Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lahr v. National Transportation Safety Board

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

sone 991283 APR 21-2010

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Su The

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

H. RAY LAHR,

Petitioner,

V.

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY BOARD, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

PETITION FORA WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JOHN H. CLARKE

Counsel of Record

1629 K Street, NW

Suite 300

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 332-3030

johnhclarke@earthlink.net

Attorney for Petitioner

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 225 6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

:.

Where the government does not dispute that it

misrepresented eyewitness accounts to a_ tragedy,

does a prohibition on disclosure of the identities of

the witnesses on privacy grounds result in a blanket

rule of non-disclosure not contemplated under the

Freedom of Information Act?

2.

Is the district court’s inquiry into the deliberative

process privilege under the Freedom of Information

Act limited to adjudication of whether the privilege

is properly asserted, and does this limited review

erroneously transform a qualified privilege into an

absolute one?

il

RULE 14.1(b) STATEMENT

A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court

whose judgment is the subject of the petition is:

Petitioner: H. Ray Lahr.

Respondents: National Transportation Safety

Board, Central Intelligence Agency, National

Security Agency.

11]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .....0...cssccscesseesesccccsess i

RULE 14.1(b) STATEMENT ...... ...0:césseccessascustesss il

TABLE OF CIT re 6 snssncscssassusvissesneeeene nee lil

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ....... 1

CPP EIT Re EA sos vsscsssacivcsssintontceecess 1

Fe iss die eigenen cae 2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED............ 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...........c0ccc00sc0ee0es 3

A. The Flight 800 Tragedy ...................0...0..... 3

B. The District Court Opinion ....................-:. 6

C. The Court of Appeals Decision .................. 12

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION.... 14

A. Where it is undisputed that the govern-

ment misrepresented eyewitness _ ac-

counts of a crime, prohibiting disclosure

of the identities of these witnesses

results in a blanket rule of non-disclosure

not contemplated under the FOTA............ 14

B. The district court’s inquiry into the de-

liberative process privilege under the

FOIA should not be limited to adjudica-

tion of whether the privilege is properly

asserted, as such an analysis erroneously

transforms the qualified privilege into an

GDUGTORE GU iiss 28

COI LA ities 38

1V

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A (Opinion of the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed June 22,

PI a oid carta var ceckucasisntsccia sascuncnceastineusecgraseaated App. 1

APPENDIX B (Order of the U.S. District Court

for the Central District of California, filed

I OE ehicek vicki thiasnids ne adeno App. 52

APPENDIX C (Order of the U.S. District Court

for the Central District of California, filed

CE oN kien serves nse App. 126

APPENDIX D (Order of the U.S. District Court

for the Central District of California, filed

Fe NEP ois hcek dens deanicatescorstaasuindiscsnceia App. 185

APPENDIX E (Order denying Petition For

Rehearing en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit, filed Jan. 21, 2010)........ App. 199

APPENDIX F (Lahr Excerpts of Record U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit)

Graphic reprinted from March 10, 1997 Press

Enterprise Newspaper article, New Data

Show Missile May Have Nailed TWA 800,

Debris Pattern Provides Key to Mystery ...... App. 202

November 17, 1997 CIA Animation, “What

Did The Eyewitnesses See?” four screen

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

Page

(i. |: ree Paris aviincncavedtet comeatevateake racist slonsunren App. 205

sehen cnrekssvcunases Aaceetss ekia ten eneeas aaiuaa toa App. 206

Drees nacus sun cgyiand aise eke tepeede cai labaliask en dairuen Gn App. 207

Vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352

Sieh es ae a nO ee ae nae 22, 26, 32, 33, 34

Forest Service Employees for Environmental

Ethics v. U.S. Forest Service, 524 F.3d 1021

SE 6. seas ciipesinivanchensnensnecndsiseaascens 13. 21, 22

General Services Administration v. Benson, 415

Be Pe EE GE, BUD vecisvcicascedssncnesescssxscronscnaiconts 13

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).................06 32

In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997)....... 36

John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S.

146 (1989), reh’g denied, 493 U.S. 1064

a aaa cass sncabadandaxbibeuedeanesddsaveessys 32

John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust &

Savings Bank, 1148S. Ct. 517 (1993)..................008 33

Lion Raisins Inc. v. United States Dep’t of

Agriculture, 354 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004)............. 33

Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv.,

ge Ee 2 te a Ly Sr 18

Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541

ose ay dv bcansanacacstivesiues 9,10

NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S.

oo aes, caapenistacsonsinesieaniaks 25, 33

NLRB v. Sears, 421 U.S. 132 (1975).............. 28, 29, 36

Painting Indus. of Haw. Mkt. Recovery Fund v.

U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 26 F.3d 1479 (9th Cir.

1994)

Vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Stern v. F'B.I., 737 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1984)............... 25

United States Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Labor Rela-

tions Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994)....... 9, 23, 24, 26, 30

United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm.

for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 775............. 30, 33

United States Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164

PARIS iv cnensci ony cavdaueas ss ccnarsnrceapennadisinstcaesyuaieiaatss 24, 25

United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S.

PEE GI as ache sindastnress en catist nase acetic eadas ori 28

STATUTES

Ree IE oon coos oau i cacenkzautsnenettedsiainepseeataseieuemeseees 2

Be ees Oe iii icc pesa isn astereesisaxsencntirseacunsines 7

BU As. © GOO AMG), BOD icccnccvciicncoscessessnsseonncens 32

re eG aioe sash tech eciarncscedisiicscmotesi 23

Fer We Rigi nht va Ha cairaactasconacs abanececdioveenaasoe 28

Be ee hater eencaseoy ackncadssabepevencisacsaeeaaurans 2

ay ed esas ns ncienncensecisks sasiscunaxqresaveasngsd 16

Oe Beds FB vias vas icacssneneddhaasaeicsstincetnionns 16

FEDERAL REGULATIONS

es a I ec ions stn can eidas cbereppecsnreesteeannceusadcanen 16

RULES

ge TR By Ee eee ame Ama Aaa een ee i)

V1ll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIAS

McCormick Evid. § 108 (6th Ed..)..................scccssceceees 31

Wright and Graham, Fed. Prac. & Pro......................31

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Freedom of Information Act Amendments

Sourcebook, House Government Operations

Committee and Senate Judiciary Committee,

Ge GIN, BONE IN BF vociccccecitnscnccesscessssccssones. 31

Es MU acon ys itate dans cinkec dav Ginixscrtpavicinsncens 29

PERIODICALS

Wash. Times, We Saw TWA Flight 800 Shot

Down By Missiles And We Won't Be Silenced

Any Longer, Advertisement, Aug. 15, 2000............ 18

Press Enterprise Newspaper, New Data Show

Missile May Have Nailed TWA 800, Debris

Pattern Provides Key to Mystery, March 10,

BOE oo Tera ncaa cd cae ihans exdacshcieaendiansiniveiieickdiswicaewaes 4,18

Corporate Legal Times, The Chosen One, Oct.

RN re oral ca os ceed sodevaseovaausasiarvtes 18

EXECUTIVE BRANCH MEMORANDA

Memorandum for the Heads of Executive De-

partments and Agencies, Pres. Obama, Jan.

I eres et ek egies ad ui rabid dicdesdkaetncane 31

LX

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Freedom of Information Act Memorandum,

Attorney General Holder, March 19, 2009........

Books

First Strike, J. Cashill & J. Sanders, WND

Books 2003, Chap. 9, The Big Lie, at 155.....

OTHER REFERENCE

Airman’s Information Manual.......

ClA-produced video entitled, What Did The

Eyewitnesses See .......0.ccc0cceeee eyuiiuieketsenee

Page

ree 32

£0

~~

15, 16

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

H. Ray Lahr respectfully petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the opinion and judgment of the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

—

OPINIONS BELOW

The panel opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit, dated June 22, 2009, is offi

cially reported at 569 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2009), and is

reproduced in Appendix A at 1-51.

The opinion and order of the U.S. District Court

for the Central District of California, dated July 31,

2006, is officially reported at 453 F. Supp. 2d 153

(C.D. CA 2006) and is reproduced in Appendix B at

o2-125.

The subsequent opinion and order of the U.S.

District Court for the Central District of California,

dated October 4, 2006, is officially reported at 2006

WL 2854314 (C.D. Cal. Oct 4, 2006), and is repro-

duced in Appendix C at 126-184.

The fees opinion and order of the U.S. District

Court for the Central District of California, dated

March 19, 2007, is not publicly reported, and is repro-

duced in Appendix D at 185-198.

The opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit, denying en banc review, dated January

21, 2010, is not publicly reported, and is reproduced

in Appendix FE at 199-201.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit was entered on August 8, 2009. A time-

ly petition for rehearing en banc was filed on July 20,

2009, and was denied on January 2], 2010. This

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

*

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552

provides, in relevant part:

(a) Each agency shall make available to the

public information as follows:

4

(3) A) *** [|Ejach agency, upon any request

for records which (1) reasonably describes

such records and (ii) is made in accordance

with published rules stating the time, place,

fees Gf any), and procedures to be followed,

shall make the records promptly available to

any person.

(b) This section does not apply to matters

that are

3

(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoran-

dums or letters which would not be available

by law to a party other than an agency in

litigation with the agency.

Bo * 2k

(6) personnel and medical files and similar

files the disclosure of which would constitute

a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy;

(7) records or information compiled for law

enforcement purposes, but only to the extent

that the production of such law enforcement

records or information ...(C) could reason-

ably be expected to constitute an unwar-

ranted invasion of personal privacy

+

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The Flight 800 Tragedy

On July 17, 1996, the military issued a warning

that it was dangerous for civilian aircraft to fly below

10,000 feet in Military Operating Zone’ Whisky 105

(“W-105”), whose western edge was about 15 miles off

Long Island’s coast. At 8:00 p.m., the military was

' Defined in Airman’s Information Manual § 3:43: “{Warn-

ing zones] denote the existence of unusual, often invisible,

hazards to aircraft, such as artillery firing, aerial gunnery, or

guided missiles.”

4

conducting classified military maneuvers.’ The dis-

trict court:

The genesis of this suit lies in the tragic

crash of Trans World Airline (“TWA”) Flight

800 (“Flight 800”). On July 17, 1996, Flight

800 departed from John F. Kennedy Inter-

national Airport in New York City, en route

to Charles de Gaulle International Airport in

Paris, France. The aircraft crashed into the

Atlantic Ocean twelve minutes after depar-

ture. There were no survivors of the accident

and the aircraft, a Boeing 747-131, was

destroyed.

App. B at 55.

The tragedy unfolded at sunset, on a relatively

cool, sunny day, ten miles off the coast of Long Is-

land’s south shore, a popular, affluent, summer re-

sort. Without a word of warning from the cockpit, the

plane exploded in view of as many as a thousand

people up and down the coast — vacationers, surfers,

fishermen, beach walkers, helicopter pilots, and other

airline pilots. The multiple explosions were seen from

“over 40 miles away.” The plane fell from the sky in

flames, the cockpit broken off from the fuselage,

* See graphic reprinted from March 10, 1997 Press Enter-

prise Newspaper article, New Data Show Missile May Have

Nailed TWA 800, Debris Pattern Provides Key to Mystery App. F

at 202.

* Quoting Nov. 17, 1997 CIA animation at 10:40, discussed

infra

3)

tragically killing 230 people, thirty-eight of whom

were under the age of 18. Almost seven hundred peo-

ple would provide the FBI with formal witness

statements as to what they had seen of the disaster.’

Seventeen months into the NTSB’s four-year

probe, on November 17, 1997, the three major net-

works broadcast excerpts of the ClA-produced video

entitled, What Did The Eyewitnesses See,’ and CNN

broadcast the 14-minute video in its entirety.”

The video climaxed with an animation purport-

ing to show what the eyewitnesses did see. As pre-

sented in the CIA video, the nose of the aircraft blew

off from an internal explosion, and then the nose-Jess

747 “pitched up abruptly and climbed several thou-

sand feet from its last recorded altitude of about

13,800 feet to a maximum altitude of about 17,000

feet.” Trailing flames, this vertically zooming nose-

less aircraft allegedly deceived the eyewilnesses into

thinking they had seen a missile. Neither the govern-

ment nor the media ever showed the animation

again.

“ The record in the case includes 673 FBI 302 eyewitness

interview reports.

* Video lodged in Cress-Appellant H. Ray Lahr’s Excerpts of

Record (“Lahr’s Excerpts”).

° See App. F at 203-06, four screen shots of CLA animation:

(1) “What Did The Eyewitnesses See;” (2) “The Eyewitnesses Did

Not See A Missile;” (3) “Not A Missile;” and (4) Quoting narrator,

“Just after the aircraft exploded, it pitched up abruptly and

climbed several thousand feet from its last recorded altitude of

about 13,800 feet to a maximum altitude of about 17,000 feet.”

6

Like tens of millions of other Americans, “[Ray]

Lahr, a former Navy pilot and retired United Air-

lines Captain who has served as ALPA’s Southern

California safety representative for over fifteen years”

(App. B at 67), saw the now notorious CIA animation,

depicting the transformation of a nose-less jumbo jet

into a soaring rocket. This animation instantly dis-

credited all eyewitness testimony and ended any real

investigation into the plane’s destruction, and trans-

formed the Flight 800 tragedy into the most contro-

versial disaster in aviation history. It remains so

today.

B. The District Court Opinion

The district court wrote that Flight 800 raises

“much-debated questions” (App. B at 53) and that

“the crash of Flight 800 and the government’s inves-

tigation and findings are matters of great public in-

terest.” App. B at 102. The court elaborated in its fee

order:

Plaintiff provides ample evidence of the pub-

lic’s interest in the information obtained in

this case. According to Plaintiff, TWA Flight

800 has already been the subject of nine

books and over 2,000 newspaper articles. A

Google search yields over 147,000 webpage

hits. Plaintiff adds that well-qualified ex-

perts will analyze the disclosures and several

will publish reports of their findings on the

websites of Flight 800 Independent Re-

searcher’s Organization (at flight800.org)

7

and the Association of Retired Airline Pro-

fessionals (al www.twa800.com). At least two

magazines have already published articles

about this Court’s ruling.

App. D at 189.

Lahr’s Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) re-

quest sought disclosure of “all records upon which all

publicly released aircraft flight path climb conclu-

sions are based, including, but not limited to, the

underlying data and basis of all written reports and

all video-animation-depictions.” App. A at 8. “Lahr

filed suit against the NTSB [and] [t]hereafter he

added as defendants the CIA and National Security

Agency (“NSA”)... ”'’ App. B at 67.

The Freedom of Information Act gives district

courts exclusive jurisdiction to “enjoin the agency

from withholding agency records and to order the

production of any agency records improperly withheld

from the complainant.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). In two

” Although the CIA is the principal defendant, it was not

initially named because Lahr in good faith relied on that Agen-

cy’s denial of its possession of responsive records. See Fee Order,

App. D at 191:

In its January 26, 2001 FOIA response letter, the CIA

wrote, “[wJe have researched this matter, and have

learned that the pertinent data, and resulting conclu-

sions, were provided by the National Transportation

Board (NTSB). CIA simply incorporated the NTSB

conclusions into our videotape.” .. . (Mot., 7:9-12) (cit-

ing June 16, 2004 Lahr Affidavit, Ex. 16). That was

not correct.

8

“thorough opinions” (App. A at 9), issued in August

and October of 2006, the district court granted in part

and denied in part the three government partial

summary motions, holding, inter alia:

¢ The FOIA’s balancing test is inapplicable

to Exemption 5, and thus, some of the

information that had been withheld un-

der the deliberative process privilege

need not be disclosed

¢ Under the FOIA’s balancing test, the pri-

vacy protections afforded by Exemption

7(C) do not shield the names of eyewit-

nesses from disclosure

s0th holdings involve solely questions of statutory

interpretation.

The district court resolved the first by holding,

inter alia, that its analysis of the deliberative process

privilege withholdings under Exemption 5 is limited

to adjudication of whether the privilege is properly

asserted. Once the court concluded that they did fall

within the privilege, and thus fell under Exemption 5,

the district court had no discretion to order dis

closure. “[T]his Plaintiff-proposed balancing test is in-

applicable to Exemption 5... There, the only test the

Court may apply is whether the record is both pre-

decisional and delrberative.” App. Bn. 33 at 86.

