Opposition Brief — Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Management District

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Supreme € Court of the United States

FRIENDS OF THE EVERGLADES, FLORIDA

WILDLIFE FEDERATION; and FISHERMEN

AGAINST DESTRUCTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT,

Petitioners,

Vv.

SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT;

CAROL WEHLE, Executive Director; UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA and U.S. SUGAR CORPORATION,

Respondents

—_ ¢- —

MICCOSUKEE TRIBE OF INDIANS OF FLORIDA,

Petitioner,

V.

SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT;

CAROL WEHLE, Executive Director; UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA and U.S. SUGAR CORPORATION,

Respondents.

TT

On Petitions For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United

States Court Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit

ww ——

BRIEF FOR RFSPONDENTS SOUTH FLORIDA

WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT AND CAROL

WEHLE, AS ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

e —

JAMES E. NuTTr

Counsel of Record

SHERYL GRIMM Woop

KEITH W. RIZZARDI

SOUTH FLORIDA WATER

MANAGEMENT DISTRICT

3301 Gun Club Road

West Palm Beach, FL 33406

(561) 682-6253

jnutt@sfwmd.gov

Attorneys for Respondents

QUESTION PRESENTED

Congress carefully crafted the Clean Water Act’s

complex regulatory structure to achieve clean water

while preserving the primacy of the States’ authority

over water resources. This case concerns the proper

interpretation of the statutory text and cooperative

federalism scheme that resulted

The South Florida Water Management District

necessarily operates a vast water control system that

regularly transfers and, as a result, discharges navi-

gable waters to implement State water resource

policies. Congress was focused upon industrial and

municipal wastes when it declared the “discharge of

any pollutant” illegal absent a federal permit. Such

discharges occur upon the “addition of any pollutant

to navigable waters.” Other sources of pollution,

including other types of “discharges,” were left to be

addressed other ways.

The Eleventh Circuit’s answer to the following

question of great national importance is not con

sistent with decisions of this Court and reveals confu-

sion among the lower courts and the executive

department:

Is it permissible to read the Clean Water Act

consistent with relevant cannons of con

struction — to criminalize unpermitted “dis-

charges of navigable waters” from State

facilities used solely to move the waters for

public purposes and that introduce nothing

to them?

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Respondent South Florida Water Management

District is a governmental entity of the State of

Florida created by Florida Statutes § 373.069(e).

Respondent Carol Wehle is an individual appear-

ing as the Executive Director of the Respondent

South Florida Water Management District.

Page

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REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW................. 7

I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION

111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TO DEFER TO THE EXECUTIVE DE-

PARTMENT CONFLICTS WITH DECI-

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A. Linguistic Analysis under S.D. Warren ...

1. Natural and Ordinary Meaning of

the Relevant Prepositional lLan-

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2. Consistency of Purpose and Struc-

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B. Limiting Canons of Construction .........

1. The “Distinct Waters” Approach Is

Not Permissible Under The Tenth

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a. Traditional State Water Manage-

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TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

ADDENDUM: Pertinent Provisions of the

Page

b. CWA’s Cooperative Federalism.... 25

ec. Clear Statement Rule And

CREOOTON .ccsaciccssesststen eee 28

2. The CWA’s Severe Criminal Penal-

ties Require A Narrow Construction

Under Principles of Lenity............... 32

Ii. THE NARROW LEGAL QUESTION PRE-

SENTED SHOULD BE REVIEWED ON

CERTIORARI, NOT LEFT TO FURTHER

LITIGATION AND CONTENTIOUS RULE-

HLA TR REWGD sors siinnossenvnvaseuckstesnelpeceansetn ena 33

A. The Eleventh Circuit and EPA Have

Exacerbated Nationwide Disarray and

Divisiveness Over The Federal Ques-

ties. Freebie oi iixcsvaxcesssaccsuaaeeee 34

B. The Resulting Regulatory Uncertainty

Is Stymieing Water Managers .............. 37

CONC LION ooeecsvescncvevensesscsucueceneninn ene ... 40

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

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Page

CASES

Arkansas v. Oklahoma Envtl. Prot. Agency, 503

rT oo. sawenuveudsuheuaseraciwebeamecraer 20

Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002)...................37

Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23 (1997)..........00.... 15

Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited

Inc. v. City of New York, 2773 F.3d 481 (2d Cir.

oo 0 505s us dviisie sedi euinvnendn ined veckhenvipentes ee

Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited

Inc. v. City of New York, 244 F. Supp.2d 41

I EMIS oc vnycaccensesesvecasecceusvasecsoacensensseaveusecsens 7

Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited

Inc. v. City of New York, 451 F.3d 77 (2d Cir.

cae suunisiveiaabesesansvesetvoccesoadante 7, 34, 35

Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlim-

ited, Inc. v. Sheehan, 71 A.D. 3d 235 (N.Y.

Ee Shukadkesedavesekeddaeesanausaasaeeusansincl aaa 7

Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000).........32

Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990).........32

Dubois v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273

(Ist Cir. 1996).......... i csnuasauspaesdeessadsasseuia reacts eauaientareeee

mee aree roung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ............cccsccoscoseneodd

Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006)................... 29

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)... .. 24

Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209

U.S. 349 (1908).............. PARR ERA AIL sve E PNR t roe 24

v1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).......25

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water

Mgmt. Dist., No. 98-6056, 1999 WL 33494862

CEP. PUG, OE, DU, LG) vscescccccvessavesssvsvesusceesencevenssehe

Natl Cable & Telecomm. Assoc. v. Brand X

Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005) ..........0........ 37

Natl Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co.,

862 F.2G 680 (Gti Cir, TIDES) ...........ccvcccseccsesssees 14, 34

Nat'l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156

RR SAN UPON cs) c4aduenivcvinianasaxacsue cena passim

Norfolk So. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158

SME E F sic chxvnadaucacessaksunkacuvaceeteces secs osen ver chia ees 20

PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S.

Fe © isitesat asic ae woe

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) ....19, 30

Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971).............. 32

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218

GRD basis sr ccichcsasseceurnavensantine ti eae 24

S.D. Warren, Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547

Se ee ici cdaicessantsichec ieee passim

S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe

of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) .............. eceeceeceee: 6, 10

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S.

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)......29, 30

United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)................ 24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

United

(1994)

JInited States v. Lopez, 5

United States v. Plaza Health Lab..,

States v.

~ Continued

Granderson,

14 U.S. 549 (19985).............. 24

Inc., 3 F.3d

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United States uv.

Sinclair Oil, Co., 767 F.Supp.

GI MEN ROIIEE Sa csacsnasiciaheunssctesacanddveaiereusanewiees 22

United States v.

Thompson/Center Arms Co.,

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CONSTITUTIONS

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STATUTES

33 U.S.C. §

33 U.S.C. §

S.C.

33 U.S.C.

33 U.S.C.

Aes

33 U.S.C.

33 U.S.C.

33 UV.

33 U.S

33 U.S.C.

33 U.S.C.

20

21

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505 (0) 9, 20, 26, 37

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I ay hae 22, 26

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Vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

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Fla. Stat. §373.016............. rapiadesewsdsaeuh aeuanenaell 2,21, 25

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REGULATIONS

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OTHER AUTHORITIES

Brief of Former EPA Administrators in S. Fla.

Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee, No. 02-626,

2003 WL 22793539 (U.S. Nov. 14, 20038)............ 8, 36

Brief of the United States in S. Fla. Water

Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee, No. 02-626, 2003

WL 22137034 (U.S. Sept. 10, 2003)........ 4,15, 16, 39

Comprehensive Report on Central and South-

ern Florida For Flood Control and Other

Purposes, H.R. Doc. No. 80-643 (1948) .................... 3

1X

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

GAO Report to the Committee on Transporta-

tion and Infrastructure, House of Represent-

atives, South Florida Ecosystem: Restoration

ts Moving Forward but ts Facing Delays, Im-

plementation Challenges and Rising Costs

EME CITED aseccstsssscesééscevenevssesvevevssasvansescsnunstt@

H.R. Rep. No. 92-911 (1972) .....cccccccesssessseevevececeee 12, 27

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System (NPDES) Water Transfers Proposed

Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32887 (June 7, 2006).......... 27, 36

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System (NPDES) Water Transfers Proposed

Rule Submissions at www.regulations.gov

under Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2006-0141............36

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73

Fed. Reg. 33697 (June 13, 2008) (codified at

ET 0s sive sinuses Veokbannevarveiboensnsesécnsen passim

National Research Council, Progress Toward

Restoring the Everglades: The Third Biennial

Review (2010) (Prepublication Copy) ...............388, 39

Pub. L. 95-217, Clean Water Act of 1977, S.

