Appendix — North Star Alaska Housing Corp. v. United States
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX A: Order of the Federal Circuit
denying rehearing and rehearing en banc
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APPENDIX B: Decision of the Federal Circuit,
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APPENDIX C: Decision of the Court of Federal
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APPENDIX D: Judgment of the Court of Federal
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APPENDIX E: Decision of the Court of Federal]
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APPENDIX F: Decision by the Contracting
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APPENDIX G: Decision by the Contracting
Officer, March 12, 2008 .........ccccccccccscccssccccscscssescoes 204a
APPENDIX H: Decision by the Contracting
Officer, December 7, 2007 .............ccccccccccccecceeeeeues 232a
APPENDIX I: Decision by the Contracting
Officer, October 25, 2007 ..................ccccccccsosccsssecece 249a
APPENDIX J: Relevant Portions of the Contract
Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613........000000.. 265a
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
2009-5054
Filed: March 22, 2010
NORTH STAR ALASKA HOUSING
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
Claims in 98-CV-168, 02-CV-1632, 03-CV-2699,
Judge Francis M. Allegra.
ORDER
2a
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
ORDER
A combined petition for panel rehearing and for
rehearing en banc having been filed by the
Appellant, and a response thereto having been
invited by the court and filed by the Appellee, and the
petition for rehearing and response, having been
referred to the panel that heard the appeal, and
thereafter the petition for rehearing en banc and
response having been referred to the circuit judges
who are in regular active service,
UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is
ORDERED that the petition for panel rehearing
be, and the same hereby is, DENIED and it is further
ORDERED that the petition for rehearing en banc
be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.
3a
The mandate of the court will issue on March 29,
2010.
FOR THE COURT,
Jan Horbaly
Clerk
Dated: 03/22/2010
cc: Thomas C. Goldstein
Timothy P. McIlmail
NORTH STAR ALASKA HOUSING V US, 2009-5054
(CFC-98-CV-168)
4a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,
FEDERAL CIRCUIT.
NORTH STAR ALASKA HOUSING
CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 2009-5054.
Dec. 15, 2009.
Appealed from United States Court of Federal
Claims, Case Nos. 98-CV-168, 02-CV-1632, 03-CV-
2699, Francis M. Allegra, Judge.
Paul W. Killian, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-
appellant. With him on the brief was Mark J. Groff.
Timothy P. MclIimail, Trial Attorney, Commercial
Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for
defendant-appellee. With him on the brief were Tony
West, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E.
Davidson, Director, and Donald E. Kinner, Assistant
Director.
LOURIE, LINN, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
Judgment
PER CURIAM.
This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.
6a
APPENDIX C
United States Court of Federal Claims
NORTH STAR ALASKA HOUSING
CORPORATION, Plaintiff,
v.
The UNITED STATES, Defendant.
Nos. 98-168C, 02-1632C, 03-2699C.
Jan. 9, 2009.
ORDER
ALLEGRA, Judge.
On March 7, 2007, this court held that the United
States had breached its covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in administering an Army housing
contract with North Star Alaska Housing Corporation
(North Star). North Star Alaska Hous. Corp. uv.
United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 158, 189-212 (2007).
Relying on a wealth of evidence, this court found that
defendant's representatives acted with animus in a
fashion calculated to hinder plaintiff's performance.
Id. Among the actions cited by the court was
defendant's abuse of the claim resolution process
required by the Contract Disputes Act. Id. at 208-12.
Judgment in favor of plaintiff was entered on April
15, 2008. Defendant did not prosecute an appeal.
On June 18, 2008, plaintiff filed a motion for
attorney's fees and litigation expenses, invoking 28
U.S.C. § 2412(b). Defendant filed its response in
opposition to the motion on August 4, 2008. Plaintiff
Ta
filed its reply on August 21, 2008. Argument on the
motion is deemed unnecessary.
Absent a statute or enforceable contract provision,
fee shifting is generally prohibited, with each party
instead ordinarily bearing its own attorney's fees.
See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991);
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421
U.S. 240, 257 (1975). This so-called "American Rule"
is founded on the belief that requiring an
unsuccessful litigant to pay the litigation expenses of
the prevailing party would unduly deter parties from
seeking to "vindicate their rights" in a judicial forum.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); see also Arcambel v.
Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796) Gn which this
rule originated). Over the years, however, courts
have recognized limited exceptions to this rule,
among them that a court may use its inherent power
to assess attorney's fees “when a party has ‘acted in
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45-46, (quoting
F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber
Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)); see also Alyeska, 421
U.S. at 258-59. Section 2412(b) of Title 28, a
provision of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAdA),
extends this concept to the United States, subjecting
it to the award of attorney's fees in civil cases "to the
same extent that any other party would be liable
under the common law ... for such an award." See also
H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 9 (1980) (section 2412(b)
8a
"reflects a strong movement by Congress toward
placing the federal government and civil litigants on
completely equal footing"); Kerin v. U.S. Postal Seruv.,
218 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2000).
The “bad faith” exception to the American Rule
serves the “dual purpose of vindicat[ing] judicial
authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions
available for contempt of court and mak[ing] the
prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his
opponent's obstinacy.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46
quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n. 14
(1978)); see Chambers, 501 U.S. at 74 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (bad faith exception to American Rule
“permits fee shifting as a sanction to the extent
necessary to protect the judicial process”). Such an
award is punitive in nature and should be imposed
only in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons
of justice. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973);
Eureka Inv. Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d
932, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Under this exception, it is
appropriate to assess attorney's fees when the court
finds that “fraud has been practiced upon it, or that
the very temple of justice has been defiled[.]” Univ.
Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580
(1946). Such a sanction is also appropriate when a
party, in bad faith, delays or disrupts litigation or
hampers the enforcement of a _ court. order.
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46. The “bad faith” exception
thus applies “to a full range of litigation abuses,” id.,
and “depends not on which party wins the lawsuit,
but on how the parties conduct themselves during the
litigation.” Id. at 53; see also Hutto, 437 U.S. at 689
n. 14.
9a
In keeping with these sentiments, the Federal
Circuit recently concluded that “fee awards cannot be
assessed based on claims of bad faith primary
conduct,” i.e., “conduct that forms the basis for the
substantive claim for relief.” Centex Corp. v. United
States, 486 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also
Consumers Energy Co. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl.
670, 676-77 (2008). The Federal Circuit noted that
its view was shared by at least eight other circuit
courts.! Centex reasoned that “authorizing a court to
1 The Federal Circuit cited a variety of cases for this
proposition, including the following: Zapata Hermanos
Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., Inc., 313 F.3d 385, 391
(7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1068 (2003) (holding that
“behavior in the litigation itself is the only lawful domain of the
relevant concept of ‘inherent authority”); Towerridge, Inc. v.
T.A.O., Inc., 111 F.3d 758, 765 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[A]n award of
attorneys’ fees may not be premised solely on prelitigation
conduct.”); Lamb Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist.,
103 F.3d 1422, 1435 (8th Cir. 1997) (“{A court] may not base an
[attorney's fees] award solely on the conduct that led to the
substantive claim.”); Ass'n of Flight Attendants v. Horizon Air
Indus., Inc., 976 F.2d 541, 550 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[N]o federal
appellate authority in or out of the Ninth Circuit has clearly
approved an order shifting attorney's fees based solely upon a
finding of bad faith as an element of the cause of action
presented in the underlying suit. We decline to do so.”); Sanchez
v. Rowe, 870 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1989) (“We hold that the
requisite bad faith ... may not be based on a party's conduct
forming the basis for [the] substantive claim.”) (emphasis
omitted); Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 765 F.2d
1004, 1014 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Vexatious conduct inherent in the
fraudulent acts that make up the 10b-5 cause of action cannot
be the basis for an attorney's fee award”); Shimman uv. Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 744 F.2d 1226, 1233 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985) (“We therefore hold that the
bad faith exception to the American Rule does not allow an
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shift fees based solely on bad faith conduct that forms
the basis for the substantive claim for relief would
undermine the American Rule by penalizing a party
who raises good faith defenses to claims of liability
for bad faith conduct.” 486 F.3d at 1372; see also id.
(expressing a desire to “protect a defendant's right to
go to court and argue a non-frivolous defense to a
claim, even if the claim arose from the defendant's
bad faith conduct”). The court also categorically
rejected arguments that the EAJA was intended to
“alter the common law fee-shifting rule,” emphasizing
instead that, as under the common law, “[flee-shifting
is not permitted for bad faith conduct that precedes
the accrual of the claim in question.” Jd. at 1375.
Centex thus suggests that the bad faith exception
ordinarily applies only if some bad faith conduct
occurs in the context of litigation.
II.
Seemingly undaunted by the limitations inherent
in this holding, plaintiff asseverates that attorney's
fees are warranted here because defendant proceeded
in bad faith in several critical regards. First, it
asserts that fees are recoverable here because
defendant's prior counsel, Mr. Donald Kinner,
award of attorney fees based only on bad faith in the conduct
giving rise to the underlying claim.”); Cordeco Dev. Corp. v.
Santiago Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256, 262-63 (1st Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976) (disapproving the position that the
bad faith exception extends to bad faith in the events giving rise
to litigation).
lla
exhibited bad faith in the conduct of this litigation by:
(i) advising the Army to extend its practice of
reducing the reimbursements paid for replacing
carpet damaged by occupants to reflect the age of the
carpeting--a practice the parties referred to as
“depreciation;” and (ii) triggering, or at least
promoting, a criminal investigation of plaintiff's
conduct that caused the court to stay this action for
nearly a year (and which ultimately resulted in no
indictments). Second, plaintiff contends that fees
should be imposed because the Army corrupted the
contract claim resolution process, inappropriately
coercing the contracting officers into denying various
contract claims filed by plaintiff. For its part,
however, defendant contends that all the conduct
identified by the plaintiff was “primary conduct” that
formed the “basis for the substantive claim for relief’
here. It argues that, under Centex, such conduct
provides no basis for assessing attorney's fees under
the “bad faith” exception to the American Rule. And
it asserts that much of the conduct identified by
plaintiff as the basis for its fee claim simply was not
characterized by the court as being in bad faith.
A
The latter point bears emphasis at the outset. In
fact, the court did not find--and plaintiff did not
prove--that Mr. Kinner engaged in any bad faith
conduct regarding the Army's decision to extend its
depreciation practice to other occupant-damaged
items replaced by plaintiff. As this court previously
described, the Army's initial decision to reduce the
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reimbursement associated with replacing carpeting
initially was supported by at least one decision of this
court that had allowed such depreciation. North
Star, 76 Fed. Cl. at 201 (citing West Carthage Assocs.
v. United States, No. 00-622C (Fed. Cl. May 30,
2002)). Based, inter alia, upon the existence of this
precedent, the court found that the Army's initial
decision to adopt the depreciation practice was not
motivated by animus. North Star, 76 Fed. Cl. at 202.
The court, however, went on to find that--
Over time, however, this practice took on new
dimensions. Particularly as viewed through
the prism of the many statements of animus
in the record, it is clear the use of
depreciation clearly became yet another
weapon by which Mr. Peterson, Ms. Kiser and
others could effectuate their animus toward
North Star. And this certainly was true by
the time that these officials, responding to a
July 3, 2002, ruling by this court shedding
considerable doubt on the legality of the
depreciation practice, extended depreciation
to counter tops, vinyl and other types of
materials installed in the units.
North Star, 76 Fed. Cl. at 202. This findings thus
hinged on statements reflecting animus made by Mr.
Peterson, Ms. Kiser and other Army officials. Id.
But, the record contained no such statements made
by Mr. Kinner. Indeed, it is conceivable, if not likely,
that he urged the extension of the depreciation
practice merely in an effort to make the Army's
practices with respect to carpet and other items
legally consistent. That seemingly is the sort of
tactical decision--in itself reasonable--that Centex
13a
intended to protect. At all events, absent any specific
finding that Mr. Kinner acted in bad faith regarding
the depreciation issue, there is no basis upon which
to impose attorney's fees here predicated upon his
participation in the extension decision.
Nor did the court determine that Mr. Kinner acted
in bad faith in seeking a criminal investigation of
plaintiffs conduct. While the circumstances
surrounding the genesis of that investigation are
admittedly bothersome, it remains that the court did
not find--and plaintiff most certainly has not shown--
that the investigation itself, any actions taken by
defendant's prior counsel (or other Justice
Department officials) in pursuit thereof, or any
resulting delay, were the result of bad faith. North
Star, 76 Fed. Cl. at 211; see also United States v.
Ford, 737 F.2d 1506, 1510 (9th Cir. 1984) (fee movant
bears the burden of establishing an opponent's bad
faith); 10 James Wm. Moore, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 4 54.171[2][c] (83d ed. 2008) (citing
additional cases). As such, plaintiff second allegation
also lacks the factual predicates necessary to bring it
within the bad faith exception to the American Rule.
B.
A closer call is presented by plaintiff's final banner
claim--that it is entitled to attorney's fees because
defendant corrupted the administrative claim
process. This court found that bad faith permeated
the Army's conduct in this regard. North Star, 76
Fed. Cl. at 208-12. Moreover, the Federal Circuit, in
Centex, left open the question whether “the judicial
l4a
process is abused by defendant's bad faith response to
a claim for relief after the claim accrues but before
the judicial process is formally invoked.” 486 F.3d at
1372 n. 1. This response, of course, begs further
inquiries regarding the proper contours of the
sanctioning authority represented by the “bad faith”
exception.
The judicial thinking on that subject can be
arrayed over a spectrum. On one end of that
spectrum are those circuits that liberally construe the
sanctioning authority to reach virtually any form of
“bad faith” conduct, freely including that which
predates the litigation. Plaintiff cites two cases that
lie on this end of the _ spectrum--Maritime
Management, Inc. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1326
(11th Cir. 2001) and Brown v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 492
(9th Cir. 1990). In Maritime Management, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court finding that
the United States had acted in bad faith by delivering
an incomplete administrative record to the General
Accounting Office in a bid protest. Maritime Mgmt.,
242 F.3d at 1333-34. And in Brown, the Ninth
Circuit upheld sanctions based upon a Department of
Health and Human _ Services’ program that
systematically reviewed the decisions of
administrative law judges in terms of the ratio of
benefits allowed to benefits denied--a program that
the district court had found was adopted in “bad
faith.” Brown, 916 F.2d at 496-97. Both cases
employed the broad view of the bad faith exception--
the one that permits fee shifting even where the bad
faith was solely an aspect of the conduct giving rise to
the lawsuit. See Maritime Mgmt., 242 F.3d at 1333;
Brown, 916 F.2d at 496. Not surprisingly, decisions
at this end of the spectrum have no problem in
l5a
concluding that the “bad faith” denial of a claim is
sanctionable. Take, for example, American Hosp.
Ass'n v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1991), in
which the D.C. Circuit held that the bad faith
exception may be invoked where “a party, confronted
with a clear statutory or judicially-imposed duty
towards another, is so recalcitrant in performing that
duty that the injured party is forced to undertake
otherwise unnecessary litigation to vindicate plain
legal rights.” Jd. at 220 (citation omitted); see also
S.E.C. v. Zahareas, 374 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2004);
Cobell v. Norton, 319 F.Supp.2d 36, 43-44 (D.D.C.
2004).
At the other end of the spectrum are decisions
that, in more narrowly construing the sanctioning
authority, conclude that fee shifting can never be
based upon “bad faith” conduct that solely predates
the litigation. See Zapata, 313 F.3d at 391 (this
power 18 “is to be exercised sparingly, to punish
misconduct ... occurring in the litigation itself, not in
the events giving rise to the litigation”); Ass'n of
Flight Attendants, 976 F.2d at 549. These cases are
particularly sensitive to the limitations associated
with a court's use of inherent power, drawing
support, in this regard, from the various opinions in
Chambers. They often cite, see, e.g., Towerridge, 111
F.3d at 766, the majority's statement in Chambers
that (“[t]he imposition of sanctions under the bad-
faith exception depends ... on how the parties conduct
themselves during the litigation.”) 501 U.S. at 46.
They also rely, see, e.g., Ass'n of Flight Attendants,
976 F.2d at 549, on Justice Kennedy's dissent, in
which he more pointedly stated--
16a
When a federal court, through invocation of
its inherent powers, sanctions a party for bad-
faith prelitigation conduct, it goes well
beyond the exception to the American Rule
and violates the Rule's careful balance
between open access to the federal court
system and penalties for the willful abuse of
it.
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 74 (Kennedy, J. dissenting);
see also id. at 60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).”
