Appendix — North Star Alaska Housing Corp. v. United States

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Appendix

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX A: Order of the Federal Circuit

denying rehearing and rehearing en banc

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APPENDIX B: Decision of the Federal Circuit,

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APPENDIX C: Decision of the Court of Federal

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APPENDIX D: Judgment of the Court of Federal

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APPENDIX E: Decision of the Court of Federal]

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APPENDIX F: Decision by the Contracting

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APPENDIX G: Decision by the Contracting

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APPENDIX H: Decision by the Contracting

Officer, December 7, 2007 .............ccccccccccccecceeeeeues 232a

APPENDIX I: Decision by the Contracting

Officer, October 25, 2007 ..................ccccccccsosccsssecece 249a

APPENDIX J: Relevant Portions of the Contract

Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613........000000.. 265a

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FEDERAL CIRCUIT

2009-5054

Filed: March 22, 2010

NORTH STAR ALASKA HOUSING

CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal

Claims in 98-CV-168, 02-CV-1632, 03-CV-2699,

Judge Francis M. Allegra.

ORDER

2a

NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

ORDER

A combined petition for panel rehearing and for

rehearing en banc having been filed by the

Appellant, and a response thereto having been

invited by the court and filed by the Appellee, and the

petition for rehearing and response, having been

referred to the panel that heard the appeal, and

thereafter the petition for rehearing en banc and

response having been referred to the circuit judges

who are in regular active service,

UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is

ORDERED that the petition for panel rehearing

be, and the same hereby is, DENIED and it is further

ORDERED that the petition for rehearing en banc

be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

3a

The mandate of the court will issue on March 29,

2010.

FOR THE COURT,

Jan Horbaly

Clerk

Dated: 03/22/2010

cc: Thomas C. Goldstein

Timothy P. McIlmail

NORTH STAR ALASKA HOUSING V US, 2009-5054

(CFC-98-CV-168)

4a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,

FEDERAL CIRCUIT.

NORTH STAR ALASKA HOUSING

CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2009-5054.

Dec. 15, 2009.

Appealed from United States Court of Federal

Claims, Case Nos. 98-CV-168, 02-CV-1632, 03-CV-

2699, Francis M. Allegra, Judge.

Paul W. Killian, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld

LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-

appellant. With him on the brief was Mark J. Groff.

Timothy P. MclIimail, Trial Attorney, Commercial

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States

Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for

defendant-appellee. With him on the brief were Tony

West, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E.

Davidson, Director, and Donald E. Kinner, Assistant

Director.

LOURIE, LINN, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

Judgment

PER CURIAM.

This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

6a

APPENDIX C

United States Court of Federal Claims

NORTH STAR ALASKA HOUSING

CORPORATION, Plaintiff,

v.

The UNITED STATES, Defendant.

Nos. 98-168C, 02-1632C, 03-2699C.

Jan. 9, 2009.

ORDER

ALLEGRA, Judge.

On March 7, 2007, this court held that the United

States had breached its covenant of good faith and

fair dealing in administering an Army housing

contract with North Star Alaska Housing Corporation

(North Star). North Star Alaska Hous. Corp. uv.

United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 158, 189-212 (2007).

Relying on a wealth of evidence, this court found that

defendant's representatives acted with animus in a

fashion calculated to hinder plaintiff's performance.

Id. Among the actions cited by the court was

defendant's abuse of the claim resolution process

required by the Contract Disputes Act. Id. at 208-12.

Judgment in favor of plaintiff was entered on April

15, 2008. Defendant did not prosecute an appeal.

On June 18, 2008, plaintiff filed a motion for

attorney's fees and litigation expenses, invoking 28

U.S.C. § 2412(b). Defendant filed its response in

opposition to the motion on August 4, 2008. Plaintiff

Ta

filed its reply on August 21, 2008. Argument on the

motion is deemed unnecessary.

Absent a statute or enforceable contract provision,

fee shifting is generally prohibited, with each party

instead ordinarily bearing its own attorney's fees.

See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991);

Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421

U.S. 240, 257 (1975). This so-called "American Rule"

is founded on the belief that requiring an

unsuccessful litigant to pay the litigation expenses of

the prevailing party would unduly deter parties from

seeking to "vindicate their rights" in a judicial forum.

Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,

386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); see also Arcambel v.

Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796) Gn which this

rule originated). Over the years, however, courts

have recognized limited exceptions to this rule,

among them that a court may use its inherent power

to assess attorney's fees “when a party has ‘acted in

bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive

reasons.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45-46, (quoting

F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber

Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)); see also Alyeska, 421

U.S. at 258-59. Section 2412(b) of Title 28, a

provision of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAdA),

extends this concept to the United States, subjecting

it to the award of attorney's fees in civil cases "to the

same extent that any other party would be liable

under the common law ... for such an award." See also

H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 9 (1980) (section 2412(b)

8a

"reflects a strong movement by Congress toward

placing the federal government and civil litigants on

completely equal footing"); Kerin v. U.S. Postal Seruv.,

218 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2000).

The “bad faith” exception to the American Rule

serves the “dual purpose of vindicat[ing] judicial

authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions

available for contempt of court and mak[ing] the

prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his

opponent's obstinacy.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46

quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n. 14

(1978)); see Chambers, 501 U.S. at 74 (Kennedy, J.,

dissenting) (bad faith exception to American Rule

“permits fee shifting as a sanction to the extent

necessary to protect the judicial process”). Such an

award is punitive in nature and should be imposed

only in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons

of justice. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973);

Eureka Inv. Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d

932, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Under this exception, it is

appropriate to assess attorney's fees when the court

finds that “fraud has been practiced upon it, or that

the very temple of justice has been defiled[.]” Univ.

Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580

(1946). Such a sanction is also appropriate when a

party, in bad faith, delays or disrupts litigation or

hampers the enforcement of a _ court. order.

Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46. The “bad faith” exception

thus applies “to a full range of litigation abuses,” id.,

and “depends not on which party wins the lawsuit,

but on how the parties conduct themselves during the

litigation.” Id. at 53; see also Hutto, 437 U.S. at 689

n. 14.

9a

In keeping with these sentiments, the Federal

Circuit recently concluded that “fee awards cannot be

assessed based on claims of bad faith primary

conduct,” i.e., “conduct that forms the basis for the

substantive claim for relief.” Centex Corp. v. United

States, 486 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also

Consumers Energy Co. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl.

670, 676-77 (2008). The Federal Circuit noted that

its view was shared by at least eight other circuit

courts.! Centex reasoned that “authorizing a court to

1 The Federal Circuit cited a variety of cases for this

proposition, including the following: Zapata Hermanos

Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., Inc., 313 F.3d 385, 391

(7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1068 (2003) (holding that

“behavior in the litigation itself is the only lawful domain of the

relevant concept of ‘inherent authority”); Towerridge, Inc. v.

T.A.O., Inc., 111 F.3d 758, 765 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[A]n award of

attorneys’ fees may not be premised solely on prelitigation

conduct.”); Lamb Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist.,

103 F.3d 1422, 1435 (8th Cir. 1997) (“{A court] may not base an

[attorney's fees] award solely on the conduct that led to the

substantive claim.”); Ass'n of Flight Attendants v. Horizon Air

Indus., Inc., 976 F.2d 541, 550 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[N]o federal

appellate authority in or out of the Ninth Circuit has clearly

approved an order shifting attorney's fees based solely upon a

finding of bad faith as an element of the cause of action

presented in the underlying suit. We decline to do so.”); Sanchez

v. Rowe, 870 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1989) (“We hold that the

requisite bad faith ... may not be based on a party's conduct

forming the basis for [the] substantive claim.”) (emphasis

omitted); Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 765 F.2d

1004, 1014 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Vexatious conduct inherent in the

fraudulent acts that make up the 10b-5 cause of action cannot

be the basis for an attorney's fee award”); Shimman uv. Int'l

Union of Operating Eng'rs, 744 F.2d 1226, 1233 (6th Cir. 1984),

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985) (“We therefore hold that the

bad faith exception to the American Rule does not allow an

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shift fees based solely on bad faith conduct that forms

the basis for the substantive claim for relief would

undermine the American Rule by penalizing a party

who raises good faith defenses to claims of liability

for bad faith conduct.” 486 F.3d at 1372; see also id.

(expressing a desire to “protect a defendant's right to

go to court and argue a non-frivolous defense to a

claim, even if the claim arose from the defendant's

bad faith conduct”). The court also categorically

rejected arguments that the EAJA was intended to

“alter the common law fee-shifting rule,” emphasizing

instead that, as under the common law, “[flee-shifting

is not permitted for bad faith conduct that precedes

the accrual of the claim in question.” Jd. at 1375.

Centex thus suggests that the bad faith exception

ordinarily applies only if some bad faith conduct

occurs in the context of litigation.

II.

Seemingly undaunted by the limitations inherent

in this holding, plaintiff asseverates that attorney's

fees are warranted here because defendant proceeded

in bad faith in several critical regards. First, it

asserts that fees are recoverable here because

defendant's prior counsel, Mr. Donald Kinner,

award of attorney fees based only on bad faith in the conduct

giving rise to the underlying claim.”); Cordeco Dev. Corp. v.

Santiago Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256, 262-63 (1st Cir. 1976), cert.

denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976) (disapproving the position that the

bad faith exception extends to bad faith in the events giving rise

to litigation).

lla

exhibited bad faith in the conduct of this litigation by:

(i) advising the Army to extend its practice of

reducing the reimbursements paid for replacing

carpet damaged by occupants to reflect the age of the

carpeting--a practice the parties referred to as

“depreciation;” and (ii) triggering, or at least

promoting, a criminal investigation of plaintiff's

conduct that caused the court to stay this action for

nearly a year (and which ultimately resulted in no

indictments). Second, plaintiff contends that fees

should be imposed because the Army corrupted the

contract claim resolution process, inappropriately

coercing the contracting officers into denying various

contract claims filed by plaintiff. For its part,

however, defendant contends that all the conduct

identified by the plaintiff was “primary conduct” that

formed the “basis for the substantive claim for relief’

here. It argues that, under Centex, such conduct

provides no basis for assessing attorney's fees under

the “bad faith” exception to the American Rule. And

it asserts that much of the conduct identified by

plaintiff as the basis for its fee claim simply was not

characterized by the court as being in bad faith.

A

The latter point bears emphasis at the outset. In

fact, the court did not find--and plaintiff did not

prove--that Mr. Kinner engaged in any bad faith

conduct regarding the Army's decision to extend its

depreciation practice to other occupant-damaged

items replaced by plaintiff. As this court previously

described, the Army's initial decision to reduce the

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reimbursement associated with replacing carpeting

initially was supported by at least one decision of this

court that had allowed such depreciation. North

Star, 76 Fed. Cl. at 201 (citing West Carthage Assocs.

v. United States, No. 00-622C (Fed. Cl. May 30,

2002)). Based, inter alia, upon the existence of this

precedent, the court found that the Army's initial

decision to adopt the depreciation practice was not

motivated by animus. North Star, 76 Fed. Cl. at 202.

The court, however, went on to find that--

Over time, however, this practice took on new

dimensions. Particularly as viewed through

the prism of the many statements of animus

in the record, it is clear the use of

depreciation clearly became yet another

weapon by which Mr. Peterson, Ms. Kiser and

others could effectuate their animus toward

North Star. And this certainly was true by

the time that these officials, responding to a

July 3, 2002, ruling by this court shedding

considerable doubt on the legality of the

depreciation practice, extended depreciation

to counter tops, vinyl and other types of

materials installed in the units.

North Star, 76 Fed. Cl. at 202. This findings thus

hinged on statements reflecting animus made by Mr.

Peterson, Ms. Kiser and other Army officials. Id.

But, the record contained no such statements made

by Mr. Kinner. Indeed, it is conceivable, if not likely,

that he urged the extension of the depreciation

practice merely in an effort to make the Army's

practices with respect to carpet and other items

legally consistent. That seemingly is the sort of

tactical decision--in itself reasonable--that Centex

13a

intended to protect. At all events, absent any specific

finding that Mr. Kinner acted in bad faith regarding

the depreciation issue, there is no basis upon which

to impose attorney's fees here predicated upon his

participation in the extension decision.

Nor did the court determine that Mr. Kinner acted

in bad faith in seeking a criminal investigation of

plaintiffs conduct. While the circumstances

surrounding the genesis of that investigation are

admittedly bothersome, it remains that the court did

not find--and plaintiff most certainly has not shown--

that the investigation itself, any actions taken by

defendant's prior counsel (or other Justice

Department officials) in pursuit thereof, or any

resulting delay, were the result of bad faith. North

Star, 76 Fed. Cl. at 211; see also United States v.

Ford, 737 F.2d 1506, 1510 (9th Cir. 1984) (fee movant

bears the burden of establishing an opponent's bad

faith); 10 James Wm. Moore, MOORE'S FEDERAL

PRACTICE 4 54.171[2][c] (83d ed. 2008) (citing

additional cases). As such, plaintiff second allegation

also lacks the factual predicates necessary to bring it

within the bad faith exception to the American Rule.

B.

A closer call is presented by plaintiff's final banner

claim--that it is entitled to attorney's fees because

defendant corrupted the administrative claim

process. This court found that bad faith permeated

the Army's conduct in this regard. North Star, 76

Fed. Cl. at 208-12. Moreover, the Federal Circuit, in

Centex, left open the question whether “the judicial

l4a

process is abused by defendant's bad faith response to

a claim for relief after the claim accrues but before

the judicial process is formally invoked.” 486 F.3d at

1372 n. 1. This response, of course, begs further

inquiries regarding the proper contours of the

sanctioning authority represented by the “bad faith”

exception.

The judicial thinking on that subject can be

arrayed over a spectrum. On one end of that

spectrum are those circuits that liberally construe the

sanctioning authority to reach virtually any form of

“bad faith” conduct, freely including that which

predates the litigation. Plaintiff cites two cases that

lie on this end of the _ spectrum--Maritime

Management, Inc. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1326

(11th Cir. 2001) and Brown v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 492

(9th Cir. 1990). In Maritime Management, the

Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court finding that

the United States had acted in bad faith by delivering

an incomplete administrative record to the General

Accounting Office in a bid protest. Maritime Mgmt.,

242 F.3d at 1333-34. And in Brown, the Ninth

Circuit upheld sanctions based upon a Department of

Health and Human _ Services’ program that

systematically reviewed the decisions of

administrative law judges in terms of the ratio of

benefits allowed to benefits denied--a program that

the district court had found was adopted in “bad

faith.” Brown, 916 F.2d at 496-97. Both cases

employed the broad view of the bad faith exception--

the one that permits fee shifting even where the bad

faith was solely an aspect of the conduct giving rise to

the lawsuit. See Maritime Mgmt., 242 F.3d at 1333;

Brown, 916 F.2d at 496. Not surprisingly, decisions

at this end of the spectrum have no problem in

l5a

concluding that the “bad faith” denial of a claim is

sanctionable. Take, for example, American Hosp.

Ass'n v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1991), in

which the D.C. Circuit held that the bad faith

exception may be invoked where “a party, confronted

with a clear statutory or judicially-imposed duty

towards another, is so recalcitrant in performing that

duty that the injured party is forced to undertake

otherwise unnecessary litigation to vindicate plain

legal rights.” Jd. at 220 (citation omitted); see also

S.E.C. v. Zahareas, 374 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2004);

Cobell v. Norton, 319 F.Supp.2d 36, 43-44 (D.D.C.

2004).

At the other end of the spectrum are decisions

that, in more narrowly construing the sanctioning

authority, conclude that fee shifting can never be

based upon “bad faith” conduct that solely predates

the litigation. See Zapata, 313 F.3d at 391 (this

power 18 “is to be exercised sparingly, to punish

misconduct ... occurring in the litigation itself, not in

the events giving rise to the litigation”); Ass'n of

Flight Attendants, 976 F.2d at 549. These cases are

particularly sensitive to the limitations associated

with a court's use of inherent power, drawing

support, in this regard, from the various opinions in

Chambers. They often cite, see, e.g., Towerridge, 111

F.3d at 766, the majority's statement in Chambers

that (“[t]he imposition of sanctions under the bad-

faith exception depends ... on how the parties conduct

themselves during the litigation.”) 501 U.S. at 46.

They also rely, see, e.g., Ass'n of Flight Attendants,

976 F.2d at 549, on Justice Kennedy's dissent, in

which he more pointedly stated--

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When a federal court, through invocation of

its inherent powers, sanctions a party for bad-

faith prelitigation conduct, it goes well

beyond the exception to the American Rule

and violates the Rule's careful balance

between open access to the federal court

system and penalties for the willful abuse of

it.