Rep. No. 95-370 (July 28, 1977), 1977 WL

ee eats et iucua cali ce ruaetaressibéhssuvubbanevssdacarecevesss 26, 28

Senate Debate on S. 2770 (1972) Legislative

a ae Oe Re Pe 27

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

acerca suddincesenvideckersene ticdcuas4bte tesibentenyenveesaadsiens 13

STATEMENT

The fundamental issue in this case is whether a

state water management agency may lawfully trans-

fer, and as a result, discharge navigable waters to

which it adds nothing, without the need for a federal

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

(“NPDES”) permit or, conversely, whether the Clean

Water Act’s (“CWA”) NPDES program reaches such

traditionally local, vital water management activities.

To regulate water management under a federal

program designed to eliminate waste discharges

would fundamentally alter the federal-state balance

stricken by the CWA’s cooperative federalism struc-

ture.

Congress plainly never intended to criminalize

public water transfers or to extend federal NPDES

permitting jurisdiction over them. The Eleventh

Circuit’s finding that it is permissible to read the Act

otherwise squarely contradicts relevant decisions of

this Court. As a result, the appellate court has given

the Environmental Protection Agency discretion

where Congress did not. Discretion the agency has

already indicated, in its response to petitions for

rehearing below, that it intends to exercise. The

Agency has since established a task force and is

developing a strategy to expand the NPDES. Allowing

the Executive Department to be arbiter of its own

jurisdiction, without clear direction from Congress,

flies in the face of the distinct federal and state roles

Congress carefully delineated to preserve the primacy

of State authorities. Whatever regulatory certainty

the CWA and the Rule once provided the Nation is

gone. Water managers nationwide are stymied by

these events.

For these and other important reasons ex-

pounded below, these non-federal Respondents re-

spectfully encourage review on certiorari and suggest

it is incumbent upon the Court to replace the Elev-

enth Circuit’s errant deference-based rationale’ with

a properly reasoned judicial position that is con-

sistent with directly applicable interpretive doctrines

of this Court.

1. Public Water Transfers.

Respondent Carol Wehle is the Executive Direc

tor of the Respondent South Florida Water Manage

ment District, one of five districts established by the

State to provide stewardship over public water re

sources. The District implements State and Local

water policies throughout its extensive jurisdiction,

which is larger than the States of Connecticut, Mary

land and Rhode Island combined. It is drawn along

hydrologic boundaries, to allow a comprehensive

watershed approach to managing the Everglades

ecosystem. Fla. Stat. §§373.016; 373.069(2)(e). The

Respondents concede to have, as a fallback argument,

supported deference in the past. Deference, however, results

from an inferior interpretive analysis that ignores proper

linguistic analysis and, more critically, relevant canons of

construction discussed herein

~~

Respondents’ complicated mission is to protect water

resources of the region by balancing and improving

water quality, flood control, natural systems and

water supply. These are traditional State functions

that entitle the Water Management District to protec-

tions of the Eleventh Amendment of the United

States Constitution.

The imposition of NPDES strictures is a grave

concern to State and Local water managers nation

wide and these respondents particularly. The pump

stations involved here are but three of 391 water

control structures and hundreds of miles of canals

and levees that comprise the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineer’s Central & Southern Florida Project for

Flood Control and Other Purposes (C&SF) the

country’s largest — for which the SFWMD is the local

sponsor. The specter of applying NPDES to the

C&SF threatens to impede local control of water

management and land use decisions and to divert

scarce resources from a joint federal and state multi

billion dollar, multi-agency effort to re-plumb the

C&SF project to restore the Florida Everglades and

* Those concerns are extensively documented by hundreds

of comments provided during EPA’s rulemaking (located at

www.regulations.gov under Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2006-0141)

and by dozens of amicus curiae that have participated at all

stages of this case and in the related matters discussed, infra,

r

Statement Part 3 at p. 5

’ Fla. Stat. §373.1501(4): see, Comprehensive Report on

Central and Southern Florida for Flood Control and Other

Purposes, H.R. Doc. No. 80-643 (1948)

develop south Florida’s water resources. See Brief of

the United States in S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v

Miccosukee, No. 02-626, 2003 WL 22137034 at *14

(U.S. Sept. 10, 2003) (“mistaken imposition of NPDES

permitting requirements ... is unlikely to provide

any substantial environmental benefits. Rather, it

would likely misdirect governmental resources and

potentially hinder the Everglades restoration process”).

Flow diversions accomplished by the District's

pumps are categorized as “water transfers” because

their operation merely “conveys and connects waters

of the United States without subjecting the trans

ferred water to intervening industrial, municipal, or

commercial use.” 40 C.F.R. §122.301)) (2008). Public

facilities used to move water are an “integral compo

nent of U.S. infrastructure.” National Pollutant

Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water

Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33699 col. 1

(June 13, 2008) codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122 (“Water

Transfers Rule”). Thousand of water transfers are

routinely conducted by federal, state, and local agen

cies across the United States for millions of people

who depend upon them daiiy for public water supply,

irrigation, power generation, flood control and envi

ronmental restoration. /d. at 33698 col. 2&3. Since

enactment of the Clean Water Act, the EPA has

consistently understood that an NPDES pollutant is

“added” upon its introduction from outside the navi

gable waters or, conversely, that NPDES is not trig

gered when navigable waters containing pollutants

are connected and conveyed, i.e. when waters are

merely moved between and among themselves. Nat’/

Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175 (D.C. Cir

1982)

2. Proceedings Below.

The South Florida Water Management District

was dismissed after a finding that its water transfers

constitute a traditional State Function which entitled

it to Eleventh Amendment protections. Carol Wehle,

its Executive Director, was joined as a defendant

under Ex Parte Young’ and ordered to apply for

NPDES permits

In the decision for which review on certiorari i:

sought, the court of appeals reversed the judgment

imposing NPDES and held moot Petitioners’ cross

appeal of the District’s dismissal. Under Rule 12 of

this Court, both the District and its Executive Dire«

Lor are Respondents entitled LO file document

3. Related Litigation.

Several pending matters are directly related

to this case and will largely be determined by it

The first case, in which this Court declined to decide

* The Ex Parte Young doctrine allows State officer ind

employees to be sued for prospective injunctive rehef, despite

the llth Amendment, to prevent ongoing violations of federal

law. 209 U.S. 123 (1908)

6

the question presented here, S. Fla. Water Mgmt.

Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, remains pending

on remand. 541 U.S. 95 (2004). EPA withdrew a

motion to intervene in Miccosukee when it became

clear this appeal would proceed first. The trial court

stayed the case after extensive discovery and pretrial

proceedings but shortly before an extensive trial in

recognition that this case can and should finally

resolve the parties’ primary legal dispute.

In 2008, twenty-three petitions were filed to

challenge the Water Transfers Rule in the First,

Second, Third, Sixth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of

Appeals and in the Southern District Courts’ of New

York and Florida. The United States Judicial Panel

on Multidistrict Litigation transferred to the Elev-

enth Circuit those petitions that were filed with the

Courts of Appeals. Like Miccosukee, these rule chal-

lenges have also been stayed in anticipation of a

dispositive decision in this case.

In 2002, New York City became the only public

water manager, Respondents aside, ever required by

a court to obtain an NPDES permit for water trans-

fers. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited

Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001)

(“Catskill I’). Over the ensuing years, continuous

litigation resulted in multi-million dollar civil

* Challenges were brought in both District and Appeals

Courts because of a question, not relevant here, regarding

original jurisdiction.

~]

penalties and hundreds of thousands of dollars in

attorneys’ fees and costs. Catskill Mountains Chapter

of Trout Unlimited Inc. v. City of New York, 244

F. Supp.2d 41, 57 (N.D. N.Y. 2003). Further adminis-

trative and state court proceedings, vacated the

initial permit for authorizing deviations from re-

quired effluent limitations and remanded for the City

to seek variances (which the permitting agency had

never before issued). Catskill Mountains Chapter of

Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Sheehan, 71 A.D. 3d 235 (N.Y.

