Appendix — Windsor v. Maid of the Mist Corp.

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OFFICE OF THE CLER»

APPEND!X CONTENTS '

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Supreme Court Order extending date for filing Petitic

for Writ of Certiorari dated September

Supreme Court Order extending date for filing Petitio

for Writ of Certiorari dated July ?

2010

Eleventh Circuit Order denying consideration of M

tor rehearing dated June 28. 2010 f

Windsor Motion for Reconsideration at ad Motion

Rehearing En Banc regarding Order to Pay Sa ons

dated May 4, 201¢

) ) f\

ZO 2010

\A { Ro Nchn ¢ oF tt ( ir toe P ’

VV INGSOF RESPONSE LO KIeVé th ru ager awalal

Sanctions dated March 29. 2010 16

Windsor Motion to Vacate Order and Motion fo

Reconsideration dated March 8, 201¢

Windsor Motion for Hearing regarding Ability t

Sanctions dated March 8. 2010 1

The exhibits and affidavits referenced herein have not bes

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ncluded in this Append x due to the volume. If the ¢

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see these, the Petitioner can easily provide the

Eleventh Circuit Order denying the Appeal dated

fo ge a A | |) ANE en ae In an 69

N.D. Ga. Order dated June 30, 2009 on motion to quash

MN ork here og apn ce 171

N.D. Ga. Order dated June 8, 2009 on stay of subpoena

for deposition of Judge Evans..............180

PARE IG vious saan onus peias i 182

11° Cir. R. 27-4 182

Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

September 2, 2010

Mr. William M. Windsor

P.O. Box 681236

Marietta, GA 30068

Re: = William M. Windsor

v. Maid of the Mist Corporation, et al.

Application No. 10A98

Dear Mr. Windsor:

The application for a further extension of time in

the above-entitled case has been presented to Justice

Thomas, who on September 2, 2010 extended the time

to and including September 23, 2010.

This letter has been sent to those designated on

the attached notification list.

Sincerely,

William K. Suter, Clerk

By /s/

Erik A. Fossum

Case Analyst

Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Mr. William M. W indsor

P.O. Box 681236

Marietta, GA 30068

Re W lliam M VA nasor

v. Maid of the Mist Corpor

App Cal

The applicatior

above-entitled case has been

Thomas, who on July

including September &

This letter has been

In No

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the attached notification |

110

sent to those a

1OA98

CXTePNSION ¢

presented

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10 extendea t

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which to file a petition tor a writ of certiorari in

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to Justice

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION

MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD

Plaintiffs-Appe

A rf

WILLIAM M. WINDSO

Tr ) \l (

DGE ORINDA D LYS

10 t-Anne

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Georgia

ORDER

Consistent with the Court’s April 26, 2010, Order

barring any additional filings in this closed appeal, the

Clerk is directed to return unfiled the documents

tendered by Appellant after entry of our Order

The Clerk may discard any documents tendered

by Appellant after the entry of this Order.

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

FILED

U.S.COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JOHN LEY

CLERK

APPEAL DOC.NO. 09-14735-D

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS, Appellee

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION and

MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Appellees,

ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC, ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC.,

Defendants; and WILLIAM M. WINDSOR, Appellant

and Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division

Case No. 1:09-CV-01543-WSD

Judge William S. Duffey, Jr.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER

DATED APRIL 26, 2010 AND REQUEST TO ALLOW

MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC TO BE

CONSIDERED

\villiam M. Windsor

P.O. Box 681236

Marietta, GA 30068

Telephone: 770-578-1094

Facsimile: 770-234-4106

Email: bill@billwindsor.com

PRO SE FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

William M. Windsor (“Windsor”) hereby submits

this MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER

DATED APRIL 26, 2010 AND REQUEST TO ALLOW

MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC TO BE

CONSIDERED to this Court for consideration for filing

Windsor shows the Court as follows:

1. The Order dated April 26, 2010

(“ORDER”) is EXTREMELY UNFAIR from this panel of

the Eleventh Circuit. [ORDER is Exhibit 1.]

2. The Clerk of the Court accepted and filed

Windsor’s April 6, 2010 “Reasonable Response” to the

Panel's request for Windsor to respond to Plaintiffs’

request for attorneys’ fees. Now this Panel wants to

deny that it was filed. This is unfair and surely improper

3, The Panel's excuse is that the “Reasonable

Resporise” exceeds the 20 page limit of Fed.R.App.P.

27(d)(2). {Exhibit 2.] But Windsor’s “Reasonable

Response” is not a response to a motion as dictated by

Fed.R.App.P. 27(d)(2). The docket in this Appeal will

show that Windsor previously filed a response to the

motion that met the requirements of Fed.R.App.P.

27(d)(2). The “Reasonable Response” was a response

requested by this Panel in regard to an award of

sanctions pursuant to FRAP Rule 38. It wasn’t a motion

at all. FRAP Rule 38 places no page limits on a

“Reasonable Response.” It simply provides that after

notice from the court, a “reasonable opportunity to

respond” will be provided. This is what Windsor

provided — a response to an outrageous sanction. [See

Exhibit 3.] This Panel also refers to 11" Cir. R. 27-4, but

it similarly provides “a reasonable opportunity to

respond,” and it places no page limits on the

“Reasonable Response.” Windsor carefully checked the

FRAP and 11" Cir. Rules before filing this “Reasonable

Response.” Exhibit 4 shows that there are no rules

relative to Answers. Exhibit 5 shows thai there are no

rules relative to Responses to an answer on

documentation on a request for attorneys’ fees. A search

for “local rule 27” in versuslaw.com returns only two

cases, and neither case refers to 27-4. [Exhibit 6.] Asa

result, it is totally improper for this Panel to reject

Windsor’s “Reasonable Response.” This Panel has

violated FRAP 38 and 11" Cir. R. 27-4 by denying

Windsor a “Reasonable Response.”

4. On March 8, 2010, Windsor filed a

Motion for a Hearing on the FRAP Rule 38 sanctions.

This 17-page Motion is the proscribed length. The

Motion cited over 100 cases in support. On April 5,

2010, Windsor filed a Reply to Appellees’ Response in

Opposition to Windsor’s Motion for Hearing on the issue

of FRAP Rule 38 sanctions. This 10-page Reply is the

proscribed length. This Reply again cited the key

Eleventh Circuit case that says Windsor is entitled to an

evidentiary hearing. This Panel could have ruled on this

motion that pre-dated the “Reasonable Response,” rather

than denying it because a subsequent motion was

viewed as too long. The hearing would provide the

ability for Windsor to provide a “reasonable response.

”

5. This Panel wants to award sanctions

against Windsor, but this Court has not made an inquiry

to determine if Windsor has the money to pay. Windsor

cannot afford to pay sanctions. Windsor has submitted

financial information to this Court under seal for in

camera inspection. Windsor prays that the financial

information will be returned based upon this ORDER.

6. This ORDER denies Windsor the ability to

file a Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court, and it

denies him the ability to seek a stay while that appeal is

pending. Windsor cannot afford to pay these sanctions,

and relief is desperately needed.

7. On March 29, 2010, Windsor submitted a

Petition for Rehearing En Banc. Windsor’s file copy is

Exhibit 7 hereto. Windsor respectfully requests that this

Petition be distributed. The decision of this Panel has to

be completely and totally erroneous, and there are

significant issues involved.

WHEREFORE, Windsor prays that this Court grant

said motion and that this Court do as follows:

(1) grant this motion;

(2) issue an order allowing Windsor’s financial

documents to be filed under seal for an in

camera inspection;

(3) grant Windsor’s Motion for Hearing filed on

March 8, 2010;

(4) schedule an evidentiary hearing;

(5) consider Windsor’s “Reasonable Response”

as it was filed, or allow Windsor to file a

shorter “Reasonable Response,” if necessary;

(6) process the Petition for Reheat np kn

it may be considered by the Eleventh |

and

') grant such other relief as the Court

appropriate

Respectfully submitted, tl 1t|

O10

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

re ‘

’0) KBox f f

Manetta. C,A {006

Telephone ()-5

Facsimile: 770-2 34-4101

Email: bill@b iIndsOor

(Certificates of ¢ omphlance Service ind Interest

have been omitted to reduce the size ac

At penal»

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BEFORE: | |

BY THE COUR]

All pending motions filed by Appr n clu

\ppellant Ss motion to vacate and tor reconsiderati«

ind any request for relief contained ny omer

document filed by Appel mt are )| )

Appellant’s response to Appellees Maid of the

Mist, et al. (“Maid”)’s motion for Fleventh Circuit Rule

27-4 sanctions far exceeds the twenty (20) page limit of

Fed. R.App.P. 27(d)(2). Therefore, we STRIKE Appellant's

response and direct the Clerk to return that document

unfiled

Maid’s motion for Eleventh Circuit Rule 27-4

sanctions for Appellant's filing of frivolous motions is

DENILD tn light of the Rule 38 sanctions that we award

below. However, we note that this Order does not

preclude the grant of another Rule 27-4 motion filed in

any of Appellant's other appeal or petitions pending with

this Court

In Compliance with the direction tn our February

25, 2010, Order dismissing the appeal as frivolous and

granting Rule 38 sanctions to Maid, Maid has filed a

statement of its Costs and expenses (including attorneys’

fees). Maid seeks an award of Rule 38 sanctions in an

amount of $37,401.17

We have reviewed the declaration of maid's

counsel, the records attached thereto, and Appellant's

overlong response, which fails to meaningfully

challenge the amounts sought by Maid

We note that the first of Maid’s billing entries is

for work performed before the notice of appeal for this

case was filed in the District Court. Consequently, we

discount that entry for $67.50 in our determination of

the amount to be awarded.

APPEAL DOC.NO. 09-14735-D

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS, Appellee

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION and

MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Appellees,

ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC, ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC.,

Defendants; and WILLIAM M. WINDSOR, Appellant

and Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division

Case No. 1:09-CV-01543-WSD

Judge William S. Duffey, Jr.

OPPOSITION OF WILLIAM M. WINDSOR TO

PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATION FOR “COSTS AND

EXPENSES” UNDER RULE 38

PURSUANT TO ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 25, 2010

William M. Windsor

3924 Lower Roswell Road

Marietta, GA 30068

Telephone: 770-578-1094

Facsimile: 770-578-1057

Email: bill@billwindsor.com

PRO SE FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

William M. Windsor (“Windsor”) opposes the Plaintiffs’

Application for “Costs and Expenses” filed on March 10,

2010 in the form of “Declaration of Carl H. Anderson,

Ir., (“Mr. Anderson”) Counsel for Appellees,” for the

reasons expressed herein and in documents referenced.

(pages deleted)

ARGUMENTS AND

UTHORITY

This Court’s Order provides no rational

explanation, inexplicably departs from established law,

is devoid of any reasoning, and doesn’t even contain

objectionable summary or conclusory statements — it

contains no statements. (See Avalos v. U.S. Att'y Gen.

2006 WL 2567603 (11th Cir. Sept. 7, 2006).)

Windsor opposes the Application of Appellees for

“Costs and Expenses” for a significant number of

reasons. FRAP Rule 38 provides a “reasonable

opportunity to respond” and says the court may award

“just damages.” An award of ANY damages in this

matter would not be just.

Windsor finds no page limits mentioned on an

FRAP 38 “reasonable opportunity to respond, so this

Opposiiton will go significantly over the pages due for a

normal response to a motion. If Windsor needs to move

for approval to exceed the page count, he so moves.

Windsor demands an evidentiary hearing.

(pages deleted)

Respectfully submitted this 29" day of Marc!

2010.

William M. Windsor

Pro Se

3924 Lower Roswell Road

Marietta, GA 30068

Telephone: 770-5

Facsimile: 770-578-1057

Email: bill@billwindsor.«

APPEAL DOC.NO. 09-14735-D

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS —

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION and

MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Appellees,

ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC, ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC.,

Defendants; and WILLIAM M. WINDSOR, Appellant

and Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division

Case No. 1:09-CV-01543-WSD

Judge William S. Duffey, Jr.

MOTION TO VACATE ORDER

AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

BY APPELLANT WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

William M. Windsor

3924 Lower Roswell Road

Marietta, GA 30068

Tele none: 770-578-1094

Facsimile: 770-578-1057

Email: bill@billwindsor.com

PRO SE FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

1. This is a Motion to Vacate Order of this

Court dated February 25, 2010 dismissing Windsor’s

Appeal and granting sanctions pursuant to FRAP 38

(“ORDER” — Exhibit A hereto) and a Motion for

Reconsideration (“MTVMEFR”). The Appeal (“Appeal”) is

from the orders of the United States District Court,

Northern District of Georgia, Civil Action Number1:09-

CV-01543-WSD entered June 30, 2009 and September

2, 2009 (“Appealed Orders” — Exhibit B hereto).

Ps This Court’s decision provides no rational

explanation, inexplicably departs from established law,

is devoid of any reasoning, and doesn’t even contain

objectionable summary or conclusory statements — it

contains no statements. (See Ava/os v. U.S. Att'y Gen.,

2006 WL 2567603 (11th Cir. Sept. 7, 2006).)

3. This MTVMER contains new evidence,

presents an intervening expression of law, explains clear

errors in this Court's previous ruling to warrant vacating,

and presents law pertaining to “frivolous” appeals. (Ray

v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, No. 08-10879

(11th Cir. 04/13/2009).)

A. THIS ORDER VIOLATES THE LAW OF THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT REGARDING BOTH SANCTIONS

AND DEPOSITIONS Of JUDGES.

4. Windsor is pro se, and sanctions are

inappropriate. The District Court never indicated that

Windsor’s claims were meritless. In neither of the

Appealed Orders did Judge Duffey warn Windsor about

anything. None of the Appellees indicated that

Windsor’s claims were meritless or even requested

sanctions in the District Court. (See Exhibit B.) This is a

clear error of law. The Eleventh Circuit says:

“Generally, sanctions under Fed. R. App. P. 38

and § 1912 are inappropriate against a pro se

appellant even if the appeal is frivolous. Woods

v. IRS, 3 F.3d 403, 404 (11th Cir. 1993) (per

curiam). Nevertheless, we have imposed

sanctions on pro se litigants who were warned by

the district judge that their claims relating to

various tax issues were meritless. United States v.

Morse, 532 F.3d 1130, 1132-33 (11th Cir. 2008)

(ner curiam); King v. United States, 789 F.2d 883,

884 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). While

Pollinger's claims are frivolous in nature, after

reviewing the record in full, and considering that

Pollinger is a pro se appellant, we deny the

government's motion for sanctions.” (Pollinger v.

Internal Revenue Service Oversight Board, No.

09-12295 (11th Cir. 01/15/2010). lemphasis

added |

We have imposed Rule 38 sanctions on a pro se

taxpayer after the Tax Court had apprised the

taxpayer of the potential consequences of

maintaining an appeal based on arguments

previously rejected by the court. (Biermann v.

Comm'r, 769 F.2d 707, 708 (11th Cir. 1985).)

(Perkins v. Commissioner of IRS, No. 07-12689

(11th Cir. 01/09/2008).)

5. [here are many examples of federal district

judges giving testimony in the territory of the Eleventh

Circuit:

“...the courts apparently have had little difficulty

in calling federal district judges to the witness

stand. For example, in United States v.

Jenison,485 F. Supp. at 665, eight United States

District Judges from the Southern District o1

Florida testified... And in United States v.

Holman, 510 F. Supp. at 1180, a federal district

judge testified ... in the Northern District of

Florida. See also United States v. Cabrera-

Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. at 805 n. 2; United States

v. Breland, 522 F. Supp. 468, 471-74

(N.D.Ga.1981) (testimony of nine federal district

judges).

“Further, the practice of calling federal judges to

testify in these cases has been discussed, and

approved sub silentio, on two occasions in the

Eleventh Circuit. See United States v. Holman,

680 F.2d at 1357; United States v. Perez-

Hernandez, 672 F.2d at 1387-88 (defendant

adopted record in the Jenison case for purposes of

his dismissal motion).” (United States v. Cross,

708 F.2d 631 (11th Cir. 06/30/1983).)

6. The justification cited by the Appellees

and Judge Duffey to quash the subpoena for deposition

was “mental processes.” But Windsor made it absolutely

clear that he would not seek testimony about the judge’s

mental processes. [Appeal Brief P 34, 41, 53, 54, 56-60.]

Windsor even agreed to let Judge Duffey approve the

deposition questions in advance. {Appeal Brief P 41, 53,

54.] (See generally Shelton v. American Motors Corp.,

805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986).)

+e Research done by Windsor indicated that

judges are clearly subject to depositions.

(See Peek v. Kemp, 746 F.2d 672 (11th Cir.

10/26/1984); Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d

1227 (11th Cir. 09/10/1982); Wynn v. Smith, 446

F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 07/12/1971); Young v. Barrett,

912 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 08/27/1990); Doherty V.

American Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 334 (6th Cir.

02/24/1984); R.W.T. v. Honorable Donald F.

Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 07/11/1983);

Alan Mcsurely, Et Al. v. John L. Mcclellan, Et Al,

No. 82-2369 (DC Circuit) 12/10/82; Glaser v.

Board of Bar Examiners, 17 F.3d 394 (9th Cir.

02/11/1994); Spry v. Boles, 299 F.2d 332 (4th Cir.

02/13/1962); Buckner v. Hudspeth, 105 F.2d 396

(10th Cir. 06/20/1939); Drake v. Portuondo, No.

06-1365-pr (2d Cir. 01/23/2009).

8. But the clearest evidence is the Subpoena

Regulations of the Judicial Conference that Windsor

identified and used as the roadmap for his subpoena of

Judge Evans. [Appeal Brief P 34-41.]

The test that should be applied in determining

whether a judge may be compelled to testify is

well stated by Judge Austin, of the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

in Standard Packaging Corporation v. Curwood,

Inc., 365 F. Supp. 134 (1973), as follows:

"Generally, all individuals are subject to the

lawful authority of a competent court to compel

testimony of any facts within their knowledge and

relevant to the issues at hand. (Citations omitted.)