Chambers, 501 U.S. at 74 (Kennedy, J. dissenting);

see also id. at 60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).”

Tending toward this end of the spectrum are also

decisions that, owing to a general hesitancy to

sanction prelitigation conduct, refuse to assess fees

based upon the underlying conduct that gave rise to

the substantive claims in the case, but admit that

there might be extreme circumstances in which

conduct predating the litigation so impacts the

integrity of the subsequent judicial proceedings as to

give rise to fee-shifting. Compare F.D.I.C.. vu.

2 The majority opinion in Chambers declined to reach the

question whether the “bad faith” exception applied to

prelitigation conduct, as it viewed the district court's sanction

there as applying only to post-litigation conduct. 501 U.S. at 54-

55 & n. 16. The dissenters disagreed with this point, prompting

them to define more directly the scope of the sanctioning

authority. Jd. at 74 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). It should be

noted that the statements in Chambers are not inconsistent

with Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). To be sure, the

Supreme Court allowed an attorney's fee award there because

the defendants had callously refused to pay maintenance and

cure. Jd. at 530-31. But, as the Federal Circuit noted in Centex,

486 F.3d at 1373, that award was based upon long-standing

admiralty principles, which envisioned the recovery of attorney's

fees in the case as an aspect of damages.

17a

Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566 (5th Cir. 2008) with

Sanchez v. Rowe, 870 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1989);

see also 10 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE at 4

54.171[2][c][{ii] (advocating this more limited view).

The varying results in the latter cases often hinge not

so much upon differing views of the law, as upon

factual nuances and deference to district court

findings regarding the impact of prior “bad faith”

conduct on a given court proceeding.

Several reasons convince the court that the more

restrictive view of the “bad faith” exception ought to

apply here. First, this view is more in accord with

the rationale expressed in Centex. After all, the

Federal Circuit refused to follow American Hospital

and clearly aligned itself with those circuits that have

held that an award of attorney's fees may not be

premised on prelitigation conduct unless that conduct

somehow directly impacts the judicial process.

Centex, 486 F.3d at 1371-73. Second, this narrower

view recognizes not only that the imposition of “bad

faith” sanctions ought to be rare, but that that is the

case because it involves the exercise of the court's

inherent authority. That authority is highly lmited

and exists only to the extent necessary to ensure the

proper functioning of the court, that is, to address

actions that affect the exercise of judicial authority,

relate to the behavior of the parties and attorneys in

the litigation before the court, or otherwise “degrade

the judicial system.” Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v.

Rambus, Inc., 523 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008),

cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 279 (2008).3

3 See also Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co.,

23 F.3d 374, 378 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Without a finding of fraud or

18a

Giving effect to these limitations seemingly requires

the court to forego punishing prelitigation conduct

that. does not significantly impact the integrity of the

proceedings before it. Finally, it should not be

overlooked that an approach that predicates fee

liability based solely on how an agency handles an

administrative claim threatens to expose the

government to greater fee liability than its private

counterparts. The latter, of course, generally do not

employ formal claim processes. And even where such

processes exist, usually through contracts, courts

have been hesitant to impose fees based solely on the

bad faith administration of those provisions. See

Lamb, 103 F.3d at 1436-37 (relying on Chambers in

holding that the bad faith administration of a

contract “does not provide a basis upon which the

court may use its inherent power to award attorney

fees”). As such, readily imposing liability on the

government in such circumstances likely violates that

part of section 2412(b) which instructs that “the

United States shall be lable for [attorney’s fees] to

the same extent that any other party would be liable

under the common law.”

Under this narrower view of the “bad faith”

exception, the Army's “bad faith” conduct as to the

claims process here does not support the imposition of

attorney’s fees. For one thing, even though that

process plainly was conducted in bad faith, many, if

not all, of plaintiff's claims would have been denied--

bad faith whereby the ‘very temple of justice has been defiled,’

the court enjoys no discretion to employ inherent powers to

impose sanctions.”); Zapata, 313 F.3d at 391.

19a

and, in some instances, should have been denied--

even in a perfectly fair process. This court said as

much in its prior opinion, in which it rejected much of

the relief originally requested by plaintiff in its CDA

claims, including plaintiffs claim that it was entitled

to damages for the loss of its business value, by far

the most dollar-intensive of its claims. See North

Star, 76 Fed. Cl. at 213-17. And there is no assertion

(or proof) that defendant acted in “bad faith” in

defending against the claims that this court

sustained--again suggesting that virtually all the

claims here would have been denied even in a “good

faith” process. As such, unlike cases like American

Hospital, it is hardly true here that, but for the bad

faith, plaintiff could have avoided this action and the

significant expenditure of judicial resources it

entailed. In other words, this is not a case in which

the identified conduct directly impacted the integrity

of the judicial process. Moreover, while the court

does not believe, as defendant intimates, that Centex

requires that anything pled as part of a complaint

becomes, by virtue of that fact, part and parcel of a

substantive primary claim, here, the fact remains

that the Army’s perversion of the claims process was

an integral part of plaintiffs argument that

defendant had breached its covenant of good faith

and fair dealing and, concomitantly, of the court's

findings in that regard. As such, the “bad faith”

conduct in this regard appears to fall squarely within

the category which Centex holds cannot form the

basis for a “bad faith” fees claim.

Plaintiff makes a variety of other lesser allegations

in support of its fee request--for example, that bad

faith warranting fee shifting was exhibited when, at

trial, certain witnesses testified in contradiction to

20a

hard evidence, or when the government allegedly

used the criminal investigation to supplement

inappropriately its discovery. But, these allegations

are just that--allegations--unsupported by any

evidence evincing bad faith. Other claims made by

plaintiff--for example, that certain Army officials

falsified project records--again represent primary

conduct supporting substantive bad faith contentions

in the lawsuit at issue or in one of the subsequent

lawsuits that plaintiff filed with respect to this same

contract. As such, like plaintiff's principal

allegations, none of these other assertions supports

an award of attorney's fees.

ITT.

Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES

plaintiffs motion for attorney's fees and litigation

expenses.

IT 1S SO ORDERED.

2la

APPENDIX D

Case 1:98-cv-00168-FMA Document 361

Filed: 04/15/2008

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 98-168 C

NORTH STAR ALASKA HOUSING

CORPORATION,

JUDGMENT

V.

THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to the court’s Opinion and Order, filed

March 7, 2007, the parties’ Joint Status Report

Proposing Judgment, filed on May 4, 2007,

defendant’s filing of Incentive Fee Decisions on June

21, 2007, and the court’s April 14, 2007 Order

Directing Judgment,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this date,

pursuant to Rule 58, that judgment is in favor of the

plaintiff in the following amounts:

A. For the fire that occurred at 765 Bataan

Court on August 23, 1996, $15,695.63, plus

interest on that amount as provided in the

Contract Disputes Act (CDA), calculated

from September 12, 1996;

B.

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For rent reductions based upon alleged

excess downtime for February through June

2002, $7,506.33, plus interest on that

amount as provided in the CDA, calculated

from September 4, 2002; and

. For incentive fees for contract performance

year 1998, $56,667.00, plus interest on the

amount as provided in the CDA, calculated

from March 29, 1999.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

that the court declares that plaintiff is entitled to

receive the following incentive fees:

A.

For incentive fees for contract performance

year 1999, $55,437.00, plus any interest as

provided by law;

For incentive fees for contract performance

years 2000, $52,835.00, plus any interest as

provided by law; and

. For incentive fees for contract performance

year 2001, $53,614.00, plus any interest as

provided by law.

John S. Buckley

Acting Clerk of Court

April 15, 2008

By: s/Lisa L. Reys

Deputy Clerk

23a

NOTE: As to appeal, 60 days from this date, see

RCFC 58.1, re number of copies and listing of all

plaintiffs. Filing fee is $455.00.

24a

APPENDIX E

United States Court of Federal Claims

NORTH STAR ALASKA HOUSING

CORPORATION, Plaintiff,

Vv

The UNITED STATES, Defendant.

Nos. 98-168C, 02-1632C, 03-2699C.

Filed under seal: March 7, 2007.

Reissued: April 2, 2007.!

OPINION

ALLEGRA, Judge.

Just follow the Miami Hurricane's Game Plan.

Blitz Fisher the first time he takes the handoff from

Wartes. Force them to go for the short gains. Keep

them out of the red zone. On offense, exercise good ball

control and mix up the plays to throw off their timing.

Try to draw them offsides and into a _ penalty

1 An unredacted version of this opinion was issued under

seal on March 7, 2007. The parties were given an opportunity to

propose redactions, but no such proposals were made.

Accordingly, the opinion is issued in its original form, with

minor corrections.

25a

situation. And always remember that you have home

field advantage.?

Despite what might appear, this is neither a case

about football, nor even sports-at least, the athletic

sort. Rather, it is a government contract case, before

the court following trial in Fairbanks, Alaska, as well

as trial and closing arguments in Washington, D.C.

Armed with charged quotes like the above, plaintiff

alleges, inter alia, that defendant's representatives

acted in bad faith in administering the subject

housing contract-driven by animus that led them to

breach the contract repeatedly and to interpret other

provisions in a fashion calculated to deny plaintiff the

benefits of the bargain. So the question is-did

defendant act in bad faith? And the answer, in light

of the record, is-yes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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B. Critachl TERMS OF CBO LORKS «....000ccccscnccsscsccecscsccsscssevene 161

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es INTE occ cc cdposcaceicekacecubunasiveuiscss ad ioe 169

Ss a scusabudeinenibanbous ten 173

Fs RRR eS Eceneem ewan ene ence meee 175

ERE RE ee ricer rater ee Tree 176

6. 2003 and forward......................0..... PROP NE ra 18]

ED. PS Bi TINO ec assncostnnccagennececcctescesctienes eens 182

2 Thomas Beech Peterson, Chief of Housing, Department for

Public Works, State of Alaska, United States Army.

Ly Sa. ccccscsocscoceees —

Pi, Oe cette asters ss vies: see a 183

B. Bad Faith... 5 I ES, | |

: Standard of Proof... (0 187

2. Did Defendant Act in Bad Faith?.. oe ae

a. Specific Statements Evidencing Animus

“Just follow the Miami Hurricane's

en ciccssnsccccocens 190

b. Actions Taken by Defendant Indicative of

Bad Faith-“Force them to go for the short

gains. On offense, exercise good ball

control and mix up the plays to throw off

their timing. Try to draw them offsides

and into a penalty situation.”........... ..193

1. Actions that Increased Downtime .... 194

2. Downtime Calculations ........................005. 198

3. Actions Otherwise Designed to Increase Nort h

ons ccscssrevacccnoones 200

4. Actions Designed to Reduce North Star's

Compensation ..............06..0065 Ss 203

5. Other Issues.. as 205

c. Abuse of the Diapute Re solution Process:

“always remember that you have home

field advantage’”............... 208

a ee A 212

C. Damages... lacuastaecese ates rd ae

1. Lose of Value... : 213

2. Other Damages..... 217

I]. CONCLUSION ............ 217

Fact AIS Bisiasiientssiscies: 219

Fact Appendix I] ...........ccccrcersveses eens ..222

Fact Appendix II1........... reer et ccive 225

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

Based on the record, including the _ parties’

stipulations, the court finds as follows:

A. Background

North Star Alaska Housing Corporation (North

Star) is a Seattle, Washington-based corporation,

27/a

whose president and owner is Richard Fischer. After

a competitive bidding process, North Star was

awarded a contract to design and build a 400-unit

housing project for soldiers and their families at Fort

Wainwright, Alaska, in the southeast section of

Fairbanks, Alaska. The award resulted in a long.

term relationship between North Star and the Army

Corps of Engineers (Army), the terms of which are

outlined in a series of contracts between the two

parties. Lease No. DACA: 85-1-86-11 requires North

Star to lease property on Fort Wainwright for thirty-

two years, through June 26, 2018. Lease Contract

No. DACA: 85-9-86-27 requires North Star to lease

the same property with residential buildings and

other improvements back to the government. Lease

No. DACA: 85-5-88-17, entered into on November 6,

1987, is the lease of the improved property from

North Star to the Army for a term of nineteen years

and six months, through May 5, 2007. Under this

agreement (the Lease), the Army agreed to rent all

400 units in the development; it pays shelter rent for

the use of the housing and maintenance rent for

maintenance and _ operational — services. The

residential development resulting from this project is

referred to as Birchwood Estates (Birchwood). See

generally, North Star Alaska Housing Corp. v. United

States, 30 Fed. Cl. 259, 265 (1993) (describing these

events).

The last decade of the administration of the

leaseback phase of Birchwood has been quarre]some,

to say the least. Prior to the initiation of this action,

the parties agreed to settle a prior suit filed by North

Star involving various claims arising out of the

leaseback. Subsequent to that settlement, problems

with the leaseback continued and North Star

23a

disputed various actions taken by the Army's

representatives in the administration of the contract.

Ultimately, North Star filed claims with the

contracting officer regarding a number of these

matters. After some procedural machinations,

various of these claims were incorporated into the

First Amended Complaint filed in this case by North

Star on August 23, 1999. Following settlement

negotiations and an extended debate regarding

whether a binding settlement had occurred, plaintiff

filed a Second Amended Complaint in this case on

April 16, 2002, which included essentially the same

seven counts in the First Amended Complaint, but

expanded somewhat on plaintiffs prior allegations of

bad faith

B. Critical Terms of the Lease

To determine whether plaintiff's contractual rights

have been breached, the court first must determine

what those rights are. See San Carlos Irrigation and

Drainage District v. United States, 877 F.2d 957, 959

(Fed. Cir. 1989); Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v.

United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 751, 759 (2003). At the

outset, then, the court must outline the provisions in

the Lease that underlie the disputes that will be

discussed in greater detail below.

1. Basic Provisions

Article I of the Lease provides that the “Premises”

includes “land situated on the Fort Wainwright

Military Reservation ... together with the

improvements constructed and provided thereon.”

29a

Article IV of the Lease specifies that “the

Government shall pay to [North Star] an annual

rental ... consist[ing] of a shelter rent and a

maintenance rent” and that the “portion of the

annual rental attributable to maintenance shall be

increased or decreased at the commencement of each

year.” Article VIII of the Lease states that-

lijn addition to rents stipulated in Article IV

of this Lease, the Government, at its option,

may pay [North Star] an incentive fee not to

exceed 5 percent (5%) of the maintenance

rental for all housing units, for the period of

time for which [North Star's] performance of

the obligations and responsibilities contained

herein are evaluated and found by the

Government to substantially exceed the

established standards. The amount of the

incentive fee shall be determined by an

Incentive Fee Board based upon the

performance of [North Star] in operating the

Premises in accordance with its obligation.

Exhibit ‘C’ contains the provisions to

establish the makeup of the Board and the

procedures for determining such bonuses.”

+ Section H.4. of the maintenance annex provides that “[ajn

incentive fee, for exceptional performance of standards

contained in this annex, not to exceed 5 percent of the

‘Maintenance Rental’, will be determined on an annual basis by

a board composed of three (Army) Officers or civilian personnel

who will evaluate [North Star's] performance over the preceding

twelve-month period. The board will make a determination

within 60 days after the end of the period to grant all, some, or

none of the incentive award fee.”

30a

Exhibit C to the Lease is the “Maintenance, Repair

and Operational Services Standards Annex” (herein

referred to as the “maintenance annex”), in which

most of the details regarding how Birchwood is to be

run are found.‘

Various provisions in the Lease map the contours

of the parties' responsibilities in regards to the

property-these obligations flow to and from North

Star, the Army, and the soldier occupants of the

units. Regarding North Star's responsibilities in

maintaining the property, section E of the

maintenance annex declares that-

[North Star] shall be_ responsible for

maintaining all real property assets provided

for in this lease agreement including dwelling

units ... to a standard that prevents

deterioration beyond that which results from

normal wear and tear, and _ corrects

deficiencies in a timely manner to assure full

life expectancy of the facilities and

equipment. The level of maintenance shall

assure all structures are free of missing

components or defects which would affect the

4 Section B.18. of the maintenance annex defines

“Maintenance” as “[t]he recurring periodic or scheduled work

required to preserve real property facilities, systems, moveable

equipment, and accessories in such condition that they may be

effectively utilized for their designated purpose.” Article IV of

the Lease provides that “[i]t is expressly understood and agreed

to by [North Star] that the obligations of the Government to

make any payments under this agreement and Lease [are]

subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose.”

