Opposition Brief — Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Management District
Supreme Court brief2010
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
VP sour eale
Dn The | a
Supreme € Court of the United States
FRIENDS OF THE EVERGLADES, FLORIDA
WILDLIFE FEDERATION; and FISHERMEN
AGAINST DESTRUCTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT,
Petitioners,
Vv.
SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT;
CAROL WEHLE, Executive Director; UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA and U.S. SUGAR CORPORATION,
Respondents
—_ ¢- —
MICCOSUKEE TRIBE OF INDIANS OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
V.
SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT;
CAROL WEHLE, Executive Director; UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA and U.S. SUGAR CORPORATION,
Respondents.
TT
On Petitions For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United
States Court Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit
ww ——
BRIEF FOR RFSPONDENTS SOUTH FLORIDA
WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT AND CAROL
WEHLE, AS ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
e —
JAMES E. NuTTr
Counsel of Record
SHERYL GRIMM Woop
KEITH W. RIZZARDI
SOUTH FLORIDA WATER
MANAGEMENT DISTRICT
3301 Gun Club Road
West Palm Beach, FL 33406
(561) 682-6253
jnutt@sfwmd.gov
Attorneys for Respondents
QUESTION PRESENTED
Congress carefully crafted the Clean Water Act’s
complex regulatory structure to achieve clean water
while preserving the primacy of the States’ authority
over water resources. This case concerns the proper
interpretation of the statutory text and cooperative
federalism scheme that resulted
The South Florida Water Management District
necessarily operates a vast water control system that
regularly transfers and, as a result, discharges navi-
gable waters to implement State water resource
policies. Congress was focused upon industrial and
municipal wastes when it declared the “discharge of
any pollutant” illegal absent a federal permit. Such
discharges occur upon the “addition of any pollutant
to navigable waters.” Other sources of pollution,
including other types of “discharges,” were left to be
addressed other ways.
The Eleventh Circuit’s answer to the following
question of great national importance is not con
sistent with decisions of this Court and reveals confu-
sion among the lower courts and the executive
department:
Is it permissible to read the Clean Water Act
consistent with relevant cannons of con
struction — to criminalize unpermitted “dis-
charges of navigable waters” from State
facilities used solely to move the waters for
public purposes and that introduce nothing
to them?
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
Respondent South Florida Water Management
District is a governmental entity of the State of
Florida created by Florida Statutes § 373.069(e).
Respondent Carol Wehle is an individual appear-
ing as the Executive Director of the Respondent
South Florida Water Management District.
Page
COLI BS TIOOIN PICEASIIIN FEUD) o..0.c0cccccscconssscsnvcvovvecsnvees i
PRU Rahs BS CO RIRE MAD EUES A, sisnsvcsvasstdaasencovscuscscsasesenss il
SRR GPE TRG BRE BBN hn ssccavsessdsccvencescscsscissenes Vv
aI orcs ec cavenystnarceedccoussupeiiaricmens eaenretanens 1
Lh. PPRREIG FHMGOL TRAPIBIONS ...cscc ssc cccscccyesescsvesscee. 2
2. Proceedings Below ..................... Tey ene auras 5
Pe MO Ni ovine cicsevccicnssisviensvcescescesannvess 5
REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW................. 7
I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
111
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TO DEFER TO THE EXECUTIVE DE-
PARTMENT CONFLICTS WITH DECI-
PUA P OURS Pe PRM GAPRIEEE dscsniestescnnrissnaseserscs
A. Linguistic Analysis under S.D. Warren ...
1. Natural and Ordinary Meaning of
the Relevant Prepositional lLan-
MI Sins xny cusp asvauadsunedaenceaeersexceliencers
2. Consistency of Purpose and Struc-
tks 6s ka can tend geebnerN rei chads oud si baaeeds
B. Limiting Canons of Construction .........
1. The “Distinct Waters” Approach Is
Not Permissible Under The Tenth
TI nooo ca skids andeecdenandasdaccies
a. Traditional State Water Manage-
PI acasces cdesewecsvess spuds Gitboxckatomenans
10
24
1V
TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued
ADDENDUM: Pertinent Provisions of the
Page
b. CWA’s Cooperative Federalism.... 25
ec. Clear Statement Rule And
CREOOTON .ccsaciccssesststen eee 28
2. The CWA’s Severe Criminal Penal-
ties Require A Narrow Construction
Under Principles of Lenity............... 32
Ii. THE NARROW LEGAL QUESTION PRE-
SENTED SHOULD BE REVIEWED ON
CERTIORARI, NOT LEFT TO FURTHER
LITIGATION AND CONTENTIOUS RULE-
HLA TR REWGD sors siinnossenvnvaseuckstesnelpeceansetn ena 33
A. The Eleventh Circuit and EPA Have
Exacerbated Nationwide Disarray and
Divisiveness Over The Federal Ques-
ties. Freebie oi iixcsvaxcesssaccsuaaeeee 34
B. The Resulting Regulatory Uncertainty
Is Stymieing Water Managers .............. 37
CONC LION ooeecsvescncvevensesscsucueceneninn ene ... 40
Cleam Water Act oicccccsseccdncscscestsdoae eee Al
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
D>.
Page
CASES
Arkansas v. Oklahoma Envtl. Prot. Agency, 503
rT oo. sawenuveudsuheuaseraciwebeamecraer 20
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002)...................37
Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23 (1997)..........00.... 15
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited
Inc. v. City of New York, 2773 F.3d 481 (2d Cir.
oo 0 505s us dviisie sedi euinvnendn ined veckhenvipentes ee
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited
Inc. v. City of New York, 244 F. Supp.2d 41
I EMIS oc vnycaccensesesvecasecceusvasecsoacensensseaveusecsens 7
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited
Inc. v. City of New York, 451 F.3d 77 (2d Cir.
cae suunisiveiaabesesansvesetvoccesoadante 7, 34, 35
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlim-
ited, Inc. v. Sheehan, 71 A.D. 3d 235 (N.Y.
Ee Shukadkesedavesekeddaeesanausaasaeeusansincl aaa 7
Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000).........32
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990).........32
Dubois v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273
(Ist Cir. 1996).......... i csnuasauspaesdeessadsasseuia reacts eauaientareeee
mee aree roung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ............cccsccoscoseneodd
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006)................... 29
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)... .. 24
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209
U.S. 349 (1908).............. PARR ERA AIL sve E PNR t roe 24
v1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).......25
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist., No. 98-6056, 1999 WL 33494862
CEP. PUG, OE, DU, LG) vscescccccvessavesssvsvesusceesencevenssehe
Natl Cable & Telecomm. Assoc. v. Brand X
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005) ..........0........ 37
Natl Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co.,
862 F.2G 680 (Gti Cir, TIDES) ...........ccvcccseccsesssees 14, 34
Nat'l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156
RR SAN UPON cs) c4aduenivcvinianasaxacsue cena passim
Norfolk So. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158
SME E F sic chxvnadaucacessaksunkacuvaceeteces secs osen ver chia ees 20
PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S.
Fe © isitesat asic ae woe
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) ....19, 30
Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971).............. 32
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218
GRD basis sr ccichcsasseceurnavensantine ti eae 24
S.D. Warren, Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547
Se ee ici cdaicessantsichec ieee passim
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) .............. eceeceeceee: 6, 10
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)......29, 30
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)................ 24
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
United
(1994)
JInited States v. Lopez, 5
United States v. Plaza Health Lab..,
States v.
~ Continued
Granderson,
14 U.S. 549 (19985).............. 24
Inc., 3 F.3d
BE es BUI hatitstsisticssevelee cearteeser exces 19
United States uv.
Sinclair Oil, Co., 767 F.Supp.
GI MEN ROIIEE Sa csacsnasiciaheunssctesacanddveaiereusanewiees 22
United States v.
Thompson/Center Arms Co.,
Pe Sie, PD CRO) oniscnscccessnsssessversene iGaecnkvamineesysoeeeee
CONSTITUTIONS
3 Me SP. Sk | Ep Sap ERED SOR en Rn DES iC un Unite NeAen en EE Ta 24
STATUTES
33 U.S.C. §
33 U.S.C. §
S.C.
33 U.S.C.
33 U.S.C.
Aes
33 U.S.C.
33 U.S.C.
33 UV.
33 U.S
33 U.S.C.
33 U.S.C.
20
21
$125 1(al(7)..cccccececeseeees eee 21, 37
REPU SY onvisccscesvecussesnsserscovas 9, 20, 25, 26, 37
505 (0) 9, 20, 26, 37
seus acicieecnsenanens 22, 26
I ay hae 22, 26
BAB YOEOI AD) gcc csccissecossccncssessecsavecsissestenivnvens 32
§1319(C)(Q) .ececcccececececcecesceseecescacecescecesceseeeee eB!