An exemption from compulsory testimony is

recognized in certain situations to protect

integrity and individual responsibility of

government officials whose duties involve thi

exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial authority

(Citations omitted.) The essential line of

demarcation appearing from the cases is that

judicial and quasi-judicial officers may be

compelled to testify only as to relevant matters of

fact that do not probe into or Compromise the

mental processes employed in formulating th

judgment in question (United States v. Cross

516 I Supp 700 (M.ID.Ga. 06/18/1981

Y Ihe ORDER of thi { ourt

fact and law

B. THIS COURT ERRED IN ISSUING AN ORDER

INDICATING THAT WINDSOR’S APPEAL WAS

FRIVOLOUS

10 Windsor’ , Appe al Was not tri

11 Fleventh ¢ ircuit ule ’

frivolous motion

‘A motion ts frivolous if: (a) it is without legal

merit and cannot be supported by a reasonabl

argument for an extension, modification, or

reversal of existing law, or the establishment of

new law; or (b) it contains assertions of materi

facts that are false or unsupported b

y the record

or (C) it is presented for an improper purpose

such as to harass or to cause unnecessary dh

needless increase in the cost of litigation

a complaint may not be aismissed

frivolous if ‘any of the legal point are) arguable on thew

merits.’” (Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 §

Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).) Since judge

do not have an immunity regarding depositions; since

t? ladW ¢ ited hy Ine Appe hoe } i¢ to do

if only (dS

mental prot PSSe and Since Windsor had Ayiet d IO ie

Judpe Dultley approve thy depo: hor que Hor

ATVANCE there iS Certainly al ars ratyle poi}

Most of the ¢ ( ! ryV\ asofr

lound on “trivolous appea refers to criminal Case

| tyre { ité ’ ra pron Pe cil () | roorry) ) [ cf

cl ry i rive () | | i] | lf ‘

einer iniaw ot tact T olo clain ri di

clam describing fantasti or delusional

cenano claims with which federal district

idges are all too familiar." (Neitzke v. Williams

IOUS. Ct. 182 1633 (1989): Bilal v. Driver

F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 200

r it Hlepation re} Q)} r

i Cie@a4&ny hasel . l¢ va Port are rivoa

vhnen they are indi putably aa The mr

Su/tentuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1? |? BEL

Cir.1990 Battle v. Central State Hospitai

| i 1JG ] {) it} { ! QO)

rpeuments must truly strike beyond the pale lo

j , ‘

nound ol morattty good bel WVIOT OF | Teruaal

civilized company]. (Washington v. Alaimo, 9

Ipp 1395 (S81). Gsa. 1996

ify

lax Protester | 1d)

are objectively frivolous (without any legal or factual

basis); (2) whether the person whe sipned the pleadings

should have been aware that they were frivolous; of (4)

there ts a finding of bad tatth. (Baker v. Alderman, \5%

|.jd 516, 524 (1th Cir 1998).) Pro se Windsor spent

weeks investipzating the subpoena for Judge Evans, he

Response to the Motion to Quash, and the Appeal of the

rulings on the Motion to Quash. Windsor’s research

indicated that bis actions were absolutely reasonable

objective, and proper before filing. There has been no

finding of bad faith, nor can they be. Woindsor has done

NOTHING ERIVOLOUS!

17 ‘Something more than a lack of ment

required |. fora clam to be Considered triivolous. bdo "| tht

iS NOt suffrcrent that the claumn be tound mentless, the

Clanm must be without a plausible legal or factual beast

and lae king In puUstCation. (Jorres v. City of Orlando

2641. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (MD). bla, 2005) (att ae

bed Appx. $91 lth Cir, 2008))

Ii Windsor has not submitted rambling: bret:

that make no atte Mipt to address the elements 1 quisite to

obtarning reversal; has not fled numerous documents

containing irrelevant arguments and authorty, did not

seck to relitipate issues already adjudicated, has not

failed to explain how the lower tribunal erred or to

present clear or copent arpuments for overturning the

decision below; has not reanued frivolous positions for

which sanctions had already been imposed inthe tral

forum; has not cited inapplicable or irclevant

authorities; misrepresenting facts or law to the coun. All

he has done ts identify Judge Evans and Judge Duttey a

corrupt federal yudges, which he can prove

19. | Windsor has researched every case on

“motions to quash subpoenas” on www.versuslaw.com

and he has not found a single case that indicates any

courts rejected arguments similar to those offered by

Windsor or where sanctions were imposed for a

frivolous appeal. (See Pollard v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue Service, 786 F.2d 1063 (11th Cir.

04/14/1986).) (See Exhibit D hereto.)

20. This Appeal was not taken “in the face of

clear, unambiguous, dispositive holdings of this and

other appellate courts.’ (Capps v. Eggers, 782 F.2d 1341,

1343 (5th Cir.1986). See McDougal v. Comm'r, 818

F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir.1987); Stelly v. Comm'r, 761 F.2d

1113, 1116 (5th Cir. 1985); Finch v. Hughes Aircratt

Co., 926 F.2d 1574, 1579-80, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)

1914, 1918 (Fed. Cir. 1991).)

Sanctions on pro se litigants are appropriate if

they were warned that their claims are frivolous

and they were aware of "ample legal authority

holding squarely against them." Stel//y v. Comm'r

supra. (7aylor v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, No. 09-60455 (5th Cir. 10/26/2009).)

21. Windsor has researched every Eleventh

Circuit case involving pro se parties filing appeals such

as his, and he finds no precedent for finding a pro se

party to have filed a frivolous motion in attempts to

reverse rulings on motions to quash. See Exhibit E.

(See Redeker-Barry v. United States, No. 08-

16166 (11th Cir. 06/25/2009); Kang v. Noro-

Moseley Partners, No. 07-10310 (11th Cir.

09/04/2007); Securities and Exchange

Commission v. Investment Technology, Inc., 200

Fed.Appx. 858 (11th Cir. 09/14/2006); Lawyers

Title Ins. Conp. v. JDC (America) Corp., 52 F.3d

1575 (11th Cir. 05/31/1995); Moore v. Armour

Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1194 (11th Cir.

04/02/1991); In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 842

F.2d 1229 (11th Cir. 03/31/1988); and (Spivey v.

ie 683 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 08/16/1982)

22. In Spivey v. Zant the district court's error

tainted the evidentiary hearing by denying Spivey, and

the court, access to materials which might have helped

resolve the factual issues which precipitated the hearing

and as to which other, dispositive, evidence was not

available. Judge Duffey has done the same thing by

denying Windsor access to information that only Judge

Evans has that will prove fraud in Civil Action 1:06-CV-

0714-ODE (“MIST-1”) and enable him to get the case

reopened.

“We therefore vacate the order of the district

court and remand for further proceedings. Spivey

must be permitted to inspect the materials in

Schloth's possession which may bear on the

factual issues before the court. The court must

then reopen the evidentiary hearing and allow

Spivey a full and fair opportunity to cross-

examine Schloth based on those materials, and to

present whatever additional evidence — the

materials divulge.” (Spivey v. Zant 683 F.2d 881

(11th Cir. 08/16/1982).)

c THERE IS NO BASIS WHATSOEVER FOR THIS

ORDER

a There is no basis fer this ORDER, and the

ORDER is challenged on this basis.

24. — This Court gave a two sentence response

to the Appeal of the Motion to Quash: “In reviewing

motions filed with the Court, we have also reviewed

Appellant's brief, which fails to meaningfully challenge

the orders on appeal. Consequently, we sua sponte

DISMISS this appeal AS FRIVOLOUS AS BRIEFED.” This

is an erroneous decision. This is an error of fact because

it failed to consider the uncontroverted facts.

25. It is interesting that the ORDER indicates

that the Appellees’ briefs were not considered. (Page 2

of the ORDER, fourth paragraph — Exhibit A.)

26. The Eleventh Circuit cited no case law to

support the ruling; only one case was cited and

erroneously — Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223 (11th

Cir. 08/19/2003). This case DENIED Rule 38 sanctions:

“Fed. R. App. P. 38. "Rule 38 sanctions have been

imposed against appellants who raise ‘clearly

frivolous claims' in the face of estaolished law

and clear facts." Misabec Mercantile, Inc. De

Panama v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette ACL1

Futures, Inc., 853 F.2d 834, 841 (11th Cir. 1988).

“Because Farese has raised valid arguments as to

why the district court's dismissal should be

reversed or vacated, we conclude that the Rule

38 motion is without merit and deny the motion.”

[emphasis added.

27. Eventhe Misabec Mercantile case

DENIED Rule 38 sanctions:

“Rule 38 sanctions have been imposed against

appellants who raise ‘clearly frivolous claims’ in

the face of established law and clear facts. See,

e.g., United States v. A Single Family Residence,

803 F.2d 625, 632 (11th Cir.1986); Stubbs v.

Commissioner, 797 F.2d 936, 938-39 (11th

Cir.1986). This is not such a case. We

accordingly decline to impose Rule 38

sanctions.” [emphasis added .|

28. The Eleventh Circuit made it clear on

January 15, 2010 that sanctions under FRAP 38 are

inappropriate against a pro se appellant even /f the

appeal is trivolous. (Pollinger v. Internal Revenue Service

Oversight Board, No. 09-12295 (11th Cir. 01/15/2010).

lemphasis added. |

29. So, this Court has no law to support its

ruling on sanctions and no facts -- NO explanation of

eny type. If this Court had an explanation for how the

Appeal could be considered frivolous, Windsor should

have been afforded the due process right to see what

they had to say and respond. This Court denied Windsor

a complete record of the case, and Windsor was

afforded no procedural safeguards. This Court issued

this ORDER for illegal reasons.

30. Such dismissals are not favored. They are

unfair to litigants. (Franklin v. State of Oregon, State

Welfare Division, 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981);

Lewis v. State of New York, 547 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).)

31. — Such dismissals deny an appellant the

opportunity to make legal arguments against the

dismissal. The prejudice is particularly acute with

respect to pro se parties ... who are generally unskilled

in the art of pleading. (7ingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d

1109 (6th Cir. 09/15/1983).)

D. THIS COURT’S ORDER HAS ERRORS OF LAW

32. The ORDER dismissing Windsor’s Appeal

as frivolous is an error of law because the Supreme Court

expressed on October 20, 2009 that courts err in

disposing of claims without explanation of any sort.

(Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 558 U.S. ___ (2009), (08-

10495).)

33. The decision to deny the appeal is an error

of law because, as a general rule, any individual

competent to be a witness may be compelled to testify as

to facts within his or her knowledge that are relevant to a

matter before the court. (See Blair v. United States, 250

U.S. 273, 39S. Ct. 468, 63 L. Ed. 979 (1919); Standard

Packaging Cerp. v. Curwood, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 134

(N.D.UL.1973).)

E. THIS COURT'S ORDER IS A VIOLATION OF

WINDSOR’'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

34. — This Court has violated Windsor’s

Constitutional rights and has denied due process. This

Court's cursory treatment of Windsor’s Appeal does not

comport with fair procedure and lacks the equality that

is required by the Constitution and its amendments.

35. | Windsor has been denied a fair judge at all

stages of the proceedings. Judge Evans and Judge Duffey

violated Windsor’s legal rights guaranteed in the First,

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments

to the U.S. Constitution under color of law. The 11th

Circuit has done so as well.

36. Windsor submits that this Court issued this

ORDER for the sole purpose of damaging Windsor

because he has sued the Eleventh Circuit and has

requested leave of court to sue each of the judges that

issued this ORDER. These judges as much as said so.

37. Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull must

recuse themselves because they have a personal interest

in the outcome of this appeal.

38. Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull have

become accessories after the fact and conspirators with

Judge Duffey and Judge Evans in obstiuction of justice.

The ORDER of this Court denies Windsor access to the

information that will enable him to recover $1 million

“stolen” from him as the result of the fraud upon the

courts in MIST-1.

Zz THIS COURT DISCRIMINATED AGAINST

WINDSOR BECAUSE HE IS PRO SE

39. — This Court has discriminated against

Windsor because he is pro se. This Court has also

discriminated against him because he has had the

audacity to tae action against federal judges.

40. Windsor submits that his experience is that

judges in the Northern District of Georgia and the

Eleventh Circuit ROUTINELY violate the law and twist

the facts and the law to accomplish their own improper

purposes. These judges have apparently decided that

they will take the law into their own hands and do

whatever they please. All of the federal judges in Atlanta

that Windsor has encountered are dishonest and corrupt.

41. By calling this Appeal frivolous, this Court

must prove that the legal points on pages 22-26 and 60-

67 in Windsor’s Appeal are not arguable on their merits.

(Anders v. California, supra.)

42. It is not frivolous for Windsor to claim the

ERRORS OF LAW cited on pages 28-50 of the

Appellant's Brief as these are arguable on their merits.

43. It was not frivolous for Windsor to claim

the ERRORS OF FACT cited on pages 27, 50-60 of the

Appellant's Brief.

G. THESE JUDGES ISSUED THIS ORDER BECAUSE

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT IS CORRUPT.

44. There is nothing wrong with the Appeal

Brief. The problem is that Judges Carnes, Barkett, and

Hull are corrupt. They don’t like it that Windsor is

exposing the corruption in the federal court system in

Atlanta, so they are taking corrupt action to damage him.

45. | Windsor was shocked when the Eleventh

Circuit denied the appeals of Alcatraz and Windsor at

Summary Judgment. Alcatraz cited six primary errors

with 13 subsidiary errors. Windsor cited an additional

10 errors. Judge Hull, Judge Fay, and Judge Dubina did

not address the points of error, and the ruling makes

absolutely no sense to Windsor.

46. Windsor asked that this Court not let that

happen again. But Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull

have proven that they are dishonest.

47. Judges of the Eleventh Circuit have proven

their own dishonesty and corruption again and again in

these actions. Windsor believes every order issued has

been erroneous. All Eleventh Circuit orders involving

Windsor are referenced and incorporated herein as if

attached hereto.

48. The Affidavit of William M. Windsor,

attached hereto as Exhibit F and referenced and

incorporated herein, includes information that is not

included in this Motion to Vacate and Motion to

Reconsider due to page limits.

49. Windsor asks that this Court reconsider the

Motion to Disqualify all Eleventh Circuit and Northern

District of Georgia judges because there is an

appearance of bias that requires recusal.

50. | Windsor asks that this Court reconsider the

Motion for Change of Venue so this Appeal may be

moved to another Circuit where the judges will not be

friends and associates of Judge Evans. Windsor cited 7

cases. By refusing the change of venue and

disqualification of the judges, this Court is denying due

process to Windsor and Is failing to ensure justice in this

case. This Court screams “appearance of bias.”

51. Plaintiffs’ filings relative to this Appeal was

filled with false statements and statements not supported

by the record.

52. By turning a blind eye to the criminal

activity and grossly violating Windsor’s Constitutional

rights, this Court is a disgrace to the judicial system.

This Court is an accomplice to the criminal acts of the

Appellees and their attorneys.

53. The Appellees did not quote a single valid

case to support their Motion for Sanctions. The

Appellees did not provide any valid case law authority

for their FRIVOLOUS motion for sanctions.

54. It is well-established that Courts will

compel judicial testimony when it is needed and that

discovery is absolutely permissible post-discovery.

55. This Court claimed Windsor provided no

legal basis for his Motion to Disqualify the Judges.

Windsor clearly identified the legal basis in his motion

and in his Reply to the Response of Judge Evans.

Windsor assumes 28 U.S.C. 144 and 28 U.S.C. 455 are

also to be considered.

56. Judge Evans has information material to

civil proceedings. She is obligated by law to testify.

57. | When Windsor filed his Appeal, he did not

have access to research information that he now has. As

a result, some important case law was unknown to him

that supports the requirement of Judge Evans to give

testimony:

Neither are we aware oi any rule generally

exempting a judge from the normal obligation to

respond as a witness when he has information

material to a criminal or civil proceeding. Cf.

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-707

(1974). (Dennis v. Sparks et al, 101 S. Ct. 183,

449 U.S. 24 (U.S. 11/17/1980).)

There is no constitutionally based privilege

immunizing judges from being required to testify

about their judicial conduct. The doctrine of

judicial immunity does not excuse a judge from

responding as a witness when his co-conspirators

are sued. (Dennis v. Sparks et al, 101 S. Ct. 183,

449 U.S. 24 (U.S. 11/17/1980).)

Whatever their origins, these exceptions to the

demand for every man's evidence are not lightly

created nor expansively construed, for they are in

derogation of the search for truth. Because of the

key role of the testimony of witnesses in the

judicial process, courts have historically been

cautious about privileges. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,

dissenting in E/kins v. United States, 364 U. S.

206, 364 U. S. 234 (1960), said of this:

"Limitations are properly placed upon the

operation of this general principle only to the very

limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or

excluding relevant evidence has a public good

transcending the normally predominant principle

of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining

truth." (/n re Suspension to Practice Before United

States District Court of Southern District of lowa

of John D. Randall John D. Randall, 640 F.2d 898

(8th Cir. 01/21/1981).)

Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees

that no person shall be deprived of liberty without

due process of law. It is the manifest duty of the

courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to

accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and

admissible evidence be produced. Page 418 U. S.

711 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705

707 (1974). (In re Suspension to Practice Before

United States District Court of Southern District of

lowa of John D. Randall John D. Randall, 640

F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 01/21/1981).)

Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges

contravene the fundamental principle that "'the

public... has a right to every man's evidence."

(United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331

(1950).) As such, they must be strictly construed

and accepted "only to the very limited extent that

permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant

evidence has a public good transcending the

normally predominant principle of utilizing all

rational means for ascertaining truth." E/kins v.

United States, 364 U.S, 206, 234 (1960)

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Accord, United States

v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, See also 8 J. Wigmore,

Evidence § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961); 4 The

Works of Jeremy Bentham 321 (J. Bowring ed.

1843). (Trammell v. United States, \00 S. Ct. 906,

445 U.S. 40 (U.S. 02/27/1980).)

Evidentiary privileges in litigation are not favored.

See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234

(1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting): "Limitations are

properly placed upon the operation of this

general principle [of no testimonial privilege]

only to the very limited extent that permitting a

refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence

has a public good transcending the normally

predominant principle of utilizing all rational

means for ascertaining truth." See also 8 J.

Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (McNaughton rev

1961); 4 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 321 (J.

Bowring ed. 1843). Herbert v. Lando et al, 99 S.

Ct. 1635, 441 U.S. 153 (U.S. 04/18/1979).

In Nero Trading's case, the district court's failure

to articulate its reasons for forgoing an evidentiary

hearing and denying Nero Trading's motion to

quash leads us to conclude that Nero Trading was

not afforded a meaningful opportunity to question

the Service concerning its reasons for issuing the

summonses. The district court refused a limited

adversarial hearing and issued a perfunctory order

with only passing reference to any legal standard

and no reference at all to either the merits of the

Service's prima facie case or Nero Trading's

claims in rebuttal. (Nero Trading, LLC v. United

States, Dep't of the Treasury, 570 F.3d 1244 (11th

Cir. 06/10/2009).)