Tending toward this end of the spectrum are also
decisions that, owing to a general hesitancy to
sanction prelitigation conduct, refuse to assess fees
based upon the underlying conduct that gave rise to
the substantive claims in the case, but admit that
there might be extreme circumstances in which
conduct predating the litigation so impacts the
integrity of the subsequent judicial proceedings as to
give rise to fee-shifting. Compare F.D.I.C.. vu.
2 The majority opinion in Chambers declined to reach the
question whether the “bad faith” exception applied to
prelitigation conduct, as it viewed the district court's sanction
there as applying only to post-litigation conduct. 501 U.S. at 54-
55 & n. 16. The dissenters disagreed with this point, prompting
them to define more directly the scope of the sanctioning
authority. Jd. at 74 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). It should be
noted that the statements in Chambers are not inconsistent
with Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). To be sure, the
Supreme Court allowed an attorney's fee award there because
the defendants had callously refused to pay maintenance and
cure. Jd. at 530-31. But, as the Federal Circuit noted in Centex,
486 F.3d at 1373, that award was based upon long-standing
admiralty principles, which envisioned the recovery of attorney's
fees in the case as an aspect of damages.
17a
Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566 (5th Cir. 2008) with
Sanchez v. Rowe, 870 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1989);
see also 10 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE at 4
54.171[2][c][{ii] (advocating this more limited view).
The varying results in the latter cases often hinge not
so much upon differing views of the law, as upon
factual nuances and deference to district court
findings regarding the impact of prior “bad faith”
conduct on a given court proceeding.
Several reasons convince the court that the more
restrictive view of the “bad faith” exception ought to
apply here. First, this view is more in accord with
the rationale expressed in Centex. After all, the
Federal Circuit refused to follow American Hospital
and clearly aligned itself with those circuits that have
held that an award of attorney's fees may not be
premised on prelitigation conduct unless that conduct
somehow directly impacts the judicial process.
Centex, 486 F.3d at 1371-73. Second, this narrower
view recognizes not only that the imposition of “bad
faith” sanctions ought to be rare, but that that is the
case because it involves the exercise of the court's
inherent authority. That authority is highly lmited
and exists only to the extent necessary to ensure the
proper functioning of the court, that is, to address
actions that affect the exercise of judicial authority,
relate to the behavior of the parties and attorneys in
the litigation before the court, or otherwise “degrade
the judicial system.” Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v.
Rambus, Inc., 523 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 279 (2008).3
3 See also Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co.,
23 F.3d 374, 378 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Without a finding of fraud or
18a
Giving effect to these limitations seemingly requires
the court to forego punishing prelitigation conduct
that. does not significantly impact the integrity of the
proceedings before it. Finally, it should not be
overlooked that an approach that predicates fee
liability based solely on how an agency handles an
administrative claim threatens to expose the
government to greater fee liability than its private
counterparts. The latter, of course, generally do not
employ formal claim processes. And even where such
processes exist, usually through contracts, courts
have been hesitant to impose fees based solely on the
bad faith administration of those provisions. See
Lamb, 103 F.3d at 1436-37 (relying on Chambers in
holding that the bad faith administration of a
contract “does not provide a basis upon which the
court may use its inherent power to award attorney
fees”). As such, readily imposing liability on the
government in such circumstances likely violates that
part of section 2412(b) which instructs that “the
United States shall be lable for [attorney’s fees] to
the same extent that any other party would be liable
under the common law.”
Under this narrower view of the “bad faith”
exception, the Army's “bad faith” conduct as to the
claims process here does not support the imposition of
attorney’s fees. For one thing, even though that
process plainly was conducted in bad faith, many, if
not all, of plaintiff's claims would have been denied--
bad faith whereby the ‘very temple of justice has been defiled,’
the court enjoys no discretion to employ inherent powers to
impose sanctions.”); Zapata, 313 F.3d at 391.
19a
and, in some instances, should have been denied--
even in a perfectly fair process. This court said as
much in its prior opinion, in which it rejected much of
the relief originally requested by plaintiff in its CDA
claims, including plaintiffs claim that it was entitled
to damages for the loss of its business value, by far
the most dollar-intensive of its claims. See North
Star, 76 Fed. Cl. at 213-17. And there is no assertion
(or proof) that defendant acted in “bad faith” in
defending against the claims that this court
sustained--again suggesting that virtually all the
claims here would have been denied even in a “good
faith” process. As such, unlike cases like American
Hospital, it is hardly true here that, but for the bad
faith, plaintiff could have avoided this action and the
significant expenditure of judicial resources it
entailed. In other words, this is not a case in which
the identified conduct directly impacted the integrity
of the judicial process. Moreover, while the court
does not believe, as defendant intimates, that Centex
requires that anything pled as part of a complaint
becomes, by virtue of that fact, part and parcel of a
substantive primary claim, here, the fact remains
that the Army’s perversion of the claims process was
an integral part of plaintiffs argument that
defendant had breached its covenant of good faith
and fair dealing and, concomitantly, of the court's
findings in that regard. As such, the “bad faith”
conduct in this regard appears to fall squarely within
the category which Centex holds cannot form the
basis for a “bad faith” fees claim.
Plaintiff makes a variety of other lesser allegations
in support of its fee request--for example, that bad
faith warranting fee shifting was exhibited when, at
trial, certain witnesses testified in contradiction to
20a
hard evidence, or when the government allegedly
used the criminal investigation to supplement
inappropriately its discovery. But, these allegations
are just that--allegations--unsupported by any
evidence evincing bad faith. Other claims made by
plaintiff--for example, that certain Army officials
falsified project records--again represent primary
conduct supporting substantive bad faith contentions
in the lawsuit at issue or in one of the subsequent
lawsuits that plaintiff filed with respect to this same
contract. As such, like plaintiff's principal
allegations, none of these other assertions supports
an award of attorney's fees.
ITT.
Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES
plaintiffs motion for attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.
IT 1S SO ORDERED.
2la
APPENDIX D
Case 1:98-cv-00168-FMA Document 361
Filed: 04/15/2008
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 98-168 C
NORTH STAR ALASKA HOUSING
CORPORATION,
JUDGMENT
V.
THE UNITED STATES
Pursuant to the court’s Opinion and Order, filed
March 7, 2007, the parties’ Joint Status Report
Proposing Judgment, filed on May 4, 2007,
defendant’s filing of Incentive Fee Decisions on June
21, 2007, and the court’s April 14, 2007 Order
Directing Judgment,
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this date,
pursuant to Rule 58, that judgment is in favor of the
plaintiff in the following amounts:
A. For the fire that occurred at 765 Bataan
Court on August 23, 1996, $15,695.63, plus
interest on that amount as provided in the
Contract Disputes Act (CDA), calculated
from September 12, 1996;
B.
22a
For rent reductions based upon alleged
excess downtime for February through June
2002, $7,506.33, plus interest on that
amount as provided in the CDA, calculated
from September 4, 2002; and
. For incentive fees for contract performance
year 1998, $56,667.00, plus interest on the
amount as provided in the CDA, calculated
from March 29, 1999.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
that the court declares that plaintiff is entitled to
receive the following incentive fees:
A.
For incentive fees for contract performance
year 1999, $55,437.00, plus any interest as
provided by law;
For incentive fees for contract performance
years 2000, $52,835.00, plus any interest as
provided by law; and
. For incentive fees for contract performance
year 2001, $53,614.00, plus any interest as
provided by law.
John S. Buckley
Acting Clerk of Court
April 15, 2008
By: s/Lisa L. Reys
Deputy Clerk
23a
NOTE: As to appeal, 60 days from this date, see
RCFC 58.1, re number of copies and listing of all
plaintiffs. Filing fee is $455.00.
24a
APPENDIX E
United States Court of Federal Claims
NORTH STAR ALASKA HOUSING
CORPORATION, Plaintiff,
Vv
The UNITED STATES, Defendant.
Nos. 98-168C, 02-1632C, 03-2699C.
Filed under seal: March 7, 2007.
Reissued: April 2, 2007.!
OPINION
ALLEGRA, Judge.
Just follow the Miami Hurricane's Game Plan.
Blitz Fisher the first time he takes the handoff from
Wartes. Force them to go for the short gains. Keep
them out of the red zone. On offense, exercise good ball
control and mix up the plays to throw off their timing.
Try to draw them offsides and into a _ penalty
1 An unredacted version of this opinion was issued under
seal on March 7, 2007. The parties were given an opportunity to
propose redactions, but no such proposals were made.
Accordingly, the opinion is issued in its original form, with
minor corrections.
25a
situation. And always remember that you have home
field advantage.?
Despite what might appear, this is neither a case
about football, nor even sports-at least, the athletic
sort. Rather, it is a government contract case, before
the court following trial in Fairbanks, Alaska, as well
as trial and closing arguments in Washington, D.C.
Armed with charged quotes like the above, plaintiff
alleges, inter alia, that defendant's representatives
acted in bad faith in administering the subject
housing contract-driven by animus that led them to
breach the contract repeatedly and to interpret other
provisions in a fashion calculated to deny plaintiff the
benefits of the bargain. So the question is-did
defendant act in bad faith? And the answer, in light
of the record, is-yes.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
eb ee 160
aa isis ineapiannsebbeives cebcaaaseaaiia 160
B. Critachl TERMS OF CBO LORKS «....000ccccscnccsscsccecscsccsscssevene 161
DS ss inecceuadavstidnannavessvepcossobaches 161
De Oe I oo sci cvcesccnssssssosescnccssccsscdzcucsens 164
i a ar ao sida sbenuecevusaibakeeral 166
CC, Te I, Fe COG oc isiscetscsccccesiccnssersccccsccevescesse 167
a ke ee sichicdsgedanasanadenn 167
es INTE occ cc cdposcaceicekacecubunasiveuiscss ad ioe 169
Ss a scusabudeinenibanbous ten 173
Fs RRR eS Eceneem ewan ene ence meee 175
ERE RE ee ricer rater ee Tree 176
6. 2003 and forward......................0..... PROP NE ra 18]
ED. PS Bi TINO ec assncostnnccagennececcctescesctienes eens 182
2 Thomas Beech Peterson, Chief of Housing, Department for
Public Works, State of Alaska, United States Army.
Ly Sa. ccccscsocscoceees —
Pi, Oe cette asters ss vies: see a 183
B. Bad Faith... 5 I ES, | |
: Standard of Proof... (0 187
2. Did Defendant Act in Bad Faith?.. oe ae
a. Specific Statements Evidencing Animus
“Just follow the Miami Hurricane's
en ciccssnsccccocens 190
b. Actions Taken by Defendant Indicative of
Bad Faith-“Force them to go for the short
gains. On offense, exercise good ball
control and mix up the plays to throw off
their timing. Try to draw them offsides
and into a penalty situation.”........... ..193
1. Actions that Increased Downtime .... 194
2. Downtime Calculations ........................005. 198
3. Actions Otherwise Designed to Increase Nort h
ons ccscssrevacccnoones 200
4. Actions Designed to Reduce North Star's
Compensation ..............06..0065 Ss 203
5. Other Issues.. as 205
c. Abuse of the Diapute Re solution Process:
“always remember that you have home
field advantage’”............... 208
a ee A 212
C. Damages... lacuastaecese ates rd ae
1. Lose of Value... : 213
2. Other Damages..... 217
I]. CONCLUSION ............ 217
Fact AIS Bisiasiientssiscies: 219
Fact Appendix I] ...........ccccrcersveses eens ..222
Fact Appendix II1........... reer et ccive 225
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the record, including the _ parties’
stipulations, the court finds as follows:
A. Background
North Star Alaska Housing Corporation (North
Star) is a Seattle, Washington-based corporation,
27/a
whose president and owner is Richard Fischer. After
a competitive bidding process, North Star was
awarded a contract to design and build a 400-unit
housing project for soldiers and their families at Fort
Wainwright, Alaska, in the southeast section of
Fairbanks, Alaska. The award resulted in a long.
term relationship between North Star and the Army
Corps of Engineers (Army), the terms of which are
outlined in a series of contracts between the two
parties. Lease No. DACA: 85-1-86-11 requires North
Star to lease property on Fort Wainwright for thirty-
two years, through June 26, 2018. Lease Contract
No. DACA: 85-9-86-27 requires North Star to lease
the same property with residential buildings and
other improvements back to the government. Lease
No. DACA: 85-5-88-17, entered into on November 6,
1987, is the lease of the improved property from
North Star to the Army for a term of nineteen years
and six months, through May 5, 2007. Under this
agreement (the Lease), the Army agreed to rent all
400 units in the development; it pays shelter rent for
the use of the housing and maintenance rent for
maintenance and _ operational — services. The
residential development resulting from this project is
referred to as Birchwood Estates (Birchwood). See
generally, North Star Alaska Housing Corp. v. United
States, 30 Fed. Cl. 259, 265 (1993) (describing these
events).
The last decade of the administration of the
leaseback phase of Birchwood has been quarre]some,
to say the least. Prior to the initiation of this action,
the parties agreed to settle a prior suit filed by North
Star involving various claims arising out of the
leaseback. Subsequent to that settlement, problems
with the leaseback continued and North Star
23a
disputed various actions taken by the Army's
representatives in the administration of the contract.
Ultimately, North Star filed claims with the
contracting officer regarding a number of these
matters. After some procedural machinations,
various of these claims were incorporated into the
First Amended Complaint filed in this case by North
Star on August 23, 1999. Following settlement
negotiations and an extended debate regarding
whether a binding settlement had occurred, plaintiff
filed a Second Amended Complaint in this case on
April 16, 2002, which included essentially the same
seven counts in the First Amended Complaint, but
expanded somewhat on plaintiffs prior allegations of
bad faith
B. Critical Terms of the Lease
To determine whether plaintiff's contractual rights
have been breached, the court first must determine
what those rights are. See San Carlos Irrigation and
Drainage District v. United States, 877 F.2d 957, 959
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v.
United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 751, 759 (2003). At the
outset, then, the court must outline the provisions in
the Lease that underlie the disputes that will be
discussed in greater detail below.
1. Basic Provisions
Article I of the Lease provides that the “Premises”
includes “land situated on the Fort Wainwright
Military Reservation ... together with the
improvements constructed and provided thereon.”
29a
Article IV of the Lease specifies that “the
Government shall pay to [North Star] an annual
rental ... consist[ing] of a shelter rent and a
maintenance rent” and that the “portion of the
annual rental attributable to maintenance shall be
increased or decreased at the commencement of each
year.” Article VIII of the Lease states that-
lijn addition to rents stipulated in Article IV
of this Lease, the Government, at its option,
may pay [North Star] an incentive fee not to
exceed 5 percent (5%) of the maintenance
rental for all housing units, for the period of
time for which [North Star's] performance of
the obligations and responsibilities contained
herein are evaluated and found by the
Government to substantially exceed the
established standards. The amount of the
incentive fee shall be determined by an
Incentive Fee Board based upon the
performance of [North Star] in operating the
Premises in accordance with its obligation.
Exhibit ‘C’ contains the provisions to
establish the makeup of the Board and the
procedures for determining such bonuses.”
+ Section H.4. of the maintenance annex provides that “[ajn
incentive fee, for exceptional performance of standards
contained in this annex, not to exceed 5 percent of the
‘Maintenance Rental’, will be determined on an annual basis by
a board composed of three (Army) Officers or civilian personnel
who will evaluate [North Star's] performance over the preceding
twelve-month period. The board will make a determination
within 60 days after the end of the period to grant all, some, or
none of the incentive award fee.”
30a
Exhibit C to the Lease is the “Maintenance, Repair
and Operational Services Standards Annex” (herein
referred to as the “maintenance annex”), in which
most of the details regarding how Birchwood is to be
run are found.‘
Various provisions in the Lease map the contours
of the parties' responsibilities in regards to the
property-these obligations flow to and from North
Star, the Army, and the soldier occupants of the
units. Regarding North Star's responsibilities in
maintaining the property, section E of the
maintenance annex declares that-
[North Star] shall be_ responsible for
maintaining all real property assets provided
for in this lease agreement including dwelling
units ... to a standard that prevents
deterioration beyond that which results from
normal wear and tear, and _ corrects
deficiencies in a timely manner to assure full
life expectancy of the facilities and
equipment. The level of maintenance shall
assure all structures are free of missing
components or defects which would affect the
4 Section B.18. of the maintenance annex defines
“Maintenance” as “[t]he recurring periodic or scheduled work
required to preserve real property facilities, systems, moveable
equipment, and accessories in such condition that they may be
effectively utilized for their designated purpose.” Article IV of
the Lease provides that “[i]t is expressly understood and agreed
to by [North Star] that the obligations of the Government to
make any payments under this agreement and Lease [are]
subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose.”
