Opposition Brief — American Road & Transportation Builders Ass'n v. Environmental Protection Agency
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No. 09-1485 OFFICE OF THE Geet
$n He Supreme Court of the Cluited States
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BRIE FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSTTION
PARLE OF AUTHORTTII
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$n the Supreme Court of the Glnited States
Bhi POR THE bEDERAL Me SPONDENT
IN OPPOSTPION
OPINIONS BELOW
1 tie Opmion ob thie COUPL OF appeal (fet App Be 144)
reporled ab ev 4d LIO9%. The decision of the lanvi
MURISDICTION
Phe pudvment of the « UPL OL appeal Vas Entered on
becember LL. ZO09 petit On lor reheariny is denied
! barecl ZO1L0 (Vet F jt bia Phi petition tor
A] |
vritlol certiorari was filed on dune 5, ZO10. The pur)
STATEMENT
1. Section 215 of the Clean Air Act (CAA or Act), 42
USC. 7547, authorizes the linvironmental Protection
Agency (uPA) to promulpate emission standards for
“new nonroad enpines.” 42 USC. 7547063). The term
“nonroad enpines” describes a wide variety of mobile,
non-hiphway cnpines, including enpines used in tractor:
lawnmowers, construction equipment, and locomotive:
See 40 C.F LR. 85.1602 (2008); 40 CR. 89.1 (200%)"; see
yenerally Luge Mfrs. Ass'n ve. WPA, && Ie.38d L075
LO8O 1082 (1.0. Cir. 1996) (MA) (discussing 1990 CAA
amendments, which pave l¢PA authority over nonroad
engines)
section 209 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. 7545, preempt
Inany state reyulations pertaining to nonroad enpine:
tates may not adopt “any standard or other require
rraeeral relating to the control of emissions” from new loco
mollve Eenpines Or from new ot 2 Lae Of less than 175
horse powe! that are used in construction or tari quip
ment. 42 USC. 7543(e)01). The CAA establishes a dif
ferent preemption reyime for all other nonroad engine:
lub yect Lo iA approval, ¢ alifornia Hhaty adopt Ils OW
lundards for such enganes, 42 USC. 7545(e)(2)(A),
and other States may then adopt and enforce provi
lons 1dentical to Californmia’s as their own, 4Z U.S.C
(h45(e ZB). Tor any type of nonroad eninge, a state
regulation is not preempted if itis nota “standard” on
an “iiplementation and enforcement’ provision relating
everal of thu reyulation diseussed in thas bmel were recently ve
coded and pt ennew section number borconsistet cy with thie prior
proceeding in this Case, this brief will cite to the ZOO8 version of the
to the “control of emissions.” See 42 U.S.C. 7545(e):
I;MA, && FF Sd at 1094
2. In 1994, PA completed two rulemaking proceed
ings related to nonroad engine emissions. See Control
of Air Pollution; Determination of Sipnifteance for Non
road Sourees and Hmission Standards for New Nonroad
Compression-Ipnition fenygines At or Above 37 Kilo
watts, 59 led. Rep. 31,606 (1994); Air Pollution Control;
Preemption of State Regulation for Nonroad lengine and
Vehicle Standards, 59 led. Keg. 66,969 (1994); see also
AZ USC. 7547(a) Qpoverning PA rulemaking authority
for nonroad enpine emissions); 42 USC. 7545(e) (direct
Ing IPA to issue reyulations poverning preemption pro
visions). Pnone of the resulting rules, lf PA defined the
scope of the statutory term “new nonroad engines.” 42
USC. 7547(ays). Under EPA’s definition, engines are
considered “new” until they are either placed into ser
vice or sold to an ultimate purchaser. 40 CFR. &5_ 1602;
see 59 Fed. Rep. at 61,528 31,541 (explaining definition);
id. at 86,971-36,974. Tn addition, in rules that essentially
track the lanyvuape of the statute, EPA distinguished the
Lypes of “new” enpines for which States may never pro
mulpate “standard|s|or other requirement[s| relating to
the control of emissions” under 42 U.S.C. 75438(e)C1)
from those for which they may promulpate such require
ments i they adopt PA approved California rules un
der 42 USC. 2545(e)(2). See 40 CAR. &5.1608 85.1606;
see also 59 Fed. Rep. at 66,9%6-56,98%
MPA also adopted an interpretive rule, which was
readopted in 1997, stating in relevant part that:
MPA beheves that states are not precluded wnder
section 209 from regulating the use and operation
of nonroad enpines, such as reyulations on hours
of usage, daily mass emission limits, or sulfur tim
its on fuel; nor are permits repulating such opera
lions precluded, once the engine is no longer new.
