Opposition Brief — In re Orcutt
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No. 10-525
Sn the
Supreme Court of the Anited States
IN RE: WILLIAM E. ORCUTT!
On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circutut
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Teresa L. Watson, KS Bar# 16654
Counsel of Record
J. Steven Pigg, KS Bar# 09213
Fisher, Patterson, Sayler
& Smith, LLP
3550 SW 5" Street, P.O. Box 949
Topeka, Kansas 66601-0949
Phone: (785) 232-7761
fax: (785) 232-6604
E-mail: twatson@fisherpatterson.com
spigg@fisherpattterson.com
Attorneys for Respondent
Joel R. Euler in his
November 18, 2010
individual capacity
Becker Gallagher Cincinnan, OH Washington, D.C. + 800.890.5001
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Counter-Statement of the Questions Presented
Table of Contents
Table of Authorities
Statement of the Case
Reasons for Denying the Wr
Orcutt’'s Petition for Writ of
Mandamus should be denied
because it is an untimely Petition
for Writ of Certiorar1
Orcutt’s claims arising out of state
foreclosure proceedings are barred
under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine
he district court did not err in
declining to consider two claim:
arising out of pending
criminal proceedings against
Orcutt based on the Younge,
ibstention doctrine
The district court did not err in
dismissing the balance of Orcutt’:
claims based on Fed.R.Civ.Pro
12(b)(6) lL?
Conclusion aa
Appendix
Opinion of the District Court
(filed September 23, 2009)
IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
District of Columbia Court of Appeals \
keldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482,
103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206
(1983) ar ae ee
Kenmen Engg v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468
473 (10 Cir. 2002) 6
Rooker v. Fidehty Trust Co., 263 U.S. 4138,
115-16, 448.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362
(1923) 6-8. 1]
Sanchez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 08-2148,
2009 WL, 56894. at *3 10" Cir. 2009) LO
Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational & Prof]
Licensing of the Dep't of
Commerce of Utah, 240 F.3d 871
875 (10" Cir. 2001) 9,11
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746
27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) 9-1]
Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 241
18 U.S.C. § 1343
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)
28 U.S.C. §2101(e)
12 U.S.C. § 198]
42. U.S.C. § 1983
12 U.S.C. § 1985
Rules
Hed. R.Civ.Pro. 12(b)(6)
sup.Ct. R. 15(2)
sup.Ct. R. 13Q1)
sup.Ct. R. 13(5) G
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff William EF. Orcutt proceeds pro se. His
recitation of the facts is cursory and incomplete. It will
be supplemented here pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 15(2). Most of the facts below are gleaned from
the district court’s opinion.
Orcutt was the defendant in two Doniphan
County, Kansas, civil lawsuits, case nos. 2006-CV-1
(the Farmers State Bank lawsuit) and 2006-CV-30 (the
Troy State Bank lawsuit). Orcutt was also prosecuted
and convicted by a jury ina Doniphan County, Kansas,
criminal trial, case no. 2007-CR-16, for violating K.S.A.
21-3734 (impairment of a security interest). Orcutt
appealed his criminal case to the Kansas Court of
Appeals, case number 08-101395A. The matter was
ultimately affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded to the district court. Orcutt’s petition for
review was denied by the Kansas Supreme Court on
March 3], 2010.
The district court set out the operative facts of
the case as follows:
“In 1984, plaintiff started a farm
and home equipment’ business in
Wathena, Kansas in which he leased and
rented equipment. In the1990s, plaintiff
formed A-1 Auto and Metal Salvage in
which he bought and sold cars in
Wathena. Farmers and Troy both made
promissary notes and_= security
agreements to plaintiff or his wife
individually or to an entity that plaintiff
owned. Plaintiffs employees, Jason
Orcutt and Bobby Orcutt, also took out
loans from Farmers. These loans were
secured by personal property and
personal guarantees made to Farmers by
plaintiff and his wife.”
Farmers Lawsuit
“Farmers called the notes that
were due and named plaintiff both
individually and doing business as A>]
Metal and Salvage, Inc., Farmers and
Home Equipment and Orcutt’s Auto
Sales as defendants. Plaintiff admitted
hability on the promissory notes and
stipulated that he and the other
defendants, jointly and severally, owed
l’armers $414,741.64.’
