Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Holtzer v. Davis

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Supreme Court US.

= 09-730 DEC 17 2009

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

an The

Supreme Court of the United States

KEVIN C. HOLTZER,

Petitioner,

V.

BARRY DAVIS, Warden,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Sixth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

F. MARTIN TIEBER

Counsel of Record

TIEBER LAW OFFICE

246 E. Saginaw Street

East Lansing, MI 48823

(517) 339-0454

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 226 6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Petitioner is serving a mandatory, non-parolable

life sentence, or “death in prison.” On federal habeas

review he argued that his state postconviction issues,

which were not run on direct review, should not be

procedurally defaulted, because they pertain directly

to the core question of guilt or innocence, and because

direct appeal counsel was ineffective. Did the Sixth

Circuit err in refusing to grant a certificate of

appealability under these circumstances?

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question Presented For Review ....................:0006 i

Table cf Ai aiiiietscnesccscccccccsccoees iv

Reference to Decisions Below .....................0.cs0008 1

Statement Of JUriGdictioOn ........cccccccrerssorsvesssccoeees 1

Statutory Provision Involved....................e.cceeeeees 1

StateweOe’ Ge Ge era dess vesseccceccccsccscese 2

Argument for Granting the Writ....................0066 4

Comeh eins crassa EET iabebasasctscvecsecesccees 18

APPENDIX

October 7, 2009 unpublished Order of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit denying a certificate of appealability,

Holtzer v. Davis (No. 09-1411)................eeeeeeee App. 1

March 11, 2009 unpublished Opinion and

Order of the United States District Court for

the Western District of Michigan denying

writ of habeas corpus, Holtzer v. Davis (No.

2:06-cv-169; 2009 WL 723881).................eeeee App. 6

November 3, 2008 unpublished Magistrate’s

Report and Recommendation to deny the

writ, Holtzer v. Davis (United States District

Court for the Western District of Michigan,

No. SGC eda actecsacnscccesccess. App. 10

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS -— Continued

Page

June 6, 2006 original Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus and Brief in Support, with

Appendices, Record Entry No. 1, filed in the

Federal District Court for the Western

District of Michigan, Holtzer v. Davis (No.

Re OIE sis haisisissacecsntandbvanstebaavieaatieaneeiane App. 27

lv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233

SII ihriaisd Cab hisghucdanleduclaseapeaveusudakicadinnmencisdstwialsadeiaiaae 8

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)........... 4,5,7,8

Jimenez v. Quarterman, __._ U.S. __; 129

Se es dacambecanawenesnaunale 8

Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 105 F.3d

I I TN a caida ciccaeinnienseiscanecenvescoisdennesien 5

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)............... 5,6

Roper v. Weaver, 550 U.S. 598 (2007) ........ TROON E DR re 8

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000)................... 5,6

Webster v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___ (No. 08-10314;

2009 WL 4111159, decided November 30,

MET sadiskicecciciaceddasssiastisberinccbucrasceeaaredematalinieiniate 8

STATUTES

I aa he sie assesids alabama maneeeaneel 1

I te as ate ea es 5

SN as Old saadapasbaaaaenne 2

NE Me I ao iss saccacednensixanavwincexsaxwiurivedenbiaavnuine 1

Be Ne ee I vo varisccccusccvuinacensehvabeccstsndencanvasens 12

I ii cassatncrenisindesindcensbidnibunctectaskcesaiaseipesd@oadeniee 1

Be 5 os ack cecsoninendanamncandubiontsaumacebiamubundade 1,2

Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act

OF I, I BI ci caccti sissies cuvesducadvarvasiedeaddevisye 3,5

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

ee EC Es sacedencbacunueabanacaubontea 12, 15

Re Me MI WU obo ccnseveivedsceentenesinesénsceens 2,10, 17

re I ET ho oni icscxcestsvevonsvnctacusencousenss 12,15

OTHER AUTHORITIES

2 Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice

and Procedure (5th Ed.) §35.4Db..................cceeeeeeeee eee 8

1

REFERENCE TO DECISIONS BELOW

The March 11, 2009 Opinion and Order of the

United States District Court for the Western District

of Michigan is unpublished (Case no. 2:06-cv-169;

2009 WL 723881). The October 7, 2009 Order of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

denying a certificate of appealability is unpublished

(Case no. 09-1411). Both of these decisions are repro-

duced in the appendix to this petition.