2010). Today, ten years after the City was sued, it

remains uncertain whether New York can comply

with NPDES. Its attempts to obtain a final permit

continue and will inevitably lead to further litigation.

The Second Circuit’s conjecture that the NPDES

program contains sufficient “flexibility,” to assure

that important State transfers can be authorized, has

proven more complicated in practice. See Catskill

Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited Inc. v. City of

New York, 451 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Catskill IT”).

The burden of misapplying NPDES to water transfers

weighs heavily upon public water managers.

ca

REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW

While concurring with the Eleventh Circuit’s

judgment, Respondent Water Managers concede this

case amply satisfies the Court’s criteria for certiorari

review. The Petitions correctly point out that an

important federal question regarding the proper

interpretation of a major federal regulatory program

8

is squarely and concisely presented. The question

has confounded those courts that have addressed it.

Their decisions have yielded inconsistent interpretive

approaches and almost uniformly ignored the cooper-

ative federalism principles discussed here. The Exec-

utive Department is in similar disarray. Different

administrations cannot even agree whether the EPA

has been consistent in its views over the years’ and,

now, disagree whether the CWA is ambiguous on the

question presented.

After decades in court defending the position EPA

codified after years of rulemaking, the Executive

Department surprised the Nation, in this case, with

the extraordinary declaration that it “in fact intends

to reconsider the rule.” Federal Response to Motions

for Reconsideration En Banc, below, at 15. That

singular filing quashed whatever regulatory certainty

the Rule purported to provide. A proper interpretation

by this Court would end many more years of ongoing

and inevitably recurring litigation and rulemaking.

Most importantly, it would provide much needed

clarity for thousands of state and local water manag-

ers who must plan and account for each state’s ever

changing and complex water and land resource needs

during increasingly tough economic times.

° Cf. Brief of Former EPA Administrators in S. Fla. Water

Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee, No. 02-626, 2003 WL 22793539 (U.S.

Nov. 14, 2003) and the Water Transfers Rule at 33701 Col. 2.

9

A critical basis for review not revealed by the

Petitions but of utmost concern to these Respondents

is that the lower court’s rationale conflicts with

relevant decisions of this Court. Key canons of statu-

tory construction were misapplied or altogether

ignored. Had the lower court followed this Court’s

guidance and direction, it would have adopted the

CWA’s only permissible reading, and not deferred. For

when properly construed, the plain text, cooperative-

federalism structure and principles of lenity — the

latter two of which the lower court flatly disregarded

— defy attributing to Congress any intent to criminal-

ize unpermitted discharges of the type involved here.

The lower court’s deference-based rationale is

particularly problematic given that — in the name

of cooperative federalism — Congress intentionally

delimited federal jurisdiction for the express purpose

of preserving States’ rights and responsibilities for

water and land resource management. 33 U.S.C.

§1251(b) & (g). Under today’s Chevron doctrine, the

EPA now views itself free to extend its own jurisdic-

tion well beyond express limits that the Executive

Department has often and for decades repeatedly

acknowledged were intended by Congress to protect

the States. EPA assumed, in its objections to rehear-

ing below, that the Rule, and thus the law, is up for

grabs with each change of administration.

By resorting to deference in a cooperative federal-

ism context where deference has no proper place, the

lower court further muddied the Clean Water Act and

10

with it the nationwide regulatory landscape. Con-

gress never delegated to EPA the discretion to redraw

the roles the CWA so carefully defined for the federal

and state governments. That intrusion, authorized by

the Eleventh Circuit, is antithetical to the CWA’s core

structure.

I THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION TO

DEFER TO THE EXECUTIVE DEPART-

MENT CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF

THIS COURT.

Decisions of this Court have set forth relevant

interpretive rules that, when faithfully considered,

proscribe Petitioners’ reading of the CWA and, thus,

deference to EPA. Three approaches — misapplied or

ignored by the Eleventh Circuit — should have guided

its review. First, the linguistic analysis anticipated by

S.D. Warren, Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., yields a

singular “ordinary or natural” plain meaning of the

relevant limiting language. 547 U.S. 370, 376 (2006).

The Eleventh Circuit erred by not giving full effect

to a determinative prepositional clause. Second,

regardless of whether the Court accepts outright

the linguistic approach Miccosukee dubbed “unitary

waters,” the Eleventh Circuit erred by leaping to

deference without yielding to clear statement princi-

ples of the Tenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Principles that were specifically devised

" Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 96.

1]

by this Court for these very circumstances, i.e.,

to resolve ambiguities in favor of protecting and

preserving States’ rights and responsibilities. Third,

the CWA criminalizes pollutant discharges, implicat-

ing this Court’s rules of lenity that should equally

have constrained the lower court. Before resorting to

Chevron, courts must exhaust these canons of con-

struction that are intended to guide the determina-

tion of whether a statute appropriately lends itself to

more than one permissible reading.” Here the Clean

Water Act does not.

In short, nothing in the Act manifests Congres-

sional intent to federally permit State and Local

water transfers and to criminalize those that are not.

Absent a clear statement of intent to do so, the court

erred in finding “reasonable” an interpretation that,

when applied, greatly expands federal criminal

liability and vests EPA with the apparent authority to

re-adjust, at its discretion, the federal-state balance

that Congress so carefully struck in creating the CWA.

* Various commentators have debated whether the clear

statement and lenity principles discussed herein should be ap-

plied: 1) before reaching Chevron’s domain (Step Zero), 2) under

Chevron’s Step One, when determining whether the statute is

“ambiguous,” 3) under Step Two when determining “reasonable-

ness,” and 4) or, advocating that Chevron has only One Step,

when deciding generally whether there is more than one “per-

missible” reading. Whichever analytical construct, or variation

thereof, the Court invokes, the canons discussed here preclude

deference in this case.

12

A. Linguistic Analysis under S.D. Warren.

Not long ago, the Court reiterated the need to use

great care when construing the CWA:

It should also go without saying that uncriti-

cal use of interpretive rules is especially

risky in making sense of a complicated stat-

ute like the Clean Water Act, where technical

definitions are worked out with great effort

in the legislative process. H.R. Rep. No. 92-

911, p. 125 (1972) (“[I]Jt is extremely im-

portant to an understanding of [NPDES] to

know the definition of the various terms used

and a careful reading of the definitions... is

recommended. Of particular significance

,>”

[are] the words ‘discharge of pollutants’ ”).

S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. at 380. Indeed, when Congress

fine-tunes its statutory definitions, it tends to do so

with a purpose in mind. Id. at 384.

In S.D. Warren, the Court noted that the use of

prepositional phrasing — “discharge of pollutants” as

opposed to “discharge” — was plainly intended to dis-

tinguish the jurisdictional reaches of two key Clean

Water Act programs. The subject of this case, NPDES

— the narrower of those programs — is delimited by

the terms “discharge of pollutants” and its definition:

“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters

from any point source.” 33 U.S.C. §1362(7) & (12).

The question presented turns upon the proper mean-

ing of these few defining terms. Friends Pet. App. at

132a-133a. When carefully construed, the ordinary

13

and natural meaning of these terms with their defini-

tions excludes water transfers from NPDES. The

CWA is neither textually nor contextually ambiguous

on the point.

1. Natural and Ordinary Meaning of the

Relevant Prepositional Language.

Setting aside the policy arguments discussed

below, the relevant linguistic and structural analysis

in this case is straight-forward.

a. The triggering statutory term for NPDES “is

not the word ‘discharge’ alone, but ‘discharge of a

pollutant,’ a phrase made narrower by its specific

definition requiring an ‘addition’ of a pollutant to the

water. §1362(12).” S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. at 380-81.

Since the term “addition” is neither defined in the

statute nor a term of art, the courts are left to con-

strue it in accordance with its “ordinary or natural”

meaning. See id. at 376. The word is commonly

understood as “the joining or uniting of one thing

to another.” Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary 24 (2002). In turn, the act of “joining or

uniting” is commonly understood to require that the

“thing” being joined must start apart from, or outside

of the “thing” it joins, and be moved to it. It is neither

natural nor ordinary, but rather bizarre, to say that

two things already together are “joined or united” by

the mere movement of one within the other.

14

There is no dispute in this case over the thing

being “added.” All navigable waters contain “pollu-

tants” and, therefore, under Petitioners’ “distinct

waters” approach, become “pollutants” themselves.