“The Doniphan County, Kansas
district court (the Kansas court’)
determined the interests and obligations
of all defendants. The Kansas court found
that an express agency relationship
existed among plaintiff, Jason Orcutt,
and Bobby Orcutt in that the latter two
were authorized to borrow money on
behalf of plaintiff. The Kansas court
entered judgment in favor of Farmers
and granted its motion to extinguish
redemption rights. The court ordered a
sheriffs ‘sale-of réal estate located in
Doniphan County and confirmed and
approved the sale on December 5, 2007.
No notice of appeal was filed.”
Troy Lawsuit
“Troy called the notes that were
due and named plaintiff, his wife, and
Farmers as defendants. The Kansas
court found that plaintiff was delinquent
on the promissory notes, security
agreements, and real estate mortgages
and foreclosed on various real estate and
secured property. The Kansas court also
found that plaintiff had waived his nght
of redemption. A sheriffs sale of real
estate located in Doniphan County was
ordered and confirmed and approved by
the Kansas court on June 22, 2007. No
notice of appeal was filed.” (Response,
App. 4a-5a.)
Orcutt later filed suit against various
defendants alleging violations under federal criminal
statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,1341, 1343, and 1962(c) and
(d). Orcutt also alleged violations under federal civil
statutes 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. Orcutt
claimed that defendants conspired to illegally seize
and sell his property in bad faith and used Kansas law
and judicial proceedings to do so.
Defendants named in Orcutt’s complaint were
Brandon, Tony, and Brice Libel (“the Libels”), who are
officers of Farmers State Bank and were witnesses
during the Farmers lawsuit. James Needham is the
president of Troy State Bank and was a witness during
the Troy lawsuit. Joel Euler is an attorney who
represented Farmers in both civil lawsuits against
Orcutt. Ire Dennis Hawver is an attorney who
represented plaintiff in both civil lawsuits. Robert
Orcutt is plaintiffs brother who allegedly forged
plaintiffs name in order to borrow money. Thad Geiger
and Needham were subpoenaed to testify in the felony
criminal case against Orcutt. Darrell Lamme and
Larry Hunsaker are employees of the City of Elwood,
Kansas, which is also a defendant. Jerry Dubach is the
sheriff of Doniphan County, which is also a defendant.
The district court observed that though Orcutt’s
complaint was “virtually devoid of facts,” Orcutt’s
claims apparently stemmed from an alleged illegal
foreclosure on his personal and real assets by Farmers
State Bank and Troy State Bank. The foreclosures
were based upon notes which Orcutt alleges were
signed with his name by his brother and employee,
Robert Orcutt, without authorization.
Orcutt also alleged, without specificity, that
local law enforcement officers used illegal search
warrants and other harassment methods to destroy
Orcutt’s businesses and well being. All other
allegations of Orcutt’s complaint were generic and
failed to identify any specific defendant.
Orcutt’s complaint. failed to identify any specific
act or omission of defendant Euler upon which his
claims are based and failed to identify Euler
individually at any point other than the paragraph in
which he identified Euler's residence address
Defendant Euler was not mentioned in any of Orcutt’s
alleged 35 counts in the complaint.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
es Orcutt’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus should
be dismissed because it is an untimely Petition
for Writ of Certiorari.
Orcutt filed the instant Petition for Writ of
Mandamus on October 15, 2010. In it, he attacks the
reasoning contained in the decisions of the District
Court and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. In his
conclusion he asks this Court to enter an order
overturning the decision of the courts below. This ts
the very essence of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
A Petition for Writ of Certiorari seeking relief
from the decision of a federal circuit court of appeals
must be filed within 90 days of entry of judgment. 28
U.S.C. §2101(c); Supreme Court Rule 13(1). The entry
of judgment in this case occurred on June 9, 2010.
Because Orcutt timely filed a petition for rehearing,
the time to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this
case ran from the date rehearing was denied. Supreme
Court Rule 13(1). Orcutt’s petition for rehearing was
denied on June 15, 2010.
Orcutt had 90 days to file a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari beginning on June 15, 2010. This means his
Petition for Writ of Certiorari should have been filed
on or before September i3, 2010. Instead, it was filed
6
October 15, 2010, approximately one month late
Orcutt did not seek or receive a grant of additional
time to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. See
Supreme Court Rule 13(5).
Orcutt’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus is, in
reality, a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and as such
was untimely filed. The Petition should be dismissed.