59 ed. Reg. at 31,839 (now codified at 40 Cob LR. Pt. &9,
Subpt. A, App. A (2008)) (App. A); see Control of Air
Pollution: mission Standards For New Nonroad
Compression-lynition lenpgines At or Above 37 Kilo
watts; Preemption of State Repulation for Nonroad bon
vine and Vehicle Standards; Amendments to Rules,
62 ed. Key. 67,788 (1997). In HE PA’s view, such in-use
repulations are not “standard
s|or other requirements |
relating to the control of emissions” and therefore
are not subject to preemption under either 42 ULS.0
THASCO)A) or Th438(e)(2). The D.C. Cireuit: affirmed
PA's interpretation of the statutory provisions in rele
vant part. See WMA, 8&8 F.8d at 1095-1094.
$. On July 12, 2002, more than eight years after
MPA had issued these rules, petitioner asked the ayencey
lo commence a new rulemaking to amend or repeal
them. Radsinge a number of arguments that the DLC.
Circuit had previously rejected in “MA, see, eg, Pet
App. 66a, petitioner asked I;PA to preempt “state and
local requirements ‘that impose in-use and operational
controls or fleet-wide purchase, sale or use standards on
nonroad engines.” Td. at 22a.
ln March 2006, petitioner filed a petition for review
Inthe DOC. Cireuit, contending that le PA had either con
structively denied its rulemaking petition or had unrea
sonably delayed action on it. Peto App. Pb2a. EPA later
Phe interpretive rule oes on to state: “bPA beteves that state:
are precluded from requiring retrofitting: of used nonroad enpines ex
copl that states are permitted to adopt and enforce any such retroti
binge requirements identiealte California requirements which have been
authored by EPA under [42 USC W545," App A
announced its intention to prant or deny the petition in
the context of a larger rulemaking concerning nonroad
engines, See id. at 20a-2la. At the same time, EPA
made clear that it was “not proposing to adopt the es
plicit changes requested by [petitioner] in its petition.”
fd at 20a. The D.C. Circuit then dismissed petitioners
petition for review as moot. fd. at Lda.
After receiving: comments in response to petitioners
rulemakings request, PA denied it. Pet. App. 22a 87a,
S9a-YGla. First, the ayencey concluded that its “regula
lions as written are sufficient and need not be revised to
address speeitically” petitioner's arguments about state
preseriplion of “fleet? emissions. /d. at 23a; see id. at
26a ("{Wle do not believe any change in regulations is
necessary. ‘The current repulations preempt state ana
local standards related to the control of emissions from
nonroad engines. This peneral language would imelude
emission standards reyulating fleets as well as individ
ualenpines or equipment.”). Second, HPA rejected peti
lioner’s request that it preempt state regulations impos
Ing use and operational controls, stating that its prion
interpretation of the statute on this point, as affirmed by
the ILC. Cireuit, was correct. Jd. at 28a; see 7d. at 59a
S4dal EPA separately “reorpaniz[ed| the repulatory lan
yuage related to preemption of state standards” as part
of a larper effort “to write its repulations in plain lan
puage format.” dd. at SS8a-89a
1. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the court
ot appeals, Which dismussed the pel ition as time-barred
under Section 807(b)CL) of the CAA, 42 ULS.C. 7607(b)dC1)
(Supp. EL 2008). See Pet. App. la ia. The court es
plarmed that the Aet requires peurlon for review of any
“nationally applicable repulations: lo be broupthit within
60 days after their promulpation, unless the petition 1
based “solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth
day,” in which case it must be brought within 60 days
after the date on which those new grounds arose. Jd. at
hba-ba (quoting 42 U.S.C. 76070D)C1) GSupp. PL 2008)).