3la
safety, pleasing appearance or habitability of
the units or would prevent any electrical,
mechanical, plumbing or structural system
from functioning in accordance with the
de ign intent.... The quality of the work and
the repaired areas shall be fully compatible
with adjacent surfaces or equipment. All
replacements shall match existing
dimensions, material, quality of work, finish,
color and design.... Wherever the term
‘pleasing appearance’ is used in this or
subsequent paragraphs, it shall be construed
to mean an appearance similar to the original
finished appearance with only minor,
nonobjectionable deterioration resulting from
normal use. The housing unit shall be
evaluated against the maintenance standards
contained herein to determine deficiencies
requiring corrections.
A series of other provisions in the maintenance annex
requires North Star to maintain interior wall
systems, linoleum and other tile floor coverings,
carpeting, house accessories, outside recreational
equipment, and painting.6 Section G.1l. of the
maintenance annex obligates North Star to ensure
5 The Lease is particularly specific regarding painting,
indicating in section E.8.(c) of the maintenance annex that-
[pJaint ... shall be carefully applied with good clean
brushes, approved rollers or by airless spraying...
Finish coats shall be smooth and free from runs, sags
or other surface preparation defects. Each coat of paint
shall be of sufficient thickness to cover completely the
previous coat or surfaces.
32a
that refuse is collected “twice weekly with three days
between collections,” while section G.3.(a) of the
maintenance annex requires North Star to provide
janitorial services.
Further, section E.8.(d) of the maintenance annex
provides that “[cJomplete interior painting will be
accomplished as required in conjunction with the
change of occupancy work. Complete interior
painting will be accomplished at the first change of
occupancy occurring subsequent to the 3rd, 6th, 9th,
12th, 15th, and 18th years of the_lease agreement.”
This provision additionally states that “[c]omplete or
partial interior painting during all other changes of
occupancy, except where required in connection with
maintenance and repair, will be at the discretion of
[North Star].”
Resident handbooks that were issued periodically
during the years in question gave soldiers and their
families instructions on how to clean their units.
Inter alia, the 2000 version of this handbook
instructed residents to “maintain [the] quarters as a
prudent homeowner, and report any needed repairs;”
“{tlo keep the premises clean and safe inside and
outside;” “[t]o dispose of trash properly and in a
timely manner;” “[t]o use all electrical, plumbing,
sanitary, heating and appliances properly and in
accordance with applicable manuals;” to maintain the
appearance of yards, landscaping and playgrounds;
and to exercise care in dealing with cigarettes,
matches and lighters. The handbook emphasized that
residents would be responsible for pet damage. An
appendix to the handbook stressed that: (i) “[ijf the
resident willfully or negligently destroys, defaces,
damages, impairs, or removes any part of the
33a
premises (including fixtures, facilities, and
apphances) or willfully or negligently permits any
person to do so, replacement or repair will be at the
resident's expense;” and (ii) “[t]he residents will at
their own expense ... replace or repair all broken or
damaged glass, screens, flooring, wood plaster,
drywall, and locks occurring during their occupancy,
normal wear and tear excepted.”
Other provisions in the Lease distinguish between
permissible modifications to the units, ordinary wear
and tear, and occupant-caused damage. Article VII of
the Lease recites that “[t]he Government shall have
the right ... to make alterations, attach fixtures, and
erect additions, structures, or signs in or upon the
Premises. However, no such changes shall be made to
any improvement without the written consent of
[North Star].” As to occupant damage, Section C.1.(s)
of the maintenance annex specifies that-
[djamages to a housing unit or to other
improvements within the project which are
beyond normal wear and tear and are caused
by the Government or an occupant, his
dependents, or invited guests, which are not
corrected by the Government or occupant,
shall be repaired by [North Star]. The cost of
such repairs. shall be billed to the
Government.... Repair of damages which
occur to the units or other improvements that
cannot be attributed to the Government, his
agents, officers, occupants, their dependents,
or invited guests, shall be accomplished by
[North Star] at no cost to the Government.
Section D.7.(c) of the maintenance annex provides
34a
that “[iJn the event the occupant fails to properly
clean the unit for any reason, or correct damages
beyond normal wear and tear for which the occupant
is responsible, it shall become [North Star's]
responsibility to satisfactorily clean and repair the
unit for the next occupant.” Section C.2.(c)(10) of the
annex indicates that the government is required to
notify North Star “via work authorization of
occupant-caused damages or conditions requiring
correction or cleaning and reimburs[e] [North Star]
for accomplishment of same.” Section C.3.(a) of the
maintenance annex provides that “occupants shall be
lable for loss or damage to the housing unit or
equipment caused by the abuse or negligence of the
assigned occupant, dependents, or guests.”
To minimize debates regarding the cost of various
repairs, Section C.1.(t) of the maintenance annex sets
forth that-
{North Star] shall, with the approval of the
Government, establish a list of cleaning and
repair costs for dwelling unit components
which will establish the normal maximum
amounts to be charged in the event of damage
to property and equipment installed within a
living unit over and above normal wear and
tear. The list of repair costs will be based
upon the latest published edition of applicable
Engineered Performance Standards (EPS)
Manuals (Army TB 420-series, Navy
NAVFAC P-700 Series, Air Force AFM 85-
series) which will be utilized to estimate
manhour requirements... The manhour
requirements will be multiplied by the
Department of Labor Service Contract Act
35a
Wage Determination rate plus materials at
wholesale cost plus reasonable overhead and
profit.... Such a list will be subject to change
annually or from time to time by mutual
agreement of [North Star] and_ the
Government. Examples of items which might
be included on this list are cleaning of stove,
refrigerator, and entire dwelling unit,
replacement of interior door,
patching/repairing hole in interior door,
patching/repairing hole in dry wall...
Under section C.2.(c)(11) of the maintenance annex,
the Government is required to “[a]pprove [an] annual
.. hist of repair costs for occupant damages and
printed occupant instructions as submitted by [North
Star].” Further, section H.2. of the maintenance
annex states that for those items of work for which
North Star is entitled to reimbursement, “the
Government shall issue a work authorization, in
writing, authorizing the accomplishment of such
work,” indicating that North Star's “charges for this
work will be based upon the approved list of repair
costs.” Likewise, sections H.3.(a) and (b) of the
maintenance annex indicate that North Star is to
submit invoices for services performed in response to
the work authorizations, that the billing should be “in
accordance with the approved List of Repair Costs,”
and that “[uJpon the Government's verification of
work actually performed invoices will be processed for
payment.”
The Lease prescribes certain staffing requirements
fore the site. The Army appoints a “housing project
manager, who, under section B.15. of the
maintenance annex, is “charged with the
36a
responsibility for the day-to-day administration of the
housing site and fulfillment of the Government's
responsibilities under the terms of [the] lease
agreement.” Amplifying the responsibilities of this
job, section C.2.(b) of the maintenance annex explains
that the manager “shall serve as the primary point of
contact for matters involving the day-to-day
coordination and administration of the Government's
responsibilities.” Correspondingly, under section
B.28. of the maintenance annex, North Star appoints
a “site manager,’ who is its “[p]rimary point of
contact authorized to act ... in all matters regarding
work required at the housing site.” Section C.1.(c)(2)
of the maintenance annex provides that “[North Star]
shall furnish sufficient personnel to perform all work
specified within this annex.”® In this regard, section
C.1. of the maintenance annex provides that-“[North
Star] is responsible for the ... maintenance, repair,
replacement ... and all operations required to support
the housing site. This includes ... housing units ... and
all other components and systems of the total housing
site insofar as such responsibilities are not normally
undertaken by local governmental authorities.”
Section C.1.(4) of the maintenance annex provides
that “{t]he quality and workmanship of maintenance,
repair, replacement, and operational services shall be
6 Section D.1..of the maintenance annex provides that
“(North Star} is responsible for managing the total work effort
associated with the maintenance and other services required
herein to assure fully adequate and timely completion of these
services.... [North Star] is expected to assure an adequate staff
of personnel, with the necessary management expertise, at the
housing site continuously to assure the completion of the work
in accordance with sound and efficient management practices.”
37a
first class in every respect and will be subject to the
approval of the Government.”
The Lease also. provides for performance
monitoring and the resolution of disputes. Thus,
section C.2.(c)(17) of the maintenance annex says
that the government must “give [North Star] written
notice of either noncompliance or unsatisfactory work
on the part of [North Star].” Section D.3. of the
maintenance annex states that-
{North Star] shall meet with the Government
periodically as called for by the Government.
A mutual effort will be made to resolve all
problems identified. The written minutes of
these meetings, prepared by the Government,
shall be signed by [North Star] and the
Government. Should [North Star] not concur
with the minutes, [North Star] will state, in
writing, to the Government any areas of
disagreement.
Further, section C.2.(c)(15) of the maintenance annex
provides that the government is required to
“[s]chedule, arrange, and conduct performance
7 Section C.1.(h) of the maintenance annex provides that
“{a] facility history file for each housing unit ... identified by
address shall be maintained by [North Star]. Each file shall
contain a copy of all Government-issued work authorizations,
preventative maintenance inspection reports[,} ... routine
maintenance or repair, and renovation work orders in progress
or completed. The Government shall require access to these files
and they shall be available for periodic review by the
Government. All documents shall be filed within 10 days of the
completed transaction.”
38a
evaluation meetings with [North Star], and any other
parties deemed necessary by the Government.”
2. Change of Occupancy
The Lease contains a number of provisions
governing changes of occupancy. Inter alia, it
provides a specific set of procedures for determining
deficiencies in a particular unit, who is responsible
for the costs for repairing those deficiencies, and how
and when those deficiencies are to be remedied.
Central to these mandates are a detailed set of
inspection procedures.
Section D.7.(b) of the maintenance annex states
that North Star “is responsible for conducting or
participating in various types of inspections as
described below,” which inspections “shall be
conducted in accordance with the technical standards
and guidance provided here.” In this regard, the
Lease provides for a pre-termination inspection, a
termination inspection and an acceptance inspection.
Section C.2.(c)(7) of the annex makes the government
responsible for scheduling and coordinating these
inspections, while section C.2.(c)(8) of the annex
requires the government to advise North Star “of
proposed occupancy changes and _ date of
pretermination and termination.” In this regard,
section D.7.(b)(1) of the maintenance annex adds:
8 Section B.7. of the maintenance annex defines “Change of
Occupancy” as “[t]he termination of assignment by the
Government of [an] occupant to a unit or the assignment of [an]
occupant by the Government to a unit and the associated
downtime occurring between these two events.”
39a
The Government will schedule a_ pre-
termination and termination inspection after
being advised by the occupant of an
impending move. These inspections will be
scheduled during normal working hours. The
Government will, in writing, notify [North
Star] of the date, time, and address of each
inspection. The Government will make every
effort to provide this notice 21 days in
advance of the projected change of occupancy.
Because of short-time occupant orders or
other extenuating circumstance, [North Star]
can expect an average of 10-14 days advance
notice. [North Star], or [its] representative, is
required to attend the pre-termination
inspection.
As to. pre-termination inspections, section
D.7.(b)(2) of the maintenance annex indicates that-
During the _ pre-termination inspection,
[North Star] shall identify and prepare work
orders covering all painting, maintenance,
and repair work required of [North Star]. The
Government shall jointly identify, with the
occupant, all damage to property and
installed equipment which is over and above
normal wear and tear and which is the
occupant's responsibility to correct. The
Government will provide the occupant with a
list of this work and associated costs for
which the occupant is liable, as contained on
the approved list of repair costs, and provide
a copy to [North Star]. At the conclusion of
this inspection, the Government shall notify,
in writing, [North Star] of the firm date and
40a
time for the final inspection and the date and
time that the unit will be turned over to
[North Star] for accomplishment of change of
occupancy work. [North Star], in turn, shall
immediately provide the Government with a
firm written commitment as to the date and
time that the unit will be turned back over to
the Government for assignment to the next
occupant.
These pre-termination inspections are designed, in
part, to allow North Star to prepare for the work that
it will perform during the downtime following the
change in occupancy.
Regarding the termination inspection, section
D.7.(b)(3) of the maintenance annex states that “[t]he
Government will conduct the termination inspection
jointly with the occupant after the furnishings have
been removed.” It further indicates that North Star's
“representation at the termination inspection is at
[its] discretion.” The termination inspection is
performed after the occupant has been afforded an
opportunity to remedy certain of the deficiencies
identified at the pre-termination inspection. It also
allows the parties to adjust, as necessary, the
schedule for the Army to turn a unit over to North
Star and for North Star to return the unit for a new
tenant. In this regard, section D.7.(b)(3) of the Lease
explains-
Should the date and time that the unit will be
turned over to [North Star] change for any
reason, the Government shall immediately
notify [North Star] in writing of the revised
date and time. [North Star] will then
immediately notify the Government, in
4la
writing, of the revised date and time that the
unit will be turned over to the Government
for assignment. Subsequent to the
termination inspection, the Government will
issue to the [North Star] a work authorization
for the repair of damages, or accomplishment
of cleaning, which are the responsibility of the
occupant but were not completed at the time
of the termination inspection.
Section D.7.(a) of the maintenance annex indicates
that “[w]Jork identified by [North Star] or [the]
Government during the pre-termination and final
termination inspections which is required to make a
unit ready for the next occupant, shall be
accomplished while the unit is vacant.” It states that
“(t]his work includes any routine maintenance and
repair, as well as interior painting.” Section C.1.(p) of
the maintenance annex requires that after North
Star performs the necessary repairs and
replacements and, “[p]rior to acceptance of a unit by
the Government,” North Star “shall clean the entire
unit” and “shall insure units meet the same standard
of cleanliness the Government’ requires’ of
terminating occupants.” This work includes “removal
of all stains, fingerprints, and paint spots, cleaning of
all dust and dirt, washing of windows, cleaning of all
appliances, cleaning of all ceramic tile, and washing
of floors.”
Section D.7.(d) of the maintenance annex reads
that “[u]Jpon completion of all change of occupancy
work, [North Star] wil notify the Government of
work completion and unit availability,” at which
point the Army conducts the third of the change of
occupancy inspections, the “acceptance inspection.”
42a
Section B.2. of the maintenance annex defines the
“Acceptance Inspection” as “[t}he inspection of a
vacant unit between changes of occupancy or
subsequent to completion of renovation work to
ensure that all work has been’ completed
satisfactorily and that the unit is in a presentable
condition for viewing and acceptance by a prospective
occupant.” Providing further information about these
inspections, section C.2.(a) of the maintenance annex
declares-
[alcceptance inspections of all dwelling units
will be conducted ... after completion of repair
or rehabilitation work on the unit. The
Government shall conduct these inspections
jointly with [North Star]. The Government
will schedule these inspections to occur on the
same date that the work is completed if
notification of work completion is received
before 12:00 noon, or before 12:00 noon of the
next workday, if such notification is received
er 12:00 noon, at a time that is mutually
reeable. The Government has the right to
‘use to accept the unit if the work has not
been completed or performed satisfactorily or
is otherwise not in accordance with the
provisions of this annex. The Government
shall, immediately upon conclusion of the
acceptance inspection, notify [North Star] in
writing of acceptance or refusal. If the unit is
refused, the Government shall also notify
[North Star], in writing, of all discrepancies
requiring correction.
Section H.1.(c) of the maintenance annex provides
that “{iJn the event [North Star] fails to complete
ASa
change of occupancy maintenance work by the date
identified by [North Star] as when the unit would be
returned to the Government ... the Government shall
assess liquidated damages based on the most current
average daily rate of BAQ [basic allowance for
quarters] plus VHA [variable housing allowance] plus
average daily lease cost per unit for each calendar
day subsequent to that date.”
3. Downtime
Many of North Star's claims here involve
“downtime,” defined by Section D.5. of | the
maintenance annex as “the period during which a
housing unit is vacant for reasons of change of
occupancy, maintenance work, major repair or
unhabitability, or restoration of units damayed by
fires or acts of God.” That section emphasizes that
“(North Star] shall ensure that downtime while a unit
has been turned over to fit] does not exceed the
allowable time prescribed [in sections D.5.(a) and (b)
of the maintenance annex].” It further stresses that
“Idjowntime must be minimized in order to maximize
occupancy of these units.” Section B.10. of the
maintenance annex similarly defines “Downtime” as
“[t]he period of time during which a unit 1s vacant
and has been officially turned over to [North Star] for
accomplishment of required work,” and adds that
“(flor purposes of this lease agreement, downtime is
measured in working days, vice calendar days.”