Z. Orcutt’s claims arising out of state foreclosure
proceedings are barred under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker-Fe/dman doctrine is based on two
United States Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 448.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed.
362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75
L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The doctrine “prohibits a lower
federal court from considering claims actually decided
by a state court, and claims inextricably intertwined
with a prior state-court judgment.” Kenmen Eng’g v.
City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 473 (10 Cir. 2002)
(internal citation and quotations omitted). A claim is
inextricably intertwined if “the state-court judgment
caused, actually and proximately, the injury for which
the federal-court plaintiff seeks redress.” /d. at 476. A
federal case does not involve an “inextricably
intertwined” state court judgment if the complaint
challenges the constitutionality of the state law, so
long as the state court did not address it and the
plaintiff does not request the federal court to upset the
state court judgment. /d.
The district court in this case reasoned
The court finds that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine’ precludes
review of plaintiffs claims arising out of
or otherwise related to the Farmers and
Troy lawsuits. Viewed to the outer hmits
of liberal construction, plaintiff's
allegations raise claims that were
decided in favor of defendants by the
Kansas court or are inextricably
intertwined with the state judgments
The Kansas court found that Bobby
Orcutt was authorized to borrow money
on behalf of plaintiff by virtue of an
express agency relationship. The Kansas
court interpreted the contracts and
determined the contractual rights and
interests of the parties in both the
Farmers and Troy lawsuits. It also found
that plaintiff had no right of redemption
in both lawsuits
The Kansas court entered
judgments 1n both the Farmers and Troy
lawsuits which entitled the banks to
foreclose on their security interests and
to execute on other property to collect the
debt owed by plaintiff. The Doniphan
County sheriff took possession of
plaintiffs properties pursuant to the
judgments and sold the property in a
sheriffs sale. The Kansas court found
that the sale was regular and in
contormity with Kansa vy and
(Respon e App a)
Orcutt argu in hi Petit
Mandamus that Hovoker-keldman does not : ly
because he does not seek to overturn the state court
decisions. Instead, he argues, he simply seeks damage
from individual defendants for personal wrongful act
committed against him to be paid out of each
individual defendant's personal fund This |
nothing to do with the Rooker: heldman analy
Orcutt s claims clearly attack the validity of the
tate court's orders in the foreclosure case or at the
very least are inextricably intertwined with them. At
page & of his Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Orcutt
argues that defendants violated his constitutional!
rights by trespassing, breaking and entering and
accuses them of “inappropriate treatment” of hi
personal property amounting to theft. All of the
alleged violations happened in the context of the
foreclosure proceeding
Rooker: keldman apphes to bar Orcutt’s claim
and his Petition for Writ of Mandamu hould |
denied
i
3 The district court did not err in declining to
consider two claims arising out of pending
criminal proceedings against Orcutt based on
the Younger abstention doctrine
} UnvCT at tcl ] tri ’ ma
Younger v. Harri 10) \ } ct 16
L..td.2d 669 (1971) he doctrine p! ent 1 fece
district court from intertering in nvoins
proceeding. Wetzel v. Div. of Occupational & P21
hacensing of the Dep't of Comme: ai hy
Lt el eT MOOD). Furth
L.ilederal 1] ) [ [
reising jurisdiction whet ne
Onvoinyv Lite crimini |
Iministrative proceeding Lin Lal
yurt provide in adequat forum to he
Line claim raised mn tre eae
ym plant mad 4.5/7 tne Lil proces ain
involve lm portant Late mle!
matters which traditionally look to stat
law for their resolution r impli
paratlely art ul ted Hol
ih | | 1} i}
There are except to the J
ibstention doctrin me of which 1
Late prose ution undertaken in bad fait!
