Appendix — Schneller v. Prospect Park Nursing & Rehabilitation Center
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ALD-134 NOT PRECEDENTAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No.09-4372
JAMES D. SCHNELLER, HEIRS AND
BENEFICIARIES OF MARJORIE C.
SCHNELLER, BY JAMES D. SCHNELLER,
TRUSTEE AD LITEM ESTATE OF MARJORIE
SCHNELLER, BY AND THROUGH JAMES D.
SCHNELLER, TRUSTEE AD LITEM, MARJORIE
ZITOMER, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
MARJORIE SCHNELLER, ESTATE OF GEORGE
H. SCHNELLER, BY AND THROUGH
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE JAMES D
SCHNELLER
es
PROSPECT PARK NURSING AND
REHABILITATION CENTER, [TS OWNERS
AND EMPLOYEES; MARJORIE ZITOMER;
RICHARD SCHNELLER; T. SERGEANT
PEPPER, ESQUIRE
James D. Schneller, Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 08-ev-05 704 )
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F.. Stengel
Submitted by the Clerk for Possible Dismissal for
Lack of Jurisdiction
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR
27.4 and [.0.P. 10.6
February 25,2010
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit
Judges
(Opinion filed: March 8, 2010)
OPINION
PER CURIAM
Appellant James D. Schneller, proceeding
pro se, appeals from the District Court's dismissal
of his action and denial of his post-judgment
motions. For the reasons that follow, we will
dismiss in part for Jack of jurisdiction and
otherwise summarily affirm the judgment of the
District Court.
Schneller initiated the underlying civil action
in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in 2008.' In it, he
primarily alleged that defendants committed
medical and legal malpractice in rendering
negligent services to his parents at the ends of
their lives. By opinion and order entered on
June26, 2009, the District Court dismissed all of
his claims and ordered the case closed. On July 10,
Schneller timely filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied on August 6, 2009. On August
11, Schneller filed a motion to "supplement the
record,’ followed by a motion for sanctions and
costs on September 1. The District Court denied
schneiler's motion to supplement the record on
September 4, 2009, and denied his motion for
sanctions and costs on September 9, 2009. On
October 8, 2009, Schneller filed a six-page
document entitled "Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to
Appeal In Forma Pauperis" which detailed the
errors allegedly made by the District Court in
' Schneller filed his complaint pro se. In it, he
purported to represent other persons and entities. As
a pro se litigant, Schneller may not represent parties
other than himself. See Osei-Afrivie v. Med. Coll. Of
F'a., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
non-lawyer proceeding pro se could not represent his
own children); 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (parties may proceed
in federal court “personally or by counsel").
Accordingly, we will treat him as the sole Appellant
in this appeal. See also Schneller v. Fox Subacute at
Clara Burke, 317 F. App'x 135, 137 n.1 (3d Cir. 2008)
dismissing Appellant's complaint and denying hi
post-judgment motions and requested leave to
appeal in forma pauperis. The District Court
granted him leave to appeal in forma pauperis on
October?7, 2009, and Schneller filed a document
entitled "Notice of Appeal’ on November 10,2009
Appellant seeks to appeal both the District
Court's dismissal of his action and its denial of hi
post-judgment motions. The District Court‘
judgment dismissing the underlying action became
final on August 6, 2009, when the District Court
denied Appellant's timely-filed motion for
reconsideration.’ See 28 USC. §1291 (vesting
jurisdiction in courts of appeals over "final
decisions” of the district courts); Budinich V
Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. L96, 199
200(1988) (holding that a final decision is one that
ends the litigation on the merits and leave
nothing for the court to do but execute the
socause the motion for reconsideration was filed
within ten business days of the District Court's entry
of judgment, the time to file a notice of appeal from
the June26, 2009 dismissal was tolled until the
District Court denied the motion for reconsideration
on August 4,2009. See former Fed. R. Civ. P.59(e)
(amendment effective Dec. 1,2009). Appellant's
subsequent motions to supplement the record and fo:
sanctions do not fall within the subset of post
judgment motions which toll the time for filing a
notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)
decided after ents
affect its finality Be
au
notice of appeal within thirt
order, we lack jurisdiction over
June 26, 2009 opinion and order
action and it tO, ZO0%9 ord
motion tor
reconsideration
1(a)(1): Bowles v. Ru
(holding tha
post judgment motions are
ee Pennsylvania Klaherty
faq Cir. 19908) Post
hdyment order
purpose of 12!