3la

safety, pleasing appearance or habitability of

the units or would prevent any electrical,

mechanical, plumbing or structural system

from functioning in accordance with the

de ign intent.... The quality of the work and

the repaired areas shall be fully compatible

with adjacent surfaces or equipment. All

replacements shall match existing

dimensions, material, quality of work, finish,

color and design.... Wherever the term

‘pleasing appearance’ is used in this or

subsequent paragraphs, it shall be construed

to mean an appearance similar to the original

finished appearance with only minor,

nonobjectionable deterioration resulting from

normal use. The housing unit shall be

evaluated against the maintenance standards

contained herein to determine deficiencies

requiring corrections.

A series of other provisions in the maintenance annex

requires North Star to maintain interior wall

systems, linoleum and other tile floor coverings,

carpeting, house accessories, outside recreational

equipment, and painting.6 Section G.1l. of the

maintenance annex obligates North Star to ensure

5 The Lease is particularly specific regarding painting,

indicating in section E.8.(c) of the maintenance annex that-

[pJaint ... shall be carefully applied with good clean

brushes, approved rollers or by airless spraying...

Finish coats shall be smooth and free from runs, sags

or other surface preparation defects. Each coat of paint

shall be of sufficient thickness to cover completely the

previous coat or surfaces.

32a

that refuse is collected “twice weekly with three days

between collections,” while section G.3.(a) of the

maintenance annex requires North Star to provide

janitorial services.

Further, section E.8.(d) of the maintenance annex

provides that “[cJomplete interior painting will be

accomplished as required in conjunction with the

change of occupancy work. Complete interior

painting will be accomplished at the first change of

occupancy occurring subsequent to the 3rd, 6th, 9th,

12th, 15th, and 18th years of the_lease agreement.”

This provision additionally states that “[c]omplete or

partial interior painting during all other changes of

occupancy, except where required in connection with

maintenance and repair, will be at the discretion of

[North Star].”

Resident handbooks that were issued periodically

during the years in question gave soldiers and their

families instructions on how to clean their units.

Inter alia, the 2000 version of this handbook

instructed residents to “maintain [the] quarters as a

prudent homeowner, and report any needed repairs;”

“{tlo keep the premises clean and safe inside and

outside;” “[t]o dispose of trash properly and in a

timely manner;” “[t]o use all electrical, plumbing,

sanitary, heating and appliances properly and in

accordance with applicable manuals;” to maintain the

appearance of yards, landscaping and playgrounds;

and to exercise care in dealing with cigarettes,

matches and lighters. The handbook emphasized that

residents would be responsible for pet damage. An

appendix to the handbook stressed that: (i) “[ijf the

resident willfully or negligently destroys, defaces,

damages, impairs, or removes any part of the

33a

premises (including fixtures, facilities, and

apphances) or willfully or negligently permits any

person to do so, replacement or repair will be at the

resident's expense;” and (ii) “[t]he residents will at

their own expense ... replace or repair all broken or

damaged glass, screens, flooring, wood plaster,

drywall, and locks occurring during their occupancy,

normal wear and tear excepted.”

Other provisions in the Lease distinguish between

permissible modifications to the units, ordinary wear

and tear, and occupant-caused damage. Article VII of

the Lease recites that “[t]he Government shall have

the right ... to make alterations, attach fixtures, and

erect additions, structures, or signs in or upon the

Premises. However, no such changes shall be made to

any improvement without the written consent of

[North Star].” As to occupant damage, Section C.1.(s)

of the maintenance annex specifies that-

[djamages to a housing unit or to other

improvements within the project which are

beyond normal wear and tear and are caused

by the Government or an occupant, his

dependents, or invited guests, which are not

corrected by the Government or occupant,

shall be repaired by [North Star]. The cost of

such repairs. shall be billed to the

Government.... Repair of damages which

occur to the units or other improvements that

cannot be attributed to the Government, his

agents, officers, occupants, their dependents,

or invited guests, shall be accomplished by

[North Star] at no cost to the Government.

Section D.7.(c) of the maintenance annex provides

34a

that “[iJn the event the occupant fails to properly

clean the unit for any reason, or correct damages

beyond normal wear and tear for which the occupant

is responsible, it shall become [North Star's]

responsibility to satisfactorily clean and repair the

unit for the next occupant.” Section C.2.(c)(10) of the

annex indicates that the government is required to

notify North Star “via work authorization of

occupant-caused damages or conditions requiring

correction or cleaning and reimburs[e] [North Star]

for accomplishment of same.” Section C.3.(a) of the

maintenance annex provides that “occupants shall be

lable for loss or damage to the housing unit or

equipment caused by the abuse or negligence of the

assigned occupant, dependents, or guests.”

To minimize debates regarding the cost of various

repairs, Section C.1.(t) of the maintenance annex sets

forth that-

{North Star] shall, with the approval of the

Government, establish a list of cleaning and

repair costs for dwelling unit components

which will establish the normal maximum

amounts to be charged in the event of damage

to property and equipment installed within a

living unit over and above normal wear and

tear. The list of repair costs will be based

upon the latest published edition of applicable

Engineered Performance Standards (EPS)

Manuals (Army TB 420-series, Navy

NAVFAC P-700 Series, Air Force AFM 85-

series) which will be utilized to estimate

manhour requirements... The manhour

requirements will be multiplied by the

Department of Labor Service Contract Act

35a

Wage Determination rate plus materials at

wholesale cost plus reasonable overhead and

profit.... Such a list will be subject to change

annually or from time to time by mutual

agreement of [North Star] and_ the

Government. Examples of items which might

be included on this list are cleaning of stove,

refrigerator, and entire dwelling unit,

replacement of interior door,

patching/repairing hole in interior door,

patching/repairing hole in dry wall...

Under section C.2.(c)(11) of the maintenance annex,

the Government is required to “[a]pprove [an] annual

.. hist of repair costs for occupant damages and

printed occupant instructions as submitted by [North

Star].” Further, section H.2. of the maintenance

annex states that for those items of work for which

North Star is entitled to reimbursement, “the

Government shall issue a work authorization, in

writing, authorizing the accomplishment of such

work,” indicating that North Star's “charges for this

work will be based upon the approved list of repair

costs.” Likewise, sections H.3.(a) and (b) of the

maintenance annex indicate that North Star is to

submit invoices for services performed in response to

the work authorizations, that the billing should be “in

accordance with the approved List of Repair Costs,”

and that “[uJpon the Government's verification of

work actually performed invoices will be processed for

payment.”

The Lease prescribes certain staffing requirements

fore the site. The Army appoints a “housing project

manager, who, under section B.15. of the

maintenance annex, is “charged with the

36a

responsibility for the day-to-day administration of the

housing site and fulfillment of the Government's

responsibilities under the terms of [the] lease

agreement.” Amplifying the responsibilities of this

job, section C.2.(b) of the maintenance annex explains

that the manager “shall serve as the primary point of

contact for matters involving the day-to-day

coordination and administration of the Government's

responsibilities.” Correspondingly, under section

B.28. of the maintenance annex, North Star appoints

a “site manager,’ who is its “[p]rimary point of

contact authorized to act ... in all matters regarding

work required at the housing site.” Section C.1.(c)(2)

of the maintenance annex provides that “[North Star]

shall furnish sufficient personnel to perform all work

specified within this annex.”® In this regard, section

C.1. of the maintenance annex provides that-“[North

Star] is responsible for the ... maintenance, repair,

replacement ... and all operations required to support

the housing site. This includes ... housing units ... and

all other components and systems of the total housing

site insofar as such responsibilities are not normally

undertaken by local governmental authorities.”

Section C.1.(4) of the maintenance annex provides

that “{t]he quality and workmanship of maintenance,

repair, replacement, and operational services shall be

6 Section D.1..of the maintenance annex provides that

“(North Star} is responsible for managing the total work effort

associated with the maintenance and other services required

herein to assure fully adequate and timely completion of these

services.... [North Star] is expected to assure an adequate staff

of personnel, with the necessary management expertise, at the

housing site continuously to assure the completion of the work

in accordance with sound and efficient management practices.”

37a

first class in every respect and will be subject to the

approval of the Government.”

The Lease also. provides for performance

monitoring and the resolution of disputes. Thus,

section C.2.(c)(17) of the maintenance annex says

that the government must “give [North Star] written

notice of either noncompliance or unsatisfactory work

on the part of [North Star].” Section D.3. of the

maintenance annex states that-

{North Star] shall meet with the Government

periodically as called for by the Government.

A mutual effort will be made to resolve all

problems identified. The written minutes of

these meetings, prepared by the Government,

shall be signed by [North Star] and the

Government. Should [North Star] not concur

with the minutes, [North Star] will state, in

writing, to the Government any areas of

disagreement.

Further, section C.2.(c)(15) of the maintenance annex

provides that the government is required to

“[s]chedule, arrange, and conduct performance

7 Section C.1.(h) of the maintenance annex provides that

“{a] facility history file for each housing unit ... identified by

address shall be maintained by [North Star]. Each file shall

contain a copy of all Government-issued work authorizations,

preventative maintenance inspection reports[,} ... routine

maintenance or repair, and renovation work orders in progress

or completed. The Government shall require access to these files

and they shall be available for periodic review by the

Government. All documents shall be filed within 10 days of the

completed transaction.”

38a

evaluation meetings with [North Star], and any other

parties deemed necessary by the Government.”

2. Change of Occupancy

The Lease contains a number of provisions

governing changes of occupancy. Inter alia, it

provides a specific set of procedures for determining

deficiencies in a particular unit, who is responsible

for the costs for repairing those deficiencies, and how

and when those deficiencies are to be remedied.

Central to these mandates are a detailed set of

inspection procedures.

Section D.7.(b) of the maintenance annex states

that North Star “is responsible for conducting or

participating in various types of inspections as

described below,” which inspections “shall be

conducted in accordance with the technical standards

and guidance provided here.” In this regard, the

Lease provides for a pre-termination inspection, a

termination inspection and an acceptance inspection.

Section C.2.(c)(7) of the annex makes the government

responsible for scheduling and coordinating these

inspections, while section C.2.(c)(8) of the annex

requires the government to advise North Star “of

proposed occupancy changes and _ date of

pretermination and termination.” In this regard,

section D.7.(b)(1) of the maintenance annex adds:

8 Section B.7. of the maintenance annex defines “Change of

Occupancy” as “[t]he termination of assignment by the

Government of [an] occupant to a unit or the assignment of [an]

occupant by the Government to a unit and the associated

downtime occurring between these two events.”

39a

The Government will schedule a_ pre-

termination and termination inspection after

being advised by the occupant of an

impending move. These inspections will be

scheduled during normal working hours. The

Government will, in writing, notify [North

Star] of the date, time, and address of each

inspection. The Government will make every

effort to provide this notice 21 days in

advance of the projected change of occupancy.

Because of short-time occupant orders or

other extenuating circumstance, [North Star]

can expect an average of 10-14 days advance

notice. [North Star], or [its] representative, is

required to attend the pre-termination

inspection.

As to. pre-termination inspections, section

D.7.(b)(2) of the maintenance annex indicates that-

During the _ pre-termination inspection,

[North Star] shall identify and prepare work

orders covering all painting, maintenance,

and repair work required of [North Star]. The

Government shall jointly identify, with the

occupant, all damage to property and

installed equipment which is over and above

normal wear and tear and which is the

occupant's responsibility to correct. The

Government will provide the occupant with a

list of this work and associated costs for

which the occupant is liable, as contained on

the approved list of repair costs, and provide

a copy to [North Star]. At the conclusion of

this inspection, the Government shall notify,

in writing, [North Star] of the firm date and

40a

time for the final inspection and the date and

time that the unit will be turned over to

[North Star] for accomplishment of change of

occupancy work. [North Star], in turn, shall

immediately provide the Government with a

firm written commitment as to the date and

time that the unit will be turned back over to

the Government for assignment to the next

occupant.

These pre-termination inspections are designed, in

part, to allow North Star to prepare for the work that

it will perform during the downtime following the

change in occupancy.

Regarding the termination inspection, section

D.7.(b)(3) of the maintenance annex states that “[t]he

Government will conduct the termination inspection

jointly with the occupant after the furnishings have

been removed.” It further indicates that North Star's

“representation at the termination inspection is at

[its] discretion.” The termination inspection is

performed after the occupant has been afforded an

opportunity to remedy certain of the deficiencies

identified at the pre-termination inspection. It also

allows the parties to adjust, as necessary, the

schedule for the Army to turn a unit over to North

Star and for North Star to return the unit for a new

tenant. In this regard, section D.7.(b)(3) of the Lease

explains-

Should the date and time that the unit will be

turned over to [North Star] change for any

reason, the Government shall immediately

notify [North Star] in writing of the revised

date and time. [North Star] will then

immediately notify the Government, in

4la

writing, of the revised date and time that the

unit will be turned over to the Government

for assignment. Subsequent to the

termination inspection, the Government will

issue to the [North Star] a work authorization

for the repair of damages, or accomplishment

of cleaning, which are the responsibility of the

occupant but were not completed at the time

of the termination inspection.

Section D.7.(a) of the maintenance annex indicates

that “[w]Jork identified by [North Star] or [the]

Government during the pre-termination and final

termination inspections which is required to make a

unit ready for the next occupant, shall be

accomplished while the unit is vacant.” It states that

“(t]his work includes any routine maintenance and

repair, as well as interior painting.” Section C.1.(p) of

the maintenance annex requires that after North

Star performs the necessary repairs and

replacements and, “[p]rior to acceptance of a unit by

the Government,” North Star “shall clean the entire

unit” and “shall insure units meet the same standard

of cleanliness the Government’ requires’ of

terminating occupants.” This work includes “removal

of all stains, fingerprints, and paint spots, cleaning of

all dust and dirt, washing of windows, cleaning of all

appliances, cleaning of all ceramic tile, and washing

of floors.”

Section D.7.(d) of the maintenance annex reads

that “[u]Jpon completion of all change of occupancy

work, [North Star] wil notify the Government of

work completion and unit availability,” at which

point the Army conducts the third of the change of

occupancy inspections, the “acceptance inspection.”

42a

Section B.2. of the maintenance annex defines the

“Acceptance Inspection” as “[t}he inspection of a

vacant unit between changes of occupancy or

subsequent to completion of renovation work to

ensure that all work has been’ completed

satisfactorily and that the unit is in a presentable

condition for viewing and acceptance by a prospective

occupant.” Providing further information about these

inspections, section C.2.(a) of the maintenance annex

declares-

[alcceptance inspections of all dwelling units

will be conducted ... after completion of repair

or rehabilitation work on the unit. The

Government shall conduct these inspections

jointly with [North Star]. The Government

will schedule these inspections to occur on the

same date that the work is completed if

notification of work completion is received

before 12:00 noon, or before 12:00 noon of the

next workday, if such notification is received

er 12:00 noon, at a time that is mutually

reeable. The Government has the right to

‘use to accept the unit if the work has not

been completed or performed satisfactorily or

is otherwise not in accordance with the

provisions of this annex. The Government

shall, immediately upon conclusion of the

acceptance inspection, notify [North Star] in

writing of acceptance or refusal. If the unit is

refused, the Government shall also notify

[North Star], in writing, of all discrepancies

requiring correction.

Section H.1.(c) of the maintenance annex provides

that “{iJn the event [North Star] fails to complete

ASa

change of occupancy maintenance work by the date

identified by [North Star] as when the unit would be

returned to the Government ... the Government shall

assess liquidated damages based on the most current

average daily rate of BAQ [basic allowance for

quarters] plus VHA [variable housing allowance] plus

average daily lease cost per unit for each calendar

day subsequent to that date.”

3. Downtime

Many of North Star's claims here involve

“downtime,” defined by Section D.5. of | the

maintenance annex as “the period during which a

housing unit is vacant for reasons of change of

occupancy, maintenance work, major repair or

unhabitability, or restoration of units damayed by

fires or acts of God.” That section emphasizes that

“(North Star] shall ensure that downtime while a unit

has been turned over to fit] does not exceed the

allowable time prescribed [in sections D.5.(a) and (b)

of the maintenance annex].” It further stresses that

“Idjowntime must be minimized in order to maximize

occupancy of these units.” Section B.10. of the

maintenance annex similarly defines “Downtime” as

“[t]he period of time during which a unit 1s vacant

and has been officially turned over to [North Star] for

accomplishment of required work,” and adds that

“(flor purposes of this lease agreement, downtime is

measured in working days, vice calendar days.”