SC a ee er eae 26
Vill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
Bee Ae Me EE ics caccutvicintcaseaicaacichcuiecumincesdaaaaee 21
ee ee ee vcicsiss ov ccsaiun bacasiacedibe tsaenecoseaesmaemntel 29
eI One sic avinatccnckeeswnesnessxeseeansanaveruslounin 12
Re ee Oe I BF okies Cevsavoucassesuecserpananou 12,13, 15
Fla. Stat. §373.016............. rapiadesewsdsaeuh aeuanenaell 2,21, 25
hs ee We eR hin ecenecnns sce cnxcecanscanasabecersnnsssnsas 24
Fim. BEA. SS7SOGHANE]) ...ccceccccccccsccccseres ele ae oe ra 2
es ee ee OD vas gncescnsacnaancncnneuoeenn esas exuweeenae 3
REGULATIONS
BO CFB. SASSI) CBOOS) ons csicscccccsicsvecececsecoess iecctvanacaes 4
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Brief of Former EPA Administrators in S. Fla.
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee, No. 02-626,
2003 WL 22793539 (U.S. Nov. 14, 20038)............ 8, 36
Brief of the United States in S. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee, No. 02-626, 2003
WL 22137034 (U.S. Sept. 10, 2003)........ 4,15, 16, 39
Comprehensive Report on Central and South-
ern Florida For Flood Control and Other
Purposes, H.R. Doc. No. 80-643 (1948) .................... 3
1X
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
GAO Report to the Committee on Transporta-
tion and Infrastructure, House of Represent-
atives, South Florida Ecosystem: Restoration
ts Moving Forward but ts Facing Delays, Im-
plementation Challenges and Rising Costs
EME CITED aseccstsssscesééscevenevssesvevevssasvansescsnunstt@
H.R. Rep. No. 92-911 (1972) .....cccccccesssessseevevececeee 12, 27
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) Water Transfers Proposed
Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32887 (June 7, 2006).......... 27, 36
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) Water Transfers Proposed
Rule Submissions at www.regulations.gov
under Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2006-0141............36
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73
Fed. Reg. 33697 (June 13, 2008) (codified at
ET 0s sive sinuses Veokbannevarveiboensnsesécnsen passim
National Research Council, Progress Toward
Restoring the Everglades: The Third Biennial
Review (2010) (Prepublication Copy) ...............388, 39
Pub. L. 95-217, Clean Water Act of 1977, S.
Rep. No. 95-370 (July 28, 1977), 1977 WL
ee eats et iucua cali ce ruaetaressibéhssuvubbanevssdacarecevesss 26, 28
Senate Debate on S. 2770 (1972) Legislative
a ae Oe Re Pe 27
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
acerca suddincesenvideckersene ticdcuas4bte tesibentenyenveesaadsiens 13
STATEMENT
The fundamental issue in this case is whether a
state water management agency may lawfully trans-
fer, and as a result, discharge navigable waters to
which it adds nothing, without the need for a federal
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(“NPDES”) permit or, conversely, whether the Clean
Water Act’s (“CWA”) NPDES program reaches such
traditionally local, vital water management activities.
To regulate water management under a federal
program designed to eliminate waste discharges
would fundamentally alter the federal-state balance
stricken by the CWA’s cooperative federalism struc-
ture.
Congress plainly never intended to criminalize
public water transfers or to extend federal NPDES
permitting jurisdiction over them. The Eleventh
Circuit’s finding that it is permissible to read the Act
otherwise squarely contradicts relevant decisions of
this Court. As a result, the appellate court has given
the Environmental Protection Agency discretion
where Congress did not. Discretion the agency has
already indicated, in its response to petitions for
rehearing below, that it intends to exercise. The
Agency has since established a task force and is
developing a strategy to expand the NPDES. Allowing
the Executive Department to be arbiter of its own
jurisdiction, without clear direction from Congress,
flies in the face of the distinct federal and state roles
Congress carefully delineated to preserve the primacy
of State authorities. Whatever regulatory certainty
the CWA and the Rule once provided the Nation is
gone. Water managers nationwide are stymied by
these events.
For these and other important reasons ex-
pounded below, these non-federal Respondents re-
spectfully encourage review on certiorari and suggest
it is incumbent upon the Court to replace the Elev-
enth Circuit’s errant deference-based rationale’ with
a properly reasoned judicial position that is con-
sistent with directly applicable interpretive doctrines
of this Court.
1. Public Water Transfers.
Respondent Carol Wehle is the Executive Direc
tor of the Respondent South Florida Water Manage
ment District, one of five districts established by the
State to provide stewardship over public water re
sources. The District implements State and Local
water policies throughout its extensive jurisdiction,
which is larger than the States of Connecticut, Mary
land and Rhode Island combined. It is drawn along
hydrologic boundaries, to allow a comprehensive
watershed approach to managing the Everglades
ecosystem. Fla. Stat. §§373.016; 373.069(2)(e). The
Respondents concede to have, as a fallback argument,
supported deference in the past. Deference, however, results
from an inferior interpretive analysis that ignores proper
linguistic analysis and, more critically, relevant canons of
construction discussed herein
~~
Respondents’ complicated mission is to protect water
resources of the region by balancing and improving
water quality, flood control, natural systems and
water supply. These are traditional State functions
that entitle the Water Management District to protec-
tions of the Eleventh Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
The imposition of NPDES strictures is a grave
concern to State and Local water managers nation
wide and these respondents particularly. The pump
stations involved here are but three of 391 water
control structures and hundreds of miles of canals
and levees that comprise the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineer’s Central & Southern Florida Project for
Flood Control and Other Purposes (C&SF) the
country’s largest — for which the SFWMD is the local
sponsor. The specter of applying NPDES to the
C&SF threatens to impede local control of water
management and land use decisions and to divert
scarce resources from a joint federal and state multi
billion dollar, multi-agency effort to re-plumb the
C&SF project to restore the Florida Everglades and
* Those concerns are extensively documented by hundreds
of comments provided during EPA’s rulemaking (located at
www.regulations.gov under Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2006-0141)
and by dozens of amicus curiae that have participated at all
stages of this case and in the related matters discussed, infra,
r
Statement Part 3 at p. 5
’ Fla. Stat. §373.1501(4): see, Comprehensive Report on
Central and Southern Florida for Flood Control and Other
Purposes, H.R. Doc. No. 80-643 (1948)
develop south Florida’s water resources. See Brief of
the United States in S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v
Miccosukee, No. 02-626, 2003 WL 22137034 at *14
(U.S. Sept. 10, 2003) (“mistaken imposition of NPDES
permitting requirements ... is unlikely to provide
any substantial environmental benefits. Rather, it
would likely misdirect governmental resources and
potentially hinder the Everglades restoration process”).
Flow diversions accomplished by the District's
pumps are categorized as “water transfers” because
their operation merely “conveys and connects waters
of the United States without subjecting the trans
ferred water to intervening industrial, municipal, or
commercial use.” 40 C.F.R. §122.301)) (2008). Public
facilities used to move water are an “integral compo
nent of U.S. infrastructure.” National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water
Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33699 col. 1
(June 13, 2008) codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122 (“Water
Transfers Rule”). Thousand of water transfers are
routinely conducted by federal, state, and local agen
cies across the United States for millions of people
who depend upon them daiiy for public water supply,
irrigation, power generation, flood control and envi
ronmental restoration. /d. at 33698 col. 2&3. Since
enactment of the Clean Water Act, the EPA has
consistently understood that an NPDES pollutant is
“added” upon its introduction from outside the navi
gable waters or, conversely, that NPDES is not trig
gered when navigable waters containing pollutants
are connected and conveyed, i.e. when waters are
merely moved between and among themselves. Nat’/
Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175 (D.C. Cir
1982)
2. Proceedings Below.
The South Florida Water Management District
was dismissed after a finding that its water transfers
constitute a traditional State Function which entitled
it to Eleventh Amendment protections. Carol Wehle,
its Executive Director, was joined as a defendant
under Ex Parte Young’ and ordered to apply for
NPDES permits
In the decision for which review on certiorari i:
sought, the court of appeals reversed the judgment
imposing NPDES and held moot Petitioners’ cross
appeal of the District’s dismissal. Under Rule 12 of
this Court, both the District and its Executive Dire«
Lor are Respondents entitled LO file document
3. Related Litigation.
Several pending matters are directly related
to this case and will largely be determined by it
The first case, in which this Court declined to decide
* The Ex Parte Young doctrine allows State officer ind
employees to be sued for prospective injunctive rehef, despite
the llth Amendment, to prevent ongoing violations of federal
law. 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
6
the question presented here, S. Fla. Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, remains pending
on remand. 541 U.S. 95 (2004). EPA withdrew a
motion to intervene in Miccosukee when it became
clear this appeal would proceed first. The trial court
stayed the case after extensive discovery and pretrial
proceedings but shortly before an extensive trial in
recognition that this case can and should finally
resolve the parties’ primary legal dispute.