H. = THIS COURT ERRED IF IT CLAIMS WINDSOR

FILED THE APPEAL FOR ANY IMPROPER PURPOSE

58. Windsor has stated repeatedly under oath,

under penalty of perjury, and before a notary that he has

never presented any motions for any improper purpose,

such as to harass or to Cause unnecessary delay or

neediess increase in the cost of litigation. Every motion

that Windsor has filed has been supported by a sworn

affidavit. (See Affidavit of William M. Windsor attached

hereto as Exhibit F. Windsor will be happy to take a

polygraph lest to prove this This Court has 90 factua

justification for claiming improper purpose (Vit

above), so this Court Cannot chain tI pustitye ition Tor

the ORDER

THIS COURT FERRED IF 11 CLAIMS WINDSOR'S

FACTS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD

9 All material facts are fully support ad by thy

record in Windsor’s Appeal Everything was sworn

under penalty of perjury hefore a notary. Windsor’s tact

were neve; ¢ ontroverted in any manner; the Plaintits did

not tile a single affidavit. This Court has no factual

’

}

pustitn ation tor ¢ laiming facts were nol support d(ii

above), so this cannot he claim as the justiheation tor the

ORDER

60 lhe District Court did not find Windsor

Response to the Motion to Quash frivolous, nor cick thy

Mistrict Court find Windsor’s Motion for Recon: ideratiorl

of the Motion to Quash frivolous. I those dispute d

motions were not frivolous, th Appeal could not be

frivolous. Pro se Windsor could not possibly anticipate

that this Court would find something frivolous that the

District Court did not question and that Nis researc!

proves should be decided in his tavor

(| [his Court has failed to apply the proper

legal standard and has failed to follow proper procedure

in making this determination, and it has based thi

decision upon ut known factors that are Clearly

erroneous

62 Ihis Court has no right whatsoever to

assume that Judge Evans and Judge Dutley are telling th

truth. They aren't, and Windsor has proven it (See

Windsor's Appeal Buet, P20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28

2%.)

J THIS COURT ERRED IE TT CLAIMS WINDSOR'S

MOTION HAS A LACK OF LEGAL MLRII

(4 Ihis Coun cannot claim that Windsor

Appeal has a lack of legal ment (hl. A. above). Windsor

cited $5 cases, 17 statutes, 14 cules, two treatises, and

the Constitution in bis Appeal. An additional 80 Case:

are cited herein

(4 [his Court erred by failing to property

consider the cases Windsor cited

K THIS COURT ERRED IE LT CLAIMS JUDGES

HAVE IMMUNITY

G' Judges are not immune from deposition

from thei criminal acts, and from obstructing: pustice by

withholding: vital evidence

Ob A Memorandum of law on Judicial

Immunity that Windsor filed in another court is attached

hereto as Exhibit G and 1s reterone ed and ine OFrpPoral d

herew

bor the forepoing reasons, Windsor respecttully

requests that this Court vacate its ORDER dated Lebruary

25, 2010 and reconsider its ORDER based upon the

grounds enumerated herein and deny Plaintiffs’ Motion

for Sancthons

Submitted, this 8th day of March, 2010

William M. Windsor

Pro Se

— wna In rg wy iP )

(Certificates of ( ompiance service, and interested Parties

have been omitted to reduce the size and « Of this

Appendix

APPEAL DOC.NO. 09-14735-D

“IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION and

MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Appellees,

ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC, ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC.,

Defendants; and WILLIAM M. WINDSOR, Appellant

and Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division

Case No. 1:09-CV-01543-WSD

Judge William S. Duffey, Jr.

MOTION FOR HEARING

William M. Windsor

3924 Lower Roswell Road

Marietta, GA 30068

Telephone: 770-578-1094

Facsimile: 770-578-1057

Email: bill@billwindsor.com

PRO SE FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

- Windsor demands & Hearing on this

Court's order dated February 25, 2010 dismissing

Windsor’s Appeal; this Court’s order granting sanctions

pursuant to FRAP 38 (“ORDER” — Exhibit A hereto); and

Windsor’s Motion to Vacate Order filed March 8, 2010.

The Appeal (“Appeal”) is from two orders of the United

States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, Civil

Action Number1:09-CV-01543-WSD entered June 30

2009 and September 2, 2009 (“Appealed Orders”

Exhibit B hereto). The Secona 2010 Affidavit of William

M. Windsor (“Aff #2010-2” is attached hereto as Exhibit

C. (Att #2010-2 4911.)

WINDSOR DEMANDS A HEARING

2 Windsor demands a hearing. Due process

mandates a hearing. The Eleventh Circuit has indicated

that Windsor is entitled to a hearing in cases such as this

(Aff #2010-2 912.)

7 The need for a hearing in this case is even

more critical because this Court has issued a grossly

inadequate ORDER; this Court is permitting perjury and

fraud upon the courts by Plaintiffs; and this Court is

committing crimes through its action and inaction in this

Appeal. (Aff #2010-2 413.)

4. Windsor is being denied due process.

Procedural due process requires notice and an

opportunity to be heard before any governmental

deprivation of a property or liberty interest. (Z/pperer v.

City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995).}

(Atif #2010-2 414.)

5. Our founding fathers expressed noble

principles in the Constitution -- freedom, justice, and the

protection of individual rights. However, in the

administration of the laws, something has gone

dreadfully wrong. The lofty principles have been

usurped by officials with improper intentions. The

United States of today is not the benign society that the

founding fathers aspired to create. (Aff #2010-2 915.)

6. Our founding fathers did not intend for

judges to be able to lie, cheat, and help others “stea

from parties they are sworn to protect through fairness

and impartiality. But this is exactly what Judge Duffey

Judge Evans, and the judges of the Eleventh Circuit have

done. (Aff #2010-2 416.)

“Few more serious threats to individual liberty

can be imagined than a corrupt judge. Clothed

with the power of the state and authorized to pass

judgment on the most basic aspects of everyday

life, a judge can deprive citizens of liberty and

property in complete disregard of the

Constitution. The injuries inflicted may

and enduring.” (Judicial Immunity vs. Due

Process, Robert Craig Waters, Cato Journal, Vol.7

No.2 (Fall 1987).)

be seve;©re

The guarantee of Constitutional rights is

being illegally revoked by this Court. (Aff #2010-2 917.)

8. Windsor has tried repeatedly for close to a

year to obtain justice. In every instance Windsor’ s

appeals for justice and protection of the laws have been

rejected in favor of a cover up of attorney and judicial

wrongdoing and protection of the lawbreaking officers of

the court. In every instance Windsor’s rights, ostensibly

protected by the Constitution and the laws, have been

scorned, and Windsor’s appeals to the authorities have

been ignored or rejected with contempt. In even

instance where legal actions were filed with the courts

the courts have ignored the crimes. The courts have

failed to ever allow Windsor to be heard and to present

his evidence or examine the evildoers. The courts have

never even considered the facts and the overwhelming

evidence that Windsor has amassed. Instead, federal

judges have committed one crime after another while

violating their oaths of office and the Code of Judicial

Conduct. (Aff #2010-2 418.)

9 Although evidence of the crimes was

provided to various authorities of the federal

government, officers from these authorities failed to

perform their legal duties to investigate. Each official to

whom the crimes were presented had a statutory duty

the capacity, and the authority, to address the crimes.

Each official willfully failed to act and instead covered

up the crimes. (Aff #2010-2 419.)

10. On July 31, 2006, the Eleventh Circuit

issued its opinion in Am/ong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny's,

Inc., 457 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2006), as amended Oct.

10, 2006, in which the court noted that when under the

threat of sanctions, the person threatened is entitled to

an evidentiary hearing. Id at 1193. The issue presented

itself again in 2007, and the district court granted the

application for a hearing, and the Eleventh Circuit

affirmed. (Hudson v. International Computer

Negotiations, Inc., 499 F.3d 1252, 19 A.D. Cases 1249

(11th Cir. 09/17/2007).) (Aff #2010-2 420.)

11. This Court is supposed to make its rulings

based upon legal evidence and to clearly state its factual

and legal findings in its orders. This Court has not done

so. Windsor must have a fair opportunity to challenge

the “evidence” presented and to present evidence in

defense, including the right to cross examine witnesses

and require proper authentication and form for

documentary evidence at a formal evidentiary hearing.

(Aff #2010-2 421.)

..a party threatened with sanctions is entitled to a

hearing. Reynolds v. Roberts, 207 F.3d 1288,

1302 (11th Cir. 2000); Amilong & Amlong v.

Denny's Inc. No. 04-14499 (11th Cir.

07/31/2006).

12. Windsor has provided uncontroverted

proof in the record of thousands of instances of false

testimony, false pleadings, and tampering with evidence

by the Plaintiffs and their attorneys. Windsor has

provided uncontroverted proof of false statements and

perjury in the documents filed by Plaintiffs in Windsor’s

Appeal. Windsor must be able to cross examine these

witnesses. (Howell Mill/Collier Assoc. v. Pennypacker's,

194 Ga. App. 169, 171 (2) (390 SE2d 257); Mitcham v.

Blalock, 214 Ga. App. 29, 31 (2), 32; Citadel Comp. v.

All-South Subcontractors, 217 Ga. App. 736, 737 (1),

738 (458 SE2d 711). Under these cases and the

standards of the Federal Rules of Evidence, significant

portions of Plaintiffs’ filings should be excluded from

consideration. (Aff #2010-2 4 22.)

13. Plaintiffs’ Attorney, Mr. Carl Hugo

Anderson, has committed multiple counts of perjury in

his filings with this Court related to Windsor’s Appeal.

Windsor must be given the opportunity to prove this

perjury by examining Mr. Anderson. The perjury of Mr.

Anderson should be more than sufficient to cause this

Court to vacate its ORDER awarding sanctions. (Aff

#2010-2 423.)

14. This Court must conduct a hearing. refer

this to an impartial judge, or refer this motion to a

magistrate judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing,

make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and file a

Report and Recommendation. Someone must weigh

evidence. Judge Duffey never conducted a hearing.

Judge Evans never conducted a hearing. The Eleventh

Circuit never conducted a nearing. (See Amiong &

Amlong, P.A. v. Denny's, Inc., 457 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir.

2006).) (Atf #2010-2 424.)

When threatened with sanctions, the party

threatened is entitled to a hearing. (Reynolds v.

Roberts, 207 F.3d 1288, 1302 (11th Cir. 2000).)

(See Jolly Group, Ltd. v. Medline Indus., Inc., 435

F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted)

and Buccaneer Hotel, Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 183 (3d

Cir. 1999), reh'g denied, 202 F.3d 253 (3d Cir.

Oct. 21, 1999) (table entry, no WL citation).) (See

Bernstein v. Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP. No.

06-14013 (11th Cir. 06/08/2007).)

15. The Eleventh Circuit has clearly stated that

sanctions such as this Court has ordered are “in the

nature of civil contempt” and require a hearing. (Aff

#2010-2 425.)

Sanctions designed to compensate one party for

expenses incurred due to the opposing party's

misconduct is in the nature of civil contempt

requiring notice and the opportunity to be heard

prior to the award. (Campos v. City of Naples,

202 Fed.Appx. 381 (11th Cir. 10/25/2006).) (B.2.

Harbert Intern., LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441

F.3d 905, 914 (11th Cir. 2006) (See Kaplan v.

Daimler-Chrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255

(11th) Cir. 2003); Oakes v. Horizon Financial,

S.A., 259 F.3d 1315, 1320 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001)

Even the award of sanctions under the court's

nherent power must "comply with the mandates

of due process." (Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501

U.S. 32, 49-50 (1991); Roadway Express v. Piper,

e/ al, 100 S. Ct. 2455, 447 U.S. 752 at 764 (U.S.

06/23/1980); In re Mroz, 65 F.3d at 1575-76;

Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., inc., 293 F.3d

1306 (11th Cir. 06/13/2002); Boddie v.

Connecticut 401 U.S. 371, 379 28L. Ed. 2d

113, 91S. Ct. 780 (1971).)

16. Aperson's right to reasonable notice of a

charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in

his defense - a right to his day in court - are basic in our

system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a

minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him,

and to offer testimony. (United States v. Frazier, No. 01-

14680 (11th Cir. 10/15/2004).) (See also United States v.

Owen, 415 F.2d 383 (8 Cir. 1969); Chernekoff v. United

States, (9 Cir. 1955) 219 F.2d 721; United States v.

Cummins, 425 F.2d 646, 649, (8 Cir. 1970); Gonzales v.

United States, 348 U.S. 407, 75 S. Ct. 409, 99 L. Ed. 467

(1955).) (Aff #2010-2 426.)

lo say that courts have inherent power to deny all

right to defend an action and to render decrees

without any hearing whatever is, in the very

nature of things, to convert the court exercising

such an authority into an instrument of wrong and

oppression, and hence to strip it of that attribute

of justice upon which the exercise of judicial

power necessarily depends. (Hovey V. E/liott, 17

S. Ct. 841, 167 U.S. 409 at 414 (U.S

05/24/1897).) (See also Windsor v. McVeigh, 93

U.S. 274; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389

90, 18 S.Ct. 383, 387 (1898). "[Bly 'the law of the

land' is intended ‘a law which hears before it

condemns.'" Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68,

53 S.Ct. 55, 64 (1932) (citation omitted). (United

States v. Frazier, No. 01-14680 (11th Cir.

10/15/2004); Jn re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68

S.Ct. 499, 507-08 (1948); Snyder v

Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116, 54 S.Ct. 330,

336 (1934); United States v. Frazier, No. 01-

14680 (11th Cir. 10/15/2004); /n re Noel], 93

F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 11/21/1937); Hammond Packing

Company v. State of Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 29

S. Ct. 370, 53 L. Ed. 530; “rar v. Cochran,

365 U.S. 525, 81S. Ct. 723, 5 L. Ed. 2d 754;

Council of Federated Org ern v. Mize, 339

2d 898 (5th Cir. 12/2: ler Baldwin v. Hale,

68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 . Ed. 531 (1864).)

Typically, we require the district court to hold an

evidentiary hearing on damages.... See United

Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 957 (5th

Cir.1979).

17. Windsor will utilize the hearing to

challenge the basis and reasonableness of such proposed

sanctions. (Aff #2010-2 927.)

18. Windsor will also utilize the hearing to

establish that this Court has violated several criminal

statutes. (Aff #2010-2 428.)

19. The Plaintiffs and their attorneys are

dishonest. Windsor will prove at the hearing that the

Plaintiffs have dirty hands. (Aff #2010-2 429.)

20. At the hearing on this motion, the Court

will find that sanctions must be imposed against the

Plaintiffs because they have frivolously denied factual

allegations that are true and have made factual

allegations that are false. (See Williams v. R.W. Cannon,

Inc., No. 08-60168-CIV-UNGARO/SIMONTON

(S.D.Fla. 09/24/2008).) (Atf #2010-2 4 30.)

Zi, At the hearing, Windsor will address and

present evidence and testimony relative to bad faith. (Aff

#2010-2 4931.)

22. Windsor will show at the hearing that the

facts before this Court do not warrant sanctions. (Aff

#2010-2 4932.)

23. | Windsor will show at the hearing that the

Plaintiffs have not provided the information necessary to

support a claim. (Aff #2010-2 433.)

24. Windsor will show at the hearing that any

attempt by the Plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees is

barred by collateral estoppel. (Aff #2010-2 434.)

25. Windsor has stated repeatedly in his

declarations filed with this Court that he does not have a

frivolous bone in his body and has never filed any

motions that were frivolous. Windsor will provide proof

of this at the hearing as well as testimony from attorneys

and other special witnesses. (Aff #2010-2 435.)

26. Windsor objects to the affidavits provided

by the Plaintiffs. Mr. Carl Hugo Anderson is a known

perjuror. He must not be allowed to testify through

affidavits. Cross examination is mandatory with this liar

(Aff #2010-2 436.)

27. Windsor needs a reasonable period of time

following the hearing to file an amended response to the

ORDER and information regarding sanctions. (Aff

#2010-2 437.)

WINDSOR DEMANDS DUE PROCESS

28. Windsor objec ts because this Court has

previously violated Windsor’s Constitutional rights to

due process. (Aff #2010-2 438.)

29. [he courts have denied Windsor due

process for four years. Windsor has NEVER been

granted an evidentiary hearing and has been denied a

)

neutral judge. (Aff #2010-2 4 39.)

30. Procedural due process requires notice

and the opportunity to be heard. Windsor has been

denied both. (Aff #2010-2 440.)

"An essential principle of due process is that a

deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be

preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing

appropriate to the nature of the case’ " (quoting

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co

339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)); Concrete Pipe &

Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers

Pension Trust for Southern Cal, 508 U.S. 602,

617 (1993) ("due process requires a neutral and

detached judge in the first instance’ " (quoting

Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62

(1972))

‘For more than a century the central meaning of

procedural due process has been clear: ‘Partie:

whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be

heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right

they must first be notified.' " Fuentes v. Shevin

407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale

| Wall. 223, 233 (1864); Armstrang v. Manzo

80 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (other citations

omitted)). These essential constitutional promises

may not be eroded. (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124

S.Ct. 2633, 542 U.S. 507, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (U.S

06/28/2004).) (See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S

366, 389; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, 368-369

Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537; Ozie

Powell v. Alabama Haywood Patterson v. Same

Charley Weems and Clarence Norris v. Same, 53

S. Ct. 55, 287 U.S. 45 (U.S. 11/07/1932).)

It is true, of course, that "the fundamental

requirement of due process is an opportunity to

be heard upon such notice and proceedings as

are adequate to safeguard the right for which the

constitutional protection is invoked." (Anderson

National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246.)

(See Hagar v. Reclamation District \\\ U.S. 701

'08; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 10

Fong Yue Ting v. United States. “/ong Quan \

United States. Lee Joe v. United States, 13 5. '

1016, 149 U.S. 698 (U.S. 05/15/1893)

As the Supreme Court noted in Mu/lane v. Central

Hanover Bank & Trust. Co Itihe fundamental

requisite of due process of law is the opportuni

to be heard." 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652

657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (quoting Grannis \

Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S.Ct. 779, 783

L.Ed. 1363 (1914).) (See Jn re Oliver, 333 U.S

157, 273 (1948). See, e. g., Joint Anti-Fascist

41 U.S., at 143, 164

165, 171-172, 178, 185 (concurring opinions of

Black, Frankfurter, DOUGLAS, and Jackson, }}.)

Cole v. Arkansas, $33 U.S. 196, 201 (1948)

yniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S

1969); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18

1938); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385

(1914); In Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co

339 U.S. 306 (1950); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348

96 S. Ct. at 909; Mullane v. Central Hanover

Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70S. Ct. 652, 65

1441. Ed. 865 (1950); (KJeiner v. First National

Bank, 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 01/31/1985

}

Committee v. McGrath, 3

+] Inis Court never pave any notice to

Windsor of any sper ific conduct that it considered to be

potentially sanctionable. (See Allapattah Servs., Inc. \

Exxon Corp., 372 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1371 (S.D. Fla

2005); Byrne v. Nezhat 261 F.3d 1075, 1133-34 (11

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... [W]e see no reason why the absence of a

motion of a party to the litigation or some third

party requesting that a seal or protective order be

lifted should remove a federal court’s ability to

monitor and modify its previous orders in exercise

of its “supervisory power over its own records and

files.” (Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d

133, 141 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).)