9

As the government filed no transverse affidavits’

on the issue of government impropriety, there was no

question of material fact® to be decided on the court’s

resolution of the dispute over eyewitness names un-

der Exemption 7(C)’s balancing test. “Defendants did

not file any response to that statement [of genuine

issues], so on this motion, at least, Plaintiff’s asser-

tions have not been repudiated.” App. B at 60.

To determine whether a record is properly with-

held, district courts must balance the privacy interest

protected by the exemptions against the public inter-

est in government openness that would be served by

disclosure. See Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v.

Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004); United States Dep't

of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S.

487, 494-95 (1994).

* Lahr filed affidavits from 29 expert and fact witnesses.

The experts include former NTSB member, Dr. Vernon Gross,

and retired Rear Adm. Mark Hill, as well as two aerodynami

cists and six air-crash investigators, three of whom were parties

inside the TWA Flight 800 probe. Seven of Lahr’s affiants are

eyewitnesses, four of whom saw the disaster from the air. All re-

fute the government’s zoom-climb hypothesis, including two eye-

witnesses who are featured in the CIA’s zoom-climb animation.

* “When the moving party meets its burden, the adverse

party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the

adverse party’s pleadings, but the adverse party’s response, by

affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e).” App. B at 70.

10

“[A]ls a general rule, when documents are within

FOIA’s disclosure provisions, citizens should not be

required to explain why they seek the information.”

Favish, id. at 72. But where the government’s basis

for withholding the contested records is Exemption

7(C), “the usual rule that the citizen need not offer a

reason for requesting the information is inapplicable.”

Instead, the requester must “establish a sufficient

reason for the disclosure.” Jd.

The district court wrote that “[fJor the purpose

of determining whether Exemption 7(C) (and other

FOIA provisions) are applicable, and only for that

purpose, the Court finds that, taken together, this

evidence is sufficient to permit Plaintiff to proceed

based on his claim that the government acted im-

properly in its investigation of Flight 800, or at least

performed in a grossly negligent fashion. Accordingly,

the public interest in ferreting out the truth would be

compelling indeed.” App. B at 60-67 (emphasis add-

ed). The district court’s analysis under the heading

Plaintiff's allegations of impropriety:

According to Plaintiff then, the government

withheld evidence from the Flight 800 probe.

The government altered evidence during the

investigation. Evidence was removed from

the reconstruction hangar. The government

misrepresented radar data, which does not

correspond to the “zoom-climb” conclusion.

Radar data and flight recorder data are

missing. It appears that underwater video-

tapes of the debris from the plane have been

altered.

11

The government concealed the existence of

missile debris field and debris recovery loca-

tions. At its first public hearing, the NTSB

did not permit eyewitness testimony. Many

eyewitnesses vehemently disagree with the

conclusions the CIA expressed in the video

animation. The CIA falsely reported that

only twenty-one eyewitnesses saw anything

prior to the beginning of the fuselage’s de-

scent into the water. The FBI took over much

of the investigation from the NTSB, which

should have been in charge, and the CIA

never shared its data and calculations of the

trajectory study with others for peer review,

which would have been appropriate.

Plaintiff also submits evidence that the

government's conclusion that there was a

center-wing fuel tank explosion and the gov-

ernment’s “zoom-climb” theory were physi-

cally impossible under the circumstances.

For example, evidence suggested there was

no spark in the center-wing fuel tank.

Once an explosion occurred, engine thrust

would have been cut off with the loss of the

nose of the plane. Furthermore, the aviation

fuel used in Flight 800 is incapable of an

internal fire or explosion. The zoom-climb

theory is impossible because at least one

wing separated early in the crash sequence.

Additionally, a steeper climb would likely

result in a reduction in ground speed, which

contradicts radar evidence. In fact, Plaintiff’s

evidence suggests the “zoom-climb” theory is

aerodynamically impossible.

12

Finally, Plaintiff also claims that there were

“military assets” conducting classified ma-

neuvers in the area at the time of the crash,

and several vessels in the area remain

unaccounted for.

App. B at 60-67 (footnotes omitted).

C. The Court of Appeals Decision

The government appealed only the district court’s

holding that Exemption 7(C)’s equitable balancing

test mandates disclosure of the eyewitnesses’ names.

Lahr appealed the district court’s holding that

the FOIA’s balancing test is inapplicable to resolu-

tions of disputes under Exemption 5’s deliberative

process privilege.

Regarding the district court’s order to provide

complete copies of ten documents, from which the

names of 233 eyewitnesses and one supervisory FBI

agent had been redacted, the panel wrote that it was

“compelled by precedent — especially by a recent case

of this court, Forest Service Employees for Environ-

mental Ethics v. U.S. Forest Service, 524 F.3d 1021 (9th

Cir. 2008) ... to reverse this holding.” App. A at 16

The panel wrote that, under FOIA Exemption 7(C)’s

balancing test, the public could’ benefit from

disclosure only if Lahr contacted the eyewitnesses

“directly,” and any contact would infringe on the

privacy interests sought to be protected hy Exemption

“404; ik

13

The panel ruled against Lahr and affirmed the

district court’s Exemption 5 holding that “any discre-

tion retained by the district court was lmited to

determining whether the withheld documents fell

within the scope of the claimed privilege.” App. A

n. 15 at 32. The pane! wrote:

Relying on General Services Administration

v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969),

Lahr contends that traditional equity princi-

ples apply to determine whether withholding

is warranted under Exemption 5. See Ben-

son, 415 F.2d at 880 (holding that courts

must weigh “the effects of disclosure and

nondisclosure, according to traditional equity

principles”). We have subsequently explained

that the FOIA context is different, and that

Benson

merely recognized that where documents

normally privileged in the civil discovery

context are involved, courts may employ

in exemption 5 cases the same equitable

principles that they may use to fix the

scope of discovery in civil litigation

against an agency. Except in this limited

sense, however, courts do not possess

‘equitable discretion’ to deny FOIA re-

quests.

Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv.,

108 F.3d 1082, 1088 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997).

Id.

14

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A. Where it is undisputed that the govern-

ment misrepresented eyewitness accounts

of a crime, prohibiting disclosure of the

identities of these witnesses results in a

blanket rule of non-disclosure not contem-

plated under the FOIA

In this case, the government did not dispute that

it falsified its account of the disaster. In reality, it

could not. Its zoom-climb hypothesis violates several

immutable laws of physics,’ in addition to being con-

tradicted by all forensic evidence,’ virtually all of which

the government either deleted, altered, removed,

hid, or misrepresented. Government misconduct was

1¢

“|E|jngine thrust would have been cut off with the loss of

the nose of the plane.” App. B at 65. “[TJhe aviation fuel used in

Flight 800 is incapable of an internal fire or explosion.” Jd. The

aircraft did not slow and thus could not have climbed. Jd. at 64

n. 18. “Evidence suggests the ‘zoom-climb’ theory is aerodynam

ically impossible.” Jd. at 66 n. 25. “See Hill Aff., at J 4 (Bates 51)

(airplane at more than twenty degrees inclination will stall be

cause it will no longer produce lift); Pence A/ff., at 4 8 (Bates 259)

(same); Lahr Aff., at 4 62 (Bates 275) (plane would have stalled

about one and a half seconds after nose separation); see gener

ally Third Lahr Aff. (under physical characteristics concluded by

government, aircraft could never have reached impact point).”

ld

' The break-up sequence, the radar data, the photographic

evidence, the underwater imavery, the explosive residue, the flight

data recorder, the cockpit voice recorder, the climb analysis data

L5

. ’ . 12

so pervasive that non-governmental investigators

smuggled evidence out of the probe to give to the

. 13

news media.

The undisputed impossibility of the government’s

zoom-climb hypothesis begs the question posed by

the CIA in its animation, What Did The Eyewitnesses

See? Lahr wants to ask these witnesses. ‘ihe CIA

did not. Its analysts relied exclusively on FBI

302 interview reports, having interviewed no wit-

nesses. The NTSB interviewed one eyewitness,”

* NTSB investigations are conducted under the Party Process,

under which non-governmental groups, or parties, possessing

expertise in particular disciplines, are included in the process.

Lahr’s Excerpts, Holtsclaw Aff.: “[In) 1996, I provided to

Captain Richard Russell the Radar tape... recorded at the New

York Terminal Radar ... authentic.... The tape shows a

primary target at the speed of approximately 1200 knots

converging with TWA-800 ... It also shows a U.S. Navy P-3

pass over 'TWA-800 seconds after the missile has hit TWA-800.”

See also Sanders Aff.: Evidence smuggled out in 1996 by

TWA Captain Terrell Stacey to investigative reporter James

Sanders, including seat padding of reddish residue sample

of missile exhaust (that 60 Minutes freely surrendered to the

FBI)

i4

The only witness ever interviewed by the NTSB was

Kastwind pilot Captain David MacLaine. He was staring di

rectly at Flight 800 when it exploded, piloting an aircraft at

about 17,000 feet. The transcript of his real-time Air Traffic

Control. “Ah we just saw an explosion up ahead of us here about

sixteen thousand feet or something like that. It just went down

in the water.” (Lahr’s Excerpts ATC Transcript MacLaine.)

MacLaine’s next day Report also reported that the aircraft fell

downwards. When the NTSB interviewed MacLaine in March of

1999 — over two years after both the CIA and NTSB announced

(Continued on following page)

16

notwithstanding that its enabling statute mandates

that it do so.”

The FBI provided the CIA 233 interview reports.

‘The CIA used these reports to generate its report said

to analyze what the witnesses saw, which, in turn,

formed the basis of the CIA video, What Did The Eye-

witnesses See? The CIA released its written analysis,

but redacted the names appearing adjacent to the

witnesses’ accounts.

Here, evidence of the government’s misrepresent-

ing, then concealing eyewitness accounts from public

view pervades the investigative history of the govern-

ment’s four-year probe, as the district court observed.

“See Hill Aff., at 4 7, Exh. 1, p. 2 (Bates 46) (no

their zoom-climb conclusions — he was repeatedly clear that all

the debris fel! downwards out of Flight 800, not upwards. (Inter-

view ‘Transcript MacLaine Id.) Had the aircraft climbed, it would

have done so through MacLaine’s airspace

See, e.g., Affidavit of former NTSB member Vernon Gross

(Lahr’s Excerpts): “[B]y a mandate of the Congress, there is one

body, the National Transportation Safety Board, that is entirely

charged with the investigation of any transportation accident

Any time you take away from the NTSB, which, by congres-

sional charter, must be in charge, and have the FBI say that

they [NTSB] will not investigate or interrogate any witnesses

whatsoever, that immediately raises an issue in my mind about

the politics of it.” See also 49 U.S.C. § 1131(a)(2) (same); 49

C.FR. Part 831, Accident/Incident Investigation Procedures;

831.5 Priority of Board Investigations (same, requiring agencies

to timely exchange information); 49 U.S.C. § 1131(a)(2)(B)

(amendment after TWA hearings providing mechanism to de

clare probe criminal before the FBI can divest the NTSB of

primary jurisdiction)

17

witnesses allowed to speak at hearings); Lahr Aff.”

(App. B at 63). The “FBI objected to [the] use of [the]

CIA video and witness materials or testimony at [the]

public hearing.” Jd. n. 15.'° “Many eyewitnesses vehe-

mently disagree with the conclusions the CIA ex-

pressed in the video animation” (id.), and Lahr is “not

aware of any witness produced by FBI, CIA or NTSB

that corroborated ‘zoom-climb’ theory.” Jd. n. 16.

. ° . . 17

Of the 183 known eyewitnesses to missile fire,

only a scattering of the accounts from these witnesses

*” See also Id. n. 7:

See Affidavit of Rear Admiral Hill, at 417, Exh. C, pp.

2-3 (Bates 46-47) (adopting claims of William Donaldson,

a deceased Naval Commander, that the NTSB assisted

DOJ in hiding a witness and that the head of the FBI

investigation placed the investigation in “pending inac-

tive status” to avoid testing missile theory and to hide

witness testimony); Affidavit of James Speer, at 4] 14-

15 (Bates 184) (ALPA’s representative during the official

probe claims that FBI covered up positive test for

nitrates and hid airplane part); Perry Aff., {| at 50 (Bates

253) (FBI agent stated witness was too far away to see

what she claimed); Lahr Aff, at {] 52-54 (Bates 273) (FBI

would not allow Witness Group to conduct witness

interviews, contrary to normal NTSB procedure); Young

Aff., at | 2() (Bates 394) (non-governmental parties to

investigation had no access to FBI witness summaries

for over [al year).

" After the NTSB Witness Group reconvened (it had been

disbanded), the FBI allowed Safety Board investigators to review

458 interview Reports, with names redacted, “provided no notes

were taken and no copies were made,” according to the resultant

October 17, 1997, Witness Group Factual Report, NTSB Exhibit

4A (see tLahr’s Excerpts). As the district court: observed, the

“Witness Group factual report states that, of 183 witnesses who

(Continued on following page)

18

appeared in print in lesser publications, and not a

single account in the New York Times. The sad fact is

that any eyewitness who desires to share his observa-

tions with the public is compelled to purchase adver-

tising space. On the eve of the second public hearing,

after four years of being ignored, six eyewitnesses

placed a full-page advertisement in the Washington

Times, entitled We Saw TWA Flight 800 Shot Down

By Missiles And We Won't Be Silenced Any Longer.

The August 2000 advertisement is subtitled “Here

observed a streak of light, 96 said it originated from the sur-

face.” App. B at 64 n. 16. Conspicuously absent from the NTSB’s

public docket, containing “over 3,000 [case] documents” (App. A

at 7), is this incriminating Witness Group Factual Report.

That Report also recounts that “[oJn July 21, 1996 ..

Assistant U.S. Attorney Valerie Caproni informed Norm

Weimeyer, head of the Flight 800 probe’s operations group, ‘that

no interviews were to be conducted by the NTSB.’” At the time,

Caproni was Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Criminal Division of

the United States Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New

York. In August 2003, FBI Director Mueller named her General

Counsel of the FBI. See Corporate Legal Times, The Chosen One,

Oct. 2004, R. Vosper: “In addition, Caproni ruffled some feathers

when she charged James Sanders, a freelance journalist, for

removing a piece of the wreck in order to test it in a lab for

explosive residue ... ‘Conspiracy theorists came out of the

woodwork before the last piece of the plane hit the Atlantic,’ she

says.”

See App. F at 202: Graphic reprinted from March 10, 1997

Press Enterprise Newspaper article, New Data Show Missile

May Have Nailed TWA 800, Debris Pattern Provides Key to

Mystery, reporting that “author and investigative reporter”

James Sanders had gathered and reviewed evidence from which

he had concluded that the crash was the result of a collision

with a missile.

19

Are A Few Of The Hundreds Of Our Statements The

FBI Concealed,” followed by six eyewitness accounts.

It ends, “America Must Know The Truth.” It is re-

printed here, App. F at 207-12, and states in part:

We are some of the hundreds of eyewitnesses

to the crash of TWA Flight 800 that killed

230 people off the coast of Long Island on

July 17, 1996.

We are OUTRAGED that the FBI would not

let a single one of us testify at the NTSB’s

public hearing ... The FBI feared that our

testimony would undermine the video pro-

duced by the CIA that was shown on national

television to persuade viewers that we all

mistook the plane’s burning fuel for a missile

* *

We are INCENSED that for nearly four

years the FBI refused to release its hundreds

of reports of interviews with eyewitnesses

who told them what we saw — the plane

being hit by missiles...

*k 4 -

And we are SHOCKED at the lengths to

which the FBI, the CIA and the NTSB have

all gone to discredit and ignore our testimony

in order to hide the truth.

ok *k

Hundreds of us SAW what happened. The

FBI, the CIA and the NTSB must not be

20

allowed to get away with this cover-up by

defamation of the eyewitnesses...

* % *

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, former Chair-

man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said,

“All the evidence would point to a missile.”

* * *k

App. F at 207-212.

The advertisement generated no media attention.

The district court reasoned that disclosure might

“assist Plaintiff in investigating and uncovering

government malfeasance by, for instance, leading to

individuals who might repudiate what the govern-

ment attributed to them or might even declare that

the government misused or misrepresented the infor-

mation they provided.” App. C at 105. The court

reasoned that privacy implications from disclosure,

on the other hand, would be minimal.

Defendants proffer no assertions by any of

the eyewitnesses, even in camera, that they

wish to avoid being asked for information.

Even assuming these individuals ultimately

were contacted, if they were not interested in

responding to inquiries, they could easily

decline to be interviewed. Therefore, the

consequences arising from disclosure appear

shght.

App. B at 104-05.

