Opposition Brief — American Road & Transportation Builders Ass'n v. Environmental Protection Agency

Supreme Court brief2010

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

oupreme Coun Us q

te ’ Ff j

C if

\ol > (DY AUG 6 ~ 2010

No. 09-1485 OFFICE OF THE Geet

$n He Supreme Court of the Cluited States

YMERICAN ROAD & ‘TI PORT LON | I |

\ { it) ra tet bap ht

( [oN‘ 1’ | ON A ‘

/ / ) / \4 y}

/ am | / } () )

/ } (

BRIE FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT

IN OPPOSTTION

PARLE OF AUTHORTTII

f f j ' ;'7 if;

| a Iiy j | a 10, 1) {

|

Ol Ice { wari 274 / {) fit

1) ). FIG. 3 | pA, U.ar. Lys

I / Lj; fis L thie frutes j

} 1) ¢ { j hy be ( 14

() ( ( l} frif / Ya

{ { { j ti Fe

/ $C, YOL T MCDA. 4

1‘) } e pa)

/ f {/ | yf { } wd |

Loenecd PAL , A Ny)

f j Mea / {j (‘tly bru

f if

|

/ / i) if

$n the Supreme Court of the Glnited States

Bhi POR THE bEDERAL Me SPONDENT

IN OPPOSTPION

OPINIONS BELOW

1 tie Opmion ob thie COUPL OF appeal (fet App Be 144)

reporled ab ev 4d LIO9%. The decision of the lanvi

MURISDICTION

Phe pudvment of the « UPL OL appeal Vas Entered on

becember LL. ZO09 petit On lor reheariny is denied

! barecl ZO1L0 (Vet F jt bia Phi petition tor

A] |

vritlol certiorari was filed on dune 5, ZO10. The pur)

STATEMENT

1. Section 215 of the Clean Air Act (CAA or Act), 42

USC. 7547, authorizes the linvironmental Protection

Agency (uPA) to promulpate emission standards for

“new nonroad enpines.” 42 USC. 7547063). The term

“nonroad enpines” describes a wide variety of mobile,

non-hiphway cnpines, including enpines used in tractor:

lawnmowers, construction equipment, and locomotive:

See 40 C.F LR. 85.1602 (2008); 40 CR. 89.1 (200%)"; see

yenerally Luge Mfrs. Ass'n ve. WPA, && Ie.38d L075

LO8O 1082 (1.0. Cir. 1996) (MA) (discussing 1990 CAA

amendments, which pave l¢PA authority over nonroad

engines)

section 209 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. 7545, preempt

Inany state reyulations pertaining to nonroad enpine:

tates may not adopt “any standard or other require

rraeeral relating to the control of emissions” from new loco

mollve Eenpines Or from new ot 2 Lae Of less than 175

horse powe! that are used in construction or tari quip

ment. 42 USC. 7543(e)01). The CAA establishes a dif

ferent preemption reyime for all other nonroad engine:

lub yect Lo iA approval, ¢ alifornia Hhaty adopt Ils OW

lundards for such enganes, 42 USC. 7545(e)(2)(A),

and other States may then adopt and enforce provi

lons 1dentical to Californmia’s as their own, 4Z U.S.C

(h45(e ZB). Tor any type of nonroad eninge, a state

regulation is not preempted if itis nota “standard” on

an “iiplementation and enforcement’ provision relating

everal of thu reyulation diseussed in thas bmel were recently ve

coded and pt ennew section number borconsistet cy with thie prior

proceeding in this Case, this brief will cite to the ZOO8 version of the

to the “control of emissions.” See 42 U.S.C. 7545(e):

I;MA, && FF Sd at 1094

2. In 1994, PA completed two rulemaking proceed

ings related to nonroad engine emissions. See Control

of Air Pollution; Determination of Sipnifteance for Non

road Sourees and Hmission Standards for New Nonroad

Compression-Ipnition fenygines At or Above 37 Kilo

watts, 59 led. Rep. 31,606 (1994); Air Pollution Control;

