, Inc. v. City

of Richmond, 359 F.3d 830, 836 (6 Cir. 2004)

(“[c]ritical to the holding in [Al/adin’s Castle], however,

was the fact that legislators had publicly expressed an

intention to re-enact the offending legislation”).

39a

The Plaintiff argues that this Court should not

follow Kentucky Right to Life because it is no longer

good law in light of Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.

Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000).

(DE 43, Pf.’s Brief at 8 n.7; DE 44 Pf.’s Response at 3).

In that case, the Supreme Court held that a citizen

suitor’s claim for civil penalties under the Clean Water

Act did not necessarily become moot when, after the

litigation commenced, the defendant came _ into

compliance with its permit which imposed limitations

on the defendant's discharge of pollutants. Jd. at

lL i3-i4

The Court noted that, “[i]t is well settled that ‘a

defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged

practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to

determine the legality of the practice.” Jd. at 189

(quoting Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. at 289). This

is because, 1f a defendant can moot an action by

voluntarily ceasing the practice in question after

litigation has begun, then the defendant is “

return to his old ways.” Jd.

free to

The Court stated that, to prevent that from

happening, a case can become moot by a defendant's

voluntary conduct if “subsequent events made it

absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior

could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Jd. (quoting

United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn.,

393 U.S. 199,203 (1968). “The heavy burden of

persuading the court that the challenged conduct

cannot reasonably be expected to start up again lies

with the party asserting mootness.” /d. (international

quotations and brackets and citation omitted).

40a

The Plaintiff argues that Friends of the Earth has

implicitly overturned Kentucky Right to Life. However,

in Brandywine, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 359 F.3d 830

(6 Cir. 2004), a case decided after Friends of the

Earth, the Sixth Circuit determined that the plaintiff's

claim for declaratory and injunctive relief was moot,

citing Kentucky Right to Life. Id. at 835-36. In that

case, the plaintiff asserted that the city’s zoning

ordinance was unconstitutional. After the plaintiff

filed the action, the city amended the ordinance. /d. at

833

The Sixth Circuit noted that the plaintiff asked the

court to declare the zoning ordinance unconstitutional]

and to prevent the city from enforcing it. Jd. at 836

The court determined these claims were moot because

the court could “neither declare unconstitutional nor

enjoin the enforcement of a provision that 1s no longer

in effect.” Jd. As to the plaintiffs claim for money

damages, however, the court determined that claim

was not moot because, despite the amendment, the

plaintiff could seek damages for any losses caused by

the enforcement of the challenged ordinance. Jd

Brandywine makes clear that Kentucky Right to

Life remains good law after Friends of the Earth.

Furthermore, Friends of the Earth 1S

distinguishable from this case in that the defendant in

that case was a private party who was charged with

The Plaintiff also argues that the Court should not follow

Kentucky Right to Life because its “rationale is flawed.” (DE 44,

Pf.’s Response at 7). However, because neither the Sixth Circuit

Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court has overruled Kentucky

Right to Life, this district court must follow it

4ia

not complying with the terms of its permit governing

the amount of treated water the defendant could

discharge into a nearby waterway. Friends of the

Earth, 528 U.S. at 175-177. The issue was whether

the case became moot by the actions of the private

party to bring itself into compliance with the law or

whether there was a reasonable expectation that the

private party would return to its “old ways.” /d. at 189.

The defendant in this case, however, like that in

Kentucky Right to Life, is a government official and the

issue, like that in Kentucky Right to Life, is whether

the case has become moot by the Kentucky Genera!

Assembly’s amendment of a statute.

The Sixth Circuit has noted that “cessation of the

allegedly illegal conduct by government officials has

been treated with more solicitude by the courts than

similar action by private parties... such self-correction

provides a secure foundation for a dismissal based on

mootness so long as it appears genuine.” Mosley v.

Hairston, 920 F.2d 409, 415 (6" Cir. 1990) (quoting

Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1365 (7? Cie.

1988)). See also Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 705

(6° Cir. 2003); Fed. of Adver. Indus. Representatives v.