The Lease contains a detailed description of how

downtime is to be calculated. Section D.5.(a) of the

. ° “gy

maintenance annex, entitled “Change of Occupancy

Downtime,” provides that “[t}he total number of

44a

downtime days for units vacant for purposes of

change of occupancy maintenance shall not exceed

the number of moveouts (excluding moveouts for

purposes of scheduled repairs or fires and acts of

God) per month multiplied by 3 days.” It indicates

further that “if [in] any 5-day work period, more than

eight units are turned over to [North Star], two

additional days will be allowed for each unit in excess

of eight.’9 Likewise, section D.5.(b) of the

maintenance annex, entitled “Scheduled Repair or

Renovation Downtime,” provides that-

[djowntime for reasons of scheduled repair or

renovation will be completed on the basis of

the actual number of days any specific unit

has been turned over to [North Star] for such

8 As to the “3-day” rule, the Lease gives the following

example: “For example, if there are 10 move-outs in 1 month,

the total allowable downtime for that month is 30 days.” As to

the “5-day” rule, the Lease gives the following example-

For example, if there are 17 move-outs in a month, the

total allowable downtime is 51 days. However, if 11 of

these units were turned over to [North Star] within a

5-day work period, an additional] 6 days will be allowed

for a total of 57 days in allowable downtime

(representing the additional 2 days for each of the

units in excess of eight turned over within a 5-day

work period added to the 51 days allowed for 17 move-

outs).

Despite Lease provisions suggesting that downtime is to be

measured on an average monthly basis, section D.7.(d)(1) of the

maintenance annex states that “[a]ll change of occupancy work

must be completed within three working days after the unit

becomes available, which shall be determined from the date the

unit is turned over to [North Star] by the Government for

change of occupancy work.”

45a

work. The downtime period will begin with

the date the Government turns the unit over,

in writing, to [North Star] for this purpose

and will end when the Government accepts,

in writing, the unit from [North Star]

subsequent to work completion.

Section D.7.(d)(2) of the maintenance annex

provides that “[t]he downtime period will be

determined as follows: If the unit becomes

available prior to 12:00 noon, the period will

begin at 1:00 p.m. that day. If the unit

becomes available at 12:00 noon or later, the

maintenance period will begin at the start of

the following work day.”

The Lease provides for penalties snould North Star

fail to comply with the downtime provisions. Section

D.5.(b) of the maintenance annex indicates that

“{djeductions for [North Star's] failure to adhere to

the scheduled downtime will be in accordance with

clause H.1. [of the maintenance annex].” Section H.

1.(d) of the annex provides that “[i]f the downtime in

any one month for units vacant for purposes of

change of occupancy work exceeds the allowable

downtime for that month (established in accordance

with clause D.5.(a) [of the maintenance annex] ), the

Government shall assess liquidated damages based

on the most current average daily rate of BAQ plus

VHA plus average daily lease cost for each calendar

day in excess of the allowabie downtime.”

C. The Dispute: A Chronology

The findings in this segment are described

chronologically, rather than by the subject dispute

46a

(e.g., downtime or incentive fees), because the record

demonstrates that conflicts involving the Lease fed

on each other, with new disputes springing up

periodically to further complicate matters.

Understanding this synergy is key to a _ proper

understanding and analysis of plaintiff's bad faith

claims.

1. 1989 through 1995

During the first several years after the contract

was awarded, disputes began to arise, among them

concern over the phase-in of the project itself, refuse

collection, the timing of various rent payments, and

whether defendant was required to have an on-site

manager. However, these issues were addressed

under the dispute resolution mechanism provided by

the contract; the parties otherwise enjoyed a positive

working relationship. Indicative of this is the fact

that, as illustrated in the following chart, from 1987

through 1992, North Star received various incentive

fee awards, often accompanied by glowing transmittal

letters that lauded its efforts:!°

10 For example, the Army's January 4, 1989, letter

announcing the fee award for 1988 indicated that North Star

had “demonstrated exceptional response to the soldiers and

their families” and had “done very high quality work.” Likewise,

a 1991 letter from the Army awarding North Star an incentive

fee, thanked North Star for “the high standards of work

accomplishment, excellent customer service and _ very

professional project management,” and commented, “[t]he

incentive fee award is well deserved by your staff and is

government money well spent.” Indeed, a January 1993, letter

notified North Star that the Birchwood project had been

47a

1987 (interim period) $13,236.09

1988 $42,921.00

1989 $56,113.93

1990 $50,295.78

1991 $52,398.78

1992 $53,326.19

In 1993, when several issues were not resolved to

its satisfaction by contracting officer decisions, North

Star filed a lawsuit in this court. On December 22,

1993, this court granted, in part, and denied, in part,

the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

Despite this litigation, North Star continued to

receive essentially the maximum incentive fees

allowed-$54,041.30 for 1993 confirmed by a decision

issued on February 2, 1994, and $55,225.00 for 1994

confirmed by a decision issued on January 11, 1995.

In September of 1995, the lawsuit was settled. In

the settlement agreement, North Star offered “to

assume full responsibility for refuse collection and

disposal,” for which the United States agreed to

provide North Star $1,000 per month. However, a

disagreement eventually arose over what this

provision entailed. On November 22, 1995, the Fort

Wainwright Director of Public Works informed the

highlighted at a recent hearing of the Senate Defense

Appropriations Subcommittee, where it was “described in a U.S.

Army, Pacific, fact sheet as an extremely successful project and

a prototype for future Army housing initiatives.”

48a

Commander, U.S. Army Engineer District Alaska

that “[t]he Army standard for adequate housing is

weekly curbside trash pick-up.” On December 1,

1995, the contracting officer pointed North Star to

the Lease provision requiring that North Star “insure

that refuse is collected twice weekly” and directed

North Star to provide the same type of refuse

collection and disposal as required by the Lease.

During this same year, disputes began to arise

concerning the calculation of downtime and changes

of occupancy. But, again, these disputes appear to

have been handled amicably, with Suzanne M.

Harrison, the Chief of the Housing Division at Fort

Wainwright, indicating in an August 17, 1995,

memorandum that “[a]s always, North Star was very

cooperative in assisting Housing in gaining maximum

utilization of these 400 units.” Others, however, had

different ideas. An October 27, 1995, memorandum

that was coordinated by Thomas B. Peterson, the

Chief of Housing for the Army's Department for

Public Works in Alaska, instructed, as to the Lease's

downtime provisions, that North Star's “failure to

meet timeframes so computed should result in the

enforcement of penalties.” Several weeks later, on

November 22, 1995, Karen Goodrich, then the Chief

of Housing at Fort Wainwright, alerted Mr. Peterson

that a dispute continued as to what the 1995

settlement required in terms of trash removal.!!

11 Although at other points in the record it appears that the

debate involved both the periodicity of the pick ups and whether

they would be curbside, Ms. Goodrich, in her memorandum,

apparently focused only on the former issue, as she stated that

“[a]n out of court settlement was reached to allow the contractor

to decrease pick-up from twice a week to once a week.”

49a

That same day, Mr. Peterson wrote the Commander

of the U.S. Army Engineer District for Alaska, stating

that North Star has “unilaterally eliminated trash

collection services.” While admitting that “weekly

curbside trash pick-up” was the Army standard, Mr.

Peterson indicated that North Star's failure to pick

up trash represented an “unanticipated, unfortunate

and totally unsatisfactory elimination of services

[that] needs to be resolved immediately.”!2 He

requested “intervention to correct this blatant

abrogation of support responsibility for 801

Birchwood residents.” On November 29, 1995, the

day that North Star apparently was to announce its

trash removal policies to the tenants, Mr. Peterson

sent a facsimile to two North Star officials in which

he warned that “I suggest that you defer tonight's

discussion of this issue or Post Commander Reps will

be forced to tell tenants to disregard your letter of

instruction,” adding that “[t]his divisiveness will

cause us other problems and open a pandoras [sic]

box.” The record suggests that, notwithstanding this

facsimile, North Star communicated with the tenants

regarding trash removal.

Subsequent efforts to resolve this dispute over

refuse collection proved unsuccessful. On December

29, 1995, Mr. Peterson wrote North Star suggesting,

apparently for the first time, that the issue

12 While, in his memorandum, Mr. Peterson appears to

suggest that Nerth Star had ceased all trash pick up, other

parts of the record suggest that the dispute involved whether

such service would be provided once or twice a week.

5Va

concerning refuse collection could impact North Star's

ability to receive an incentive fee.!3

2. 1996 and 1997

On January 10, 1996, the Army wrote North Star

indicating that “the unilateral notification of

residents by North Star of your intention to eliminate

required trash collection services” and “the failure to

provide the level of trash collection services to which

you agreed in the Sep 95 settlement” had caused

North Star's performance to be rated “less than

exceptional” in November and December of 1995, a

rating that, in turn, caused the Army to reduce the

incentive fee. North Star unsuccessfully appealed this

decision to the Army's Director of Public Works at

Fort Richardson, Alaska.

In the spring of 1996, a dispute began to develop

regarding change of occupancy turnaround time.

Prior to this time, North Star had consistently

repaired vacant units and turned them back to the

Army in less than the time specified by the Lease. At

a meeting held on July 10, 1996, Mr. Peterson

complained that North Star was falling behind in

turning units back on a timely basis. At the meeting,

be indicated the Army's intent to begin turning over

units to North Star for repair in blocks-8 units to be

released each Monday. In the minutes of this

13 In an undated letter that appears to have been issued

prior to December 29, 1995, Mr. Peterson indicated that another

disagreement over the interpretation of the Lease would “not

impact or affect the performance standards used to establish the

annual incentive award.”

Hla

meeting, Mr. Peterson is reported to have stated that

the latter process was designed to ensure that the

Army would not be “penalized” by requiring it to

provide North Star with additional down time,

indicating that his goal was “to issue them in a

sequence that keeps it to an average of three days.” !4

In a August 12, 1996, memorandum to Col. Albert J.

Kraus, the Commander of the Alaska District, Mr.

Peterson recapped the meeting, highlighting the

turnover problem while emphasizing that “[t]he

change of occupancy turnaround time is a significant

factor in determining overall performance award.” In

August of 1996, Col. Kraus was replaced by Col. Wm.

David Brown.

The incentive fee award meeting for 1996 occurred

on January 8, 1997. Following the meeting, Mr.

Peterson sent an e-mail to Mr. Edward Miller, then

the Army's Birchwood manager, chastising him for

being unprepared. At that meeting, Mr. Miller had

made assertions regarding North Star's performance

for which he lacked documentation. Criticizing this,

Mr. Peterson indicated, in his e-mail, that “I don't

think we want to emphasize to Fischer that after all

your time on site, you are just now starting to keep a

formal record of your inspections, that will just

embarrass us all.” At the meeting, North Star

apparently also argued that, under the Lease, it was

entitled to additional days for approved work

authorizations. In an undated letter, Col. Brown

\4 Recall, that, in terms of downtime, section D.5. (a) of the

maintenance annex states, “if [in] any 5-day work period, more

than eight units are turned over to [North Star], two additional

days will be allowed for each unit in excess of eight.”

52a

subsequently rejected that interpretation. On

February 10, 1997, Col. Brown, in an _ internal

memorandum, proposed that the Army's. rent

payment for 1996 be reduced by $41,256.57 “based on

excessive change of occupancy down time.”!5 On

April 16, 1997, Col. Brown wrote North Star

announcing an incentive fee award for 1996 of

$39,000, indicating that “[t]he only rated areas which

were significantly less than exceptional were between

occupancy vacancy rates.” Nonetheless, the letter

indicated that actual payment of the fee might be

delayed because of “the ongoing attempts to collect

overdue accounts receivable from North Star.” On

May 22, 1997, Mr. Fischer indicated that he was

unaware of any overdue accounts and asserted that

North Star was not being treated “even handedly.”

Col. Brown disagreed with the latter characterization

in a letter dated June 6, 1997, yet also indicated that

“future awards will probably be made ‘subject to the

availability of funding.’ ”

The refuse collection and downtime issues

continued to fester. On June 10, 1997, Mr. Dennis

Klein, the Chief of the Army's Real Estate Division in

Alaska and the Contracting Officer for the Lease,

wrote Mr. Fischer indicating that he had been

16 On April 9, 1997, an evaluation meeting was conducted at

which Mr. Fischer complained regarding the Army's practice of

holding units after they had been received from the cleaners and

releasing them in a group, implying that this practice was

contributing to downtime delays. Mr. Peterson and Ms. Goodrich

essentially responded that they had adopted the practice to

ensure that the Army did not release more than 8 unite in a

five-day period so as inadvertently to afford North Star

additional downtime under the Lease.

53a

notified by Mr. Peterson that “recent changes in

refuse collection and disposal in the Birchwood

housing complex [have] resulted in service that is

below the level required by the subject lease.” Mr.

Klein warned that the failure to commence twice

weekly collection on or before June 23, 1997, could

result in the imposition of penalties. On June 11,

1997, Mr. Fischer responded, taking exception to the

imposition of penalties and indicating that North

Star had repeatedly requested a contracting officer's

decision on the refuse point, but had not received that

decision. On June 13, 1997, Mr. Klein wrote,

confirming his receipt of the June 11, 1997, letter. On

June 20, 1997, Mr. Fischer sent a second letter to Mr.

Klein, stating-

It is quite obvious to us that your action on

this matter was punitive. The post

commander at Fort Wainwright has not

regarded once a week pick up as a problem

[and] in fact was not informed of your action

prior to our recent contact with him. The first

that his office knew of the change you

demanded was our call to him to inquire as to

what days he would suggest the garbage be

picked up.

Mr. Fischer concluded-“We consider the above actions

to be in bad faith in your dealings with us.”

On July 9, 1997, North Star and the Army

conducted a maintenance evaluation and incentive

meeting for the months of April through June of

1997. At that meeting, Mr. Miller offered the results

of his evaluations, to which North Star raised

numerous exceptions. In a memorandum dated July

9, 1997, the Army unilaterally adopted a depreciation

54a

schedule for all carpeting, thereby reducing the

reimbursement amount that North Star would

receive for replacing carpeting with. occupant

damage. This memorandum, issued by Ms. Mae

Harrell, then the Army's housing manager at

Birchwood, stated-

1. Effective immediately, all charges for

damages to carpet will be figured using a ten

(10) year life expectancy in ALL housing

areas.

2.If the carpet is determined to be ten (10)

years old, it will be replaced as fair wear and

tear and not [sic] charge will be brought

against the occupant. If the damage is due to

pet odor, the occupant will be charged for

sealing the floor and any other measures

required to abate the pet odor.

3.When determining the depreciation on

damaged carpet, subtract 10% of the total

value for each year that the carpet has been

installed. This does not include the labor for

installing the carpet only the materials.

On July 11. 1997, Mr. Fischer sent the Army a letter

addressing Mr. Miller's ratings on a point-by-point

basis. On August 1, 1997, Col. Brown responded,

agreeing that Mr. Miller's evaluation was “incomplete

and unsatisfactory in so far as presenting a clear

objective record.” This letter indicated that the

evaluations were being reconsidered, but,

nonetheless, asserted that North Star should replace

carpeting that is “in worn and poor condition” which

had “outlived its useful economic life.” Thereafter, it

appears that Col. Brown sent North Star a letter

5bda

providing a more detailed response to North Star's

dissatisfaction with the specific evaluation comments

made previously by Mr. Miller. This letter asserts

that North Star had initiated a legal action against

Mr. Miller and indicates that the lawsuit “will not

help to improve on site working relationships” and

may generate “some negative feelings on both sides

for the foreseeable future.” In the letter, Col. Brown

increased North Star's ratings on several, but not all,

of the factors on which North Star had appealed.

On August 7, 1997, Mr. Fischer wrote Mr. Klein

indicating that North Star would not begin to collect

refuse twice weekly until “a clear demand” to that

effect was made. This letter indicated that the

“refuse collection has been the subject of a request

that you issue a contracting officer's decision since

May 22, 1996.” On August 13, 1997, Mr. Klein

requested North Star to commence twice-weekly

collection of garbage, trash and bulk items beginning

August 18, 1997. On September 5, 1997, Mr.

Peterson e-mailed Ms. Goodrich criticizing Mr.

Miller's performance and indicating, with respect to

the evaluation meetings-“I guess my point is, it isn't

business as usual anymore, we need to relook and

prepare better than ever.” On September 25, 1997,

Mr. Robert A Welch, then Chief of the Army's

Acquisition Branch, Real Estate Division, in

Anchorage, requested North Star to provide formal

notice to the tenants of the twice-weekly refuse

collection. North Star, however, refused to do so,

operating apparently on the view that it had been

instructed otherwise by Mr. Klein.

At a quarterly evaluation meeting held on October

15, 1997, the parties disputed the Army's use of

56a

depreciation for carpeting. A transcript indicates that

the following exchange between Mr. Fischer and Col.