The Lease contains a detailed description of how
downtime is to be calculated. Section D.5.(a) of the
. ° “gy
maintenance annex, entitled “Change of Occupancy
Downtime,” provides that “[t}he total number of
44a
downtime days for units vacant for purposes of
change of occupancy maintenance shall not exceed
the number of moveouts (excluding moveouts for
purposes of scheduled repairs or fires and acts of
God) per month multiplied by 3 days.” It indicates
further that “if [in] any 5-day work period, more than
eight units are turned over to [North Star], two
additional days will be allowed for each unit in excess
of eight.’9 Likewise, section D.5.(b) of the
maintenance annex, entitled “Scheduled Repair or
Renovation Downtime,” provides that-
[djowntime for reasons of scheduled repair or
renovation will be completed on the basis of
the actual number of days any specific unit
has been turned over to [North Star] for such
8 As to the “3-day” rule, the Lease gives the following
example: “For example, if there are 10 move-outs in 1 month,
the total allowable downtime for that month is 30 days.” As to
the “5-day” rule, the Lease gives the following example-
For example, if there are 17 move-outs in a month, the
total allowable downtime is 51 days. However, if 11 of
these units were turned over to [North Star] within a
5-day work period, an additional] 6 days will be allowed
for a total of 57 days in allowable downtime
(representing the additional 2 days for each of the
units in excess of eight turned over within a 5-day
work period added to the 51 days allowed for 17 move-
outs).
Despite Lease provisions suggesting that downtime is to be
measured on an average monthly basis, section D.7.(d)(1) of the
maintenance annex states that “[a]ll change of occupancy work
must be completed within three working days after the unit
becomes available, which shall be determined from the date the
unit is turned over to [North Star] by the Government for
change of occupancy work.”
45a
work. The downtime period will begin with
the date the Government turns the unit over,
in writing, to [North Star] for this purpose
and will end when the Government accepts,
in writing, the unit from [North Star]
subsequent to work completion.
Section D.7.(d)(2) of the maintenance annex
provides that “[t]he downtime period will be
determined as follows: If the unit becomes
available prior to 12:00 noon, the period will
begin at 1:00 p.m. that day. If the unit
becomes available at 12:00 noon or later, the
maintenance period will begin at the start of
the following work day.”
The Lease provides for penalties snould North Star
fail to comply with the downtime provisions. Section
D.5.(b) of the maintenance annex indicates that
“{djeductions for [North Star's] failure to adhere to
the scheduled downtime will be in accordance with
clause H.1. [of the maintenance annex].” Section H.
1.(d) of the annex provides that “[i]f the downtime in
any one month for units vacant for purposes of
change of occupancy work exceeds the allowable
downtime for that month (established in accordance
with clause D.5.(a) [of the maintenance annex] ), the
Government shall assess liquidated damages based
on the most current average daily rate of BAQ plus
VHA plus average daily lease cost for each calendar
day in excess of the allowabie downtime.”
C. The Dispute: A Chronology
The findings in this segment are described
chronologically, rather than by the subject dispute
46a
(e.g., downtime or incentive fees), because the record
demonstrates that conflicts involving the Lease fed
on each other, with new disputes springing up
periodically to further complicate matters.
Understanding this synergy is key to a _ proper
understanding and analysis of plaintiff's bad faith
claims.
1. 1989 through 1995
During the first several years after the contract
was awarded, disputes began to arise, among them
concern over the phase-in of the project itself, refuse
collection, the timing of various rent payments, and
whether defendant was required to have an on-site
manager. However, these issues were addressed
under the dispute resolution mechanism provided by
the contract; the parties otherwise enjoyed a positive
working relationship. Indicative of this is the fact
that, as illustrated in the following chart, from 1987
through 1992, North Star received various incentive
fee awards, often accompanied by glowing transmittal
letters that lauded its efforts:!°
10 For example, the Army's January 4, 1989, letter
announcing the fee award for 1988 indicated that North Star
had “demonstrated exceptional response to the soldiers and
their families” and had “done very high quality work.” Likewise,
a 1991 letter from the Army awarding North Star an incentive
fee, thanked North Star for “the high standards of work
accomplishment, excellent customer service and _ very
professional project management,” and commented, “[t]he
incentive fee award is well deserved by your staff and is
government money well spent.” Indeed, a January 1993, letter
notified North Star that the Birchwood project had been
47a
1987 (interim period) $13,236.09
1988 $42,921.00
1989 $56,113.93
1990 $50,295.78
1991 $52,398.78
1992 $53,326.19
In 1993, when several issues were not resolved to
its satisfaction by contracting officer decisions, North
Star filed a lawsuit in this court. On December 22,
1993, this court granted, in part, and denied, in part,
the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.
Despite this litigation, North Star continued to
receive essentially the maximum incentive fees
allowed-$54,041.30 for 1993 confirmed by a decision
issued on February 2, 1994, and $55,225.00 for 1994
confirmed by a decision issued on January 11, 1995.
In September of 1995, the lawsuit was settled. In
the settlement agreement, North Star offered “to
assume full responsibility for refuse collection and
disposal,” for which the United States agreed to
provide North Star $1,000 per month. However, a
disagreement eventually arose over what this
provision entailed. On November 22, 1995, the Fort
Wainwright Director of Public Works informed the
highlighted at a recent hearing of the Senate Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee, where it was “described in a U.S.
Army, Pacific, fact sheet as an extremely successful project and
a prototype for future Army housing initiatives.”
48a
Commander, U.S. Army Engineer District Alaska
that “[t]he Army standard for adequate housing is
weekly curbside trash pick-up.” On December 1,
1995, the contracting officer pointed North Star to
the Lease provision requiring that North Star “insure
that refuse is collected twice weekly” and directed
North Star to provide the same type of refuse
collection and disposal as required by the Lease.
During this same year, disputes began to arise
concerning the calculation of downtime and changes
of occupancy. But, again, these disputes appear to
have been handled amicably, with Suzanne M.
Harrison, the Chief of the Housing Division at Fort
Wainwright, indicating in an August 17, 1995,
memorandum that “[a]s always, North Star was very
cooperative in assisting Housing in gaining maximum
utilization of these 400 units.” Others, however, had
different ideas. An October 27, 1995, memorandum
that was coordinated by Thomas B. Peterson, the
Chief of Housing for the Army's Department for
Public Works in Alaska, instructed, as to the Lease's
downtime provisions, that North Star's “failure to
meet timeframes so computed should result in the
enforcement of penalties.” Several weeks later, on
November 22, 1995, Karen Goodrich, then the Chief
of Housing at Fort Wainwright, alerted Mr. Peterson
that a dispute continued as to what the 1995
settlement required in terms of trash removal.!!
11 Although at other points in the record it appears that the
debate involved both the periodicity of the pick ups and whether
they would be curbside, Ms. Goodrich, in her memorandum,
apparently focused only on the former issue, as she stated that
“[a]n out of court settlement was reached to allow the contractor
to decrease pick-up from twice a week to once a week.”
49a
That same day, Mr. Peterson wrote the Commander
of the U.S. Army Engineer District for Alaska, stating
that North Star has “unilaterally eliminated trash
collection services.” While admitting that “weekly
curbside trash pick-up” was the Army standard, Mr.
Peterson indicated that North Star's failure to pick
up trash represented an “unanticipated, unfortunate
and totally unsatisfactory elimination of services
[that] needs to be resolved immediately.”!2 He
requested “intervention to correct this blatant
abrogation of support responsibility for 801
Birchwood residents.” On November 29, 1995, the
day that North Star apparently was to announce its
trash removal policies to the tenants, Mr. Peterson
sent a facsimile to two North Star officials in which
he warned that “I suggest that you defer tonight's
discussion of this issue or Post Commander Reps will
be forced to tell tenants to disregard your letter of
instruction,” adding that “[t]his divisiveness will
cause us other problems and open a pandoras [sic]
box.” The record suggests that, notwithstanding this
facsimile, North Star communicated with the tenants
regarding trash removal.
Subsequent efforts to resolve this dispute over
refuse collection proved unsuccessful. On December
29, 1995, Mr. Peterson wrote North Star suggesting,
apparently for the first time, that the issue
12 While, in his memorandum, Mr. Peterson appears to
suggest that Nerth Star had ceased all trash pick up, other
parts of the record suggest that the dispute involved whether
such service would be provided once or twice a week.
5Va
concerning refuse collection could impact North Star's
ability to receive an incentive fee.!3
2. 1996 and 1997
On January 10, 1996, the Army wrote North Star
indicating that “the unilateral notification of
residents by North Star of your intention to eliminate
required trash collection services” and “the failure to
provide the level of trash collection services to which
you agreed in the Sep 95 settlement” had caused
North Star's performance to be rated “less than
exceptional” in November and December of 1995, a
rating that, in turn, caused the Army to reduce the
incentive fee. North Star unsuccessfully appealed this
decision to the Army's Director of Public Works at
Fort Richardson, Alaska.
In the spring of 1996, a dispute began to develop
regarding change of occupancy turnaround time.
Prior to this time, North Star had consistently
repaired vacant units and turned them back to the
Army in less than the time specified by the Lease. At
a meeting held on July 10, 1996, Mr. Peterson
complained that North Star was falling behind in
turning units back on a timely basis. At the meeting,
be indicated the Army's intent to begin turning over
units to North Star for repair in blocks-8 units to be
released each Monday. In the minutes of this
13 In an undated letter that appears to have been issued
prior to December 29, 1995, Mr. Peterson indicated that another
disagreement over the interpretation of the Lease would “not
impact or affect the performance standards used to establish the
annual incentive award.”
Hla
meeting, Mr. Peterson is reported to have stated that
the latter process was designed to ensure that the
Army would not be “penalized” by requiring it to
provide North Star with additional down time,
indicating that his goal was “to issue them in a
sequence that keeps it to an average of three days.” !4
In a August 12, 1996, memorandum to Col. Albert J.
Kraus, the Commander of the Alaska District, Mr.
Peterson recapped the meeting, highlighting the
turnover problem while emphasizing that “[t]he
change of occupancy turnaround time is a significant
factor in determining overall performance award.” In
August of 1996, Col. Kraus was replaced by Col. Wm.
David Brown.
The incentive fee award meeting for 1996 occurred
on January 8, 1997. Following the meeting, Mr.
Peterson sent an e-mail to Mr. Edward Miller, then
the Army's Birchwood manager, chastising him for
being unprepared. At that meeting, Mr. Miller had
made assertions regarding North Star's performance
for which he lacked documentation. Criticizing this,
Mr. Peterson indicated, in his e-mail, that “I don't
think we want to emphasize to Fischer that after all
your time on site, you are just now starting to keep a
formal record of your inspections, that will just
embarrass us all.” At the meeting, North Star
apparently also argued that, under the Lease, it was
entitled to additional days for approved work
authorizations. In an undated letter, Col. Brown
\4 Recall, that, in terms of downtime, section D.5. (a) of the
maintenance annex states, “if [in] any 5-day work period, more
than eight units are turned over to [North Star], two additional
days will be allowed for each unit in excess of eight.”
52a
subsequently rejected that interpretation. On
February 10, 1997, Col. Brown, in an _ internal
memorandum, proposed that the Army's. rent
payment for 1996 be reduced by $41,256.57 “based on
excessive change of occupancy down time.”!5 On
April 16, 1997, Col. Brown wrote North Star
announcing an incentive fee award for 1996 of
$39,000, indicating that “[t]he only rated areas which
were significantly less than exceptional were between
occupancy vacancy rates.” Nonetheless, the letter
indicated that actual payment of the fee might be
delayed because of “the ongoing attempts to collect
overdue accounts receivable from North Star.” On
May 22, 1997, Mr. Fischer indicated that he was
unaware of any overdue accounts and asserted that
North Star was not being treated “even handedly.”
Col. Brown disagreed with the latter characterization
in a letter dated June 6, 1997, yet also indicated that
“future awards will probably be made ‘subject to the
availability of funding.’ ”
The refuse collection and downtime issues
continued to fester. On June 10, 1997, Mr. Dennis
Klein, the Chief of the Army's Real Estate Division in
Alaska and the Contracting Officer for the Lease,
wrote Mr. Fischer indicating that he had been
16 On April 9, 1997, an evaluation meeting was conducted at
which Mr. Fischer complained regarding the Army's practice of
holding units after they had been received from the cleaners and
releasing them in a group, implying that this practice was
contributing to downtime delays. Mr. Peterson and Ms. Goodrich
essentially responded that they had adopted the practice to
ensure that the Army did not release more than 8 unite in a
five-day period so as inadvertently to afford North Star
additional downtime under the Lease.
53a
notified by Mr. Peterson that “recent changes in
refuse collection and disposal in the Birchwood
housing complex [have] resulted in service that is
below the level required by the subject lease.” Mr.
Klein warned that the failure to commence twice
weekly collection on or before June 23, 1997, could
result in the imposition of penalties. On June 11,
1997, Mr. Fischer responded, taking exception to the
imposition of penalties and indicating that North
Star had repeatedly requested a contracting officer's
decision on the refuse point, but had not received that
decision. On June 13, 1997, Mr. Klein wrote,
confirming his receipt of the June 11, 1997, letter. On
June 20, 1997, Mr. Fischer sent a second letter to Mr.
Klein, stating-
It is quite obvious to us that your action on
this matter was punitive. The post
commander at Fort Wainwright has not
regarded once a week pick up as a problem
[and] in fact was not informed of your action
prior to our recent contact with him. The first
that his office knew of the change you
demanded was our call to him to inquire as to
what days he would suggest the garbage be
picked up.
Mr. Fischer concluded-“We consider the above actions
to be in bad faith in your dealings with us.”
On July 9, 1997, North Star and the Army
conducted a maintenance evaluation and incentive
meeting for the months of April through June of
1997. At that meeting, Mr. Miller offered the results
of his evaluations, to which North Star raised
numerous exceptions. In a memorandum dated July
9, 1997, the Army unilaterally adopted a depreciation
54a
schedule for all carpeting, thereby reducing the
reimbursement amount that North Star would
receive for replacing carpeting with. occupant
damage. This memorandum, issued by Ms. Mae
Harrell, then the Army's housing manager at
Birchwood, stated-
1. Effective immediately, all charges for
damages to carpet will be figured using a ten
(10) year life expectancy in ALL housing
areas.
2.If the carpet is determined to be ten (10)
years old, it will be replaced as fair wear and
tear and not [sic] charge will be brought
against the occupant. If the damage is due to
pet odor, the occupant will be charged for
sealing the floor and any other measures
required to abate the pet odor.
3.When determining the depreciation on
damaged carpet, subtract 10% of the total
value for each year that the carpet has been
installed. This does not include the labor for
installing the carpet only the materials.
On July 11. 1997, Mr. Fischer sent the Army a letter
addressing Mr. Miller's ratings on a point-by-point
basis. On August 1, 1997, Col. Brown responded,
agreeing that Mr. Miller's evaluation was “incomplete
and unsatisfactory in so far as presenting a clear
objective record.” This letter indicated that the
evaluations were being reconsidered, but,
nonetheless, asserted that North Star should replace
carpeting that is “in worn and poor condition” which
had “outlived its useful economic life.” Thereafter, it
appears that Col. Brown sent North Star a letter
5bda
providing a more detailed response to North Star's
dissatisfaction with the specific evaluation comments
made previously by Mr. Miller. This letter asserts
that North Star had initiated a legal action against
Mr. Miller and indicates that the lawsuit “will not
help to improve on site working relationships” and
may generate “some negative feelings on both sides
for the foreseeable future.” In the letter, Col. Brown
increased North Star's ratings on several, but not all,
of the factors on which North Star had appealed.
On August 7, 1997, Mr. Fischer wrote Mr. Klein
indicating that North Star would not begin to collect
refuse twice weekly until “a clear demand” to that
effect was made. This letter indicated that the
“refuse collection has been the subject of a request
that you issue a contracting officer's decision since
May 22, 1996.” On August 13, 1997, Mr. Klein
requested North Star to commence twice-weekly
collection of garbage, trash and bulk items beginning
August 18, 1997. On September 5, 1997, Mr.
Peterson e-mailed Ms. Goodrich criticizing Mr.
Miller's performance and indicating, with respect to
the evaluation meetings-“I guess my point is, it isn't
business as usual anymore, we need to relook and
prepare better than ever.” On September 25, 1997,
Mr. Robert A Welch, then Chief of the Army's
Acquisition Branch, Real Estate Division, in
Anchorage, requested North Star to provide formal
notice to the tenants of the twice-weekly refuse
collection. North Star, however, refused to do so,
operating apparently on the view that it had been
instructed otherwise by Mr. Klein.