v.ithout hop ol obtainin vt)
conviction and perhap Lt
extraordinary circumstane Ny Th
irreparable injury can be shown.’ /d
$76. The plaintiff bears a heavy burd
LO how that the Late action wa
frivolou Or undertaken vith
reasonably objective hope of uc a9
motivals d by cde fend int
il YT
I]
harm or that he is being retaliated or
discriminated against by defendant
Plaintiff was convicted in his Kansas
criminal trial and therefore he cannot
show that there was no hope for a
conviction. Plaintiff asserts conclusory
allegations that defendants continually
exercised bad faith in prosecuting him
because they failed to follow Kansas law
in an unspecified way. Conclusory
allegations will not suffice. Wertze/, 240
F.3d at 877 CL]t is the plaintiff's ‘heavy
burden’ to overcome the bar of Younger
abstention by setting forth more than
mere allegations of bad faith = or
harassment.”).” (Response, App. 13a)
Orcutt argues in his Petition for Writ of
Mandamus at page 11 that all three exceptions to the
Younger abstention doctrine apply in this case. He
does not explain why
The district court dismissed Orcutt’s claims
which arose out of his criminal conviction based on
Younger because his criminal appeal was pending
Since then, his case was affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded to the state district court for
further proceedings. As long as the criminal case 1
pending, Younger applies
Kven if Orcutt’s criminal matter had been
finally decided, Rooker-Feldman would apply to bar
consideration of the claims arising out of Orcutt’s
criminal conviction. Kither way, Orcutt’s Petition for
12
Writ of Mandamus should be denied
4 The district court did not err in dismissing the
balance of Orcutt’s claims based on
Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b)(6).
The district court dismissed the balance of
Orcutt’s complaint because he failed .o state a claim.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that “the
claimsin Mr. Orcutt’s complaint are so conclusory that
we are unable to discern exactly what acts he is
complaining about, or who is supposed to have
committed those acts.” (Petition for Writ of
Mandamus, App. 4) Certainly, as to defendant Euler,
there is absolutely no indication of what claims, if any,
are brought against him or what role he played in any
alleged violation.
Orcutt does not identify the dismissal of his
claims on this basis as a question presented for review.
He does not complain about their dismissal. This issue
Is Waived
CONCLUSION
Orcutt's Petition for Writ of Mandamus should
be dismissed or denied
Teresa L. Watson, KS Barf 16654
Counsel of Record
steven Pigg, KS Bar# 09213
isher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, LLP
5550 SW 5" Street, P.O. Box 949
lopeka, Kansas 66601-0949
Phone: (785) 232-7761/Fax: (785) 232-6604
li-mail: twatson@fisherpatterson.com
spigg@fisherpattterson.com
Attorneys for Respondent
Joel R. Euler in his individual capacity
APPENDIX
INDEX
Opinion of the District Court
(filed September 23, 2009) la’ l&8a
la
Case No. 2:09-cv-02025-MLB-DJW Document 94
Filed 09/23/2009
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
WILLIAM EF. ORCUTT, ]
Plaintiff, ) CIVIL ACTION
Vv. ) No. 09-2025-MLB
BRANDON LIBEL. et al
Defendants
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the court are the following:
Defendants James Needham and “had
Geiger’s motion to dismiss’ and
memorandum in support (Docs. 28, 29);
plaintiff William Orcutt’s pro se response
(Doc. 42); defendants’ reply (Doc. 55);
plaintiffs surreplies (Docs. 59, 67); and
defendants’ motions to strike plaintiff's
: : « ry l
surreplies (Docs. 62, 70)
‘Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file out of time a response to
Needham and Geiger's reply (Doc. 65). The court granted the
motion (Doc. 66). Plarintiff filed essentially the same arguments
in his second response (Doc. 67) as he did in his surreply (Doc
*).
2 Defendants Darrell Lamme, Larry Hunsaker,
and City of Elwood, Kansas’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings and memorandum in
support (Docs. 30, 31); plaintiffs response (Doc.
41); and defendants’ reply (Doc. 46).
Defendant Joel Euler’s motion to dismiss and
ed
memorandum in support (Docs. 32, 33) and
plaintiffs response (Doc. 50). No reply was
filed.
4 Defendants Doniphan County, Kansas and
Jerry Dubach’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings and memorandum in support (Docs.
44, 45). Plaintiff filed no response
5 Defendants Brandon, ‘Tony and Brice Libel’s
motion to dismiss and memorandum in support
(Docs. 75, 77); plaintiff's response (Doc. 83); and
defendants’ reply (Doc. 86).
Pro se plaintiff William Orcutt filed suit against
defendants alleging violations under federal criminal!
statues 18 U.S.C.§§ 241, 1341, 1343, and 1962(c) and
(d). Plaintiff further alleges violations under federal
civil statutes 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985.
Essentially, plaintiff claims that defendants
collectively conspired to illegally seize and sell his
property in bad faith and used Kansas law and judicial
proceedings to do so.