The law is clear that it is within the Court's

discretion, sua sponte, to unseal the record. (See

In re Cendant, 260 F.3d at 192.) It is also beyond

question that this Court retains the power to

modify or lift seal orders that it nas previously

granted. (Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23

F.3d 772, at 784-785 (3d Cir. 1994).)

Furthermore, because there exists an antecedent,

extremely broad, right of access to judicial

records and proceedings promoting "a pervasive

common law right 'to inspect and copy public

records and documents, including judicial

records and documents," /n re Cendant, 260 F.3d

at 192, this Court intends to order the unsealing

of the record. (Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Rite

Aid Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 497 (E.D.Pa.

11/23/2004).)

37. | Whatever is under seal should establish

either that Maid committed fraud upon the courts by

filing bogus documents, or that Judge Evans withheld

documents that were extremely relevant to MIST-1. In

either case, this evidence should prove that the order te

quash the subpoena was improper. (Aff #2010-2 947.)

38. — There is no justification for keeping the

Diesel

contents secret from Windsor. Windsor has obtained the

valid documents directly from The Niagara Parks

Commission and the State of New York. Copies of these

contracts were previously filed in MIST-1 by Windsor

and were provided to Judge Evans. Since Windsor has

the contracts, so there is no confidentiality justification.

In addition, these documents have now been made

public by the news media, and these documents are

available for review or download on the Internet. (Aff

#2010-2 9 48.)

39. ‘There is not “good cause” to keep these

documents under seal. These documents cannot be

used for improper purposes. Lifting the seal will not

disclose any corporate secrets or information as the

documents are now public. Lifting the seal will not

protect scandalous or defamatory matter as there is none

in these documents. (Aff #2010-2 449.)

Under the common law, there is a well-

established presumption of pubic access to

judicial documents. (See Mixon v. Warner

Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597

(1978).) This public right of access is codified for

bankruptcy cases in 11 U.S.C. § 107(a), which

provides that all papers filed in a bankruptcy case

are public records open to examination, except as

specifically provided in the statute. (See Gitto

Global Corp., 422 F.3d at 6-7; In re Crawford,

194 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 1999); William T.

Bodah and Michelle M. Morgan, “Protective

Orders in the Bankruptcy Court: The

Congressional Mandate of Bankruptcy Code

Section 107 and its Constitutional Implications,”

24 Hastings Const. L. Q. 67 (Fall 1996).) The

statute provides for two exceptions to this broad

right of public access: the court may (and, on

motion of a party in interest, shall) (1) protect an

entity with regard to certain commercial secrets

and information, or (2) “protect a person with

respect to scandalous or defamatory matter

contained in a paper filed in a case under this

title.” (Lawrence P. King, Collier on Bankruptcy

§ 107.03|1] |b) (15th ed. Rev. 2007).) “...in light

of the public’s common law presumptive right of

access to judicial documents, the court has the

authority to lift a protective order or seal on

documents in its files, even in the absence of a

motion.

[A] district court can modify a protective order

when a third party requests judicial documents

after the parties have filed a stipulation of

dismissal pursuant to settlement. (Gambale v.

Deutsche Bank, 377 F.3d 133 (2nd Cir. 2004).)

[he existence of a common law right of access to

judicial records is beyond dispute. (See Littlejohn

v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 677-78 (3d Cir.

1988); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819

(3d Cir. 1981) (Criden 1).) This Court has made it

clear that our "strong presumption" of openness

does not permit the routine closing of judicial

records to the public. The party seeking to seal

any part of a judicial record bears the heavy

burden of showing that "the material is the kind of

information that courts will protect" and that

“disclosure will work a clearly defined and

serious injury to the party seeking closure."

(Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen,733 F.2d 1059,

1071 (3d Cir. 1984); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., \6

F.3d 549 (3d Cir. 02/23/1994),)

40. It has been a violation of Windsor’s

Constitutional rights to due process as well as First

Amendment and common law rights that Judge Evans

has kept these documents under seal. (Aff #2010-2

450.)

There is both a First Amendment and common

law right to inspect judicial records. (See United

States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d Cir.

1985) (First Amendment).) While the public’s

right to inspect judicial records may give way in

certain circumstances to other, more pressing

interests, such as the Government's interest in

maintaining confidentiality in order to

successfully build a criminal case, “Is}uch

circumstances will be rare . . . and the balance of

interests must be struck with special care.”

(Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S: 39, 45 (1984).)

41. Windsor’s most basic legal rights are at

stake here. (Aff #2010-2 451.)

“The operations of the courts and the judicial

conduct of judges are matters of utmost public

concern,” (Landmark Commc’‘ns, ~ v. Virginia,

435 U.S. 829, 839, 98S. Ct. 1535, 1541 (1978);

(Romero v. Drummond (11" Cir. iPetc

Even if the initial sealing was justified, when there

is a subsequent motion to remove such a seal, the

district court should closely examine whether

circumstances have changed sufficiently to allow

the presumption allowing access to court records

to prevail. In this case, we see no reason to

maintain the impoundment.” (Mi/ler v. Indiana

Hosp., 16 F.3d 549 (3d Cir. 02/23/1994).)

42. Judge Duffey, Judge Evans, and this Court

have no legal right to conceal evidence. There is a legal

obligation to disclose. The actions of these judges

constitute obstruction of justice. (Aff #2010-2 952.)

“The post-judgment discovery by a defeated

litigant of evidence establishing, clearly and

convincingly, that the prevailing party gave false

testimony which likely affected the result may

provide a basis for vacating a judgment under

Rule 60(b). E.g., 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S§ 2860-

61 (1995); see Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d

624, 631 (2d Cir. 1976) (requirement of clear and

convincing proof).)

43. The Middle District of Georgia has ruled

that discovery can be obtained from judges in matters

involving disqualification, one of the important issues in

this civil action: (Aff #2010-2 953.)

“| conclude that the discovery mechanisms of the

Federal Rules of Civil procedure would be

available in an appropriate Case to a party who

contemplates filing a motion for disqualification

of the presiding judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

144 or 455(a), and who wishes to establish

relevant facts from witnesses other than the

presiding judge such as, in this instance, Judges

Fitzpatrick and Elliott.” (Cheeves v. Southern

Clays, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 1570 (M.D.Ga.

06/17/1992.)

44. Windsor has provided extensive proof of

fraud and dishonest activity in this case. (See MIST-1

Doc.462, incorporated herein as if attached hereto.) The

documents under seal will provide proof of a specific act

of fraud. (Aff #2010-2 454.)

“...after final judgment has entered, our strong

interest in the finality of judgments leads courts to

intervene in a search for evidence of fraud only if

there has been some showing that a fraud actually

has occurred. See H.K. Porter Co. v. Goodyear

Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115, 1118-22 (6th

Cir. 1976) (discovery in aid of a motion attacking

a final judgment on the basis of fraud should be

permitted only if there is some evidence of fraud);

see also Midwest Franchise Corp. v. Metromedia

Restaurant Group, Inc., 177 F.R.D. 438, 440

(N.D. lowa 1997) (prima facie showing of fraud

required); United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 826

F. Supp. 1153, 1154 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (same).

(Duhaime v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance

Co., 183 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 06/28/1999).)

45. Discovery may certainly be appropriate in

an effort to prove fraud upon the court. (H.. K. Porter Co.

v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir.

06/09/1976).) (Aff #2010-2 455.)

46. Judge Evans has violated 18 USC §

1512(c), and she shall be fined under this title or

imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. (Aff #2010-

2 456.)

THIS COURT DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WINDSOR

BECAUSE HE IS PRO SE

47. Windsor submits that this Court has

discriminated against him because he is pro se. This

Court has also discriminated against him because he has

had the audacity to take action against federal judges.

(Aff #2010-2 457.)

48. Windsor submits that his experience is that

judges in the Northern District of Georgia and the

Eleventh Circuit ROUTINELY violate the law and twist

the facts and the law to accomplish their own improper

purposes. These judges have apparently decided that

they will take the law into their own hands and do

whatever they please. All of the federal judges in Atlanta

that Windsor has encountered are dishonest and corrupt.

(Aff #2010-2 458.)

49. Pro Se Windsor is being denied equal

protection, a violation of his Constitutional rights. (Aff

#2010-2 459.)

50. | Windsor’s Motion to Vacate and Motion

for Reconsideration filed on March 8, 2010 is referenced

and incorporated herein as if attached hereto as are all

documents filed in this Appeal. (Aff #2010-2 460.)

WHEREFORE, Windsor respectfully requests that

the Court do as follows:

1) Schedule the evidentiary hearing;

Issue an order giving Windsor the ability to

conduct depositions prior to the hearing;

2) Issue an order lifting the seal on MIST-1 Doc

168;

3) Grant Windsor a jury trial; and

4) Deny any fees to the Plaintiffs, and grant such

sanctions and other relief to Windsor as the Court

deems appropriate.

Submitted, this 8th day of March, 2010

William M. Windsor

/s/

William M. Windsor

Pro Se

3924 Lower Roswell Road

Marietta, GA 30068

Telephone: 770-578-1094

Facsimile: 770-578-1057

Email: bill@billwindsor.com

(Certificates of Compliance e, Service, and Interested Parties

have been omitted to reduce the size and cost of this

Appendix.)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-14735-DD

MAID OF THE MIST COTRPORATION,

MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Versus

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Defendant-Appellant

JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS,

Movant-Appellee.

BEFORE: CARNES, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

Now pending before the Court are numerous

motions filed both by Appellant and by Appellees Maid

of the Mist, et al. ("Maid"). Included in those motions are

Appellant's "Emergency Motion to Disqualify Eleventh

Circuit Judges and Motion to Change Venue" and Maid's

Motion for Sanctions for Filing a of this Court and for

transfer to another venue.

It is plain from review of Appellant's motion, as

well as this history of this appeal and the previous cases

filed by Appellant in this Court, that he seeks to

disqualify the members of this Court based on his belief

that previous adverse rulings were the result of bias,

dishonesty or some other improper motivation or intent,

up to and including relationships with Judges Evans and

Duffey of the Northern District of Georgia.

However, as the Supreme Court stated in Liteky v.

U.S., 510 U.S. 540 555,114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994),

"judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid

basis for a bias or partiality motion." see also Byrne v.

Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1103 (11th Cir. 2001);

McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F .2d 674, 678

(11th Cir. 1990). Appellant's motion to disqualify and

the other motions filed by Appeliant fail to allege any

valid basis for disqualification. Consequently,

Appellant's motion to disqualify this Court is without

merit and is DENIED

In reviewing the motions filed with the Court, we

have also reviewed Appellant's brief, which fails to

meaningfully challenge the orders on appeal.

Consequently, we sua sponte DISMISS this appeal AS

FRIVOLOUS AS BRIEFED. See 11th Cir. R. 42-4.

With the exception of Maid's Motion for

Sanctions for Filing a Frivolous Appeal, all remaining

motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

We now turn to Maid's Motion for Sanctions for

Filing a Frivolous Appeal. Although this motion initially

cites to 11th Cir. Rule 27-4 (sanctions for filing a

frivolous motion), the motion later cites to Fed.R.App.P.

38 and was filed contemporaneously with Maid's brief

as required by Rule 38. We therefore consider this

motion filed pursuant to Rule 38 and analyze it under

that rule. We take into consideration the fact that,

despite Appellant's prolific filings, Appellant is a pro se

litigant.

Rule 38 provides that: "If a court of appeals

determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a

separately filed motion or notice from the court and

reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages

and single or double costs to the appellee." "The purpose

of Rule 38 damages is to compensate appellees who are

forced to defend judgments awarded them in the trial

court from appeals that are wholly without merit, and to

‘preserve the appellate court calendar for cases worthy

of consideration.’ ... Another important purpose is to

discourage litigants from unnecessarily wasting their

opponents’ time and resources." See Nagle v. Alspach, 8

Fad 141, 145 (3rd Cir. 1993),

We have imposed Rule 38 sanctions upon

"appellants who raise ‘clearly frivolous claims' in the

face of established law and clear facts." See Farese v,

Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003) citing

Misabec Mercantile, Inc. De Panama v. Donaldson,

Lufkin & Jenrette ACLI Futures, Inc. 853 F.2d 834, 841

(11th Cir. 1988).

After review of the matters pending before us, we

readily conclude that Appellant's conduct in this Court

meets the requirement for imposition of Rule 38

sanctions. Therefore, Maid's Rule 38 motion is

GRANTED.

Maid is DIRECTED to file a statement of costs and

expenses within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this

Order. Appellant's response to Maid's statement will bi

due within fourteen (14) days of service of Maid’:

Statement

FILED

L).S. COURT OF APPEAL '

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT]

FEB 25 2010

IHOMAS K. KAH!

CLERK

APPEAL DOC.NO. 09-14735-D

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION and

MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD

Appellees,

ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC, ALCATRAZ MEDIA, IN¢

Defendants; and WILLIAM M. WINDSOR, Appellant

and Defendant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division

Case No. 1:09-CV-01543-WSD

Judge William S. Duffey, Jr

BRIEF OF DEFENDANI/APPELLAN]

WILLIAM M, WINDSOR

William M. Windsor

$924 Lower Roswell Road

Marietta, GA 30068

lclephon 0-578-1094

Facsimile: 770-578-105

Email: bill@billwindsor.com

PRO SE FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLAN |

WILLIAM M. WINDS

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

William M. Windsor, Pro Se, hereby certifies pursuant to

FRAP 26.1 and 11" Cir. Rule 26.1-1 that the following

persons, judges, associations of person, firms,

partnerships, or corporations may have an interest in the

outcome of this case:

1) Alcatraz Media, Inc., and Alcatraz Media,

LLC, Defendants (jointly “Alcatraz”)

2) Anderson, Judge R. Lanier, United States

Appellate Judge.

3) Anderson, Jr., Carl Hugo (“Mr. Anderson”),

Counsel for Appellees, Maid of the Mist

Corp. and Maid of the Mist Steamboat

Company, Ltd.

4) Barkett, Judge Rosemary, United States

Appellate Judge.

5) Batten, Timothy C., United States District

Judge.

6) Berry, Judith L. (“Berry”), customer of

Alcatraz and Maid.

7) Birch, Judge Stanley F., United States

Appellate Judge

8) Black, Judge Susan H., United States

Appellate judge.

9) Blackburn, Judge, United States District

Judge.

19) Bright, Sarah Louise (“Ms. Bright”),

Counsel for Appellees, Maid of the Mist

Corp. and Maid of the Mist Steamboat

Company, Ltd.

11)Brown, Marc W. (“Mr. Brown”), Counsel

for Appellees, Maid of the Mist Corp. and

Maid of the Mist Steamboat Company, Ltd.

12)Carlson, Sandra (“Carlson”), Assistant

Controller of Maid.

13)Camp, Jack T., United States District Judge.

14)Carnes, Judge Ed, United States Appellate

Judge.

15)Carnes, Judge, United States District Judge.

16)Chambliss, Senator Saxby.

17)Conway, Judge, United States District

Judge.

18)Cooper, Clarence, United States District

Judge.

19)Cox, Judge Emmett Ripley, United States

Appeilate Judge.

20)Dubina, Judge Joel F., United States

Appellate Judge.

21)Duffey, Hon. William S. (“Judge Duffey”),

United States District Judge.

22)Edmondson, Judge J.L., United States

Appellate Judge.

23)Evans, Hon. Orinda D. (“Judge Evans” or

the “DC”), United States District Judge.

24)tverybody Loves Travel, LLC, company

owned by the owners of Defendants

Alcatraz Media, Inc., and Alcatraz Media,

LLC.

25) Fay, Judge Peter T., United States

Appellate Judge.

)Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”).

)Forrester, J. Owen, United States District

Judge.

28) Fuller, Judge, United States District Judge.

29) Georgia Athletic and Entertainment

Commission (“GAEC”).

30)Glynn, Christopher (“Glynn”), President of

Maid.

31)Godbold, Judge John C., United States

Appellate Judge.

32)Granade, Judge, United States District

Judge.

33) Hawkins & Parnell (“H&P”), Counsel for

Appellees, Maid of the Mist Corp. and

Maid of the Mist Steamboat Company, Ltd.

34) Hill, Judge James C., United States

Appellate Judge.

35) Hull, Judge Frank M., United States

Appellate Judge.

36) Huber, Christopher J, United States

Attorney.

37)Hunt, Willis B., Jr., United States District

Judge.

38) Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit.

39)Kravitch, Judge Phyllis A., United States

Appellate Judge.

40) Maid of the Mist Corporation

(“Corporation”), Appellee, and Maid of the

Mist Steamboat Company, Ltd.

(“Steamboat”), Appellee, (jointly “Maid”).

41)Marcus, Judge Stanley, United States

Appellate Judge.

42)Martin, Beverly B., United States District

Judge.

43)Mendell, Brett A. (“Mr. Mendell”), Former

Counsel for Appellees, Maid of the Mist

Corp. and Maid of the Mist Steamboat

Company, Ltd.

44)Mickle, Judge, United States District Judge.

45)Moore, Judge, United States District Judge.

46) Moye, Charles A., United States District

Judge.

47)Murphy, Harold., United States District

Judge.

48) National Association of Ticket Brokers.

49) New York State Bar Association.

50) New York State Office of Parks, Recreation

and Historic Preservation

51)New York State Comptroller's Office

52)Niagara County New York District

Attorney.

53) Niagara Parks Commission

54)O’Kelley, William C., United States

District Judge.

55)Pannell, Charles A., United States District

Judge.

56)Penland, James W. (“Mr. Penland”),

Former Counsel for William M. Windsor,

Appellant.

57)Phillips Lytle (“Phillips”), Counsel for

Appellees, Maid of the Mist Corp. and

Maid of the Mist Steamboat Company, Ltd.

58)Pryor, Judge William H., United States

Appellate Judge.

59) Quillian Yates, Sally, Acting Unites States

Attorney.

60) Raley, G. Brian (“Mr. Raley”), Former

Counsel for Defendants Alcatraz Media,

Inc., and Alcatraz Media, LLC.

61)Reserve 123, Inc., a Company owned by

the owners of Defendants Alcatraz Media,

Inc., and Alcatraz Media, LLC.

62)Reserve XL, Inc., a company owned by the

owners of Defendants, Alcatraz Media,

Inc., and Alcatraz Media LLC.

63)Round America, LLC, a company owned

by William M. Windsor.

64) Royal, Judge, United States District Judge.

65)Ruddy, Timothy P. (“Ruddy”), Vice-

President of Maid.

66)Russ, Arthur (“Mr. Russ”), Counsel for

Appellees, Maid of the Mist Corp. and

Maid of the Mist Steamboat Company, Ltd.

67)Schul, Robert J. (“Schul”), Controller of

Maid.