Chicago, 326 F.3d 924, 929 (7th Cir.2003) (Friends of

the Earth standard “is the appropriate standard for

cases between private parties, but this is not the view

we have taken toward acts of voluntary cessation by

government officials ... we place a greater stock in

their acts of self-correction, so long as they appear

genuine.”); New England Reg'l Council of Carpenters

v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 18 (ist Cir.2002) (“{ulnder

circuit precedent. . .the City of Mesquite exception

applies ‘only where there is a reasonable expectation

that the challenged conduct will be repeated following

42a

dismissal of the case.”); Valero Terrestrial Corp. v

Paige, 211 F.3d 112, 116 (4th Cir.2000) (“we are

convinced that Mesquite is generally limited to the

circumstance. . .1In which a defendant openly

announced an intention to reenact ‘precisely the same

provision’ held unconstitutional below.”); Citizens for

Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v.

Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir.2000) (“the

repeal of a challenged statute is one of those events

that makes it ‘absolutely clear that the allegedly

wrongful behavior. . .could not reasonably be expected

to recur.”); Native Village of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38

F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir.1994) (same)

In support of his argument that this case is not

moot, the Plaintiff cites Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d

697 (6° Cir. 2003). In that case, the state Attorney

General issued a Notice of Intended Action (“NIA”) to

the plaintiff stating that the Attorney General may file

an enforcement action against the plaintiff under the

state Consumer Protection Act unless the plaintiff

ceased certain advertising activity. Jd. at 700-01. The

plaintiff filed suit, asserting that the state statute was

unconstitutional and preempted by federal law. Jd. at

701. While the case was pending before the district

court, the Attorney General withdrew the NIA stating

that it would not issue a new NIA unless certain

“changed circumstances occurred.” Jd at 702. The

district court then dismissed the action as moot. Id.

In determining whether the case was moot, the

Sixth Circuit noted that the Attorney General’s

withdrawal of the NIA “acknowledges that related

litigation is ongoing and might reasonably be expected

to lead to the ‘changed circumstances” which would

cause a new NIA to be issued. Jd. at 705. The Sixth

ma,

43a

Circuit determined that, because the withdrawal! did

not make it “absolutely clear that the enforcement

action 1s not reasonably likely to recur,” the case was

not moot. /d. at 705-06.

In this case, however, there is no indication that

the Kentucky General Assembly will reenact the

deleted provisions of the Act after this case is

dismissed. The Plaintiff argues that the fact that the

Act passed with overwhelming support in both houses

combined with the popular opposition to the WBC’s

funeral protests make it likely that the General

Assembly will reenact Sections 5(1)(b) and (c). The

Plaintiff also argues that the fact that the Attorney

General has made the argument that the provisions

were “necessary” is evidence that the Kentucky

General Assembly will reenact them. However, these

facts do not raise the likelihood of the reenactment of

the provisions above mere speculation, at best. There

is simply no reason to question the genuineness of the

Kentucky General Assembly’s amendment of the Act

The Plaintiff also cites Cam JI, Ine

Louisville/ Jefferson County Metro Govt., 460 F.3d 717

(6 Cir. 2006). However, in that case, the defendant

local government amended the local ordinance in a

way that “did not completely remove the alleged

harm.” /d. at 720. Thus, the Sixth Circuit found the

amendment did not moot the case because “where the

changes in the law arguably do not remove the harm

or threatened harm underlying the dispute, the case

remains alive and suitable for judicial determination.”

Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). In this

case, the Plaintiffonly challenged two provisions of the

Act and the amendment to the Act entirely omitted

tinose two provisions.

44a

The Plaintiff also cites Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d

1030 (6" Cir. 2004). At issue in that case were certain

regulations promulgated by the Michigan Department

of Corrections (“MDOC”) that were repealed while the

case was pending. The Sixth Circuit held that the

repeal did not moot the case for two reasons. First,

promulgation of the rules was “solely within the

discretion of the MDOC.” 7d. at 1035. Thus, the court

determined “there is no guarantee that MDOC will not

change back to its older, stricter Rule as soon as this

action terminates.” Jd. Second, and more importantly,

the plaintiffin that case had asserted claims for money

damages and the purging of their disciplinary record:

Id

This case differs from Akers in that reenactment of!