At a quarterly evaluation meeting held on October
15, 1997, the parties disputed the Army's use of
56a
depreciation for carpeting. A transcript indicates that
the following exchange between Mr. Fischer and Col.
Brown transpired:
BROWN: Okay, so if there's pet damage on a
nine year old carpet, then your position is the
government is responsible for paying the
whole amount, basically?
FISCHER: Absolutely or any other damage for
that matter. Any time the government
damages anything they're responsible, |
would think.
BROWN: Even considering the fact that that-]
don't know what the industry standard is, |
don't know what it is. It may be five years. It
may be fifteen years, but-
FISCHER: It's also not relevant.
BROWN: Well, it is relevant, Dick, because I'm
going to make it relevant.
FISCHER: Okay, you go ahead and make it
relevant.
BROWN: And whether you want to accept it or
not. You know, common sense tells you if that
carpet has been and whatever the industry
standard is-I don't know what it is, but we're
going to determine what it is and you are
either going to come up with a depreciated
schedule or we're going to come up with one
and I'm going to investigate the possibility of-
I mean you think about it from a common
sense point of view. If that carpet has a-let's
say for example, and I'm not saying that's it,
but let's say for example, its got a ten year life
57a
cycle on it and let's say it's at 90 percent, say
we have dog damage to it, okay. It has been
90 percent used of its useful life at that point,
you should be replacing it year number 10
anyhow. So the government's responsibility
from a common sense point of view is we
should be responsible for the remaining life of
that carpet, because you have benefited from
the first nine years of that carpet and we
should be responsible for the remainder of it
‘if a dog tears it up. If you had the carpet in
there for one year and we have to replace it,
then we shouldn't be responsible for the nine
years of remaining life. It has been in there-if
the useful life is ten years and a dog tears it
up and the useful life is ten years, we
shouldn't have to be responsible for any of it.
So, it's all going to depend on what that is
that if you don't want to deal with us on this,
then what I'm going to do is I'm going to get
with the lawyers and we're going to come up a
depreciated schedule and then I will-we will
figure out some way to deduct that from your
payments and then if you want to sue us,
have at it, but you know what is fair here and
you need to work with us on this and we'll
work with you on it, but if you don't, I'm going
to do exactly what I said I'm going to do and
let the chips fall where they will, cause you
know that's the right thing. You know that.
FISCHER: Absolutely not. I totally disagree
with you.
BROWN: Okay fine, let's move on, move on to
the next one.
58a
GOODRICH: I think Billie was finishing up her
portion of the-
FISCHER: So-
BROWN: I told you right up front what I'm
going to do about it and if you want to talk
about it, we will.
FISCHER: I'd be happy to talk about it, you
just cut me off, so.
BROWN: Well, you told me you totally disagree .
so we'll just move on.
FISCHER: I do disagree totally and | have good
reason for it and I'd be real pleased to go into
it, if you wish.
BROWN: Okay, go ahead.
FISCHER: Okay. We have cooperated and we
will continue to cooperate and any time a
carpet is not serviceable we're going to
replace it. That's what we're doing and that's
what we'll continue to do. If that carpet is
damaged, we have no way of determining
whether that carpet-when that carpet will not
be serviceable. Depending upon the care of
the unit, it could be that the carpet is
serviceable for 20 years. We don't know.
BROWN: Well, there's industry standards for
that and we can determine that.
FISCHER: Well that's not per our contract.
Industry standards are not part of our
contract.
BROWN: Well, that's fine, you know-
59a
FISCHER: It says when the carpet is no longer
serviceable.
BROWN: If that's your position, that's your
J k h
position and we'll go from there.
FISCHER: Well, Colonel, that seems to be the
way you care to settle all these things.
BROWN: No, I just can't seem to get any-any,
you know, common sense, you're a business
man and if the shoe was on the other foot, you
would say exactly what we're saying out here.
You know and-
FISCHER: We have a responsibility to keep
these units in impeccable condition and that's
what we're doing and we're not going to be
responsible whether some tenant damages
something in these units.
BROWN: No, and you should not be.
FISCHER: That's right.
BROWN: You should not be.
FISCHER: And that's our position.
BROWN: And neither should the government
be totally responsible for 10 year old carpet in
total when a dog damages it and you know
that.
FISCHER: If the life of the-
BROWN: Okay, let's move on. J don't even care
to talk to you any more about this issue.
You're very unreasonable on this and J knew
you were going to be-so let's just move on to
another issue. We'll just let your lawyers and
60a
our lawyers deal with this, because I'm going
to figure out a way that I can take it right out
of your pay.
Later, at this same meeting, Col. Brown ordered that
future evaluation meetings not be recorded.
In the late summer or early fall of 1997, the Army
hired a contractor to conduct a survey of the
Birchwood residents, with a view toward using the
survey results in making _ incentive fee
determinations. On November 14, 1997, Mr. Fischer
wrote Col. Brown emphasizing that, contrary to the
latter's assertion, “[t]here is no lawsuit pending
against Mr. Miller” and complaining about Col.
Brown's decision to move the evaluation meetings to
Fort Richardson, Alaska. Regarding the increasing
tensions between the parties, Mr. Fischer asserted-
Our contract provides a clear forum for
contractual: resolution of differences of
opinions. We would expect to follow these
procedures. Differences of opinion’ on
contractual matters which we have had in the
past have not affected the Army's assessment
of North Star's performance. This was the
case until your decision to demerit North Star
for the difference in the manner that the
turnaround time has been interpreted this
past year.
Mr. Fischer again asserted that the Army was
dealing with North Star in “bad faith” and indicated
that he would not be dealing with further
correspondence on this matter because “[i]t is clear to
me and | dare say to everyone present at the last
quarterly meeting that you have a personal problem
Gla
with me.” On November 25, 1997, North Star
requested a contracting officer's decision with respect
to both the turnaround time and refuse collection
issues.
On December 9, 1997, Mr. Peterson prepared a
memorandum for the DPW staff in which he asserted
that issues involving downtime and_ carpet
depreciation should impact the decision whether to
grant North Star an incentive fee for 1997. In this
regard, he argued-
From an ethical perspective, I think the board
would be acting in contravention of the
government's interests if it were to approve a
substantial cash award during a period when
the contractor's failure to apply sound and
efficient management practices ( ve., failure
to pro rate the cost of carpet JAW industry
standards) has become a _ substantive cost
I don't think that the Board can ethically
ignore North Star's failure to fairly apportion
the carpeting cost. An approval of an
incentive award which could be construed by
the contractor as either ignoring’ or
encouraging continued actions by North Star
which result in double payment for carpeting
maintenance costs would be a derelection [sic]
of the Board's explicit and implicit duties in
representing the best interests of the U.S.
Government.
Accordingly, it appears that, at least by this time, the
fact that North Star was raising various claims with
the contracting officer was viewed by Mr. Peterson as
62a
a reason to deny it an incentive fee. On December 11,
1997, the Army's District Engineer wrote North Star
indicating that the contracting officer decisions on
the issue of twice-weekly refuse collection and down
time would be issued within 45 days of North Star's
November 25, 1997, request.
On December 12, 1997, Mr. Peterson e-mailed Col.
Brown and Ms. Goodrich, reiterating that it would be
“unethical to pay an incentive award to North Star
for a time period during which they have ... blatantly
refused to discuss equitably apportioning costs” for
carpet. Mr. Peterson indicated that “[a]s a member of
the Board, I feel that we are bound by formal
principles of ethical conduct to select the ‘no incentive
award option until the government's maintenance
concerns are addressed/resolved.”. In an e-mail
December 22, 1997, Mr. Peterson further asserted
that North Star's position with respect to carpet
replacement was not in “good faith.”
3. 1998
On January 28, 1998, Mr. Klein sent Col. Brown a
copy of his decision on the downtime issue. This
decision concluded-
I find and conclude that the contract allows
for a maximum occupancy downtime per unit
of three days for completion after turnover by
the Government to [North Star], if eight or
less units are turned over within any given 5-
day work period. I find that if more than eight
units are turned over within any 5-day work
period, then the allowable occupancy
downtime is increased to five days per unit
63a
for units in excess of eight. I further find and
conclude that the maximum allowable
aggregate occupancy downtime in any given
month cannot be interpreted to permit
occupancy downtime maintenance on the
units to run consecutively.
This decision was mailed to North Star on January
29, 1998. That same day, Col. Brown sent North Star
a letter in which he announced an incentive fee
award of only $21,272, less than half of the prior
awards. On March 9, 1998, North Star filed a
complaint in this court, primarily to address the
depreciation issue. The contracting officer's decision
on the carpet depreciation issue was mailed to North
Star on March 26, 1998. This decision by Mr. Klein
concluded-
I find and conclude that when it is
determined, based upon inspection, that
because of normal wear and tear, carpet no
longer has a pleasing appearance as defined
in the contract, then it is the responsibility of
[North Star] to replace such carpet. I find and
conclude that the contract requires that the
expected useful life of carpet be established
by reasonable proof. I find that where carpet
is replaced due to pet or other occupant
damage beyond normal wear and tear, the
replacement cost paid by the Government is
required to be depreciated based on the age of
the carpet in relation to its expected useful
life and reasonable replacement schedule.
These contracting officer decisions resolved little in
terms of the parties' disputes over particular units.
Indeed, new issues incessantly arose.
64a
One of these issues involved what North Star
referred to as “stockpiling’-the Army's practice of
holding units that had been vacated by service
members for days, sometimes weeks, and occasionally
months, and then releasing them to North Star, for
maintenance and repairs, in batches. Various Army
officials contended that this process was designed to
prevent the Army from inadvertently releasing more
than eight units to North Star within a 5-day work
period, so as to trigger the extended 5-day downtime
period.!® North Star, however, complained bitterly
that stockpiling made it difficult for it to perform the
necessary repairs within the _ allotted’ time,
complicating, in particular, the scheduling of
subcontractors for tasks such as carpet and vinyl
replacement.!7 In a June 3, 1998, memorandum,
‘6 At trial, Mr. Harold Hopson, who eventually become the
contracting officer on the Lease, admitted that stockpiling
requires Nerth Star to have more staffing and makes it more
difficult for North Star to meet the downtime requirement. He
further testified that he mistakenly thought the Army was
releasing the units as they were cleaned. Mr. Rodney Everett,
who was the Contracting Officer Representative at Birchwood,
testified that stockpiling made North Star's task “very difficult”
and that he would not have administered the Lease in this
fashion.
17 In his testimony, Mr. Eldon Wartes, who would
eventually become North Star's site manager at Birchwood,
explained-
Q: What was the impact of that behavior on your
work when you started in 1998?
A: It's huge. These units all issued at the same
time.... There's no way I can schedule subcontractors
to be in these units all at the same time. It's just a
scheduling nightmare.
65a
North Star's site manager complained to Ms.
Goodrich that this practice was “another effort by the
Army to make it as difficult as possible for North Star
to perform its contract,” asserting further that North
Star “regards this action to be another exercise of bad
faith on the part of the Army in dealing with North
Star.”
These complaints, however, fell on deaf ears as Mr.
Peterson instead was focused on reducing North
Star's rent for what he perceived as excess downtime
and, if possible, contracting out the repair and
maintenance functions to a third party. In a July 8,
1998, e-mail to Mr. Kiein, Col. Brown and Ms.
Goodrich, he wrote that “|ajlthough we now have the
benefit of several favorable CODs, we still seem to be
floundering as to the best course of action for
deducting rent, withdrawing work for
accomplishment by an alternate source, etc.” On July
13, 1998, Mr. Peterson wrote Mr. Klein urging that
rental deductions be made against North Star and
stating “[wJe expect your support to finalize this
action this week and so inform NorthStar.” The next
day, July 14, 1998, Mr. Klein responded-
It is important that we focus on providing the
soldier with the best service and housing
available. I perceive that as your role as a
housing manager. We will work with you to
accomplish that goal. Please refrain from
directing the Contracting Officer. A number
Mr. Wartes further testified that stockpiling has strained
his relationship with various local subcontractors, particularly
when schedules were changed by the Army at the last moment.
66a
of the contractual issues you frequently
address are under consideration in the
Federal Court of Claims and are subject to
review and determination by the attorney's
handling this case.
Mr. Klein added that _a_ contracting officer
representative would attend the next evaluation
meeting, “but will not be able to make commitments
relating to assessment of damages or reductions of
rent.” Rejecting this position, Mr. Peterson, in an
internal memorandum, dated July 20, 1998,
complained that Mr. Klein had raised “disturbing
issues” regarding the “quality of the coordination and
support which we feel that we are entitled to receive.”
He indicated that his office “needs a _ strong,
aggressive proponent” and “may not find it” in Mr.
Klein's office. This memorandum also recommended
that a “(flormal strategy for access to Birchwood” be
developed for when the Lease expired in 2007,
suggesting that Mr. Peterson was already focusing on
replacing North Star nearly a decade before that
opportunity would first arise. On July 20, 1998, Mr.
Peterson formerly responded to Mr. Klein's e-mail of
July 14, stating, inter alia, that “[yJour first
paragraph [quoted above] seems to be giving us poor
legal advice,” and that, instead, there should be a
“bias toward action.” On July 22, 1998, Mr. Klein
responded, stating that “I am totally confused at your
memo,” indicating further that “[t]here appears to be
a lot of jumping to conclusions and emotional
overtones.”
In the fall of 1998, the Army again surveyed the
Birchwood residents. The survey contained several
questions that appeared to ask residents their views
AR.
67a
regarding the ongoing contractual disputes between
the parties. For example, one question stated, “[ijn
their original proposal, [North Star] proposed the
replacement of carpet in each unit at approximately
seven year intervals,” and asked the _ tenants
essentially how often they would like to have their
carpet replaced. Another question stated that North
Star “advised the government, in June 1998, that
they had experienced an almost complete turnover of
employees,” and asked the residents “[d]id you, as a
tenant, experience any decline in service which you
felt was attributed to this high employee turnover.”
The survey also had one or more questions that
implied that North Star was responsible for certain
reductions in service that, in fact, had been prompted
by the Army (e.g., the elimination of a location where
residents could obtain household supplies). Another
question asked tenants whether they had “pleasant”
or “unpleasant” living experiences without identifying
maintenance issues that were the Army's
responsibility, potentially leaving the false
impression that all the deficiencies at Birchwood
were North Star's fault.
On December 30, 1998, Mr. Peterson prepared a
“discussion” paper in which he advocated that North
Star not receive an incentive fee for 1998. In so
arguing, he relied heavily upon several factors: (i)
that there continued to be disputes regarding carpet
replacement; (ii) that an audit was pending regarding
the contractor's alleged failure to meet agreed upon
standards; (iii) the results of annual resident survey,
68a
which he refers to as a “primary evaluation tool;”!8
and (iv) that funding for the Army's overall resident
program had been reduced and that any incentive fee
not paid to North Star could be used to “mitigate
reductions in maintenance/ repair programs.” This
memorandum concluded “[b]ased upon the facts as
above, particularly FY 99 ... Sanding posture in
USARK [the U.S. Army in Alaskaj, the Board (Mr.
Peterson and Ms. Goodrich) place a low overall
priority on the approval of any incentive award for
1998 and recommend that ‘none’ be approved at this
time.”
4. 1999 and 2000
On or about February 1, 1999, Mr. Everett became
the Contracting Office Representative -based at
Birchwood. In May of 1999, North Star was notified
that it would receive a incentive fee of $3,730 for
1998. The letter announcing this fee cited the survey
results as the primary reason why the fee was so low,
but did not mention budget considerations, despite
the rationale expressed in Mr. Peterson's internal
memorandum.
In the months that followed, increasing
disagreements occurred between’ the parties
concerning downtime calculations, stockpiling and
18 Those results indicated, for example, that 49 percent of
the residents were dissatisfied with North Star's “decision” to
eliminate the self-help store. Perhaps not surprisingly, 46
percent of the residents said that carpeting should be replaced
every seven years, while 44 percent said that it should be
replaced more frequently.
69a
various other issues. Mr. Peterson continued to
believe that he was not receiving adequate support
from the contracting officer. For example, on
September 9, 1999, he e-mailed Mr. Klein,
complaining that Mr. Everett had not been present at
several meetings, indicating that his absence was a
“major failure” and “pretty embarrassing to me.” Mr.
Peterson, however, apparently was unaware that Mr.
Everett was on vacation, a point that Mr. Klein made
on September 13, 1999, in explaining the situation to
his superior, Lt. Col. Sheldon Jahn. In that e-mail,
Mr. Klein indicated that “[t]here will always be
unpopular COR determinations but | fully expect
each call to be based upon the _ contract/lease
provisions and made without prejudice to any of the
parties.” Col. Jahn responded to Mr. Klein,
indicating, in reference to Mr. Peterson, “I am not
sure why there always seems to be this immediate
accusation approach to concerns.” Nonetheless, Mr.