When a particular statute does not specifically ad
dress the circumstances under which newly-arising
events will provide a basis for judicial review, the 1
Circuit has found that “agency denial ofa petition for a
new rulemaking which complains of substantive infirm
lies in existing rules is, for the most part, judicially
reviewable irrespective of time limits dating from the
rules’ enactment.” Pet. App. 6a (emphasis omitted)
The court of appeals explained, however, that judicial
review provisions like the one in the CAA warrant dif
ferent treatment because they demonstrate that “Con
press has ‘specifically address[ed] the consequence:
of failure to brings a challenge within the statutory pe
riod.” 7d. at Za (quoting National Mining Ass ‘nv. Di
partment of the Intervor, 70 bk.8d 1645, 1850 (oC. Cir,
I995)). Accordingly, ander such a provision, review of
rules after the eXpiration of the original 60-day period L;
permitted only under the circumstances identified in the
statute. /do at 7a da. Phe court explamed that the CAA’
judiclal-review provision “imposes one additional con
traint on petitions brought outside the original 60-day
window based on afler-arising grounds: they must be
filed within 60 days of the new event, rather than any
lime afterate Ja at Sa
Petitioner contended that its pelillon Was Linney be
cause its Clams did not ripen until after the closing of
the oriinal 60 day window for review Pet App Dil
Mhe court of appeals held that, even assuming peti
Hioner’s Challenge was based on prounds that post-dated
the oripinal promulpation of the PA rules, the chal
lene was nevertheless untimely because petilloner had
identified no trippering event that had taken place dur
ny the 60 day: before the tiling of its pelitlions With el
ther the EPA or the court of appeal fd at 10a. The
court of appeals found it unnecessary to determine
whether a party that asserts a later-arisings prounad for
review bs required to file first with the EPA or with the
court ol appeal , Since petilbone rs challenve was un
timely under either approach. 7d. at lla
The court of appeals alse rejecu dl petitioner Con)
tention that EPA had “reopened® the rales it was chal
lenping and had thereby triggered a new 60-day period
for judicial review. Pet. App. lla-I3a. The court found
that MPA “pave no ‘indication that [it] had undertaken
a serious, substantive reconsideration — of the repula
Lions that petitioner challenged. Jd. at 15a. Instead
KPA had effectively sought comment on whether 1
should rPeapen the reyulations and had Vitimately de
cided not to do so. Lhid
') Petitioner’ request for rehearing en bane wa
denied, with no member of the court of appedat request
nvavote Let App iia
ARGUMENT
The court of appeal correctly held that it lacked
jumsdiction to consider petitioner's challenge to ke PA
1994 rules because MPA had not reapened if earhies
rules boo pur lal review and Ppeluiblonet had identified no
new “prounds [for review] arisinge within the 60 day
preceding petitioner tiling L'hye COULT (it Is1on doe
not conthet with any decision of this Court or any othes
court of appeal Purther review Is not warranted
| Petitione) Conte hal that the court of appr al beac
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jurisdiction to review its claim because fy PAts “re prom
Ulgat{ion|> of its “entire et of preemption rales re
Opened every il pect of tho erule Lo rere wed Challenp
Pet. 14, 25-28. That tactbound contention lacks merit
and raises no lepalissue of recurring importance
Linder the b).¢ Circuit's “well established Peopn
Inge doctrine, When an agency pro eeding “expli Itty on
i! iplicithy SHOW that the ap Crit. 4 aclua l\ recA dere (]
a previous rule, “the matter has been reopened and the
time period for seeking judicial review bepits anew
National Ass'n of Reverstonary Prop. Ovoners vo. Su
Fite Pransp Hbd., 1DOS F.8d 1385, 141 ()).( 51 Wipe
(NAREO). When the agency has “opened the issue up
anew, Its renewed adherence [to the ruled}. uit)
ctantively reviewable. /bid (Quoting Puhlic ( [ er %
NRC, 901 F.2d 147, 150 (D.C. Cn cert. denied, 49%
US. 992 (1990) fn order “[tlo determine whether at
BreneyY PeCONSIG red a pres ously decided matter, thu
Crigypreriny the reopet Ll] yr doctrine a court ‘must look to
the entire Context of the rulemaking including all rele
Vall proposal and reaction Ol thie avency /
(quoting Publee Citizen, VOL F.2d at 150)
bnthis case, the court of appeais exam qd “the e
La context of the rulemaking and correctly conclude
that “KPA dha not ri Open Con kKderation of the regula
Lions ~petitioner} asked il to review 1’ \pp
(quoting NARPO., Vos F.5d at 141); se Pat lla-loa
In the notice of pr d rulemaking, EPA expla
Chat dt Was Prapostl lc Ut rer its preel i}
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pore Cun publi hed) order grantings ib, raise no bosiv