Sections 5(1)(b) and (c) is not solely within the

discretion of one government agency. Instead, it would

require action by two houses of the General Assembly,

neither of which has indicated a desire to do so. More

importantly, however, in this case, the Plaintiff doe

not seek monetary damages. Instead, he only asked

this Court to declare unconstitutional Sections 5(1)(b)

and (c) of the Act and to enjoin the state from enforcing

them. Because those provisions no longer exist, thi:

case will be dismissed as moot

B. Attorneys’ Fees.

The next issue 1s whether the Plaintiffis entitled to

attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. That statute

provides that, in any action to enforce 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the

prevailing party. ..areasonable attorney’s fees as part

of the costs... .” 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b). A prevailing

plaintiff “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee

unless special circumstances would render such an

award unjust.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429

(1983) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1611, p.4(1976)). “[Tlhe

fee applicant bears the burden ~ establishing

entitlement to an award ” Id. at

Plaintiffs are “prevailing parties for attorney fee

purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in

litigation which achieves some of the benefit the

parties sought in bringing suit.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506

U.S. 103, 109 (1992) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433

|A] plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merit

f his claim materially alters the legal relationship

between the partie: n way that directly benefit

the plaintiffs.” /d

be entitled 1

attorneys’ fees if ‘special circumstances would render

uch an award unjust.” Deja Vu v. Metropolitan

Government of Nashville, 421 F.3d 417, 422 (6% Ci

2005) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429

(1983)). “But little guidance has been provided by the

Supreme Court as to precisely what constitutes a

pecial circumstance that would defeat a fee award

and we have recently opted for a case-by-case approach

rather than adopting a ‘predetermined formula.” /d

“In that case-by-case inquiry, the burden is on the

non-prevailing party to make a strong showing that

‘special circumstances warrant a denial of fees.” /d

(quoting Morscott, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 936 F.2d

271, 273 (6th Cir.1991)

In Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v

Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532

U.S. 598 (2001), the Supreme Court held that

plaintiff is not a “prevailing party” where his lawsuit

7

caused a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct

if he does not also secure a judgment on the merits o1

urt ordere 1 Cor ent de ree Id at 600

after the plaintiff filed suit charging

that certain provisions of West Virginia state law

violated federal law, the state legislature enacted two

ills which eliminated the challenged provisions, /d. at

01. In holding that the plaintiff was not a “prevailing

the Supreme Court rejected the catalyst

int to which the plaintiff 1s deemed

revalling party if he “achieves the desired result

because le V 1U ed a voluntary change in thi

defendants conduct. Jd he Court determined that

‘atalyst theory was incorrect because it permitted

ittorney lee “where there I nojudicially anctioned

nang legal relationship / it

Later, in Sol Wyner, 127 S.Ct. 2188 (2007), the

Court determined that a plaintiff who obtain

preliminary injunction alter an abbreviated hearing 1

not entitled to attorney's fees where the court late!

denies a permanent injunction after a dispositive

adjudication on the merits. /d. at 2191. The Court held

that “la] plaintiff who achieves a transient victory at

the threshold of an action can gain no award under

that fee-shifting provision if, at the end of th

litigation, her initial success is undone and she leave

the courthouse emptyhanded.” /d. at 2192. The Court

noted that the fact that the eventual ruling on the

merits superseded the preliminary ruling was “{olf

controlling importance.” Jd. at 2195-96. The Court

expressly stated that it was not addressing whether a

plaintiff may sometimes be entitled to attorney's fee:

where he obtains a preliminary injunction and there |

no tinal dec I f Line rie | ’ ij] I

196

his case 1s dillerent Irom Buckhannon in th

Viaintilf in this case obtained a preliminary injunct

prior to the defendants voluntary cessation of tl

conduct And this case 1 liftferent from Sole in tha

the preliminary injunction was not dissolved before th

case became moot he Court has been unable t

locate any Sixth Circuit cases in which the plaint

was awarded attorney, rer where he obtained o

preliminary miunction Hbeltlore the c: Vil (] ai

Il | i the rT f ‘ ‘

Ihe Plaintiff re ( ‘ }

1 7326 (6° Coy (0) PVE?) P |

“an Cuircult ienied | plaintifl I |

ttorney fer hold vy thata plaintill

preliminary nyunctior mn only be consider

prevailing party r tne niunct represent

imbiguou na bi l probable Tee '

merit ind not mere yntenance f the ’

yuo Ordered becau tne balance yt ¢ itive

»T Live p yntiti / ! 4 { {}{) {

Weh Le if } if {

ne

in that Lhe | Lill charged tl

iefendant town hip and ts ollicials had violated

fMirst Amendment rights by retaliating against him 1

hling lawsuits with regard to certain “certificat

occupancy he had unsuc fully petit T

Lownship to } ic to him. fd L (42 }

ine district ! Le |

50a

The preliminary injunction did not, however,

amount to a ruling that the plaintiff was entitled to

engage in the communications that he proposed in his

Complaint. In fact, it appears that current Kentucky

law — which the Plaintiff never challenged — would

likely prohibit the activity in which the Plaintiff

proposed to engage. The Plaintiff proposed to

“congregate, picket, or demonstrate” within 300 feet of

a funeral, to make sounds and display images

observable or within earshot of funeral participants

and to distribute literature near a funeral. The

Plaintiff explains that these activities would be

conducted as part of a “campaign against

homosexuality” and the proposed communicetions are

controversial and offensive and target the funerals of

military personnel. (DE 48, Pf.’s Brief at 5, 7).

The Court’s ruling does not mean that the Plaintiff

can conduct these activities. The Plaintiff is

unambiguously prohibited under current Kentucky

law from engaging in tumultuous behavior, making

unreasonable noise, and creating a “physically

offensive” condition at a funeral. He is also prohibited

from making “any utterance, gesture, or display

designed to outrage the sensibilities of the group”

attending the funeral, if such acts are done with intent

to prevent or disrupt the funeral. The Plaintiff has not

even challenged these provisions of the Act.”

’ While Plaintiff professes in his Complaint that he has no

subjective intent to disrupt the funeral with his activities, his

liability for his proposed communications does not depend upon

his subjective intent. See, e.g., Little v. Commonwealth, 272

S.W.3d 180, 186 (Ky. 2008) (intent can be inferred from a

defendant’s conduct).

bla

For these reasons, the Court finds that the

preliminary injunction in this particular case does a

render the Plaintiffa prevailing party under 42 U.

§ 1988.

Moreover, even if he were to be considered a

“prevailing party’ ee 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the special

circumstances described above.’ a ke the denial of

attorney’s fees in this action. While the Plaintiff may

have obtained a preliminary injunction, the injunction

did not directly benefit him. Further, current

Kentucky law that was :n force throughout this

litigation and never challenged by the Plaintiff would

appear to likely prohibit much of the communications

proposed by the Plaintiff.

For all these reasons, the Plaintiff should not be

awarded attorney's fees.

Dated this 26" day of June, 2009

Karen K. Cc aldwell /s/ KKC

United States District Judge

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

CENTRAL DIVISION AT FRANKFORT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-CV-24-KKC

[Filed July 14, 2009]

BART McQUEARY,

PLAINTIFF

JACK CONWAY,

in his Official Capacity as Attorney General

of the Commonwealth of Kentucky

DEFENDANT.

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the opinion and order entered in

this matter on June 26, 2009, the Court HEREBY

ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that:

this matter is DISMISSED as moot:

this judgment is FINAL and APPEALABLE,

and

3) this matter is STRICKEN from the active

docket of this Court.

Dated this 14" day of July, 2009

Signed By:

aN Karen K. Caldwell /s/ KKC

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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