In 2008, twenty-three petitions were filed to
challenge the Water Transfers Rule in the First,
Second, Third, Sixth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeals and in the Southern District Courts’ of New
York and Florida. The United States Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation transferred to the Elev-
enth Circuit those petitions that were filed with the
Courts of Appeals. Like Miccosukee, these rule chal-
lenges have also been stayed in anticipation of a
dispositive decision in this case.
In 2002, New York City became the only public
water manager, Respondents aside, ever required by
a court to obtain an NPDES permit for water trans-
fers. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited
Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“Catskill I’). Over the ensuing years, continuous
litigation resulted in multi-million dollar civil
* Challenges were brought in both District and Appeals
Courts because of a question, not relevant here, regarding
original jurisdiction.
~]
penalties and hundreds of thousands of dollars in
attorneys’ fees and costs. Catskill Mountains Chapter
of Trout Unlimited Inc. v. City of New York, 244
F. Supp.2d 41, 57 (N.D. N.Y. 2003). Further adminis-
trative and state court proceedings, vacated the
initial permit for authorizing deviations from re-
quired effluent limitations and remanded for the City
to seek variances (which the permitting agency had
never before issued). Catskill Mountains Chapter of
Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Sheehan, 71 A.D. 3d 235 (N.Y.
2010). Today, ten years after the City was sued, it
remains uncertain whether New York can comply
with NPDES. Its attempts to obtain a final permit
continue and will inevitably lead to further litigation.
The Second Circuit’s conjecture that the NPDES
program contains sufficient “flexibility,” to assure
that important State transfers can be authorized, has
proven more complicated in practice. See Catskill
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited Inc. v. City of
New York, 451 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Catskill IT”).
The burden of misapplying NPDES to water transfers
weighs heavily upon public water managers.
ca
REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW
While concurring with the Eleventh Circuit’s
judgment, Respondent Water Managers concede this
case amply satisfies the Court’s criteria for certiorari
review. The Petitions correctly point out that an
important federal question regarding the proper
interpretation of a major federal regulatory program
8
is squarely and concisely presented. The question
has confounded those courts that have addressed it.
Their decisions have yielded inconsistent interpretive
approaches and almost uniformly ignored the cooper-
ative federalism principles discussed here. The Exec-
utive Department is in similar disarray. Different
administrations cannot even agree whether the EPA
has been consistent in its views over the years’ and,
now, disagree whether the CWA is ambiguous on the
question presented.
After decades in court defending the position EPA
codified after years of rulemaking, the Executive
Department surprised the Nation, in this case, with
the extraordinary declaration that it “in fact intends
to reconsider the rule.” Federal Response to Motions
for Reconsideration En Banc, below, at 15. That
singular filing quashed whatever regulatory certainty
the Rule purported to provide. A proper interpretation
by this Court would end many more years of ongoing
and inevitably recurring litigation and rulemaking.
Most importantly, it would provide much needed
clarity for thousands of state and local water manag-
ers who must plan and account for each state’s ever
changing and complex water and land resource needs
during increasingly tough economic times.
° Cf. Brief of Former EPA Administrators in S. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee, No. 02-626, 2003 WL 22793539 (U.S.
Nov. 14, 2003) and the Water Transfers Rule at 33701 Col. 2.
9
A critical basis for review not revealed by the
Petitions but of utmost concern to these Respondents
is that the lower court’s rationale conflicts with
relevant decisions of this Court. Key canons of statu-
tory construction were misapplied or altogether
ignored. Had the lower court followed this Court’s
guidance and direction, it would have adopted the
CWA’s only permissible reading, and not deferred. For
when properly construed, the plain text, cooperative-
federalism structure and principles of lenity — the
latter two of which the lower court flatly disregarded
— defy attributing to Congress any intent to criminal-
ize unpermitted discharges of the type involved here.
The lower court’s deference-based rationale is
particularly problematic given that — in the name
of cooperative federalism — Congress intentionally
delimited federal jurisdiction for the express purpose
of preserving States’ rights and responsibilities for
water and land resource management. 33 U.S.C.
§1251(b) & (g). Under today’s Chevron doctrine, the
EPA now views itself free to extend its own jurisdic-
tion well beyond express limits that the Executive
Department has often and for decades repeatedly
acknowledged were intended by Congress to protect
the States. EPA assumed, in its objections to rehear-
ing below, that the Rule, and thus the law, is up for
grabs with each change of administration.
By resorting to deference in a cooperative federal-
ism context where deference has no proper place, the
lower court further muddied the Clean Water Act and
10
with it the nationwide regulatory landscape. Con-
gress never delegated to EPA the discretion to redraw
the roles the CWA so carefully defined for the federal
and state governments. That intrusion, authorized by
the Eleventh Circuit, is antithetical to the CWA’s core
structure.
I THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION TO
DEFER TO THE EXECUTIVE DEPART-
MENT CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF
THIS COURT.
Decisions of this Court have set forth relevant
interpretive rules that, when faithfully considered,
proscribe Petitioners’ reading of the CWA and, thus,
deference to EPA. Three approaches — misapplied or
ignored by the Eleventh Circuit — should have guided
its review. First, the linguistic analysis anticipated by
S.D. Warren, Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., yields a
singular “ordinary or natural” plain meaning of the
relevant limiting language. 547 U.S. 370, 376 (2006).
The Eleventh Circuit erred by not giving full effect
to a determinative prepositional clause. Second,
regardless of whether the Court accepts outright
the linguistic approach Miccosukee dubbed “unitary
waters,” the Eleventh Circuit erred by leaping to
deference without yielding to clear statement princi-
ples of the Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Principles that were specifically devised
" Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 96.
1]
by this Court for these very circumstances, i.e.,
to resolve ambiguities in favor of protecting and
preserving States’ rights and responsibilities. Third,
the CWA criminalizes pollutant discharges, implicat-
ing this Court’s rules of lenity that should equally
have constrained the lower court. Before resorting to
Chevron, courts must exhaust these canons of con-
struction that are intended to guide the determina-
tion of whether a statute appropriately lends itself to
more than one permissible reading.” Here the Clean
Water Act does not.
In short, nothing in the Act manifests Congres-
sional intent to federally permit State and Local
water transfers and to criminalize those that are not.
Absent a clear statement of intent to do so, the court
erred in finding “reasonable” an interpretation that,
when applied, greatly expands federal criminal
liability and vests EPA with the apparent authority to
re-adjust, at its discretion, the federal-state balance
that Congress so carefully struck in creating the CWA.
* Various commentators have debated whether the clear
statement and lenity principles discussed herein should be ap-
plied: 1) before reaching Chevron’s domain (Step Zero), 2) under
Chevron’s Step One, when determining whether the statute is
“ambiguous,” 3) under Step Two when determining “reasonable-
ness,” and 4) or, advocating that Chevron has only One Step,
when deciding generally whether there is more than one “per-
missible” reading. Whichever analytical construct, or variation
thereof, the Court invokes, the canons discussed here preclude
deference in this case.
12
A. Linguistic Analysis under S.D. Warren.
Not long ago, the Court reiterated the need to use
great care when construing the CWA:
It should also go without saying that uncriti-
cal use of interpretive rules is especially
risky in making sense of a complicated stat-
ute like the Clean Water Act, where technical
definitions are worked out with great effort
in the legislative process. H.R. Rep. No. 92-
911, p. 125 (1972) (“[I]Jt is extremely im-
portant to an understanding of [NPDES] to
know the definition of the various terms used
and a careful reading of the definitions... is
recommended. Of particular significance
,>”
[are] the words ‘discharge of pollutants’ ”).
S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. at 380. Indeed, when Congress
fine-tunes its statutory definitions, it tends to do so
with a purpose in mind. Id. at 384.
In S.D. Warren, the Court noted that the use of
prepositional phrasing — “discharge of pollutants” as
opposed to “discharge” — was plainly intended to dis-
tinguish the jurisdictional reaches of two key Clean
Water Act programs. The subject of this case, NPDES
— the narrower of those programs — is delimited by
the terms “discharge of pollutants” and its definition:
“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters
from any point source.” 33 U.S.C. §1362(7) & (12).