Brown transpired:

BROWN: Okay, so if there's pet damage on a

nine year old carpet, then your position is the

government is responsible for paying the

whole amount, basically?

FISCHER: Absolutely or any other damage for

that matter. Any time the government

damages anything they're responsible, |

would think.

BROWN: Even considering the fact that that-]

don't know what the industry standard is, |

don't know what it is. It may be five years. It

may be fifteen years, but-

FISCHER: It's also not relevant.

BROWN: Well, it is relevant, Dick, because I'm

going to make it relevant.

FISCHER: Okay, you go ahead and make it

relevant.

BROWN: And whether you want to accept it or

not. You know, common sense tells you if that

carpet has been and whatever the industry

standard is-I don't know what it is, but we're

going to determine what it is and you are

either going to come up with a depreciated

schedule or we're going to come up with one

and I'm going to investigate the possibility of-

I mean you think about it from a common

sense point of view. If that carpet has a-let's

say for example, and I'm not saying that's it,

but let's say for example, its got a ten year life

57a

cycle on it and let's say it's at 90 percent, say

we have dog damage to it, okay. It has been

90 percent used of its useful life at that point,

you should be replacing it year number 10

anyhow. So the government's responsibility

from a common sense point of view is we

should be responsible for the remaining life of

that carpet, because you have benefited from

the first nine years of that carpet and we

should be responsible for the remainder of it

‘if a dog tears it up. If you had the carpet in

there for one year and we have to replace it,

then we shouldn't be responsible for the nine

years of remaining life. It has been in there-if

the useful life is ten years and a dog tears it

up and the useful life is ten years, we

shouldn't have to be responsible for any of it.

So, it's all going to depend on what that is

that if you don't want to deal with us on this,

then what I'm going to do is I'm going to get

with the lawyers and we're going to come up a

depreciated schedule and then I will-we will

figure out some way to deduct that from your

payments and then if you want to sue us,

have at it, but you know what is fair here and

you need to work with us on this and we'll

work with you on it, but if you don't, I'm going

to do exactly what I said I'm going to do and

let the chips fall where they will, cause you

know that's the right thing. You know that.

FISCHER: Absolutely not. I totally disagree

with you.

BROWN: Okay fine, let's move on, move on to

the next one.

58a

GOODRICH: I think Billie was finishing up her

portion of the-

FISCHER: So-

BROWN: I told you right up front what I'm

going to do about it and if you want to talk

about it, we will.

FISCHER: I'd be happy to talk about it, you

just cut me off, so.

BROWN: Well, you told me you totally disagree .

so we'll just move on.

FISCHER: I do disagree totally and | have good

reason for it and I'd be real pleased to go into

it, if you wish.

BROWN: Okay, go ahead.

FISCHER: Okay. We have cooperated and we

will continue to cooperate and any time a

carpet is not serviceable we're going to

replace it. That's what we're doing and that's

what we'll continue to do. If that carpet is

damaged, we have no way of determining

whether that carpet-when that carpet will not

be serviceable. Depending upon the care of

the unit, it could be that the carpet is

serviceable for 20 years. We don't know.

BROWN: Well, there's industry standards for

that and we can determine that.

FISCHER: Well that's not per our contract.

Industry standards are not part of our

contract.

BROWN: Well, that's fine, you know-

59a

FISCHER: It says when the carpet is no longer

serviceable.

BROWN: If that's your position, that's your

J k h

position and we'll go from there.

FISCHER: Well, Colonel, that seems to be the

way you care to settle all these things.

BROWN: No, I just can't seem to get any-any,

you know, common sense, you're a business

man and if the shoe was on the other foot, you

would say exactly what we're saying out here.

You know and-

FISCHER: We have a responsibility to keep

these units in impeccable condition and that's

what we're doing and we're not going to be

responsible whether some tenant damages

something in these units.

BROWN: No, and you should not be.

FISCHER: That's right.

BROWN: You should not be.

FISCHER: And that's our position.

BROWN: And neither should the government

be totally responsible for 10 year old carpet in

total when a dog damages it and you know

that.

FISCHER: If the life of the-

BROWN: Okay, let's move on. J don't even care

to talk to you any more about this issue.

You're very unreasonable on this and J knew

you were going to be-so let's just move on to

another issue. We'll just let your lawyers and

60a

our lawyers deal with this, because I'm going

to figure out a way that I can take it right out

of your pay.

Later, at this same meeting, Col. Brown ordered that

future evaluation meetings not be recorded.

In the late summer or early fall of 1997, the Army

hired a contractor to conduct a survey of the

Birchwood residents, with a view toward using the

survey results in making _ incentive fee

determinations. On November 14, 1997, Mr. Fischer

wrote Col. Brown emphasizing that, contrary to the

latter's assertion, “[t]here is no lawsuit pending

against Mr. Miller” and complaining about Col.

Brown's decision to move the evaluation meetings to

Fort Richardson, Alaska. Regarding the increasing

tensions between the parties, Mr. Fischer asserted-

Our contract provides a clear forum for

contractual: resolution of differences of

opinions. We would expect to follow these

procedures. Differences of opinion’ on

contractual matters which we have had in the

past have not affected the Army's assessment

of North Star's performance. This was the

case until your decision to demerit North Star

for the difference in the manner that the

turnaround time has been interpreted this

past year.

Mr. Fischer again asserted that the Army was

dealing with North Star in “bad faith” and indicated

that he would not be dealing with further

correspondence on this matter because “[i]t is clear to

me and | dare say to everyone present at the last

quarterly meeting that you have a personal problem

Gla

with me.” On November 25, 1997, North Star

requested a contracting officer's decision with respect

to both the turnaround time and refuse collection

issues.

On December 9, 1997, Mr. Peterson prepared a

memorandum for the DPW staff in which he asserted

that issues involving downtime and_ carpet

depreciation should impact the decision whether to

grant North Star an incentive fee for 1997. In this

regard, he argued-

From an ethical perspective, I think the board

would be acting in contravention of the

government's interests if it were to approve a

substantial cash award during a period when

the contractor's failure to apply sound and

efficient management practices ( ve., failure

to pro rate the cost of carpet JAW industry

standards) has become a _ substantive cost

I don't think that the Board can ethically

ignore North Star's failure to fairly apportion

the carpeting cost. An approval of an

incentive award which could be construed by

the contractor as either ignoring’ or

encouraging continued actions by North Star

which result in double payment for carpeting

maintenance costs would be a derelection [sic]

of the Board's explicit and implicit duties in

representing the best interests of the U.S.

Government.

Accordingly, it appears that, at least by this time, the

fact that North Star was raising various claims with

the contracting officer was viewed by Mr. Peterson as

62a

a reason to deny it an incentive fee. On December 11,

1997, the Army's District Engineer wrote North Star

indicating that the contracting officer decisions on

the issue of twice-weekly refuse collection and down

time would be issued within 45 days of North Star's

November 25, 1997, request.

On December 12, 1997, Mr. Peterson e-mailed Col.

Brown and Ms. Goodrich, reiterating that it would be

“unethical to pay an incentive award to North Star

for a time period during which they have ... blatantly

refused to discuss equitably apportioning costs” for

carpet. Mr. Peterson indicated that “[a]s a member of

the Board, I feel that we are bound by formal

principles of ethical conduct to select the ‘no incentive

award option until the government's maintenance

concerns are addressed/resolved.”. In an e-mail

December 22, 1997, Mr. Peterson further asserted

that North Star's position with respect to carpet

replacement was not in “good faith.”

3. 1998

On January 28, 1998, Mr. Klein sent Col. Brown a

copy of his decision on the downtime issue. This

decision concluded-

I find and conclude that the contract allows

for a maximum occupancy downtime per unit

of three days for completion after turnover by

the Government to [North Star], if eight or

less units are turned over within any given 5-

day work period. I find that if more than eight

units are turned over within any 5-day work

period, then the allowable occupancy

downtime is increased to five days per unit

63a

for units in excess of eight. I further find and

conclude that the maximum allowable

aggregate occupancy downtime in any given

month cannot be interpreted to permit

occupancy downtime maintenance on the

units to run consecutively.

This decision was mailed to North Star on January

29, 1998. That same day, Col. Brown sent North Star

a letter in which he announced an incentive fee

award of only $21,272, less than half of the prior

awards. On March 9, 1998, North Star filed a

complaint in this court, primarily to address the

depreciation issue. The contracting officer's decision

on the carpet depreciation issue was mailed to North

Star on March 26, 1998. This decision by Mr. Klein

concluded-

I find and conclude that when it is

determined, based upon inspection, that

because of normal wear and tear, carpet no

longer has a pleasing appearance as defined

in the contract, then it is the responsibility of

[North Star] to replace such carpet. I find and

conclude that the contract requires that the

expected useful life of carpet be established

by reasonable proof. I find that where carpet

is replaced due to pet or other occupant

damage beyond normal wear and tear, the

replacement cost paid by the Government is

required to be depreciated based on the age of

the carpet in relation to its expected useful

life and reasonable replacement schedule.

These contracting officer decisions resolved little in

terms of the parties' disputes over particular units.

Indeed, new issues incessantly arose.

64a

One of these issues involved what North Star

referred to as “stockpiling’-the Army's practice of

holding units that had been vacated by service

members for days, sometimes weeks, and occasionally

months, and then releasing them to North Star, for

maintenance and repairs, in batches. Various Army

officials contended that this process was designed to

prevent the Army from inadvertently releasing more

than eight units to North Star within a 5-day work

period, so as to trigger the extended 5-day downtime

period.!® North Star, however, complained bitterly

that stockpiling made it difficult for it to perform the

necessary repairs within the _ allotted’ time,

complicating, in particular, the scheduling of

subcontractors for tasks such as carpet and vinyl

replacement.!7 In a June 3, 1998, memorandum,

‘6 At trial, Mr. Harold Hopson, who eventually become the

contracting officer on the Lease, admitted that stockpiling

requires Nerth Star to have more staffing and makes it more

difficult for North Star to meet the downtime requirement. He

further testified that he mistakenly thought the Army was

releasing the units as they were cleaned. Mr. Rodney Everett,

who was the Contracting Officer Representative at Birchwood,

testified that stockpiling made North Star's task “very difficult”

and that he would not have administered the Lease in this

fashion.

17 In his testimony, Mr. Eldon Wartes, who would

eventually become North Star's site manager at Birchwood,

explained-

Q: What was the impact of that behavior on your

work when you started in 1998?

A: It's huge. These units all issued at the same

time.... There's no way I can schedule subcontractors

to be in these units all at the same time. It's just a

scheduling nightmare.

65a

North Star's site manager complained to Ms.

Goodrich that this practice was “another effort by the

Army to make it as difficult as possible for North Star

to perform its contract,” asserting further that North

Star “regards this action to be another exercise of bad

faith on the part of the Army in dealing with North

Star.”

These complaints, however, fell on deaf ears as Mr.

Peterson instead was focused on reducing North

Star's rent for what he perceived as excess downtime

and, if possible, contracting out the repair and

maintenance functions to a third party. In a July 8,

1998, e-mail to Mr. Kiein, Col. Brown and Ms.

Goodrich, he wrote that “|ajlthough we now have the

benefit of several favorable CODs, we still seem to be

floundering as to the best course of action for

deducting rent, withdrawing work for

accomplishment by an alternate source, etc.” On July

13, 1998, Mr. Peterson wrote Mr. Klein urging that

rental deductions be made against North Star and

stating “[wJe expect your support to finalize this

action this week and so inform NorthStar.” The next

day, July 14, 1998, Mr. Klein responded-

It is important that we focus on providing the

soldier with the best service and housing

available. I perceive that as your role as a

housing manager. We will work with you to

accomplish that goal. Please refrain from

directing the Contracting Officer. A number

Mr. Wartes further testified that stockpiling has strained

his relationship with various local subcontractors, particularly

when schedules were changed by the Army at the last moment.

66a

of the contractual issues you frequently

address are under consideration in the

Federal Court of Claims and are subject to

review and determination by the attorney's

handling this case.

Mr. Klein added that _a_ contracting officer

representative would attend the next evaluation

meeting, “but will not be able to make commitments

relating to assessment of damages or reductions of

rent.” Rejecting this position, Mr. Peterson, in an

internal memorandum, dated July 20, 1998,

complained that Mr. Klein had raised “disturbing

issues” regarding the “quality of the coordination and

support which we feel that we are entitled to receive.”

He indicated that his office “needs a _ strong,

aggressive proponent” and “may not find it” in Mr.

Klein's office. This memorandum also recommended

that a “(flormal strategy for access to Birchwood” be

developed for when the Lease expired in 2007,

suggesting that Mr. Peterson was already focusing on

replacing North Star nearly a decade before that

opportunity would first arise. On July 20, 1998, Mr.

Peterson formerly responded to Mr. Klein's e-mail of

July 14, stating, inter alia, that “[yJour first

paragraph [quoted above] seems to be giving us poor

legal advice,” and that, instead, there should be a

“bias toward action.” On July 22, 1998, Mr. Klein

responded, stating that “I am totally confused at your

memo,” indicating further that “[t]here appears to be

a lot of jumping to conclusions and emotional

overtones.”

In the fall of 1998, the Army again surveyed the

Birchwood residents. The survey contained several

questions that appeared to ask residents their views

AR.

67a

regarding the ongoing contractual disputes between

the parties. For example, one question stated, “[ijn

their original proposal, [North Star] proposed the

replacement of carpet in each unit at approximately

seven year intervals,” and asked the _ tenants

essentially how often they would like to have their

carpet replaced. Another question stated that North

Star “advised the government, in June 1998, that

they had experienced an almost complete turnover of

employees,” and asked the residents “[d]id you, as a

tenant, experience any decline in service which you

felt was attributed to this high employee turnover.”

The survey also had one or more questions that

implied that North Star was responsible for certain

reductions in service that, in fact, had been prompted

by the Army (e.g., the elimination of a location where

residents could obtain household supplies). Another

question asked tenants whether they had “pleasant”

or “unpleasant” living experiences without identifying

maintenance issues that were the Army's

responsibility, potentially leaving the false

impression that all the deficiencies at Birchwood

were North Star's fault.

On December 30, 1998, Mr. Peterson prepared a

“discussion” paper in which he advocated that North

Star not receive an incentive fee for 1998. In so

arguing, he relied heavily upon several factors: (i)

that there continued to be disputes regarding carpet

replacement; (ii) that an audit was pending regarding

the contractor's alleged failure to meet agreed upon

standards; (iii) the results of annual resident survey,

68a

which he refers to as a “primary evaluation tool;”!8

and (iv) that funding for the Army's overall resident

program had been reduced and that any incentive fee

not paid to North Star could be used to “mitigate

reductions in maintenance/ repair programs.” This

memorandum concluded “[b]ased upon the facts as

above, particularly FY 99 ... Sanding posture in

USARK [the U.S. Army in Alaskaj, the Board (Mr.

Peterson and Ms. Goodrich) place a low overall

priority on the approval of any incentive award for

1998 and recommend that ‘none’ be approved at this

time.”

4. 1999 and 2000

On or about February 1, 1999, Mr. Everett became

the Contracting Office Representative -based at

Birchwood. In May of 1999, North Star was notified

that it would receive a incentive fee of $3,730 for

1998. The letter announcing this fee cited the survey

results as the primary reason why the fee was so low,

but did not mention budget considerations, despite

the rationale expressed in Mr. Peterson's internal

memorandum.

In the months that followed, increasing

disagreements occurred between’ the parties

concerning downtime calculations, stockpiling and

18 Those results indicated, for example, that 49 percent of

the residents were dissatisfied with North Star's “decision” to

eliminate the self-help store. Perhaps not surprisingly, 46

percent of the residents said that carpeting should be replaced

every seven years, while 44 percent said that it should be

replaced more frequently.

69a

various other issues. Mr. Peterson continued to

believe that he was not receiving adequate support

from the contracting officer. For example, on

September 9, 1999, he e-mailed Mr. Klein,

complaining that Mr. Everett had not been present at

several meetings, indicating that his absence was a

“major failure” and “pretty embarrassing to me.” Mr.

Peterson, however, apparently was unaware that Mr.

Everett was on vacation, a point that Mr. Klein made

on September 13, 1999, in explaining the situation to

his superior, Lt. Col. Sheldon Jahn. In that e-mail,

Mr. Klein indicated that “[t]here will always be

unpopular COR determinations but | fully expect

each call to be based upon the _ contract/lease

provisions and made without prejudice to any of the

parties.” Col. Jahn responded to Mr. Klein,

indicating, in reference to Mr. Peterson, “I am not

sure why there always seems to be this immediate

accusation approach to concerns.” Nonetheless, Mr.

