Appendix — Schneller v. Prospect Park Nursing & Rehabilitation Center

Supreme Court brief2010

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

ALD-134 NOT PRECEDENTAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No.09-4372

JAMES D. SCHNELLER, HEIRS AND

BENEFICIARIES OF MARJORIE C.

SCHNELLER, BY JAMES D. SCHNELLER,

TRUSTEE AD LITEM ESTATE OF MARJORIE

SCHNELLER, BY AND THROUGH JAMES D.

SCHNELLER, TRUSTEE AD LITEM, MARJORIE

ZITOMER, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF

MARJORIE SCHNELLER, ESTATE OF GEORGE

H. SCHNELLER, BY AND THROUGH

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE JAMES D

SCHNELLER

es

PROSPECT PARK NURSING AND

REHABILITATION CENTER, [TS OWNERS

AND EMPLOYEES; MARJORIE ZITOMER;

RICHARD SCHNELLER; T. SERGEANT

PEPPER, ESQUIRE

James D. Schneller, Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 08-ev-05 704 )

District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F.. Stengel

Submitted by the Clerk for Possible Dismissal for

Lack of Jurisdiction

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR

27.4 and [.0.P. 10.6

February 25,2010

Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit

Judges

(Opinion filed: March 8, 2010)

OPINION

PER CURIAM

Appellant James D. Schneller, proceeding

pro se, appeals from the District Court's dismissal

of his action and denial of his post-judgment

motions. For the reasons that follow, we will

dismiss in part for Jack of jurisdiction and

otherwise summarily affirm the judgment of the

District Court.

Schneller initiated the underlying civil action

in the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania in 2008.' In it, he

primarily alleged that defendants committed

medical and legal malpractice in rendering

negligent services to his parents at the ends of

their lives. By opinion and order entered on

June26, 2009, the District Court dismissed all of

his claims and ordered the case closed. On July 10,

Schneller timely filed a motion for reconsideration

which was denied on August 6, 2009. On August

11, Schneller filed a motion to "supplement the

record,’ followed by a motion for sanctions and

costs on September 1. The District Court denied

schneiler's motion to supplement the record on

September 4, 2009, and denied his motion for

sanctions and costs on September 9, 2009. On

October 8, 2009, Schneller filed a six-page

document entitled "Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to

Appeal In Forma Pauperis" which detailed the

errors allegedly made by the District Court in

' Schneller filed his complaint pro se. In it, he

purported to represent other persons and entities. As

a pro se litigant, Schneller may not represent parties

other than himself. See Osei-Afrivie v. Med. Coll. Of

F'a., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that

non-lawyer proceeding pro se could not represent his

own children); 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (parties may proceed

in federal court “personally or by counsel").

Accordingly, we will treat him as the sole Appellant

in this appeal. See also Schneller v. Fox Subacute at

Clara Burke, 317 F. App'x 135, 137 n.1 (3d Cir. 2008)

dismissing Appellant's complaint and denying hi

post-judgment motions and requested leave to

appeal in forma pauperis. The District Court

granted him leave to appeal in forma pauperis on

October?7, 2009, and Schneller filed a document

entitled "Notice of Appeal’ on November 10,2009

Appellant seeks to appeal both the District

Court's dismissal of his action and its denial of hi

post-judgment motions. The District Court‘

judgment dismissing the underlying action became

final on August 6, 2009, when the District Court

denied Appellant's timely-filed motion for

reconsideration.’ See 28 USC. §1291 (vesting

jurisdiction in courts of appeals over "final

decisions” of the district courts); Budinich V

Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. L96, 199

200(1988) (holding that a final decision is one that

ends the litigation on the merits and leave

nothing for the court to do but execute the

socause the motion for reconsideration was filed

within ten business days of the District Court's entry

of judgment, the time to file a notice of appeal from

the June26, 2009 dismissal was tolled until the

District Court denied the motion for reconsideration

on August 4,2009. See former Fed. R. Civ. P.59(e)

(amendment effective Dec. 1,2009). Appellant's

subsequent motions to supplement the record and fo:

sanctions do not fall within the subset of post

judgment motions which toll the time for filing a

notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)

decided after ents

affect its finality Be

au

notice of appeal within thirt

order, we lack jurisdiction over

June 26, 2009 opinion and order

action and it tO, ZO0%9 ord

motion tor

reconsideration

1(a)(1): Bowles v. Ru

(holding tha

post judgment motions are

ee Pennsylvania Klaherty

faq Cir. 19908) Post

hdyment order

purpose of 12!