68)Shoob, Marvin H., United States District

Judge.

69) State Bar of Georgia.

70)Story, Richard W., United States District

Judge.

71)Sullivan, Kathleen E. (“Ms. Sullivan”),

Former Counsel for Defendants Alcatraz

Media, Inc., and Alcatraz Media, LLC.

72)Take 5 Tours, Inc., a company owned by

the owners of Defendants Alcatraz Media,

Inc., and Alcatraz Media, LLC.

73) Thrash, Thomas W., United States District

Judge.

74) Tidwell, G. Ernest, United States District

Judge.

75)Tjoflat, Judge Gerald Bard, United States

Appellate Judge.

6) United States Attorney General.

7) United States Attorney's Office.

8) United States Supreme Court.

9) Vining, Robert L, Jr., United States District

Judge.

80)Ward, Horace T., United States District

ludge.

81)Wilson, Judge Charles R., United States

Appellate Judge.

82)Windsor, William M. (“Windsor or

Appellant”), Defendant and Appellant.

(Defendants Alcatraz and Windsor are

reflected herein as “A&W.”)

83)ZZ Tours, Inc., a company owned by

William M. Windsor.

No corporate disclosure statement is necessary for this

party because Windsor is a natural, human, person.

Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of November, 2009.

William M. Windsor:

William M. Windsor

Pro Se

3924 Lower Roswell! Road

Marietta, GA 30068

Telephone: 770-578-1094

Facsimile: 770-578-1057

Email: bill@billwindsor.com

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL

ARGUMENT

Appellant Windsor requests oral argument.

This case is heavily fact dependent in a record that

contains thousands of false statements. Windsor

believes that oral argument will aid the court by

providing a more in-depth explanation of the facts

and will give the court the opportunity to question

Windsor about facts and issues to aid the court in

making a more informed decision.

Windsor ts pro se, and Windsor believes the

oral argument will assist the court in any areas

where Windsor was at a disadvantage as a pro se

party in the preparation of the written appeal.

Windsor also believes that the Eleventh

Circuit discriminates against pro se parties. An oral

argument might reduce the opportunity for this

Court to discriminate.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Certificate of Interested Persons.............

Statement Regarding Oral Argument.

Table of Contents................cescceee

1. Statement of Jurisdiction............

I]. Statement of the Issues...............

Il]. Statement of the Case................

A. Statement of the Proceedings Below

B. Statement of the Facts.................

IV. Summary of Argument.....................

V. Standard of Review..............scscccessees

VI. Argument and Citations of Authority.....

A. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY

ALLOWING JUDGE EVANS TO FILE A

MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA AND TO |

CREATE THIS CIVIL ACTION................ 22 |

B. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY

DEMONSTRATING PERVASIVE BIAS

AGAINST

SDN neem RNAP TAREE &

C. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY

MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS IN

Oe pasos h cece dueakswvexsass 24

D. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY

ENCOURAGING PERJURY,

S UBORNATION OF PERJURY, RULE

11 VIOLATIONS, OBSTRUCTION OF

JUSTICE, DISHONEST PARTIES,

DISHONEST ATTORNEYS, AND

DISHONEST JUDGES. ......cccccseeees 26

E. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY

MAKING FACT DECISIONS THAT

WERE CONTRARY TO THE FACTS

THAT WERE BEFORE THE

ENE cada wachucssauscassauiaedeceuceaseacs 27

F. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY

COMMITTING PERJURY......28

G. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY

ISSUING ORDERS WITHOUT LEGAL

FUE LOE Wiel BON sk ev ccesessecsns 28

H. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY

CLAIMING WINDSOR DID NOT CITE

ERRORS OF LAW AS CRITERIA

THAT WOULD JUSTIFY

RECONSIDERATION OF THE QUASH

I. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY

CLAIMING WINDSOR DID NOT CITE

ERRORS OF FACT AS CRITERIA

THAT WOULD JUSTIFY

RECONSIDERATION OF THE

ei) ¢y oe 2) Se 50

J. JUDGE DUFFEY HAS VIOLATED

THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

AND HAS DEPRIVED WINDSOR OF

HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS......60

K. JUDGE DUFFEY FAILED TO

PROVIDE VALID LEGAL

JUSTIFICATION FOR DENYING

CHANGE OF VENUE.........63

. Conclusion -- Relief Sought.......

Certificate of Compliance.

Certificate of Service.

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases

Boyd v. United, 116 U.S. 616 at 635 (1885).......61

Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 112)

te, sepecccccscccedacavececesdareencd

Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978) ......... 62

Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications,

ho a eC et 62

Concrete Pipe & Prods. V. Constr. Laborers

Pensioa Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) .........: 3]

Corwin v. Walt Dinsey Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1254

iss vanceccceseceeccdsdueccacseas 18

Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) ............ 6]

Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 (1894)....62

FDIC v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 1266, 1272

(10th Cir.1998) (internal quotation omitted)........61

Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications,

SN FUP OOD, FOe LI, ZOO... accccccscceveccscevere ose 62

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 155 (1966)...... 62

Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance,

Cee OF os, Be SOY, 371, OTE woees vn ces cen scccrses sO

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484

sree tris sensed cnecesieeeevcsesscevcunectaen

Johnson v. Beto, 337 F. Supp. 1371, 1376 (S.D.

is sae twice soccene $eaeseoa cence 66

Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216

Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968).............58

Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct.

cn civnauvebauntecdertscnssescdas 3]

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, 180

RRR anne oe pe ee a

Marshall v. Jerrico Inc., 446 US 238, 242, 100

S.Ct. 1610, 64 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1980)............31, 32

Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 313

EES Paar A re 66

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)...31

Murphy v. Florida, 42\ U.S. 794, 797 (1975)......66

Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14,75 S.Ct

pS 0 | pcg Ok ne 5]

Olmstad v. United States, (1928) 277 U.S. 438....62

Pamplin v. Mason, 364 F.2d | (Sth Cir. 1966).....66

People v. Zajic, 88 \\l|.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626

SRR a ORIN TCA ee SE an a en 57

Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 483 n. 35, 96S. Ct

3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976)...................... |

Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332..............62

United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220, 1S. Ct. at

ae seer sero. Se Nes 62

United States v. Marcello, 280 F. Supp. 510, 513-14

Fe EE ETE ee nn ae 66

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-736

ee a ree Det a iy 18

United States v. Sciarra, 85) F.2d 621, 635 (11th

Snare cisco cab actincveeuadsckskocdacoumie ao

United States v. Tokars, 839 F. Supp. 1578, 1581

eS a ecauaaes 66

United States v. Williams, 523 F.2d 1203, 1208 (Sth

Go B, , - | Sea ARR Beene rarest ren ae eS pce 66

Zurich v. Matrix, 426 F.3d 1281, 1286-1288 (10"

Cir. 2005) 6)

statutes

IS U.S.C. 37] 6

Ik U.S.C. 100] 6

Ik U.S.C. 1503 64. 6‘

Ik U.S.C. 1512(b) 6

Ik U.S.C. 1512(c) 6

Is U.S.C. 1621 64

18 U.S.C. 1622 64

18 U.S.C. 1623 64

28 U.S.C. 144 j9

28 U.S.C. 455 Q 23

28 U.S.C. 1404 64

42 USA

19X34 64

28 U.S.C.A.§81332

28 U.S.C.A.§129]

O.C.G.A. 16-10-70 64

O.C.G.A,. 16-10-93 oe

O.C.G.A. 43-4B.. 19

Subpoena Regulations Adopted by Judicial

Conference 34. 37, 54

Rules

Code of Judicial Conduct 1 46, 47, 4%, 64

FRAP 31(a)(1) 2

LR 3.1B, NDGa 63

LR 7.1C, NDGa 1S - 64

LR 7.2B

NDGa 14

LR &3.1C, NDC

LR &3.1FQ2)

NDGa

he R.Civ.P. Rule ||

hR.Civ.P. Rule 34

EF R.Civ.P. Rule 37

bR.Civ.P. Rule

i RoCiv.P. Rule 60(d)(3)

State 14 rol Georgia ule

(Conduct

Treatises

Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, §

IIIT 600 NEES ADE IY BL OO ES TO Meat 58

Robert Craig Waters. Tort & Insurance Law

6 |

Journal, Spr. 1986.....

Constitutional Provisions

Constitution of the United States 6

I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

District Court Jurisdiction:

Jurisdiction for the District Court’s subject

matter 1s diversity among the parties pursuant to 28

U.S.C.A.§1332.

Court of Appeals Jurisdiction:

The United States Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit has juriscliction of this case

pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.4 i291 because this is an

appeal of final decisions 0° the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, a

district court within the Eleventh Judicial Circuit.

Filing Dates Establishing the Timeliness of the

Appeal:

The Order Staying the Case (“Stay Order’)

was entered on June 8, 2009. [R.4.] (Depo-Doc.4.)

The “Order Granting Motion to Quash and

Motion to Supplement” (“Quash Order’) was

entered June 30, 2009. [R.32.] (Depo-Doc.32.)

The Motion for Reconsideration (“MFR”)

was filed on July 10, 2009. [R.34.] (Depo-Doc.34.)

8/7

The Motion for Change of Venue (“MCV”)

was filed on July 10, 2009. [Depo-Doc.36.)

The “Order Denying Motion for

Reconsideration and Motion for Change of Venue”

(“Reconsideration Order’) was entered September

3, 2009. [R.42.] (Depo-Doc.42.)

On September 15, 2009, the appeal fee was

paid. (Depo-Doc.44.)

The Appeal was docketed on September 21,

2009. [R.DS1.] {DS1.]

FRAP Rule 31(a)(1) provides that the

appellant must serve and file a brief within 40 days

after the record is filed. The record was filed on

October 14, 2009, so based upon FRAP, the Brief is

due by November 23, 2009. (Depo-Doc.47.)

However, on September 22, 2009, the U.S.C.A.

issued a notice to Windsor stating that Appeliant’s

Brief was to be filed within 40 days from September

21, 2009. This set a deadline of November 1, a

Sunday, so the Brief may be due on Monday,

November 2, 2009. (Depo-Doc.48.)

This civil action is shown as a “closed case”

by the District Court. [R.DS1.] [DS1.]

Assertion that the Appeal is from an

Appealable Order that establishes the Court of

Appeals’ Jurisdiction:

The Order Granting the Motion to Quash

(“Quash Order’) was filed on June 30, 2009.

[R.32.] (Depo-Doc.32.) The Motion for

Reconsideration (“MFR”) was filed on July 10,

2009 (Depo-Doc.34.) The Reconsideration Order

(“Reconsideration Order’) [R.42.| (Depo-Doc.42)

was entered on September 3, 2009. These orders

are final and appealable. The Reconsideration

Order is a reconsideration of the Quash Order.

These address the same subject, so this is an appeal

of both orders.

il. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

This 1s an appeal from an order dated

September 3, 2009 (“Reconsideration Order’) and

the underlying order dated June 30, 2009 (“Quash

Order’) that led to this appeal. These orders are

jointly referred to as the “Appealed Orders.”

The issues of error before the Court of Appeals are

as follows:

Whether Judge Duffey erred by allowing

Judge Evans to file a Motion to Quash Subpoena

and create this civil action.

Whether Judge Duffey erred by

demonstrating pervasive bias against Windsor.

Whether Judge Duffey erred by making false

statements in orders.

Whether Judge Duffey erred by encouraging

perjury, subornation of perjury, Rule 11 violations,

obstruction of justice, dishonest Plaintiffs, dishonest

Plaintiffs’ Attorneys, and dishonest Judge Evans.

Whether Judge Duffey erred by making fact

decisions contrary to the facts that were before the

court.

Whether Judge Duffey erred by commiting

perjury.

Whether Judge Duffey erred by issuing orders

without legal justification.

Whether Judge Duffey erred by claiming

Windsor did not cite errors of law that would justify

reconsideration on the Court’s orders.

Whether Judge Duffey erred by claiming

Windsor did not cite errors of fact that would justify

reconsideration on the Court’s orders.

Whether Judge Duffey erred by violating

Windsor’s Constitutional rights.

Whether Judge Duffey erred by failing to

report Judge Evans to the appropriate authorities for

violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Whether Judge Duffey erred by failing to

report Plaintiffs’ Attorneys to the appropriate

authorities for violations of the State Bar of Georgia

Rules of Professional Conduct.

Whether Judge Duffey erred by failing to

provide valid legal justification when denying

Motion for Change of Venue.

Wl. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This 1s an appeal from orders of the United States

District Court, Northern District of Georgia, Case

Number 1:09-CV-01543-WSD: Order entered

September 3, 2009 [R.42.] (Depo-Doc.42)

(“Reconsideration Order’), and Order entered June

30, 2009 (“Quash Order”) [R.32.] (Depo-Doc.32.).

Jointly referenced as the “Appealed Orders,” these

orders contain rulings on quashing a deposition and

denying a change of venue.

A. Statement of the Proceedings Below

On August 29, 2005, Maid initiated civil

action 1:06 CV-0714-ODE (“MIST-1”) in the

Superior Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia, by

filing a Verified Complaint seeking injunctive relief.

It was verified by Glynn. [R.1.] (Doc.1.) ”

On October 12, 2005, A&W filed a Verified

Answer and told the truth; Alcatraz filed a

counterclaim. Windsor signed the Verified Answer

swearing that virtually everything in the Verified

’ Throughout this Brief, the Record Excerpts are referenced

as “R.#.” Please note that there are two records. Two Docket

Sheets are provided (DS1 and DS2). Citations to the record in 1:09-

CV-01543-WSD (DS1) are cited as “Depo-Doc.” Citations to the

record in 1:06-CV-0714-ODE (DS2) are cited as “(Doc.#-Pg.#.)”

“Dec#” is used to refer to the numbered declarations of William M

Windsor. Interested persons are defined on pages i to iv

Complaint was false. [R.3.] (Doc.3;Doc.315:Exh.A

Pg.23-9]48-49.) Windsor compiled the proof that the

Verified Complaint was false using the testimony of

the Plaintiffs’ witnesses. (Doc.377;Doc.462.)

On March 20, 2006, Maid filed an “Updated

Brief in Support of Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order” alleging that A&W were

improperly selling Maid vouchers. (Doc.6-Pg.1.)

Maid claimed that A&W had violated the Lanham

Act. (Doc.6-Pg.6.) A&W removed the action to

the U.S. District Court. (Doc.1-Pg.1.)

On March 28, 2006, A&W filed a Response

to Motion for TRO. Windsor told the truth under

oath, swearing that Maid’s claims were false.

(Doc.4.) Windsor compiled the proof that the

Motion was false using the testimony of the

Plaintiffs’ witnesses. (Doc.377;Doc.462.)

On March 29, 2006, the case was assigned to

Judge Evans. (Doc.8.)

On March 30, 2006, Judge Evans established

the erroneous position that what Glynn of Maid said

was true and what Windsor said was false. The

TRO was issued. [R.10.] (Doc.10.) (Doc.361-

Dec#2:Pg.25-4]81;Doc.381-Dec#7:P25-439;

Doc.315;Doc.462.)

On March 30, 2006, A&W filed a motion

with justification for a $400,000 bond. (Doc.11.)

Judge Evans ordered only $5,000. (Doc.10.) This

demonstrated bias. (Doc.462.)

On April 11 and 12, 2006, Judge Evans held

the only evidentiary hearing in this case on Maid’s

request for a preliminary injunction. (Doc.35;

Doc.36; Doc.37.) At the conclusion of the

evidence, Judge Evans informed Maid that they had

seven days to identify a cause of action. (Doc.36-

Pgs.166-167.)

On April 19, 2006, Maid filed a Proposed

Order Granting Preliminary Injunction. This

identified claims of tortious interference and false

advertising as the legal arguments for the hearing a

week before. (Doc.27-Pg.1.)

On May 12, 2006, Judge Evans granted a

preliminary injunction (“PI”) based upon Maid’s

new tortious interference claim. Judge Evans

maintained her position that what Glynn said was

true and what Windsor said was false. Judge Evans

made many false statements in the PI Order. [.33.]

(Doc.33-Pg.1.) Windsor compiled the proof that the

P] Order was false using the testimony of the

Plaintiffs’ witnesses. [R.377.] (Doc.377-Exh.9;

Doc.462.)

On January 22, 2007, A&W moved for

summary judgment (“SJ”) on Maid’s tortious

interference claim, and Maid moved for SJ on

tortious interference, attorney fees under

O.C.G.A.§13-6-11, and all Alcatraz counterclaims.

(Doc.146;Doc.148.)

On February 2, 2007, Windsor brought the

hundreds of lies, perjury, and Rule 11 violations of

Maid to the attention of Judge Evans, but she cut

him off in mid-sentence and ignored it. [R.174.]

(Doc. 174-Pgs.34,45-47,25-28.)

On August 9, 2007, Judge Evans granted

Maid’s motion for summary judgment (“SJ Order’)

and denied Alcatraz’s motion. Judge Evans made as

many as 200 false statements in the SJ Order.

[R.251.] (Doc.251.) Windsor compiled the proof

that the SJ Order was false using the testimony of

the Plaintiffs’ witnesses.

(Doc.377_Exh.22;Doc.462.)

On September 7, 2007, Alcatraz appealed the

SJ Order (Appeal No. 07-14214-BB).

On September 10, 2007, Windsor appealed

the SJ Order. (Appeal_ No. 07-14235-BB).

(Doc.254;Doc.256.)

On October 21, 2008, the U.S.C.A. vacated

and remanded the SJ Order in part. (Doc.344.)

On October 29, 2008, an order was entered

making the USCA mandate the judgment of the D¢

(Doc.346.)

On December 9, 2008, Judge Evans entered

by consent a “Final Order and Judgment.”

(Doc.354.) A&W did not provide any releases; th

only promise was to not appeal the summary

judgment to the Supreme Court. (Doc.354-Pg.4.)

On April 24, 2009, Windsor began efforts t

get the case reopened and to get Judge Evans

recused:

April 24, 2009 -- Motion to Recuse Judg:

Evans. [R.361.] (Doc.36]1.)

April 24, 2009 -- Motion to Reopen Casi

(Doc.362.)

April 27, 2009 -- Motion for Sanction

(Doc.363.)

April 27, 2009 -- Motion for Sanction

(Doc.364.)

May 7. 2009 -- Motion for Discovery

(Doc.374.)

May 13, 2009 -- Amended Dec #3 [R.377.]

(Doc.377.)

May 20, 2009 Reply 10 Response to Motion

to Recuse. (Doc.381.)

May 22, 2009 — Reply to Response to Motion

to Reopen (Doc. 385.)

On May 22, 2009, Windsor filed Notice t

lake Deposition of ludge Evans (Doc.389.)

On May 22, 2009, Judge Evans entered

order denying several of Windsor’s motions

(Doc.390.)