Peterson continued to send Mr. Klein e-mails

requesting that changes be made in draft contracting

officer decisions (CODs). In one e-mail, dated

October 25, 1999, Mr. Peterson made _ several

recommendations regarding a pending COD

concerning an incentive fee award, indicating that

the decision should refer to North Star's alleged

policy of “establishing a ‘below market’ wage scale for

Birchwood employees.” A November 8, 1999, e-mail

from Mr. Everett to Mr. Peterson invites comments

on a draft of a position paper that indicates that “Fair

Wear and Tear determinations cannot be used to

create a de-facto depreciation schedule.”

On December 17, 1999, Mr. Peterson again

shipped out an e-mail in advance of the incentive fee

meeting, urging once more that North Star not

70a

receive an award. In another e-mail dated December

29, 1999, he elaborated on why he opposed an award,

stating, “remember that if we award even $1, this

goes into the record books as an exceptional rating.”

(Emphasis in original). An attachment to this e-mail

indicated that one of the reasons that Mr. Peterson

was opposed to giving North Star an incentive fee for

1999 was because North Star was challenging, in this

court, the diminished fee it received in 1998.

As the year 2000 unfolded, the parties disagreed as

to which government officials were empowered to

order North Star to perform work. North Star

asserted that only the contracting officer had this

authority, but that view was rejected by Mr. Klein.

The latter, in a February 24, 2000, letter to North

Star emphasized that the Army's Project Manager

“has the authority and responsibility to identify

maintenance needs and to direct North Star to

perform maintenance as required.” On February 29,

2000, Col. Mark C. Nelson, by then the new Director

of Public Works, notified North Star that no incentive

award would be made for 1999. Col. Nelson's letter

cited a variety of reasons for this decision, among

them statistics taken from the most recent resident

survey.!9 The dispute between the parties involving

refuse collection took a new turn when, in April of

2000, the Army indicated that North Star could no

19 The 1999 resident survey continued to raise issues before

the residents that were being disputed by the parties. Among

other things, it indicated that under the contract, “[e]xterior

painting” is scheduled “at five year intervals or ‘more often as

required,’ ” and asked the residents to evaluate North Star's

painting efforts in light of this requirement

Tla

longer use the Fort Wainwright landfill for household

trash. While North Star complained about this

action, the record reveals that the landfill was closed

to all such trash for environmental reasons, and not

just to trash collected by North Star.

In May of 2000, the parties negotiated what they

believed was a settlement of the 1998 lawsuit.

Apparently under’ the _ settlement, defendant

eliminated various practices-for example, the Army

began to spread the release of units to North Star

over a calendar week, rather than concentrating

them on a single day.*® Depreciation also ceased. Yet,

various new debates continued to arise among the

parties, including disputes over who was responsible

for replacing $13 butter dishes and $10 ice trays. In

September of 2000, Connie Kiser became the 801

housing project manager. In December of that year,

North Star issued a series of memoranda complaining

that the Army was not enforcing various safety and

cleanliness regulations. On December 19, 2000,

North Star filed notice in this court that it was

rescinding the settlement agreement.

20 Describing the impact this change wrought, Mr. Wartes

testified

Q: Was there impact on your workload as a result of

that?

A: Immediately scheduling waa casier. | had units to

schedule all week, instead of one day or two days of the

week. | had units that weren't filling for a couple of

days without having work done in them, because | had

six of them at the same time. Yes, it made things much

casier

72a

5. 2001 and 2002

On January 30, 2001, Mr. Peterson again relayed

complaints to Mr. Klein regarding the level of support

that Public Works was receiving from Mr. Everett,

indicating that his superior “feels that Rod [Everett]'s

position should be more responsive to supporting our

requirements (specifically to supporting Connie

[Kiser] ), more proactive, and most importantly,

accomplishing measurable results.” Later, on

January 31, 2001, in discussing another dispute in

which Mr. Wartes indicated that he would not take

direction from Ms. Kiser, Mr. Peterson e-mailed Mr.

Klein, stating that Mr. Wartes's position precluded

an incentive fee award for 2000 and that “[i]t's time

to back [Ms. Kiser] 100%.” By at least this time, the

parties began to have additional disputes regarding

the inspections under the Lease, with issues arising

concerning the timing and notification of those

inspections and whether the Army was entitled to

conduct inspections at times not specified in the

Lease. Apparently commenting on those disputes, on

February 9, 2001, Mr. Peterson sent Mr. Klein and

others an e-mail in which he stated-

If our project manager's interpretation of the

lease is correct, this should be completely and

clearly expressed to [North Star] by Rod.

If there is lease ambiguity, our project

manager's position should still be supported

as completely and clearly as possible by Rod.

He is not paid to be neutral, but to

aggressively support a reasonable

government position.

73a

In June of 2001, the Army announced that North

Star would not receive an incentive award for 2000,

citing again the resident surveys,?!' as well as

excessive downtime, but also referring to an issue

involving overcharges for lock installation.2?

On July 24, 2001, Lt. Col. Michael T. Meeks, the

Director of Public Works, issued a memorandum to

the Army Engineer District requesting that a protocol

be established under which all contracting officer

decisions would be reviewed by employees in Public

Works. This memorandum requested that “[a] staff

summary ... shall be attached to each draft COD and

this will be used by the FWA Housing Office to note

concurrence/noncurrence and any comments.” The

memorandum further indicated that-

fijn the event of nonconcurrence, the

USARAK staff, including the Staff Judge

Advocate will review the draft COD. A

summary of the USARAK and proposed

changes in wording will be provided to the

Office of Real Estate and reviewed prior to

finalizing the COD.

Col. Meeks added that “[t]his procedure will insure

that Public Works and USARAK comments are

21 Among the questions on the 2000 survey was “[hjlow

satisfied are you with the twice weekly curbside refuse

collection?”

22 Regarding the latter point, a June 15, 2001, letter from

the Army to Mr. Wartes cited North Star for “[k]nowingly

charging the government and military families for new

materials while recycling used lock-sets.” The record, however,

suggests that by this time, North Star already had admitted this

mistake and had reimbursed the Army for the charges involved.

T4a

reviewed and incorporated, as appropriate,” and

listed Mr. Peterson as the contact for this action.

Various documents in the record, as well as

testimony at trial, indicate that this procedure was

implemented at least as early as August 17, 2001.

In a November 5, 2001, e-mail, Mr. Peterson

recommended that the lockset issue, as well as other

unidentified allegations of fraud, warranted an

outside investigation of North Star by the Army's

Internal Review and Audit Compliance Office Army

(IRACO). In this e-mail, Mr. Peterson asserted that

“[t]his issue continues to preclude any consideration

for incentive award until it is finally resolved to the

government's satisfaction.” By early December of

2001, he and Ms. Kiser decided that they would

require North Star to submit individual invoices for

certain repair and replacement items, even though

the Lease seemingly provided that such items would

be listed in a repair cost book to be negotiated

annually by the parties. In one e-mail sent to Mr.

Peterson, Ms. Kiser stated: “I feel that the lock set

issue is just the tip of the ice berg.” On December 11,

2001, Mr. Peterson sent an e-mail to the contracting

officer and a variety of other Army personnel citing

the lockset issue and the resulting audit as grounds

for denying North Star any incentive fee for 2001.

In January of 2002, Mr. Harold Hopson replaced

Mr. Klein as the contracting officer for the Lease. On

January 8, 2002, a hearing was held in this case at

which defendant's motion for summary judgment to

enforce the settlement agreement was denied. On

January 15, 2002, Ms. Harrell e-mailed Col. Meeks

complaining about a variety of issues and indicating

that “[t]he bottom line [is] we want to get rid of the

(da

settlement.” On January 28, 2002, Mr. Hopson wrote

North Star indicating that defendant was

withdrawing from the settlement agreement and

would seek to recoup any payments made to North

Star based upon that agreement.

Following the collapse of the settlement

agreement, the situation worsened considerably.

Almost immediately, and despite howls of complaint

from North Star, Mr. Peterson and Ms. Kiser

resumed the practice of stockpiling, releasing units in

groups of eight on Mondays and Fridays without

regard to how long the units had been vacant. In

February of 2002, the Army indicated that it had

received the results of the IRACO audit, which had

found that various work authorizations were missing

from the Birchwood files. In a letter dated February

28, 2002, which is not in the record, but referenced by

other correspondence, Col. David B. Snodgrass

indicated that the missing files precluded the Army

from considering a performance award for North Star

for 2001 or for any part of 2002 for which the issue

remained unresolved. On March 6, 2002, Ms. Kiser

forwarded to North Star the repair list for 2002,

substantially reducing the number of items listed

therein and emphasizing that “[a]ll items not

included in the list will require invoicing at the time

the work is required.” Extending a concept that

previously had been applied only to a few items (e.g.,

carpeting), her memorandum further indicated that

“[p]rices approved in this listing are subject to

depreciation to be determined on a case by case

basis.”

Gn March 15, 2002, Mr. Wartes wrote Col.

Snodgrass objecting to his incentive fee

76a

determination. This letter indicated that the

overcharges regarding the locksets involved $135,

which had already been refunded to the Army

(possibly as early as November of 2000). The letter

also asserted that the Birchwood files that allegedly

were missing had been pulled for a spreadsheet

analysis, that North Star had shown the auditors the

boxes containing those files, but that the auditors had

declined an invitation to review those documents.

North Star indicated that the auditors had not

complained about any missing files and that the first

that it became aware there was a continuing issue

concerning the files was when it received the

incentive fee letter... Apparently prompted by a

memorandum received from Ms. Kiser, on April 17,

2002, Mr. Everett wrote Mr. Wartes complaining

about excess downtime in February and March 2002,

and indicating that liquidated damages of $2,874.47

would be deducted from the next rental payment. On

April 30, 2002, North Star wrote Mr. Everett

requesting that he provide the backup documentation

for his downtime calculations. In the succeeding

months, particularly, in May of 2002, the parties

continued to dispute a variety of issues, including

whether Ms. Kiser was authorized to modify

unilaterally the repair cost book and to require

invoices for the items not covered in her price list. In

internal e-mails dated May 22, 2002, a representative

from IRACO indicated that the lockset issue alone

was insufficient to warrant further audit, but that an

expansion of the audit, nonetheless, should be sought.

By way of explanation, the auditor indicated that

“our audit results, used as evidence, could prove

crucial in supporting our (the Govt) [sic] case against

the lawsuit brought by North Star.” The same day,

Tla

Mr. Peterson responded that his office “greatly

support|[s] expanding the investigation.”

Again prompted by a memorandum sent by Ms.

Kiser, on May 22, 2002, Mr. Everett sent North Star

a letter asserting that there had been excess

downtime in April and assessing liquidated damages

in the amount of $2,308.25. On May 24, 2002, Mr.

Wartes responded to this letter, asserting that “[n]o

justification has been provided for your calculation of

excess downtime,” and indicating that he had still not

received a response.to his April 30, 2002, request for

the backup documentation for defendant's calculation

of downtime for February and March. On June 27,

2002, Ms. Rhonda Sekyra, North Star's Treasurer,

wrote Ms. Kiser cataloguing the problems that North

Star was experiencing regarding the turnover of

units, including the Army's practices of: (i) revising

turnover dates and failing to provide timely

notifications; (ii) not distinguishing between change

of occupancy downtime and repair and renovation

downtime; (ii) failing properly to conduct pre-

termination inspections; and (iv) failing to issue

proper work authorizations. The record reveals that

disputes involving individual units continued

throughout this period. In July of 2002, the parties

again exchanged correspondence, in which the Army

reemphasized that Ms. Kiser was authorized to direct

North Star to perform work. In a letter dated July 18,

2002, Mr. Wartes highlighted that the Army had

apparently begun using depreciation in calculating

the reimbursement owed North Star for blinds and

counter tops replaced as the result of occupant

damage.

78a

On July 31, 2002, Mr. Everett sent North Star a

letter in which he determined that there was excess

downtime for May and June of 2002, indicating that

$2,350.61 would be deducted from North Star's next

rental payment. On August 1, 2002, Mr. Wartes

contested this determination and again demanded

back-up documentation, while noting that requests

for such documentation for February, March and

April had still not been satisfied. On August 8, 2002,

Mr. Wartes wrote Ms. Kiser alleging a new practice-

that the Army was ignoring pet damage, leaving it to

North Star to determine whether carpeting so

damaged would be left in a unit or replaced at its

expense.” Correspondence during this period also

suggests yet another new bone of contention between

the parties-indications that Ms. Kiser was inspecting

units outside of the regular turnover regime, at which

inspections North Star representatives were not

present, and using information obtained during those

inspections as a basis for requiring North Star to

perform repairs and maintenance.

23 Commenting on the impact of this, Mr. Wartes testified-

This is just one of many types of instances where there

was a double standard, where the government when it

perceived it was damaged, you know, it would be their

responsibility. They would note it, and let it go on for

[the] next occupant versus the most infinitesimal thing

they could find that they would perceive to be North

Star's responsibility, they would force us to replace it.

At another point in his testimony, Mr. Wartes noted that

the practice of not repairing occupant damage gave residents the

false impression that North Star was not maintaining

Birchwood, thereby negatively impacting North Star's scores in

the resident surveys.

79a

On August 29, 2002, Mr. Peterson sent an e-mail

to Ms. Kiser, with copies to various other officials, in

which he summarized the results of the then

completed IRACO audit. This email indicated:

We had a pre-final briefing today. The final

audit will document a series of relatively

minor problems which we will pass on to

[North Star] to correct, but no real big ticket

items. There is about $20K in double billings

which we will ask [North Star] to correct and

reimburse, but most of that appears to be

from Ed Miller's sloppy work, not any [North

Star] conspiracy.

The audit will document a quantum

improvement in the quality of government

oversight since Connie took over, and all

auditors emphasized what a great job you are

doing (as measured by the sharp decline in

gov [sic] work authorizations and challenges

to their attempts to charge the government).

Well done!

Other documentation in the record verifies that the

monthly work authorizations issued by the Army to

North Star went from $13,468.08 per month in 2000,

to $15,039.60 per month in 2001, and then down to

$5,257.15 per month in 2002. An e-mail from Ms.

Kiser indicates that this reduction was “due to

imposition of depreciation schedule and aggressive

monitoring of occ[upant] damage vs fair wear.”24

24 In her deposition, Nikisha Goins, formerly one of the

government inspectors at Birchwood, provided a much different

impression as to how these work authorizations were reduced.

80a

On September 4, 2002, North Star filed a claim

with Mr. Hopson detailing numerous alleged

violations of the Lease, accusing the Army of: (i)

failing to oversee occupant conduct; (ii) failing to

issue work authorizations for occupant-caused

damage; (iii) issuing improper and untimely work

authorizations that reduce or eliminate the amount

owed to North Star; (iv) failing to issue work

authorizations that employ the List of Repair Costs;

(v) taking depreciation on all replacement items ( e.g.,

flooring, counter tops, blinds, and appliances); (vi)

Describing Ms. Kiser's modus operandi, Ms. Goins commented

that “I think I would say I was ... being used as a tool to make

North Star pay for stuff.” She further explained that Ms. Kiser

instructed her, as follows:

Just that when I'm doing inspections, you know, ...

either Eldon [Wartes] has to pay for it or the occupants

have to pay for it.... It was pretty much | was being

used to go out there to do the inspection, assess the

damages but bring as less charges back to the

government as possible in other words.

Along these same lines, Ms. Goins specifically stated that Ms.

Kiser had directed her to save the government money and that,

correspondingly, the Army failed to replace items at Birchwood

that it replaced at other housing facilities at the fort. “[NJothing

was coming out of [Ms. Kiser’s}] pocket,” she stated, “[ijt was

either the occupant was going to pay for it or Eldon was going to

pay for it.” Amplifying the latter point, she indicated that in her

view the military families “got a raw end of the deal living at

Birchwood,” as “every little thing” was charged to them. Ms.

Goins further indicated that one of the other inspectors

cautioned her to keep copies of her inspections because Ms.

Kiser would change the results, sometimes without even seeing

the unit involved. In particular, she indicated that she made

copies for “[t]he ones that were kind of shady ... the ones that

were like I didn't feel comfortable.”