59). As such, the court treats both responses to Needham and
Geiger’s reply and motion to strike as surrephies
3a
Defendants contend that the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction and further that plaintiff has failed
to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), (6) and (c). Defendants variously asset other
bases for dispositive relief but, in the interest of
brevity, these will not be discussed.
For the following reasons, the aforesaid,
dispositive motions are granted
In addition, plaintiff has failed a second motion
for leave to amend his complaint to add Jack Euler as
a defendant.” (Docs. 91, 92). Mr. Euler is an attorney
who submitted an order in the Farmers lawsuit.
Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Euler “participated in the
civil rights violations towards plaintiff by signing an
improper and erroneous document which instigated
and perpetuated the civil rights violations thereafter.”
Plaintiffs motion is denied as futile for the reasons
specified herein.
PARTIES
l. Plaintiff was the defendant in two
Doniphan County, Kansas civil lawsuits, Case Nos
2006-CV-1 (the Farmers State Bank lawsuit) and
2006-CV-30 (the Troy State Bank lawsuit). He also
was prosecuted and convicted by a jury in a Doniphan
County, criminal trial, Case No. 2007-CR-16, for
violating K.S.A. 21-3734 Gmpairment of a security
interest). Plaintiffs appeal, case number 08-10395A,
Plaintiffs first motion to amend (Doc. 74) was denied
1a
is currently pending before the Kanses Court of
Appeals.
2 Brandon, Tony, and Brice Libel (“the
Libels”) are officers of Farmers State Bank (“Farmers”)
and were witnesses during the Farmers lawsuit
3 James Needham is the president of the
Troy State Bank (“Troy”) and was a witness during the
Troy lawsuit
3 Joel Euler 1 an attorney who
represented Farmers in both civil lawsuits against
plaintiff
D Ira Dennis Hawver is an attorney who
represented plaintiff in both civil lawsuits
6 Bobby (or Robert) Orcutt is plaintiffs
brother allegedly forged plaintiffs name in “order to
borrow money from [Farmers] at the instruction of
srandon Libel.” (Doc. 77 at 7)
7 Thad Geiger and Needham’ were
subpoenaed to testify in the felony criminal case
against plaintiff
8 City of Elwood, Kansas and Darrell
Lamme and Larry Hunsaker who are employees of
KH lwood, are alleged to have violated plaintiffs rights
9. Doniphan County, Kansas and Jerry
Dubach, who is the sheriff of Doniphan County are also
alleged to have violated plaintiffs rights
I]. FACTS”
In 1984, plaintiff started a farm and home
equipment business in Wathena, Kansas in which he
leased and rented equipment. In the 1990's, plaintiff
formed A-1 Auto and Metal Salvage in which he
bought and sold cars in Wathena. Farmers and Troy
both made promissary notes and security agreements
to plaintiff or his wife individually or to an entity that
plaintiff owned. Plaintiffs employees, Jason Orcutt
and Bobby Orcutt, also took out loans from Farmers.
These loans were secured by personal property and
personal guarantees to Farmers by plaintiff and his
wife. (Doc. 78-22 at 2).
farmers Lawsult
Farmers called the notes that were due and
named plaintiff both individually and doing business
as A-1 Metal and Salvage, Inc., Farmers and Home
Equipment and Orcutt’s Auto Sales as defendants.‘
Plaintiff admitted liability on the promissory notes
(Doc. 78-17 at 2) and stipulated that he and the other
‘Plaintiffs complaint is virtually devoid of facts. The court has
been able to ascertain the facts set forth herein primarily from
defendants’ submissions
‘Farmers also named plaintiffs wife, Jason Orcutt, and Bobby
Orcutt as defendants
ba
defendants, jointly and severally, owed Farmer:
$414,741.64. (Doc. 78-14 at 2)
The Doniphan County, Kansas district court
(“the Kansas court”) determined the interests and
obligations of all defendants. The Kansas court found
that an express agency relationship existed among
plaintiff. Jason Orcutt, and Bobby Orcutt in that the
later two were authorized to borrow money on behalf
of plaintiff. (Doc. 78°22 at 2). The Kansas court
entered judgment in favor of Farmers and granted its
motion to extinquish redemption rights. (Doc. 78°23 at
2). The court ordered a sheriffs sale of the real estate
located in Doniphan County and confirmed and
approved the sale on December 5, 2007. (Doc. 78°25 at
2). No notice of appeal was filed
Troy Lawsuit
Troy called the notes that were due and named
plaintiff, his wife, and Farmers as defendants. ‘lhe
Kansas court found that plaintiff was delinquent on
the promissory notes, security agreements, and real
estate mortgages and foreclosed on various real estate
and secured property. (Doc. 78-29 at 5). The Kansas
court also found that plaintiff had waived his right of