)] and immediate}
i
HecauseE Lhe pole Y aAVAINSI PICce};rie
unlikely to!
be undermined. | Phe Court de
chnellers motion to supplement t
orde! entered eplember 1 ‘ACHOCVY)
failed to file ;
}
rnotice o] appeal WILD)
that denial, we also lack wurISdIcLion Over Ni
appeal with re? pect
P. A(a)e]
chneller
Bowle
motion tor
ANCLION
until September 9, 2009. On Octobe:
chneller filed a document entitled "Plaints
Motion ie) | eave ne Appr ay In) apr
which specified those orders he wished
the grounds he wi hed to appeal them on mid tl
court he wi hed to appeal therm to bhe District
Court should have treated this document a
notice of appeal. red. Kh. App. P. Stet]
Masquerade Novelty vo Unique Indu OI2Z Yd
66.5, 6050 (3d Cir. | has, within the time provided
hile an appeal hied documents that spectly the
partly or partie taking the appeal Lhye
judgment, order or part thereof appealed from, and
the court to which the appeal is taker Because
this document was timely-filed with respect to the
Uistrict Courts dental of Appellant's motions for
anctions, we retain jurisdiction over his apy
from that order. See Fed. R. App. I. 4
Flaherty, O83 F.2d at 1276
‘
In hy motion tor HOCLIOT wand ee |
if
chneller argued that DuUrstlantl lo Federal Kurt
Civil Procedure | land 28 US. 192%
hould be sanctioned for filyny frivolous an
vexatious motions and pleadings for the pury
prt) ( {)
causing: unnecessary delay and increasing: the ee
of the litigation. While Schneller set forth the |
and legal arguments made by Appellee threat Pie
disayvreed with, he did not provide any basis fro
which the Distriet Court could have concluded th
Appellees alleged those fuets or made t)
Pitdovt
arguments for an improper purpose or with th
intent of misleading the court. Schnell
for sanctions was not the proper vehicle for
challenging these assertions and arguments
appeal was. Because Schneller failed to timely
appeal from the District Court's dismissal of his
action and denial of his motion for reconsideration,
we cannot consider these arguments at the present
Lime
secause Schnellers appeal presents no
substantial question, we will summarily affirm the
orders of the District Court denying the requested
relief See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; L.O.P. 10.6. Schneller’
appeal from the District Court's dismissal of hi
action, denial of his motion for reconsideration
and denial of his motion to supplement the record
is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1); Bowles 551 U.S. at 21%
ALD-134 NOT PRECEDENTAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No.09-4372
JAMES D. SCHNELLER, HEIRS AND
BENEFICIARIES OF MARJORIE C.
SCHNELLER, BY JAMES D. SCHNELLER,
TRUSTEE AD LITEM ESTATE OF MARJORIE
SCHNELLER, BY AND THROUGH JAMES D.
SCHNELLER, TRUSTEE AD LITEM, MARJORIE
ZITOMER, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
MARJORIE SCHNELLER, ESTATE OF GEORGE
H. SCHNELLER, BY AND THROUGH
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE JAMES D
SCHNELLER
vs
PROSPECT PARK NURSING AND
REHABILITATION CENTER, [ITS OWNERS
AND EMPLOYEES; MARJORIE ZITOMER;
RICHARD SCHNELLER; T. SERGEANT
PEPPER, ESQUIRE
James D. Schneller, Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 08-ev-05704)
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
Submitted by the Clerk for Possible Dismissal for
Lack of Jurisdiction
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR
27.4 and I1.0.P. 10.6
February 25,2010
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit
Judges
JUDGMENT
‘his cause came to be considered on the record
from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania for possible
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or summary action
pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and 1L.O.P. 10.6
on February 25, 2010. On consideration whereof; it
Is now hereby
ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this Court that
the appeal is dismissed in part for lack of
jurisdiction and the order of the District Court
entered September 9, 2009, be and the same is
hereby affirmed. All of the above in accordance
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES D. SCHNELLER, «
Plaintiff
PROSPECT PARK NURSING &
REHABILITATION CENTER, et a
Defendants
MEMORANDUM
More than SIX years » death Ot his elderly
mother on March 31, 2002, James D. Schneller and
se action
allegedly four other plaintiffs’ filed a pro
vate
® aart
sc plaintiffs inciude: (1) fiers and beneficiart
of Marjorie C. Schneller, by James D. Schneller,
trustee ad/item; (2) Estate of Marjorie Schneller, by
and through dames D. Schneller, trustee ad/item
against several defendants* whom be claims are
legally responsible. The genesis of the case appears
to be medical and legal malpractice as a result of
the allegedly neghgent services rendered to Mr.