)] and immediate}

i

HecauseE Lhe pole Y aAVAINSI PICce};rie

unlikely to!

be undermined. | Phe Court de

chnellers motion to supplement t

orde! entered eplember 1 ‘ACHOCVY)

failed to file ;

}

rnotice o] appeal WILD)

that denial, we also lack wurISdIcLion Over Ni

appeal with re? pect

P. A(a)e]

chneller

Bowle

motion tor

ANCLION

until September 9, 2009. On Octobe:

chneller filed a document entitled "Plaints

Motion ie) | eave ne Appr ay In) apr

which specified those orders he wished

the grounds he wi hed to appeal them on mid tl

court he wi hed to appeal therm to bhe District

Court should have treated this document a

notice of appeal. red. Kh. App. P. Stet]

Masquerade Novelty vo Unique Indu OI2Z Yd

66.5, 6050 (3d Cir. | has, within the time provided

hile an appeal hied documents that spectly the

partly or partie taking the appeal Lhye

judgment, order or part thereof appealed from, and

the court to which the appeal is taker Because

this document was timely-filed with respect to the

Uistrict Courts dental of Appellant's motions for

anctions, we retain jurisdiction over his apy

from that order. See Fed. R. App. I. 4

Flaherty, O83 F.2d at 1276

‘

In hy motion tor HOCLIOT wand ee |

if

chneller argued that DuUrstlantl lo Federal Kurt

Civil Procedure | land 28 US. 192%

hould be sanctioned for filyny frivolous an

vexatious motions and pleadings for the pury

prt) ( {)

causing: unnecessary delay and increasing: the ee

of the litigation. While Schneller set forth the |

and legal arguments made by Appellee threat Pie

disayvreed with, he did not provide any basis fro

which the Distriet Court could have concluded th

Appellees alleged those fuets or made t)

Pitdovt

arguments for an improper purpose or with th

intent of misleading the court. Schnell

for sanctions was not the proper vehicle for

challenging these assertions and arguments

appeal was. Because Schneller failed to timely

appeal from the District Court's dismissal of his

action and denial of his motion for reconsideration,

we cannot consider these arguments at the present

Lime

secause Schnellers appeal presents no

substantial question, we will summarily affirm the

orders of the District Court denying the requested

relief See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; L.O.P. 10.6. Schneller’

appeal from the District Court's dismissal of hi

action, denial of his motion for reconsideration

and denial of his motion to supplement the record

is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1); Bowles 551 U.S. at 21%

ALD-134 NOT PRECEDENTAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No.09-4372

JAMES D. SCHNELLER, HEIRS AND

BENEFICIARIES OF MARJORIE C.

SCHNELLER, BY JAMES D. SCHNELLER,

TRUSTEE AD LITEM ESTATE OF MARJORIE

SCHNELLER, BY AND THROUGH JAMES D.

SCHNELLER, TRUSTEE AD LITEM, MARJORIE

ZITOMER, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF

MARJORIE SCHNELLER, ESTATE OF GEORGE

H. SCHNELLER, BY AND THROUGH

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE JAMES D

SCHNELLER

vs

PROSPECT PARK NURSING AND

REHABILITATION CENTER, [ITS OWNERS

AND EMPLOYEES; MARJORIE ZITOMER;

RICHARD SCHNELLER; T. SERGEANT

PEPPER, ESQUIRE

James D. Schneller, Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 08-ev-05704)

District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel

Submitted by the Clerk for Possible Dismissal for

Lack of Jurisdiction

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR

27.4 and I1.0.P. 10.6

February 25,2010

Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit

Judges

JUDGMENT

‘his cause came to be considered on the record

from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania for possible

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or summary action

pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and 1L.O.P. 10.6

on February 25, 2010. On consideration whereof; it

Is now hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this Court that

the appeal is dismissed in part for lack of

jurisdiction and the order of the District Court

entered September 9, 2009, be and the same is

hereby affirmed. All of the above in accordance

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES D. SCHNELLER, «

Plaintiff

PROSPECT PARK NURSING &

REHABILITATION CENTER, et a

Defendants

MEMORANDUM

More than SIX years » death Ot his elderly

mother on March 31, 2002, James D. Schneller and

se action

allegedly four other plaintiffs’ filed a pro

vate

® aart

sc plaintiffs inciude: (1) fiers and beneficiart

of Marjorie C. Schneller, by James D. Schneller,

trustee ad/item; (2) Estate of Marjorie Schneller, by

and through dames D. Schneller, trustee ad/item

against several defendants* whom be claims are

legally responsible. The genesis of the case appears

to be medical and legal malpractice as a result of

the allegedly neghgent services rendered to Mr.