redemption. A sheriffs sale of real estate located in
Doniphan County was ordered (Doc.7831) and
confirmed and approved by the Kansas court on June
22, 2007. (Doc. 78°30). No notice of appeal was filed
li lede ral ourt I himite
jurisdiction | | land] there is a strong presumption
iainst federal jurisdiction Beams v. Norton
I Supp 2d 1323. 1327 (D.Kan. 2004) \ party m
move for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (bdC1¢
because the federal court lack uby L Matte
jurisdiction. ‘The plaintiff bears the burden to plead
adequate fact not conclusory allegation that ar
ufficient to prove jurisdiction. Beams, 327 F Supp
at 1327 (citing Penteco Corp. Ltd. Partnership—19#
Union Gas System, Inc., 929 F.2d 1519, 152) CLO
Cir. 1991). Plaintiff ha vVholly failed t
I tooker Kediman Voctru
hy court lack Jur! di} Li | ( mv Hil
judgments from state court proceeding
1257(a) provide Iflinal judyment r decree
rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
deci 1OT) could be had may eo) reviewed Dy Line
Supreme Court by writ of certiorar This statut
has been interpreted Lo preclude review of final state
court proceedings by federal district courts unde:
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (192
nd District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldma)
160 U.S. 462, 482-3 (1983)
‘The hooker’ keldman loctringe
prohibit a lower federal court tboth
from considering claims actually decided
by a state court, and claims inextricably
intertwined with } prio! tate-court
motuon
iy her "4
Kan.2Z008) Ceitin
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Kansas judgments by filing § 1983 claims in federal
court and allege that the parties involved in those
proceedings violated his constitutional rights.”
Anderson v. State of Colo., 793 F.2d 262, 263 (10th Cir
1986) (“Itis well settled that federal district courts are
without authority to review state court judgments
where the relief sought 1s in the nature of appellate
review. )
Plaintiffis not challenging the constitutionality
of the laws and rules that governed hi Cat
proceedings. He simply claims that defendants violated
his constitutional rights and in effect, requests thi
court to upset the Kansas court judgments. As such
the court lacks jurisdiction to review plaintiff's claim
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; Tal, 453 F.3d at 1256. Al!
counts, except Counts 5, 9, 13, and 27, are dismissed
HCCAUSe they were either decided by the KK insa ourt
‘he court could also sua sponte dismiss plaintiffs complaint
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Garrett v. Seymour, No. 06-7029
2007 WL 549388, at *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 23, 2007). Plaintiff
illeges in conclusory fashion that defendants collectively
conspired to unfairly and in bad faith take his property in
violation of federal constitutional law, federal statutes, and
Kansas common law. At no point in his complaint does plaintiff
make clear exactly which defendant did what alleged violatior
In § 1983 cases, defendants often include the government
agency and a number of government actors sued in their
individual capacities. Therefore it is particularly important
such circumstances that the complaint make clear exactly wh
is allered to have done what to whom, to provide each
individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against
him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations against
the state.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249-50 (10th
Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
165-6 n. 10 (2007))
lla
and final judgments were entered accordingly or are
inextricably intertwined with those judgments. Counts
5.9, 13. and 27 are dismissed for other reasons. infra
- Younger Doctrine
Plaintiff was convicted in the Kansas court for
violating criminal statute K.S.A. 21-2734. His appeal
is currently pending before the Kansas Court of
Appeals. Defendants contend that the court must
abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
Under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal
courts should not ‘interfere with tate court
proceedings when a state forum provides an
adequate avenue for relief.” Weitzel v. Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing of Dept. of
Commerce of State of Utah, 240 F.3d 871, 875 (0th
Cir. 2001).
A federal court must abstain fron
exercising jurisdiction when: ()) t
an ongoing state criminal, civil, or
administrative proceeding, (2) the state
court provides an adequate forum to hear
the claims raised in the = federal
complaint, and (3) the state proceedings
“involve important state interests,
matters which traditionally look to state
law for their resolution or implicate
separately articulated state policies.”