The relevant dispute here is over the thing “to” which

the pollutant must be added or joined, 1.e., to what

must a pollutant be joined to trigger NPDES? Con-

gress plainly and clearly answered “to navigable

waters,” which it expressly defined for NPDES pur-

poses to mean: “the waters of the United States.”

Inserting that definition, NPDES proscribes only

those “additions” that join pollutants “to the waters of

the United States.”

It follows that NPDES does not apply unless a

pollutant is moved from outside “the waters of the

United States” into them. Natl Wildlife Fed’n v.

Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir.

1988); Natl Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156,

175 (D.C. Cir. 1982). NPDES cannot by the CWA’s

plain terms be triggered by the mere movement,

redistribution or transfer of pollutants within “the

waters of the United States.” The Sixth Circuit ex-

plained that a “facilitys movement of pollutants

already in the water is not an ‘addition’ of pollutants

to navigable waters of the United States.” Consumers

Power, 862 F.2d at 581, also at 586 (the pollutants

“always remain within the waters of the United

States, and hence cannot be added”).

The United States’ amicus brief in Miccosukee

found this interpretation to be “clear” and further

explained that Congress identified and referred to the

15

navigable waters “as a whole for NPDES purpose,” an

argument Miccosukee dubbed a “unitary waters”

approach:

Section 510(12) defines the “discharge of a

pollutant” to include “any addition of any

pollutant to navigable waters from any point

source.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(12) (emphasis add-

ed). Its use of the modifier “any” with refer-

ence to “addition,” “pollutant,” and “point

source” expresses Congress’s understanding

that the various types of additions, pollu-

tants, and point sources are all within the

Clean Water Act’s regulatory reach. The ab-

sence of the modifier “any” in conjunction

with “navigable waters,” by contrast, signi-

fies Congress’s further understanding that

“the waters of the United States” should be

viewed as a whole for purposes of NPDES

permitting requirements. Once a pollutant is

present in one part of “the waters of the

United States,” its simple conveyance to a

different part is not a “discharge of a pollu-

tant” within the meaning of the Act.

Brief of the United States in Miccosukee at *19; see

also Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29-30 (1997)

(if “Congress includes particular language in one

section of a statute but omits it in another section of

the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress

acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate

inclusion or exclusion” (quotation marks omitted)).

16

Further textual confirmation of the “unitary

waters” approach comes from the CWA’s use of “the”

before “waters of the United States.” That definitive

article has particularizing force when used before a

noun and after a preposition. It ordinarily reflects an

intention to refer to “the waters” as a whole, not to “a”

water, “some” waters, or otherwise individualize the

waters it references.

The combined effect of these linguistic choices

makes plain that Congress never intended NPDES to

reach water transfers of the type here. That makes

perfect sense given that, “[t/hroughout its considera-

tion of the [Clean Water] Act, Congress’ focus was

on traditional industrial and municipal wastes.”

Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175.

b. Petitioners’ alternative, “distinct waters”

reading misses the mark. Again, the United States

Brief in Miccosukee explained that the “distinct

waters” theory does not provide an alternative “rea-

sonable” construction:

Section 502(12) [the definition of a discharge

of pollutants] cannot reasonably be under-

stood to include an activity that merely

transports navigable waters from one loca-

tion ... to another location. Such an activity

can conceivably lead to changes in water

quality, but it does not, within the normal

meaning of the relevant terms, constitute an

“addition” of any pollutant to “the waters of

the United States.”

Brief of the United States in Miccosukee at *16 (em

phasis supplied).

17

Critically, the Eleventh Circuit conceded Peti

tioners’ reading alters and embellishes upon the

CWA’s plain text: Petitioners’ “reading effectively asks

[the court] to add a fourth ‘any’ to the statute.”

Friends Pet. App. at 28a. What Petitioners proffer

this Court is not a plain reading of the text. They

provide instead what amounts to alternative lan

guage that Congress could have adopted had water

transfers been an intended target. As the “distinct

waters” argument makes clear, if Congress wanted to

extend NPDES to water transfers, “it could easily

have chosen suitable language, e.g., “all pollution

released through a point source.” Gorsuch, 693 F.2d

at 176. But, the NPDES system was limited to “addi-

tion” to the water from the “outside world.” /d. at 175.

It is well established that statutory terms used with

prepositions, as with “addition ... to navigable wa-

ters” here, convey a narrower concept than when used

alone. S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. at 375. The fundamental

mistake of the “distinct waters” theory is to ignore

meaningful prepositional language out of a desire to

proscribe all “additions” to “any” water.

The Eleventh Circuit, nonetheless, found the

statutory language “ambiguous” because it believed

<

the definition “addition ... to navigable waters” can

reasonably be read to refer to waters in the individual

sense or to waters as a unitary whole. Friends Pet.

App. at 26a. That contention was based upon the

ordinary usage of the isolated term “waters.” Re-

spondents do not disagree that term can collectively

refer to several different bodies of water or to any one

Re.

body of water. Jd. But, by isolation of the term “wa

ters” the Court created “ambiguity” that does not

exist when the term is read in context of the entire

prepositional phrase

The parties’ dispute is not over the undeniable

divisibility and distinctiveness of the many “naviga-

ble waters.” It is over what it means to “add” some

thing “to” them. Quite simply, did Congress call for an

addition “to the waters” or “to any distinct waters”?

The moniker “unitary waters” merely characterizes

an understanding that the former and not the latter

was plainly intended. The fact that the “waters” could

have been referred to distinctly is implied and irrele-

vant. The “unitary waters” approach acknowledges

that Congress plainly and unambiguously referenced

them as an aggregate whole for NPDES purposes.

Unfortunately, in support of its proclivity for agency

deference, the Department of Justice recently adopted

the linguistic fallacy of isolating a single term from

its context, which became its basis to retreat from

the plain language interpretation the United States

advanced in Miccosukee. Response of the United

States to Petitions for Rehearing En Banc at 12. The

United States has now abandoned the position it had

defended in this case and every other case on the

issue in which EPA participated

For the same reason, the “unitary waters” ap

. 2 . : , ~7

proach is not undermined by Rapanos and the irrele

vant fact that the “navigable waters” comprise many

distinct water features. See Rapanos v. United States,

047 U.S. 715 (2006). In Rapanos, the Court was

19

confronted with the meaning and scope of the isolated

terms “navigable waters,” which is not confronted

here. The waters involved in this case are all admit

tedly navigable

At bottom, the critical linguistic analysis called

for in S.D. Warren reveals a singularly plain reading

of the relevant definitions. The “distinct waters”

approach does not provide a reasonable alternative

reading sufficient to render the CWA ambiguous as to

the applicability of NPDES to water transfers

2. Consistency of Purpose and Structure.

Lacking a cogent plain meaning alternative to

“unitary waters,” advocates of the “distinct waters”

theory resort to unpersuasive contextual arguments

Uniformly, they claim that the failure to impose

NPDES upon water transfers runs contrary to the

CWA’s overarching goal of restoring the Nations’

waters. 33 U.S.C. §125l(a). That argument fails

because 1) the sweeping goals of a comprehensive,

multifaceted regulatory scheme speaks little about

the intended scope of any particular constituent

program; and 2) the argument falsely insinuates that

the failure to impose NPDES upon water transfers

allows noxious discharges to proceed with impunity

outside the CWA as a whole

The narrow question posed by this case cannot be

resolved merely by reference to a general goal. United

States v. Plaza Health Lab., Inc., 3 ¥.3d 643, 647 (2d

20

Cir. 1993) (citing Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C.

Cir. 1982) (“it 1s one thing for Congress to announce a

grand goal, and quite another for it to mandate full

implementation of that goal”)). “Caution is always

advisable in relying upon a general declaration of

purpose to alter the apparent meaning of a specific

provision.” Jd. It frustrates rather than effectuates

legislative intent simplistically to assume that what-

ever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be

the law. Norfolk So. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158,

171 (2007). In fact, Congress’ avowed purpose to

minimize pollution was not unequivocal, as the CWA’s

specific provisions are the result of careful balancing

of countervailing policies. See infra, p. 25, Part

I(B)(1)(b). The CWA’s grand goal provides no guidance

as to how Congress resolved this balancing act. In

addition to that general caution, there are more

specific indications that Congress did not want to

interfere any more than necessary with state water

management. See 33 U.S.C. §125l1(b) & (g). The

CWA’'s overall purpose does not tell us anything

about how it is to be achieved or the role of each

individual program or provision. To say the least,

§1251(a) does not require courts to construe the term

“discharge of pollutants” expansively in a way that

is contrary to its plain defining language and compet-

ing federalism goals.