The question presented turns upon the proper mean-
ing of these few defining terms. Friends Pet. App. at
132a-133a. When carefully construed, the ordinary
13
and natural meaning of these terms with their defini-
tions excludes water transfers from NPDES. The
CWA is neither textually nor contextually ambiguous
on the point.
1. Natural and Ordinary Meaning of the
Relevant Prepositional Language.
Setting aside the policy arguments discussed
below, the relevant linguistic and structural analysis
in this case is straight-forward.
a. The triggering statutory term for NPDES “is
not the word ‘discharge’ alone, but ‘discharge of a
pollutant,’ a phrase made narrower by its specific
definition requiring an ‘addition’ of a pollutant to the
water. §1362(12).” S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. at 380-81.
Since the term “addition” is neither defined in the
statute nor a term of art, the courts are left to con-
strue it in accordance with its “ordinary or natural”
meaning. See id. at 376. The word is commonly
understood as “the joining or uniting of one thing
to another.” Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 24 (2002). In turn, the act of “joining or
uniting” is commonly understood to require that the
“thing” being joined must start apart from, or outside
of the “thing” it joins, and be moved to it. It is neither
natural nor ordinary, but rather bizarre, to say that
two things already together are “joined or united” by
the mere movement of one within the other.
14
There is no dispute in this case over the thing
being “added.” All navigable waters contain “pollu-
tants” and, therefore, under Petitioners’ “distinct
waters” approach, become “pollutants” themselves.
The relevant dispute here is over the thing “to” which
the pollutant must be added or joined, 1.e., to what
must a pollutant be joined to trigger NPDES? Con-
gress plainly and clearly answered “to navigable
waters,” which it expressly defined for NPDES pur-
poses to mean: “the waters of the United States.”
Inserting that definition, NPDES proscribes only
those “additions” that join pollutants “to the waters of
the United States.”
It follows that NPDES does not apply unless a
pollutant is moved from outside “the waters of the
United States” into them. Natl Wildlife Fed’n v.
Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir.
1988); Natl Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156,
175 (D.C. Cir. 1982). NPDES cannot by the CWA’s
plain terms be triggered by the mere movement,
redistribution or transfer of pollutants within “the
waters of the United States.” The Sixth Circuit ex-
plained that a “facilitys movement of pollutants
already in the water is not an ‘addition’ of pollutants
to navigable waters of the United States.” Consumers
Power, 862 F.2d at 581, also at 586 (the pollutants
“always remain within the waters of the United
States, and hence cannot be added”).
The United States’ amicus brief in Miccosukee
found this interpretation to be “clear” and further
explained that Congress identified and referred to the
15
navigable waters “as a whole for NPDES purpose,” an
argument Miccosukee dubbed a “unitary waters”
approach:
Section 510(12) defines the “discharge of a
pollutant” to include “any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(12) (emphasis add-
ed). Its use of the modifier “any” with refer-
ence to “addition,” “pollutant,” and “point
source” expresses Congress’s understanding
that the various types of additions, pollu-
tants, and point sources are all within the
Clean Water Act’s regulatory reach. The ab-
sence of the modifier “any” in conjunction
with “navigable waters,” by contrast, signi-
fies Congress’s further understanding that
“the waters of the United States” should be
viewed as a whole for purposes of NPDES
permitting requirements. Once a pollutant is
present in one part of “the waters of the
United States,” its simple conveyance to a
different part is not a “discharge of a pollu-
tant” within the meaning of the Act.
Brief of the United States in Miccosukee at *19; see
also Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29-30 (1997)
(if “Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion” (quotation marks omitted)).
16
Further textual confirmation of the “unitary
waters” approach comes from the CWA’s use of “the”
before “waters of the United States.” That definitive
article has particularizing force when used before a
noun and after a preposition. It ordinarily reflects an
intention to refer to “the waters” as a whole, not to “a”
water, “some” waters, or otherwise individualize the
waters it references.
The combined effect of these linguistic choices
makes plain that Congress never intended NPDES to
reach water transfers of the type here. That makes
perfect sense given that, “[t/hroughout its considera-
tion of the [Clean Water] Act, Congress’ focus was
on traditional industrial and municipal wastes.”
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175.
b. Petitioners’ alternative, “distinct waters”
reading misses the mark. Again, the United States
Brief in Miccosukee explained that the “distinct
waters” theory does not provide an alternative “rea-
sonable” construction:
Section 502(12) [the definition of a discharge
of pollutants] cannot reasonably be under-
stood to include an activity that merely
transports navigable waters from one loca-
tion ... to another location. Such an activity
can conceivably lead to changes in water
quality, but it does not, within the normal
meaning of the relevant terms, constitute an
“addition” of any pollutant to “the waters of
the United States.”
Brief of the United States in Miccosukee at *16 (em
phasis supplied).
17
Critically, the Eleventh Circuit conceded Peti
tioners’ reading alters and embellishes upon the
CWA’s plain text: Petitioners’ “reading effectively asks
[the court] to add a fourth ‘any’ to the statute.”
Friends Pet. App. at 28a. What Petitioners proffer
this Court is not a plain reading of the text. They
provide instead what amounts to alternative lan
guage that Congress could have adopted had water
transfers been an intended target. As the “distinct
waters” argument makes clear, if Congress wanted to
extend NPDES to water transfers, “it could easily
have chosen suitable language, e.g., “all pollution
released through a point source.” Gorsuch, 693 F.2d
at 176. But, the NPDES system was limited to “addi-
tion” to the water from the “outside world.” /d. at 175.
It is well established that statutory terms used with
prepositions, as with “addition ... to navigable wa-
ters” here, convey a narrower concept than when used
alone. S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. at 375. The fundamental
mistake of the “distinct waters” theory is to ignore
meaningful prepositional language out of a desire to
proscribe all “additions” to “any” water.
The Eleventh Circuit, nonetheless, found the
statutory language “ambiguous” because it believed
<
the definition “addition ... to navigable waters” can
reasonably be read to refer to waters in the individual
sense or to waters as a unitary whole. Friends Pet.
App. at 26a. That contention was based upon the
ordinary usage of the isolated term “waters.” Re-
spondents do not disagree that term can collectively
refer to several different bodies of water or to any one
Re.
body of water. Jd. But, by isolation of the term “wa
ters” the Court created “ambiguity” that does not
exist when the term is read in context of the entire
prepositional phrase
The parties’ dispute is not over the undeniable
divisibility and distinctiveness of the many “naviga-
ble waters.” It is over what it means to “add” some
thing “to” them. Quite simply, did Congress call for an
addition “to the waters” or “to any distinct waters”?
The moniker “unitary waters” merely characterizes
an understanding that the former and not the latter
was plainly intended. The fact that the “waters” could
have been referred to distinctly is implied and irrele-
vant. The “unitary waters” approach acknowledges
that Congress plainly and unambiguously referenced
them as an aggregate whole for NPDES purposes.
Unfortunately, in support of its proclivity for agency
deference, the Department of Justice recently adopted
the linguistic fallacy of isolating a single term from
its context, which became its basis to retreat from
the plain language interpretation the United States
advanced in Miccosukee. Response of the United
States to Petitions for Rehearing En Banc at 12. The
United States has now abandoned the position it had
defended in this case and every other case on the
issue in which EPA participated
For the same reason, the “unitary waters” ap
. 2 . : , ~7
proach is not undermined by Rapanos and the irrele
vant fact that the “navigable waters” comprise many
distinct water features. See Rapanos v. United States,
047 U.S. 715 (2006). In Rapanos, the Court was
19
confronted with the meaning and scope of the isolated
terms “navigable waters,” which is not confronted
here. The waters involved in this case are all admit
tedly navigable
At bottom, the critical linguistic analysis called
for in S.D. Warren reveals a singularly plain reading
of the relevant definitions. The “distinct waters”