21

The panel relied on Forest Service Employees for

Environmental Ethics v. U.S. Forest Service, 524 F.3d

1021 (9th Cir. 2008) in reversing the district court’s

holding. That case adjudicated the disclosure of the

names of 23 employees that the Forest Service had

redacted from its Report on a controversial fire that

killed two of its own employees, and which led to

OSHA citations and criminal charges. The panel con-

cluded that Lahr “is for all relevant purposes identi-

cal to that in Forest Service Employees.” App. A at 25.

The panel wrote that, under FOIA Exemption 7(C)’s

balancing test, the public could benefit from disclo

sure only if Lahr contacted the eyewitnesses “di-

rectly,” and any contact would infringe on the privacy

interests sought to be protected by Exemption 7(C).

Disclosure of “identities ... alone will shed no new

light on the [Agency’s] ... performance of its duties

beyond that which is already publicly known.” Jd. at

24, quoting Forest Service.

The panel’s conclusion that eyewitnesses who are

not among Lahr’s affiants are “heretofore silent wit-

nesses” who “have by their silence indicated that con-

tact is unwelcome” (App. A at 19-20") works a near

'* The panel reasoned:

In Forest Service Employees, ‘(t]he fact that the record

does not indicate that any of the employees ha[d) spo-

ken out in the five years since the incident occurred

le[d] us to conclude that such contacts [were] unwanted.’

Id. Similarly here: Although some of the eyewitnesses

have spoken out, and indeed, have joined Lahr in

insisting that the NTSB and CIA reconstructions do

(Continued on following page)

22

blanket rule of nondisclosure of eyewitness names,

even where all indications that witnesses to the event

— whose accounts were first, misrepresented, and,

second, ignored ~— want to be heard. Under the panel’s

analysis, the more likely it is that disclosure would

“open up the inner workings of government to public

scrutiny” (Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S.

352, 372 (1976)), because “inquiries by media repre-

sentatives [are] substantially more likely” (App. A at

20), the less likely the court is to order disclosure.

Once it is determined that a FOIA plaintiff seeks

disclosure of names of eyewitnesses in an effort to

contact them to corroborate or refute what the gov-

ernment attributed to them, the inquiry is at an end,

because the witnesses, or at least those who are not

among the plaintiff’s affiants, have not “come for-

ward publicly.” Jd. at 19. Under the Ninth Circuit’s

reasoning, the greater the possibility that disclosure

of the records will reveal government corruption or

negligence, thereby fulfilling the purpose of the FOIA,

the greater the reason to keep the documents from

the public.

not accord with their perceptions, others have not

come forward publicly despite the widespread pub-

licity given the reconstruction of the incident. It is

presumably these heretofore silent witnesses whom

Lahr wishes to contact. Forest Service Employees indi-

cates that these witnesses have by their silence indi-

cated that contact is unwelcome.

App. A at 19-20.

23

The privacy issue before the lower courts was

whether disclosure of the names corresponding to

accounts that these witnesses allegedly provided to

investigators was a warranted disclosure under Ex-

emption 7(C), which allows withholding records only

if disclosure could be “an unwarranted invasion of

personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). Warranted

invasions of the personal privacy are not exempt.

Under the panel’s analysis, avoidance of direct con-

tact is analyzed the same in cases involving govern-

ment corruption as it is where the FOIA plaintiff

seeks disclosure to facilitate learning whether stat-

utes are being diligently enforced.”

The panel’s decision is an untenable expansion

of this Court’s holding in United States Dep’t of De-

fense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487

'’ The panel cited Painting Indus. of Haw. Mkt. Recovery

Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 26 F.3d 1479, 1484-85 (9th Cir.

1994), where a labor organization sought the release of payroll

records submitted to the Air Force by a government contractor

working on an Air Force base in an effort to learn whether the

Air Force was diligently enforcing a federal wage statute. Jd. at

1481. Direct contact with the employees was necessary to ac-

complish the organization’s goal, and it was held that Exemption

6 authorized the Air Force to withhold the payroll records

because the only “additional public benefit” the release of the

employees’ personal information would provide was “inextricably

intertwined” with the invasion of the employees’ privacy. [d. at.

1485. Avoidance of harassment is a cognizable privacy interest

under the FOIA, protecting against “unwanted commercial so-

licitations.” Jd. at 1479.

24

(1994), where Exemption 6” authorized the Defense

Department to withhold the home addresses of its

employees from its response to a FOIA request filed

by the unions representing the employees. Jd. at 502.

Noting that the unions sought this information pre-

cisely because nonunion employees had decided not to

share it with them, the Court found it “clear” that

such employees had “some nontrivial privacy interest

in nondisclosure, and in avoiding the influx of union

related mail, and, perhaps, union-related telephone

calls or visits, that would follow disclosure.” Jd. at 501

(emphasis in original).

In United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S.

164, 178-79 (1991), this Court applied Exemption 6 to

withhold the identities of Haitian refugees inter-

viewed in State Department reports where there was

no indication that an additional round of interviews

by the FOIA requester “would produce any relevant

information that is not set forth in the documents

that have already been produced.” The Court explained

20

Because of their similar language, Exemption 7(C) is of-

ten closely associated with Exemption 6. Exemption 6 protects

“personnel ... and similar files the disclosure of which would

constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,”

whereas Exemption (b)(7) protects law enforcement records which

“could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted in-

vasion of personal privacy” (emphasis added). Ilowever, Exemp-

tions 7(C) and 6 “differ in the magnitude of the public interest

that is required to override the respective privacy interests

protected by the exemptions,” the former being more protective

of privacy than the latter. United States Dept of Defense v. Fed.

Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994), 496 n. 6.

25

that an “asserted interest in ascertaining the veracity

of the |government’s] interview reports” would not

outweigh privacy interests, where “[t]here is not a

scintilla of evidence, either in the documents

themselves or elsewhere in the record, that tends to

impugn the integrity of the reports.” Jd. at 179. The

same cannot be said here.

As one court explained, “{f lor example, the public

may have an interest in knowing that a government

investigation itself is comprehensive, that the report

of an investigation released publicly is accurate, that

any disciplinary measures imposed are adequate, and

that those who are accountable are dealt with in an

appropriate manner.” Stern v. F.B.J., 737 F.2d 84, 92

(D.C. Cir. 1984). According to this Court, “[t]he basic

purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry,

vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed

to check against corruption and to hold the governors

accountable to the governed.” NLRB v. Robbins Tire

& Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978). “[A] basic

purpose of the FOIA is to... [provide] a needed check

against corruption.” Jd.

“In this case,” wrote the Ninth Circuit, “because

only the names of witnesses and agents are missing

from the released documents, under the applicable

precedents the ‘marginal additional usefulness’ of the

names in exposing government misconduct must

outweigh the privacy interests at stake.” App. A at 23

(citation omitted). The panel dismissed the district

court’s observation that, “fo]ln the other hand, dis-

closure of these persons’ identities ultimately could

26

contribute significantly to the ‘public understanding

of the operations or activities of the government.’”

App. B at 105 quoting United States Dep't of Defense

v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 494 (1994)

On the issue of disclosure of witness identities,

the Ninth Circuit treats all law enforcement records

equally; such a blanket proscription is in derogation

of this Court’s observation in Dep’t of the Alr Force v.

Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976), that “disclosure, not

secrecy, is the dominant objective” of the FOIA. The

Ninth Circuit’s precedent works a near-irrefutable pre-

sumption that the names of witnesses in a criminal

probe cannot be disclosed.

Because “Plaintiff’s assertions have not been

repudiated” (App. B at 61), the panel’s holding was a

pure question of law. Whether to order disclosure of

investigative records of the TWA Flight 800 tragedy is

a question of exceptional importance. The question of

whether the CIA zoom-climb animation 1s “the bold-

est and most flagrant lie ever visited on the American

people in peacetime” is an extremely important one.

As an event cannot be both impossible and possible at

21

the same time, eyewitnesses did not see the aircraft

in “various stages of crippled flight,” as the CIA video

claims, but rather, they saw something else.

* First Strike, J. Cashill & J. Sanders, WND Books 2008,

Chap. 9, The Big Lie, at 155.

27

If unchallenged allegations of the government’s

concealment of the facts of the most controversial

disaster in aviation history~’ do not tip the balance in

favor of disclosure of the eyewitness’ names,” nothing

would. The Ninth Circuit’s precedent results in a near

blanket rule of non-disclosure not contemplated un-

der the FOIA.

“ See Lahr’s Excerpts, Affidavit of Air Line Pilot’s Asso-

ciation representative James Speer: “[I|t’s been successfully

covered up, the truth is not known, and there are many pcople

fortunately still working on it trying to discover the truth... [I}t

was never declared a crime scene ... So here we are in limbo, a

dedicated group of people with a mission to seek the truth,

obstructed by the government.”

** See Lahr’s Excerpts, Affidavit of Blackhawk pilot Major

Fred Meyer: “This was not an accident. . . . If you’re conducting a

missile shoot under the main traffic control routes into New

York City, you have exhibited in my mind, depraved indifference

to human life. That’s not an accident — under any statute — any

codes anywhere. That’s murder. Now, if it was a foreign force —

that’s murder...”

** Nor did the panel affirm disclosure of names redacted

from the CIA’s reports on eyewitnesses who have not been silent,

including Lahr’s affiants. See district court opinion (App. 63 n.

16): “See Brumley Aff., at |] 1-2 (Bates 210) (representation in

video isn’t close to what he saw); Wire Aff., at {4 2-5 (Bates 214)

(what was in video did not represent what he had told agent);

Fuschetti Aff., at J 1-2 (Bates 191) (pilot of other plane never

saw vertical movement); Meyer Aff., at 9 5(b) (Bates 193) (air-

craft never climbed); Angelides Aff., at 7 5 (Bates 215) (anima-

tion bore no resemblance to what he saw).” And see id. at 62 n. 7:

“Perry Aff., J at 50 (Bates 253) (FBI agent stated witness was

too far away to see what she claimed).

28

B. The district court’s inquiry into the de-

liberative process privilege under the

FOIA should not be limited to adjudication

of whether the privilege is properly as-

serted, as such an analysis erroneously

transforms the qualified privilege into an

absolute one

Exemption 5 provides that FOIA disclosure re-

quirements do not apply to information that qualifies

as “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or

letters which would not be available by law to a party

other than an agency in litigation with the agency.”

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). “Exemption 5 withholds from a

member of the public documents which a private

party could not discover in litigation with the agency.”

United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792,

801 (1984). Exemption 5 incorporates all civil discov-

ery privileges; if a document is immune from civil

discovery, it 1s similarly protected from mandatory

disclosure under the FOIA.

The discovery privilege at issue here is the

deliberative process privilege, which is commonly

understood to “cover[ } documents reflecting advisory

opinions, recommendations and deliberations com-

prising part of a process by which governmental

decisions and policies are formulated... .” NLRB ov.

Sears, 421 U.S. 1382, 150 (1975).

The deliberative process privilege is a qualified

privilege.

29

Here, the lower courts followed the rule memo-

rialized by this Court in NLAB (supra), that, in the

FOIA context, the standard to be employed is wheth-

er the documents would “routinely be disclosed” in

civil litigation.” Under this analysis, documents for

which a party would have to make a showing of need

are not routinely disclosed and thus do not fall into

this category. As a result, the qualified deliberative

process privilege is treated as if it were an absolute

one, and courts in FOIA cases do not take into ac-

count a party’s need for the documents in ruling on a

privilege’s applicability. Once a government agency

makes a prima facie showing of privilege, the analy-

sis under FOIA Exemption 5 ceases, and the court

does not proceed to balance the interests.

By contrast, in civil litigation, to decide whether

to uphold a claim of deliberative process privilege, the

“ NLRB v. Sears, 95 S. Ct. 1504, 1516, n. 15 (1975):

The ability of a private litigant to override a privilege

claim set up by the Government, with respect to an

otherwise disclosable document, may itself turn on

the extent of the litigant’s need in the context of the

facts of his particular case, or on the nature of the

case. However it is not sensible to construe the Act to

require disclosure of any document which would be

disclosed in a hypothetical litigation in which the

private party’s claim is the most. compelling. Indeed

the House Report says that Exemption 5 was intended

to permit disclosure of those intra-agency memoranda

which would “routinely be disclosed” in private litiga-

tion and we accept this as the law. H.R. Rep. No.

1497, p. 10.

30

court must balance the government’s claimed need for

secrecy against the court’s own need for evidence to

resolve a dispute before it. In civil discovery disputes,

courts weigh the relative need of the parties and the

kind of litigation involved — a balancing test.

In apparent justification of this disparate treat-

ment of qualified privileges under FOIA, courts ob-

serve that the identity of the litigants and the need

for the evidence is always the same under the FOIA.

The plaintiff’s identity is irrelevant, and the sole

factor weighing in favor of disclosure under the FOIA,

the extent to which disclosure would open up the

inner workings of government to public scrutiny,” is

not considered.

The government’s interpretation is unsupported

by the legislative history, violates the well-settled

principle that FOIA exemptions are to be construed

narrowly, and, indeed, is contrary to the purpose of

the statute.

Congress did not intend a blanket rule of non-

disclosure for deliberative materials. “It is relatively

clear from the legislative history that Congress, like

* United States Dep’t of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations

Auth., 510 U.S. at 495: The “only relevant ‘public interest in dis-

closure’... is the extent to which disclosure would serve the

‘core purpose of the FOIA,’ which is ‘contributing significantly to

public understanding of the operations or activities of the govern-

ment.” Id. (quoting United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters

Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 775 (1989))

(emphasis in original).

most people in 1966, had never heard of the ‘delibera-

tive process privilege.’ The only privileges specifically

mentioned in the legislative history are the attorney-

client and work product privileges.” McCormick Evid.

§ 108 (6th Ed.) “Forty years ago a writer found very

little authority for any privilege for communications

between government officials. At the time the Federal

Rules of Evidence were adopted, there were only a

handful of cases that recognized the deliberative

process privilege. It is only in the last two decades

that federal courts have developed the privilege.”

Wright and Graham, Fed. Prac. & Pro. Chap. 6 Privi-

leges § 5680 Official Information — Deliberative Proc-

ess Privilege.

Moreover, “(t]he prediction that Exemption 5 was

potentially the ‘most far-reaching’ of the F.O.I.A.

exemptions has proved to be true in practice.” This

far-reaching application was likely the impetus for

President Obama’s January 21, 2009, Memorandum

” Wright and Graham Fed. Prac. & Pro. Chap. 6 Privileges

§ 5680 Official Information — Deliberative Process Privilege:

According to a study by the Congressional Research

Service of the Library of Congress, the (b)(5) exemp-

tion was the second most frequent ground for refusing

to disclose under the Freedom of Information Act

during its first four years, having been invoked in 375

of 1800 refusals while the trade secret and commer-

cial information exemption was invoked 403 times.

See krecdom of Information Act Amendments Source-

book, House Government Operations Committee and

Senate Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong., lst Sess.,

1975, p. 104-105.

32

for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,

where he wrote that “Government should not keep in-

formation confidential merely because public officials

might be embarrassed by disclosure, [or] because

errors and failures might be revealed ... ” In Attor-

ney General Holder’s March 19, 2009, Freedom of In-

formation Act Memorandum of the same name, he

wrote the “[aJn agency should not withhold records

merely because it can demonstrate, as a technical

matter, that the records fall within the scope of a

FOIA exemption.”

An agency’s withholding of documents must fall

into one of nine exemptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9),

552(d). In accordance with the broad disclosure

provisions of FOIA, the enumerated exemptions are

narrowly construed. See, e.g., John Doe Agency uv.

John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989), reh’g de-

nied, 493 U.S. 1064 (1990); Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose,

425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). Categorical exemption upon

making a prima facie showing of the qualified deliber-

ative process privilege is a narrow construction. So

too with the attorney work product privilege, more

accurately referred to as the work product doctrine.”

In deference to the “philosophy of full agency dis-

closure” that animates FOIA, “[t]he Supreme Court

“ The work product doctrine, recognized by this Court in

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), G) protects materials

created by non-lawyers as well as lawyers, and (ii) can be over-

come if the adversary establishes a substantial need for the

material.

33

has interpreted the disclosure provisions of FOIA

broadly... .” Lion Raisins Inc. v. United States Dept

of Agriculture, 354 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004).

The purpose of FOIA is to protect “the citizens’ right

to be informed about what their government is up to.”

United States Dept of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for

Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989).

“Disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of

FOIA.” Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,

361 (1976). According to this Court, “[t]he basic pur-

pose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital

to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to

check against corruption and to hold the governors

accountable to the governed. NLAB v. Robbins Tire &

Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).

“(We examine first the language of the governing

statute, guided not by a single sentence or member of

a sentence, but looking to the provisions of the whole

law, and to its object and policy.” John Hancock Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 114 S. Ct.

517, 523 (1993) (internal quotations, brackets, and

citations omitted).)

After in camera reviews, the lower courts allowed

the government to withhold one record entirely, and

two in part, on the grounds that they were protected

under the deliberative process privilege.

¢ Record 27, an 18-page CIA Report, en-

titled, Dynamic Flight Simulation, dated

March 3, 1998, described by the dis-

trict court “analysis and preliminary

conclusions,” from which the court

34

ordered disclosure of its title, date and

bolded titles, holding the balance to be

deliberative. App B. at 172. The panel

affirmed. App. A at 34.

e Record 28, a March 1998, 17-page CIA

“[djraft report concerning preliminary

analysis and conclusions regarding ra-

dar tracking” (App. B at 174), held par-

tially exempt from disclosure, save its

title, date, bolded titles, and Appendix.

App. Aat 34.

¢ Record 43, a five-page CIA “draft with

handwritten annotations reflecting can-

did discussion and opinion *** re-

garding CIA analysis of eyewitness

reports about the crash ... entitled, “An

Overview of the C.I.A.’s Analysis of

Witness Statements in the TWA Flight

800 Investigation” (App. C at 174), un-

dated, held to be exempt from disclosure

in its entirety. App. A at 33.

The sole factor weighing in favor of disclosure

under the FOIA, the extent to which disclosure would

“open up the inner workings of government to public

scrutiny” (Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S.

352, 372 (1976), was not considered.

A record is protected by the privilege if its au-

thors were acting within their statutory authority.

Here, they were not. First, the author would have to

be oblivious to the fact that the zoom-climb theory

violates the laws of physics, as well as the fact that

all forensic and testimonial evidence is consistent

35

only with a missile strike. Second, the record itself

must be consistent with good faith deliberation lead-

ing to a good faith conclusion of the existence of a

zoom-climb.

Record 27 is an “eighteen-page CIA document

dated March 1998, described by the agency as a

{d]jraft report containing analysis and preliminary

conclusions regarding further assessment of TWA

Flight 800,’ on the subject of “Dynamic Flight Simu-

lation” (App. A at 33), written after release of CIA’s

animation. From its released headings that record

undoubtedly purports to explain Flight 800’s aerody-

namics. But that impossibility is among numerous

allegations that defendants did not dispute. “On this

motion ... Plaintiff’s assertions have not been

repudiated.” App. B at 61. See also id. at 66: “In fact,

Plaintiff’s evidence suggests the ‘zoom climb’ theory

is aerodynamically impossible.” App. B at 66.

Disclosure of the basis upon which the government

allegedly relied would reveal false assumptions.

Similarly with the CIA’s Record 28, Analysis of

Radar ‘Tracking. Not one of the dozen sets of Radar

data is consistent with any scenario that included a

zoom-climb. If this record reflects that Radar corrobo-

rates the zoom-climb hypothesis, it is false, and if it

contradicts any z00m-climb, it is further evidence

that defendant’s zoom-climb was knowingly false.

Thus, this “radar tracking” record would open up the

inner workings of government to public scrutiny.

36

Record 43, the “Overview of the C.I.A.’s Analysis

of Witness Statements,” is said to “discuss[ ] the CIA’s

assessment of individual eyewitness reports,” with

“(hjandwritten comments and edits appearling] on

each page.” App. A. at 35. Given that the CJA never

interviewed a single eyewitness, as well as the

government's dissemination of scores of fabrications

regarding eyewitness accounts, this record cannot

reflect good faith deliberations regarding eyewit-

nesses’ accounts, but, rather, reflects efforts to cover

them up.

Like most of the CIA records at issue in the case,

these three were generated after the animation’s

broadcast,” but still held to be “predecisional.””’

Lahr also argued “government misconduct,

crime, and fraud bars the application of Exemption

* See, e.g., Lahr’s Excerpts, Clarke Decl., listing 23 con-

tested CIA records, only 11 of which predate the broadcast of the

CIA animation; see also id. at 558 9 13, Schulze Decl.: “(No

supporting acrodynamic calculations were begun until almost a

year later [after broadcast of CLA animation].”

*” The district court reasoned that “[t]he CIA video anima-

tion surely has the status of a final agency decision, but ... the

August 23, 2000 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report also is a final

agency decision, and to the extent that it docs not expressly

incorporate the earlier CIA findings, further work on the matter

after the November 17, 1997 broadcast would be predecisional.”

App. B at 111. Lahr argued that a document is predecisional

when it is “received by the decisionmaker [sic] on the subject of

the decision prior to the time the decision is made,” Sears, 421

U.S. at 151.

37

5.”"" But, ruled the panel, “Lahr did not so argue in

the district court, and so waived the issue.” App. A at

27-28. “Lahr argues that we may nonetheless reach

the question because it is purely one of law,” but,

“thjere, considering the issue for the first time on

appeal would unfairly prejudice the government ...

Lahr did, of course, make general allegations of gov-

ernment misconduct in the district court, as his entire

request is an attempt to prove a massive government

conspiracy. But disproving the general, substantive

allegations of misconduct is not the government’s ob-

ligation in FOIA litigation.” Jd. Under this analysis,

whether the government falsified its version of the

disaster is irrelevant.

As these records purport to explain the impossible,

Lahr has made a clear “allegation of a connection

between these particular documents and government

misconduct,” contrary to the panel’s reasoning. Jd. at

29 n. 14.

The government did not deliberate the aircraft’s

post-initiating event flight trajectory. It deliberated

how to cover it up.

*' App. A at 27-28: “See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 738

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (““[W]here there is reason to believe the docu-

ments sought may shed light on government misconduct, the

privilege is routinely denied, on the grounds that shielding in-

ternal government deliberations in this context does not serve

the public’s interest in honest, effective government.”

38

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a

writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN H. CLARKE

Counsel of Record

1629 K Street, NW

Suite 300

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 332-3030

Counsel for Petitioner

A-P-P-E-N-D-I-X

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPENDIX A (Opinion of the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed

June 22.2009). ........... App. 1

APPENDIX B (Order of the U.S. District

Court for the Central District of

California, filed July 31,2006) .. . . App. 52

APPENDIX C (Order of the U.S. District

Court for the Central District of

California, filed October 4, 2006) . . . App. 126

APPENDIX D (Order of the U.S. District

Court for the Central District of

California, filed March 19, 2007). . . App. 185

APPENDIX E (Order denying Petition

For Rehearing en banc U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

filed dan. 21,2010). ......6%.. App. 199

APPENDIX F (Lahr Excerpts of Record U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit)

Graphic reprinted from March 10,

1997 Press Enterprise Newspaper

article, New Data Show Missile May

Have Nailed'TWA 800, Debris Pattern

Provides Key to Mystery ....... App. 202

November 17, 1997 CIA Animation,

"What Did The Eyewitnesses See?" four

screen shots

2 ih ae, Me!

i) ee ||

702............... .App. 205

OA. sw tt tt tt ee ee

Wash. 7T1mes advertisement,

August 15,2000. ........... -App. 206

APPENDIX A

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

H. RAY LAHR, )

)

Plaintitf-Cross-Appellant/Appellee, )

) Nos.06-56717

Vv. ) 06-56732, 07-

) 55709

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION )

SAFETY BOARD; CENTRAL ) D.C. No. 03-

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ) 8023-AHM

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, )

) OPINION

Defendants/Cross-Appellees- )

Appellants. )

)

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

A. Howard Matz, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and#Submitted

August 8, 2008—Pasadena, Cal:fornia

Filed June 22, 2009

Before: Roger J. Miner,* Kim McLane Wardlaw and

Marsha 8S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

-*The Honorable Roger J. Miner, Senior United

States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit, sitting by

designation.

COUNSEL

John H. Clarke, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-cross-

appellant/appellee Ray Lahr.

Steve Frank, Leonard Schaitman, United States

Department of Justice, George S. Cardona, Acting

United States Attorney, and Peter D. Keisler,

Assistant Attorney General, Washington, D.C., for

defendants-appellants/cross appellees National

Transportation Safety Board, et al.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

Trans World Airlines Flight 800 ("TWA Flight 800")

exploded in midair off the coast of Long Island on July

17, 1996, killing all 230 people aboard. The cause of

this dramatic and tragic event remains, for some, in

dispute, and that dispute underlies this lawsuit

brought under the Freedom of Information Act

("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552.

The government, after an extensive investigation,

concluded that the accident was caused by an

explosion in one of the aircraft's fuel tanks, initiated

by an electrical short circuit. Ray Lahr is, to put it

mildly, not convinced. He maintains that the

government has engaged in a massive cover-up of the

real cause, which he suspects is most likely a strike

App. 2

by a missile launched offshore by the U.S. Navy. In an

attempt to prove his theory, Lahr initiated more than

two hundred FOIA requests for documents and data

to federal agencies involved in the investigation.

When the agencies gave him only some of the

information he asked for, Lahr filed this lawsuit. On

summary judgment, the district court ordered the

government to release some documents in compliance

with his requests but authorized it to withhold others,

as exempt from disclosure pursuant to several of

FOIA's enumerated exemptions. Lahr appeals

several of the district court's rulings authorizing

nondisclosure; the government appeals only one of the

district court's rulings adverse to it. We affirm in

part, reverse in part, and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Crash and the Investigation

At approximately 8:19 p.m. on July 17, 1996, TWA

Flight 800 left John F. Kennedy Airport in New York

en route to Charles de Gaulle International Airport in

Paris. Twelve minutes after departure, the Boeing

747 aircraft crashed into the Atlantic Ocean.

Everyone on board died. According to the government,

many eyewitnesses reported seeing a "streak of hght,

resembling a flare, moving upward in the sky to the

point where a large fireball appeared." The

eyewitnesses then saw the fireball split into two as it

descended toward the water.

The National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB")

launched a broad-based civil investigation into the

App. 3

cause of the crash.! As part of its efforts, the NTSB

appointed several entities to assist in_ the

investigation, including the Boeing Company, the Air

Line Pilots Association, and 'I'WA. Initial examination

of the eyewitness reports and information from the

cockpit voice and data recorders led the NTSB to

narrow the possible causes to three: structural failure

of the airplane; a bomb or missile; and an explosion in

the fuel tank. The possibility that a bomb or missile

destroyed TWA Flight 800 led the FBI to launch a

criminal investigation into the incident. As part of its

investigation, the FBI asked Central Intelligence

Agency ("CIA") weapons analysts for assistance in

determining what the eyewitnesses actually saw.

The NTSB's investigation was, in its words, "by far

the most expensive and the most extensive in the

history of the Board." In the end, the NTSB concluded

that the probable cause of the disaster was an

explosion of the aircraft's center wing fuel tank,

resulting from the ignition of a flammable fuel and air

mixture in the tank. Although the NTSB could not

determine with certainty what caused the mixture to

ignite, it believed the explosion was most likely

initiated by a short circuit. The NTSB determined

that the explosion could not have been caused by the

detonation of a bomb or a missile strike.2 A multi-

agency analysis of the wreckage, ninety-five percent

1 The NTSB "is responsible for the _ investigation,

determination of facts, conditions, and circumstances and the

cause or probable cause or causes of: all accidents involving civil

aircraft, and certain public aircraft." 49 C.F.R. § 800.3(a).

2

The NTSB also ruled out structural failure as a cause of

the crash.

of which was recovered, found no evidence of bomb or

missile damage.? The unrecovered pieces of the

aircraft, the NTSB concluded, were not by themselves

large enough to encompass all of the damage that

would have been caused by a bomb or a missile.

Finally, although trace amounts of explosives were

found on three separate picces of the wreckage, "the

lack of any corroborating evidence associated with a

high-energy explosion" led the NTSB to conclude that

the crash was not caused by a bomb or missile strike.

To explain the more than 250 eyewitness accounts

that described "a streak of light" or "a flarelike object"

rising in the sky, the NTSB developed what Lahr calls

the “zoom-climb" theory. In essence, the NTSB's

theory was that the fuel tank explosion caused the

front portion of the aircraft's fuselage to separate

from the rest of the plane and fall to the ocean.

Having lost the considerable mass of the forward

fuselage, the remainder of the plane, now much

lighter and on fire, was rapidly propelled upwards in

the sky, ascending more than 2,000 feet before itself

falling back toward the ocean. As the burning plane

fell, the wings separated from the body of the aircraft,

and the wreckage erupted into a "fuel-fed fireball"

that descended into the water. Thus, the NTSB

contends, the streak of light observed by the

witnesses was not a missile but the burning plane

itself, traveling upward in various stages of "crippled

flight" after the initial explosion took place.‘4

3 This analysis involved the NTSB, the FBI, the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATE"), and the Federal

Aviation Administration ("FAA").

4 The NTSB concedes that this explanation does not

account for fifty-six eyewitnesses who reported seeing a streak of

App. 5

The NTSB arrived at this conclusion after analyses of

radar data, flight data recorder information, and

proprietary information about the aircraft's weight

and aerodynamics provided by Boeing. NTSB

investigator Dennis Crider completed a Trajectory

Study, which attempted to determine the location of

the plane when various parts fell by mapping the

trajectory of the wreckage as it fell to the ocean floor.

This study led to the conclusion that the forward part

of the plane fell off first. Crider also conducted a

computer-modeled flight-path simulation to

determine the motion of the main body of the aircraft

after the forward fuselage fell off. This simulation

demonstrated that the rest of the aircraft would have

continued to ascend after the loss of the front of the

plane, only later descending toward the ocean. The

NTSB also used computer programs, named

BALLISTIC and BREAKUP, to figure out the path of

certain pieces of the aircraft and the moment when

the forward fuselage separated from the main body.

The CIA's analysis also concluded that the

eyewitnesses did not see ae missile. In its

investigation, the CIA examined eyewitness reports,

radar tracking data, and information from the cockpit

voice and fhght data recorders to reconstruct the

flight path of the aircraft. The CIA analysts

concluded, in accord with the NTSB, that after the

initial explosion, the aircraft “pitched upward" more

than 3,000 feet before a fireball erupted, and the

light ascending vertically or originating at the horizon. It

attributes this discrepancy to deficiencies in interviewing,

documentation, and the eyewitnesses' memory or perception.

App. 6

remainder of the aircraft then descended rapidly.

Thus, like the NTSB, the CIA found that "[t]he

eyewitness sightings of greatest concern—the ones

which originally raised the possibility of a missile—

took place after the aircraft exploded."®

Both the NTSB and the CIA developed video

animations depicting their conclusions regarding the

explosion and the subsequent trajectory of the

aircraft. ‘(he N'I'SB presented four videos depicting

"graphical accident reconstructions" at a December

1997 public hearing. The CIA's video, "What Did the

Eyewitnesses See?” was broadcast on CNN in

November 1997. The CIA did not release any

additional analysis of the accident or conclusions

about what the eyewitnesses saw. After the video

aired, the CIA continued to refine its analysis based

on new data from the NTSB, but its ultimate

conclusion—-that eyewitnesses did not see a missile—

did not change, and the agency did not issue a final

report.

In 2000, the NTSB issued its comprehensive final

report on the crash, explaining its analysis and

conclusions in detail. This report, as well as almost

3,000 documents from the investigation, is publicly

available. Included among the documents in the

public record are FBI summaries of more than 700

eyewitness accounts, some with names and other

identifying information redacted.

5 The CIA's initial conclusion, reported in 1997, that the

plane ascended 3,200 feet differs from the NTSB's conclusion,

reported in 2000, that the maximum ascent was about 2,000 feet.

App. 7

B. The FOIA Requests and Proceedings in the District

Court

Lahr, a former Navy and commercial pilot and a

member of the Air Line Pilots Association, believes

the TWA Flight 800 investigation resulted in a

massive government cover-up of the real cause of the

crash. ‘he true story, according to Lahr, is that an

errant Navy missile caused the crash. The "zoom-

climb" theory is not plausible, Lahr maintains, and

was fraudulently concocted to mislead the public.