Fair consideration of the Act as a whole also

dispels the concern expressed by the Court in

Miccosukee that “several NPDES provisions” reflect

an intent to protect individual waters that “might be

21

read to suggest a view contrary to the unitary waters

approach.” 541 U.S. at 107. The CWA created a

multifaceted, compreliensive regulatory scheme that

uses a variety of controls to reach its goals, not only

NPDES. When limiting federal NPDES jurisdiction,

Congress by no means left any non-point [non-

NPDES] sources, including water transfers, un-

addressed or individual waters unprotected.

To the contrary, the CWA declares: [Tjhe national

policy that programs for the control of nonpoint

sources of pollution be developed and implemented in

an expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of

{the CWA] to be met through the control of both point

and nonpoint sources of pollution. 33 U.S.C.

§1251(a)(7). More specifically, the CWA stated “the

national policy that areawide waste treatment man-

agement planning processes be developed and imple-

mented to assure adequate control of sources of

pollutants in each State.” 33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(5).

The Water Transfers Rule makes clear that

limiting NPDES does nothing more than leave the

control of water transfers to non-NPDES authorities.

Water Transfers Rule at 33699 col. 2. In short, while

the unitary approach allows water transfers without

NPDES, it does not remotely propose they can or

should be conducted freely, outside the CWA as a

whole or with impunity.

“ Non-point source pollution is defined by exclusion, it in-

cludes all water quality problems not subject to §402, 33 U.S.C.

$1342. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 166.

22

Indeed, the district court 1n this case noted the

immense, ongoing federal and state effort to address

concerns with the entire Everglades ecosystem,

including the subject transfers. To that end, the court

cataloged the considerable regulatory framework

within which the subject pumps operate and that is

guiding restoration and protection of the effected

wate: bodies. Friends Pet. App. at 103a (District

Court Findings Part H). Pumping has been greatly

reduced and only occurs today to prevent catastrophic

flooding or to protect emergency water supplies dur-

ing extreme drought. Jd. at 88a & 108a. Petitioners

even conceded below that the pollutants at issue

could be addressed in a number of alternative ways.

Petitioners’ additional claims, that the “unitary

waters” approach undermines other CWA programs

equally miss the mark. For example, CWA Section

404, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Dredge and

Fill Permitting, is a separate and independent pro-

gram. United States v. Sinclair Oil, Co., 767 F.Supp.

200, 201 n.1 (D. Mont. 1990). As the Water Transfers

Rule explains, Sec. 404 is unaffected by excluding

water transfers from NPDES. Water Transfers Rule

at 33703 col. 3. As well, CWA Section 303, the Total

Maximum Daily Load program, does not conflict, but

rather supplements NPDES to ensure individual

water bodies are protected from other sources of

pollution, like water transfers, through a comprehen-

sive watershed planning process. 33 U.S.C. §1313(d)

& (e) (requiring States to identify and provide for the

protection and restoration of any water body NPDES’

effluent limitations do not protect).

Both the Solicitor General, in Miccosukee, and

EPA in its preamble to its Final Water Transfers

Rule, further expounds in detail how the unitary

waters approach is supported by, and wholly con-

sistent with, not only the plain language, but also

multiple purposes and structure of the CWA. In the

end, water transfers have never been generally per-

mitted as desired by Petitioners. The Water Transfers

Rule simply codifies the thirty-eight year status quo.

B. Limiting Canons of Construction.

Even were Petitioners’ broad “distinct waters”

theory to be considered a “reasonable” plain meaning

alternative to the “unitary waters” approach, it would

be nonetheless impermissible. Two relevant interpre-

tive approaches dictate that result. First, in this

cooperative-federalism context, where Congress care-

fully balanced federal-state interests, “ambiguity” —

the absence of a clear manifestation of Congressional

intent — requires the court to check Executive powers

by adopting the narrower reading. Second, because

the CWA is a criminal statute, lenity requires the

more limited construction.

l. The “Distinct Waters” Approach Is

Not Permissible Under The Tenth

Amendment.

To enforce protections of the Tenth Amendment,

the Court has enunciated a clear statement rule

providing that “lilf Congress intends to alter the

24

‘usual constitutional balance between the States and

the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention

to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the

statute.’” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460

(1991). To that end, Congress must make a clear

statement before courts will find that it has inter-

fered with traditional state authorities because

“States retain substantial sovereign powers under our

constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress

does not readily interfere.” Jd. at 461. This funda-

mental interpretive rule dictates that “unless Con-

gress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be

deemed to have significantly changed the federal-

state balance.” United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,

349 (1971); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,

331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (a federal statute does not

supersede “the historic police powers of the States...

unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of

Congress”). The courts have a “particular duty to

ensure that the federal-state balance is not de-

stroyed” with respect to “traditional concern[s] of the

States.” See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580,

581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

a. Traditional State Water Manage-

ment.

The Respondents’ responsibility for managing

water resources is constitutional. Fla. Const. art. Il

$7. Its police powers to manage waters for public

health, safety and welfare are well established and

codified. Fla. Stat. §373.016(3)(j); see Hudson County

Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).

25

Comprehensive water management is a State prior-

ity. Fla. Stat. §373.016. States’ traditional interests

in water management are at their peak where the

control of pollution in urban and agricultural basins —

as in this case — implicates both water and land use

planning. 33 U.S.C. §1251(b). Historically, land uses

have been widely regulated by state, not federal

authorities. The district court found the Respondent

South Florida Water Management District entitled to

Eleventh Amendment protections precisely because

its water transfers constitute the exercise of the

State’s traditional and primary power over both land

and water resources. Friends Pet. App. 18la (“The

Florida Legislature has recognized that the manage-

ment and protection of water resources is of critical

importance to the State.” (emphasis in original)).

These functions go to the heart of the rights protected

as well by the CWA’s cooperative federalism and the

Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

b. CWA’s Cooperative Federalism.

The Clean Water Act follows a cooperative feder-

alism model that envisions a close regulatory part-

nership between the state and federal governments to

restore and maintain the Nation’s waters. Arkansas

v. Oklahoma Envtl. Prot. Agency, 503 U.S. 91, 101

(1992); Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489

(1987). In creating this scheme, Congress struck a

careful balance among competing policies and inter-

ests. Id. at 499. To that end, the CWA established

distinct roles for the federal and state governments to

26

achieve their goals. PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep't of

Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704 (1994).

The CWA relies heavily upon the states to main-

tain primary responsibility to prevent, reduce and

eliminate pollution, to plan for the development and

use of land and water resources and to consult with

the Environmental Protection Agency. 33 U.S.C.

§§1251(b) & (gy, 13813(d) & (e) & 1329. Congress

did not want to interfere any more than necessary

with state water management. 33 U.S.C. §1251(g);

Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 178. Federal agencies are in

turn directed to “co-operate with State and local

agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to pre-

vent, reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with

programs for managing water resources.” 33 U.S.C.

§125l(g). Thus, the CWA’s cooperative federalism

scheme was predicated upon the value of local input

and experimentation. The issue is not whether water

transfers escape regulation, but by what controls

Congress intended them to be addressed.

In 1972, the Congress made a clear and pre-

cise distinction between point sources, which

would be subject to direct Federal [NPDES]

regulation, and nonpoint sources, control of

which was specifically reserved to the State

and local governments through [non-NPDES]

process * * * judging that these matters were

appropriately left to the level of government

closest to the sources of the problem.

Pub. L. 95-217, Clean Water Act of 1977, S. Rep. No.

95-370 (July 28, 1977), 1977 WL 16152 at *8-9.

27

As reflected in the comments of Senator Muskie,

the primary sponsor of the legislation in the Senate,

programs developed to deal with nonpoint sources

“would involve land use and other controls of that

kind.” Senate Debate on S. 2770 (1972) Leg. Hist. at

1314. Thus, Congress fine-tuned its programs “in

order to use them in separate places and to separate

ends,” leaving many sources of pollution to non-

NPDES programs. S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. at 383. The

NPDES was not designed to address all “pollution”

caused by all “discharges,” but was limited to the

“discharge of pollution.” Jd. In the end, Congress

explicitly chose not to federalize all water pollution

control. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 178.