Preemption of State Regulation for Nonroad lengine and

Vehicle Standards, 59 led. Keg. 66,969 (1994); see also

AZ USC. 7547(a) Qpoverning PA rulemaking authority

for nonroad enpine emissions); 42 USC. 7545(e) (direct

Ing IPA to issue reyulations poverning preemption pro

visions). Pnone of the resulting rules, lf PA defined the

scope of the statutory term “new nonroad engines.” 42

USC. 7547(ays). Under EPA’s definition, engines are

considered “new” until they are either placed into ser

vice or sold to an ultimate purchaser. 40 CFR. &5_ 1602;

see 59 Fed. Rep. at 61,528 31,541 (explaining definition);

id. at 86,971-36,974. Tn addition, in rules that essentially

track the lanyvuape of the statute, EPA distinguished the

Lypes of “new” enpines for which States may never pro

mulpate “standard|s|or other requirement[s| relating to

the control of emissions” under 42 U.S.C. 75438(e)C1)

from those for which they may promulpate such require

ments i they adopt PA approved California rules un

der 42 USC. 2545(e)(2). See 40 CAR. &5.1608 85.1606;

see also 59 Fed. Rep. at 66,9%6-56,98%

MPA also adopted an interpretive rule, which was

readopted in 1997, stating in relevant part that:

MPA beheves that states are not precluded wnder

section 209 from regulating the use and operation

of nonroad enpines, such as reyulations on hours

of usage, daily mass emission limits, or sulfur tim

its on fuel; nor are permits repulating such opera

lions precluded, once the engine is no longer new.

59 ed. Reg. at 31,839 (now codified at 40 Cob LR. Pt. &9,

Subpt. A, App. A (2008)) (App. A); see Control of Air

Pollution: mission Standards For New Nonroad

Compression-lynition lenpgines At or Above 37 Kilo

watts; Preemption of State Repulation for Nonroad bon

vine and Vehicle Standards; Amendments to Rules,

62 ed. Key. 67,788 (1997). In HE PA’s view, such in-use

repulations are not “standard

s|or other requirements |

relating to the control of emissions” and therefore

are not subject to preemption under either 42 ULS.0

THASCO)A) or Th438(e)(2). The D.C. Cireuit: affirmed

PA's interpretation of the statutory provisions in rele

vant part. See WMA, 8&8 F.8d at 1095-1094.

$. On July 12, 2002, more than eight years after

MPA had issued these rules, petitioner asked the ayencey

lo commence a new rulemaking to amend or repeal

them. Radsinge a number of arguments that the DLC.

Circuit had previously rejected in “MA, see, eg, Pet

App. 66a, petitioner asked I;PA to preempt “state and

local requirements ‘that impose in-use and operational

controls or fleet-wide purchase, sale or use standards on

nonroad engines.” Td. at 22a.

ln March 2006, petitioner filed a petition for review

Inthe DOC. Cireuit, contending that le PA had either con

structively denied its rulemaking petition or had unrea

sonably delayed action on it. Peto App. Pb2a. EPA later

Phe interpretive rule oes on to state: “bPA beteves that state:

are precluded from requiring retrofitting: of used nonroad enpines ex

copl that states are permitted to adopt and enforce any such retroti

binge requirements identiealte California requirements which have been

authored by EPA under [42 USC W545," App A

announced its intention to prant or deny the petition in

the context of a larger rulemaking concerning nonroad

engines, See id. at 20a-2la. At the same time, EPA

made clear that it was “not proposing to adopt the es

plicit changes requested by [petitioner] in its petition.”

fd at 20a. The D.C. Circuit then dismissed petitioners

petition for review as moot. fd. at Lda.