On June 3, 2009, Judge Evans filed an

Emergency Motion to Quash Subpoena. [Depo

Doc.!.)

On June 8, 2009, Judge Duffey issued an

Order Staying Case. [R.4.] (Depo-Doc.4.)

On June 10, 2009, Judge Evans filed a

Motion to Supplement Emergency Motion to Quash

Subpoena. (Depo-Doc.8.)

On June 18, 2009, Windsor filed a Motion for

Reconsideration or Revision of Order Staying Case

| Depo-Doc.15. |

lifth Declaration of W141

( omplete timeline Ol

happened in this ca

much more. (Doc.364.-Dec#12:4912007-12014.)

Maid’s managers have committed hundreds

of counts of perjury and have conspired to commit

fraud upon the courts. (Doc.362-Dec#1:41;

Doc.385: Dec#6:419;Doc.364-Dec#12: 412007;

Doc.377-Amended_ Dec#3,Exhs.1-28.) 46 of the 50

paragraphs in the Verified Complaint were false or

incorrect and/or not based upon the personal

knowledge of Glynn. (Doc.377-Amended Dec#3-

Exh.1:Pgs.1-158.)

The lies, false sworn pleadings, false

pleadings, and discovery abuse continued

throughout MIST-1. This deprived A&W of a fair

trial. (Doc.363;Doc.364-Dec#12;Doc.377-Exh.23;

Doc.361-Exh.16.) The dishonesty of Maid and

Maid’s attorneys was compounded by the bias and

improper and illegal acts of Judge Evans, who

withheld documents from A&W, violated the rights

of A&W by denying the most basic discovery, and

acted without the impartiality required of a judge

(Doc.381; Doc.377-Amended Dec#3:Exhs.9,22.)

Windsor has documented everything.

(Doc.377;Doc.378;Doc462.) Evidence before the

court consists of the entire docket in MIST-1,

especially Docs. 361-362-363-364-368-374-377-

378-38 1-383-385-462-474. [R.DS2.]

On May 12, 2006, Judge Evans signed an

100

The Pl Order «

tatements. Windsor has do

as 17 of these statements are

testimony of Maid’s manager R.2 )

Amended Dec#3-Exh.9:Pes.1-&

had the evidence before her

know the facts. Judge Evans wa

advised by A&W that sworn affidavits fi

customers proved that the alleged

the injunction had been proven to |

Judge Evans did nothing. |R.174.](D

On August 8, 2007, Judge |

Summary Judgment Order (“SJ Orde!

Windsor has documented that as mat

416 statements by Judge Evans are t

or are conclusions based on false staten

[R.377.] (Doc.377-Amended Dec#3-Ex!

184.)

Judge Evans claimed 1n the SJ Order that she

rejected the statements of fact presented by the

parties, so she drafted the facts based on the

evidence. [R.251.] (Doc.251:Pg.3.) Judge Evans

invented facts and made statements that are proven

se Rae |

to be false by the evidence. [R.377.] (Doc.377-

Amended Dec#3.Exh.22?

Windsor has charged Judge Evans with

perjury, obstruction of justice, RICO, fraud upon the

court, and more

The facts relevant to the District Court’s

consideration of the Motion to Quash were set out 1

Depo-Doc.34 P.3-7 § 16-30: Depo-Doc.21; Depo

Doc.24. A comprehensive statement of facts 1n

Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-0714-ODE has been set

out in the sworn Twenty-Fifth Declaration of

William M. Windsor (“Dee #25” — Doc.462). Itis a

horror story of abuse and violations of the law by

the Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ Attorneys, and Judge

Orinda D. Evans. [Depo-Doc.21 Dee #35 930

Maid has not filed a single affidavit in 2009,

so Windsor’s declarations are uncontroverted and

provide the only facts for this Court to consider

IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellant Windsor asserts that the Appeal

Orders constitute error summarized as follows

Windsor seeks reversal of the Appealed

Orders. Judge Duffey issued the order denyins

Windsor’s Motion for Reconsideration of Ordet

Quash Deposition (“MFR”), and denying Wind;

Motion tor Change of Venue (“MCV”) after

initially issuing an Order to Quash the Dep

R.42.] (Doc.42.) [R.32.] (Doc.32)

ludge Duttey erred by allow ns ¢ I

chiiti Vil cll

oO file a Motion to Quash Subpoena and create tl

civil action. Neither Judge Evans nor Judge Duft

4 AU

cited any legal authority for the creation of c1\

action 1:09-CV-01543-WSD or to have a sitti

judge file a Motion to Quash her own subpo¢

issued by the District Court Clerk

Judge Duffey erred by demonstratins

pervasive bias against Windsor. The denial of 1

motions was because of the bias, not based upon th

merits or law

Judge Duffey erred by making

statements in orders

Judge Duffey erred by encouraging perjury,

subornation of perjury, Rule 11 violations

obstruction of justice, dishonest Plaintiffs, dishonest

Plaintiffs’ Attorneys, and dishonest Judge Evans

Judge Duffey and federal judges in Atlanta, Georgia

improperly encourage these actions

ludge Duffey erred by making fact decisior

contrary to the facts that were betore the court

[here is no factual support for the Appealed Orders

ludge Evans did not file a single affidavit. [R.DS]

Judge Duffey erred by commiting perjury

Judge Dutfey and federal judges in Atlanta, Georg

improperly make false statements 1n orders to

damage litigants. The Appealed Orders cont

false statements

ludge Duttey erred DY 1ISSUII p orders W thout

legal justification

Judge Duffey erred by claiming Windsor d

not cite errors of law that would justify

reconsideration on the Court’s orders

Judge Duffey erred by claiming Windsor di

not cite errors of fact that would justify

reconsideration on the Court’s orders

Judge Duffey erred by violating Windsor’s

Constitutional rights by violating the Constitution

nd the Code of Judicial Conduct

Evans to the appropriate authorities for violations

the Code of Judicial Conduct

[), . ' +4! . ]

rofessional Conduct

1 ] na $4 | {

LOY C Jutiey € ed \ rOVIG

ustification w len Mo CI

;\ _

a i

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Windsor ask this Court to consider that the

standard of review should be plain error. The errors

in this case are so fundamental that, absent the

errors, an unbiased judge would have reached a

different result.

A district court's denial of a motion for

reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. (Corwin v. Walt Dinsey Co., 475 F.3d

1239, 1254 (11th Cir. 2007).)

Since plain error has permeated the entire

proceedings due to Judge Duffey’s bias, Judge

Evans’ bias, and the dishonesty of Maid and Maid’s

attorneys, Windsor respectfully proposes t!iat this

Court elect to conduct a de novo review of the entire

record under both its review and supervisory

powers.

Plain-error review involves four prongs.

(United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-736

(1993).) Windsor meets the requirements.

Errors have been made of such a nature that

to leave them uncorrected would result in damage to

the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial

process.

106

vs ARGUMENT AND CITATIONS OF

AUTHORITY

The legal system was structured so that grave

miscarriages of justice, such as the one in this case,

should not happen. Unfortunately, the legal system

and its protections do not exist in the federal courts

in Atlanta, Georgia. Federal judges in Atlanta

routinely violate the law and the rights of litigants

for their own misguided purposes.

Oaths theoretically require honesty. The

federal judges in Atlanta ignore their oaths and the

oaths of others.

The system theoretically provides safeguards

and checks and balances such as Rules 11, 34, 37,

Local Rule 83.1C, Rule 60, 28 U.S.C. 144 and 455

that provide means to call party, attorney, and

judicial dishonesty to the attention of judges. The

federal judges in Atlanta ignore these rules and laws

as they abuse the rights of litigants for their own

improper purposes.

The worst of hardships has resulted from the

dishonesty in this case. A&W have lost

approximately $1,000,000.00, have been saddled

with an injunction that is a violation of Georgia law,

have been defamed, and have lost years of man

hours fighting the injustice. Now others are unfairly

using the erroneous decision in this case in litigation

107

against Alcatraz in efforts to “void” O.C.G.A.43-

4B. To Alcatraz, the financial cost represents years

of pre-tax profits. To Windsor, the financial cost

represents money that this retiree expected to live

on in retirement.

None of this should have happened. The

hardship has been extreme, unexpected, unfair, and

illegal. And it continues.

Maid and Maid’s Attorneys deliberately

planned and carefully executed an unconscionable

scheme to obtain tudgments and injunctions against

A&W, to force A&W to incur significant legal

expenses and to obtain money from A&W.

(Doc.377-Amended Dec#3:Exh.23; Doc.363:

Doc.364-Dec#12.)

Amended Dec#3 and the exhibits thereto

provide proof of the massive dishonesty and bad

faith. [R.377.] (Doc.377-Amended Dec#3:Exhs.1-

28;also-Doc.378-Dec#5;Doc.462.)

When Judge Evans created this action to

cause Judge Duffey to enter the picture, Windsor

felt he would finally get someone to look at the

facts. Sadly, Judge Duffey has quickly proven to be

as dishonest as Judge Evans.

There is no basis for the orders that Judge

Duffey issued in this matter. His orders are filled

108

with lies. The ONLY facts before Judge Duffey

were those provided by Windsor, yet Judge Duffey

managed to invent his own facts so he could rule

against Windsor. There was no legal basis for

Judge Duffey’s orders, so he just lied again and

again to protect his next-door neighbor, Judge

Evans. Judge Duffey and Judge Evans are part of

the corruption that is rampant in the federal court

system in Atlanta, Georgia.

What has happened in this civil action and in

the underlying action is quite simple. Judge Evans

showed pervasive bias, ignored the facts and the

law, and has done everything that she could to cheat

the Defendants. Windsor has proven massive

dishonesty and wrongdoing by the Plaintiffs, their

attorneys, and Judge Evans. Judge Evans is now

trying to cover up her criminal actions, and her

friend, Judge Duffey, has come to her rescue by

issuing the Appealed Orders without factual or legal

support. Judge Duffey 1s committing perjury and

obstruction of justice, and he is relying on the

corruption in the Eleventh Circuit to cover him and

his next-door neighbor, Judge Evans. Judges of the

Eleventh Circuit have proven their own dishonesty

and corruption again and again in these actions.

(See the Appeals in 1:06-CV-0714-ODE, 1:09-CV-

01543-WSD, 1:09-CV-02027-WSD, and the

Complaint of Judicial Misconduct and Judicial

Review Petition filed by Windsor against Judge

Evans with the Judicial Council of the Eleventh

109

Circuit.)

Windsor comes now to appeal the corrupt

actions of Judge Evans and Judge Duffey to a

corrupt group of Eleventh Circuit judges. Windsor

is filing a motion to disqualify all Eleventh Circuit

and Northern District of Georgia judges because

Windsor is convinced that he will never receive a

fair hearing.

Honest judges will reverse and remand the

orders of Judge Duffey if the decision 1s based on

the motions filed, the case law cited, fundamental!

legal rights and obligations, and what the Jaw should

be. [Depo-Doc.2] P1-2;Dec #35 41 1-15.|

A. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY

ALLOWING JUDGE EVANS TO FILE A

MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA AND TO

CREATE THIS CIVIL ACTION,

Neither Judge Evans nor Judge Duffey cited

any legal authority for this civil action, the motion

by Judge Evans, or the orders by Judge Duffey.

Windsor cannot find any rule in the FRCP or any

case law to provide a legal basis for a judge to file a

motion to quash in a civil action in which she is

presiding and has been accused of misconduct

The subpoena for Judge Evans’ deposition

was provided and signed by the District Court Clerk

110

in response to a letter from Windsor explaining the

need. Judges have no power to file motions in their

own court. Judges have no power to cause a civil

action to be created without first filing a civil action

Phis “civil action” simply appeared without

explanation. [R.DS1.] [Depo-Doc. 1. |

B. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY

DEMONSTRATING PERVASIVE BIAS

AGAINST WINDSOR.

Judge Duffey does not have a fair or impartial

bone 1n his body when it comes to his fnend, next

door neighbor, and former supervisor, Judge Evans

Judge Duffey’s initial involvement in thi:

matter was to enter an order that made statement:

that improperly favored the position of Judge Evan

| Depo-Doc.15. Dec #29 4 29001.|

lhe Stay Order says: “The subpoena, served

by William M. Windsor, secks Judge Evans

testimony regarding her mental processes and base

for her decisions in the closed case....””. This

language 1s totally inappropriate. [Depo

Doc.15. Dec #29 4 29004.| There was no such

evidence before the Court. |Depo-Doc.15. Dec #29

{ 29005. ]

lhe “closed case” language in the Stay Order

iS also inappropriate. The declarations and motion:

before the Court and in |:06-cv-0714-ODE indicate

that MIST-1] 1s not a “closed case.” | Depo

Doc.15. Dec #29 49 29010

“It follows that the statute grants a similar

right during subsequent phases of the

litigation, when a judge has already decided,

or 1s in the process of deciding, the most

significant issues presented in a case. We

therefore construe section 455(a)'s

‘proceeding"” requirement to embrace only

such activity following the initiation of an

action by a private party or governmental

agency designed ultimately to modify or

affect the substantive nghts of a litigant.’”

(U.S. v. Sciarra, 85) F.2d 621, 635 (1 Ith Cu

1QR8).)

lhe language in the Stay Order regarding the

service of the subpoena was also inaccurate. The

Stay Order says: “Windsor attempted to serve a

deposition subpoena on Judge Evans in her

chambers....”. This, too, is incorrect information

improperly claimed by Mr. Huber. [Depo

Doc.15. Dec #29 4 29023.| The Second

Declaration of Michelle Thornton (“Ms. Thornton’)

attached to Depo-Doc.!5 as Exhibit D explains that

she determined the polite way to deliver the

subpoena to the receptionist after consulting with

the U.S. Marshal Service. Ms. Thornton did not go

near the chambers of Judge vans. (exhibit D to

Depo Doc.15.) | Depo Doc.‘ Dec 429 ¥ 290274 |

}

[he pervasive bias continued. Judge

Dulfey's next act of bias was to declare Windsor

“scurrilous and irresponsible” based SOLELY on

Windsor’s testimony. [R.32.] (Depo-Doc.32.)

W mndsor does not believe there Cal) he any hy tel

proof of extrajudicial bias than having Judge Dutt

make such a statement when he had no facts before

him to indicate anything negative about Windsor

Neither the Plaintiffs’ Attorneys nor Judpe levan

have filed any affidavits in 2009. [R.DS1. |

IR .DS2.] So, Judge Dullfey decided Windsor wa

‘scurmlous and irresponsible because he charged

ludge vans with misconduct and criminal

violations. This is bias against Windsor and

prejudice for federal judge Phis as extrajudicial

bias, and it has been pervasive

C. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED

BY MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS IN

ORDERS

ludge Dulfey’s Reconsideration Order falsely

SAYS

“Windsor also has not demonstrated that there

is any nced to correct a Clear error of law o1

fact. In fact. Windsor does not cite any case

or Statutes to support his conclusory

allegations. Windsor simply rehashes the

arguments he made both before Judge Evans

and this Court. He cites to over a dozen of his

declarations and other filings as “legal

support” for his motion for reconsideration. A

review of these documents reveals that they

simply express Windsor’s disagreement with

Judge Evans’ rulings (which were affirmed

on appeal) and the Court’s June 30 Order.

This disagreement is not an appropriate

ground for reconsideration.”

Judge Duffey’s claims are false and

dishonest.

Windsor compared his Response to the

Motion to Quash and his Motion for

Reconsideration to prove this false statement by

Judge Duffey. [Depo-Docs.21,24,34.] There were

117 paragraphs in the Response to Emergency

Motion to Quash Subpoena [Depo-Doc.21], 55

paragraphs in the Response to Motion to

Supplement Emergency Motion to Quash Subpoena

{Depo-Doc.24], and 36 paragraphs in the Motion for

Reconsideration [Depo-Doc.34]. The 36 paragraphs

constitute just 21% of what was in the prior

responses. Of the 36, 23 paragraphs are new; eight

(8) paragraphs are responses to issues raised by the

orders that required some previous information to be

repeated and emphasized (two of the eight

paragraphs summarized what had been expressed in

114

46 paragraphs in the responses); three (3)

paragraphs were repeated; and two (2) paragraphs

were changed slightly to update them. If Windsor

admits that five pages are essentially repeated, this

means only 3% of the Motion for Reconsideration

could be even remotely characterized as a “rehash,”

and after all, it is a motion to reconsider what had

been previously discussed. Only two (2) paragraphs

(paragraphs 2 and 23) repeat arguments presented to

Judge Evans.

Windsor has therefore proven that Judge

Duffey’s statement that Windsor “simply rehashes

the arguments he made both before Judge Evans and

this Court” is false and dishonest. Windsor finds

this typical of the dishonesty of the federal judges in

Atlanta, Georgia. Federal judges in Atlanta

routinely make false statements to avoid dealing

with the facts and the law to accomplish their own

improper purposes.

D. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY

ENCOURAGING PERJURY, SUBORNATION

OF PERJURY, RULE 11 VIOLATIONS,

OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, DISHONEST

PARTIES, DISHONEST ATTORNEYS, AND

DISHONEST JUDGES.

Judge Duffey ignored Windsor’s

uncontroverted proof of massive dishonesty in

MIST-1.

Judge William S. Duffey, Judge Orinda D.

Evans, Judge R. Lanier Anderson. Judge Rosemary

Barkett, Judge Stanley F. Birch, Judge Susan H.

Black, Judge Blackburn, Judge Ed Carnes, Judge

Conway, Judge Joel F. Dubina, Judge J.L.

Edmondson, Judge Peter T. Fay. Judge Fuller, Judge

John C. Godbold, Judge Granade, Judge James C.

Hill, Judge Frank M. Hull, Judge Phyllis A.

Kravitch, Judge Stanley Marcus, Judge Mickle,

Judge Moore, Judge William H. Pryor, Judge Royal,

Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat, and Judge Charles R.

Wilson have all ignored the dishonesty in this

matter. Their actions support perjury, subornation

of perjury, Rule 11 violations, obstruction of justice,

dishonest parties, dishonest attorneys, and corrupt

judges.

EK. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY MAKING

FACT DECISIONS THAT WERE CONTRARY

TO THE FACTS THAT WERE BEFORE THE

COURT.

Judges, just like jurors, are obligated to deal

with only the facts presented to them for

consideration. Judges and jurors are not allowed to

let their personal prejudices replace or affect the

facts, but Judge Duffey did.

The only facts before Judge Duffey in this

Civil Action are contained in the declarations of

116

Wiliam M. Windsor. [R.DS1.] [R.DS2.] Judge

Duffey erred by making fact statements that were

not facts presented by Windsor.

There were no affidavits presented by any

other parties, as is required by Local Rule 7.1 A.(1).

Therefore, every statement made by Judge Duffey

that 1s not cited to a Windsor declaration or

expressed as law or case law is improper.