8la

using additional inspections as the basis for ordering

maintenance and repairs; (vii) deviating otherwise

from the turnover inspection regime specified by the

Lease; (viii) placing a disproportionate number of

temporary occupants at Birchwood; (ix) assessing

liquidated damages against North Star and the

failure to provide documentation for the calculation of

those damages; and (x) failing to make incentive fee

awards to North Star. North Star attributed these

various violations to “bad faith,” asserting, in

particular that “[t]he Government's discriminatory

treatment of Birchwood constitutes a bad faith

violation of the Government's contractual obligation

to oversee the day-to-day administration of the

housing units and to enforce Army Family Housing

rules and regulations.” Among other things, the

claim sought damages corresponding to the

diminution in the value of Birchwood, a figure set at

$12,146,000, as well as additional expenses for 1996

through 2001, totaling $813,390, for an overall

damages figure of $12,959,390. Two days following

the filing of this claim, on September 6, 2002, Mr.

Peterson e-mailed Ms. Kiser recommending that she

“install[ ] a trap door in front of your desk which you

can release when Eldon [Wartes] is standing on it in

front of your desk. Connected to a chute to the Chena

River.”

In the ensuing months, the parties continued to

dispute a variety of issues, including whether the

Army was obliged to have a North Star

representative at the final inspections and whether

depreciation was applicable to various items. These

exchanges were marked by further charges and

counter-charges of “bad faith.” On October 11, 2002,

in an e-mail to Mr. Fischer, Mr. Wartes asserted that

82a

Ms. Kiser was signing documents for inspections that

she had not conducted (a practice that was confirmed

by the testimony of two of her employees). On or

about October 15, 2002, it appears that Ms. Kiser

introduced yet another requirement-that upstairs

and downstairs carpeting needed to match in color (

e.g., that if the upstairs carpet was brown, the

downstairs carpet had to be brown, or both needed to

be blue). In an undated memorandum issued at

about this time, Ms. Kiser noted that even where

carpeting was being replaced due to occupant

damage, North Star was obliged to replace, at its

expense, other carpet in the unit to ensure that the

old and new carpeting matched. At about the time of

this memorandum, Mr. Peterson began transitioning

into retirement (an event punctuated by the infamous

“Miami football” e-mail that began this opinion). On

October 15, 2002, Mr. Wartes wrote Ms. Barbara S.

Lehman, who had_ replaced Mr. Peterson,

complaining that the surveys designed by the Army

were biased against North Star.

Various e-mails sent in October of 2002 indicate

that, despite the meager findings produced by the

first IRACO audit, various Army personnel were

attempting to convince Congressiona) staffers that

North Star's claims should be the subject of a

Government Accounting Office audit. In November of

2002, Ms. Kiser adopted a new practice in regards to

painting. Specifically, the Lease envisioned that a

unit would be painted if it became vacant after

certain specified Lease anniversary dates ( e.g.,

November 6, 2002), whether or not an inspection

actually revealed a need for painting. The record

indicates that in the latter part of 2002, Ms. Kiser

began twin practices designed to maximize such

Ba

cyclical paintings-the first was to hold units vacant

until after the anniversary date had passed; the

second was to assign units to temporary occupants, so

that the unit would become vacant shortly after the

anniversary dates. In some instances, these practices,

which were confirmed by the testimony of the former

inspectors, required units to be fully painted twice

within a matter of months. On November 19, 2002,

North Star filed its complaint in Case No. 02-1632C.

In December of 2002, the parties traded complaints,

each asserting that the other was attempting to

reduce costs by avoiding its responsibilities under the

Lease. The Army's position in this regard was voiced

in an audit document released by IRACO on

December 17, 2002, while North Star's response took

the form of a December 24, 2002, letter to Mr.

Hopson.

6. 2003 and Forward

‘

On January 30, 2003, Acting Housing Division

Chief Cynthia Larson e-mailed Mr. Hopson to

complain about a draft COD that apparently did not

hold that depreciation was applicable to counter tops

and other materials installed in units. In this e-mail,

Ms. Larson wrote-

Rod [Everett] provided Connie [Kiser] ‘with

the draft for the COD on the above mentioned

units [646 and 833]. I have some grave

concerns with [the] findings. We have

already been down this road before and DO

NOT want to go down it again. The issue of

depreciation is not up for discussion, as we

see it. Our direction came specifically from

84a

Don Kinner, DOJ in a teleconference with the

COE, Housing, and DOJ, in which he stated

depreciation will apply to everything; where

the question was asked specifically, does

depreciation apply only to carpet or all repair

items. Don Kinner's [sic] stated it applied to

everything. I believe if we allow this COD to

go out as is, we are opening ourselves up for

complete failure on all key issues and

litigation will CONSUME our daily efforts

The contract states any repair. or

replacement shall match in kind and color to

all adjacent surfaces. With this said, we have

been applying this to all repairs and as |

under|stand]|, Ann is stating that this is only

applicable to carpet replacement and no other

repairs. Again, our stand has to be unified

and we have not been applying this concept,

based on guidance from the COE. We

CANNOT change ships mid stream, if we do,

all previous work will be negated, and the

judge has already accused us of inconsistency

in our methodologies.

I feel with this being such a

SIGNIFICANT change to the day to day

operations, we need to have a meeting and

discuss PRIOR to this COD being released

and come up with a CONCRETE PLAN of

action. | feel precedence will be set and

HOLD ON, we're on the roller coaster again

(Emphasis in original). On January 31, 2003, Mr.

Hopson sent North Star the final version of the COD

regarding units 646 and 833. That COD indicated

Ba

that “[clountertop material will be depreciated based

upon a schedule to be determined by the Government

after North Star submits pertinent cost information.”

On February 12, 2003, Mr. Hopson e-mailed Ms

Harrell, indicating that the comments on draft CODs

provided by her office were “invaluable.”

On February 20, 2003, Col. Snodgrass sent North

Star a letter denying it any incentive fee for 2002. As

basis for this decision, the letter cited, inter alia, the

audit and the lockset issue, the results of the resident

survey,”° and North Star's practice of challenging Ms

Kiser's authority to direct work. On March 4, 2003,

North Star responded to this letter. It noted that the

lockset issue-which the December 2001 IRACO audit

had revealed involved only $135-had been used “to

deny incentive fee awards to North Star since 2000.”

North Star further complained that the resident

surveys were biased against it, specifically asserting

that the surveys were designed to give residents the

false impression that North Star was at fault for the

Army's failure to enforce certain policies ( e.g., pet

control). On March 24, 2003, the Army provided

North Star with a summary of the findings of the

JIRACO foilow-up investigation that was conducted

between May and August of 2002. Those findings

continued to maintain that the facility history files

did not contain the work authorizations that were

approved by the Army. The audit also verified that,

26 Among the questions asked by the 2002 survey werk

“|hjow satisfied would you be with leas than the twice-weekly

trash pickup you now receive?’ Although inartfully framed, this

queation again raised with the tenants an issue being debated

by the parties

86a

in four instances, North Star had installed used

locksets and billed the Army for the installation of

new ones. The summary concluded that “IRACO's

findings have been forwarded to the Army's Criminal

Investigation Command to determine’ whether

further investigation is warranted.” On March 28,

2003, the court granted defendant's motion to stay

the 1998 case pending the resolution of the criminal

investigation; that stay remained in force until May

5, 2004.

During the first quarter of 2003, the parties

continued to argue over inspection procedures, with

the Army maintaining that it had the right to inspect

units at any time and North Star asserting that such

ad hoc inspections could not supplant the inspection

protocols established by the Lease. Ultimately, this

dispute led to a contracting officer decision, dated

May 22, 2003, which held that while the Army could

conduct additional inspections, “North Star must be

notified of and permitted to attend any inspection

being performed for the purpose of identifying

maintenance requirements.” Many of the issues

previously identified continued to be hot topics of

dispute between the parties for the remainder of 2003

and into 2004. As if these were not enough, two new

sets of issues were raised during this period. First, a

variety of issues arose when the Army, on June 5,

2003, ordered North Star to perform cleaning services

that had previously been performed by another Army

contractor-the Army afforded North Star five

additional days of down time where a “full cleaning is

required,” but indicated that additional down time

would be determined by the Army on a case-by-case

basis where “only a partial cleaning or a minimum

amount of cleaning is required.” Second, in a letter

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dated July 10, 2003, North Star accused the Army of

refusing to authorize work for occupant damage, but

then, upon a later change of occupancy, insisting such

work was required by fair wear and tear. During this

period, stockpiling continued, periodically spiking?®

and the conflict between the parties was further

heightened when Ms. Kiser, for the first time, used a

black light to determine that the painting in a unit

was inadequate, thereby allegedly identifying flaws

that were not visible to the naked eye.

On November 20, 2003, plaintiff filed its complaint

before this court in case No. 03-2699C. On March 9,

2004, the Army denied North Star an incentive fee for

2003, citing many of the issues that had been raised

in prior award decisions (although not raising the

lockset issue). In June of 2004, Ms. Lori Dallas

replaced Ms. Kiser as the Housing Project

Manager/Site Manager of Birchwood.

D. Proceedings to Date

As noted, on March 9, 1998, North Star filed its

initial complaint in this case. In 1998 and 1999,

there were numerous disputes between the parties

involving electronic discovery and other issues. On

August 23, 1999, North Star filed an amended

26 For example, on Friday, August 8, 2003, Ms. Kiser

released four units, all of which required’ extensive

subcontractor work. Then, on Monday, August 11, 2003, she

released five more units requiring subcontractor work. The nine

units released on those days had been vacant, prior to being

turned over to North Star, for time periods ranging from 28 to

82 days.

88a

complaint. On April 6, 2000, Judge Bruggink stayed

the case pending settlement discussions. On May 26,

2000, the parties entered into an agreement

establishing the preliminary terms of a settlement.

On December 19, 2000, North Star filed a notice of

recision, claiming that the settlement agreement

remained unconsummated. On January 3, 2001, this

case was reassigned to the undersigned. On June 14,

2001, defendant filed a motion for summary

judgment, seeking to enforce the _ settlement.

Following briefing, on January 9, 2002, the court

denied the motion for summary judgment, based

upon the existence of genuine issues of material fact.

On January 31, 2002, defendant issued its own notice

of recision of the settlement and the settlement

thereby was deemed abandoned.

Further discovery ensued. On April 16, 2002,

North Star filed a second amended complaint. On

April 19, 2002, defendant filed a motion for summary

judgment on the merits of this case. On June 3, 2002,

the court scheduled this case for a trial to begin on

October 16, 2002. Following additional discovery, the

court, in an unpublished opinion dated July 3, 2002,

granted, in part, and denied, in part, defendant's

motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, the

parties indicated that they were making substantial

progress toward settlement, leading the court, on

July 19, 2002, to postpone the trial and further stay

the case. Settlement, however, did not materialize.

On March 12, 2003, defendant, at a_= status

conference, requested that the case be further stayed

pending completion of the Army _ Criminal

Investigations Division investigation of North Star.

Before this request was acted upon, on March 28,

2003, North Star filed a motion for summary

89a

judgment. After additional filings regarding the

criminal investigations were received, the court

granted defendant's request and the case was stayed

(with periodic progress reports) until May 5, 2004.

On that day, the court lifted the stay, in part, to allow

defendant to respond to the plaintiffs March 28,

2003, motion for summary judgment. Shortly after

this response was filed, further discovery disputes

arose. On September 2, 2004, the court consolidated

Case Nos. 02-1632C and 03-2699C with the earlier

1998 case. On October 4, 2004, the court issued an

order granting, in part, and denying, in part,

plaintiffs summary judgment motion. On January

18, 2005, the court issued an order requiring expert

discovery and establishing a trial date of August 15,

2005.

Trial in this case occurred between August 15 and

23, 2005, at which both fact and expert witnesses

were presented. Further trial in this matter was

conducted on September 2, 2005. Following the filing

of extensive post-trial briefs, closing argument in this

case occurred on July 20, 2006.

Il. DISCUSSION

With the foregoing findings as reference points, the

court proceeds to consider the claims made by

plaintiff and defendant's responses thereto.

A. Jurisdiction

In a motion in limine filed before trial, as well as

during its closing argument and in its post-trial

briefs, defendant asserted that a variety of the claims

90a

raised by plaintiff in its amended complaints should

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It contends that

these claims were not properly filed with the

contracting officer and that no decisions, therefore,

were rendered on these matters. Because subject

matter jurisdiction is a “threshold matter,” it must be

addressed before the court turns to the merits. See

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,

94-95 (1998); Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 219

F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

This court has “jurisdiction to render judgment

upon any claim by or against, or dispute with, a

contractor arising under ... the Contract Disputes Act

of 1978 [(CDA)].” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2); see also

Applied Cos. v. United States, 144 F.3d 1470, 1477

(Fed. Cir. 1998). In this framework, the “strict

limits” of the CDA _ constitute “jurisdictional

prerequisites to any appeal.” England v. The

Swanson Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir.

2004) (citing Sharman Co. v. United States, 2 F.3d

1564, 1569 n. 6 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Hence, jurisdiction

is lacking “unless the contractor's claim is first

presented to the contracting officer and that officer

renders [or is deemed to render] a final decision on

the claim.” England, 353 F.3d at 1379; see also D.L.

Braughler Co., Inc. v. West, 127 F.3d 1476, 1480 (Fed.

Cir. 1997); James M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. United

States, 93 F.3d 1537, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Bath Iron

Works Corp. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1567, 1578

(Fed. Cir. 1994). And these requirements must be

met separately for each claim raised-there is no

pendent or ancillary jurisdiction. See Joseph Morton

Co. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1273, 1281 (Fed. Cir.

1985); see also Health Ins. Plan of Greater N_Y., Inc.

v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 33, 48 (2004).

9la

Section 605 of the CDA expressly requires that

“{a]ll claims by a contractor against the government

. shall be in writing and shall be submitted to the

contracting officer for a decision.” 41 U.S.C. § 605(a);

see also England, 353 F.3d at 1379. Where the

amount of a claim exceeds $100,000, the claim must

be certified by the contractor. 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)(1).

While the CDA does not define further the content of

a “claim,” FAR § 2.101 defines a “claim” as “a written

demand or written assertion by one of the contracting

parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of

money in a sum certain, the adjustment or

interpretation of contract terms, or other relief

arising under or relating to the contract.” 48 C.F.R. §

2.101; see also England, 353 F.3d at 1379; Reflectone,

Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

This definition, which has often been employed by

courts analyzing whether the CDA requirements are

met,27 thus distinguishes between claims that seek

monetary relief and other types of demands involving

“the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms”

or “other relief arising under or relating to the

contract.” Neither type of claim must be submitted

“in any particular form or use any particular

wording.” Contract Cleaning Maint., Inc. v. United

States; 811 F.2d 586, 592 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also

Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d

1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“certain ‘magic words’

need not be used and the intent of the ‘claim’

governs’); Engineered Demolition, Inc. v. United

27 See, e.g., Envtl. Tectonics Corp. v. United States, 72 Fed.

Cl. 290, 294 (2006); Renda Marine, Inc. v. United States, 71 Fed.

Cl. 378, 387 n. 9 (2006).

92a

States, 70 Fed. Cl. 580, 587 (2006). Indeed, various

cases suggest. that a claim may arise from the

combination of more than one document submitted to

the contracting officer. See Clearwater Constructors,

Inc. v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 303, 309 (2003);

Exec. Ct. Reporters, Inc. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl.

769, 774 (1998) (“a series of letters can be read

together to comprise a clear and unequivocal

statement giving the contracting officer notice of the

basis for the contractor's claim”); Al Munford, Inc. v.

United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 185, 189 (1998) (“Such a

statement may be in the form of one or several

documents.”).

In other regards, the requirements for monetary

and nonmonetary claims diverge somewhat. The

Federal Circuit has described the requirements oi a

monetary claim in practical terms, stating that “[a]ll

that is required is that the contractor submit in

writing to the contracting officer a clear and

unequivocal statement that gives the contracting

officer adequate notice of the basis and amount of the

claim.” Scott Timber Co. v. United States, 333 F.3d

1358, 13865 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Contract

Cleaning, 811 F.2d at 592); see also Ace Constructors,

Inc. v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 253, 266 (2006).

Consistent with this “common sense” view, this court

has consistently interpreted the “sum _ certain”

requirement to include amounts in dispute that “can

be easily determined by a simple mathematical

calculation or from the contractor's submission to the

contracting officer.” Metric Constr. Co. v. United

93a

States, 14 Cl. Ct. 177, 179 (1988).28 In this regard,

the claim must provide enough specificity so as to

meet the twin purposes of the CDA's administrative

exhaustion requirement-to screen out unwarranted or

inflated claims, see CPS Mech. Contractors, 59 Fed.

Cl. at 764; Kirkham Constrs., Inc. v. United States, 30

Fed. Cl. 90, 93 (1993) (citations omitted), and to

facilitate resolution of contract disputes’ by

negotiation, at the agency level, rather than by

litigation, H.L. Smith, Inc. v. Dalton, 49 F.3d 1568,

1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also S.