By leaving diversion projects and their navigable-

water discharges to non-NPDES controls, including

land use planning, Congress preserved the primacy of

the States’ role in managing water and land resources

through programs that address both quantity and

quality. This policy reduces “federal/state friction” by

allowing States to “continue to exercise the primary

responsibility in both of these areas and thus provide

a balanced management control system.” Gorsuch,

693 F.2d at 179 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 92-911 at 96

(1972)). That friction is at the heart of the Tenth

Amendment. Approaching the water quality problems

involved in the management of navigable waters

through comprehensive, non-NPDES programs avoids

such friction and furthers the CWA’s cumulative

policies. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

28

System (NPDES) Water Transfers Proposed Rule, 71

Fed. Reg. 32887 (June 7, 2006).

Courts have noted that legislative history bol-

sters the view that “[tl]he division of pollution contro]

. was not just a device for separating out pollution

sources amenable to NPDES.... Rather, Congress

viewed [non-NPDES] state pollution control pro-

grams....as in part an ‘experiment’ in the effective-

ness of state regulation.” Gorsuch at 176. Congress

acknowledged that:

| Non-point-source/non-NPDES programs] may

not be adequate. It may be that the States

will be reluctant to develop [adequate] con-

trol measures ... and it may be that some

time in the future a Federal presence can be

justified and afforded. But for the moment, it

is both necessary and appropriate to make a

distinction as to the kinds of activities that

are to be regulated by the Federal Govern-

ment and the kinds of activities which are to

be subject to some measure of local control.

Pub. L. 95-217, Clean Water Act of 1977, S. Rep. No.

95-370 (July 28, 1977), 1977 WL 16152 at *10.

c. Clear Statement Rule And Chevron.

Also absent from the CWA is any basis to believe

Congress intended in 1972 to delegate to EPA the

discretion to determine at what “time in the future a

Federal presence can be justified and afforded” and

therefore to shift its authority over water transfers.

29

Discretion to expand jurisdiction over water transfers

is not something that Congress manifested any intent

to grant EPA. The CWA authorizes EPA’s Administra-

tor to “prescribe such regulations as are necessary to

carry out his functions under [the CWA].” 33 U.S.C.

§1361(a). EPA’s authority is not so broad as it is

supporting now. It would be anomalous for Congress

to have so painstakingly delineated federal state roles

— to preserve State authority and minimize federal-

state friction — and by implication give the EPA

authority to “readjust” those roles. See Gonzales uv.

Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 259-260 (2006) (implicit au-

thority to adopt an expansive meaning “would trans-

form the carefully described limits on [executive]

authority ... into mere suggestions.”). Any inadvert-

ent lack of clarity how and when water transfers are

to be federally regulated is not the type of interstitial

gap the Executive Department should be authorized

by the court’s to fill for themselves. The consequences

of shifting federal NPDES over State facilities are far

too serious to pretend that Congress intended EPA to

make the call.

4: +: *

The need for a clear statement extending federal

powers is heightened in this case, where Congress

made explicit its policy to preserve the State’s pri-

mary responsibilities over water and land resources.

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army

Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001)

(““SWANCC”). In SWANCC, the Court applied the

30

Clear Statement Rule to the CWA, noting that Con-

gress chose to preserve States’ rights over land and

water resource under §101(b) & (g), rather than

“expressing a desire to readjust the federal-state

balance” by extending federal jurisdiction. Jd. Thus,

in the cooperative federalism context of the CWA, not

only is there a glaring absence of any, much less a

clear, manifestation of Congressional intent for

NPDES to reach water transfers, the CWA contains

express limitations designed to avoid friction caused

by federal intrusions into the traditional state do

main.

Even if the “distinct waters” approach were

accepted as a reasonable alternative reading a

concession that inherenty admits the requisite clear

statement is lacking — its adoption would plainly shift

the federal-state balance. It would also, by implica-

tion, grant EPA discretion to extend its own jurisdic-

tion over the States at any time. For these reasons,

“distinct waters” is not a “permissible” construction

and, therefore, deference was out of place. Coopera

tive federalism schemes in the nature of the CWA

should not be left to administrative fiat, but changed

only when Congress deems it necessary.

There can be no denying that the burdens of

federal Clean Water Act permitting are not light.

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721 (The burden of federal

regulation [under §404] is not trivial); SWANCC,

531 U.S. at 161 (2001) (“Permitting the United

States government to claim federal jurisdiction” over

State water transfers “would result in a significant

3]

impingement of the States’ traditional and primary

power over land and water use”). For example, the

remedies that the Petitioners sought below, include a

slew of interim operational restrictions pending the

issuance of a permit (Friends Pet. App. 47a-48a) and

joinder of the State’s permitting agency so that the

federal court can marshal that State process. Jd. at

50a. The lower court concedes that these remedies

will result in a “somewhat lengthy process .. . further

evidentiary hearings, which would require ... addi-

tional discovery. ... to resolve highly technical argu

ments.” Id. at 49a. Indeed, the court conceded that

“because EPA does not currently issue permits for

water transfers|.] ... it is unclear what a NPDES

permit wou!d ultimately look like (whether it would

require treatment of the water, require pumping to

cease, contain a pumping schedule, etc... .).” Jd. at

124a. Critically, the court observed NPDES will

“provide another layer of review, a Federal review”

which it speculated “may do nothing more than

provide a more effective mechanism for ensuring [the

District’s] compliance with its current obligations.”

Id. at 124a, 126a. Such coercion of the State the

shifting of decision making away from the local level

to the federal agencies and courts — along with the

practical problems of transferring responsibility for

pollutant treatment from upstream sources to public

water managers, offends core Tenth Amendment

values and undercuts the CWA’s cooperative federal!

ism scheme.

2. The CWA’s Severe Criminal Penal-

ties Require A Narrow Construc-

tion Under Principles of Lenity.

Further constraining the court from Petitioners

expansive “distinct waters” approach is the familiar

principle that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of crim

inal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”

Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000)

(quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812

(1971)). The CWA is enforceable through criminal a:

well as civil penalties. Violations carry fines up to

$100,000 per day and six years’ imprisonment. 33

U.S.C. §1319(c)\(2). Even a negligent violation can

bring heavy fines and two years in_ prison

§1319(c)(1). Under Petitioners interpretation, anyone

managing navigable waters so as to change their

natural flow and divert water into another “distinct

water body” commits a criminal offense. Criminal

statutes are subject to a rule of strict construction

and the rule of lenity, which require resolving doubt:

about a statute’s meaning against the government

Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990)

These rules apply in civil cases to statutory provi

sions, like Section 402, that have both criminal and

civil consequences. See United States v. Thompson/

Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 518 n.10 (1992) (plu

rality) (applying the rule of lenity to interpret a “tax

statute [with] criminal applications”; the rule 1

one “of statutory construction|,| * * * not a rule of

administration calling for courts to refrain in crimi

nal cases from applying statutory language that

would have been held to apply if challenged in civil

litigation”). Because the court found no “unambigu

ously correct” interpretation of the CWA (United

States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994)), and

because an expansive interpretation exposes Pcti

tioner and countless other public water managers to

criminal sanctions, the rules of lenity and_ strict

construction require it be firmly rejected. In this

context, any “ambiguity” in the scope of NPDES that

survives a principled construction of the Act needed

to have been resolved narrowly

Properly considered, these established canons of

construction reveal a singular “permissible” interpre

tation of the terms that determine the intended scope

of NPDES. Deference and the potential criminaliza

Lion it brings with it have no place here

ll. THE NARROW LEGAL QUESTION PRE-

SENTED SHOULD BE REVIEWED ON

CERTIORARI, NOT LEFT TO FURTHER

LITIGATION AND CONTENTIOUS RULE-

MAKING.

When a court fails to properly interpret a cooper!

ative federalism statute, the burden of the error falls

upon the States and the public that must confront it

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision exacerbates burdens

that are immediate, real and undue, regardless of

whether EPA makes good on its promise to reconsider

the rule. Thus, Respondents are not seeking an

advisory opinion about speculative future rmghts or

events, but seeking relief from tangible harms present-

ly inflicted by the Eleventh Circuit’s errant decision.