Lahr, in an attempt to prove his thesis, made 145

FOIA requests to the NTSB in October 2003. Lahr

informed the NTSB that he was "seeking the N'I'SB's

zoom-climb data and calculations in order to validate

or invalidate the NTSB's and CIA's zoom-climb

conclusions." He further elaborated:

The FOIA Requests are for all records upon

which all publicly released aircraft flight path

climb conclusions are based, including, but not

limited to, the underlying data and basis of all

written reports and all video-animation-

depictions. This includes but is not limited to

all computer simulation and = animation

programs, and the data entered into all such

programs, in each case correlating which data

was entered into which program.

At the same time, Lahr made 105 FOIA requests to

the CIA. Citing the November 1997 video depiction of

the aircraft's trajectory, Lahr indicated that the

request was for all records on which the CIA based its

conclusions regarding the aircraft's climb and flight

path, including those reported in the video depiction.

App. 8

In response to these requests, both agencies

conducted searches for responsive records. They

released certain documents (some of which were

redacted), withheld some documents, and found no

responsive documents for some requests. Dissatisfied

with the agencies' responses, Lahr filed this lawsuit

under FOIA. The agencies moved for summary

judgment, contending that their searches were

adequete and that their withholding of ccrtain

records or parts of records was proper under various

statutory exemptions. On the government's summary

judgment motions, the district court, in two thorough

opinions, decided in Lahr's favor on 26 of the 32

disputed requests.

The government appeals only one aspect of the

district court's ruling. The agencies released eleven

documents with the names of eyewitnesses and FBI

agents redacted, citing Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of

FOIA.6 On summary judgment, the district court

ordered the agencies to release these names, holding

that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the

privacy interests of the witnesses and agents. The

agencies appeal from this decision.

S Exemption 6 states that FOIA does not apply to

"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of

which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of

personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Exemption 7(C) provides

that FOIA does not apply to matters that are “records or

information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to

the extent that the production of such law enforcement records

or information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an

unwarranted invasion of personal privecy." /d. § 552(b)(7)(C).

App. 9

Lahr cross-appeals several of the district court's

rulings. The agencies withheld four documents’ under

FOIA Exemption 5, relating to documents protected

under the deliberative process privilege.® The district

court held that Exemption 5 applied to these

documents, as they were both "predecisional" and

"deliberative" and thus properly withheld from

disclosure.

Lahr's FOIA request also sought information about

the agencies' computer simulations. He asked for the

software programs used by the CIA and the NTSB in

running their simulations, as well as the data inputs

the agencies used to generate their results. Although

the district court required the government to disclose

most of the programs themselves, it held that the

agencies could withhold much of the data, including

the data inputs used by the BALLISTIC program that

Lahr claims determined the aircraft's flight path after

the explosion. Lahr appeals from this decision.

Lahr also contends that the agencies’ search for

responsive records was inadequate. The district court

held the government's search adequate in some

respects but not others. On appeal, Lahr contests the

district court's conclusion that certain aspects of the

agencies' search were adequate.

7 As the government explained at oral argument, the

NTSB subsequently released one of these documents, leaving

only three such documents at issue in this appeal.

8 Exemption 5 provides that FOIA does not apply to

"interagency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which

would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in

litigation with the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).

App. 10

Finally, Lahr contends that the government's

affidavit pursuant to Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820

(D.C. Cir. 1973)—generally known as the "Vaughn

index"—insufficiently described the documents

withheld by the agencies and the FOIA exemptions

that apply to them.

For tne reasons stated below, we reverse the district

court's conclusion that the government must disclose

the names of the eyewitnesses and FBI agents, and

affirm the remainder of the district court's rulings.

Il. DISCUSSION

[1] FOIA “was enacted to facilitate public access to

Government documents." U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray,

502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991). The statute provides public

access to official information "shielded unnecessarily"

from public view and establishes a "judicially

enforceable public right to secure such information

from possibly unwilling official hands." Dep't of Air

Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) Gnternal

quotation marks omitted). Doing so, it was hoped,

would "ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the

functioning of a democratic society, needed to check

against corruption and to hold the _ governors

accountable to the governed.” John Doe Agency v.

9 While the appeals of the district court's summary

judgment decisions were pending, the district court granted

Lahr's motion for attorneys' fees, awarding him $146,442 in costs

and fees. The government has appealed this award, arguing

that, .f it prevails on its appeal of the summary judgment

decisions, the fee award should be vacated and remanded to the

district court for a new determination. Because we reverse part

of the district court's summary judgment order, we remand the

award of attorneys’ fees for reconsideration.

App. 11

John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) Gnternal

quotation marks omitted).

[2] At the same time, FOIA contemplates that some

information may legitimately be kept from the public.

The statute contains nine enumerated exemptions

allowing the government to withhold documents or

portions of documents. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)-(9).

FOIA's "strong presumption in favor of disclosure"

means that an agency that invokes one of the

statutory exemptions to justify the withholding of any

requested documents or portions of documents bears

the burden of demonstrating that the exemption

properly apples to the documents. Fay, 502 U.S. at

173. Moreover, in light of FOIA's’ purpose of

encouraging disclosure, we have held that "its

exemptions are to be interpreted narrowly." Assemb/y

of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 920

(9th Cir. 1992).

In seeking to justify the withholding of some

documents or portions of documents responsive to

Lahr's request, the agencies have invoked several

FOIA exemptions. We discuss the documents and the

relevant exemptions in turn.

A. Eyewitness and FBI Agent Names

In response to Lahr's request, the agencies released

several documents that summarize or _ discuss

eyewltness accounts and contain analysis by FBI

agents involved in the criminal investigation. The

agencies redacted the names of the cyewitnesses and

FBI agents in eleven of these documents, but the

district court ordered the government to release the

names. The government contends that it is entitled to

App. 12

withhold these names from disclosure under FOIA

Exemptions 6 and 7(C), which generally recognize

that individual privacy interests may justify limiting

public disclosure of governmental information in

certain contexts. See Ray, 502 U.S. at 174-75.

[3] Specifically, Exemption 6 states that FOIA does

not apply to "personnel and medica! files and similar

files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly

u.:warranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. §

552(b)(6). Exemption 7(C) provides that FOIA does

not apply to "records or information compiled for law

enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the

production of such law enforcement records . . . could

reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted

invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).

Exemptions 6 and 7(C) speak of an "unwarranted"

invasion of personal privacy, not any invasion. So, to

determine whether a record is properly withheld, we

must balance the privacy interest protected by the

exemptions against the public interest in government

openness that would be served by disclosure. See

Nat’? Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S.

157, 171 (2004); U.S. Dep't of Def v. Ked. Labor

Relations Auth. (FLRA), 510 U.S. 487, 494-95 (1994).

Although both exemptions require such balancing, the

analysis under the two provisions is not the same, as

"Exemption 7(C)'s privacy language is broader than

the comparable language in Exemption 6 in two

respects." U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for

Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989).

[4! Specifically, Exemption 6 requires that the

invasion of privacy b "clear/y unwarranted," a

requirement omitted from the language of Exemption

App. 13

7(C). See isd. Second, whereas Exemption 7(C)

prevents disciosure of information that "could

reasonably be expected to constitute" an unwarranted

invasion of privacy, Exemption 6 limits the protection

to information that "would constitute" an

unwarranted invasion of privacy. /d. at 755-56; see

also Hunt v. FBI, 972 F.2d 286, 287-88 (9th Cir.

1992). In other words, although both exemptions

require the court to engage in a similar balancing

analysis, they "differ in the magnitude of the public

interest that is required to override the respective

privacy interests protected by the exemptions." /LAA,

510 U.S. at 496 n. 6.

The district court found that the documents at issue

were compiled for law enforcement purposes and so

met the threshold test for Exemption 7(C). Lahr has

not challenged this determination on appeal. So, as

the government claimed both exemptions for each

disputed redaction, it need meet only the lower

threshold of Exemption 7(C). See Hunt, 972 F.3d at

288. Because both exemptions require balancing of

public and private interests, cases arising under

Exemption 6 also inform our analysis. /d.

In considering the personal privacy interests at stake,

the Supreme Court has emphasized that "the concept

of personal privacy under Exemption 7(C) is not some

limited or cramped notion of that idea." Favish, 541

U.S. at 165 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Instead, personal privacy interests encompass a broad

range of concerns relating to an "individual's control

of information concerning his or her person,"

Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763, and an "interest in

keeping personal facts away from the public eye." Jd.

at 769.

App. 14

The Supreme Court has also clarified the nature of

the relevant public interests served by disclosure.

Once the government has identified a cognizable

privacy interest, "the on/y relevant public interest in

the FOIA balancing analysis is the extent to which

disclosure of the information sought would shed light

on an agency's performance of its statutory duties or

otherwise let citizens know what their government is

up to." Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S.

355, 355-56 (1997) (per curiam) (alteration and

internal quotation marks omitted). Where there are

relevant privacy interests at stake, a requester must

demonstrate that the interest served by disclosure "is

a significant one, an interest more specific than

having the information for its own sake," and that

disclosure is likely to advance that interest. Favish,

541 U.S. at 172. Where the public interest advanced

is that officials were neghgent or that they otherwise

improperly performed their duties, the requester

must establish "more than a bare suspicion" of

wrongdoing, by "“producling] evidence that would

warrant a belicf by a reasonable person that the

alleged Government imprepriety might have

occurred." /d. at 174.

Applying these considerations, the district court

acknowledged the eyewitnesses’ and FBI agents'

privacy interest in avoiding exposure of their

connection to the incident, but found this interest

weak. On the other hand, the district court found that

Lahr had introduced sufficient evidence of possible

goverament wrongdoing and that disclosure of the

redacted names might direct Lahr to individuals who

could "repudiate what the government attributed to

them or might even declare that the government

App. 15

misused or misrepresented the information they

provided." Accordingly, in balancing the personal

privacy interests of the eyewitnesses and FBI agents

against the public interest in disclosure, the district

court concluded that the balance favored disclosure.

Whether or not we would agree with that conclusion

absent controlling case law, we are compelled by

precedent—especially by a recent case of this court,

Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics v.

U.S. Forest Service, 524 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2008), not

available to the district court, to reverse this holding.

1. Privacy Interests

a. Eyewitnesses

[5] We begin with the privacy interests of the

eyewitnesses.!° Releasing unredacted documents

would reveal publicly these eyewitnesses' involvement

in a controversial criminal investigation. The

Supreme Court has indicated that the privacy

interests of citizens are highest when disclosure

would reveal information collected about them in

conjunction with a criminal inquiry, especially where

their link to the investigation is the result of "mere

happenstance." Favish, 541 U.S. at 166. In Favish,

the Court observed that

law enforcement documents obtained by

Government investigators often contain

information about persons interviewed as

witnesses or initial suspects but whose link to

10 Because the privacy interests of the eyewitnesses and

FBI agents differ, we discuss the interests of cach in turn.

App. 16

the official inquiry may be the result of mere

happenstance. There is_- special reason,

therefore, to give protection to this intimate

personal data ....In this class of cases where

the subject of the documents is a _ private

citizen, the privacy interest is at its apex.

/d. (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 765

("[Dlisclosure of records regarding private citizens,

identifiable by name, is not what the framers of the

FOIA had in mind."). Nothing in the record suggests

that the eyewitnesses' connection to the investigation

was anything more than coincidence. They just

happened to be in the vicinity when the tragedy

occurred, and so saw the incident.

[6] Some concerns about connecting private

individuals to criminal investigations are not present

here-—-for instance, the potential for physical harm or

the disclosure of particularly embarrassing private

details shared in the course of certain investigations.

See, e.g., Ray, 502 U.S. at 175-76; Hunt, 972 F.2d at

288. The potential for unwanted contact by third

parties, including the plaintiff, media entities, and

commercial solicitors, nonetheless remains.!! The

11 The district court observed that release of the unredacted

documents would disclose only the names of eyewitnesses, and

not their home addresses, phone numbers, or other personal

information. In this regard, the information is less invasive than

information some courts have protected to avoid third-party

harassment. See, e.g., Bibles, 519 U.S. 355-456 (mailing lists);

FLRA, 510 U.S. at 502 (home addresses); Painting Indus .of

Haw. Mkt. Recovery Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 26 F.3d

1479, 1484-85 (9th Cir. 1994) (names, addresses, and payroll

records). Nevertheless, the release of the witnesses’ names

presumably is sufficient to enable Lahr to contact them:

App. 17

case law establishes that protection from such

unwanted contact facilitated by disclosure of a

connection to government operations and

investigations is a cognizable privacy interest under

Exemptions 6 and 7(C). See, e.g., LRA, 510 U.S. at

501 (protecting the home addresses of USS.

Department of Defense employees from disclosure to

union representatives, citing their "nontrivial privacy

interest in nondisclosure, and in avoiding the influx of

union-related mail, and... telephone calls or visits,

that would follow disclosure"); Minnis v. U.S. Dep't of

Agric., 737 F.2d 784, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding

an Exemption 6 privacy interest in names and

addresses of permit holders seeking to avoid

commercial contact); see also, e.g., McDonnell v.

United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1993)

(upholding the nondisclosure under Exemption 7(C) of

the names of living witnesses interviewed in the

criminal investigation of a 1934 fire aboard an ocean

liner).

Applying these precedents, we recently held in Forest

Service Employees that government employees

cooperating as witnesses in a disaster investigation

had a cognizable privacy interest under Exemption 6

in preventing the disclosure of their names in

connection with the incident and the official

investigation. 524 F.3d at 1025-27. The Forest Service

contacting the witnesses is precisely why he wants the

information. In fact, the ability to contact the witnesses with

only their names formed the basis of the district court's

conclusion that their disclosure would advance the public

interest: "Disclosure might nevertheless assist Plaintiff in

investigating and uncovering government malfeasance by, for

instance, leading to individue’s who might repudiate what the

government attributed to them. .

App. 18

had released a report investigating its role in an

accident in which two firefighters died fighting a

wildfire (the "Cramer Fire"), but redacted the names

of all Forest Service employees who were mentioned

in the report. /d. at 1023. Although the individuals in

Forest Service Employees were government

employees, most were named in the report simply as

cooperating witnesses in the investigation rather than

as potential wrongdoers. /d. at 1026.

Discussing the cognizable privacy interests at stake,

we observed that "the potential for harassment that

drew the district court's attention was that which

would be presented by the media, curious neighbors,

and the FSEEE [plaintiff Forest Service Employees

for Environmental Ethics] itself." 7d) Like Lahr, the

FSEEE planned to contact the individuals named in

the report should their identities be released, and,

"[mJoreover, in light of the significant public attention

the Cramer Fire received, it is likely that the media

and others would join the FSEEE in such pursuit.” Jd.

Further, in Forest Service Employees, "|t|he fact that

the record does not indicate that any of the employees

hald] spoken out in the five years since the incident

occurred le[d] us to conclude that such contacts [were]

unwanted." /d. Similarly here: Although some of the

eyewitnesses have spoken out, and indeed, have

joined Lahr in insisting that the NTSB and CIA

reconstructions do not accord with their perceptions,

others have not come forward publicly despite the

widespread publicity given the reconstruction of the

incident. It is presumably these heretofore silent

witnesses whom Lahr wishes to contact. Forest

Service Employees indicates that these witnesses

App. 19

have by their silence indicated that contact is

unwelcome.

[7] In short, Forest Service Employees dictates the

result in this case. As in Forest Service Employees,

the plaintiff plans to contact the witnesses if their

names became available. The crash of TWA Fhght

800 gencrated vastly more national and international

media attention than the Cramer Fire, making

inguines by media representatives substantially more

likely than in Forest Service Employees.12 Moreover,

to identify a cognizable privacy interest under

Exemption 7(C), we need not conclude that an

invasion of privacy would occur with certainty, but

only that it could reasonably be expected. See AHwnt,

972 F.2d at 288. Applying the holdiugs of Forest

Service Employees and its predecessors that avoiding

undesired contacts is a protected personal privacy

interest—we conclude that the eyewitnesses have

more than a de minimis privacy interest in avoiding

unwanted contacts by Lahr and others.

b. FBI Agents

[8] The CIA asserts that the FBI agents have a

privacy interest "in not being subjected to unofficial

questioning about the analytic project or investigation

at issue and in avoiding annoyance or harassment in

their official, business, and private lives." We have

held that "individuals do not’ waive all privacy

interests in information relating to them simply by

12 Because FOIA contemplates that "if the information is

subject to disclosure, it belongs to all," Favish, 541 U.S. at 172,

we must consider the effect of releasing the information to the

general public and not jv ¢ to the individual requestor.