Schneller's parents during the last few months of

their lives. In fact, in the majority of paragraphs

introducing the defendants, the plaintiff indicates

that “this action is an action in_ professional

lability and intentional tort against this

defendant.” See Compl. 11

4,9-13. The only exceptions are in the paragraphs

for his brother and sister. Id. 5-7. The

and (3) Marjorie Zitomer executrix of the Estate of

Marjorie Schneller (Miss Zitomer is Mr. Schneller's

sister and also a defendant in this action). In a

related case the Third Circuit noted: "Schneller filed

his complaint pro se. He also purports to represent

other persons and entities. Although Schneller is

entitled to represent himself pro se, he ‘may not

appear pro se in the cause of another person or

entity.” Schneller et al. v. Crozer Chester Medical

Center, et al, 276 Fed. Appx. 169, *170 n.1 (38dCir.

2008). Accordingly. | will refer to Mr. Schneller as

the sole plaintiff in this case.

These defendants include; (1) Prospect Park

Nursing and Rehabilitation Center; (2) “its owners

and employees;" (3) Marjorie Zitomer (4) Richard

Schneller (the plaintiffs brother); and (5) T. Sergeant

Pepper, Esq.

defendants have filed motions to dismiss. For the

following reasons, | will grant these motions and

dismiss this case.

BACKGROUND

In February 2004, Mr. Schneller began an action

against these defendants tn the Court of Common

Pleas of the County of Delaware. The case was

dismissed through entries of judgment non pros for

failure to file Certificates of Merit as required by

Rule 1042.3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil

Procedure. Schneller et al. v. Prospect. Park

Nursing & Rehabilitation Center et al., 2006 Pa.

Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 392 (2006). Mr.

Schneller unsuccessfully attempted to re-open the

case and/or strike the judgment of non pros. Id. He

then appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court

which affirmed without an opinion the entries of

judgment. Schneller et al. v. Prospect Park

Nursing & Rehabilitation Center. et al., 945 A.2d

781 (Pa.Super. 2007). The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal.

Schneller et al. v. Prospect Park Nursing &

Rehabilitation Center. et al., 2008 Pa. LEXIS 2398

(Pa. 2008).

The sixty (60) page complaint contains three-

hundred seventy-three (373) paragraphs

purporting to provide the basis of the plaintiffs

thirty-two (32) claims:

CountlA - Violation of the Assisted Suicide

Funding Restriction Act of 1997

Count1B - Civil Action for Deprivation of

Rights

Count 1 C Conspiracy to Interfere with

Civil Rights - Depriving Persons of Rights and

Privileges

Count 1 D Conspiracy to Interfere with

Civil Rights - Obstructing Justice and Intimidating

Parties - Battery

CountlE - Neglect to Prevent Deprivation

of Rights and Conspiracy for Deprivation of Right

Count 1 F Failure to Warn

Count 2 Breach of Contract

Count 3 Breach of Contract

Count 4 Fraudulent Inducement ot

Contracts

Count 5 Breach of Contidential

Fiduciary Relationship

Count 6 Wrongful Death

Count 7 Survival

Count 8 Intentional Tort

Power of Attorney

Count 9 Intentional Tort

Advanced Health Directive

Count 10 Negligence Per Se |

numerous state and federal statute:

Count 1} Slander and Libel

Count 12 Breach of Confidentialit

Count 13 Survival - Negligent and

Intentional Infliction of “motional Distre:

Count 14 Survival - Fraud

Count 15 Survival - Conspiracy

Count 16 Survival Action - Puniti

Damages

Count 17 Professional Negligence

Medical

Count I: Professional Negligence

Attorney and Firm

Count 19 Survival - Negligent and

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distre

George Schneller

Count 20 : Survival - Fraud and Intent)

Misrepresentation to George H. Schneller

Count 2] Survival Action - Cons

Damaging to George R. Schneller

Count 22 Survival Action - Punitive

Damages for the Estate of George H. Schneller

Count 23 Intentional Infliction of

Emotional Distre:

Count 24 Conspiracy

Count 25 Punitive Damage

Count 26 Tortious Interference

Prospective Economic Advantage

Count 27 sreach of Fiduciary Dut

Mr. Schneller also alleges violations ot

Various regulation entitled Requirement 1Or

Term Care Facilities. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.10, et

seq.” Compl. 4] 18d.

STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss under Rule | 2(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted examines

the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Conley _v.

Gibson, 3855 U.S. 41,45-46(1957). The factual

allegations must be sufficient to make the claim for

relief more than just speculative. Bel) Atlantic

Corn. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In

determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss

a federal court must construe the complaint lib

erally, accept all factual allegations in the com

plaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences

These provisions "contain the requirements that

an institution must meet in order to qualify to

participate as a {skilled nursing facility] in the

Medicare program, and as a nursing facility in the

Medicaid program. They serve as the basis for

survey activities for the purpose of determining

whether a facility meets the requirements for

participation in Medicare and Medicaid." 42 C.F LR

§ 483.1(b). These regulations do not confer a pri-

vate right of action. Accordingly, they provide no

basis for jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331

in favor of the plaintiff. Id

Sucks County Cmty.Col]

Cir. 1984)

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not

require a plaintiff to plead in detail all of the fact

upon which he bases his claim. Conley, 855 U.S

47. Rather, the Rules require a "short and plain

statement’ of the claim that will give the defendan

fair notice of the plaintiffs claim and the ground

upon which it rests. Id. The "complaint must allege

facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Neither "bald

assertions’ nor "vague and conclusory allegation

are accepted as true. See Morse v. Lower Merion

School Dist., 132 F.Sd 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997):

Sterling v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transy

Auth., 897 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The clain

must contain enough factual matters to suggest

the required elements of the claim or to "raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence of those elements. Phillips v. County of

Allegheny, 515 F.2d 224,234 (3d Cir. 2004

— -

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

A case may be also dismissed under Rul

(b)(1) and IZ (h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil

!

Procedure "|wlihenever it appears by sugyestion of

the parties or otherwise that the court § lacl

jurisdiction of the subject matter Fed. R.Civ.P

12(h)(3). Alternatively, a court choo Ing not tO

erant a motion to dism) for | ubject ma

More

mplaimnt

ine delendal

hould he di}

ubject royuri

jurisdiction

aulhnorized by

District cour

Hiction over fede

however, only five counts attempt to set forth

federal causes of action. The first count alleges a

violation of the Assisted Suicide Funding

Restriction Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 14401, et seq.

See Compl. {$l 88-99. The defendants argue that

this Act does not create a private right of action,

and thus cannot provide the basis for jurisdiction. |

ayree.

If Congress intends to create a private cause of

action under a federal] statute, then federal court

should find a private cause of action under the

given statute. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors.

Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,15(1979). Congress’

intent is determined by examining "the language or

structure of a statute or the circumstances of its

enactment." Id. "|W]|hether a statute creates a

cause of action, either expressly or by implication.

is basically a matter of statutory construction." Id.

[If the language of the statute expressly gives a

remedy then courts should be wary when they are

requested to add an additional remedy that is not

expressly provided for in the statute. Id

The structure and languayve of this Act do not show

any intent by Congress to establish a private caus\

of action. The purpose of the Act is "to continue

current federal policy by providing explicitly that

federal funds may not be used to pay for items and

services (inciuding assistance) the purpose of

which is to cause (or assist In causing) the suicide,

euthanasia, or mercy killing of any individual." 42

U.S.C. § 14401(1,). Mr. Schneller claims that

jurisdiction is proper under this Act because

Defendant Prospect Park applied funds

appropriated by Congress including federal funds

under certain grant programs, ana federal

advocacy grants, to pay for and provide for services

which directly contributed to the assisting and

causing of the death of Marjorie C. Schneller, by

unlawful means including euthanasia, mercy

killing and assisted suicide. See Compl. 11.95. Mr.

Schneller's assertion is contrary to law.

The rationale for the enactment of this statute

is to prevent federal funds from being used for the

criminal and unlawful purpose of assisted suicide

See 42 U.S.C.A. $14401 (a)(2). There have never

been any criminal charges in connection with the

care and treatment of Marjorie Schneller, and the

claims that the defendants engaged in some type of

mercy killing are unfounded. Further, no court has

found that Title 42 U.S.C. $14401, et seg., creates a

private cause of action. Thus, because the Assisted

Suicide Funding Restriction Act cannot form the

basis of subject matter jurisdiction, I will dismiss

Count IA.