After receiving: comments in response to petitioners

rulemakings request, PA denied it. Pet. App. 22a 87a,

S9a-YGla. First, the ayencey concluded that its “regula

lions as written are sufficient and need not be revised to

address speeitically” petitioner's arguments about state

preseriplion of “fleet? emissions. /d. at 23a; see id. at

26a ("{Wle do not believe any change in regulations is

necessary. ‘The current repulations preempt state ana

local standards related to the control of emissions from

nonroad engines. This peneral language would imelude

emission standards reyulating fleets as well as individ

ualenpines or equipment.”). Second, HPA rejected peti

lioner’s request that it preempt state regulations impos

Ing use and operational controls, stating that its prion

interpretation of the statute on this point, as affirmed by

the ILC. Cireuit, was correct. Jd. at 28a; see 7d. at 59a

S4dal EPA separately “reorpaniz[ed| the repulatory lan

yuage related to preemption of state standards” as part

of a larper effort “to write its repulations in plain lan

puage format.” dd. at SS8a-89a

1. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the court

ot appeals, Which dismussed the pel ition as time-barred

under Section 807(b)CL) of the CAA, 42 ULS.C. 7607(b)dC1)

(Supp. EL 2008). See Pet. App. la ia. The court es

plarmed that the Aet requires peurlon for review of any

“nationally applicable repulations: lo be broupthit within

60 days after their promulpation, unless the petition 1

based “solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth

day,” in which case it must be brought within 60 days

after the date on which those new grounds arose. Jd. at

hba-ba (quoting 42 U.S.C. 76070D)C1) GSupp. PL 2008)).

When a particular statute does not specifically ad

dress the circumstances under which newly-arising

events will provide a basis for judicial review, the 1

Circuit has found that “agency denial ofa petition for a

new rulemaking which complains of substantive infirm

lies in existing rules is, for the most part, judicially

reviewable irrespective of time limits dating from the

rules’ enactment.” Pet. App. 6a (emphasis omitted)

The court of appeals explained, however, that judicial

review provisions like the one in the CAA warrant dif

ferent treatment because they demonstrate that “Con

press has ‘specifically address[ed] the consequence:

of failure to brings a challenge within the statutory pe

riod.” 7d. at Za (quoting National Mining Ass ‘nv. Di

partment of the Intervor, 70 bk.8d 1645, 1850 (oC. Cir,

I995)). Accordingly, ander such a provision, review of

rules after the eXpiration of the original 60-day period L;

permitted only under the circumstances identified in the

statute. /do at 7a da. Phe court explamed that the CAA’

judiclal-review provision “imposes one additional con

traint on petitions brought outside the original 60-day

window based on afler-arising grounds: they must be

filed within 60 days of the new event, rather than any

lime afterate Ja at Sa

Petitioner contended that its pelillon Was Linney be

cause its Clams did not ripen until after the closing of

the oriinal 60 day window for review Pet App Dil

Mhe court of appeals held that, even assuming peti

Hioner’s Challenge was based on prounds that post-dated

the oripinal promulpation of the PA rules, the chal

lene was nevertheless untimely because petilloner had

identified no trippering event that had taken place dur

ny the 60 day: before the tiling of its pelitlions With el

ther the EPA or the court of appeal fd at 10a. The

court of appeals found it unnecessary to determine

whether a party that asserts a later-arisings prounad for

review bs required to file first with the EPA or with the

court ol appeal , Since petilbone rs challenve was un

timely under either approach. 7d. at lla

The court of appeals alse rejecu dl petitioner Con)

tention that EPA had “reopened® the rales it was chal

lenping and had thereby triggered a new 60-day period

for judicial review. Pet. App. lla-I3a. The court found

that MPA “pave no ‘indication that [it] had undertaken

a serious, substantive reconsideration — of the repula

Lions that petitioner challenged. Jd. at 15a. Instead

KPA had effectively sought comment on whether 1

should rPeapen the reyulations and had Vitimately de

cided not to do so. Lhid

') Petitioner’ request for rehearing en bane wa

denied, with no member of the court of appedat request

nvavote Let App iia

ARGUMENT

The court of appeal correctly held that it lacked

jumsdiction to consider petitioner's challenge to ke PA

1994 rules because MPA had not reapened if earhies

rules boo pur lal review and Ppeluiblonet had identified no

new “prounds [for review] arisinge within the 60 day

preceding petitioner tiling L'hye COULT (it Is1on doe

not conthet with any decision of this Court or any othes

court of appeal Purther review Is not warranted

| Petitione) Conte hal that the court of appr al beac

|}

|

jurisdiction to review its claim because fy PAts “re prom

Ulgat{ion|> of its “entire et of preemption rales re

Opened every il pect of tho erule Lo rere wed Challenp

Pet. 14, 25-28. That tactbound contention lacks merit

and raises no lepalissue of recurring importance

Linder the b).¢ Circuit's “well established Peopn

Inge doctrine, When an agency pro eeding “expli Itty on

i! iplicithy SHOW that the ap Crit. 4 aclua l\ recA dere (]