approach does not provide a reasonable alternative
reading sufficient to render the CWA ambiguous as to
the applicability of NPDES to water transfers
2. Consistency of Purpose and Structure.
Lacking a cogent plain meaning alternative to
“unitary waters,” advocates of the “distinct waters”
theory resort to unpersuasive contextual arguments
Uniformly, they claim that the failure to impose
NPDES upon water transfers runs contrary to the
CWA’s overarching goal of restoring the Nations’
waters. 33 U.S.C. §125l(a). That argument fails
because 1) the sweeping goals of a comprehensive,
multifaceted regulatory scheme speaks little about
the intended scope of any particular constituent
program; and 2) the argument falsely insinuates that
the failure to impose NPDES upon water transfers
allows noxious discharges to proceed with impunity
outside the CWA as a whole
The narrow question posed by this case cannot be
resolved merely by reference to a general goal. United
States v. Plaza Health Lab., Inc., 3 ¥.3d 643, 647 (2d
20
Cir. 1993) (citing Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (“it 1s one thing for Congress to announce a
grand goal, and quite another for it to mandate full
implementation of that goal”)). “Caution is always
advisable in relying upon a general declaration of
purpose to alter the apparent meaning of a specific
provision.” Jd. It frustrates rather than effectuates
legislative intent simplistically to assume that what-
ever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be
the law. Norfolk So. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158,
171 (2007). In fact, Congress’ avowed purpose to
minimize pollution was not unequivocal, as the CWA’s
specific provisions are the result of careful balancing
of countervailing policies. See infra, p. 25, Part
I(B)(1)(b). The CWA’s grand goal provides no guidance
as to how Congress resolved this balancing act. In
addition to that general caution, there are more
specific indications that Congress did not want to
interfere any more than necessary with state water
management. See 33 U.S.C. §125l1(b) & (g). The
CWA’'s overall purpose does not tell us anything
about how it is to be achieved or the role of each
individual program or provision. To say the least,
§1251(a) does not require courts to construe the term
“discharge of pollutants” expansively in a way that
is contrary to its plain defining language and compet-
ing federalism goals.
Fair consideration of the Act as a whole also
dispels the concern expressed by the Court in
Miccosukee that “several NPDES provisions” reflect
an intent to protect individual waters that “might be
21
read to suggest a view contrary to the unitary waters
approach.” 541 U.S. at 107. The CWA created a
multifaceted, compreliensive regulatory scheme that
uses a variety of controls to reach its goals, not only
NPDES. When limiting federal NPDES jurisdiction,
Congress by no means left any non-point [non-
NPDES] sources, including water transfers, un-
addressed or individual waters unprotected.
To the contrary, the CWA declares: [Tjhe national
policy that programs for the control of nonpoint
sources of pollution be developed and implemented in
an expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of
{the CWA] to be met through the control of both point
and nonpoint sources of pollution. 33 U.S.C.
§1251(a)(7). More specifically, the CWA stated “the
national policy that areawide waste treatment man-
agement planning processes be developed and imple-
mented to assure adequate control of sources of
pollutants in each State.” 33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(5).
The Water Transfers Rule makes clear that
limiting NPDES does nothing more than leave the
control of water transfers to non-NPDES authorities.
Water Transfers Rule at 33699 col. 2. In short, while
the unitary approach allows water transfers without
NPDES, it does not remotely propose they can or
should be conducted freely, outside the CWA as a
whole or with impunity.
“ Non-point source pollution is defined by exclusion, it in-
cludes all water quality problems not subject to §402, 33 U.S.C.
$1342. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 166.
22
Indeed, the district court 1n this case noted the
immense, ongoing federal and state effort to address
concerns with the entire Everglades ecosystem,
including the subject transfers. To that end, the court
cataloged the considerable regulatory framework
within which the subject pumps operate and that is
guiding restoration and protection of the effected
wate: bodies. Friends Pet. App. at 103a (District
Court Findings Part H). Pumping has been greatly
reduced and only occurs today to prevent catastrophic
flooding or to protect emergency water supplies dur-
ing extreme drought. Jd. at 88a & 108a. Petitioners
even conceded below that the pollutants at issue
could be addressed in a number of alternative ways.
Petitioners’ additional claims, that the “unitary
waters” approach undermines other CWA programs
equally miss the mark. For example, CWA Section
404, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Dredge and
Fill Permitting, is a separate and independent pro-
gram. United States v. Sinclair Oil, Co., 767 F.Supp.
200, 201 n.1 (D. Mont. 1990). As the Water Transfers
Rule explains, Sec. 404 is unaffected by excluding
water transfers from NPDES. Water Transfers Rule
at 33703 col. 3. As well, CWA Section 303, the Total
Maximum Daily Load program, does not conflict, but
rather supplements NPDES to ensure individual
water bodies are protected from other sources of
pollution, like water transfers, through a comprehen-
sive watershed planning process. 33 U.S.C. §1313(d)
& (e) (requiring States to identify and provide for the
protection and restoration of any water body NPDES’
effluent limitations do not protect).
Both the Solicitor General, in Miccosukee, and
EPA in its preamble to its Final Water Transfers
Rule, further expounds in detail how the unitary
waters approach is supported by, and wholly con-
sistent with, not only the plain language, but also
multiple purposes and structure of the CWA. In the
end, water transfers have never been generally per-
mitted as desired by Petitioners. The Water Transfers
Rule simply codifies the thirty-eight year status quo.
B. Limiting Canons of Construction.
Even were Petitioners’ broad “distinct waters”
theory to be considered a “reasonable” plain meaning
alternative to the “unitary waters” approach, it would
be nonetheless impermissible. Two relevant interpre-
tive approaches dictate that result. First, in this
cooperative-federalism context, where Congress care-
fully balanced federal-state interests, “ambiguity” —
the absence of a clear manifestation of Congressional
intent — requires the court to check Executive powers
by adopting the narrower reading. Second, because
the CWA is a criminal statute, lenity requires the
more limited construction.
l. The “Distinct Waters” Approach Is
Not Permissible Under The Tenth
Amendment.
To enforce protections of the Tenth Amendment,
the Court has enunciated a clear statement rule
providing that “lilf Congress intends to alter the
24
‘usual constitutional balance between the States and
the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention
to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute.’” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460
(1991). To that end, Congress must make a clear
statement before courts will find that it has inter-
fered with traditional state authorities because
“States retain substantial sovereign powers under our
constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress
does not readily interfere.” Jd. at 461. This funda-
mental interpretive rule dictates that “unless Con-
gress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be
deemed to have significantly changed the federal-
state balance.” United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,
349 (1971); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (a federal statute does not
supersede “the historic police powers of the States...
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress”). The courts have a “particular duty to
ensure that the federal-state balance is not de-
stroyed” with respect to “traditional concern[s] of the
States.” See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580,
581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
a. Traditional State Water Manage-
ment.
The Respondents’ responsibility for managing
water resources is constitutional. Fla. Const. art. Il
$7. Its police powers to manage waters for public
health, safety and welfare are well established and
codified. Fla. Stat. §373.016(3)(j); see Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
25
Comprehensive water management is a State prior-
ity. Fla. Stat. §373.016. States’ traditional interests
in water management are at their peak where the
control of pollution in urban and agricultural basins —
as in this case — implicates both water and land use
planning. 33 U.S.C. §1251(b). Historically, land uses
have been widely regulated by state, not federal
authorities. The district court found the Respondent
South Florida Water Management District entitled to
Eleventh Amendment protections precisely because
its water transfers constitute the exercise of the
State’s traditional and primary power over both land
and water resources. Friends Pet. App. 18la (“The
Florida Legislature has recognized that the manage-
ment and protection of water resources is of critical
importance to the State.” (emphasis in original)).
These functions go to the heart of the rights protected
as well by the CWA’s cooperative federalism and the
Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
b. CWA’s Cooperative Federalism.
The Clean Water Act follows a cooperative feder-
alism model that envisions a close regulatory part-
nership between the state and federal governments to
restore and maintain the Nation’s waters. Arkansas
v. Oklahoma Envtl. Prot. Agency, 503 U.S. 91, 101
(1992); Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489
(1987). In creating this scheme, Congress struck a
careful balance among competing policies and inter-
ests. Id. at 499. To that end, the CWA established
distinct roles for the federal and state governments to
26
achieve their goals. PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep't of
Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704 (1994).
The CWA relies heavily upon the states to main-
tain primary responsibility to prevent, reduce and
eliminate pollution, to plan for the development and
use of land and water resources and to consult with
the Environmental Protection Agency. 33 U.S.C.
§§1251(b) & (gy, 13813(d) & (e) & 1329. Congress
did not want to interfere any more than necessary
with state water management. 33 U.S.C. §1251(g);
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 178. Federal agencies are in
turn directed to “co-operate with State and local
agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to pre-
vent, reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with
programs for managing water resources.” 33 U.S.C.
§125l(g). Thus, the CWA’s cooperative federalism
scheme was predicated upon the value of local input
and experimentation. The issue is not whether water
transfers escape regulation, but by what controls
Congress intended them to be addressed.