Judge Duffey made various statements that

seem to purport to be facts in the Appealed Order,

but these statements must not be considered.

Neither Judge Evans nor Plaintiffs filed any

affidavits in 2009. Windsor’s fact statements have

not been controverted. That’s because they are true.

This Court must not accept that what Judge

Duffey writes is true. Proof of this is provided in

Depo-Docs.4,32,42,6,13,15,17,20,21,24,34,36. (See

also R.377;Doc.377;R.390;Doc.390;Doc.462.)

Fk. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY

COMMITTING PERJURY.

Judge Duffey has made false statements, and

this is perjury. Judge Duffey knew statements he

has made in his orders are false. He made them

while under his oath as a federal judge and as a

member of the State Bar of Georgia. He made the

statements intentionally for the purpose of

perverting the legal system and covering up for his

next-door neighbor, Judge Evans.

This Court should ask the U.S. Attorney to

have a grand jury consider perjury and obstruction

of justice charges against Judge Duffey and Judge

Evans.

G. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED

BY ISSUING ORDERS WITHOUT LEGAL

JUSTIFICATION.

Judge Duffey did not have legal justification

for issuing the Quash Order (Depo-Doc.32) or the

Reconsideration Order (Depo-Doc.42.).

Judge Duffey had no legal authority for this

civil action, the motion by Judge Evans, or the

orders issues. (F< P.) There is no rule or case law

to provide a legal basis for a judge to file a motion

to quash in a civil action in which she is presiding

and has been accused of misconduct. So, there is no

118

rule or case law to permit another judge to rule on

such a motion.

Judge Duffey ignored the facts and the law in

the Motion for Reconsideration, and Judge Duffey’s

failure to address the legal issues raised had no legal

justification and was an abuse of discretion. (Depo-

Doc.34,42.)

H. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY

CLAIMING WINDSOR DID NOT CITE

ERRORS OF LAW AS CRITERIA THAT

WOULD JUSTIFY RECONSIDERATION

OF THE QUASH ORDER.

Windsor provided a lengthy list of motions,

responses, and declarations as legal support for the

Motion for Reconsideration. (Depo-Doc.34 42.)

Contrary to the claims of Judge Duffey, these

motions and responses cited various laws and case

law. The declarations provided factual support for

that law.

Judge Duffey dismissed consideration of the

Motion for Reconsideration with the patented

dishonest judicial response “simply expressing

disagreement with rulings.”

Judge Duffey speaks of Judge Evans’ rulings

and affirmation on appeal as if these were rulings

that enyone should give any credence to. They were

119

frauds. Judge Duffey conveniently ignores all of the

proof. The only facts before Judge Duffey and this

Court are that those rulings were perjury and fraud

upon the courts.

Windsor did specify errors of law and fact

made by Judge Duffey in his previous decision.

Windsor did not rehash in the Motion for

Reconsideration the arguments he had previously

presented as he addressed 15 specific errors of law

and fact. When a judge fails to address the errors of

law and fact expressed in a motion, the order must

be reversed and remanded.

Judge Duffey’s Reconsideration Order

(Depo-Doc.42_ P2) stated that “A motion for

reconsideration is appropriate where there is...a

need to correct a clear error of law or fact.”

Windsor expressed nine errors of law in the

Motion for Reconsideration (Depo-Doc.34). These

were not addressed by Judge Duffey in tlie

Reconsideration Order (R.42;Depo-Doc.42):

ERROR OF LAW 41: Judge Duffey failed to

address that Windsor argued that the Appealed

Orders violate the Constitution as the Deposition

is vital to Windsor’s legal and Constitutional

rights.

120

Judge Duffey’s position 1s that Windsor is not

equal, that Windsor’s rights are inferior to the

“supremacy” of a federal judgeship. [Depo-

Doc.21 Dec #35 965-67.] This Court must reject

the attempt to claim that Windsor has no rights.

[Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35 468.]

Judges must be subject to deposition when

the testimony of the judge is necessary to prevent

injustice to the party requesting it. Judges must be

subject to deposition when the judges have violated

the law. Judges must be subject to deposition when

they and only they have the information needed.

[Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35 9]69-72.]

Judge Evans violated her oath repeatedly.

[Depo-Doc.21 Dec_#35 473-74.] Judge Evans was

totally biased, and this violates the Constitution.

“The neutrality requirement helps to

guarantee that life, liberty, or property will

not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or

distorted conception of the facts or the law.

See Mathews vy. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344

(1976)..., by ensuring that no person will be

deprived of his interests in the absence of a

proceeding in which he may present his case

with assurance that the arbiter is not

predisposed to find against him.” (Marshall

v. Jerrico Inc., 446 US 238, 242, 100 S.Ct.

1610, 64 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1980).)

121

"... courts, have a constitutional obligation to

safeguard personal liberties and to uphold

federal law." (Stone v Powell, 428 US 465,

483 n. 35, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d .067

(1976).)

Denying the Defendants access to important

records, evidence, and witnesses is a violation of

Equal Protection. [Depo-Doc.21_Dec_#35 475.|

Judge Evans violated the Defendants’ civil

and constitutional rights under color of law. [Depo-

Doc.21 Dec #35 4$76.]

“The Due Process Clause serves two

purposes...One 1s to produce, through the use

of fair procedures to prevent the wrongful

deprivation of interests; ...the other is a

guarantee of basic fairness, i.e.: to make

people feel that they have been treated fairly.”

“(t|rial before an ‘unbiased judge’ is essential

to due process.” Johnson v. Mississippi, 403

U.S. 212, 216 (1971); accord Concrete Pipe

& Prods. V. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust,

508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) “due process

requires a neutral and detached judge in the

first instance.” (citation omitted)

122

“justice must give the appearance of justice”

Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80

S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United

States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13

(1954).

“even if there is now showing of actual bias”,

“due process is denied by circumstances that

create the likelihood or the appearance if

bias” Peters v. Kiff, 407, U.S. 493, 502

(1972).

Windsor believes that the Defendants have

not been given a fair trial and cannot have a fair

hearing of any type due to the issues alleged.

|Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35 9$77.]

The due process clauses of both the Georgia

and the United States Constitutions guarantee a

party an impartial and disinterested tribunal in civil

cases. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242,

100 S.Ct. 1610, 1613 (1980).

"... the particular phraseology of the

constitution of the United States confirms and

strengthens the principle, supposed to be

essential to all written constitutions, that a

law repugnant to the constitution is void, and

that courts, as well as other departments, are

bound by that instrument." "In declaring

what shall be the supreme law of the land, the

123

Constitution itself is first mentioned; and not

the laws of the United States generally, but

those only which shall be made in pursuance

of the Constitution, have that rank". "All law

(rules and practices) which are repugnant to

the Constitution are VOID". Since the 14th

Amendment to the Constitution states "NO

State (Jurisdiction) shall make or enforce any

law which shall abridge the rights, privileges,

or immunities of citizens of the United States

nor deprive any citizens of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law, ... or

equal protection under the law", this renders

judicial immunity unconstitutional. Marbury

v. Madison, 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, 180

(1803).

The Ninth Amendment to the United States

Constitution states, ““The enumeration in the

Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed

to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”

The extent of those rights was detailed in

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)

in Justice Goldberg’s concurrence:

While the Ninth Amendment——and indeed the

entire Bill of Rights—originally concerned

restrictions upon federal power, — the

subsequently enacted Fourteenth Amendment

prohibits the States as well from abridging

124

fundamental personal liberties. And, the

Ninth Amendment, in indicating that not all

such liberties are specifically mentioned tn

the first eight amendments, is surely relevant

in showing the existence of other fundamental

personal rights, now protected from state, as

well as federal, infringement. In sum, the

Ninth Amendment simply lends — strong

support to the view that the ‘liberty’ protected

by the Fifth And Fourteenth Amendments

from infringement by the Federal

Government or the States is not restricted to

rights specifically mentioned 1n the first eight

amendments.

[his deposition is extremely important

because Windsor has motions pending vans in 1 :06-

CV-0714-ODE that require the testimony of Judge

Evans for Windsor to have the best opportunity for

success. Windsor has accused Judge Evans of

participating with the Plaintifis and their attorneys in

perpetrating a fraud upon the court in 1:06-CV-0714-

ODE. [Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35 480-81.| Denying

Windsor the ability to take Judge Evans’ deposition

deprives Windsor of his Constitutional right to

obtain the information that he needs to get the

orders and judgment set aside in MIST-1.

Windsor also submits that it 1s a violation of

his Constitutional and civil rights to be required to

prove extrajudicial bias without being afforded the

125

opportunity to question Judge Evans in a deposition

Only Judge Evans knows the source of her

extramdicial bias, and Windsor must be given the

opportunity to depose Judge Evans to obtain the

discovery needed. Absent the ability to pursue

discovery regarding the nature of the extrajudicial

bias, Windsor has been wrongly denied the ability to

have Judge Evans disqualified as the Eleventh

Circuit denied appeal because Windsor could not

prove extrajudicial bias. [Depo

Doc.21 Dec #35 482.]

ERROR OF LAW #2: Judge Duffey failed to

address that Windsor argued that the case law

cited by Judge Duffey is not applicable to this

matter. The Quash Order and thus the

Reconsideration Order are not supported by any

case law.

Judge Duffey incorrectly claims: “The

attempt to now depose Judge Evans...is expressly

prohibited by long-standing case law.” Judge

Duffey then proceeded to recite the cases used by

the U.S. Attorney representing Judge Evans. As

Windsor noted in Depo-Doc.21,24, none of these

cases are applicable in this case as they all related

only to depositions regarding a judge’s mental

processes. [Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35 997-98. |

|Depo-Doc.24 Dec #34 420-50. |

2% U.S.C. § 604 provides the legal authority

for taking the depositions of judges. Section 4(b)()

of the Subpoena Regulations Adopted by Judicial

Conference (“Subpoena Regulations”) provides that

restrictions on depositions by judges do not apply to

“Lepal proceedings, arising out of the performance

of official duties by federal pudicial personnel, in

which federal judicial personnel are parties.” As

Judge Evans was named a “party” in the fraud upon

the court in MIST-1, the Subpoena Regulations

If the Subpoena Regulations did apply,

Windsor has made it crystal clear that he does not

seck to depose Judge Evans as to her “mental

processes.” If Judge Duffey wanted to quash this

subpoena on the basis that no one may take the

deposition of a judge who has violated the law and

committed fraud upon the court, Windsor asked that

Judge Duffey cite those cases. Judge Duffey did not

cite any cases. Windsor’s study of law indicates

that judges most definitely can be subpoenaed for

depositions in situations such as this. [Depo

Doc.34 Dec #37 §24.|

ERROR OF LAW #3: Judge Duffey failed to

address that Windsor argued that the Court

must compel Judge Evans’ testimony as required

by law due to the presence of extreme and

extraordinary circumstances in the form of bad

and improper behavior,

Judge Duffey did note that “Courts will

consider compelling judicial testimony in the

presence of extreme and extraordinary

circumstances such as a strong showing of bad faith

or improper behavior.” [Depo-Doc.32_

P6 last two sentences.] [Depo-Doc.34 Dec

#37 425.]

Judge Duffey then falsely and irresponsibly

claimed that Windsor did not show “extreme and

extraordinary circumstances.” [Depo-Doc.34 Dec

#37 426.]

Windsor is quite sure that the citizens of the

United States will be upset to learn that the

following represents “ordinary” circumstances that

our courts should not be concerned with:

e A judge that committed perjury as

many as 200 times in claiming facts in

orders of the court that were absolutely

false as proven by the evidence before

the court.

e Plaintiffs who committed perjury over

400 times.

e Attorneys for the Plaintiffs who filed

false sworn pleadings routinely,

committed hundreds of counts of

perjury, subornation of perjury, and

obstruction of justice, and violated

numerous laws, Rules, and the Code of

128

Professional Conduct. [Depo-

Doc.34 Dec #37 §27.]

There was no justice in this case. The laws of

Georgia and the United States and the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure provide legal remedies to parties

so abused. By issuing the Appealed Orders, Judge

Duffey is violating Windsor’s legal and

Constitutional rights. Judge Duffey is denying

Windsor the ability to obtain the information that he

needs to be able to have the judgment and orders in

Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-0714-ODE voided due to

perjury and fraud upon the court. Judge Duffey is

denying Windsor the ability to obtain the

information that he needs to ensure that Judge

Evans is disqualified. [Depo-Doc.34_Dec

#37 928.]

ERROR OF LAW #4: Judge Duffey failed to

address that Windsor argued that he had

complied with legal requirements of the Federal

Judiciary’s Subpoena Regulations.

In the Quash Order, Judge Duffey claimed

Windsor failed to comply with the requirements of

the Subpoena Regulations. This was false. In the

Response to the Motion to Quash (Depo-

Doc.21,24), Windsor addressed each of these legal

issues and documented exactly what was done.

{[Depo-Doc.21 P11-15 Dec #35 4§41-64.] In the

Response to the Motion to Quash, Windsor again

125

addressed each of these legal issues and documented

exactly what was done. Windsor used the published

information of the Judicial Conference as the guide

for issuing the subpoena for the deposition.

Windsor met all of the regulations to allow this

deposition to move forward, and there is no

admissible evidence before this Court to the

contrary. [Depo-Doc.34 Dec #37 437.] Judge

Duffey failed to address this in the Reconsideration

Order. [Depo-Doc.42.]

The Eighth Declaration of Defendant William

M. Windsor in Support of Motion to Recuse Judge

Evans (“Dec #8°-Doc.383) was prepared in response

to the “Subpoena Regulations Adopted by Judicial

Conference.” Windsor later prepared the Twenty-

Third Declaration of William M. Windsor (“Dec

#23” -- Evans Docket #406—R.406). Dec #23 is

even more specific in setting forth the testimony that

is being sought from Judge Evans. It explains the

relevance of the testimony, the reasons testimony is

sought, and why the information is not available

from other sources or by other means. [Depo-

Doc.21 Dec #35 §96.]

The nature of the testimony sought is

appropriate. The testimony is necessary to prevent

the perpetration of fraud or injustice in this case.

The request is not unduly burdensome and is

inappropriate under applicable court or

administrative rules. The request has proper

130

authority. The subpoena was issued by the Clerk of

the Court as is required for pro se defendants.

[Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35 §41-44.]

This request was properly served. As the

request for testimony was to be provided to the

federal judicial personnel from whom testimony is

sought at least fifteen (15) working days in advance

of the time by which the testimony was to be

required, Windsor provided the subpoena to Judge

Evans on May 20, 2009 with a proposed deposition

date of June 16, 2009. This was timely. Windsor

sent a letter to Judge Evans asking for a convenient

time for the deposition, and he did not receive a

response. This letter is to Exhibit #1to Dec #35.

[Depo-Doc.2! Dec #35 446.]

The testimony would not violate a statute,

regulation, or ethical rule. [Depo-

Doc.21_Dec_#35_447.]

The testimony would not disclose

confidential information from or pertaining to a

presentence investigation report or pertaining to an

individual’s probation, parole, or supervised release,

or would disclose any other information that is

confidential under any applicable statute or

regulation. [Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35 448.]

The testimony could not be reasonably

expected to result in the appearance of the federal

131

judiciary favoring one litigant over another, or

endorsing or supporting a position advocated by a

litigant. The purpose of this deposition is to obtain

information because of the appearance that Judge

Evans favored the Plaintiffs over the Defendants.

[Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35 449.]

This request does not seek testimony of Judge

Evans as an expert witness. [Depo-

Doc.21_ Dec_#35 951.]

This request does not seek personnel files,

records or documents pertaining to a current/former

federal judicial officer or employee. [Depo-

Doc.21 Dec #35 452.]

Windsor is seeking this deposition to prove

that documents withheld from A&W by Judge

Evans were due to fraud upon the court by the

Plaintiffs or obstruction of justice or ae by

Judge Evans. [Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35 953.)

Windsor ts seeking this gone for proper

reasons. [Depo-Doc.21_Dec_#35_ 454.]

The testimony sought is not available from

any other source or by any other means. Judge

Evans is the only person who reviewed the

documents in camera and the only person who

knows why she was so biased. [Depo-

Doc.21 Dec #35 955.]

The effect of this deposition in this particular

case should be to lead to recusal of Judge Evans and

reopening of 1:06-CV-0714-ODE so that justice

may be done. [Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35 456.]

Windsor is seeking this deposition in his

efforts to reopen 1:06-CV-0714-ODE. [Depo-

Doc.21 Dec #35 958.]

Windsor is seeking this deposition 1m his

efforts to have Judge Evans recused or disqualified.

[Depo-Doc.21 Dec _#35 459.]

Windsor is seeking this deposition in his

efforts to have Glynn, Ruddy, and Schul found

guilty of perjury. Guilty verdicts igainst Plaintiffs’

managers should enable Windsor to have the

judgment and orders in this case set aside. [Depo-

Doc.21 Dec #35 460.]

Windsor is seeking to have Plaintiffs’

Attorneys found guilty of suborning perjury,

obstruction of justice, and other charges. [Depo-

Doc.21 Dec #35 461.]

Windsor would like to ask Judge Evans about

facts. There is no deliberative process in facts used

for a summary judgment, and Windsor alleges that

as many as 210 of the statements in the Summary

Judgment Order are false. [Depo-

133

Doc.21 Dec #35 462.]

Windsor seeks information required for his

motions to recuse Judge Evans, set aside the

judgment and orders, and pursue charges against the

Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs’ attorneys, and Judge Evans

Windsor has accused Judge Evans of violating the

law. [Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35 463.]

Windsor agreed that Judge Evans did not

have to answer any questions that sought to inquire

into her mental processes in this case. If necessary,

Windsor stated he would present a list of questions

under seal for the Court to review in camera.

{[Depo-Doc.21_ Dec #35 §64;Depo-Doc.34 Dec

#37 438.]

ERROR OF LAW #5: Judge Duffey failed to

address that Windsor argued that this

proceeding is not closed; the subpoena is valid;

and the subpoena should not be quashed on that

basis. Judge Duffey recited cases submitted by

the U.S. Attorney, none of which pertain to the

facts in this matter. Judge Duffey ruled motions

moot on the basis that “a case the Court already

has noted has been appealed, affirmed, and

which is over and closed.”

The subpoena was validly issued and served.

There were proceedings in this Civil Action and in

Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-0714-ODE, inciuding a

134

Second Motion to Recuse. [Depo-

Doc.21 Dec #35 485.]

A Final Order was issued in this case in

December 200% vased upon a settlement most

reluctantly agreed to by the Defendants. That

settlement did not include a release in favor of the

Plaintiffs. The Defendants settled based upon fear

of what Judge Evans would wrongfully do to them

next. The Defendants did not agree that they would

take no further action in this or related matters.

{[Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35 487.]