Id.
(crting Amanatullah v. State Bd. of Medical
Kxaminers, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999)). If
the conditions are met, federal district courts must
abstain. Id. (stating that “Younger abstention 1s
non-discretionary| ]”)
There are exceptions to the Younger abstention
doctrine, one of which is a= state’ prosecution
undertaken in bad faith “without hope of obtaining a
valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary
circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown
Id. at 876. The plaintiff bears a heavy burden to show
that the state action was: (1) “frivolous or undertaken
with no reasonably objective hope of succe ia
motivated by defendant's suspect cla: I
retaliation for the defendant's exercise of constitutiona
rights’; and (3) “conducted in such a way as |
constitute harassment and an abuse of prosecutorial
discretion, typically through the unjustified and
oppressive use of multiple prosecutions.” Id
The court finds that the Younger abstention
doctrine apphes to plaintiffs case because he has failed
to show that any, much less all, of the conditions do
exist. First, plaintiffs appeal from his criminal!
conviction 1s currently pending before the Kansas
Court of Appeals. Second, Kansas courts provide an
adequate forum to hear plaintiffs complaints, which
plaintiff is currently utilizing. Third, Kansas has an
important state interest in considering defective
complaints and prosecutions brought in bad faith and
have state laws governing such actions by Kansas
officials. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
No. 08-2148, 2009 WL 56894, at *3 (10th Cir. Jan. 9,
2009) (stating that “the propriety of the state district
court judge's actions is a matter of obvious state
*)
a
interest and one that is best left, at least in the first
instance, for review by the state appellate courtsl |”).
Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that he
will suffer irreparable harm or that he is being
retaliated or discriminated against by defendants.’
Plaintiff was convicted in his Kansas criminal trial and
therefore he cannot show that there was no hope fora
conviction. Plaintiffasserts conclusory allegations that
defendants continually exercised bad faith in
prosecuting him because they failed to follow Kansas
law in an unspecified way. Conclusory allegations wil!
not suffice. Weitzel, 240 F.3d at 877 ([I]t is the
plaintiffs ‘heavy burden’ to overcome the bar of
Younger abstention by setting forth more than mere
allegations of bad faith or harassment.”)
The court therefore abstains from considering
plaintiffs claims concerning his criminal information
and prosecution under the Younger doctrine. Counts 9
and 13 are dismissed. This leaves Counts 5 and 27
IV. 12(b)(6)
Defendants also move to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court
construes lhberally a pro se litigant’s complaint
Dickerson v. Leavitt Rentals, 995 F. Supy. 1242, 1245
(). Kan. 1998). “Pro se complaints are held to ‘less
‘Actually, because plaintiffs complaint ts entirely conclusory, it
is impossible to determine which defendants supposedly
violated plaintiffs rights in connection with the state
prosecution, much less how they did so.
Lda
tringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Id. (quoting Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9
(1980)). Nonetheless. to withstand a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain
enough allegations of fact to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d
1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. \
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). All well-pleaded facts
ind the reasonable inferences derived from those facts
ire viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
(Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1283 (Oth Cu
2008) allegations,
bearing upon this court's consideration. Shero v. City
of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (1LOth Cir. 2007)
[In the end, the issue is not whether the plaintiff will
or she is entitled to
Beedk \ Wilson
Conclusory
however. have n
ultimately prevail, but whether hi
offer evidence to support the claim:
122 F.3d 1059, 1063 GO0th Cir. 2005)
Counts 5 ana 2
Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated
criminal statute 18 U.S.C. § 241. “[Plrivate citizens
cannot prosecute criminal actions” unless a private
right of action can be inferred from the statutory
language or Mamer_ v. Collie Club of
America, Inc., 229 F.3d 1164, 2000 WL 1114237, at *2
(10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2000) (Table); King v. Keller, No.
06-4001-SAC, 2006 WL 1517765,
‘ 6 (D. Kan. May
2006)
elsewhere.