In 1972, the Congress made a clear and pre-
cise distinction between point sources, which
would be subject to direct Federal [NPDES]
regulation, and nonpoint sources, control of
which was specifically reserved to the State
and local governments through [non-NPDES]
process * * * judging that these matters were
appropriately left to the level of government
closest to the sources of the problem.
Pub. L. 95-217, Clean Water Act of 1977, S. Rep. No.
95-370 (July 28, 1977), 1977 WL 16152 at *8-9.
27
As reflected in the comments of Senator Muskie,
the primary sponsor of the legislation in the Senate,
programs developed to deal with nonpoint sources
“would involve land use and other controls of that
kind.” Senate Debate on S. 2770 (1972) Leg. Hist. at
1314. Thus, Congress fine-tuned its programs “in
order to use them in separate places and to separate
ends,” leaving many sources of pollution to non-
NPDES programs. S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. at 383. The
NPDES was not designed to address all “pollution”
caused by all “discharges,” but was limited to the
“discharge of pollution.” Jd. In the end, Congress
explicitly chose not to federalize all water pollution
control. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 178.
By leaving diversion projects and their navigable-
water discharges to non-NPDES controls, including
land use planning, Congress preserved the primacy of
the States’ role in managing water and land resources
through programs that address both quantity and
quality. This policy reduces “federal/state friction” by
allowing States to “continue to exercise the primary
responsibility in both of these areas and thus provide
a balanced management control system.” Gorsuch,
693 F.2d at 179 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 92-911 at 96
(1972)). That friction is at the heart of the Tenth
Amendment. Approaching the water quality problems
involved in the management of navigable waters
through comprehensive, non-NPDES programs avoids
such friction and furthers the CWA’s cumulative
policies. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
28
System (NPDES) Water Transfers Proposed Rule, 71
Fed. Reg. 32887 (June 7, 2006).
Courts have noted that legislative history bol-
sters the view that “[tl]he division of pollution contro]
. was not just a device for separating out pollution
sources amenable to NPDES.... Rather, Congress
viewed [non-NPDES] state pollution control pro-
grams....as in part an ‘experiment’ in the effective-
ness of state regulation.” Gorsuch at 176. Congress
acknowledged that:
| Non-point-source/non-NPDES programs] may
not be adequate. It may be that the States
will be reluctant to develop [adequate] con-
trol measures ... and it may be that some
time in the future a Federal presence can be
justified and afforded. But for the moment, it
is both necessary and appropriate to make a
distinction as to the kinds of activities that
are to be regulated by the Federal Govern-
ment and the kinds of activities which are to
be subject to some measure of local control.
Pub. L. 95-217, Clean Water Act of 1977, S. Rep. No.
95-370 (July 28, 1977), 1977 WL 16152 at *10.
c. Clear Statement Rule And Chevron.
Also absent from the CWA is any basis to believe
Congress intended in 1972 to delegate to EPA the
discretion to determine at what “time in the future a
Federal presence can be justified and afforded” and
therefore to shift its authority over water transfers.
29
Discretion to expand jurisdiction over water transfers
is not something that Congress manifested any intent
to grant EPA. The CWA authorizes EPA’s Administra-
tor to “prescribe such regulations as are necessary to
carry out his functions under [the CWA].” 33 U.S.C.
§1361(a). EPA’s authority is not so broad as it is
supporting now. It would be anomalous for Congress
to have so painstakingly delineated federal state roles
— to preserve State authority and minimize federal-
state friction — and by implication give the EPA
authority to “readjust” those roles. See Gonzales uv.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 259-260 (2006) (implicit au-
thority to adopt an expansive meaning “would trans-
form the carefully described limits on [executive]
authority ... into mere suggestions.”). Any inadvert-
ent lack of clarity how and when water transfers are
to be federally regulated is not the type of interstitial
gap the Executive Department should be authorized
by the court’s to fill for themselves. The consequences
of shifting federal NPDES over State facilities are far
too serious to pretend that Congress intended EPA to
make the call.
4: +: *
The need for a clear statement extending federal
powers is heightened in this case, where Congress
made explicit its policy to preserve the State’s pri-
mary responsibilities over water and land resources.
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001)
(““SWANCC”). In SWANCC, the Court applied the
30
Clear Statement Rule to the CWA, noting that Con-
gress chose to preserve States’ rights over land and
water resource under §101(b) & (g), rather than
“expressing a desire to readjust the federal-state
balance” by extending federal jurisdiction. Jd. Thus,
in the cooperative federalism context of the CWA, not
only is there a glaring absence of any, much less a
clear, manifestation of Congressional intent for
NPDES to reach water transfers, the CWA contains
express limitations designed to avoid friction caused
by federal intrusions into the traditional state do
main.
Even if the “distinct waters” approach were
accepted as a reasonable alternative reading a
concession that inherenty admits the requisite clear
statement is lacking — its adoption would plainly shift
the federal-state balance. It would also, by implica-
tion, grant EPA discretion to extend its own jurisdic-
tion over the States at any time. For these reasons,
“distinct waters” is not a “permissible” construction
and, therefore, deference was out of place. Coopera
tive federalism schemes in the nature of the CWA
should not be left to administrative fiat, but changed
only when Congress deems it necessary.
There can be no denying that the burdens of
federal Clean Water Act permitting are not light.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721 (The burden of federal
regulation [under §404] is not trivial); SWANCC,
531 U.S. at 161 (2001) (“Permitting the United
States government to claim federal jurisdiction” over
State water transfers “would result in a significant
3]
impingement of the States’ traditional and primary
power over land and water use”). For example, the
remedies that the Petitioners sought below, include a
slew of interim operational restrictions pending the
issuance of a permit (Friends Pet. App. 47a-48a) and
joinder of the State’s permitting agency so that the
federal court can marshal that State process. Jd. at
50a. The lower court concedes that these remedies
will result in a “somewhat lengthy process .. . further
evidentiary hearings, which would require ... addi-
tional discovery. ... to resolve highly technical argu
ments.” Id. at 49a. Indeed, the court conceded that
“because EPA does not currently issue permits for
water transfers|.] ... it is unclear what a NPDES
permit wou!d ultimately look like (whether it would
require treatment of the water, require pumping to
cease, contain a pumping schedule, etc... .).” Jd. at
124a. Critically, the court observed NPDES will
“provide another layer of review, a Federal review”
which it speculated “may do nothing more than
provide a more effective mechanism for ensuring [the
District’s] compliance with its current obligations.”
Id. at 124a, 126a. Such coercion of the State the
shifting of decision making away from the local level
to the federal agencies and courts — along with the
practical problems of transferring responsibility for
pollutant treatment from upstream sources to public
water managers, offends core Tenth Amendment
values and undercuts the CWA’s cooperative federal!
ism scheme.
2. The CWA’s Severe Criminal Penal-
ties Require A Narrow Construc-
tion Under Principles of Lenity.
Further constraining the court from Petitioners
expansive “distinct waters” approach is the familiar
principle that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of crim
inal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”
Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000)
(quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812
(1971)). The CWA is enforceable through criminal a:
well as civil penalties. Violations carry fines up to
$100,000 per day and six years’ imprisonment. 33
U.S.C. §1319(c)\(2). Even a negligent violation can
bring heavy fines and two years in_ prison
§1319(c)(1). Under Petitioners interpretation, anyone
managing navigable waters so as to change their
natural flow and divert water into another “distinct
water body” commits a criminal offense. Criminal
statutes are subject to a rule of strict construction
and the rule of lenity, which require resolving doubt:
about a statute’s meaning against the government
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990)
These rules apply in civil cases to statutory provi
sions, like Section 402, that have both criminal and
civil consequences. See United States v. Thompson/
Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 518 n.10 (1992) (plu
rality) (applying the rule of lenity to interpret a “tax
statute [with] criminal applications”; the rule 1
one “of statutory construction|,| * * * not a rule of
administration calling for courts to refrain in crimi
nal cases from applying statutory language that
would have been held to apply if challenged in civil
litigation”). Because the court found no “unambigu
ously correct” interpretation of the CWA (United
States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994)), and
because an expansive interpretation exposes Pcti
tioner and countless other public water managers to
criminal sanctions, the rules of lenity and_ strict
construction require it be firmly rejected. In this
context, any “ambiguity” in the scope of NPDES that
survives a principled construction of the Act needed
to have been resolved narrowly
Properly considered, these established canons of
construction reveal a singular “permissible” interpre
tation of the terms that determine the intended scope
of NPDES. Deference and the potential criminaliza
Lion it brings with it have no place here
ll. THE NARROW LEGAL QUESTION PRE-
SENTED SHOULD BE REVIEWED ON
CERTIORARI, NOT LEFT TO FURTHER
LITIGATION AND CONTENTIOUS RULE-
MAKING.