Rep. No. 95-118 at 7-8 (1978) (claim requirement was

to “induce resolution of more contract disputes by

negotiation prior to litigation”). If no sum certain is

specified, the contracting officer cannot settle the

claim by awarding a specific amount of money

“because such a settlement would not preclude the

contractor from filing suit seeking the difference

between the amount awarded and some larger

amount never specifically articulated to the

contracting officer.” Exec. Ct. Reporters, 29 Fed. Cl.

at 775; see also CPS Mech. Contractors, 59 Fed. Cl. at

765.

By comparison, a nonmonetary claim-one seeking,

for example, the interpretation of contract terms-need

not seek a “sum certain.” See CW Gov't Travel, Inc. v.

United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 369, 382 (2004); Clearwater

Constructors, Inc., 56 Fed. Cl. at 309 (“To state a non-

monetary claim there is no requirement that the

contractor make a request for a sum certain.”); GPA-

28 See also CPS Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 59

Fed.Cl. 760, 764 (2004); Exec. Ct. Reporters, 29 Fed.Cl. at 775;

Sun Eagle Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl.Ct. 465, 472 (1991).

94a

I, LP v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 762, 767 (2000).

Rather, “the phrase ‘as a matter of right’ in the

regulatory definition of a ‘claim’ requires only that

the contractor specifically assert entitlement to the

[nonmonetary] relief sought. That is, the claim must

be a demand for something due or believed to be due.”

Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. United States, 178 F.3d

1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also CW Gov't Travel,

63 Fed. Cl. at 383. Such a claim, if denied or deemed

denied, thus supplies the prerequisite for this court to

exercise jurisdiction in a case in which a contractor is

seeking merely’ declaratory _ relief. Alliant

Techsystems, 178 F.3d at 1268; Garrett v. General

Elec. Co., 987 F.2d 747, 750-51 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

Defendant asserts that more than a dozen of North

Star's monetary claims were not presented to the

contracting officer with sufficient detail so as to meet

the regulatory definition of a “claim,” particularly the

“sum certain” requirement thereof. Plaintiff does not

contend that there is a single document that

establishes, for any of these questioned monetary

claims, a “sum certain” request. Rather, it contends

that the amounts sought as to these claims were

“easily calculable” based upon information accessible

to the contracting officer at the time the claims were

made-information either supplied by plaintiff or

originating with defendant. Essentially, plaintiff

asserts that the respective contracting officers should

have been able to take cost, billing or other

accounting information that they had, combine it

with various requests made by plaintiff for money

owed, and arrive at the “sum certain” that plaintiff

was seeking. The court is sympathetic to plaintiff's

plight, particularly given the specter that significant

time was expended at trial on claims that were

95a

belatedly attacked by defendant on jurisdictional

grounds. Indeed, to date, defendant has provided no

acceptable explanation as to why it did not perceive

the alleged jurisdictional defects until, in some

instances, the eve of trial, and, in other instances,

even after trial. Yet, it is axiomatic that subject

matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. See

Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed.

Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1127 (2005);

Fanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717,

720 (Fed. Cir. 1998). And the fact is-discomforting or

not-that jurisdiction is lacking as to many of the

challenged monetary claims.

While plaintiff suggests that administrative claims

can be cobbled together from various documents that

were possessed by defendant, as to most of the claims

at issue, there are no select group of documents,

supplied by plaintiff or otherwise, that provide a

“clear and unequivocal” indication as to the amount

sought by plaintiff. Contrary to _ plaintiff's

importunings, determining a sum certain for many of

these claims is not a matter of simple mathematics.

In some cases, only portions of the relevant costs are

documented; in others, historical cost data is

available for similar transactions, but not for those

that are the subject of the claim; and in still others,

the relevant data is entirely missing.29 Moreover,

29 Indicative of this, the amounts plaintiff has sought as to

some of its claims have shifted significantly during the course of

this litigation. This is perhaps best exemplified by comparing

North Star's damage estimates before and after trial, as the

following chart reveals:

96a

while the decisional law suggests that several

documents may be combined into a claim for purposes

of the CDA, that combination must still make clear

how much the plaintiff is willing to accept in

settlement of its claim. Thus, for example, multiple

documents seemingly could form a claim if one

unambiguously stated the costs involved and another

cross-referenced the earlier document and sought a

final decision to recover those costs. See, e.g., Al

Munford, 30 Fed. Cl. at 189-90; see also Contract

Cleaning Maint., 811 F.2d at 588-89, 592.59 But, such

is not the case where various documents list the costs

involved with an issue, but no document definitively

claims all or some specified amount of those costs. To

hold, in the latter situation, that the administrative

exhaustion requirements of the CDA are satisfied

would be to defeat the primary purpose for having

those requirements, which, as noted, is to provide the

Increase in $1.3 million $1.3 million

operating expenses

Decrease in market $8.6 million $8.6 million

value of Birchwood

Other damages not | $1,602,730 $2,639,565 _

covered above

It is, of course, the last of these three categories in which

the claims jurisdictionally challenged by defendant primarily lie.

30 Such an approach, indeed, is envisioned by 48 C.F.R. §

2.101, which, in defining “claim” states that “[a] voucher,

invoice, or other routine request for payment that is not in

dispute when submitted is not a claim. The submission may be

converted to a claim, by written notice to the contracting officer

as provided in 33.206(a).”

97a

agency with a concrete opportunity to settle the claim

in advance of litigation. Such a holding threatens

legal uncertainty in an area of law that is reasonably

well-settled, a result unwarranted even by the

belatedness of some of defendant's jurisdictional

arguments.*!

Nor does the so-called “enlarged claim” doctrine

offer plaintiff any solace here. Under this doctrine,

additional compensation may be sought, without

prior certification by a contracting officer's final

decision, for “new matters inherent in the claims

previously presented.” Miller Elevator Co. v. United

States, 30 Fed. Cl. 662, 701 (1994).32 For the doctrine

to apply-(i) “the increase in the amount of the claim

[must be] based on the same set of operative facts

previously presented to the contracting officer;” and

(ii) “the contractor neither knew nor reasonably

should have known, at the time when the claim was

presented to the contracting officer, of the factors

justifying an increase in the amount of the claim.”

31 Nor will this court hold, as plaintiff suggests, that the

contracting officers here had an independent obligation to obtain

a listing of the specific costs at issue. The obligation to request a

sum certain plainly lies squarely on the contractor's shoulders

and cannot be off-loaded in the fashion plaintiff seeks.

32 Accord Cerberonics, Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl.Ct. 415,

417 (1987) (“If the complaint brought here is based on the same

set of operative facts underlying the claim presented to the

contracting officer, then this court has jurisdiction....”); J.F.

Shea Co. v. United States, 4 Cl.Ct. 46, 54 (1983) (“It would be

most disruptive of normal litigation procedure if any increase in

the amount of a claim based upon matters developed in

litigation before the court had to be submitted to the contracting

officer before the court could continue to a final resolution on the

claim.”).

9GRa

AAI Corp. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 541, 544 (1991)

(quoting Kunz Constr. Co. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct.

74, 79 (1987) (emphasis in original)); see also Johnson

Controls World Services, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed.

Cl. 589, 593 (1999). Yet, aside from what North Star

knew and when, it remains that the claims at issue

are not based upon the same set of operative facts,

but, at best, similar occurrences during different time

periods. Under these circumstances, the enlarged

claim doctrine avails plaintiff naught, as _ the

decisional law so reflects.*%

Reflecting the foregoing, the court's specific

jurisdictional findings are summarized in_ the

attached Fact Appendix I, which lists the relevant

paragraphs of the various complaints raising certain

claims, the document(s) that plaintiff purports

represent a CDA claim, and various findings

regarding those documents. These findings reveal

that, while the total number of claims that remain

jurisdictionally viable 1s much reduced over those

that originally went to trial, the most significant of

33 See, e.g., Pueblo of Zuni v. United States, 467 F Supp.2d

1099, 1110-12 (D.N.M. 2006) (contract disputes in different

fiscal years “did not involve the same operative facts”); Johnson

Controls World Services, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 589,

595 (1999) (claims involved facts that though similar, were

“sufficiently distinct” to preclude application of doctrine); ECC

Int'l Corp. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 359, 367 n. 6 (1999)

(doctrine inapplicable where plaintiff “relies on facte ... that

were never presented to the contracting officer and never

addressed in a final decision”); compare Modeer v. United States,

68 Fed. Cl. 131, 137 (2005), aff'd, 183 Fed. Appx. 975 (Fed. Cir.

2006) (enlarged claim doctrine applicable to cover rent for entire

period of government holdover tenancy even though contractor's

claim was only for the firet month of the holdover period).

99a

the claims here are unaffected. That is true, in part,

because many of the latter claims seek only

declarations -relief that, as noted, does not require a

prior request for a sum certain See Clearwater

Constrs., 56 Fed. Cl. at 309, 311; see also CW Gou't

Travel, 63 Fed. Cl. at 381-82. Indeed, most of the

substantive issues raised are implicated by plaintiff's

banner claim-that defendant acted in bad faith, a

topic to which the court now turns

8B. Bad Faith

“The need for mutual fair dealing,” the I ederal

Circuit has instructed, “is no less required in

contracts to which the government is a party, than in

any other commercial arrangement. Maxima Corp

v. United States, 847 F.2d 1549, 1556 (Fed. Cir

1988); see also St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States,

368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black J., dissenting) (“It is

no less good morals and good law that the

Government should turn square corners in dealing

with the people than that the people should turn

square corners in dealing with their Government.”)

Most of plaintiffs claims may be viewed as a

variation on a theme-that the government officials

involved here, in sundry ways, acted in bad faith

Accordingly, while various of plaintiff's allegations

could be viewed as asserting breaches independent of

its bad faith claims, the court believes that the

evidence of animus here is such that it is more

appropriate to view all those allegations as being at

least potentially impacted by the government's bad

faith

100a

1. Standard of Proof

Because it is an implied term of every contract

that each party will act in good faith towards the

other, a party may breach a contract by acting in bad

faith. Link v. Dept. of the Treasury, 51 F.3d 1577,

1582 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Centex Corp. v. United

States, 395 F.3d 1283, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2005). As an

aspect of these duties, “Je]very contract ... imposes an

implied obligation ‘that neither party will do

anything that will hinder or delay the other party in

performance of the contract.” Essex Electro Eng'rs,

Inc. v. Danzig, 224 F.3d 1283, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2000)

(quoting Luria Bros. v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 676,

369 F.2d 701, 708 (1966)); see also H & S Mfg., Inc. v.

United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 301, 310 (2005), aff'd 192

Fed. Appx. 965 (Fed. Cir. 2006) . Such covenants

require each party “not to interfere with the other

party's performance and not to act so as to destroy

the reasonable expectations of the other party

regarding the fruits of the contract.” Centex Corp.,

395 F.3d at 1304; see also Malone v. United States,

849 F.2d 1441, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1988), modified on

other grounds by, 857 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1988). This

“duty not to hinder is breached when the Government

commits ‘actions that unreasonably cause delay or

hindrance to contract performance.” H & S Mfg., 66

Fed. Cl. at 311 (quoting C. Sanchez & Son, Inc. v.

United States, 6 F.3d 1539, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).

Such a breach occurs when, in the words of Judge

Posner, there has been “sharp dealing,” defined as

taking “deliberate advantage of an oversight by your

contract partner concerning his rights under the

contract.” Mkt. St. Assocs. L.P. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588,

594 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Centex Corp., 395 F.3d at

1304 (The covenant “include[s] the duty not to

10la

interfere with the other party's performance and not

to act so as to destroy the reasonable expectations of

the other party regarding the fruits of the contract.”).

When a contractor alleges bad faith, in order “to

overcome the presumption of good faith [on behalf of

the government], the proof must be almost

irrefragable.” Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v.

United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1323 n. 2 (Fed. Cir.

2003). Translated into more common parlance, “well

nigh irrefragable proof’ has been described as “clear

and convincing evidence.” Am-Pro Protective Agency,

Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1239-40 (Fed.

Cir. 2002). “In the cases where the court has

considered allegations of bad faith, the necessary

‘irrefragable proof has been equated with evidence of

some specific intent to injure the plaintiff.”

Torncello v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 20, 681 F.2d

756, 770 (1982) (emphasis in original); see also Galen

Med. Associates, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1324,

1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Librach v. United States, 147

Ct. Cl. 605, 614 (1959); cf. Tecom, Inc. v. United

States, 66 Fed. Cl. 736, 757-72 (2005). Courts have

found bad faith when confronted by a course of

government conduct that was “designedly

oppressive,” Struck Const. Co. v. United States, 96 Ct.

Cl. 186, 222, 1942 WL 4411 (1942), or that “initiated

a conspiracy’ to “get rid” of a contractor, Knotts v.

United States, 128 —t. Cl. 489, 121 F.Supp. 630, 636

(1954). See also C. Sanchez & Son, Inc., 6 F.3d at

1542. As these cases illustrate, the “irrefragable

proof’ standard, though daunting, is not intended to

be impenetrable, that is, it does not “insulate

government action from any review by courts.” The

Libertatia Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl.

702, 707 (2000) (emphasis in original); see also L.P.

102a

Consulting Group, Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl.

238, 243 (2005); Manson Const. Co. v. United States,

64 Fed. Cl. 746, 753 n. 11 (2005).54

Perhaps sensing weaknesses in its case, defendant

attempts to fasten a layer of legal kevlar onto the

“bad faith” standard that truly would make it

impregnable. It contends, for example, that there can

be no bad faith unless it is shown that a breach of an

xpress contract provision has occurred. To be sure,

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

cannot be used to expand or override contractual

duties in the express contract. See, e.g., Bradley v.

Chiron Corp., 136 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1998);

Renda Marine, Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 639,

34 In Tecom, 66 Fed. Cl. at 771, this court held that “[t]he

presumption of good faith conduct of government officials has no

relevance” in considering “claims that the duties to cooperate

and not hinder performance of a contract have been breached.”

It further held that in such circumstances, proof of a violation

need not be by clear and convincing evidence. Jd. at 769. It is

unclear whether Tecom may be squared either with Federal

Circuit precedent or the jurisprudential underpinnings of the

doctrine, in which performing in good faith and bad faith are

often viewed as mutually exclusive. See, e.g., Richard A. Lord,

23 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:22 (4th ed. 2002) (“It is

axiomatic that before a court will consider a claim that the

implied duty of good faith has been violated, there must be some

factual basis for ... bad faith on the part of the defendant.”);

Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its

Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L.REV. 810, 819

(1982) (the “good faith” standard “functioned as an excluder to

rule out a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith”).

Whatever may be the larger fate of the Tecom approach, this

court finds it unnecessary to explore its application here for, as

will be seen, plaintiff prevails under even the more rigorous

standard, which requires a clear showing of animus.

1038a

648 (2005). But, it does not follow, a fortiori, that the

covenant must be deemed fulfilled unless the express

terms of the contract are breached. Rather, the

covenant may be breached if, in ways unenvisioned

by the contract, a party proceeds in a fashion

calculated to frustrate or hinder performance by its

contracting partner. Such was the holding in Centex

Corp., 395 F.3d at 1306, in which the Federal Circuit

found that the covenant could be violated by a

hindering action, provided the plaintiff was not

seeking “an expansion of the government's duties

under the contract or for a duty that is inconsistent

with some provision of the contract.”55 In other

words, the covenant may be breached if the contract

is enforced in a fashion designed to “interferfe] with

the plaintiffs' enjoyment of the benefits contemplated

by the contract, which is among the core functions

served by the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing.” Centex Corp., 395 F.3d at 1306. Indeed, the

covenant perhaps plays its most crucial role where

one party under a contract exercises discretion in

favor of the other-“[t]he office of the doctrine of good

faith is to forbid the kinds of opportunistic behavior

that a mutually dependent, cooperative relationship

might enable in the absence of the rule.” Mkt. St.

35 See also United States v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 248

F.3d 781, 796 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1115 (2002)

(“[slince good faith is merely a way of effectuating the parties'

intent in unforseen circumstances, the implied covenant has

‘nothing to do with the enforcement of terms actually

negotiated”); Craig-Buff Ltd. P'ship v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl.

382, 388 (2006) (“a claim for a breach of the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing is not limited to specific contract

terms’).

104a

Assocs., 941 F.2d at 595.36 To hold that, absent a

separate breach, the covenant is not violated would

be to deprive this imphed promise of any vitality in

the particular universe for which it was designed-

that of contract di

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