V
The Tenth Circuit has noted that
pection 24] IS
a criminal statute
prohibiting acts of conspiracy
igainst the rights of citizens, and 1t does not provide
| da
for a private civil cause of action.” Newcomb v. Ingle,
827 F.2d 675, 677 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff makes
no argument or cites no authority to the contrary. Nor
does the court infer a private right of action in 18
U.S.C. § 241. Counts 5 and 27 are dismissed
V CONCLUSION
Kor the reasons stated more fully herein
defendants’ motions to dismiss and for judgments on
the pleadings (Docs. 28, 30, 32, 44, 75) are vranted
Plaintiff did not have permission to file a surreply and
the court has not considered his surreplies. (Docs. 59,
67). Needham and Geiger’s motions to strike plaintif
+)
surreplies (Docs. 6 (QO) are granted
Defendant Hawver has answered (Doc. 23) but
has not filed a dispositive motion. He shall have until
October 2 to file such a motion
A motion for reconsideration of this order is not
encouraged The standards governing motions to
reconsider are wellestablished. A motion to reconsider
1s appropriate where the court has obviously
misapprehended a party's position or the facts or
applicable law, or where the party produces new
evidence that could not have been obtained through
the exercise of reasonable diligence. Revisiting the
issues already addressed is not the purpose of a motion
to reconsider and advancing new arguments or
supporting facts which were otherwise available for
presentation when the original motion was briefed or
argued 1s inappropriate. Comeauv. Rupp, 810 I. Supp
l6a
1172 (D. Kan.1992). Subject to the conditions set forth
in the next paragraph, plaintiff may file only one
motion which shall not exceed five total pages and
shall strictly comply with the standards enunciated by
this court in Comeau. A motion that does not comply
with these requirements wil! be stricken. Any
responses to a motion for reconsideration shall not
exceed three pages. No reply shall be filed
Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis,evidently without consideration of 28 U.S.C
§ 1915€e)(2)(B). He has been allowed to proceed pro se
Nevertheless, it 1s apparent that some of plaintiff's
submissions have been prepared either by a lawyer
or by someone with legal training. See, e.g., Docs. 41,
12, 50, and 83. This court will not tolerate “ghost
written” submissions and neither does the Tenth
Circuit. See Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1273 (0th
Cir. 2001); Barnett v. LeMaster, No. 00-2455, 2001 WL
433413, at *3-4(C.A.10 (N.M. (LOth Cir. June 7, 2001);
Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 884, 886
(Db. Kan. 1997). Accordingly, BEFORE PLAINTIFF
WILL BE PERMITTED TO FILE IN THIS COURT,
EITHER BY PAPER FILING OR BY USE OF
CM/ECE, ANY DOCUMENT REGARDLESS OF ITS
DESIGNATION OR CONTENT, HE MUST OBTAIN
THIS COURTS PERMISSION. ON OR BEFORE
SEPTEMBER 30, 2009, PLAINTIFF SHALL
FURNISH TO THE CHAMBERS OF THE
UNDERSIGNED JUDGE AND TO DEFENDANTS’
COUNSEL A STATEMENT MADE UNDER OATH
AND SUBJECT TO THE PENALTY OF PERJURY,
WHICH FULLY SETS FORTH THE FOLLOWING:
l/a
PLAINTIFF'S KDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENTS, INCLUDING THE
IDENTITY O F ALL
POST- ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
PLAINTIFF HAS ATTENDED AND
DATES OF ATTENDANCE,
WHETHER PLAINTIFF HAS LEGAL,
TRAINING OF ANY KIND, FORMAI.
OR INFORMAL, AND, IF SO, A FULL
DESCRIPTION OF THE TRAINING
INCLUDING SCHOOLS ATTENDED
COURSES COMPLETED, DATES OF
ATTENDANCE, AND DEGREES OR
CERTIFICATES AWARDED. IF ANS
AND
PH Ie IDENTITY (FULL NAME
ADDRESS, TELEPHONE NUMBER
AND EMAIL ADDRESS) OF ANY
PERSON WHO HAS ASSISTED OR IS
ASSISTING HIM IN ANY FASHION IN
LEGAL RESEARCH AND/OR
PREPARATION OF SUBMISSIONS HE
HAS FILED IN THIS COURT AND
THAT PERSON(S) LEGAL TRAINING
AND EXPERIENCE.
FAILURE TO SUBMIT THIS INFORMATION
WILL SUBJECT PLAINTIFF TO CONTEMPT OR
OTHERSANCTIONS. FED. R. CIV. P. 110B) AND (C)
ITIS SO ORDERED
Dated thi - rd ray | Sr pte een £018) , Wi hit )
Kansa:
Monti Belot
Monti L. Belot
NITED STAT] DISTRICT JUD
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