Peterson continued to send Mr. Klein e-mails
requesting that changes be made in draft contracting
officer decisions (CODs). In one e-mail, dated
October 25, 1999, Mr. Peterson made _ several
recommendations regarding a pending COD
concerning an incentive fee award, indicating that
the decision should refer to North Star's alleged
policy of “establishing a ‘below market’ wage scale for
Birchwood employees.” A November 8, 1999, e-mail
from Mr. Everett to Mr. Peterson invites comments
on a draft of a position paper that indicates that “Fair
Wear and Tear determinations cannot be used to
create a de-facto depreciation schedule.”
On December 17, 1999, Mr. Peterson again
shipped out an e-mail in advance of the incentive fee
meeting, urging once more that North Star not
70a
receive an award. In another e-mail dated December
29, 1999, he elaborated on why he opposed an award,
stating, “remember that if we award even $1, this
goes into the record books as an exceptional rating.”
(Emphasis in original). An attachment to this e-mail
indicated that one of the reasons that Mr. Peterson
was opposed to giving North Star an incentive fee for
1999 was because North Star was challenging, in this
court, the diminished fee it received in 1998.
As the year 2000 unfolded, the parties disagreed as
to which government officials were empowered to
order North Star to perform work. North Star
asserted that only the contracting officer had this
authority, but that view was rejected by Mr. Klein.
The latter, in a February 24, 2000, letter to North
Star emphasized that the Army's Project Manager
“has the authority and responsibility to identify
maintenance needs and to direct North Star to
perform maintenance as required.” On February 29,
2000, Col. Mark C. Nelson, by then the new Director
of Public Works, notified North Star that no incentive
award would be made for 1999. Col. Nelson's letter
cited a variety of reasons for this decision, among
them statistics taken from the most recent resident
survey.!9 The dispute between the parties involving
refuse collection took a new turn when, in April of
2000, the Army indicated that North Star could no
19 The 1999 resident survey continued to raise issues before
the residents that were being disputed by the parties. Among
other things, it indicated that under the contract, “[e]xterior
painting” is scheduled “at five year intervals or ‘more often as
required,’ ” and asked the residents to evaluate North Star's
painting efforts in light of this requirement
Tla
longer use the Fort Wainwright landfill for household
trash. While North Star complained about this
action, the record reveals that the landfill was closed
to all such trash for environmental reasons, and not
just to trash collected by North Star.
In May of 2000, the parties negotiated what they
believed was a settlement of the 1998 lawsuit.
Apparently under’ the _ settlement, defendant
eliminated various practices-for example, the Army
began to spread the release of units to North Star
over a calendar week, rather than concentrating
them on a single day.*® Depreciation also ceased. Yet,
various new debates continued to arise among the
parties, including disputes over who was responsible
for replacing $13 butter dishes and $10 ice trays. In
September of 2000, Connie Kiser became the 801
housing project manager. In December of that year,
North Star issued a series of memoranda complaining
that the Army was not enforcing various safety and
cleanliness regulations. On December 19, 2000,
North Star filed notice in this court that it was
rescinding the settlement agreement.
20 Describing the impact this change wrought, Mr. Wartes
testified
Q: Was there impact on your workload as a result of
that?
A: Immediately scheduling waa casier. | had units to
schedule all week, instead of one day or two days of the
week. | had units that weren't filling for a couple of
days without having work done in them, because | had
six of them at the same time. Yes, it made things much
casier
72a
5. 2001 and 2002
On January 30, 2001, Mr. Peterson again relayed
complaints to Mr. Klein regarding the level of support
that Public Works was receiving from Mr. Everett,
indicating that his superior “feels that Rod [Everett]'s
position should be more responsive to supporting our
requirements (specifically to supporting Connie
[Kiser] ), more proactive, and most importantly,
accomplishing measurable results.” Later, on
January 31, 2001, in discussing another dispute in
which Mr. Wartes indicated that he would not take
direction from Ms. Kiser, Mr. Peterson e-mailed Mr.
Klein, stating that Mr. Wartes's position precluded
an incentive fee award for 2000 and that “[i]t's time
to back [Ms. Kiser] 100%.” By at least this time, the
parties began to have additional disputes regarding
the inspections under the Lease, with issues arising
concerning the timing and notification of those
inspections and whether the Army was entitled to
conduct inspections at times not specified in the
Lease. Apparently commenting on those disputes, on
February 9, 2001, Mr. Peterson sent Mr. Klein and
others an e-mail in which he stated-
If our project manager's interpretation of the
lease is correct, this should be completely and
clearly expressed to [North Star] by Rod.
If there is lease ambiguity, our project
manager's position should still be supported
as completely and clearly as possible by Rod.
He is not paid to be neutral, but to
aggressively support a reasonable
government position.
73a
In June of 2001, the Army announced that North
Star would not receive an incentive award for 2000,
citing again the resident surveys,?!' as well as
excessive downtime, but also referring to an issue
involving overcharges for lock installation.2?
On July 24, 2001, Lt. Col. Michael T. Meeks, the
Director of Public Works, issued a memorandum to
the Army Engineer District requesting that a protocol
be established under which all contracting officer
decisions would be reviewed by employees in Public
Works. This memorandum requested that “[a] staff
summary ... shall be attached to each draft COD and
this will be used by the FWA Housing Office to note
concurrence/noncurrence and any comments.” The
memorandum further indicated that-
fijn the event of nonconcurrence, the
USARAK staff, including the Staff Judge
Advocate will review the draft COD. A
summary of the USARAK and proposed
changes in wording will be provided to the
Office of Real Estate and reviewed prior to
finalizing the COD.
Col. Meeks added that “[t]his procedure will insure
that Public Works and USARAK comments are
21 Among the questions on the 2000 survey was “[hjlow
satisfied are you with the twice weekly curbside refuse
collection?”
22 Regarding the latter point, a June 15, 2001, letter from
the Army to Mr. Wartes cited North Star for “[k]nowingly
charging the government and military families for new
materials while recycling used lock-sets.” The record, however,
suggests that by this time, North Star already had admitted this
mistake and had reimbursed the Army for the charges involved.
T4a
reviewed and incorporated, as appropriate,” and
listed Mr. Peterson as the contact for this action.
Various documents in the record, as well as
testimony at trial, indicate that this procedure was
implemented at least as early as August 17, 2001.
In a November 5, 2001, e-mail, Mr. Peterson
recommended that the lockset issue, as well as other
unidentified allegations of fraud, warranted an
outside investigation of North Star by the Army's
Internal Review and Audit Compliance Office Army
(IRACO). In this e-mail, Mr. Peterson asserted that
“[t]his issue continues to preclude any consideration
for incentive award until it is finally resolved to the
government's satisfaction.” By early December of
2001, he and Ms. Kiser decided that they would
require North Star to submit individual invoices for
certain repair and replacement items, even though
the Lease seemingly provided that such items would
be listed in a repair cost book to be negotiated
annually by the parties. In one e-mail sent to Mr.
Peterson, Ms. Kiser stated: “I feel that the lock set
issue is just the tip of the ice berg.” On December 11,
2001, Mr. Peterson sent an e-mail to the contracting
officer and a variety of other Army personnel citing
the lockset issue and the resulting audit as grounds
for denying North Star any incentive fee for 2001.
In January of 2002, Mr. Harold Hopson replaced
Mr. Klein as the contracting officer for the Lease. On
January 8, 2002, a hearing was held in this case at
which defendant's motion for summary judgment to
enforce the settlement agreement was denied. On
January 15, 2002, Ms. Harrell e-mailed Col. Meeks
complaining about a variety of issues and indicating
that “[t]he bottom line [is] we want to get rid of the
(da
settlement.” On January 28, 2002, Mr. Hopson wrote
North Star indicating that defendant was
withdrawing from the settlement agreement and
would seek to recoup any payments made to North
Star based upon that agreement.
Following the collapse of the settlement
agreement, the situation worsened considerably.
Almost immediately, and despite howls of complaint
from North Star, Mr. Peterson and Ms. Kiser
resumed the practice of stockpiling, releasing units in
groups of eight on Mondays and Fridays without
regard to how long the units had been vacant. In
February of 2002, the Army indicated that it had
received the results of the IRACO audit, which had
found that various work authorizations were missing
from the Birchwood files. In a letter dated February
28, 2002, which is not in the record, but referenced by
other correspondence, Col. David B. Snodgrass
indicated that the missing files precluded the Army
from considering a performance award for North Star
for 2001 or for any part of 2002 for which the issue
remained unresolved. On March 6, 2002, Ms. Kiser
forwarded to North Star the repair list for 2002,
substantially reducing the number of items listed
therein and emphasizing that “[a]ll items not
included in the list will require invoicing at the time
the work is required.” Extending a concept that
previously had been applied only to a few items (e.g.,
carpeting), her memorandum further indicated that
“[p]rices approved in this listing are subject to
depreciation to be determined on a case by case
basis.”
Gn March 15, 2002, Mr. Wartes wrote Col.
Snodgrass objecting to his incentive fee
76a
determination. This letter indicated that the
overcharges regarding the locksets involved $135,
which had already been refunded to the Army
(possibly as early as November of 2000). The letter
also asserted that the Birchwood files that allegedly
were missing had been pulled for a spreadsheet
analysis, that North Star had shown the auditors the
boxes containing those files, but that the auditors had
declined an invitation to review those documents.
North Star indicated that the auditors had not
complained about any missing files and that the first
that it became aware there was a continuing issue
concerning the files was when it received the
incentive fee letter... Apparently prompted by a
memorandum received from Ms. Kiser, on April 17,
2002, Mr. Everett wrote Mr. Wartes complaining
about excess downtime in February and March 2002,
and indicating that liquidated damages of $2,874.47
would be deducted from the next rental payment. On
April 30, 2002, North Star wrote Mr. Everett
requesting that he provide the backup documentation
for his downtime calculations. In the succeeding
months, particularly, in May of 2002, the parties
continued to dispute a variety of issues, including
whether Ms. Kiser was authorized to modify
unilaterally the repair cost book and to require
invoices for the items not covered in her price list. In
internal e-mails dated May 22, 2002, a representative
from IRACO indicated that the lockset issue alone
was insufficient to warrant further audit, but that an
expansion of the audit, nonetheless, should be sought.
By way of explanation, the auditor indicated that
“our audit results, used as evidence, could prove
crucial in supporting our (the Govt) [sic] case against
the lawsuit brought by North Star.” The same day,
Tla
Mr. Peterson responded that his office “greatly
support|[s] expanding the investigation.”
Again prompted by a memorandum sent by Ms.
Kiser, on May 22, 2002, Mr. Everett sent North Star
a letter asserting that there had been excess
downtime in April and assessing liquidated damages
in the amount of $2,308.25. On May 24, 2002, Mr.
Wartes responded to this letter, asserting that “[n]o
justification has been provided for your calculation of
excess downtime,” and indicating that he had still not
received a response.to his April 30, 2002, request for
the backup documentation for defendant's calculation
of downtime for February and March. On June 27,
2002, Ms. Rhonda Sekyra, North Star's Treasurer,
wrote Ms. Kiser cataloguing the problems that North
Star was experiencing regarding the turnover of
units, including the Army's practices of: (i) revising
turnover dates and failing to provide timely
notifications; (ii) not distinguishing between change
of occupancy downtime and repair and renovation
downtime; (ii) failing properly to conduct pre-
termination inspections; and (iv) failing to issue
proper work authorizations. The record reveals that
disputes involving individual units continued
throughout this period. In July of 2002, the parties
again exchanged correspondence, in which the Army
reemphasized that Ms. Kiser was authorized to direct
North Star to perform work. In a letter dated July 18,
2002, Mr. Wartes highlighted that the Army had
apparently begun using depreciation in calculating
the reimbursement owed North Star for blinds and
counter tops replaced as the result of occupant
damage.
78a
On July 31, 2002, Mr. Everett sent North Star a
letter in which he determined that there was excess
downtime for May and June of 2002, indicating that
$2,350.61 would be deducted from North Star's next
rental payment. On August 1, 2002, Mr. Wartes
contested this determination and again demanded
back-up documentation, while noting that requests
for such documentation for February, March and
April had still not been satisfied. On August 8, 2002,
Mr. Wartes wrote Ms. Kiser alleging a new practice-
that the Army was ignoring pet damage, leaving it to
North Star to determine whether carpeting so
damaged would be left in a unit or replaced at its
expense.” Correspondence during this period also
suggests yet another new bone of contention between
the parties-indications that Ms. Kiser was inspecting
units outside of the regular turnover regime, at which
inspections North Star representatives were not
present, and using information obtained during those
inspections as a basis for requiring North Star to
perform repairs and maintenance.
23 Commenting on the impact of this, Mr. Wartes testified-
This is just one of many types of instances where there
was a double standard, where the government when it
perceived it was damaged, you know, it would be their
responsibility. They would note it, and let it go on for
[the] next occupant versus the most infinitesimal thing
they could find that they would perceive to be North
Star's responsibility, they would force us to replace it.
At another point in his testimony, Mr. Wartes noted that
the practice of not repairing occupant damage gave residents the
false impression that North Star was not maintaining
Birchwood, thereby negatively impacting North Star's scores in
the resident surveys.
79a
On August 29, 2002, Mr. Peterson sent an e-mail
to Ms. Kiser, with copies to various other officials, in
which he summarized the results of the then
completed IRACO audit. This email indicated:
We had a pre-final briefing today. The final
audit will document a series of relatively
minor problems which we will pass on to
[North Star] to correct, but no real big ticket
items. There is about $20K in double billings
which we will ask [North Star] to correct and
reimburse, but most of that appears to be
from Ed Miller's sloppy work, not any [North
Star] conspiracy.
The audit will document a quantum
improvement in the quality of government
oversight since Connie took over, and all
auditors emphasized what a great job you are
doing (as measured by the sharp decline in
gov [sic] work authorizations and challenges
to their attempts to charge the government).
Well done!
Other documentation in the record verifies that the
monthly work authorizations issued by the Army to
North Star went from $13,468.08 per month in 2000,
to $15,039.60 per month in 2001, and then down to
$5,257.15 per month in 2002. An e-mail from Ms.
Kiser indicates that this reduction was “due to
imposition of depreciation schedule and aggressive
monitoring of occ[upant] damage vs fair wear.”24
24 In her deposition, Nikisha Goins, formerly one of the
government inspectors at Birchwood, provided a much different
impression as to how these work authorizations were reduced.
80a
On September 4, 2002, North Star filed a claim
with Mr. Hopson detailing numerous alleged
violations of the Lease, accusing the Army of: (i)
failing to oversee occupant conduct; (ii) failing to
issue work authorizations for occupant-caused
damage; (iii) issuing improper and untimely work
authorizations that reduce or eliminate the amount
owed to North Star; (iv) failing to issue work
authorizations that employ the List of Repair Costs;
(v) taking depreciation on all replacement items ( e.g.,
flooring, counter tops, blinds, and appliances); (vi)
Describing Ms. Kiser's modus operandi, Ms. Goins commented
that “I think I would say I was ... being used as a tool to make
North Star pay for stuff.” She further explained that Ms. Kiser
instructed her, as follows:
Just that when I'm doing inspections, you know, ...
either Eldon [Wartes] has to pay for it or the occupants
have to pay for it.... It was pretty much | was being
used to go out there to do the inspection, assess the
damages but bring as less charges back to the
government as possible in other words.
Along these same lines, Ms. Goins specifically stated that Ms.
Kiser had directed her to save the government money and that,
correspondingly, the Army failed to replace items at Birchwood
that it replaced at other housing facilities at the fort. “[NJothing
was coming out of [Ms. Kiser’s}] pocket,” she stated, “[ijt was
either the occupant was going to pay for it or Eldon was going to
pay for it.” Amplifying the latter point, she indicated that in her
view the military families “got a raw end of the deal living at
Birchwood,” as “every little thing” was charged to them. Ms.
Goins further indicated that one of the other inspectors
cautioned her to keep copies of her inspections because Ms.
Kiser would change the results, sometimes without even seeing
the unit involved. In particular, she indicated that she made
copies for “[t]he ones that were kind of shady ... the ones that
were like I didn't feel comfortable.”