The next four counts in the complaint allege the

deprivation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§

1983, 1985, and 1986. Because they contemplate a

private cause of action, these statutes provide

subject matter jurisdiction to the court. Counts 1

IC, 1D, and IE set forth the plaintiffs civil rights

claims against the defendants for alleged violations

of his mother's rights guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Count 1B contuins allegations that

the defendants deprived Mrs. Schneller of life,

liberty, and property by enforcing her advanced

health care directive over Mr. Schneller's objection

and causing her death. See Compl. {1 105-119.

Count 1C claims that the defendants conspired to

deprive Mrs. Schneller of rights and privileges

including “her basic rights to eat. drink, and

breathe," and her "rights to life, privacy, security,

freedom of speech, freedom to write and

communicate, right to locomotion, family

interaction, rights to legal representation, to

meaningful family visits, arid right to choose her

daily regimen and health program." See Compl. {I

121-146. Count 1D alleges that the defendants “in

their conspiracy to prevent by force, intimidation,

and threat, intended to deprive classes of persons

of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal

privileges and immunities under the law,” and that

these acts constituted causes of action for

Intimidation, obstruction of justice, criminal

assault, and criminal maiming. See Compl. 111 147

163. Finally, Count IE alleges that the defendants,

“having knowledge that any and all of the wrongs

conspired to be done, as enumerated in this

complaint, were aboul to be committed, and hav InY

power to prevent or aid in preventing the

‘he Fourteenth

Constitution provides

any person of life, rity, or property,

process of law 1S. Const... Amend. 14,

protection: “the Fourteenth Amendment

extend 1 priva conduct abridging individual

ail cond ict may

responsible for t! pecific conduct

} 7 te 4 j

plaintiff con Brentwood Acad

Secondanry Sch. Athletic Ass

2001), Edmonso

Blum

lefendant

color

. . Ss

purposes. Brentwood

Edmondson Oi}

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by . the Constitution and laws, shall be

hable to the party injured in an action at law, suit

in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. $1983.

»

sy its terms, Section 1983 does not create a

substantive right; it merely provides a method for

vindicating federal rights conferred by the United

States Constitution and the federal statutes that it

order to establish a claim under Section 1983, a

plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and the laws of the

United States and that (2) the alleged deprivation

was committed by a person acting under color of

926 U.S. 40 (1999).

Here. Mr. Schneller fails ¢

requirements. Although a private party may cause

a deprivation of a constitutional right, it is

subjected to hability under Section 1983 only when

it does so under color of law. Flagg Bros. Ine. v.

excludes from its reach "merely private conduct,”

no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.

American Mfs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 50. The

actions alleged here were not performed under

color of state law, and the defendants are not and

cannot be considered state actors.

The complaint alleges, however, that the

defendants "have applied funds appropriated by

Congress for the purpose of paying for the

provision of health care services, federal finds

under certain grant programs including Medicare

and Medicaid, and federal advocacy grants, to pay

for, provide, and contribute to payment or

coverage, for health care items and service

furnished.” See Compl. {1 16. These allegations do

not establish that the defendants were acting

“under color of law" or were state actors. The

traditional exclusive governmental function tes

requires that a private entity exercise powers

traditionally and exclusively reserved to the State,

such as holding an election or eminent domain.

Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331,1335 (6 Cir

1992). The provision of hospital services is not a

traditional public function exclusively reserved for

the State. Shannon v. Shannon, 965 F.2d 542, 547

(7th Cir. 1992) (“hospital care ts not an exclusive

prerogative of the State).

When analyzing the exclusive government

function test, the Supreme Court has held that the

receipt of public finds and the performance of a

function serving the public, alone, are not enough

to make a private entity a state actor. Rendell-

Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840(1982); Black et

al. v. Indiana School District, 985 F.2d 707,710-11

($d Cir. 1993) (a school bus driver ts_ not

performing an exclusive government function, even

though paid by the state and performing a service

for the public). The fact that hospitals and nursing

homes may be extensively regulated and may

receive financial support from the government

through Medicaid and Medicare does not make

them state actors. Blum 457 U.S. at LOLI. In Blum,

the Supreme Court flatly rejected the argument

that the State's payment of more than 90% of

nursing home patients’ medical expenses and the

licensing of nursing homes does not create a

symbiotic relationship between the state and

nursing homes. Additionally, the vast majority of

Courts of Appeals have determined that the

recipient of federal construction funding, Medicare

and Medicaid funds, and the existence of tax

exemption, as well as state licensing requirements

for non-profit hospitals, do not constitute state

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Hodge vy. Paoli

Memorial Hospital, 576 F.2d 563 (8d Cir. 1978)