App. 20

taking an oath of public office, but by becoming public

officials, their privacy interests are somewhat

reduced." Lissner v. U.S. Customs Serv., 241 F.3d

1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The

directly applicable. precedents nonetheless establish

that "I BI agents have a legitimate interest in keeping

private matters that could conceivably subject them to

annoyance or harassment." Hunt, 972 F.2d at 288; see

also, e.g., Wood v. FBI, 432 F.3d 78, 88-89 (2d Cir.

2005); McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1255; Maynard v. CIA,

986 F.2d 547, 566 (st Cir. 1993).

[9] In particular, courts have recognized that agents

retain an interest in_ keeping private’ their

involvement in investigations of | especially

controversial events. See, e.g., Lesar v. U.S. Dep't of

Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 487-88 (D.C. Cir. 1980)

("[P]ublic identification of the individuals involved in

the FBI's investigation of Dr. [Martin Luther] King

[Jr.} would constitute an unwarranted invasion of

their privacy in light of the contemporary and

controversial nature of the information.") (emphasis

added). And, lower level officials, like the FBI agents

involved here, "generally have a stronger interest in

personal privacy than do senior officials." Dobronski

v. FCC, 17 F.3d 275, 280 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994).

[10] Given the controversial nature of the FBI's

investigation and the level of media attention devoted

to the accident, A’unt directs the conclusion here.

Should the names of the FBI agents mentioned in the

requested documents be revealed, there is some

hkehhood that the agents would be subjected to

unwanted contact by the media and others, including

Lahr, who are. skeptical of the government's

conclusion. Under the case law of this court and

App. 21

others, this potential is sufficient to establish a

cognizable privacy interest.

Lahr contends that the district court properly found

the privacy interests of the FBI agents diminished in

the face of allegations of official impropriety. We have

held that an investigator's privacy interest may be

reduced when there are doubts about the integrity of

his efforts. See Castaneda v. United States, 757 F.2d

1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) ("When the

reliability of the investigator's information is in doubt,

it is difficult to argue that he has a right to be

sheltered from public scrutiny."). There is no evidence

here, however, that the particular FBI agents

mentioned in the requested documents themselves

behaved improperly, or that their individual efforts

were unreliable. See Lissner, 241 F.3d at 1223-24

(noting the diminished Exemption 6 privacy interests

of two city police officers who were arrested for

smuggling steroids in their own arrest reports);

Dobronski, 17 F.3d at 278-79 (holding that an

official's Exemption 6 privacy interests were

diminished where the official's own misconduct was at

issue in the requested documents). In fact, Lahr seeks

the names of these agents in part to contact them

about alleged impropriety by other FBI agents

involved in the suspected cover-up. Although the

public interest in disclosing government impropriety

may outweigh an agent's privacy intcrests in some

circumstances, we cannot say that an FBI agent's

privacy interests are reduced because of speculation

that he may have information about general improper

conduct by the FBI.

[11] Accordingly, as with the eyewitnesses, the case

law compels the conclusion that the FBI agents have

App. 22

a cognizable privacy interest in withholding their

names in the requested documents.

2. Public Interest

[12] Holding that the eyewitnesses and FBI agents

have cognizable privacy interests does not end the

analysis. We must consider whether these interests

are outweighed by the public interest advanced in

disclosing the eyewitness and agent names in the

requested documents.

To advance a relevant public interest, the release of

the eyewitness and FBI agent names must "shed hght

on an agency's performance of its statutory duties or

otherwise let citizens know what their government is

up to." FLRA, 510 U.S. at 497 (alteration and internal

quotation marks). That is, the 2vidence must show

some nexus. between the _ specific requested

information and unveiling agency misconduct—the

public interest advanced here. See Favish, 541 U.s. at

172-73. In this case, because only the names of

witnesses and agents are missing from the released

documents, under the applicable precedents t’»

"marginal additional usefulness" of the names in

exposing government misconduct must outweigh the

privacy interests at stake. Painting Indus., 26 F.3d at

1486.

The district court concluded that "the public interest

in uncovering agency malfeasance and wrongdoing

outweighs" any privacy interest retained by the

eyewitnesses or FBI agents. Specifically, the district

court held that, with respect to the eyewitnesses'

names, "[djisclosure might . . . assist Plaintiff in

investigating and uncovering government

App. 23

malfeasance by, for instance, leading to individuals

who might repudiate what the government attributed

to them or might even declare that the government

misused or misrepresented the information they

provided." In Forest Service Employees, we viewed

skeptically the assertion that the public interest is

materially advanced by _ disclosing names_ of

individuals redacted from documents already in the

public record. We observed:

[T]he identities of the employees alone will

shed no new light on the FTorest Service's

performance of its duties beyond that which is

already publicly known. Instead, the ISEEE

secks to contact these employees itself... to

confirm the veracity of the publicly available

reports. We have previously expressed

skepticism at the notion that such derivative

use of information can justify disclosure under

Exemption 6.

524 F.3d at 1027; see also Ray, 502 U.S. at 178

(questioning, but not deciding, whether a cognizable

public interest is presented where "Itlhe asserted

public interest . . . stems not from the disclosure of

the redacted information itself, but rather from the

hope that respondents [who made the FOIA requests],

or others, may be akie to use that information to

obtain additional information outside the Government

files"). Balancing the relevant privacy and_ public

interests, we noted in Forest Service Employees that

"the only ‘additional public benefit’ the release of the

employees' personal information would provide"—the

ability to cantact witnesses or employees to obtain

information not contained in the report—"was

‘inextricably intertwined’ with tke invasion of the

App. 24

employees’ privacy." 524 F.3d at 1028 (quoting

Painting Indus., 26 F.3d at 1485). After so

recognizing, Forest Service Employees went on to hold

that when "the only way the release of the identities"

will benefit the public "is if the public uses such

information to contact the employees directly." such

use cannot justify release of the information. Jd.

[13] The situation presented here is for all relevant

purposes identical to that in Forest Service

Employees, so we are bound by the outcome in that

case of the balancing of public and private interests.

Lahr already possesses the substance of the

eyewitnesses’ reports and the FBI agents' thoughts as

they are expressed in the released memoranda and

emails. The only way that the identities of the

eyewitnesses and FBI agents mentioned in the

documents already released would have public value

is if these individuals were contacted directly by the

plaintiff or by the media. Under’ Forest

ServiceEmployees, such use is insufficient to override

the witnesses' and agents' privacy interests, as the

disclosure would bring about additional useful

information only if direct contacts, furthering the

privacy intrusion, are made. /d.

[14] Accordingly, we reverse the district court's

decision ordering the agencies to release the names of

eyewitnesses and FBI agents.

A. "Deliberative Process" Documents

Lahr challenges the agencies' withholding of three

documents the agencies claim are part of their

"deliberative process" and thus’ shielded from

disclosure under Exemption 5. Exemption 5 provides

Apn. 25

that FOIA does not apply to "interagency or intra-

agency memorandums or letters which would not be

available by law to a party other than an agency in

litigation with the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).

Exemption & "shields 'those documents, and only

those documents, normally privileged in the civil

discovery context.'" Carter v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce,

307 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting NLAB v.

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975)). "In

light of the strong policy of the FOIA that the public is

entitled to know what its government is doing and

why, [E]lxemption 5 is to be applied as narrowly as

consistent with efficient Government operation."

Maricopa Audubon Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 108

F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997) Ginternal quotation

marks omitted).

[15] The agencies invoke the "deliberative process"

privilege, which shields’ certain’ intra-agency

communications from disclosure to "allow agencies

freely to explore pussibilitics, engage in internal

debates, or play devil's advocate without fear of public

scrutiny." Assembly of Cal, 968 F.2d at 920. To fall

within this privilege, "a document must be both

‘predecisional' and 'deliberative.' " Jd.

A "predecisional" document is one prepared in

order to assist an agency decisionmaker in

arriving at his decision, and may include

recommendations, draft documents, proposals,

suggestions, and other subjective documents

which reflect the personal opinions of the

writer rather than the policy of the agency. A

predecisional document is a part of the

"deliberative process," if the disclosure of the

materials would expose an agency's

App. 26

decisionmaking process in such a way as to

discourage candid discussion within the agency

and thereby undermine the agency's ability to

perform its functions.

Id. (alteration, citations, and internal quotation

marks omitted). Lahr appeals the district court's

grant of summary judgment, after review of the

documents in camera, as to three documents withheld

pursuant to the deliberative process privilege.158 Lahr

first argues on appeal that government misconduct

bars the application of the exemption. He also

challenges the district court's conclusion that the

documents were predecisional and deliberative. After

reviewing the documents in camera, and giving

deference to the district court's factual findings on

“whether disclosure of the requested information

would reveal anything about the agency's decisional

process," Carter, 307 F.3d at 1088 (internal quetation

marks omitted), we hold that, insofar as they were

challenged in the district court, they properly fall

within Exemption 5.

As a threshold matter, Lahr contends that evidence of

government misconduct, crime, and fraud bars the

apphcation of Exemption 5. See In re Sealed Case,

121 F.3d 729, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[W]here there is

reason to believe the documents sought may shed

light on government misconduct, the privilege is

routinely denied, on the grounds that shielding

internal government deliberations in this context does

not serve the public's interest in honest, effective

18 The district court denied the agencies summary

judgment as to some other documents withheld under this

exemption. The agencies do not appeal this ruling.

App. 27

government." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Lahr did not so argue in the district court, and so

waived the issue. See A-I1 Ambulance Serv., Inc. v.

County of Monterey, 90 F.3d 333, 338 (9th Cir. 1996).

Lahr argues that we may nonetheless reach the

question because it is purely one of law. We do have

limited discretion to consider purely legal arguments

raised for the first time on appeal, sce Parks Sch. of

Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir.

1995), but that is so only where "consideration of the

issue would not prejudice the [opposing party's]

ability to present relevant facts that could affect our

decision." Aimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.

1996). Here, considering the issue for the first time on

appeal would unfairly prejudice the government.

Lahr did, of course, make general allegations of

government misconduct in the district court, as his

entire request is an attempt to prove a massive

government conspiracy. But disproving the general,

substantive allegations of misconduct is not the

government's obligation in FOIA litigation. Nor do

Lahr's misconduct allegations specifically relate to the

documents at issue under Exemption 5. Accordingly,

the government was not on notice before the district

court that its failure to submit evidence in response to

those allegations would vitiate its deliberative process

privilege. We hold, therefore, that Lahr waived this

argument by not advancing it in the district

court. 14

14 We also have discretion to reach issues not raised before

the trial court in "the exceptional cases in which review is

necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the

integrity of the judicial process lor] when a new issue arises

while appeal is pending because of a change in the law." Bolker

App. 28

1. Predecisional and Deliberative

Lahr's contention is that the agencies improperly

withheld these three documents under _ the

deliberative process privilege because they were

created after the agency's final decision, for the

purpose of interpreting or explaining the decision

after the fact. The district court concluded that the

CIA's video animation, presented to the public in

November 1997 (before the date stated on Records 27

and 28), was a final decision. But the court clarified,

however, that the video was not necessarily

the only final disposition. The CIA could have

published some sort of addendum stating it had

received and considered new data and that it

had (or had not) changed its ultimate

conclusion. Although this is not what occurred,

it also is not what was required. Defendants

have presented uncontroverted evidence that

the CIA analyzed new data that led it to reach

a conclusion. That the later conclusion was no

different than the previous one does not

preclude it from being "final" for purposes of

FOIA.

v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.

1985) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Lahr

invokes this exception as well, but there is no intervening

change in the law, and Lahr cannot meet the miscarriage of

justice standard for the same reasons already surveyed, most

especially because he has not made any allegation of a

connection between these particular documents and government

misconduct.

App. 29

Lahr argues that the district court's analysis is

incorrect. Because the CIA's video was a final] decision

and the CIA issued no subsequent final decision on

the matter, Lahr argues, the records that post date

the video cannot be "predecisional,"

Contrary to Lahr's position, the fact that the CIA did

not issue a subsequent report is, under the applicable

case law, not dispositive of whether the records are

"predecisional." See Sears, 421 U.S. at 151 n.18

(cautioning that the "emphasis on the need to protect

pre-decisional documents does not mean that the

existence of the privilege turns on the ability of an

agency to identify a specific decision in connection

with which a memorandum is prepared"). At the same

time, the absence of an identifiable later decision is of

considerable relevance to the deliberative process

privilege, as evidence of whether a later decision was

indeed under consideration. Otherwise, the privilege

would be boundless, as "[alny memorandum always

will be 'predecisional' if referenced to a decision that

possibly may be made at some undisclosed time in the

future." Assembly of Cal, 968 F.2d at 921.

Applying this understanding, we have rejected the

argument that "a continuing process of agency self>

examination is enough to render a document

‘predecisional." Maricopa Audubon Soc'y, 108 F.3d at

1094. The documents must be prepared to assist an

agency decision-maker in arriving at a_ future

particular decision, although we need not be able to

identify retroactively "the actual decision that was

made" on the basis of the withheld documents. Jd; sce

also Sears, 421 U.S. at 151 n.18. Hence, we have

rejected the applhcation of the privilege to protect

from disclosure the routine collection of data and

App. 30

analysis where the agency could point only to

speculative or generalized purposes for which the

information would be used. See Assembly of Cal., 968

F.2d at 921 (holding that the possible future use of

adjusted census data in calculating population

estimates between censuses did not render the data

"predecisional").

[16] Further, although an agency's issuance of a "final

decision" with respect to a particular issue does not

necessarily preclude the agency from withholding

documents prepared in a subsequent evaluation of the

question with the goal of confirming or rejecting its

earlier conclusions, post-decisional records fall outside

the deliberative process privilege if they follow a final

decision and are designed to explain a decision

already made. As the Supreme Court recognized in

Sears, the purpose of the deliberative process

privilege is to protect the quality of an agency's

decision; revealing "communications made after the

decision and designed to explain it" do not affect a

decision's quality. Sears, 421 U.S. at 152.

Under the deliberative process privilege, a record

must not only be_ predecisional, but also

"deliberative." A document is "deliberative" if "the

disclosure of the materials would expose an agency's

decisionmaking process in such a way as. to

discourage candid discussion within the agency and

thereby undermine the agency's ability to perform its

functions." Assembly of Cal, 968 F.2d at 921 (internal

quotation marks omitted). We give deference to the

district court's factual determination concerning

App. 31

whether that standard is met. Carter, 307 F.3d at

1088.15

We have reviewed the records 7n camera and discuss

below in general terms the applicability of the

15 Lahr also contends that the district court erred in failing

to apply a "balancing test" to the government's withholding of

the three documents under Exemption 5. Relying on Genera/

Services Administration v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir.

1969), Lahr contends that traditional equity principles apply to

determine whether withholding is warranted under Exemption

5. See Benson, 415 F.2d at 880 (holding that courts must weigh

"the effects of disclosure and nondisclosure, according to

traditional equity principles"). We have subsequently explained

that the FOIA context is different, and that Benson

merely recognized that where docurents normally

privileged in the civil discovery context are involved,

courts may employ in exemption 5 cases the same

equitable principles that they may use to fix the scope of

discovery in civil litigation against an agency. Except in

this limited sense, however, courts do not possess

‘equitable discretion’ to deny FOIA requests.

Maricopa Audubon Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1082,

1088 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, any equitable discretion retained

by the district court was limited to determining whether the

withheld documents fell within the scope of the claimed

privilege. Once the court concluded that they did fall within the

privilege, and thus fell within one of FOIA's exemptions, the

district court had no discretion to order the documents released

pursuant to equitable principles. We note, in addition, that the

determination whether a particular document is subject to

discovery in a specific lawsuit will not necessarily determine

whether that same document is subject to FOLIA release. The

identity of litigants and the need for the document in litigation

may render the document nonprivileged in litigation. See F7C v.

Warner Comme'ns, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984) (per

curiam),

App. 32

deliberative process privilege with respect to each of

the withheld documents. !&

2. Documents at Issue

a. Record 27!’

The first document ("Record 27") is an eighteen-page

CIA document dated March 1998, described by the

agency as a "[dJraft report containing analysis and

preliminary conclusions regarding further assessment

of TWA Flight 800," on the subject of "Dynamic Flight

Simulation." The document describes the steps CLA

analysts took in simulating the flight path of the

aircraft, the data and other information important to

the calculations, particular challenges the analysts

faced in conducting the analysis, and

recommendations for agency decisionmakers.

Importantly, the document explicitly discusses

refining the simulation's conclusions based on

additional and more complete data that became

available over the course of the investigation, which

continued after the release of the November 1997

animation. The district court ordered only the title,

date, and bolded headings released.