8la
using additional inspections as the basis for ordering
maintenance and repairs; (vii) deviating otherwise
from the turnover inspection regime specified by the
Lease; (viii) placing a disproportionate number of
temporary occupants at Birchwood; (ix) assessing
liquidated damages against North Star and the
failure to provide documentation for the calculation of
those damages; and (x) failing to make incentive fee
awards to North Star. North Star attributed these
various violations to “bad faith,” asserting, in
particular that “[t]he Government's discriminatory
treatment of Birchwood constitutes a bad faith
violation of the Government's contractual obligation
to oversee the day-to-day administration of the
housing units and to enforce Army Family Housing
rules and regulations.” Among other things, the
claim sought damages corresponding to the
diminution in the value of Birchwood, a figure set at
$12,146,000, as well as additional expenses for 1996
through 2001, totaling $813,390, for an overall
damages figure of $12,959,390. Two days following
the filing of this claim, on September 6, 2002, Mr.
Peterson e-mailed Ms. Kiser recommending that she
“install[ ] a trap door in front of your desk which you
can release when Eldon [Wartes] is standing on it in
front of your desk. Connected to a chute to the Chena
River.”
In the ensuing months, the parties continued to
dispute a variety of issues, including whether the
Army was obliged to have a North Star
representative at the final inspections and whether
depreciation was applicable to various items. These
exchanges were marked by further charges and
counter-charges of “bad faith.” On October 11, 2002,
in an e-mail to Mr. Fischer, Mr. Wartes asserted that
82a
Ms. Kiser was signing documents for inspections that
she had not conducted (a practice that was confirmed
by the testimony of two of her employees). On or
about October 15, 2002, it appears that Ms. Kiser
introduced yet another requirement-that upstairs
and downstairs carpeting needed to match in color (
e.g., that if the upstairs carpet was brown, the
downstairs carpet had to be brown, or both needed to
be blue). In an undated memorandum issued at
about this time, Ms. Kiser noted that even where
carpeting was being replaced due to occupant
damage, North Star was obliged to replace, at its
expense, other carpet in the unit to ensure that the
old and new carpeting matched. At about the time of
this memorandum, Mr. Peterson began transitioning
into retirement (an event punctuated by the infamous
“Miami football” e-mail that began this opinion). On
October 15, 2002, Mr. Wartes wrote Ms. Barbara S.
Lehman, who had_ replaced Mr. Peterson,
complaining that the surveys designed by the Army
were biased against North Star.
Various e-mails sent in October of 2002 indicate
that, despite the meager findings produced by the
first IRACO audit, various Army personnel were
attempting to convince Congressiona) staffers that
North Star's claims should be the subject of a
Government Accounting Office audit. In November of
2002, Ms. Kiser adopted a new practice in regards to
painting. Specifically, the Lease envisioned that a
unit would be painted if it became vacant after
certain specified Lease anniversary dates ( e.g.,
November 6, 2002), whether or not an inspection
actually revealed a need for painting. The record
indicates that in the latter part of 2002, Ms. Kiser
began twin practices designed to maximize such
Ba
cyclical paintings-the first was to hold units vacant
until after the anniversary date had passed; the
second was to assign units to temporary occupants, so
that the unit would become vacant shortly after the
anniversary dates. In some instances, these practices,
which were confirmed by the testimony of the former
inspectors, required units to be fully painted twice
within a matter of months. On November 19, 2002,
North Star filed its complaint in Case No. 02-1632C.
In December of 2002, the parties traded complaints,
each asserting that the other was attempting to
reduce costs by avoiding its responsibilities under the
Lease. The Army's position in this regard was voiced
in an audit document released by IRACO on
December 17, 2002, while North Star's response took
the form of a December 24, 2002, letter to Mr.
Hopson.
6. 2003 and Forward
‘
On January 30, 2003, Acting Housing Division
Chief Cynthia Larson e-mailed Mr. Hopson to
complain about a draft COD that apparently did not
hold that depreciation was applicable to counter tops
and other materials installed in units. In this e-mail,
Ms. Larson wrote-
Rod [Everett] provided Connie [Kiser] ‘with
the draft for the COD on the above mentioned
units [646 and 833]. I have some grave
concerns with [the] findings. We have
already been down this road before and DO
NOT want to go down it again. The issue of
depreciation is not up for discussion, as we
see it. Our direction came specifically from
84a
Don Kinner, DOJ in a teleconference with the
COE, Housing, and DOJ, in which he stated
depreciation will apply to everything; where
the question was asked specifically, does
depreciation apply only to carpet or all repair
items. Don Kinner's [sic] stated it applied to
everything. I believe if we allow this COD to
go out as is, we are opening ourselves up for
complete failure on all key issues and
litigation will CONSUME our daily efforts
The contract states any repair. or
replacement shall match in kind and color to
all adjacent surfaces. With this said, we have
been applying this to all repairs and as |
under|stand]|, Ann is stating that this is only
applicable to carpet replacement and no other
repairs. Again, our stand has to be unified
and we have not been applying this concept,
based on guidance from the COE. We
CANNOT change ships mid stream, if we do,
all previous work will be negated, and the
judge has already accused us of inconsistency
in our methodologies.
I feel with this being such a
SIGNIFICANT change to the day to day
operations, we need to have a meeting and
discuss PRIOR to this COD being released
and come up with a CONCRETE PLAN of
action. | feel precedence will be set and
HOLD ON, we're on the roller coaster again
(Emphasis in original). On January 31, 2003, Mr.
Hopson sent North Star the final version of the COD
regarding units 646 and 833. That COD indicated
Ba
that “[clountertop material will be depreciated based
upon a schedule to be determined by the Government
after North Star submits pertinent cost information.”
On February 12, 2003, Mr. Hopson e-mailed Ms
Harrell, indicating that the comments on draft CODs
provided by her office were “invaluable.”
On February 20, 2003, Col. Snodgrass sent North
Star a letter denying it any incentive fee for 2002. As
basis for this decision, the letter cited, inter alia, the
audit and the lockset issue, the results of the resident
survey,”° and North Star's practice of challenging Ms
Kiser's authority to direct work. On March 4, 2003,
North Star responded to this letter. It noted that the
lockset issue-which the December 2001 IRACO audit
had revealed involved only $135-had been used “to
deny incentive fee awards to North Star since 2000.”
North Star further complained that the resident
surveys were biased against it, specifically asserting
that the surveys were designed to give residents the
false impression that North Star was at fault for the
Army's failure to enforce certain policies ( e.g., pet
control). On March 24, 2003, the Army provided
North Star with a summary of the findings of the
JIRACO foilow-up investigation that was conducted
between May and August of 2002. Those findings
continued to maintain that the facility history files
did not contain the work authorizations that were
approved by the Army. The audit also verified that,
26 Among the questions asked by the 2002 survey werk
“|hjow satisfied would you be with leas than the twice-weekly
trash pickup you now receive?’ Although inartfully framed, this
queation again raised with the tenants an issue being debated
by the parties
86a
in four instances, North Star had installed used
locksets and billed the Army for the installation of
new ones. The summary concluded that “IRACO's
findings have been forwarded to the Army's Criminal
Investigation Command to determine’ whether
further investigation is warranted.” On March 28,
2003, the court granted defendant's motion to stay
the 1998 case pending the resolution of the criminal
investigation; that stay remained in force until May
5, 2004.
During the first quarter of 2003, the parties
continued to argue over inspection procedures, with
the Army maintaining that it had the right to inspect
units at any time and North Star asserting that such
ad hoc inspections could not supplant the inspection
protocols established by the Lease. Ultimately, this
dispute led to a contracting officer decision, dated
May 22, 2003, which held that while the Army could
conduct additional inspections, “North Star must be
notified of and permitted to attend any inspection
being performed for the purpose of identifying
maintenance requirements.” Many of the issues
previously identified continued to be hot topics of
dispute between the parties for the remainder of 2003
and into 2004. As if these were not enough, two new
sets of issues were raised during this period. First, a
variety of issues arose when the Army, on June 5,
2003, ordered North Star to perform cleaning services
that had previously been performed by another Army
contractor-the Army afforded North Star five
additional days of down time where a “full cleaning is
required,” but indicated that additional down time
would be determined by the Army on a case-by-case
basis where “only a partial cleaning or a minimum
amount of cleaning is required.” Second, in a letter
87a
dated July 10, 2003, North Star accused the Army of
refusing to authorize work for occupant damage, but
then, upon a later change of occupancy, insisting such
work was required by fair wear and tear. During this
period, stockpiling continued, periodically spiking?®
and the conflict between the parties was further
heightened when Ms. Kiser, for the first time, used a
black light to determine that the painting in a unit
was inadequate, thereby allegedly identifying flaws
that were not visible to the naked eye.
On November 20, 2003, plaintiff filed its complaint
before this court in case No. 03-2699C. On March 9,
2004, the Army denied North Star an incentive fee for
2003, citing many of the issues that had been raised
in prior award decisions (although not raising the
lockset issue). In June of 2004, Ms. Lori Dallas
replaced Ms. Kiser as the Housing Project
Manager/Site Manager of Birchwood.
D. Proceedings to Date
As noted, on March 9, 1998, North Star filed its
initial complaint in this case. In 1998 and 1999,
there were numerous disputes between the parties
involving electronic discovery and other issues. On
August 23, 1999, North Star filed an amended
26 For example, on Friday, August 8, 2003, Ms. Kiser
released four units, all of which required’ extensive
subcontractor work. Then, on Monday, August 11, 2003, she
released five more units requiring subcontractor work. The nine
units released on those days had been vacant, prior to being
turned over to North Star, for time periods ranging from 28 to
82 days.
88a
complaint. On April 6, 2000, Judge Bruggink stayed
the case pending settlement discussions. On May 26,
2000, the parties entered into an agreement
establishing the preliminary terms of a settlement.
On December 19, 2000, North Star filed a notice of
recision, claiming that the settlement agreement
remained unconsummated. On January 3, 2001, this
case was reassigned to the undersigned. On June 14,
2001, defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment, seeking to enforce the _ settlement.
Following briefing, on January 9, 2002, the court
denied the motion for summary judgment, based
upon the existence of genuine issues of material fact.
On January 31, 2002, defendant issued its own notice
of recision of the settlement and the settlement
thereby was deemed abandoned.
Further discovery ensued. On April 16, 2002,
North Star filed a second amended complaint. On
April 19, 2002, defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment on the merits of this case. On June 3, 2002,
the court scheduled this case for a trial to begin on
October 16, 2002. Following additional discovery, the
court, in an unpublished opinion dated July 3, 2002,
granted, in part, and denied, in part, defendant's
motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, the
parties indicated that they were making substantial
progress toward settlement, leading the court, on
July 19, 2002, to postpone the trial and further stay
the case. Settlement, however, did not materialize.
On March 12, 2003, defendant, at a_= status
conference, requested that the case be further stayed
pending completion of the Army _ Criminal
Investigations Division investigation of North Star.
Before this request was acted upon, on March 28,
2003, North Star filed a motion for summary
89a
judgment. After additional filings regarding the
criminal investigations were received, the court
granted defendant's request and the case was stayed
(with periodic progress reports) until May 5, 2004.
On that day, the court lifted the stay, in part, to allow
defendant to respond to the plaintiffs March 28,
2003, motion for summary judgment. Shortly after
this response was filed, further discovery disputes
arose. On September 2, 2004, the court consolidated
Case Nos. 02-1632C and 03-2699C with the earlier
1998 case. On October 4, 2004, the court issued an
order granting, in part, and denying, in part,
plaintiffs summary judgment motion. On January
18, 2005, the court issued an order requiring expert
discovery and establishing a trial date of August 15,
2005.
Trial in this case occurred between August 15 and
23, 2005, at which both fact and expert witnesses
were presented. Further trial in this matter was
conducted on September 2, 2005. Following the filing
of extensive post-trial briefs, closing argument in this
case occurred on July 20, 2006.
Il. DISCUSSION
With the foregoing findings as reference points, the
court proceeds to consider the claims made by
plaintiff and defendant's responses thereto.
A. Jurisdiction
In a motion in limine filed before trial, as well as
during its closing argument and in its post-trial
briefs, defendant asserted that a variety of the claims
90a
raised by plaintiff in its amended complaints should
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It contends that
these claims were not properly filed with the
contracting officer and that no decisions, therefore,
were rendered on these matters. Because subject
matter jurisdiction is a “threshold matter,” it must be
addressed before the court turns to the merits. See
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,
94-95 (1998); Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 219
F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
This court has “jurisdiction to render judgment
upon any claim by or against, or dispute with, a
contractor arising under ... the Contract Disputes Act
of 1978 [(CDA)].” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2); see also
Applied Cos. v. United States, 144 F.3d 1470, 1477
(Fed. Cir. 1998). In this framework, the “strict
limits” of the CDA _ constitute “jurisdictional
prerequisites to any appeal.” England v. The
Swanson Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (citing Sharman Co. v. United States, 2 F.3d
1564, 1569 n. 6 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Hence, jurisdiction
is lacking “unless the contractor's claim is first
presented to the contracting officer and that officer
renders [or is deemed to render] a final decision on
the claim.” England, 353 F.3d at 1379; see also D.L.
Braughler Co., Inc. v. West, 127 F.3d 1476, 1480 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); James M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. United
States, 93 F.3d 1537, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Bath Iron
Works Corp. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1567, 1578
(Fed. Cir. 1994). And these requirements must be
met separately for each claim raised-there is no
pendent or ancillary jurisdiction. See Joseph Morton
Co. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1273, 1281 (Fed. Cir.
1985); see also Health Ins. Plan of Greater N_Y., Inc.
v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 33, 48 (2004).
9la
Section 605 of the CDA expressly requires that
“{a]ll claims by a contractor against the government
. shall be in writing and shall be submitted to the
contracting officer for a decision.” 41 U.S.C. § 605(a);
see also England, 353 F.3d at 1379. Where the
amount of a claim exceeds $100,000, the claim must
be certified by the contractor. 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)(1).
While the CDA does not define further the content of
a “claim,” FAR § 2.101 defines a “claim” as “a written
demand or written assertion by one of the contracting
parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of
money in a sum certain, the adjustment or
interpretation of contract terms, or other relief
arising under or relating to the contract.” 48 C.F.R. §
2.101; see also England, 353 F.3d at 1379; Reflectone,
Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
This definition, which has often been employed by
courts analyzing whether the CDA requirements are
met,27 thus distinguishes between claims that seek
monetary relief and other types of demands involving
“the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms”
or “other relief arising under or relating to the
contract.” Neither type of claim must be submitted
“in any particular form or use any particular
wording.” Contract Cleaning Maint., Inc. v. United
States; 811 F.2d 586, 592 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also
Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d
1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“certain ‘magic words’
need not be used and the intent of the ‘claim’
governs’); Engineered Demolition, Inc. v. United
27 See, e.g., Envtl. Tectonics Corp. v. United States, 72 Fed.
Cl. 290, 294 (2006); Renda Marine, Inc. v. United States, 71 Fed.
Cl. 378, 387 n. 9 (2006).
92a
States, 70 Fed. Cl. 580, 587 (2006). Indeed, various
cases suggest. that a claim may arise from the
combination of more than one document submitted to
the contracting officer. See Clearwater Constructors,
Inc. v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 303, 309 (2003);
Exec. Ct. Reporters, Inc. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl.
769, 774 (1998) (“a series of letters can be read
together to comprise a clear and unequivocal
statement giving the contracting officer notice of the
basis for the contractor's claim”); Al Munford, Inc. v.
United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 185, 189 (1998) (“Such a
statement may be in the form of one or several
documents.”).
In other regards, the requirements for monetary
and nonmonetary claims diverge somewhat. The
Federal Circuit has described the requirements oi a
monetary claim in practical terms, stating that “[a]ll
that is required is that the contractor submit in
writing to the contracting officer a clear and
unequivocal statement that gives the contracting
officer adequate notice of the basis and amount of the
claim.” Scott Timber Co. v. United States, 333 F.3d
1358, 13865 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Contract
Cleaning, 811 F.2d at 592); see also Ace Constructors,
Inc. v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 253, 266 (2006).
Consistent with this “common sense” view, this court
has consistently interpreted the “sum _ certain”
requirement to include amounts in dispute that “can
be easily determined by a simple mathematical
calculation or from the contractor's submission to the
contracting officer.” Metric Constr. Co. v. United
93a
States, 14 Cl. Ct. 177, 179 (1988).28 In this regard,
the claim must provide enough specificity so as to
meet the twin purposes of the CDA's administrative
exhaustion requirement-to screen out unwarranted or
inflated claims, see CPS Mech. Contractors, 59 Fed.