“Proceedings” do not necessarily end after a

Final Order is entered. Specifically, the Defendants

have the legal right to pursue actions under FRCP

Rule 60, under various Georgia statutes, under

Local Rule 83.1C and 83.1 F(2), under the Court’s

inherent powers, and probably under other rules and

statutes. [Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35 488.]

Judge Evans issued an order on May 22, 2009

that noted that the Defendants agreed to not appeal

the Final Order. This is true, but the Defendants did

not give up any rights as there was nothing to

appeal. [Depo-Doc.2] Dec #35 $89.]

Exhibit 3 to Dec_#35 includes many

definitions of an “appeal” as “a proceeding for

review at a higher court.” There is no higher court

135

involved with Windsor’s motions, so none of this is

an appeal. [Depo-Doc.21_ Dec #35 490.]

Subpoenas and discovery are permissible

whenever a “proceeding” is pending. Windsor’s

motions create a “proceeding.” [Depo-

Doc.21_Dec_#35 491.]

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a district judge

must recuse himself "in any proceeding in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned."

“We note that section 455(d)(1) defines

"proceeding" to include "pre-trial, trial,

appellate review, or other stages of litigation.

U.S. v. Sciarra, 851 F.2d 621, 635 (11th Cir.

1988). It "confers a right upon the litigant to

seek recusal [during]... . phases [*3] of the

litigation." Jd.

“Each of the statutory examples of a

proceeding implies the judge's participation in

decisions affecting the substantive rights of litigants

to an actual case or controversy.” A pending action

is any action in which the rights of the petitioners

are at issue. The rights of Windsor are at issue in

the motions that are filed in the instant case. |Depo-

Doc.21_ Dec_ #35 $92.]

Mr. Huber claims the subpoena was untimely.

Mr. Huber distorted reality by claiming a subpoena

136

should generally be quashed when it is served after

the close of discovery. There are many occasions

that necessitate the use of a subpoena after

discovery has closed. In fact, in MIST-1, two

depositions were taken after discovery closed. It is

also clear that there are occasions where a subpoena

is appropriate after a Final Order has been issued.

[Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35 493.]

ERROR OF LAW #6: Judge Duffey failed to

address that Windsor argued that the appealed

order should be reversed as Judge Duffey did not

enforce the Rules.

Windsor objected to the Motion to Quash and

pleaded that the Motion to Quash should be denied

on procedural grounds. [Depo-

Doc.21 Dec #35 4107.]

First, neither the Motion nor the

Memorandum of Law in support of the Motion were

supported by affidavit, yet the Memorandum of Law

attempts to present facts for the consideration of this

Court. [Depo-Doc.2]1 Dec #35 4108.]

Second, Mr. Huber failed to meet the

requirements of Local Rule 7.2B: [Depo-

Doc.21 Dec #35 §109.]

Third, Mr. Huber violated Rule 11 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. Huber filed

137

false pleadings. Mr. Huber violated Local Rule

83.1C. Mr. Huber also violated Rule 3.3 of the

State Bar of Georgia Code of Professional Conduct

by failing to show candor to the tribunal. Mr. Huber

also violated Rule 3.3 of the State Bar of Georgia

Code of Professional Conduct by failing to show

fairness to the opposing party. [Depo-

Doc.21_ Dec #35 ¥110.]

Fourth, Mr. Huber contacted Mr. Carl Hugo

Anderson (“Mr. Anderson”), Plaintiffs’ attorney, to

encourage him to file a motion in support of Judge

Evans’ position in this matter. Since Mr. Huber is

an agent of the judge, Windsor submits that this is

an improper ex parte communication between Judge

Evans and the Plaintiffs’ attorney, Mr. Anderson.

[Depo-Doc.21 Dec_#35 4111.]

Fifth, Mr. Huber violated Rule | 1(a): “The

paper must state the signer's address, e-mail address,

and telephone number.” [Depo-

Doc.2] Dec #35 4J112.]

These procedural issues were raised in the

Motion for Reconsideration. [Depo-Doc.34. |

Complete details are provided therein and in the

Twenty-Ninth Declaration of William M. Windsor

(“Dec #29”) attached thereto. [Depo-

Doc.21_ Dec #35 4113.]

138

Judge Duffey violated Local Rule 7.1 C of

the Local Civil Rules for the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Georgia. “When

the movant deems it necessary to file a reply brief,

the reply must be served not later than ten (10) days

after service of the responsive pleading.” Judge

Duffey issued the Quash Order on June 30, 2009.

Windsor planned to file Reply briefs, but Windsor

was improperly denied the time allowed by the

Local Rules to reply to Depo-Doc. #27 filed June

25, 2009; Depo-Doc. #28 and Depo-Doc. #29 filed

June 26, 2009, and Depo-Doc. #30 and 31 filed June

29, 2009. The Reconsideration Order should be

reversed and remanded due to Judge Duffey’s

violation of the Local Rules. [Depo-Doc.34 Dec

#37 913.] Judge Duffey ignored these violations.

“Proceedings” do not necessarily end after a

Final Order is entered. Specifically, the Defendants

have the legal right to pursue actions under FRCP

Rule 60, under various Georgia statutes, under

Local Rule 83.1C and 83.1 F(2), under the Court’s

inherent powers, and probably under other rules and

statutes. [Depo-Doc.34 Dec #37 439.]

The Motion to Quash should have been

denied on procedural grounds. Judge Duffey was

obligated to enforce the law and the Rules, and by

ignoring these procedural deficiencies, Judge

Duffey ignored his responsibilities. [Depo-

Doc.34 Dec #37 940.}

139

ERROR OF LAW #7: Judge Duffey failed to

address that Windsor argued that this is first and

foremost a question of the most basic legal rights.

Judge Duffey did not rule on the basis of the

motion filed, the case law cited, fundamental

legal rights and obligations, and what the law

should be.

This ts first and foremost a question of the

most basic legal rights. Judge Duffey failed to

address this error of law. This Court must reverse

and remand the orders of Judge Duffey if the

decision is based on the motions filed, the case law

cited, fundamental legal rights and obligations, and

what the law should be. [Depo-Doc.21 P1-2;Dec

#35 Y11-15.]

ERROR OF LAW #8: Judge Duffey failed to

address that Windsor argued that Judge Duffey

has violated Canons 1, 2, 3, 3D(1), 3D(2) of the

Code of Judicial Conduct.

Windsor submits that Judge Duffey has

violated Canon | of the Code of Judicial Conduct -

Judges Shall Uphold the Integrity and Independence

of the Judiciary. Judges shall not show favoritism.

The rulings of Judge Duffey show definite

favoritism for a fellow judge. [Depo-Doc.34 Dec

#37 441.|

140

Windsor submits that Judge Duffey has

violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct

Judges Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance

of Impropriety. Judges shall respect and comply

with the law. Judges shall promote public

confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Judpes

shall promote public confidence in the impartiality

of the judiciary. The rulings of Judge Duffey show

definite favoritism for a fellow judge. This ruling

does not promote public confidence in the integrity

of the judiciary. The ruling of Judge Duffey sends a

message that itis okay for parties, attorneys, and

judges to violate the Rules, Codes, and laws

repeatedly in their efforts to pervert the legal

process. Judge Duffey’s ruling sanctions lying and

committing perjury in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Georgia, | Depo

Doc.34 Dee #37 942.]

Windsor submits that Judge Dulley has

violated Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct

Judges Shall Perform the Duties of Their Office

Impartially and Diligently. Judges should be

faithful to the law. Judges shall perform judicial

duties without bias or prejudice. Judges shall

accord to every person the right to be heard

according to law. The rulings of Judge Duffey

show definite favoritism for a fellow judge. Judge

Duffey has ignored the law and has denied Windsor

the night to be heard. Judge Duffey did not respond

14)

to a single thing that Windsor presented in his

motions. [Depo-Doc.34 Dee #37 443.]

Windsor submits that Judge Duffey has

violated Canon 3D.(1) of the Code of Judicial

Conduct -- Judges who receive information

indicating a substantial likelihood that another judge

has committed a violation of this Code should take

appropriate action. Judge Evans has committed

hundreds of violations of the Code of Judicial

Conduct. Rather than pretend nothing improper

happened, Judge Duffey has a legal obligation to

take action against Judge Evans. [Depo-

Doc.34 Dec #37 944.]

Windsor submits that Judge Duffey has

violated Canon 3D.(2) of the Code of Judicial

Conduct -- Judges who receive information

indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has

committed a violation of the Standards of Conduct

of the State Bar of Georgia should take appropriate

action. Judges having knowledge that a lawyer has

committed a violation of the Standards of Conduct

of the State Bar of Georgia that raises a substantial

question as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness

or fiiness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform

the appropriate authority. Rather than ignore what

has happened, Judge Duffey has a legal obligation

to take action against Plaintiffs’ Attorneys. [Depo-

Doc.34_ Dec #37 _445.]

142

ERROR OF LAW #9: Judge Duffey failed to

address that Windsor argued for extending,

modifying, or reversing existing law or

establishing new law.

Windsor must also argue for extending,

modifying, or reversing existing law or for

establishing new law, if necessary. [Depo-

Doc.21_ Dec_#35_4102.]

There is no case law with facts that even

come close to the facts in this case. Windsor

submits that all case law must be ignored. [Depo-

Doc.21 Dec #35 $103.]

The whole idea of justice requires a fair trial

with an impartial judge. [Depo-

Doc.21 Dec #35 4104.]

In extreme circumstances such as this where

it appears that the judge was not impartial, made

errors of law, made errors with facts, allowed

perjury to pervert the legal process, the losing party

should be allowed to take the Judge’s deposition in

its efforts to recuse the judge and seek to reopen the

case or get the judgment and orders set aside due to

perjury. [Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35 4105.]

When the judge is so obviously biased that

the judge ignores the facts and the law, invents facts

that do not exist in the record, completely ignores

143

charges of hundreds of counts of peryury and

suborning perjury, ignores the laws regarding

summary judgments, consistently violates its own

rulings to favor of the Plaintiffs, has extensive ex

parte dealings with the Plaintiffs’ attorneys, and

does the many other things that Judge Evans has

done, it really shouldn’t matter where the bias

comes from. In a case such as this, it was absolutely

impossible for the Defendants to have a fair trial. In

a case such as this, the Defendants should be

allowed to depose the judge to try to determine what

happened. [Depo-Doc.21_Dec_ #35 4106.]

I. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY

CLAIMING WINDSOR DID NOT CITE

ERRORS OF FACT AS CRITERIA THAT

WOULD JUSTIFY RECONSIDERATION OF

THE COURT’S ORDER.

Windsor expressed six errors of fact. These

were not addressed by Judge Duffey in the

Reconsideration Order.

Judge Duffey stated that errors of fact are a

reason for reconsideration of a motion. Then he

falsely claimed that Windsor cited no errors of fact.

This should be considered perjury. The orders must

be reversed and remanded.

ERROR OF FACT #1: One of the primary

errors of fact that Windsor made in the Metion

144

for Reconsideration is that Judge Duffey falsely

and maliciously branded Windsor as

“SCURRILOUS AND IRRESPONSIBLE.”

One of the primary points that Windsor made

in the Motion for Reconsideration is that Judge

Duffey falsely and maliciously branded Windsor as

“SCURRILOUS AND IRRESPONSIBLE.”

[Depo.Doc.34.]

This Court has the audacity to declare in the

public record that Windsor’s statements are

“scurrilous and irresponsible....” [Depo-Doc. #32 -

- Opinion and Order, P 5 42.| | Depo-Doc.34 Dec

#37 416.)

This is an outrage. Scurrilous is defined as

using coarse language, vuigar, evil, containing

obscenities, foul-mouthed. [Depo-Doc.34 Dec

#37 916 and Exhibit A.] Windsor has not used

any coarse language, nothing vulgar or evil, has

uttered no obscenities in filings with this Court, and

has not been foul-mouthed 1n the presence of this

Court. |Depo-Doc.34 Dec #37 417.]

Irresponsible is defined as a lack of

responsibility, not mentally or financially fit to

assume responsibility, not answerable to a higher

authority, unreliable, shiftless, untrustworthy,

careless. [Depo-Doc.34 Dec #37 §17 and Exhibit

B.| Windsor has not been the least bit irresponsible

145

in this matter. Windsor is mentally and financially

fit, is answerable to several higher authorities, is

reliable, 1s trustworthy, is not careless, and is

anything but shiftless. [Depo-Doc.34 Dec

#37 418.]

Windsor submits that Judge Duffey’s use of

the term “scurrilous” is legally vulgar and most

irresponsible. [Depo-Doc.34 Dec #37 4]19.] It is

libel, and it is perjury.

ERROR OF FACT #2: The only facts before

Judge Duffey in this Civil Action are contained

in the declarations of William M. Windsor.

Judge Duffey erred by making fact statements

that were not facts presented by Windsor.

Another major point regarding errors of fact

is the fact that the only facts before Judge Duffey in

this Civil Action are contained in the declarations of

William M. Windsor. Judge Duffey erred by

making fact statements that were not facts presented

by Windsor.

There were no affidavits presented by any

other parties, as is a requirement of Local Rule 7.1

A.(1). Therefore, Windsor submits that Judge

Duffey’s claim of “Background” is improper.

Judge Duffey made various statements that

seem to purport to be facts in the Appealed Orders,

146

but these statements are not supported by any

evidence or citations and should not be considered.

Neither Judge Evans nor Maid filed any affidavits in

2009. (Depo-Doc.4,32,42.) Windsor’s fact

statements have not been controverted. That’s

because they are true. [R.DS1;R.DS2.]

This Court must not accept that what Judge

Duffey writes is true. Proof of this is provided in

Depo-Docs.4,32,42,6,13,15,17,20,21,24,34,36. (See

aiso R.377;Doc.377:R.390:Doc.390;Doc.462.)

ERROR OF FACT #3: The allegations of

“Background” in the first paragraph of page 3 of

the Reconsideration Order are incorrect.

The allegations of “Background” in the first

paragraph of page 3 of the Reconsideration Order

are incorrect. Maid did not file suit against Alcatraz

and Windsor alleging tortious interference with

business relations. Maid did not seek a permanent

injunction against “Alcatraz’s future voucher sales.”

These incorrect claims of fact by Judge Duffey

indicate a lack of understanding of this case, and it

is irresponsible for him to make such statements.

Judge Duffey apparently did not even read the

information filed with the Court before issuing

orders. [Depo-Doc.34 Dec #37 §21.]

ERROR OF FACT #4: Judge Duffey has claimed

on page 5, paragraph 2 of the Reconsideration

147

Order |Depo-Doc. 32] that “it is clear that

Windsor is seeking to require Judge Evans to

testify about her mental process and decision-

making in the course of her official duties....”

This is absolutely false.

Judge Duffey has claimed on page 5,

paragraph 2 of the Reconsideration Order [Depo-

Doc.32] that “it is clear that Windsor is seeking to

require Judge Evans to testify about her mental

process and decision-making in the course of her

official duties....” This is absolutely false. How

can Judge Duffey make such a statement when the

only facts before Judge Duffey are stated in

Windsor’s declarations -- Dec #27, Dec #28, Dec

#29, Dec #30, Dec #31, Dec #32, Dec #33, Dec #34,

and Dec #35? Windsor clearly states that he will

not seek “mental processes.” Windsor clearly states

that he is even willing to submit the questions for

review and approval by Judge Duffey prior to the

deposition. [Depo-Doc.21 and Dec_#35, P 15 § 64.]

[Depo-Doc.34 Dec #37 422.]

The nature of the testimony sought is to

determine if Judge Evans withheld documents from

the Defendants improperly. Judge Evans reviewed

two contracts in camera and ruled that the contracts

would not be disclosed to the Defendants. Windsor

recently obtained copies of the contracts through

other legal actions, and these contracts were

extremely relevant and should have been produced.

148

Windsor submits that depriving the Defendants of

these documents constitutes a fraud upon the court

and obstruction of justice by either the Plaintiffs or

by Judge Evans. The nature of the testimony was

detailed in Depo-Doc.21 P.7-11_ Dec #35 431-40

ERROR OF FACT #5: Judge Evans falsely

claims in the footnote on page 8 of the

Reconsideration Order that Windsor failed to

comply with the Regulations Adopted by Judicial

Conference.

Judge Duffey claims in the footnote on page &

of the Reconsideration Order that Windsor failed to

comply with the Regulations Adopted by Judicial

Conference. Windsor processed his request to

depose Judge Evans precisely in accordance with

those Regulations. This was detailed by line item in

Windsor’s Response to the Motion to Quash [Depo-

Doc.21] and Windsor’s Response to Motion to

Supplement [Depo-Doc. #24]. This Court ignores

completely the facts in this matter in making such a

false claim. [Depo-Doc.34 Dec #37 430. ]

The nature of the testimony sought is to

determine if Judge Evans withheld documents from

the Defendants improperly. Judge Evans reviewed

two contracts in camera and ruled that the contracts

would not be disclosed to the Defendants. Windsor

recently obtained copies of the contracts through

other legal actions, and these contracts were

149

extremely relevant and should have been produced.

Windsor submits that depriving the Defendants of

these documents constitutes a fraud upon the court

and obstruction of justice by either the Plaintiffs or

by Judge Evans. The nature of the testimony was

detailed in the Depo-Doc.21 P.7-11_ Dec #35 431-

40. Details of how Windsor complied with the

requirements of the Federal Judiciary’s disclosure

regulations is provided in Depo-Doc.21 P11-15_

Dec #35 941-64.

The Eighth Declaration of Defendant William

M. Windsor in Support of Motion to Recuse Judge

Evans (“Dec #8”) was prepared in response to the

“Subpoena Regulations Adopted by Judicial

Conference.” (Exhibit B to Doc.383.) Windsor later

prepared a new declaration, the Twenty-Third

Declaration of William M. Windsor (“Dec #23”’)

attached to Doc.406 as Exhibit C. Dec #23 is an even

more specific setting forth the testimony that is being

sought from Judge Evans. It explains the relevance of

the testimony, the reasons testimony is sought, and

why the information is not available from other

sources or by other means. [Depo-Doc.21 Dec #35

496. ]

ERROR OF FACT #6: Judge Duffey made

various statements that seem to purport to be

facts in the Reconsideration Order, but these

statements are not supported by any evidence or

citations and should not be considered.

150

See Errors of Fact 3, 4, and 5 above.

Judge Duffey has also ruled motions moot on

the basis that “a case the Court already has noted

has been appealed, affirmed, and which is over ana

closed.” Judge Duffey ignores the law once again.

A case is not “over” when Rule 60, the court’s

inherent powers, set aside for perjury, subornation

of perjury, fraud upon the court, RICO violations,

obstruction of justice, witness tampering,

deprivation of rights, and Complaints of

Professional Misconduct by the attorneys and Judge

Evans are issue

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