When a court fails to properly interpret a cooper!
ative federalism statute, the burden of the error falls
upon the States and the public that must confront it
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision exacerbates burdens
that are immediate, real and undue, regardless of
whether EPA makes good on its promise to reconsider
the rule. Thus, Respondents are not seeking an
advisory opinion about speculative future rmghts or
events, but seeking relief from tangible harms present-
ly inflicted by the Eleventh Circuit’s errant decision.
A. The Eleventh Circuit and EPA Have
Exacerbated Nationwide Disarray and
Divisiveness Over The Federal Ques-
tion Presented.
The Water Transfers Rule formalized the inter-
pretation EPA formed contemporaneously with the
passage of the CWA. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 167." Early
on, EPA established and strongly defended its policy
not to impose NPDES upon water transfer facilities.
Id.. Consumers Power, 862 F.2d 580. The District of
Columbia and Sixth Circuits deferred to EPA’s policy
expressly acknowledging the CWA’s cooperative
federalism principles at a time when consistency and
i
The Eleventh Circuit and others accepting the “distinct
waters” theory as “reasonable” have taken pains to distinguish
Gorsuch and Consumers Power based upon misperceptions that
they only involved movements of waters within the same body of
water. Those cases, however, do not rely upon any such “as-
sumption of sameness.” To the contrary, they both clearly and
definitively articulate that NPDES is not triggered by moving
polluted water from one “body of water” to another. Gorsuch in
fact did not even involve a particular facility but rather was a
challenge to EPA’s nationwide policy not to impose NPDES on
tens of thousands of dams of all sorts under the “unitary waters”
interpretation, which includes the dams, reservoirs and tunnels
ultimately found liable in Catskill. The attempted distinction is
fallacious.
-J
a
“~~
~~
contemporaneous construction mattered. The Na-
tion’s water managers were reassured that the law
was clarified and well established.
By 1996, things began to change. The First
Circuit invented what became the “distinct waters”
test when it rejected the unitary waters approach as
being without “basis in law or fact” and “irrational.”
Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1296
(1st Cir. 1996). In 2002, the Second Circuit cast off
the “unitary waters” approach, finding EPA’s then
proposed water transfers rule “simply overlook [the
CWA’s] plain language.” Catskill IJ, 451 F.3d at 84.
The trial courts in Miccosukee and this matter fol-
lowed in adopting Petitioners’ “distinct waters” ap-
proach. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water
Memt. Dist., No. 98-6056, 1999 WL 33494862 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 30, 1999). While the federal government
correctly points out that none of these decisions ap-
plied Chevron, the courts’ hostility toward the linguis-
tic and cooperative federalism underpinnings of the
“unitary waters” view is palpable and disturbing.
The divisiveness and animus that developed over
the course of these cases is equally disquieting.
Numerous national amicus on both sides in Mic-
costkee and at all stages of this case attest that the
Nation has become sharply and increasingly divided.
Notably, in Dubois, the Forest Service invoked a “unitary
waters” argument to avoid permitting of a commercial facility
that would not be excluded from NPDES under EPA’s position
EPA was not involved.
36
State Attorneys General have split along regional
lines depending in part upon the importance of water
transfers to their regions (e.g. transfers are plainly
more vital to the arid west than smaller northeastern
states). Hundreds of comments to the proposed Water
Transfers Rule detail this burgeoning rift. See Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) Water Transfers Proposed Rule Submis-
sions at www.regulations.gov under Docket No. EPA-
HQ-OW-2006-0141.
Matters worsened when past and present EPA
officials disagreed whether the agency has_ been
consistent over time. Amicus briefs from former EPA
officials were filed with the Court in Miccosukee and
with the Eleventh Circuit in this case, to refute asser-
tions by the United States that EPA’s position has
e * 12 .
been longstanding and consistent. The Water Trans-
fers Rule expressly refutes those claims. Cf. Brief of
Former EPA Administrators in Miccosukee, No. 02-
262, 2003 WL 22793539 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2003) and
Water Transfers Rule at 33701 col. 2.
Today, those former EPA officials have rejoined
the administration, which has since declared EPA's
intent to “reconsider the Rule.” The current admin-
istration is taking advantage of developments in
Chevron jurisprudence that make “inconsistency” of
an agency’s position no longer a basis for declining
Tellingly, not one example of permitting a public water
transfer facility accompanied the claim that EPA has not been
consistent.
ad
~]
deference. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Assoc. v. Brand X
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005): Barnhart
uv. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 226 (2002) (particular defer-
ence to “longstanding” positions is an “anachronism -
a relic of the pre-Chevron days”). Apparently, EPA
now views itself free to extend its own jurisdiction
well beyond express limits that the Executive De-
partment has repeatedly and for decades acknowl-
edged were intended by Congress to protect the
States. The problem under that paradigm is that the
Rule, and thus the law, is up for grabs with each
change of administration.
After decades of litigation and years of rulemak-
ing these parties, water managers nationwide and
those who depend upon them are left with greater
regulatory uncertainty than ever. The Eleventh
Circuit’s errant deference-based rationale has further
muddled an already confused and contentious regula-
tory environment.
B. The Resulting Regulatory Uncertainty
Is Stymieing Water Managers.
The nation’s water managers must plan massive,
multi-billion dollar water resource and restoration
projects over extended development and implementa-
tion periods, often decades out. Since the CWA’s
enactment thirty-eight years ago, the nation’s infra-
structure has been planned, developed and modified
to address water quality issues under non-NPDES
authorities 1n cooperation with federal agencies. See
33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(7), (b) & (g).
38
These Respondents in particular are in the midst
of the world’s largest environmental project — restora-
tion of the Everglades ecosystem — which is expected
to take decades to finish. Three of those decades into
it, the project continues to face significant hurdles.
GAO Report to the Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, South
Florida Ecosystem: Restoration ts Moving Forward
but is Facing Delays, Implementation Challenges
and Rising Costs GAQO-07-520 (2007). Nearly all
projects comprising the federal-state partnered Com-
prehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (““CERP”) are
behind the original schedule. National Research
Council, Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades:
The Third Biennial Review, at 1 (2010) (Prepublica-
tion Copy) (“National Research Council Review”).
These delays result in large part from challenges
related to water quality and quantity — the heart of
the Petitioners concern with water transfers — that
highlight the difficulty of simultaneously achieving
restoration goals for all ecosystem components in all
portions of the Everglades. /d. Achieving water
quality goals throughout the South Florida Eco-
system ... will be enormously costly and will take
decades to achieve. Jd. Petitioners’ motivations “be-
lies the inherent complexity of the overarching goal”
of the CERP. /d. at 126. Extensive multibillion dollar
programs and plans are being developed within the
framework of the Clean Water Act’s non-NPDES
authorities, particularly the §303(d) & (e) TMDL and
Continued Planning Process, and a judicial consent
39
decree. Jd. at 127. Still, there remains some “opti-
mism that if restoration progress continues, substan-
tial ecological benefits will accrue to the ecosystem,
even if the effort does not achieve all the restoration
goals originally envisioned by the CERP. Jd. at 2.
The specter of substituting NPDES for CERP’s
system wide planning effort impedes the planning
process for no benefit. See Brief of the United States
in Miccosukee v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 02-
626, 2003 WL 22137034 at *14. The Solicitor General
explained the “mistaken imposition of NPDES per-
mitting requirements ... is unlikely to provide any
substantial environmental benefits. Rather, it would
likely misdirect governmental resources and poten-
tially hinder the Everglades restoration process.”
Present plans call for developing the most cost-
effective mix of “all possible options” for addressing
water quality, “including novel treatment approaches,
enhanced BMPs,” land purchases, and regulatory
changes.” National Research Council Review at 159.
The planning of massive restoration projects funda-
mentally changes once it is contemplated that the
strictures of NPDES might substitute for the better
watershed-based planning approach. Billions of
dollars are being spent to develop and implement a
cost-effective suite of remedies that balances quantity
and quality needs throughout the region. NPDES
‘* BMP means Best Management Practices for land stew-
ardship, that are intended to control land uses that are a source
of pollutants entering the navigable waters.
40
would up-end that effort. Uncertainty of what regula-
tory scheme the future holds defeats it.
* * *k
The Eleventh Circuit’s errant decision inevitably
perpetuates the decade long cycle of litigation and
contentious rulemaking water managers have been
enduring. Only this Court, in its critically important
role as interpreter of federal laws, can break the cycle.