Schneller's parents during the last few months of
their lives. In fact, in the majority of paragraphs
introducing the defendants, the plaintiff indicates
that “this action is an action in_ professional
lability and intentional tort against this
defendant.” See Compl. 11
4,9-13. The only exceptions are in the paragraphs
for his brother and sister. Id. 5-7. The
and (3) Marjorie Zitomer executrix of the Estate of
Marjorie Schneller (Miss Zitomer is Mr. Schneller's
sister and also a defendant in this action). In a
related case the Third Circuit noted: "Schneller filed
his complaint pro se. He also purports to represent
other persons and entities. Although Schneller is
entitled to represent himself pro se, he ‘may not
appear pro se in the cause of another person or
entity.” Schneller et al. v. Crozer Chester Medical
Center, et al, 276 Fed. Appx. 169, *170 n.1 (38dCir.
2008). Accordingly. | will refer to Mr. Schneller as
the sole plaintiff in this case.
These defendants include; (1) Prospect Park
Nursing and Rehabilitation Center; (2) “its owners
and employees;" (3) Marjorie Zitomer (4) Richard
Schneller (the plaintiffs brother); and (5) T. Sergeant
Pepper, Esq.
defendants have filed motions to dismiss. For the
following reasons, | will grant these motions and
dismiss this case.
BACKGROUND
In February 2004, Mr. Schneller began an action
against these defendants tn the Court of Common
Pleas of the County of Delaware. The case was
dismissed through entries of judgment non pros for
failure to file Certificates of Merit as required by
Rule 1042.3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure. Schneller et al. v. Prospect. Park
Nursing & Rehabilitation Center et al., 2006 Pa.
Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 392 (2006). Mr.
Schneller unsuccessfully attempted to re-open the
case and/or strike the judgment of non pros. Id. He
then appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court
which affirmed without an opinion the entries of
judgment. Schneller et al. v. Prospect Park
Nursing & Rehabilitation Center. et al., 945 A.2d
781 (Pa.Super. 2007). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal.
Schneller et al. v. Prospect Park Nursing &
Rehabilitation Center. et al., 2008 Pa. LEXIS 2398
(Pa. 2008).
The sixty (60) page complaint contains three-
hundred seventy-three (373) paragraphs
purporting to provide the basis of the plaintiffs
thirty-two (32) claims:
CountlA - Violation of the Assisted Suicide
Funding Restriction Act of 1997
Count1B - Civil Action for Deprivation of
Rights
Count 1 C Conspiracy to Interfere with
Civil Rights - Depriving Persons of Rights and
Privileges
Count 1 D Conspiracy to Interfere with
Civil Rights - Obstructing Justice and Intimidating
Parties - Battery
CountlE - Neglect to Prevent Deprivation
of Rights and Conspiracy for Deprivation of Right
Count 1 F Failure to Warn
Count 2 Breach of Contract
Count 3 Breach of Contract
Count 4 Fraudulent Inducement ot
Contracts
Count 5 Breach of Contidential
Fiduciary Relationship
Count 6 Wrongful Death
Count 7 Survival
Count 8 Intentional Tort
Power of Attorney
Count 9 Intentional Tort
Advanced Health Directive
Count 10 Negligence Per Se |
numerous state and federal statute:
Count 1} Slander and Libel
Count 12 Breach of Confidentialit
Count 13 Survival - Negligent and
Intentional Infliction of “motional Distre:
Count 14 Survival - Fraud
Count 15 Survival - Conspiracy
Count 16 Survival Action - Puniti
Damages
Count 17 Professional Negligence
Medical
Count I: Professional Negligence
Attorney and Firm
Count 19 Survival - Negligent and
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distre
George Schneller
Count 20 : Survival - Fraud and Intent)
Misrepresentation to George H. Schneller
Count 2] Survival Action - Cons
Damaging to George R. Schneller
Count 22 Survival Action - Punitive
Damages for the Estate of George H. Schneller
Count 23 Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distre:
Count 24 Conspiracy
Count 25 Punitive Damage
Count 26 Tortious Interference
Prospective Economic Advantage
Count 27 sreach of Fiduciary Dut
Mr. Schneller also alleges violations ot
Various regulation entitled Requirement 1Or
Term Care Facilities. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.10, et
seq.” Compl. 4] 18d.
STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS
A motion to dismiss under Rule | 2(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted examines
the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Conley _v.
Gibson, 3855 U.S. 41,45-46(1957). The factual
allegations must be sufficient to make the claim for
relief more than just speculative. Bel) Atlantic
Corn. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In
determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss
a federal court must construe the complaint lib
erally, accept all factual allegations in the com
plaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences
These provisions "contain the requirements that
an institution must meet in order to qualify to
participate as a {skilled nursing facility] in the
Medicare program, and as a nursing facility in the
Medicaid program. They serve as the basis for
survey activities for the purpose of determining
whether a facility meets the requirements for
participation in Medicare and Medicaid." 42 C.F LR
§ 483.1(b). These regulations do not confer a pri-
vate right of action. Accordingly, they provide no
basis for jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331
in favor of the plaintiff. Id
Sucks County Cmty.Col]
Cir. 1984)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
require a plaintiff to plead in detail all of the fact
upon which he bases his claim. Conley, 855 U.S
47. Rather, the Rules require a "short and plain
statement’ of the claim that will give the defendan
fair notice of the plaintiffs claim and the ground
upon which it rests. Id. The "complaint must allege
facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Neither "bald
assertions’ nor "vague and conclusory allegation
are accepted as true. See Morse v. Lower Merion
School Dist., 132 F.Sd 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997):
Sterling v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transy
Auth., 897 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The clain
must contain enough factual matters to suggest
the required elements of the claim or to "raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of those elements. Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.2d 224,234 (3d Cir. 2004
— -
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
A case may be also dismissed under Rul
(b)(1) and IZ (h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
!
Procedure "|wlihenever it appears by sugyestion of
the parties or otherwise that the court § lacl
jurisdiction of the subject matter Fed. R.Civ.P
12(h)(3). Alternatively, a court choo Ing not tO
erant a motion to dism) for | ubject ma
More
mplaimnt
ine delendal
hould he di}
ubject royuri
jurisdiction
aulhnorized by
District cour
Hiction over fede
however, only five counts attempt to set forth
federal causes of action. The first count alleges a
violation of the Assisted Suicide Funding
Restriction Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 14401, et seq.
See Compl. {$l 88-99. The defendants argue that
this Act does not create a private right of action,
and thus cannot provide the basis for jurisdiction. |
ayree.
If Congress intends to create a private cause of
action under a federal] statute, then federal court
should find a private cause of action under the
given statute. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors.
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,15(1979). Congress’
intent is determined by examining "the language or
structure of a statute or the circumstances of its
enactment." Id. "|W]|hether a statute creates a
cause of action, either expressly or by implication.
is basically a matter of statutory construction." Id.
[If the language of the statute expressly gives a
remedy then courts should be wary when they are
requested to add an additional remedy that is not
expressly provided for in the statute. Id
The structure and languayve of this Act do not show
any intent by Congress to establish a private caus\
of action. The purpose of the Act is "to continue
current federal policy by providing explicitly that
federal funds may not be used to pay for items and
services (inciuding assistance) the purpose of
which is to cause (or assist In causing) the suicide,
euthanasia, or mercy killing of any individual." 42
U.S.C. § 14401(1,). Mr. Schneller claims that
jurisdiction is proper under this Act because
Defendant Prospect Park applied funds
appropriated by Congress including federal funds
under certain grant programs, ana federal
advocacy grants, to pay for and provide for services
which directly contributed to the assisting and
causing of the death of Marjorie C. Schneller, by
unlawful means including euthanasia, mercy
killing and assisted suicide. See Compl. 11.95. Mr.
Schneller's assertion is contrary to law.