+

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Petitioner seeks review of the October 7, 2009

dispositive order of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Sixth Circuit denying his certificate of

appealability. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

<

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

28 U.S.C. § 22583:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 before a district judge, the

final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by

the court of appeals for the circuit in which the

proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final

order in a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant

to remove to another district or place for commitment

2

or trial a person charged with a criminal offense

against the United States, or to test the validity of

such person’s detention pending removal proceedings.

(cX1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be

taken to the court of appeals from —

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in

which the detention complained of arises out of

process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under § 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under

paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph

(1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy

the showing required by paragraph (2).

S

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, Kevin Holtzer, filed his Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Federal District Court

for the Western District of Michigan on June 6, 2006.

Federal jurisdiction for this filing was under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Mr. Holtzer’s petition asserted that he

was denied the right to counsel under the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution,

3

through the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, was

denied due process of law through trial counsel’s

failure to explore and present available defenses, was

denied due process of law through the prosecutor’s

egregious and repeated misconduct, was denied due

process of law and his right to a fair trial through

admission of unsound science to reach critical and

inaccurate conclusions, and was denied the effective

assistance of counsel on direct appeal where signifi-

cant and obvious critical issues were neglected.’

On March 11, 2009, the district court issued an

Opinion and Order Approving Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation (to deny the writ), and a

Judgment dismissing Mr. Holtzer’s petition, and

denying a Certificate of Appealability as to all issues

raised.

On October 7, 2009, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued an Order denying

Petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability.

¢

' Petitioner also filed an issue concerning the standard of

review under the AEDPA but did not seek a certificate of

appealability as to that issue.

4

ARGUMENT FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Petitioner Holtzer has been Sentenced

by a Michigan State Court to Mandatory

Non-Parolable Life, or “Death in Pris-

on.” Due to Ineffective Assistance of

Direct Appeal Counsel, Petitioner did

Not Raise Critical Outcome Deter-

minative Issues on Direct Appeal. These

Issues Were Raised in State Post-

conviction, and Procedurally Defaulted.

Because These Procedurally Defaulted

Issues Pertain Directly to the Core

Question of Guilt or Innocence, and

Because Petitioner Has a Debatable

Argument that Ineffective Assistance of

Direct Appeal Counsel Should Con-

stitute Cause to Overcome any Pro-

cedural Default, Petitioner Asserts it

was Error to Deny a Certificate of

Appealability, and Asks this Court to

Remand for Review by the Sixth

Circuit.

The question for the Sixth Circuit in assessing

whether to grant a certificate of appealability was not

whether Mr. Holtzer could prevail, but whether Mr.

Holtzer had raised issues which were within the

realm of judicial debatability to the extent that a

certificate of appealability should have been granted.

In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983),

this Court set forth the standard governing issuance

of a certificate as probable cause. A habeas corpus

5

petitioner appealing from the denial of a § 2254

petition had to make “a substantial showing of the

‘, denial of a federal right” to obtain a certificate of

probable cause.

The Barefoot standard was codified in Section

102 of the Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996. The key provision states that an appeal

may not be taken unless the court issues a certificate

of appealability (COA) in habeas proceedings arising

out of state court convictions. The COA shall issue

only if the application has made a _ substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right, and

the certificate should indicate which specific issue or

issues satisfy the required showing. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c).

The standard for issuance of a certificate of

appealability and for a certificate of probable cause

are the same. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322

(2003) (“by enacting AEDPA, using the specific stan-

dards the Court had elaborated earlier for the

threshold test, Congress confirmed [the Barefoot

standard]”); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483

(2000). See also Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority,

105 F.3d 1063 (6th Cir. 1997). The new law states

that certificates may issue “only if the applicant has

made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.”

In Miller-El, Justice Kennedy (writing for the

Court) again stressed that the COA process is a

gateway process which was never intended to be a

6

“ruling on the merits of petitioner’s claim.” Jd. at 331.

Under the prevailing standard, a petition must “show

that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or for

that matter agree that) the petition should have been

resolved in a different manner or that the issues

presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement

to proceed further.’” Jd. at 336 (quoting Slack, 529

U.S. at 484).