a previous rule, “the matter has been reopened and the

time period for seeking judicial review bepits anew

National Ass'n of Reverstonary Prop. Ovoners vo. Su

Fite Pransp Hbd., 1DOS F.8d 1385, 141 ()).( 51 Wipe

(NAREO). When the agency has “opened the issue up

anew, Its renewed adherence [to the ruled}. uit)

ctantively reviewable. /bid (Quoting Puhlic ( [ er %

NRC, 901 F.2d 147, 150 (D.C. Cn cert. denied, 49%

US. 992 (1990) fn order “[tlo determine whether at

BreneyY PeCONSIG red a pres ously decided matter, thu

Crigypreriny the reopet Ll] yr doctrine a court ‘must look to

the entire Context of the rulemaking including all rele

Vall proposal and reaction Ol thie avency /

(quoting Publee Citizen, VOL F.2d at 150)

bnthis case, the court of appeais exam qd “the e

La context of the rulemaking and correctly conclude

that “KPA dha not ri Open Con kKderation of the regula

Lions ~petitioner} asked il to review 1’ \pp

(quoting NARPO., Vos F.5d at 141); se Pat lla-loa

In the notice of pr d rulemaking, EPA expla

Chat dt Was Prapostl lc Ut rer its preel i}

mms ft tL new Ve 1 Cte de ot | lel ae {

Mad Ut iI potit \ Chichi IS pel IEPA I AY? CLIO

rite al reprulatl prdia bein | ‘ / { 1%) L |

ency stressed t [Uyhe proposedk re Vere

[ Od GIreeLiyV ! ( i! 4 1 | | \ ae

h tt pot thi hicatior

hy OA ti)f I ‘Way j Lif | I

| ed| feedback from | petit |

; { ' ? ; ' ; ; ’

ys it i , \ I i }

I | { rriy { [

| { t (Tid) i \ { ‘ I l {

I I ingl I] t I

t! Lh

| | | ( t { I I }

t 1 de 1 T} ] | | ae } | (

’ t ? ;

‘ !

f {

| P

\ ‘4 ,

{ | 4 ) , ' ' ,

t i } ‘

! i rice { [ | [

1 |

pore Cun publi hed) order grantings ib, raise no bosiv

Ohyoeneral importance warrantings this Court revi

Melitioner also conbend (}7e-f 16, 255) that thie

court ol appeal had jurisdiction over its petition tot

review because the paebilion Was filed Within GO day ul

ber PA denied the rulemaking petition. Tn petitioner

(he only appleable deaddine was triggered by

VA: deetoionin this ease, and aitas therefore irrelevani

under 42 | ( (GOd CL) Cotupyp 1] ZOO%) when any

(timer mney round lay things arose The court of ay)

peak correctly repected that contention, and its raling

(dest not contineh With decision of other court 7 ap)

peal or pror decisions of the IC. Cireuat

thite Court rr als @ plained the Jo Coircist

preeedent: poenerally allow a party to tile a petition with

cab caver ra lore. cing Or amend an ex bingy rude on til)

lantive prounmds and then seek pudienal review ab that

pelitton denied. Pet App Ga The court further ob

ryedd. tiowe (*} tical TT IY puchicacal re IW pProvVvis lon

pectheally identify the careams tances under which chal

bebagee to rules may be brought afler the oriyinal

judicial review period has expired. Jd at 7a Hf Coon

an directly locused on the issue lhe Courl «

Plamied, “pucieiail review of a pelition to repeal or revise

rile bo titne barred, « Cepl lo the catent that the stat

ite alle review based on later arisungs pround fhid

L hye ieiabreview provision at issue in this case

bes thata petition for review must be filed “within

j that , {ve shvee thie spol ,

thio 1 iether aa Clit of torn otiable delay ft b1A

1] ! ht the dp triet Court or mi the Court Of appre Jet

| i boo nderitaly aa c} | Jnanyevent tl

i! ! Chiuche lor re fignicool thits ii pices Ubu

iven assuming that petitioner's challenge to the

1994 rules was based “solely on prounds” arising after

expiration of the oripinal GO day period, that challenge

Was untimely. Pet. App. lOa. Petitioner contended be

low that the later arising “prounds” were the ripenimy

ofits clamas, butat did not assert (et alone demonstrate)