Respondents respectfully suggest the Court should
provide the States with the respect called for by the
cooperative federalism policies of the CWA, give clarity
to the regulatory framework within which they must
continue to operate and adhere to important princi-
ples of the Tenth Amendment and lenity.
e
CONCLUSION
Review on certiorari should be granted and the
question presented restated as set forth by Respon-
dents South Florida Water Management District and
Carol Wehle, as Executive Director.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES E. Nutr
Counsel of Record
SHERYL GRIMM Woop
KEITH W. RIZZARDI
SOUTH FLORIDA WATER
MANAGEMENT DISTRICT
3301 Gun Club Road
West Palm Beach, FL 33406
(561) 682-6253
jnutt@sfwmd.gov
Attorneys for Respondents
ADDENDUM
Pertinent Provisions of the Clean Water Act
Section 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251. Congressional
declaration of goals and policy
(a) Restoration and maintenance of chemical,
physical and biological integrity of Nation’s
waters; national goals for achievement of objec-
tive. The objective of this Act [833 USCS §§ 1251 et
seq.| is to restore and maintain the chemical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters. In
order to achieve this objective it is hereby declared
that, consistent with the provisions of this Act [33
USCS §§ 1251 et seq.] — (1) it is the national goal that
the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters
be eliminated by 1985;
(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste
treatment management planning processes be devel-
oped and implemented to assure adequate control of
sources of pollutants in each State;
(7) it is the national policy that programs for the
control of nonpoint sources of pollution be developed
and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to
enable the goals of this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq. |
to be met through the control of both point and non-
point sources of pollution.
(b) Congressional recognition, preservation,
and protection of primary responsibilities and
rights of States. It is the policy of the Congress to
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary respon-
sibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use
(including restoration, preservation, and enhance-
ment) of land and water resources,.... It is further
the policy of the Congress to support and aid research
relating to the prevention, reduction, and elimination
of pollution, and to provide Federal technical services
and financial aid to State and interstate agencies and
municipalities in connection with the prevention,
reduction, and elimination of pollution.
(g) Authority of States over water. It is the
policy of Congress that the authority of each State to
allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction
shall not be superseded, abrogated, or otherwise
impaired by this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.]. It is
the further policy of Congress that nothing in this Act
[33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.] shall be construed to
supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water
which have been established by any State. Federal
agencies shall co-operate with State and local agen-
cies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent,
reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with pro-
grams for managing water resources.
*f
Section 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313. Water quality
standards and implementation plans
(d) Identification of areas with insufficient
controls; maximum daily loads; certain
effluvient limitations revision. (1)(A) Each State
shall identify those waters within its boundaries for
which the effluent limitations required by section
301l(b) 1A) and section 301(b)(1)B), [33 USCS
§ 1311 (b)(1)(A), (B)] are not stringent enough to
implement any water quality standard applicable to
such waters. The State shall establish a priority
ranking for such waters, taking into account the
severity of the pollution and the uses to be made of
such waters.
(C) Each State shall establish for the waters ident
fied in paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection, and in
accordance with the priority ranking, the total maxi-
mum daily load, for those pollutants which the Ad-
ministrator identifies under section 304(a)(2) [33
USCS § 1314(a)(2)}] as suitable for such calculations.
Such load shall be established at a level necessary to
implement the applicable water quality standards
with seasonable variations and a margin of safety
which takes into account any lack of knowledge
concerning the relationship between effluent limita-
tions and water quality.
{ *
K
(e) Continuing planning process. (1) Each State
shall have a continuing planning process approved
under paragraph (2) of this subsection which ;
consistent with this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq
(3) The Administrator shall approve any continuing
planning process submitted to him under this section
which will result in plans for all navigable waters
within such State, which include, but are not limited
to, the following:
(A) effluent limitations and schedules of compliance
at least as stringent as those required by section
301(b)(1), section 301(b)(2), section 306, and section
307 [33 USCS $§ 1311(bx1), (2), 13816, 1317], and at
least as stringent as any requirements contained in
any applicable water quality standard in effect unde:
authority of this section
(RB tne incorporation of all element ol an\ appli
cable area-wide waste management plans under!
section 208 {33 USCS § 1288], and applicable basin
plans under section 209 of this Act [833 USCS § 1289];
(C) total maximum daily load for pollutant
accordance with subsection (d) of this section:
(F) adequate implementation, including schedules of
compliance, for revised or new water quality stan
dards. under subsection (c) of this section:
,
Section 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319. Enforcement
(c) Cmminal Penalties
(1) Neghgent violation
Any person who
(A) negligently violates section
shall be punished by a fine of not less than $2.500 nor
more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by impri
onment for not more than 1 year, or by both. If a
conviction of a person is for a violation committed
after a first conviction of such person under thi
paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not more
than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment
of not more than 2 vears. or by both
Knowing violation
Any person who
(A) knowingly violate ection |
shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 no!
more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by impri:
onment for not more than 3 years, or by both. If a
conviction of a person is for a violation committed
after a first conviction of such person under thi
paragraph, punishment shall be by fine of not more
than plOO.VOU De! lav ol violation, oO . impr
Section 319, 33 U.S.C. 1329. Nonpoint source
management programs
a State assessment reports. (1) Content he
Governor of each State shall, after notice and OPpv!
LuNnIty 1O! publi comment prey] ire ma lubmit ‘ the
\dministrator for approval, a report whic!
\ identifi those navivable water Within the
Late whict WilLnoul additi nal action LO ontro
nonpoint source f pollution, cannot reasonably be
xp ted to attain or maintain applicable water
suality standards or the oals and requirement
th A Tt i ©) ( 1 et Cd
es \dentile tho e calegorie and ubcaveyvorie oO]
nonpoint sources or, where appropriate, particular
nonpoint sources which had significant pollution to
each portion of the navigable waters identified under
ubparagraph (A) in amounts which contribute to
uch portion not meeting such water quality stan
dards or such goals and requirement:
() describes the process, including intergovern
mental coordination and public participation, for
identifying best management practices and measures
to control each category and subcategory of nonpoint
Ources and, where appropriate, particular nonpoint
sources identified under 13a subparagraph (1B) and t
reduce, to the maximum extent practicable, the level
of pollution resulting from such cateyory, subcategor
Or Source, and
(D) identifies and describe State and local pro
grams for controlling pollution added from nonpoint
sources to, and improving the quality of, each such
portion of the navigable waters, including but not
limited to those propraim which are receiving Fedet
al assistance under subsection (h) and (1)
b) State management programs. (1) In venera!
The Governor of each State, for that State or |
combination with adjacent State hall, after notice
and opportunity for public comment, prepare and
ubmit to the Administrator for approval a manage
ment program which such State proposes to imple
ment in the first four fiscal years beginning after the
lor
date of submission of such manayement program
controlling pollution added from nonpoint sources to
the navigable waters within the State and improving
the quality of such water
(2) Specific content Mach management program
proposed for implementation under this subsection
shall include each of the following
(A) An identification of the best management pra
tices and measures which will be undertaken to
reduce pollutant loadings resulting from each category
subcategory, or particular nonpoint source desiznated
Sa
under paragraph (1)(B), taking into account the
impact of the practice on ground water quality.
(B) An identification of programs (including, as
appropriate, nonregulatory or regulatory programs
for 14a enforcement, technical assistance, financial
assistance, education, training, technology transfer,
and demonstration projects) to achieve implementa-
tion of the best management practices by the catego-
ries, subcategories, and particular nonpoint sources
designated under subparagraph (A),
Section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. National pollutant
ion s
discharge eliminati y wns
(a) Permits for discharge of pollutants. (1)
Except as provided in sections 318 and 404 of this Act
[33 USCS §§ 1328, 1344], the Administrator may,
after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit
for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of
pollutants, notwithstanding section 301(a) [833 USCS
§ 1311(a)], upon condition that such discharge will
meet either (A) all applicable requirements under
sections 301, 302, 306, 307, 308, and 403 of this Act
S §§ 1311, 13812, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1343],
9a
Section 501, 33 U.S.C. § 1361. Administration
(a) Authority of Administrator to prescribe
regulations. The Administrator is authorized to
prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry
out his functions under this chapter [33 USCS
§§ 1251 et seq. ].
Section 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362. Definitions
Except as otherwise specifically provided, when used
in this Act [83 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.]:
(7) The term “navigable waters” means the waters
of the United States, including territorial seas.
(12) The term “discharge of a pollutant” and the
term “discharge of pollutants” each means (A) any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from
any point sources...
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.