A. The Eleventh Circuit and EPA Have

Exacerbated Nationwide Disarray and

Divisiveness Over The Federal Ques-

tion Presented.

The Water Transfers Rule formalized the inter-

pretation EPA formed contemporaneously with the

passage of the CWA. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 167." Early

on, EPA established and strongly defended its policy

not to impose NPDES upon water transfer facilities.

Id.. Consumers Power, 862 F.2d 580. The District of

Columbia and Sixth Circuits deferred to EPA’s policy

expressly acknowledging the CWA’s cooperative

federalism principles at a time when consistency and

i

The Eleventh Circuit and others accepting the “distinct

waters” theory as “reasonable” have taken pains to distinguish

Gorsuch and Consumers Power based upon misperceptions that

they only involved movements of waters within the same body of

water. Those cases, however, do not rely upon any such “as-

sumption of sameness.” To the contrary, they both clearly and

definitively articulate that NPDES is not triggered by moving

polluted water from one “body of water” to another. Gorsuch in

fact did not even involve a particular facility but rather was a

challenge to EPA’s nationwide policy not to impose NPDES on

tens of thousands of dams of all sorts under the “unitary waters”

interpretation, which includes the dams, reservoirs and tunnels

ultimately found liable in Catskill. The attempted distinction is

fallacious.

-J

a

“~~

~~

contemporaneous construction mattered. The Na-

tion’s water managers were reassured that the law

was clarified and well established.

By 1996, things began to change. The First

Circuit invented what became the “distinct waters”

test when it rejected the unitary waters approach as

being without “basis in law or fact” and “irrational.”

Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1296

(1st Cir. 1996). In 2002, the Second Circuit cast off

the “unitary waters” approach, finding EPA’s then

proposed water transfers rule “simply overlook [the

CWA’s] plain language.” Catskill IJ, 451 F.3d at 84.

The trial courts in Miccosukee and this matter fol-

lowed in adopting Petitioners’ “distinct waters” ap-

proach. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water

Memt. Dist., No. 98-6056, 1999 WL 33494862 (S.D.

Fla. Sept. 30, 1999). While the federal government

correctly points out that none of these decisions ap-

plied Chevron, the courts’ hostility toward the linguis-

tic and cooperative federalism underpinnings of the

“unitary waters” view is palpable and disturbing.

The divisiveness and animus that developed over

the course of these cases is equally disquieting.

Numerous national amicus on both sides in Mic-

costkee and at all stages of this case attest that the

Nation has become sharply and increasingly divided.

Notably, in Dubois, the Forest Service invoked a “unitary

waters” argument to avoid permitting of a commercial facility

that would not be excluded from NPDES under EPA’s position

EPA was not involved.

36

State Attorneys General have split along regional

lines depending in part upon the importance of water

transfers to their regions (e.g. transfers are plainly

more vital to the arid west than smaller northeastern

states). Hundreds of comments to the proposed Water

Transfers Rule detail this burgeoning rift. See Na-

tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

(NPDES) Water Transfers Proposed Rule Submis-

sions at www.regulations.gov under Docket No. EPA-

HQ-OW-2006-0141.

Matters worsened when past and present EPA

officials disagreed whether the agency has_ been

consistent over time. Amicus briefs from former EPA

officials were filed with the Court in Miccosukee and

with the Eleventh Circuit in this case, to refute asser-

tions by the United States that EPA’s position has

e * 12 .

been longstanding and consistent. The Water Trans-

fers Rule expressly refutes those claims. Cf. Brief of

Former EPA Administrators in Miccosukee, No. 02-

262, 2003 WL 22793539 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2003) and

Water Transfers Rule at 33701 col. 2.

Today, those former EPA officials have rejoined

the administration, which has since declared EPA's

intent to “reconsider the Rule.” The current admin-

istration is taking advantage of developments in

Chevron jurisprudence that make “inconsistency” of

an agency’s position no longer a basis for declining

Tellingly, not one example of permitting a public water

transfer facility accompanied the claim that EPA has not been

consistent.

ad

~]

deference. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Assoc. v. Brand X

Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005): Barnhart

uv. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 226 (2002) (particular defer-

ence to “longstanding” positions is an “anachronism -

a relic of the pre-Chevron days”). Apparently, EPA

now views itself free to extend its own jurisdiction

well beyond express limits that the Executive De-

partment has repeatedly and for decades acknowl-

edged were intended by Congress to protect the

States. The problem under that paradigm is that the

Rule, and thus the law, is up for grabs with each

change of administration.

After decades of litigation and years of rulemak-

ing these parties, water managers nationwide and

those who depend upon them are left with greater

regulatory uncertainty than ever. The Eleventh

Circuit’s errant deference-based rationale has further

muddled an already confused and contentious regula-

tory environment.

B. The Resulting Regulatory Uncertainty

Is Stymieing Water Managers.

The nation’s water managers must plan massive,

multi-billion dollar water resource and restoration

projects over extended development and implementa-

tion periods, often decades out. Since the CWA’s

enactment thirty-eight years ago, the nation’s infra-

structure has been planned, developed and modified

to address water quality issues under non-NPDES

authorities 1n cooperation with federal agencies. See

33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(7), (b) & (g).

38

These Respondents in particular are in the midst

of the world’s largest environmental project — restora-

tion of the Everglades ecosystem — which is expected

to take decades to finish. Three of those decades into

it, the project continues to face significant hurdles.

GAO Report to the Committee on Transportation

and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, South

Florida Ecosystem: Restoration ts Moving Forward

but is Facing Delays, Implementation Challenges

and Rising Costs GAQO-07-520 (2007). Nearly all

projects comprising the federal-state partnered Com-

prehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (““CERP”) are

behind the original schedule. National Research

Council, Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades:

The Third Biennial Review, at 1 (2010) (Prepublica-

tion Copy) (“National Research Council Review”).

These delays result in large part from challenges

related to water quality and quantity — the heart of

the Petitioners concern with water transfers — that

highlight the difficulty of simultaneously achieving

restoration goals for all ecosystem components in all

portions of the Everglades. /d. Achieving water

quality goals throughout the South Florida Eco-

system ... will be enormously costly and will take

decades to achieve. Jd. Petitioners’ motivations “be-

lies the inherent complexity of the overarching goal”

of the CERP. /d. at 126. Extensive multibillion dollar

programs and plans are being developed within the

framework of the Clean Water Act’s non-NPDES

authorities, particularly the §303(d) & (e) TMDL and

Continued Planning Process, and a judicial consent

39

decree. Jd. at 127. Still, there remains some “opti-

mism that if restoration progress continues, substan-

tial ecological benefits will accrue to the ecosystem,

even if the effort does not achieve all the restoration

goals originally envisioned by the CERP. Jd. at 2.

The specter of substituting NPDES for CERP’s

system wide planning effort impedes the planning

process for no benefit. See Brief of the United States

in Miccosukee v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 02-

626, 2003 WL 22137034 at *14. The Solicitor General

explained the “mistaken imposition of NPDES per-

mitting requirements ... is unlikely to provide any

substantial environmental benefits. Rather, it would

likely misdirect governmental resources and poten-

tially hinder the Everglades restoration process.”

Present plans call for developing the most cost-

effective mix of “all possible options” for addressing

water quality, “including novel treatment approaches,

enhanced BMPs,” land purchases, and regulatory

changes.” National Research Council Review at 159.

The planning of massive restoration projects funda-

mentally changes once it is contemplated that the

strictures of NPDES might substitute for the better

watershed-based planning approach. Billions of

dollars are being spent to develop and implement a

cost-effective suite of remedies that balances quantity

and quality needs throughout the region. NPDES

‘* BMP means Best Management Practices for land stew-

ardship, that are intended to control land uses that are a source

of pollutants entering the navigable waters.

40

would up-end that effort. Uncertainty of what regula-

tory scheme the future holds defeats it.

* * *k

The Eleventh Circuit’s errant decision inevitably

perpetuates the decade long cycle of litigation and

contentious rulemaking water managers have been

enduring. Only this Court, in its critically important

role as interpreter of federal laws, can break the cycle.