The rationale for the enactment of this statute
is to prevent federal funds from being used for the
criminal and unlawful purpose of assisted suicide
See 42 U.S.C.A. $14401 (a)(2). There have never
been any criminal charges in connection with the
care and treatment of Marjorie Schneller, and the
claims that the defendants engaged in some type of
mercy killing are unfounded. Further, no court has
found that Title 42 U.S.C. $14401, et seg., creates a
private cause of action. Thus, because the Assisted
Suicide Funding Restriction Act cannot form the
basis of subject matter jurisdiction, I will dismiss
Count IA.
The next four counts in the complaint allege the
deprivation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1985, and 1986. Because they contemplate a
private cause of action, these statutes provide
subject matter jurisdiction to the court. Counts 1
IC, 1D, and IE set forth the plaintiffs civil rights
claims against the defendants for alleged violations
of his mother's rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Count 1B contuins allegations that
the defendants deprived Mrs. Schneller of life,
liberty, and property by enforcing her advanced
health care directive over Mr. Schneller's objection
and causing her death. See Compl. {1 105-119.
Count 1C claims that the defendants conspired to
deprive Mrs. Schneller of rights and privileges
including “her basic rights to eat. drink, and
breathe," and her "rights to life, privacy, security,
freedom of speech, freedom to write and
communicate, right to locomotion, family
interaction, rights to legal representation, to
meaningful family visits, arid right to choose her
daily regimen and health program." See Compl. {I
121-146. Count 1D alleges that the defendants “in
their conspiracy to prevent by force, intimidation,
and threat, intended to deprive classes of persons
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the law,” and that
these acts constituted causes of action for
Intimidation, obstruction of justice, criminal
assault, and criminal maiming. See Compl. 111 147
163. Finally, Count IE alleges that the defendants,
“having knowledge that any and all of the wrongs
conspired to be done, as enumerated in this
complaint, were aboul to be committed, and hav InY
power to prevent or aid in preventing the
‘he Fourteenth
Constitution provides
any person of life, rity, or property,
process of law 1S. Const... Amend. 14,
protection: “the Fourteenth Amendment
extend 1 priva conduct abridging individual
ail cond ict may
responsible for t! pecific conduct
} 7 te 4 j
plaintiff con Brentwood Acad
Secondanry Sch. Athletic Ass
2001), Edmonso
Blum
lefendant
color
. . Ss
purposes. Brentwood
Edmondson Oi}
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by . the Constitution and laws, shall be
hable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. $1983.
»
sy its terms, Section 1983 does not create a
substantive right; it merely provides a method for
vindicating federal rights conferred by the United
States Constitution and the federal statutes that it
order to establish a claim under Section 1983, a
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States and that (2) the alleged deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of
926 U.S. 40 (1999).
Here. Mr. Schneller fails ¢
requirements. Although a private party may cause
a deprivation of a constitutional right, it is
subjected to hability under Section 1983 only when
it does so under color of law. Flagg Bros. Ine. v.
excludes from its reach "merely private conduct,”
no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.
American Mfs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 50. The
actions alleged here were not performed under
color of state law, and the defendants are not and
cannot be considered state actors.
The complaint alleges, however, that the
defendants "have applied funds appropriated by
Congress for the purpose of paying for the
provision of health care services, federal finds
under certain grant programs including Medicare
and Medicaid, and federal advocacy grants, to pay
for, provide, and contribute to payment or
coverage, for health care items and service
furnished.” See Compl. {1 16. These allegations do
not establish that the defendants were acting
“under color of law" or were state actors. The
traditional exclusive governmental function tes
requires that a private entity exercise powers
traditionally and exclusively reserved to the State,
such as holding an election or eminent domain.
Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331,1335 (6 Cir
1992). The provision of hospital services is not a
traditional public function exclusively reserved for
the State. Shannon v. Shannon, 965 F.2d 542, 547
(7th Cir. 1992) (“hospital care ts not an exclusive
prerogative of the State).