Cl. at 764; Kirkham Constrs., Inc. v. United States, 30
Fed. Cl. 90, 93 (1993) (citations omitted), and to
facilitate resolution of contract disputes’ by
negotiation, at the agency level, rather than by
litigation, H.L. Smith, Inc. v. Dalton, 49 F.3d 1568,
1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also S.
Rep. No. 95-118 at 7-8 (1978) (claim requirement was
to “induce resolution of more contract disputes by
negotiation prior to litigation”). If no sum certain is
specified, the contracting officer cannot settle the
claim by awarding a specific amount of money
“because such a settlement would not preclude the
contractor from filing suit seeking the difference
between the amount awarded and some larger
amount never specifically articulated to the
contracting officer.” Exec. Ct. Reporters, 29 Fed. Cl.
at 775; see also CPS Mech. Contractors, 59 Fed. Cl. at
765.
By comparison, a nonmonetary claim-one seeking,
for example, the interpretation of contract terms-need
not seek a “sum certain.” See CW Gov't Travel, Inc. v.
United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 369, 382 (2004); Clearwater
Constructors, Inc., 56 Fed. Cl. at 309 (“To state a non-
monetary claim there is no requirement that the
contractor make a request for a sum certain.”); GPA-
28 See also CPS Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 59
Fed.Cl. 760, 764 (2004); Exec. Ct. Reporters, 29 Fed.Cl. at 775;
Sun Eagle Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl.Ct. 465, 472 (1991).
94a
I, LP v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 762, 767 (2000).
Rather, “the phrase ‘as a matter of right’ in the
regulatory definition of a ‘claim’ requires only that
the contractor specifically assert entitlement to the
[nonmonetary] relief sought. That is, the claim must
be a demand for something due or believed to be due.”
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. United States, 178 F.3d
1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also CW Gov't Travel,
63 Fed. Cl. at 383. Such a claim, if denied or deemed
denied, thus supplies the prerequisite for this court to
exercise jurisdiction in a case in which a contractor is
seeking merely’ declaratory _ relief. Alliant
Techsystems, 178 F.3d at 1268; Garrett v. General
Elec. Co., 987 F.2d 747, 750-51 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Defendant asserts that more than a dozen of North
Star's monetary claims were not presented to the
contracting officer with sufficient detail so as to meet
the regulatory definition of a “claim,” particularly the
“sum certain” requirement thereof. Plaintiff does not
contend that there is a single document that
establishes, for any of these questioned monetary
claims, a “sum certain” request. Rather, it contends
that the amounts sought as to these claims were
“easily calculable” based upon information accessible
to the contracting officer at the time the claims were
made-information either supplied by plaintiff or
originating with defendant. Essentially, plaintiff
asserts that the respective contracting officers should
have been able to take cost, billing or other
accounting information that they had, combine it
with various requests made by plaintiff for money
owed, and arrive at the “sum certain” that plaintiff
was seeking. The court is sympathetic to plaintiff's
plight, particularly given the specter that significant
time was expended at trial on claims that were
95a
belatedly attacked by defendant on jurisdictional
grounds. Indeed, to date, defendant has provided no
acceptable explanation as to why it did not perceive
the alleged jurisdictional defects until, in some
instances, the eve of trial, and, in other instances,
even after trial. Yet, it is axiomatic that subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. See
Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1127 (2005);
Fanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717,
720 (Fed. Cir. 1998). And the fact is-discomforting or
not-that jurisdiction is lacking as to many of the
challenged monetary claims.
While plaintiff suggests that administrative claims
can be cobbled together from various documents that
were possessed by defendant, as to most of the claims
at issue, there are no select group of documents,
supplied by plaintiff or otherwise, that provide a
“clear and unequivocal” indication as to the amount
sought by plaintiff. Contrary to _ plaintiff's
importunings, determining a sum certain for many of
these claims is not a matter of simple mathematics.
In some cases, only portions of the relevant costs are
documented; in others, historical cost data is
available for similar transactions, but not for those
that are the subject of the claim; and in still others,
the relevant data is entirely missing.29 Moreover,
29 Indicative of this, the amounts plaintiff has sought as to
some of its claims have shifted significantly during the course of
this litigation. This is perhaps best exemplified by comparing
North Star's damage estimates before and after trial, as the
following chart reveals:
96a
while the decisional law suggests that several
documents may be combined into a claim for purposes
of the CDA, that combination must still make clear
how much the plaintiff is willing to accept in
settlement of its claim. Thus, for example, multiple
documents seemingly could form a claim if one
unambiguously stated the costs involved and another
cross-referenced the earlier document and sought a
final decision to recover those costs. See, e.g., Al
Munford, 30 Fed. Cl. at 189-90; see also Contract
Cleaning Maint., 811 F.2d at 588-89, 592.59 But, such
is not the case where various documents list the costs
involved with an issue, but no document definitively
claims all or some specified amount of those costs. To
hold, in the latter situation, that the administrative
exhaustion requirements of the CDA are satisfied
would be to defeat the primary purpose for having
those requirements, which, as noted, is to provide the
Increase in $1.3 million $1.3 million
operating expenses
Decrease in market $8.6 million $8.6 million
value of Birchwood
Other damages not | $1,602,730 $2,639,565 _
covered above
It is, of course, the last of these three categories in which
the claims jurisdictionally challenged by defendant primarily lie.
30 Such an approach, indeed, is envisioned by 48 C.F.R. §
2.101, which, in defining “claim” states that “[a] voucher,
invoice, or other routine request for payment that is not in
dispute when submitted is not a claim. The submission may be
converted to a claim, by written notice to the contracting officer
as provided in 33.206(a).”
97a
agency with a concrete opportunity to settle the claim
in advance of litigation. Such a holding threatens
legal uncertainty in an area of law that is reasonably
well-settled, a result unwarranted even by the
belatedness of some of defendant's jurisdictional
arguments.*!
Nor does the so-called “enlarged claim” doctrine
offer plaintiff any solace here. Under this doctrine,
additional compensation may be sought, without
prior certification by a contracting officer's final
decision, for “new matters inherent in the claims
previously presented.” Miller Elevator Co. v. United
States, 30 Fed. Cl. 662, 701 (1994).32 For the doctrine
to apply-(i) “the increase in the amount of the claim
[must be] based on the same set of operative facts
previously presented to the contracting officer;” and
(ii) “the contractor neither knew nor reasonably
should have known, at the time when the claim was
presented to the contracting officer, of the factors
justifying an increase in the amount of the claim.”
31 Nor will this court hold, as plaintiff suggests, that the
contracting officers here had an independent obligation to obtain
a listing of the specific costs at issue. The obligation to request a
sum certain plainly lies squarely on the contractor's shoulders
and cannot be off-loaded in the fashion plaintiff seeks.
32 Accord Cerberonics, Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl.Ct. 415,
417 (1987) (“If the complaint brought here is based on the same
set of operative facts underlying the claim presented to the
contracting officer, then this court has jurisdiction....”); J.F.
Shea Co. v. United States, 4 Cl.Ct. 46, 54 (1983) (“It would be
most disruptive of normal litigation procedure if any increase in
the amount of a claim based upon matters developed in
litigation before the court had to be submitted to the contracting
officer before the court could continue to a final resolution on the
claim.”).
9GRa
AAI Corp. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 541, 544 (1991)
(quoting Kunz Constr. Co. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct.
74, 79 (1987) (emphasis in original)); see also Johnson
Controls World Services, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed.
Cl. 589, 593 (1999). Yet, aside from what North Star
knew and when, it remains that the claims at issue
are not based upon the same set of operative facts,
but, at best, similar occurrences during different time
periods. Under these circumstances, the enlarged
claim doctrine avails plaintiff naught, as _ the
decisional law so reflects.*%
Reflecting the foregoing, the court's specific
jurisdictional findings are summarized in_ the
attached Fact Appendix I, which lists the relevant
paragraphs of the various complaints raising certain
claims, the document(s) that plaintiff purports
represent a CDA claim, and various findings
regarding those documents. These findings reveal
that, while the total number of claims that remain
jurisdictionally viable 1s much reduced over those
that originally went to trial, the most significant of
33 See, e.g., Pueblo of Zuni v. United States, 467 F Supp.2d
1099, 1110-12 (D.N.M. 2006) (contract disputes in different
fiscal years “did not involve the same operative facts”); Johnson
Controls World Services, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 589,
595 (1999) (claims involved facts that though similar, were
“sufficiently distinct” to preclude application of doctrine); ECC
Int'l Corp. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 359, 367 n. 6 (1999)
(doctrine inapplicable where plaintiff “relies on facte ... that
were never presented to the contracting officer and never
addressed in a final decision”); compare Modeer v. United States,
68 Fed. Cl. 131, 137 (2005), aff'd, 183 Fed. Appx. 975 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (enlarged claim doctrine applicable to cover rent for entire
period of government holdover tenancy even though contractor's
claim was only for the firet month of the holdover period).
99a
the claims here are unaffected. That is true, in part,
because many of the latter claims seek only
declarations -relief that, as noted, does not require a
prior request for a sum certain See Clearwater
Constrs., 56 Fed. Cl. at 309, 311; see also CW Gou't
Travel, 63 Fed. Cl. at 381-82. Indeed, most of the
substantive issues raised are implicated by plaintiff's
banner claim-that defendant acted in bad faith, a
topic to which the court now turns
8B. Bad Faith
“The need for mutual fair dealing,” the I ederal
Circuit has instructed, “is no less required in
contracts to which the government is a party, than in
any other commercial arrangement. Maxima Corp
v. United States, 847 F.2d 1549, 1556 (Fed. Cir
1988); see also St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States,
368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black J., dissenting) (“It is
no less good morals and good law that the
Government should turn square corners in dealing
with the people than that the people should turn
square corners in dealing with their Government.”)
Most of plaintiffs claims may be viewed as a
variation on a theme-that the government officials
involved here, in sundry ways, acted in bad faith
Accordingly, while various of plaintiff's allegations
could be viewed as asserting breaches independent of
its bad faith claims, the court believes that the
evidence of animus here is such that it is more
appropriate to view all those allegations as being at
least potentially impacted by the government's bad
faith
100a
1. Standard of Proof
Because it is an implied term of every contract
that each party will act in good faith towards the
other, a party may breach a contract by acting in bad
faith. Link v. Dept. of the Treasury, 51 F.3d 1577,
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Centex Corp. v. United
States, 395 F.3d 1283, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2005). As an
aspect of these duties, “Je]very contract ... imposes an
implied obligation ‘that neither party will do
anything that will hinder or delay the other party in
performance of the contract.” Essex Electro Eng'rs,
Inc. v. Danzig, 224 F.3d 1283, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(quoting Luria Bros. v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 676,
369 F.2d 701, 708 (1966)); see also H & S Mfg., Inc. v.
United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 301, 310 (2005), aff'd 192
Fed. Appx. 965 (Fed. Cir. 2006) . Such covenants
require each party “not to interfere with the other
party's performance and not to act so as to destroy
the reasonable expectations of the other party
regarding the fruits of the contract.” Centex Corp.,
395 F.3d at 1304; see also Malone v. United States,
849 F.2d 1441, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1988), modified on
other grounds by, 857 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1988). This
“duty not to hinder is breached when the Government
commits ‘actions that unreasonably cause delay or
hindrance to contract performance.” H & S Mfg., 66
Fed. Cl. at 311 (quoting C. Sanchez & Son, Inc. v.
United States, 6 F.3d 1539, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
Such a breach occurs when, in the words of Judge
Posner, there has been “sharp dealing,” defined as
taking “deliberate advantage of an oversight by your
contract partner concerning his rights under the
contract.” Mkt. St. Assocs. L.P. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588,
594 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Centex Corp., 395 F.3d at
1304 (The covenant “include[s] the duty not to
10la
interfere with the other party's performance and not
to act so as to destroy the reasonable expectations of
the other party regarding the fruits of the contract.”).
When a contractor alleges bad faith, in order “to
overcome the presumption of good faith [on behalf of
the government], the proof must be almost
irrefragable.” Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v.
United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1323 n. 2 (Fed. Cir.
2003). Translated into more common parlance, “well
nigh irrefragable proof’ has been described as “clear
and convincing evidence.” Am-Pro Protective Agency,
Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1239-40 (Fed.
Cir. 2002). “In the cases where the court has
considered allegations of bad faith, the necessary
‘irrefragable proof has been equated with evidence of
some specific intent to injure the plaintiff.”
Torncello v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 20, 681 F.2d
756, 770 (1982) (emphasis in original); see also Galen
Med. Associates, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1324,
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Librach v. United States, 147
Ct. Cl. 605, 614 (1959); cf. Tecom, Inc. v. United
States, 66 Fed. Cl. 736, 757-72 (2005). Courts have
found bad faith when confronted by a course of
government conduct that was “designedly
oppressive,” Struck Const. Co. v. United States, 96 Ct.
Cl. 186, 222, 1942 WL 4411 (1942), or that “initiated
a conspiracy’ to “get rid” of a contractor, Knotts v.
United States, 128 —t. Cl. 489, 121 F.Supp. 630, 636
(1954). See also C. Sanchez & Son, Inc., 6 F.3d at
1542. As these cases illustrate, the “irrefragable
proof’ standard, though daunting, is not intended to
be impenetrable, that is, it does not “insulate
government action from any review by courts.” The
Libertatia Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl.
702, 707 (2000) (emphasis in original); see also L.P.
102a
Consulting Group, Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl.
238, 243 (2005); Manson Const. Co. v. United States,
64 Fed. Cl. 746, 753 n. 11 (2005).54
Perhaps sensing weaknesses in its case, defendant
attempts to fasten a layer of legal kevlar onto the
“bad faith” standard that truly would make it
impregnable. It contends, for example, that there can
be no bad faith unless it is shown that a breach of an
xpress contract provision has occurred. To be sure,
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
cannot be used to expand or override contractual
duties in the express contract. See, e.g., Bradley v.
Chiron Corp., 136 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Renda Marine, Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 639,
34 In Tecom, 66 Fed. Cl. at 771, this court held that “[t]he
presumption of good faith conduct of government officials has no
relevance” in considering “claims that the duties to cooperate
and not hinder performance of a contract have been breached.”
It further held that in such circumstances, proof of a violation
need not be by clear and convincing evidence. Jd. at 769. It is
unclear whether Tecom may be squared either with Federal
Circuit precedent or the jurisprudential underpinnings of the
doctrine, in which performing in good faith and bad faith are
often viewed as mutually exclusive. See, e.g., Richard A. Lord,
23 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:22 (4th ed. 2002) (“It is
axiomatic that before a court will consider a claim that the
implied duty of good faith has been violated, there must be some
factual basis for ... bad faith on the part of the defendant.”);
Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its
Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L.REV. 810, 819
(1982) (the “good faith” standard “functioned as an excluder to
rule out a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith”).
Whatever may be the larger fate of the Tecom approach, this
court finds it unnecessary to explore its application here for, as
will be seen, plaintiff prevails under even the more rigorous
standard, which requires a clear showing of animus.
1038a
648 (2005). But, it does not follow, a fortiori, that the
covenant must be deemed fulfilled unless the express
terms of the contract are breached. Rather, the
covenant may be breached if, in ways unenvisioned
by the contract, a party proceeds in a fashion
calculated to frustrate or hinder performance by its
contracting partner. Such was the holding in Centex
Corp., 395 F.3d at 1306, in which the Federal Circuit
found that the covenant could be violated by a
hindering action, provided the plaintiff was not
seeking “an expansion of the government's duties
under the contract or for a duty that is inconsistent
with some provision of the contract.”55 In other
words, the covenant may be breached if the contract
is enforced in a fashion designed to “interferfe] with
the plaintiffs' enjoyment of the benefits contemplated
by the contract, which is among the core functions
served by the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.” Centex Corp., 395 F.3d at 1306. Indeed, the
covenant perhaps plays its most crucial role where
one party under a contract exercises discretion in
favor of the other-“[t]he office of the doctrine of good
faith is to forbid the kinds of opportunistic behavior
that a mutually dependent, cooperative relationship
might enable in the absence of the rule.” Mkt. St.
35 See also United States v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 248
F.3d 781, 796 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1115 (2002)
(“[slince good faith is merely a way of effectuating the parties'
intent in unforseen circumstances, the implied covenant has
‘nothing to do with the enforcement of terms actually
negotiated”); Craig-Buff Ltd. P'ship v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl.
382, 388 (2006) (“a claim for a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is not limited to specific contract
terms’).
104a
Assocs., 941 F.2d at 595.36 To hold that, absent a
separate breach, the covenant is not violated would
be to deprive this imphed promise of any vitality in
the particular universe for which it was designed-
that of contract di
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