Ohyoeneral importance warrantings this Court revi
Melitioner also conbend (}7e-f 16, 255) that thie
court ol appeal had jurisdiction over its petition tot
review because the paebilion Was filed Within GO day ul
ber PA denied the rulemaking petition. Tn petitioner
(he only appleable deaddine was triggered by
VA: deetoionin this ease, and aitas therefore irrelevani
under 42 | ( (GOd CL) Cotupyp 1] ZOO%) when any
(timer mney round lay things arose The court of ay)
peak correctly repected that contention, and its raling
(dest not contineh With decision of other court 7 ap)
peal or pror decisions of the IC. Cireuat
thite Court rr als @ plained the Jo Coircist
preeedent: poenerally allow a party to tile a petition with
cab caver ra lore. cing Or amend an ex bingy rude on til)
lantive prounmds and then seek pudienal review ab that
pelitton denied. Pet App Ga The court further ob
ryedd. tiowe (*} tical TT IY puchicacal re IW pProvVvis lon
pectheally identify the careams tances under which chal
bebagee to rules may be brought afler the oriyinal
judicial review period has expired. Jd at 7a Hf Coon
an directly locused on the issue lhe Courl «
Plamied, “pucieiail review of a pelition to repeal or revise
rile bo titne barred, « Cepl lo the catent that the stat
ite alle review based on later arisungs pround fhid
L hye ieiabreview provision at issue in this case
bes thata petition for review must be filed “within
j that , {ve shvee thie spol ,
thio 1 iether aa Clit of torn otiable delay ft b1A
1] ! ht the dp triet Court or mi the Court Of appre Jet
| i boo nderitaly aa c} | Jnanyevent tl
i! ! Chiuche lor re fignicool thits ii pices Ubu
iven assuming that petitioner's challenge to the
1994 rules was based “solely on prounds” arising after
expiration of the oripinal GO day period, that challenge
Was untimely. Pet. App. lOa. Petitioner contended be
low that the later arising “prounds” were the ripenimy
ofits clamas, butat did not assert (et alone demonstrate)
that the elanns became ripe within the 60-day period
before either the filing of its petition with ICPA or the
filing of its. petition for review with the court of appeals.
lhid) Accordingly, petitioner did not satisty the CAA’s
requirements for asserting newly-arising Challenges to
longstanding rules, and its petition for review was prop
erly dismissed as untimely.
Petitioner contends that parties with clams that
ripen after expiration of the oripinal period for review
must file administrative petitions with the IPA and can
not proceed directly to the eourt of appeals. Pet. 14-19,
ZO 21. ‘This question is not presented here because the
court of appeals found it unnecessary to decide it. Pet
App dla. iven assuming petitioner is correct that it
was required to file first with the PA, its administra
live petition was untimely because it was not filed within
60 days after the ripening of its elas. Jd) at 1Oa-dla.
Petitioner arpues that “settled law” from the DLC.
(orcuit provides thatats administrative petition need not
have been filed within 60 days of the late-arisiny
‘yrounds” for challenpe, Pet. 19-20, but the decisions i
cites are inapposite. Petitioner states that “Navajo
Tribe held the Pribe could petition lk PA years after it:
‘newonformation arose” Pet. 19 Cening Oljato Chapter
of the Navajo Tribe vo Tram, 515 bk .2d 654 CDC. Cir.
L975) (Nava Tribe)). When Navajo Tribe was decided
however, the CAA did not require petitions based on
later arian prounds to be tiled within GO days after
}f,
be made “within sixty days after such prounds arose.”
AZ NS. T6070) Supp. 1 2008) (emphasis added).
Petitioner does not appear to contend that the MPA de
cron itselfas a “pround| | arising’ after the orivinal 60
day window. See Pet. App. 10a (denial of petition to re
send rules “doesn’t count? as later-arising: pround).
Instead, it points to “disparate locomotive rules, market
participant rules, bleet Rules” and “In-Use Controls”
(Pet. 20), but it makes no attempt to demonstrate that
Hs administrative petition was filed within 60 days of the
date on which those prounds arose
Adopting petitioner's view of the statute would sub
vert Congress's intent that judicial review under the Act
be “strictly limathed?? by the statutory deadlines. 1977
House Report $22. Under petitioner's reading, a party
With anew “yround” for challenging a longstanding rule
could wait for years after that ground arose before filing
an administrative petition with the WPA on that basis,
and could then secure judicial review of the rule simply
by filing suit within 60 days after its rulemaking petition
was dened
‘Phe court of appeals’ interpretation of Section
(6070 )01) does not confliet with decisions of other
courts of appeals or with prior decisions of the D.C. Cir
eit. Petitioner contends that the decision is contrary to
a decision of the Kaghth Cireuit (/incvon Klee. Co. y.