16 As the government's Vaughn index did not supply

sufficient information for us to determine whether the

documents fell within the privilege, and because the content:

specific nature of the inquiry makes it unlikely that a more

specific Vaughn index would have aided our review, we ordered

the government to produce these documents for our in camera

inspection,

17 Like the district court, we identify the documents by the

Plaintiff's record numbers.

App. 33

Our 77 camera review of the document confirms that

it is predecisional for the purposes of the deliberative

process privilege. Although it is dated after the

November 1997 CIA animation, it was clearly

prepared for the specific purpose of aiding the agency

in its determination of the likely flight path of the

aircraft following the explosion, a determination

central to the CIA's task of explaining what the

eyewitnesses actually saw. Although the document

discusses prior CIA estimates of the aircraft's flight

path, it also reviews those estimates and makes

recommendations.

[17] The document is also "deliberative." It exposes in

detail the thought processes of the CIA analysts °

involved in calculating the simulated flight path, as

well as language reflecting their decisionmaking

process. We agree with the district court that

releasing this record would discourage the type of

candid discussion necessary for effective formulation

of agency decisions, see Assembly of Cal, 963 F.2d at

921, and conclude that the document was properly

withheld pursuant to Exemption 5.

b. Record 28

The second document ("Record 28"), titled "Analysis of

Radar Tracking," is a seventeen-page "[d]raft report

concerning preliminary analysis and_ conclusions

regarding radar tracking of TWA Flight 800." This

document also is dated March 1998. Handwriting on

the document's first page reads "Draft" and "shown to

NTSB but never finalized." As the district court's

description notes, the document "contains conclusions

and thoughts of CIA analysts concerning the viability

and accuracy of certain radar data, the application of

App. 34

such data in determining the flight path of Flight 800,

the problems with certain data and the thought

processes of individuals who analyzed the data." The

district court ordered the government to disclose the

document's title, date, bolded section headings, one

figure, arc’ the document's appendix, which contains

the re u. readings on which the document's analysis

is based. We agree, after reviewing the withheld

portions of the record, that they are both

predecisional and deliberative.

[18] The district court did order the agency to release

the raw data used in the analysis, which was

contained in the document's appendix. ‘The remainder

of the document contains the CIA analysts' evaluation

of that data, their calculations, and their thought

processes. As with Record 27, we agree that release of

the document would expose the agency's internal

deliberations in such a way that would discourage

candid discussion and effective decisionmaking. We

therefore conclude that the agency properly withheld

this document under the Exemption 5 dehberative

process privilege.

c. Record 43

The third document ("Record 43") is a five-page draft

document concerning the CIA's analysis of eyewitness

reports about the crash. A cover page preceding the

document describes it as a "response to allegations of

SA [Name] regarding C.I.A. analysis." The document

discusses the CIA's” assessment of individual

eyewitness reports. Handwritten comments and edits

appear on each page of the document in different

handwriting styles. The district court upheld the

withholding of this document in its entirety.

App. 35

The document is not dated, and its contents do not

clearly indicate whether it was created before or after

the November 1997 CIA animation. In either case, we

are persuaded that the document is_ predecisional.

Each page of the document is labeled "draft," and

several blanks appear in the text where data or other

information would likely be added. Moreover, the

document is a response to one person's criticisms of

the CIA's analysis of witness statements, suggesting

that it was part of an ongoing process of refining the

agency's ultimate conclusions about what the

witnesses saw. This conclusion is_ bolstered by

discussions of previous "drafts" of the CIA's

conclusion and by the absence of any reference to a

final version or to the termination of the CIA's

investigation into the matter.

[19] Moreover, the record is clearly deliberative. Aside

from the text of the draft itself—which discusses the

CIA analysts' impressions of witness statements and

the agency's take on the importance and significance

of certain witnesses—the handwritten comments on

the document, in the words of the district court,

"unquestionably are part of a_ give-and-take

exchange." We conclude that the document

appropriately falls within Exemption 5 and was

properly withheld in its entirety.

In sum, we hold that the withheld portions of each of

the three challenged documents properly fall within

the scope of Exemption 5.

C. Computer Simulation Inputs

Lahr challenges several of the district court's rulings

regarding the computer simulations run by the

agencies. We begin with some background to facilitate

an understanding of what is and what is not at issue

with regard to those simulations. The agencies used

several computer simulation programs in their

investigation of the crash. The CIA used a program

created by the National Security Agency ("NSA"). An

NTSB employee, Dennis Crider, wrote his own

software program. The NTSB also used two programs

called BREAKUP and BALLISTIC. The agencies’ use

of these programs resulted two tynes of potentially

discoverable information: the software programs

themselves and the inputs entered into the programs

by the agencies.

As to the first category—the programs themselves—

there is no dispute on appeal between the parties. The

district court held that the NSA's computer program

fell under an exemption, and Lahr does not challenge

that conclusion, at least with respect to the software

itself. The district court ordered the NTSB to disclose

the Crider program, and the agency does not appeal

this ruling. Finally, the agency does not contest the

district court's order directing the NTSB to search for

the BALLISTIC and BREAKUP programs and

disclose them, if found, subject to any applicable

FOIA exemptions.

The only dispute about the computer simulation

programs arises from the nondisclosure of certain of

the inputs into these software programs. We discuss

below the relevant inputs with respect to each

program.

App. 37

1. NSA Program

The CIA withheld the NSA program, citing FOIA

Exemption 3, which exempts from disclosure matters

"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute," 5

U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), and pointing to the National

Security Agency Act of 1959.18 Lahr concedes that

the NSA program itself falls within this exemption,

but argues on appeal that the data inputs are

segregable and should be disclosed. The district court

concluded that Exemption 3 was "applicable to the

software in its entirety." It is not entirely clear,

however, whether this pronouncement included what

Lahr refers to as the programs inputs, but the

government has not released any of these inputs.

Under Exemption 3 and the NSA statute, information

is properly withheld if the agency "describe[s] the

intelligence activity involved, and . . . showls] why

disclosure of requested materials could reveal the

nature of that activity.". Hayden v. Nat? Sec.

Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 608 F.2d 1381, 1391 (D.C.

Cir. 1979). The agency need not make a "specific

showing of potential harm to national security"

because "Congress has already, in enacting the

18 Specifically, the CIA cited section 6(a), which provides, tn

relevant part:

"[Nlothing in this Act or any other law . . . shall be

construed to require the disclosure of the organization or

any function of the National Security Agency, [orl any

information with respect to the activities thereof... ."

National Security Agency Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-36,

§ 6(a), 73 Stat. 63, 64 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §

402 note).

App. 38

statute, decided that disclosure of NSA activities is

notentially harmful." /d. at 1390.

The CIA submitted an initial affidavit from a senior

NSA official stating that "release of the computer

program could expose how the U.S. Government

analyzes the performance characteristics of foreign

weapons systems that are aerodynamic or ballistic."

The district court found this description wanting and

ordered an in camera affiaavit. After reviewing that

in camera submission, the district court concluded

that the affidavit sufficiently described how the

program, "a unique tool for foreign weapons system

analysis," could harm the nation if disclosed. The

district court then concluded that Exemption 3 is

applicable.

[20] After reviewing the NSA's affidavit in camera, we

agree with the district court. The affidavit states that

the program is used to analyze foreign weapons, and

outlines specific reasons why release of the program,

including the data inputs, would put the agency's

sources and methods at risk. We hold that the

affidavit offers a sufficient explanation. The program

and the inputs therefore fall within Exemption 3 and

were properly withheld.

2. Crider Program

As noted, the district court ordered disclosure of the

software for the Crider program, finding that the

program itself was not deliberative and therefore did

not properly fall within Exemption 5. Lahr contests

the district court's conclusion that the simulation

App. 39

inputs did fall within Exemption 5.19 On appeal,

Lahr's sole argument is that a government

misconduct exception bars the applicability of

Exemption 5. As with the other documents withheld

under the deliberative process privilege, we hold that

Lahr waived the argument by not raising it before the

district court. We therefore affirm the district court's

conclusion that the inputs properly fell within

Exemption 5.

3. BALLISTIC and BREAKUP Programs

Lahr made two kinds of requests relating to the

BALLISTIC and BREAKUP programs. First, he

sought the programs’ themselves. Second, he

requested "[aJll records of the formulas and data

entered into the computer simulations regarding the

NTSB's zoom-climb conclusion." The district court

ordered the government to search for and disclose, if

found, the BALLISTIC and BREAKUP programs,

subject to any applicable exemptions. The district

court also ordered the government to review its

records to locate data inputs for the BREAKUP

program and disclose that information, if found. The

government appeals none of these orders.

The district court also found, however, that the

BALLISTIC program, unlike BREAKUP, was “not

used in any manner in connection with the 'zoom-

climb conclusion,’ " and thus held that the data inputs

19 The district court does not expressly state that it found

the simulation inpuis to be deliberative, but it is clear that it so

held from the discussion as a whole. Lahr concedes as much in

his reply brief, stating that "I[t]he district court held that the

simulation inputs were privileged as deliberative," and does not

challenge the "deliberative" classification on appeal.

App. 40

for that piv»gram did not fall within the scope of

Lahr's request. Lahr appeals this ruling, arguing that

the "flight-path of the debris descending"— which he

contends the BALLISTIC program modeled—is

"inextricably a part of the government's theory that

two-thirds of the aircraft ascended."

The government's declarant stated that the

BREAKUP and BALLISTIC programs were not a part

of the simulation program for the main wreckage of

the aircraft, which modeled the ascent of the aircraft

after the separation of the nose section. Instead, these

programs were used for determination of the

trajectory of certain pieces of the aircraft other than

the main section. The declaration provides additional

detail for the BREAKUP program, indicating that it

was used to determine the "timing of the nose

separating from the aircraft." On that basis, the

district court concluded that the BREAKUP program

was in fact relevant to the zoom-climb conclusion.

Importantly, it was the tzming of the nose separation,

not the trajectory of certain pieces of the aircraft, that

the district court found related to the zoom-climb

theory. This conclusion makes sense, given that the

zoom-climb thesis centers on the upward trajectory of

the main body of the aircraft following the nose

separation and has little to do with other pieces of the

plane.

[21] The district court also determined, on the other

hand, that the government had demonstrated that the

BALLISTIC program was not used in connection with

the zoom-climb conclusion. The government's

declaration supports this conclusion. It states that the

only way in which these programs were relevant to

the flight-path simulation was by providing the

App. 41

timing point at which the nose separation occurred.

According to the declaration, this timing information

was obtained solely from the BREAKUP program. In

light of this evidence, we cannot conclude that the

district court's finding that the BALLISTIC program

did not contribute to the zoom-climb theory was

clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the district

court's conclusion that the data inputs to the

BALLISTIC program were not responsive to Lahr's

request.

D. Adequacy of Search

FOIA requires an agency responding to a request to

"demonstrate that it has conducted a_ search

reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant

documents." Zemansky v. EPA, 767 F.2d 569, 571 (9th

Cir. 1985) Ginternal quotation marks omitted). This

showing may be made by "reasonably detailed,

nonconclusory affidavits submitted in good faith." Jd.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The NTSB submitted detailed declarations describing

its search, which involved a search of the public

docket, the NTSB's accident investigation files, and

the paper records and computer systems of employees

responsible for the simulations and animations of the

flight path and for the earlier Trajectory Study. The

CIA submitted a declaration explaining its search,

which included a search of automated records and a

manual search of individual analyst files, local

databases, email, and desk files. The search was

focused on the Directorate of Intelligence, the CIA

component determined to be reasonably likely to have

records responsive to Lahr's request.

App. 42

Lahr argues that the government's searches were

inadequate, contending that several produced

documents prove the existence of additional

documents that the agencies failed to produce or to

describe in the government's Vaughn index.2° Lahr

cites fourteen documents he claims contain references

to or suggestions of other documents that should have

been produced.

These references and suggestions fall roughly into two

categories. In the first category, Lahr points to graphs

or charts (some of which are handwritten) that

attempt to map the aircraft's trajectory, and he

argues that the government must identify the source

of the data used to create them. In the second

category, Lahr points to references to other specific

documents. For instance, the CIA disclosed a redacted

letter to Boeing requesting certain "Input variables";

Lahr claims that Boeing's response to this letter was

neither disclosed nor identified. In another example,

pointing to a fax cover sheet that references attached

documents, Lahr complains that the government

failed to disclose these attachments or describe them

in the Vaughn index.

In evaluating the sufficiency of an agency's search,

"the issue to be resolved is not whether there might

exist any other documents possibly responsive to the

20 As described in the next section, the government must

submit an affidavit pursuant to Vaughn, 484 F.2d 820,

identifying the documents withheld, the FOIA exemptions

claimed, and a particularized explanation of why each document

falls within the claimed exemption. Lion Raisins v. U.S. Dep't of

Agric., 354 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004).

App. 43

request, but rather whether the search for those

documents was adequate," Zemansky, 767 F.2d at 571

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jturralde

v. Comptroller of the Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315

(D.C. Cir. 2003) ("LL]t is long settled that the failure of

an agency to turn up one specific document in its

search does not alone render a search inadequate.").

For example, in Miller y, U.S. Department of State,

779 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir, 1985), Miller attacked the

agency's search by asserting that he had "repeatedly

identified for the State Department particular

documents which were internally referred to in

documents released to him. He argues that the fact

that these referenced documents were not sent to him

indicates an inadequate search on the part of the

State Department." /d. at 1384. The Eighth Circuit

rejected this challenge:

The fact that a document once existed does not

mean that it now exists: nor does the fact that

an agency created a document necessarily

imply that the agency has retained it. ‘Thus, the

Department is not required by the Act to

account for documents which the requester has

in some way identified if it has made a diligent

search for those documents in the places in

which they might be expected to be found.

Td. at 1385; see also Maynard, 986 F.2d at 563-64;

SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201

(D.C. Cir. 1991).

Here, with respect to the data referenced in some of

the documents, Lahr only speculates that the agencies

have retained records of the data points used to create

the various charts. Lahr presents no persuasive

App. 44

evidence however that these records now exist and

either evaded discovery during the agencies' searches

or were purposely and improperly withheld. The

government's submissions describe in sufficient detail

the agencies’ search for records such as the data used

to produce these charts. We are satisfied that the

searches were reasonably calculated to uncover

responsive documents.?! The district court found no

evidence of either agency's bad faith in conducting

their searches, and, aside from his general allegations

of government cover-up, Lahr presents no evidence

that would undermine the district court's conclusion.

Lahr's claim that the government's searches were

inadequate because they failed to uncover the records

in the second category—documents referenced in

produced records—also fails for similar reasons. As an

initial matter, we note that there is a mistake or

miscommunication with respect to at least one of the

21 For instance, the NTSB's declaration stated that one

person, Douglas Crider, was "responsible for deriving the

calculations and/or computations of the flight path for TWA

flight 800," and "was the only NTSB staff [member] who created

a computer simulation of the flight path of the accident

airplane." Crider’s declaration describes in detail his several

searches for records responsive to Lahr's requests. Douglass

Brazy "was the only NTSB staff [member] responsible for

creating the animations of the flight path of TWA flight SUO

shown at the public hearing on December 8, 1997." In response

to Lahr's requests, Brazy “searched [his] office { ] and the

computer systems used to create the animations." The CLA's

declaration similarly detailed its search process, which involved

supplementing the search of the automated records system with

a manual search after the automated search turned up no

responsive records.

App. 45

documents allegedly not produced by the CLA.22 In

other instances, it is not clear whether the statements

cited by Lahr actually refer to other documents that

ever existed, let alone existed at the time of the

agencies’ searches.23 With respect to the remaining

few documents, Lahr's contentions are too speculative

to support the conclusion that the agencies’ searches

were inadequate. Even if the documents did exist

when the agencies conducted their searches, the

failure to produce or identify a few isolated documents

cannot by itself prove the searches inadequate.™4

Moreover, Lahr makes no specific allegations that the

government's searches were fraudulent or that it

purposely withheld responsive documents.

22 In this instance, it appears that the agency either did or

intended to produce the document Lahr maintains was not

disclosed. Lahr points to icons indicating Microsoft Word

documents attached to an email with the subject "Final Reports

to the FBI," but represents that the attachments were not

disclosed or identified. Yet, according to the Vaughn index for

this document, the CIA either did or intended to produce the

attached documents. This document thus offers no support for

the claim that the government's search was inadequate

23 For example, Lahr complains that one document appears

to be missing pages because it contains a "Figure 1" and a

"Figure 8" but no Figures 2 through 7. It is possible that pages

are missing, but it is more probable that the document, which is

unsigned and undated, was produced in draft form, so that the

allegedly missing figures did not vet exist. The document

includes place holders for future figures, "figure[s! x and x."