When analyzing the exclusive government
function test, the Supreme Court has held that the
receipt of public finds and the performance of a
function serving the public, alone, are not enough
to make a private entity a state actor. Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840(1982); Black et
al. v. Indiana School District, 985 F.2d 707,710-11
($d Cir. 1993) (a school bus driver ts_ not
performing an exclusive government function, even
though paid by the state and performing a service
for the public). The fact that hospitals and nursing
homes may be extensively regulated and may
receive financial support from the government
through Medicaid and Medicare does not make
them state actors. Blum 457 U.S. at LOLI. In Blum,
the Supreme Court flatly rejected the argument
that the State's payment of more than 90% of
nursing home patients’ medical expenses and the
licensing of nursing homes does not create a
symbiotic relationship between the state and
nursing homes. Additionally, the vast majority of
Courts of Appeals have determined that the
recipient of federal construction funding, Medicare
and Medicaid funds, and the existence of tax
exemption, as well as state licensing requirements
for non-profit hospitals, do not constitute state
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Hodge vy. Paoli
Memorial Hospital, 576 F.2d 563 (8d Cir. 1978)
(citing Schlein v. Milford Hospital. Inc. 561 F.2d
127 (2d Cir. 1977)
Hospital Corporation, 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 423 U.S. 1000(1975):. Jacksen v. Norton
Children's Hospitals. Inc., 487 F.2d 502(6th Cir
1S. 1000(1974); Doe \
5
Greco_v. Orange Memorial
Bellin Memorial Hospital, 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir
1973); Briscoe v. Bock, 540 F.2d 3892 (8th
1976); Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 520 F.2d
894(9th Cir. 1975); Ward v. St. Anthony Hospital
176 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973
Accordingly, the receipt of federal funding is n
determinative of state action. Private entities ar
not transformed into state actors by the simpl
provision of funds. Because Mr. Schneller cannot
establish state action, he cannot establish a causs
of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or related
statutes, which provide a necessary conduit
through which the plaintiff might recover for
alleged federal rights violations perpetrated
against him. Accordingly, | will dismiss the non
Commonwealth defendants from Count:
and IE.
If these federal claims were properly before m¢
they would still fail as untimely. Although Rule
12(b) does not explicitly permit the assertion of a
statute of limitations defense by a motion to
dismiss, the so-called "Third Circuit Rule’ allow
defendant to assert a limitations defense in a Rule
12 (b)(6) motion “if the time alleged in the
statement of a claim shows that the cause of action
has not been brought within the statute of
limitations.” Zankel v. Temple University, 245 Fed
Appx. 196, 198 (8d Cm 2007) (citing Robinson \
Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 (8d Cir. 2002)).
Because these federal statutes do not set forth a
specific statute of limitations, the claims are
subject to Pennsylvania's two-year statute of
limitations. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v.
Abrams, 544 U.S. 118, 124 (2005) (where a plaintiff
relies upon federal statutes in asserting a claim,
and those statutes do not contain a specific
provision regarding the time within which an
action may be brought, federal courts apply the
statute of limitations governing suits for personal
injury in which the action arises); Wilson v. Garcia
471 U.S. 265, 275 (1985); see also Lake v. Arnold,
232 F.3d 360,368 (3d Cir. 2000) (actions arising
under Sections 1983 and 1985 are subject to the
statute of limitations prescribed for personal-injury
actions in the state in which the relevant events
occurred). Pennsylvanias personal injury statute ol
limitations is two years. Vojtasek v. Diocese of
Allentown, 916 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. Super. 2006); 4:
Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). The death of Marjorie
Schneller is a discreet and identifiable event, and
the statute of limitations on any claims arising
from her deatti or any of the alleged events that
precipitated her death, began to arise on March 31,
2002. This action was commenced on December 5
2008, more than six (6) years later, and 1s thus
untimely by over four (4) years. Accordingly, Mr.
Schneller's federal claims would be time-barred 1f
they Wore properly hefore ryie’
Mh schni r clay the court ha:
remaining state
irsuant to 28 U-S S 13607(a), which
civil action of which the district court:
oripinal jurisdiction, the district courts shall
supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in like action
within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article
lll of the United States Constitution such
upplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that
involve the joinder or intervention of additional
partie:
The state law claims in this amended complaint
substantially predominate over the federal claims.
See 28 U.S.C. § 13867(c)(2). The federal claims in the
amended complaint wil] be dismissed. 28 U.S.C
1367(c)(3). Accordingly, I decline to exercise
upplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim
in this case
| note, how ver, Une f the LaLe law claim
properly eror . they would ill be
dismissed as untimely. The plaintiff an
the thirteen defendant are resident
Pennsylvania, and all relevant events in this casi
arose In Pennsylvania. It is well established that a
federal court shall apply Pennsylvania substantive
law and federal procedural rules to the resolution
of state law claims. See Erie Railroad Comnany
Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64) (1988)). Accordingly
Pennsylvania law povern the dy po ition of the
plaintiffs stute law claim In Pennsylvania, the
applicable two-year statute of limitations for
claims provides that: The following action
proceedings must be commenced within tw
(1)An action for assault
imprisonment, false arrest, maliciou pros
or malicio is abuse of proce!