WPA, OVS F.2d 206, 220 11975)) that requires petitioner:
With date-arising grounds for challenging an old rule to
fle an administrative petition before seeking relief in
eourt. Pet. 25; see wbad. (| Mjost other circuits have
also recopmized the petition reopener process under
5 807). As explained above, however, the court of
appeals in this case did not decide whether parties with
late arising grounds for challenging longstanding rule:
if,
riay file cuit immediately or must first present their
Clamms to the apeney. Rather, the court declined to re
Olve that question because pelillroner had failed to iden
Lily Alby Lrippermyp event lor if Chicable BE Ld Lhicat hed ()¢
curred during the GO day period preceding either peti
lioner’s administrative petition or its petition for review
Inthe DC. Cireuit. See Pet. App. Ga lla
hor similar reason pelilioner is Wronp th aryuiny
(Pet. $0-32) that the decision below conthets with the
1) ¢ Coireuat: prior ruling? in Navazyo Tribe Petitioner
bial (Pet. 30) that, “[ujnder Navajo Leribe anyone
ecking judicial review outside [Section T6070DjIC1)'s] 60
day window must present them information or clits to
PA by administrative petition, seeking judicial review
only after EPA demies the petition * Tn this case, the
court ol cipopot itl acknowledped Uhicat peneral PUI, While
leaving open the question whether an exception might
apply when the late-arising “pround’ is the ripening of
a Cladin See Pet App Ya-lla Moreover, a noted
above, pp. 15-14, supra, the court in Navajo Tribe ad
(ire ed an earher version of the Act: judicial PreVvIewW
prove bot) which did nol re (quire thal Challenge: byzas ed
on date-arising grounds “be filed within sixty days atter
such prounds arise.” Compare Navajo Tribe, 515 b2d
at 657 n.3, with 42 U.S. T6071) C pop I} 2OOS)
Ldvcat post Navajo Tribe Littibhige provision Was the lineh
pin of the court of appeals’ analysis in this case
In any eve rill there as no need for this Court to police
the PLC. Cireuit’s internal procedures for reconciling
asserted conflicts between pane! decisions. Phat court
i. fully capable of resolvings any such disapreement
through on hance consideration See Wisnieiwske \
U/nited States, 353 US. 901, 902 (1957) Cltis primarily
the task of a Court ol Appeal to reconeile its internal
a
ditficulties.”). dn this case, pebrlioner : oupht en bane
review ol the panel deck bork, bit Iho yudypre rPeque; tea a
volte ou the petition for rehearimg. See Pet. App. Uda
1 Petitioner contends that, even if the court of ap
peals did not have jurisdiction over his petition for re
view under 42 USC. 760701) CSupp. TE 2008), 1 had
jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 USC. 16510)
Pet. 24-25. Petitioner failed to preserve that arpument
below, andat laeks merit in any event
a. Other than one unexplamed Statement in its Open
Inge bret, see Pet. © A. Bro 1 CPhis Court ha: puri dic
lion pursuant to Clean Air Act §& 307001), 42 USO
TOO7(D)O1), as well as the All Writs Act, 28 USC
16542), petitioner did not rely on the All Writs Act
below. Phe court of appeal: did not discuss the statute.
The peuilron fora writ of certiorart therelore does not
properly present this question. See howakim v. Aliller,
5 US. 251, 264 (1976) (per curiam) (Tt is only in ex
ceptional cases Comipy here from the federal courts that
questions nol pressed Or passed tpor below are re
viewed.) Ceitation omitted)
bo Petitioner's invocation of the All Writs Act lack
mertinany event. Petitioner contends that the statute
could be used to compel lPA to provide “defhinitive an
Vers Lo [petitioner's | substantive question: ” Pet. 24
‘The All Writs Act does not create ain such cause of ac
tion. Rather, it provides that federal court: may Issue
relied that a: appropriate to the case before it, “contin
pent on that court's subypect matter jurisdiction over the
ease.” United States v. Denedo, 129 8. Ct. 22138, 2221
(POO)
Hlere, the scope of the court of uppeak ‘Ssubyject-miat
ber jurisdiction to review EPA actions is defined by 42
UES 0 Z6070IOL) CStuppp. PE 2008S). Where Conpress hia
pected the prerequisites for jgudietil review as toa
particular category of cases, courts respect that choice
rather than a ine Dbroadel POWEOr: of review under
another statute. See Califano ve Sande. 180 US. 99
IOS C1977): Whithey Nato Bank ve bank of New Orlean:
& Trust Co, 3879 US. 411, 422 (1965). The CAA’s prant
Of yur} diction is therefore exclusive, and pebuilboner I
not entitled to review except in accordance with it
bern
CONCLUSEON
The pebitlon lorawril ol ee rhiorarl howuld bye denied
he per tlully submitted
NEAL KUMAK I VAI
i fay hey Creve
(| Moke )
| ant Attorney G
Ati r?’OLO
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