24 The government, of course, must produce responsive

documents actual/y uncovered in a search, unless one of FOLA's

exemptions applies.

App. 46

Finally, Lahr argues that the CIlA should have

disclosed or identified in the VaugAn index a report

on TWA Flight 800 by CIA analyst Randolph Tauss,

which was the subject of a 2003 Washington Post

article (the "Tauss Report"). Lahr's argument fails for

two reasons. First, as the district court found, the

document is not responsive to Lahr's FOLA request.

Lahr requested "all records upon which this publicly

released aircraft flight path climb conclusion las set

forth in the 1997 video] was based." The document is

a narrative recounting of the CIA's participation in

the investigation of the crash, including the use of

eyewitness reports. Although undated, it is clearly a

retrospective look at the CIA's investigation, not a

record on which the CLA's conclusion of the flight path

was based. Second, a_ redacted version of the

document now appears in the public record. The

names of CIA analysts are redacted, but the district

court held that these names were properly withheld

under Exemption 3, and Lahr has not challenged this

ruling on appeal. As Lahr could not get any more of

this document than is now available to him, the issue

is moot.

[22] In sum, we hold that the agencies' declarations

are sufficient to support the conclusion that their

searches were reasonably calculated to uncover

responsive records and were therefore adequete for

the purposes of FOLA.

E. Vaughn Index

Government agencies must submit an affidavit

pursuant to Vaughn, 484 F.2d 820, "identifying the

documents withheld, the FOIA exemptions claimed,

and a_=particularized explanation of why each

App. 47

document falls within the claimed exemption." Lion

Raisins, 354 F.3d at 1082. The Vaughn index "must

be detailed enough for the district court to make a de

novo assessment of the government's claim of

exemption." Jd. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Lahr makes several challenges to the sufficiency of

the government's Vaughn index. "We review de novo

whether the [agency]'s indices and _ supporting

declarations constitute a sufficient Vaughn index."

Citizens Comm'n on Human Fights v. FDA, 45 F.3d

1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1995).

1. Correlation Records

[23] Lahr first contends that the government's

Vaughn i. dex fails to identify records "correlating"

various information, such as radar, flight data

recorder, and cockpit voice recorder data, with its

zoom-climb conclusion. The NTSB's Vaugén index

does specifically address records of the correlation of

the zoom-climb calculations with these data, referring

Lahr to responsive records available in the public

docket or released in response to the FOIA requests,

or stating that responsive documents were withheld

under Exemption 5. Lahr maintains that the

government's "Vaughn index should identify the

records of the correlations it claims to have

performed." We cannot discern from this articulation

what additional clarification about the available

information Lahr seeks; most likely, he is complaining

not about the Vaughn index, but about the NTSB's

failure to release additional records of this variety. In

any event, we conclude that the government's Vaughn

index sufficiently identifies correlation records.

App. 48

2. CIA Simulation

Lahr next contends that the government's Vaughn

index fails to identify the dates on which the

government ran the NSA simulation program and

whether it was the CIA or the NSA that actually ran

it, arguing that he made a specific request for that

information.25 Specifically, Lahr claims that the CIA

produced two printouts of the simulation with

allegedly different results—one a set of graphical!

charts bearing the date "5/16/97" and the other, data

tables bearing two dates, "3/98" and "3/15/04." Lahr

faults the government's Vaughn index for failing to

state whether both records were generated from the

NSA's simulation program.

[24] The documents produced and the Vaughn index

sufficiently respond to Lahr's request. As to the first

document, there is nothing to suggest that the

graphical charts were not created on the date

specified. According to the government's Vaughn

index, an email accompanying the charts identifies

the CIA agents involved in creating the document, but

their names have been redacted under Exemption 3, a

redaction Lahr does not dispute. The government's

description plainly states that the graphs are

depictions of the results of certain aspects of the

trajectory simulation program, and the email so

confirms. As to the second, it is true that the

document contains two handwritten dates, but the

"3/98" date is preceded by "dated =,” suggesting that

25 Lahr contends that the relevant request was for "all

records reflecting whether or not the NTSB conducted the

computer simulations in-house, and, if not, all records of when,

where, and by whom the computer simulations were performed."

App. 49

the tables report data and results from the simulation

run at that time.26 The document also contains the

redacted name of a CIA analyst involved in the

simulation, as the Vaughn index indicates. ‘The

document explicitly says that the data tables are the

product of the trajectory simulation program. Viewed

together, the documents and the Vaughn index are

sufficient to answer Lahr's challenge.

3. Affiants' Personal Knowledge

As a general matter, "laln affidavit from an agency

employee responsible for supervising a FOIA search is

all that is needed to satisfy" the personal knowledge

requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e).

Carney v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 814 (2d

Cir. 1994); see also Maynard, 986 F.2d at 559-60.

Lahr argues that, although agency affidavits under

FOIA generally may be made based on information

available to the affiant in her official capacity, here,

because he has proven fraud, the CIA should be

required to produce affidavits based only on personal

knowledge. Lahr contends that the CIA omitted

certain key documents in its submission to the district

court and released documents using a confusing

numbering system that complicated his efforts at

organizing the CIA's responses.

26 The computer printout itself contains the "3/15/04" date

that is also handwritten on the front page of the document. The

text of the printout, however, also reads, "Boeing proprietary

information removed." In context, this most likely indicates that

the printout was reproduced at this later date, in response to

Lahr's FOIA request.

App. 50

Lahr properly points out that an agency's proven

misconduct can undermine the presumed veracity of

its affidavits. See, e.g., Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 243,

249 (6th Cir. 1994). He points to no authority,

however, that proof of fraud obviates the general rule

applicable in FOJA cases that an affiant need not

have personally conducted the search. Furthermore,

Lahr's complaints about the CIA's handling of his

FOIA requests might suggest some bureaucratic

mismanagement, but they do not prove fraud in that

regard.

[25] We hold that the government's VaugAn index was

sufficient.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's decision

is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and

REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.27

27 The district court concluded that, as it ordered

production of twenty six out. of thirty-two contested records, Lahr

"substantially prevailed" within the meaning of the statute. Our

decision reversing the district court's order that the government

rclease names redacted in eleven documents requires that the

district court reconsider its conclusion that Lahr "substantially

prevailed." Our reversal on these eleven documents also could

alter the district court's assessment of Lahr's entitlement to fees

and the calculation of any fees awarded. We therefore remand

for reconsideration of the fee award.

App. 51

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CASE NO. CV 03-8023 AHM (RZx)

H. RAY LAHR,

Plaintiff,

Ws

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY BOARD, CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and

NATIONAL SECURITY

AGENCY,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN

PART DEFENDANT CIA'S SECOND MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

"Certain historical facts are unassailable, while

others are constantly subject to attack and,

ultimately, remain shrouded in mystery and

confusion." Minier v. Central Intelligence Agency, 88

F.3d 796, 799 (Sth Cir. 1996). This irrefutable

observation aptly describes the controversy that

triggered this lawsuit. Barely more than ten years

ago on July 17, 1996, a United States commercial

aircraft - - TWA Fhght 800 - - exploded in mid-air off

App. 52

the coast of Long Island. Everyone aboard perished.

What happened? How? Why? Who was responsible?

Was it an accident? A terrorist attack?

Of course there was an official investigation. And of

course there was an official explanation. And of

course there was an ensuing torrent of critics and

skeptics who challenged the bona fides of the

investigation and rejected the explanation.

Equally predictable, the doubters (or at least Plaintiff,

representing one group of them) have now turned to

the courts to seek a ruling ordering the Government

to turn over information that it has thus far withheld.

For the reasons set forth below, | find that plaintiff is

entitled to some, but not all, of what he seeks. The

Court therefore GRANTS summary judgment to

Defendants only as to the records specified below.} In

doing so, J do not purport to provide an answer to the

above much-debated questions nor an affirmation or

repudiation of the official government conclusion as to

the cause of the flight's crash.

SUMMARY

DISCLOSURE

MORL NTSB PLAINTIFF JUDGMENT REQUIRED?

551 GRANT NO

DD2 48 DENY YES

1 MORI references are to the last three digits of

Government's numbering system. The multiple identifications

reflect the sad fact that the parties affixed multiple and

confusing identifications to given documents.

App. 53

553 GRANT NO

554 12 DENY YES

555 GRANT NO

556 1 GRANT NO

302 DENY YES

380 8633 66 DENY YES

$82 34 76 DENY YES

382 35 77 DENY YES

22?) 836 78 DENY YES

NSA Computer Program GRANT NO

I, Background

A. Factual Summary*

1. The Crash Investigation and

Ensuing FOIA Litigation

The genesis of this suit lies in the tragic crash of

Trans World Airline ("TWA") Fhght 800 ("Flight

800"). On July 17, 1996, Flight 800 departed from

John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York

2 The following factual summary incorporates facts

presented in all three of the Defendants' various motions for

partial summary judgment.

City, en route to Charles de Gaulle International

Airport in Paris, France. The aircraft crashed into the

Atlantic Ocean twelve minutes after departure. There

were no survivors of the accident and the aircraft, a

Boeing 747-131, was destroyed. Some eyewitnesses

recounted having seen "a streak of hght, resembling a

flare, moving upward in the sky to the point where a

large fireball appeared.... [and] split into two fireballs

as it descended toward the water." Moye Dec/., Ex. IV,

at p. 278.

The National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB")

is an independent federal agency charged with

investigating civil aviation accidents in the United

States. 49 C.F.R. §§ 800.3, 831.2. The NTSB conducts

investigations in ‘order to determine the

circumstances relating to and the probable causes of

accidents and to make safety recommendations that

are intended "to prevent similar accidents or incidents

in the future." Jd. § 831.4. The NTSB has the

authority to designate parties to assist the agency in

conducting an accident investigation. Jd. § 831.11

("Parties shall be limited to those Persons,

government agencies, companies, and associations

whose employees, functions, activities, or products

were involved in the accident or incident and who can

provide suitable qualified technical personnel actively

to assist in the investigation."). Following an accident

investigation, the NTSB issues its probable cause

determination and safety recommendations in an

official report. Jd. § 831.4.

Per its mandate, the NTSB conducted = an

investigation of Flight 800. The NTSB appointed

several entities as party participants to assist in the

investigation, including the Boeing Commercial

App. 55

Airplane Group ("Bocing CAG") and the Air Linc

Pilots Association

("‘ALPA").3 Boeing also’ voluntarily provided

information to the NTSB and Central Intelligence

Agency ("CIA") concerning flight characteristics and

performance of Boeing 747s. Third Buroker Decl. at §

10. The investigation of Fhght 800 eventually

produced a public docket containing approximately

2,750 documents. Public hearings were held in

December 1997 and in August 2000. On August 23,

2000, the NTSB adopted the "Aircraft Accident

Report: In-flight Breakup Over The Atlantic Ocean"

(the "Accident Report") as the official NTSB accident

report on Flight 800. See Moye Decl. TV. The parties

do not dispute that the Accident Report constitutes

the NTSB's final conclusion as to the probable cause

of the Flight 800 accident, although Plaintiff claims

that the CIA animation, see /nfra, also constitutes a

final conclusion.

The NTSB concluded that during the initial break-up

of the aircraft, the forward fuselage detached from the

remainder of the aircraft. The remainder briefly

continued to climb in "crippled flight." See Moye Decl.,

Ex. IV, at pp. 288, 290. Plaintiff Lahr calls this

3 The other parties included the Federal Aviation

Administration; TWA; the International Association of

Mechanists, Aerospace Workers, and Flight Attendants; the

National Air Traffic Controllers Association; Pratt & Whitney;

Honeywell; and the Crane Company, Hydro-Aire, Inc. Moye Decl,

Ex. IV at p. 302.

App. 56

conclusion, of which he is skeptical, the "zoom-ciimb"

conclusion.4

Dennis Crider, a National Resource Specialist for

Vehicle Simulation in the Vehicle Performance

Division of the NTSB, was assigned to _ the

investigation of Flight 800. Crider was tasked with

determining the trajectories of parts of the aircraft

and the flight path of the main wreckage following the

loss of the forward fuselage. Crider Decl, at 3-5.

Crider developed four reports in the course of his

involvement with the Flight 800 investigation: the

Trajectory Study, the Main Wreckage Flight Path

Study ("Flight Path Study") and the Errata to the

Main Wreckage Flight Path Study, Addendum Ito the

Flight Path Study ("Addendum I"), and Addendum II

to the Flight Path Study ("Addendum II"). These

reports form a part of the extensive Flight 800 public

docket and were considered by the NTSB panel (the

"Safety Board") prior to its issuance of the Accident

Report.

On October 8, 2003, Plaintiff H. Ray Lahr filed over

one hundred Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")

requests with the NTSB and CIA, many of which have

since been withdrawn. Lahr basically seeks the

records upon which the four Crider reports, two video

animations shown at the 1997 public hearing, and one

4 Defendants construed the term "z00m-climb" conclusion to

refer to the flight path of the aircraft following the loss of the

forward fuselage." NTSB Mot 'n, at p. 4. This construction of the

term corresponds with Lahr's characterization of the "zoom- climb"

as "the aircraft's continuing to fly after the nose of TWA 800 was

blown off, climbing as much as 3,200 feet." Moye Decl., Ex. I-i, at p.

48.

App. 57

CIA animation broadcast on the Cable News Network

("CNN")® are based. The requests are divided into

eleven distinct categories (many of the requests fall

into more than one category):

A, All records of formulas used by the

NTSB in its computations of the zoom

chmb conclusions;

B. All records of the weight and balance

data used by the NTSB in. its

computations of the zoom-climb

conclusions;

C. All records of the formulas and data

entered into the computer simulations

regarding the NTSB's zoom-climb

conclusions;

D. All records reflecting whether or not the

NTSB conducted the computer

simulations in-house, and, if not, all

records of when, where, and by whom

the computer simulations were

performed;

i. The computer simulation programs used

by the NTSB and CIA;

F. The printout of the computer simulations

used by the NTSB;

6 The CIA animation was broadcast on November 17

1997. NTSB Opp'n, at p. 17.

’

App. 58

G. All records of the timing sequence of the

zoom-climb, including, but not limited to

radar, radio transmissions, and the flight

data recorder ("FDR");

ri. All records of the correlation of the zoom-

climb calculations with the actual radar

plot;

[. All records of the information provided

by Boeing to the NTSB used by the

NTSB to calculate these zoom-climb

conclusions;

J. All records of the process by which the

N'TSB arrived at its zoom-climb

conclusions;

K. All records generated or received by the

NTSB used in its computations of its

zoom:climb conclusions.

Moye Decl, Ex. I-1, at p. 49.

The NTSB and CIA performed searches for these

records and located a number of responsive records in

the public docket and in responses to prior FOIA

requests made by Lahr. ‘They released certain records

to Lahr, some of which were redacted. Lahr

challenges the adequacy of the agencies' searches and

the agencies’ decisions to withhold, in full or in part,

various records. The agencies assert that their

searches were adequate, that they have turned over

all responsive records to Lahr, and that they have

properly withheld records, in full or in part, under

App. 59

provisions of FOIA that create exemptions from the

statute's fundamental mandate of disclosure.

2. Plaintiff's Allegations of

Government Impropricty

"[Als a general rule, when documents are within

FOIA's disclosure provisions, citizens should not be

required to explain why they seck the information."

Nat’ Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S.

157, 172(2004). Here, however, the Government's

basis for withholding many of the contested records is

Kxemption 7(C) under FOIA, which permits the

government to withhold information compiled for law

enforcement purposes that "could reasonably be

expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of

personal privacy." Ia such circumstances, "to balance

the competing interests in privacy and disclosure

[that courts must weigh in applying Exemption 7(C)],.

the usual rule that the citizen need not offer a

reason for requesting the information must be

inapplicable." Jd. Instead, the requester must

"establish a sufficient reason for the disclosure." /d.

"[Where] the public interest being asserted is to show

that responsible officials acted negligently or

otherwise improperly in the performance of their

duties, the requester must establish more than a bare

suspicion in order to obtain disclosure. Rather, the

requester must produce evidence that would warrant

a behef by a reasonable per

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lahr v. National Transportation Safety Board · 561 U.S. 1007 | Frix