(2)An action to recover damage lor injurie
person or for the death of an individual cau
the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful viole
negligence of another
(3)An action for taking, detaining
personal property, Including action
recovery thereof
(JJAnyY other action Ol proceeding rere
damayves for injury to person or property which |
founded on negligent, intentional, or otherwiss
tortious conduct or any other action or proceedir
sounding ii Lrespass, including deceit. or fraud
except an acl proceeding subject , Tainay
complaint
would
nnsvivania jaw
ZU0Z, a
Phu
}
|
i
id the
(he Dlaintill
|
PWocument
» (Das
ORDERED t!
CRANTED
MI |)
BENEFICIA
CINELLER, BY JAN
aia Phk AD LITEM ESTAT I
CHINELILER, BY AND THROUG
CHNELILER ‘ hk AD LIVEN
JZVPOMER, EAE Ux OF THI
MARJORIE MLATE O
AND THRO
TET ATION
MPLOY hike
J SCHNE!
i) od et DD
On Appeal from the United States District Cour
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 08-ev-05704
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F
Present: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER
McKEE, RENDELL, BARRY, AMBRO, FUENTES.
SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN.
HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, Circuit
PETITION FOR EN BANG
petition for rehearing
been submitted to the
participated in the decision of this Court,
the other available circuit Judges in acti
and no judge who concurred in the decist
asked for rchearing, and a majority of
judges ofthe cireult In regular activ
having voted for rehearing by the court
the petition for rehearing is DENIED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES D. SCHNELLER, «
PROSPECT PARK NURSING &
REHABILITATION CENTER, et a
Defendants
STENGEL, J.
AND NOW, thi
upon consideration of
BY THE COURT.
LAWRENCE F. STENGE]
On June26, 2009, I dismissed the
captioned case. (Documents #21
The plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration to which the defendants
responded. Granting a motion for
reconsideration is appropriate “if the party
seeking reconsideration shows at least one
of the following grounds; (1) an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) the
availability of new evidence that was not
available when the court granted the
motion... or (3) the need to correct a clear
error of law or factor to prevent manifest
Injustice.” Max's Seafood Cafe’ ex rel. Lou
Ann. Ine. v. Ouinteres, 176 F.8d 669, 677
gd Cir. 1999) citing N. River Ins Co v.
CIGNA Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d
Cr. 1995), see also Cont l Cas. Co. v.
Diversified Indus. Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937,
943 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (because federal courts
have a strong interest in the finality of
jJudgrnents, motions for reconsideration
should be granted sparingly). The plaintiff
has shown none of those grounds. There
Was no intervening CNnanvge in the
controlling law, no new evidence present
rno clear error of law or tact In TT} \
previous Memorandum and Order
dismissing the action Accordingly. Iv
| rir th ry ' .
aqaeny 1e IO?)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES D. SCHNELLER, et al., CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff:
PROSPECT PARK NURSING &
REHABILITATION CENTER. et al..
Defendants
FILED SEP 4 2009
STENGEL, J.
AND NOW, this 3d day of September,
2009, upon consideration of the plaintiffs motion {
“ srt * = ? ' “a
supploment the recora (Vocumer!
hereby ORDERED that the motion is DENIED
BY THE COURT.
LAWRENCE F. STENGEI
|
| On June 26, 2009, | granted the defendants
motions to dismiss this case in its entirety. See
Documents #21 and 22. On August 6, 2009, |
denied the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of
that dismissal. See Document #25. The case is
terminated and further supplementation of the
record is unnecessary. Accordingly, I will deny thi
motion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES D. SCHNELLER, et al., CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff's
PROSPECT PARK NURSING &
REHABILITATION CENTER, et al
Defendant:
ORDER
STENGEL, J.
AND NOW. this 3d day of Septembe
2009, upon consideration of the plaintif!
for sanction and for costs to defendant
vexatious, frivolous, unsupported, and dilator
digation’ (Document #27), it is here!
that the motion is DENIED
BY THE COURT.
LAWRENCE F. STENGEI
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.