Respondents respectfully suggest the Court should

provide the States with the respect called for by the

cooperative federalism policies of the CWA, give clarity

to the regulatory framework within which they must

continue to operate and adhere to important princi-

ples of the Tenth Amendment and lenity.

e

CONCLUSION

Review on certiorari should be granted and the

question presented restated as set forth by Respon-

dents South Florida Water Management District and

Carol Wehle, as Executive Director.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES E. Nutr

Counsel of Record

SHERYL GRIMM Woop

KEITH W. RIZZARDI

SOUTH FLORIDA WATER

MANAGEMENT DISTRICT

3301 Gun Club Road

West Palm Beach, FL 33406

(561) 682-6253

jnutt@sfwmd.gov

Attorneys for Respondents

ADDENDUM

Pertinent Provisions of the Clean Water Act

Section 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251. Congressional

declaration of goals and policy

(a) Restoration and maintenance of chemical,

physical and biological integrity of Nation’s

waters; national goals for achievement of objec-

tive. The objective of this Act [833 USCS §§ 1251 et

seq.| is to restore and maintain the chemical, physi-

cal, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters. In

order to achieve this objective it is hereby declared

that, consistent with the provisions of this Act [33

USCS §§ 1251 et seq.] — (1) it is the national goal that

the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters

be eliminated by 1985;

(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste

treatment management planning processes be devel-

oped and implemented to assure adequate control of

sources of pollutants in each State;

(7) it is the national policy that programs for the

control of nonpoint sources of pollution be developed

and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to

enable the goals of this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq. |

to be met through the control of both point and non-

point sources of pollution.

(b) Congressional recognition, preservation,

and protection of primary responsibilities and

rights of States. It is the policy of the Congress to

recognize, preserve, and protect the primary respon-

sibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and

eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use

(including restoration, preservation, and enhance-

ment) of land and water resources,.... It is further

the policy of the Congress to support and aid research

relating to the prevention, reduction, and elimination

of pollution, and to provide Federal technical services

and financial aid to State and interstate agencies and

municipalities in connection with the prevention,

reduction, and elimination of pollution.

(g) Authority of States over water. It is the

policy of Congress that the authority of each State to

allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction

shall not be superseded, abrogated, or otherwise

impaired by this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.]. It is

the further policy of Congress that nothing in this Act

[33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.] shall be construed to

supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water

which have been established by any State. Federal

agencies shall co-operate with State and local agen-

cies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent,

reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with pro-

grams for managing water resources.

*f

Section 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313. Water quality

standards and implementation plans

(d) Identification of areas with insufficient

controls; maximum daily loads; certain

effluvient limitations revision. (1)(A) Each State

shall identify those waters within its boundaries for

which the effluent limitations required by section

301l(b) 1A) and section 301(b)(1)B), [33 USCS

§ 1311 (b)(1)(A), (B)] are not stringent enough to

implement any water quality standard applicable to

such waters. The State shall establish a priority

ranking for such waters, taking into account the

severity of the pollution and the uses to be made of

such waters.

(C) Each State shall establish for the waters ident

fied in paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection, and in

accordance with the priority ranking, the total maxi-

mum daily load, for those pollutants which the Ad-

ministrator identifies under section 304(a)(2) [33

USCS § 1314(a)(2)}] as suitable for such calculations.

Such load shall be established at a level necessary to

implement the applicable water quality standards

with seasonable variations and a margin of safety

which takes into account any lack of knowledge

concerning the relationship between effluent limita-

tions and water quality.

{ *

K

(e) Continuing planning process. (1) Each State

shall have a continuing planning process approved

under paragraph (2) of this subsection which ;

consistent with this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq

(3) The Administrator shall approve any continuing

planning process submitted to him under this section

which will result in plans for all navigable waters

within such State, which include, but are not limited

to, the following:

(A) effluent limitations and schedules of compliance

at least as stringent as those required by section

301(b)(1), section 301(b)(2), section 306, and section

307 [33 USCS $§ 1311(bx1), (2), 13816, 1317], and at

least as stringent as any requirements contained in

any applicable water quality standard in effect unde:

authority of this section

(RB tne incorporation of all element ol an\ appli

cable area-wide waste management plans under!

section 208 {33 USCS § 1288], and applicable basin

plans under section 209 of this Act [833 USCS § 1289];

(C) total maximum daily load for pollutant

accordance with subsection (d) of this section:

(F) adequate implementation, including schedules of

compliance, for revised or new water quality stan

dards. under subsection (c) of this section:

,

Section 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319. Enforcement

(c) Cmminal Penalties

(1) Neghgent violation

Any person who

(A) negligently violates section

shall be punished by a fine of not less than $2.500 nor

more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by impri

onment for not more than 1 year, or by both. If a

conviction of a person is for a violation committed

after a first conviction of such person under thi

paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not more

than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment

of not more than 2 vears. or by both

Knowing violation

Any person who

(A) knowingly violate ection |

shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 no!

more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by impri:

onment for not more than 3 years, or by both. If a

conviction of a person is for a violation committed

after a first conviction of such person under thi

paragraph, punishment shall be by fine of not more

than plOO.VOU De! lav ol violation, oO . impr

Section 319, 33 U.S.C. 1329. Nonpoint source

management programs

a State assessment reports. (1) Content he

Governor of each State shall, after notice and OPpv!

LuNnIty 1O! publi comment prey] ire ma lubmit ‘ the

\dministrator for approval, a report whic!

\ identifi those navivable water Within the

Late whict WilLnoul additi nal action LO ontro

nonpoint source f pollution, cannot reasonably be

xp ted to attain or maintain applicable water

suality standards or the oals and requirement

th A Tt i ©) ( 1 et Cd

es \dentile tho e calegorie and ubcaveyvorie oO]

nonpoint sources or, where appropriate, particular

nonpoint sources which had significant pollution to

each portion of the navigable waters identified under

ubparagraph (A) in amounts which contribute to

uch portion not meeting such water quality stan

dards or such goals and requirement:

() describes the process, including intergovern

mental coordination and public participation, for

identifying best management practices and measures

to control each category and subcategory of nonpoint

Ources and, where appropriate, particular nonpoint

sources identified under 13a subparagraph (1B) and t

reduce, to the maximum extent practicable, the level

of pollution resulting from such cateyory, subcategor

Or Source, and

(D) identifies and describe State and local pro

grams for controlling pollution added from nonpoint

sources to, and improving the quality of, each such

portion of the navigable waters, including but not

limited to those propraim which are receiving Fedet

al assistance under subsection (h) and (1)

b) State management programs. (1) In venera!

The Governor of each State, for that State or |

combination with adjacent State hall, after notice

and opportunity for public comment, prepare and

ubmit to the Administrator for approval a manage

ment program which such State proposes to imple

ment in the first four fiscal years beginning after the

lor

date of submission of such manayement program

controlling pollution added from nonpoint sources to

the navigable waters within the State and improving

the quality of such water

(2) Specific content Mach management program

proposed for implementation under this subsection

shall include each of the following

(A) An identification of the best management pra

tices and measures which will be undertaken to

reduce pollutant loadings resulting from each category

subcategory, or particular nonpoint source desiznated

Sa

under paragraph (1)(B), taking into account the

impact of the practice on ground water quality.

(B) An identification of programs (including, as

appropriate, nonregulatory or regulatory programs

for 14a enforcement, technical assistance, financial

assistance, education, training, technology transfer,

and demonstration projects) to achieve implementa-

tion of the best management practices by the catego-

ries, subcategories, and particular nonpoint sources

designated under subparagraph (A),

Section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. National pollutant

ion s

discharge eliminati y wns

(a) Permits for discharge of pollutants. (1)

Except as provided in sections 318 and 404 of this Act

[33 USCS §§ 1328, 1344], the Administrator may,

after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit

for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of

pollutants, notwithstanding section 301(a) [833 USCS

§ 1311(a)], upon condition that such discharge will

meet either (A) all applicable requirements under

sections 301, 302, 306, 307, 308, and 403 of this Act

S §§ 1311, 13812, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1343],

9a

Section 501, 33 U.S.C. § 1361. Administration

(a) Authority of Administrator to prescribe

regulations. The Administrator is authorized to

prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry

out his functions under this chapter [33 USCS

§§ 1251 et seq. ].

Section 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362. Definitions

Except as otherwise specifically provided, when used

in this Act [83 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.]:

(7) The term “navigable waters” means the waters

of the United States, including territorial seas.

(12) The term “discharge of a pollutant” and the

term “discharge of pollutants” each means (A) any

addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from

any point sources...

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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