(citing Schlein v. Milford Hospital. Inc. 561 F.2d

127 (2d Cir. 1977)

Hospital Corporation, 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert

denied, 423 U.S. 1000(1975):. Jacksen v. Norton

Children's Hospitals. Inc., 487 F.2d 502(6th Cir

1S. 1000(1974); Doe \

5

Greco_v. Orange Memorial

Bellin Memorial Hospital, 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir

1973); Briscoe v. Bock, 540 F.2d 3892 (8th

1976); Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 520 F.2d

894(9th Cir. 1975); Ward v. St. Anthony Hospital

176 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973

Accordingly, the receipt of federal funding is n

determinative of state action. Private entities ar

not transformed into state actors by the simpl

provision of funds. Because Mr. Schneller cannot

establish state action, he cannot establish a causs

of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or related

statutes, which provide a necessary conduit

through which the plaintiff might recover for

alleged federal rights violations perpetrated

against him. Accordingly, | will dismiss the non

Commonwealth defendants from Count:

and IE.

If these federal claims were properly before m¢

they would still fail as untimely. Although Rule

12(b) does not explicitly permit the assertion of a

statute of limitations defense by a motion to

dismiss, the so-called "Third Circuit Rule’ allow

defendant to assert a limitations defense in a Rule

12 (b)(6) motion “if the time alleged in the

statement of a claim shows that the cause of action

has not been brought within the statute of

limitations.” Zankel v. Temple University, 245 Fed

Appx. 196, 198 (8d Cm 2007) (citing Robinson \

Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 (8d Cir. 2002)).

Because these federal statutes do not set forth a

specific statute of limitations, the claims are

subject to Pennsylvania's two-year statute of

limitations. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v.

Abrams, 544 U.S. 118, 124 (2005) (where a plaintiff

relies upon federal statutes in asserting a claim,

and those statutes do not contain a specific

provision regarding the time within which an

action may be brought, federal courts apply the

statute of limitations governing suits for personal

injury in which the action arises); Wilson v. Garcia

471 U.S. 265, 275 (1985); see also Lake v. Arnold,

232 F.3d 360,368 (3d Cir. 2000) (actions arising

under Sections 1983 and 1985 are subject to the

statute of limitations prescribed for personal-injury

actions in the state in which the relevant events

occurred). Pennsylvanias personal injury statute ol

limitations is two years. Vojtasek v. Diocese of

Allentown, 916 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. Super. 2006); 4:

Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). The death of Marjorie

Schneller is a discreet and identifiable event, and

the statute of limitations on any claims arising

from her deatti or any of the alleged events that

precipitated her death, began to arise on March 31,

2002. This action was commenced on December 5

2008, more than six (6) years later, and 1s thus

untimely by over four (4) years. Accordingly, Mr.

Schneller's federal claims would be time-barred 1f

they Wore properly hefore ryie’

Mh schni r clay the court ha:

remaining state

irsuant to 28 U-S S 13607(a), which

civil action of which the district court:

oripinal jurisdiction, the district courts shall

supplemental jurisdiction over all other

claims that are so related to claims in like action

within such original jurisdiction that they form

part of the same case or controversy under Article

lll of the United States Constitution such

upplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that

involve the joinder or intervention of additional

partie:

The state law claims in this amended complaint

substantially predominate over the federal claims.

See 28 U.S.C. § 13867(c)(2). The federal claims in the

amended complaint wil] be dismissed. 28 U.S.C

1367(c)(3). Accordingly, I decline to exercise

upplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim

in this case

| note, how ver, Une f the LaLe law claim

properly eror . they would ill be

dismissed as untimely. The plaintiff an

the thirteen defendant are resident

Pennsylvania, and all relevant events in this casi

arose In Pennsylvania. It is well established that a

federal court shall apply Pennsylvania substantive

law and federal procedural rules to the resolution

of state law claims. See Erie Railroad Comnany

Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64) (1988)). Accordingly

Pennsylvania law povern the dy po ition of the

plaintiffs stute law claim In Pennsylvania, the

applicable two-year statute of limitations for

claims provides that: The following action

proceedings must be commenced within tw

(1)An action for assault

imprisonment, false arrest, maliciou pros

or malicio is abuse of proce!