that the elanns became ripe within the 60-day period

before either the filing of its petition with ICPA or the

filing of its. petition for review with the court of appeals.

lhid) Accordingly, petitioner did not satisty the CAA’s

requirements for asserting newly-arising Challenges to

longstanding rules, and its petition for review was prop

erly dismissed as untimely.

Petitioner contends that parties with clams that

ripen after expiration of the oripinal period for review

must file administrative petitions with the IPA and can

not proceed directly to the eourt of appeals. Pet. 14-19,

ZO 21. ‘This question is not presented here because the

court of appeals found it unnecessary to decide it. Pet

App dla. iven assuming petitioner is correct that it

was required to file first with the PA, its administra

live petition was untimely because it was not filed within

60 days after the ripening of its elas. Jd) at 1Oa-dla.

Petitioner arpues that “settled law” from the DLC.

(orcuit provides thatats administrative petition need not

have been filed within 60 days of the late-arisiny

‘yrounds” for challenpe, Pet. 19-20, but the decisions i

cites are inapposite. Petitioner states that “Navajo

Tribe held the Pribe could petition lk PA years after it:

‘newonformation arose” Pet. 19 Cening Oljato Chapter

of the Navajo Tribe vo Tram, 515 bk .2d 654 CDC. Cir.

L975) (Nava Tribe)). When Navajo Tribe was decided

however, the CAA did not require petitions based on

later arian prounds to be tiled within GO days after

}f,

be made “within sixty days after such prounds arose.”

AZ NS. T6070) Supp. 1 2008) (emphasis added).

Petitioner does not appear to contend that the MPA de

cron itselfas a “pround| | arising’ after the orivinal 60

day window. See Pet. App. 10a (denial of petition to re

send rules “doesn’t count? as later-arising: pround).

Instead, it points to “disparate locomotive rules, market

participant rules, bleet Rules” and “In-Use Controls”

(Pet. 20), but it makes no attempt to demonstrate that

Hs administrative petition was filed within 60 days of the

date on which those prounds arose

Adopting petitioner's view of the statute would sub

vert Congress's intent that judicial review under the Act

be “strictly limathed?? by the statutory deadlines. 1977

House Report $22. Under petitioner's reading, a party

With anew “yround” for challenging a longstanding rule

could wait for years after that ground arose before filing

an administrative petition with the WPA on that basis,

and could then secure judicial review of the rule simply

by filing suit within 60 days after its rulemaking petition

was dened

‘Phe court of appeals’ interpretation of Section

(6070 )01) does not confliet with decisions of other

courts of appeals or with prior decisions of the D.C. Cir

eit. Petitioner contends that the decision is contrary to

a decision of the Kaghth Cireuit (/incvon Klee. Co. y.

WPA, OVS F.2d 206, 220 11975)) that requires petitioner:

With date-arising grounds for challenging an old rule to

fle an administrative petition before seeking relief in

eourt. Pet. 25; see wbad. (| Mjost other circuits have

also recopmized the petition reopener process under

5 807). As explained above, however, the court of

appeals in this case did not decide whether parties with

late arising grounds for challenging longstanding rule:

if,

riay file cuit immediately or must first present their

Clamms to the apeney. Rather, the court declined to re

Olve that question because pelillroner had failed to iden

Lily Alby Lrippermyp event lor if Chicable BE Ld Lhicat hed ()¢

curred during the GO day period preceding either peti

lioner’s administrative petition or its petition for review

Inthe DC. Cireuit. See Pet. App. Ga lla

hor similar reason pelilioner is Wronp th aryuiny

(Pet. $0-32) that the decision below conthets with the

1) ¢ Coireuat: prior ruling? in Navazyo Tribe Petitioner

bial (Pet. 30) that, “[ujnder Navajo Leribe anyone

ecking judicial review outside [Section T6070DjIC1)'s] 60

day window must present them information or clits to

PA by administrative petition, seeking judicial review

only after EPA demies the petition * Tn this case, the

court ol cipopot itl acknowledped Uhicat peneral PUI, While

leaving open the question whether an exception might

apply when the late-arising “pround’ is the ripening of

a Cladin See Pet App Ya-lla Moreover, a noted

above, pp. 15-14, supra, the court in Navajo Tribe ad

(ire ed an earher version of the Act: judicial PreVvIewW

prove bot) which did nol re (quire thal Challenge: byzas ed

on date-arising grounds “be filed within sixty days atter

such prounds arise.” Compare Navajo Tribe, 515 b2d

at 657 n.3, with 42 U.S. T6071) C pop I} 2OOS)

Ldvcat post Navajo Tribe Littibhige provision Was the lineh

pin of the court of appeals’ analysis in this case

In any eve rill there as no need for this Court to police

the PLC. Cireuit’s internal procedures for reconciling

asserted conflicts between pane! decisions. Phat court

i. fully capable of resolvings any such disapreement

through on hance consideration See Wisnieiwske \

U/nited States, 353 US. 901, 902 (1957) Cltis primarily

the task of a Court ol Appeal to reconeile its internal

a

ditficulties.”). dn this case, pebrlioner : oupht en bane

review ol the panel deck bork, bit Iho yudypre rPeque; tea a

volte ou the petition for rehearimg. See Pet. App. Uda

1 Petitioner contends that, even if the court of ap

peals did not have jurisdiction over his petition for re

view under 42 USC. 760701) CSupp. TE 2008), 1 had

jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 USC. 16510)

Pet. 24-25. Petitioner failed to preserve that arpument

below, andat laeks merit in any event

a. Other than one unexplamed Statement in its Open

Inge bret, see Pet. © A. Bro 1 CPhis Court ha: puri dic

lion pursuant to Clean Air Act §& 307001), 42 USO

TOO7(D)O1), as well as the All Writs Act, 28 USC

16542), petitioner did not rely on the All Writs Act

below. Phe court of appeal: did not discuss the statute.

The peuilron fora writ of certiorart therelore does not

properly present this question. See howakim v. Aliller,

5 US. 251, 264 (1976) (per curiam) (Tt is only in ex

ceptional cases Comipy here from the federal courts that

questions nol pressed Or passed tpor below are re

viewed.) Ceitation omitted)

bo Petitioner's invocation of the All Writs Act lack

mertinany event. Petitioner contends that the statute

could be used to compel lPA to provide “defhinitive an

Vers Lo [petitioner's | substantive question: ” Pet. 24

‘The All Writs Act does not create ain such cause of ac

tion. Rather, it provides that federal court: may Issue

relied that a: appropriate to the case before it, “contin

pent on that court's subypect matter jurisdiction over the

ease.” United States v. Denedo, 129 8. Ct. 22138, 2221

(POO)

Hlere, the scope of the court of uppeak ‘Ssubyject-miat

ber jurisdiction to review EPA actions is defined by 42

UES 0 Z6070IOL) CStuppp. PE 2008S). Where Conpress hia

pected the prerequisites for jgudietil review as toa

particular category of cases, courts respect that choice

rather than a ine Dbroadel POWEOr: of review under

another statute. See Califano ve Sande. 180 US. 99

IOS C1977): Whithey Nato Bank ve bank of New Orlean:

& Trust Co, 3879 US. 411, 422 (1965). The CAA’s prant

Of yur} diction is therefore exclusive, and pebuilboner I

not entitled to review except in accordance with it

bern

CONCLUSEON

The pebitlon lorawril ol ee rhiorarl howuld bye denied

he per tlully submitted

NEAL KUMAK I VAI

i fay hey Creve

(| Moke )

| ant Attorney G

Ati r?’OLO

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.