(2)An action to recover damage lor injurie

person or for the death of an individual cau

the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful viole

negligence of another

(3)An action for taking, detaining

personal property, Including action

recovery thereof

(JJAnyY other action Ol proceeding rere

damayves for injury to person or property which |

founded on negligent, intentional, or otherwiss

tortious conduct or any other action or proceedir

sounding ii Lrespass, including deceit. or fraud

except an acl proceeding subject , Tainay

complaint

would

nnsvivania jaw

ZU0Z, a

Phu

}

|

i

id the

(he Dlaintill

|

PWocument

» (Das

ORDERED t!

CRANTED

MI |)

BENEFICIA

CINELLER, BY JAN

aia Phk AD LITEM ESTAT I

CHINELILER, BY AND THROUG

CHNELILER ‘ hk AD LIVEN

JZVPOMER, EAE Ux OF THI

MARJORIE MLATE O

AND THRO

TET ATION

MPLOY hike

J SCHNE!

i) od et DD

On Appeal from the United States District Cour

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 08-ev-05704

District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F

Present: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER

McKEE, RENDELL, BARRY, AMBRO, FUENTES.

SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN.

HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, Circuit

PETITION FOR EN BANG

petition for rehearing

been submitted to the

participated in the decision of this Court,

the other available circuit Judges in acti

and no judge who concurred in the decist

asked for rchearing, and a majority of

judges ofthe cireult In regular activ

having voted for rehearing by the court

the petition for rehearing is DENIED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES D. SCHNELLER, «

PROSPECT PARK NURSING &

REHABILITATION CENTER, et a

Defendants

STENGEL, J.

AND NOW, thi

upon consideration of

BY THE COURT.

LAWRENCE F. STENGE]

On June26, 2009, I dismissed the

captioned case. (Documents #21

The plaintiff filed a motion for

reconsideration to which the defendants

responded. Granting a motion for

reconsideration is appropriate “if the party

seeking reconsideration shows at least one

of the following grounds; (1) an intervening

change in the controlling law; (2) the

availability of new evidence that was not

available when the court granted the

motion... or (3) the need to correct a clear

error of law or factor to prevent manifest

Injustice.” Max's Seafood Cafe’ ex rel. Lou

Ann. Ine. v. Ouinteres, 176 F.8d 669, 677

gd Cir. 1999) citing N. River Ins Co v.

CIGNA Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d

Cr. 1995), see also Cont l Cas. Co. v.

Diversified Indus. Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937,

943 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (because federal courts

have a strong interest in the finality of

jJudgrnents, motions for reconsideration

should be granted sparingly). The plaintiff

has shown none of those grounds. There

Was no intervening CNnanvge in the

controlling law, no new evidence present

rno clear error of law or tact In TT} \

previous Memorandum and Order

dismissing the action Accordingly. Iv

| rir th ry ' .

aqaeny 1e IO?)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES D. SCHNELLER, et al., CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff:

PROSPECT PARK NURSING &

REHABILITATION CENTER. et al..

Defendants

FILED SEP 4 2009

STENGEL, J.

AND NOW, this 3d day of September,

2009, upon consideration of the plaintiffs motion {

“ srt * = ? ' “a

supploment the recora (Vocumer!

hereby ORDERED that the motion is DENIED

BY THE COURT.

LAWRENCE F. STENGEI

|

| On June 26, 2009, | granted the defendants

motions to dismiss this case in its entirety. See

Documents #21 and 22. On August 6, 2009, |

denied the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of

that dismissal. See Document #25. The case is

terminated and further supplementation of the

record is unnecessary. Accordingly, I will deny thi

motion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES D. SCHNELLER, et al., CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff's

PROSPECT PARK NURSING &

REHABILITATION CENTER, et al

Defendant:

ORDER

STENGEL, J.

AND NOW. this 3d day of Septembe

2009, upon consideration of the plaintif!

for sanction and for costs to defendant

vexatious, frivolous, unsupported, and dilator

digation’ (Document #27), it is here!

that the motion is DENIED

BY THE COURT.

LAWRENCE F. STENGEI

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.