The Miller-Eil Court went on to note that “the

threshold inquiry does not require full consideration

of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the

claims.” Jd. at 336. In fact this Court affirmatively

noted that § 2253 forbids it. “When a court of appeals

sidesteps this process by first deciding the merits of

an appeal, and then justifies its denial of a certificate

of appealability based on its adjudication of the actual

merits, it is in essence deciding an appeal without

jurisdiction.” Jd. at 336-37. The Miller-El Court went

on to note:

“(Ojur opinion in Slack held that a certificate

of appealability does not require a showing

that the appeal will succeed. Accordingly, a

court of appeals should not decline the

application for a certificate of appealability

merely because it believes the applicant will

not demonstrate an entitlement to relief. The

holding in Slack would mean very little if

appellate review were denied because the

prisoner did not convince a judge, or, for that

matter, three judges, that he or she would

prevail. It is consistent with § 2253 that a

certificate of appealability will issue in some

7

instances where there is no certainty of

ultimate relief. After all, when a certificate of

appealability is sought, the prisoner ‘has

already failed in that endeavor.’” Jd. at 337

(quoting Barefoot, at 893 n.4).

The Miller-El Court overruled the Fifth Circuit’s

refusal to grant the COA. “We do not require peti-

tioner to prove, before the issuance of a certificate of

appealability, that some jurists would grant the

petition for habeas corpus.” Jd. at 338. In fact the

Court stated that in some cases, the law required the

issuance of a certificate of appealability even though

“every jurist of reason might agree” after plenary

consideration that the petitioner will not prevail.

The Barefoot Court approved the following

remarks from an earlier Georgia federal case: “obvi-

ously, the petitioner need not show that he should

prevail on the merits. He has already failed in that

endeavor. Rather, he must demonstrate that the

issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a

court could resolve the issues in a different manner.”

463 U.S. at 893, fn. 4. Thus, in defining the sub-

stantial showing standard, this Court instructed that

lower federal courts may not deny applications for

probable cause certificates solely because they have

already denied the petitions on the merits.

A leading habeas commentator has urged that

the COA should be granted if the appeal presents

questions of substance, i.e., at least one issue that is

“debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could

resolve in a different manner, that is adequate to

8

deserve encouragement to proceed further; that is not

squarely foreclosed by statute, rule, or authoritative

court decision, or’... [that is not] lacking any factual

basis in the record.” See 2 Liebman, Federal Habeas

Corpus Practice and Procedure (5th Ed.) § 35.4b,

p. 1076-77. Mr. Holtzer meets this standard. As the

Barefoot Court noted: “A court of appeals should be

confident that petitioner’s claim is squarely foreclosed

by statute, rule, or authoritative court decision, or is

lacking any factual basis in the record of the case,

before dismissing it as frivolous.” 463 U.S. at 894.

Where a certificate of appealability has been

denied on procedural grounds, a petitioner must show

not only that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial

of a constitutional right, but also that jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the district

court was correct in its procedural ruling. Jimenez uv.

Quarterman, __ U.S. __; 129 S. Ct. 681, 684, fn. 3

(2009), citing Slack, supra at 473. Petitioner asserts

that he has made this dual showing, and notes that

this Court has not hesitated to reverse COA denials

when, as here, such action is appropriate. Webster v.

Cooper, __ U.S. __ (No. 08-10314; 2009 WL 4111159,

decided November 30, 2009); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarter-

man, 550 U.S. 233 (2007); Roper v. Weaver, 550 U.S.

598, 604 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).’

* While Justice Scalia, in dissent, focuses on capital cases

as deserving of special scrutiny with respect to a COA denial, it

(Continued on following page)

9

Mr. Holtzer continues to serve his non-parolable

life sentence while this petition is pending; his

purpose is not to “harass,” but to obtain a ruling

on his federal constitutional claims. The screening

process is designed to prevent undebatable claims

from being appealed. The standards for the issuance

of a certificate of appealability are met with respect to

the following issues for the reasons stated, infra.

ISSUE I - INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL

COUNSEL

Each of the issues presented by Mr. Holtzer are

primarily fact driven, and the IAC issue is no ex-

ception.* In this case Petitioner Holtzer argues that

should be pointed out that Petitioner Holtzer is serving

Michigan’s most severe sentence, mandatory, non-parolable life,

often termed “death in prison.”

* Due to the import of the facts it is important for Petitioner

to respond to the repeated claims of the district court, in its

March 11, 2009 Opinion and Order, that Petitioner misrepre-

sented the record below. Initially, at p. 1 of its Opinion and

Order, the district court chides Petitioner for claiming “it was

inappropriate” or “error” for the magistrate to rely on the fact

statement issued by the Michigan Court of Appeals in this case

in 2003. A review of Petitioner’s objections to the magistrate

judge’s R & R will show that such an argument was never made.

Petitioner merely pointed out that the issues being considered

by the Michigan appellate court were not the issues being raised

on habeas. The district court, at p. 2 of its Opinion and Order,

asserted that Petitioner “misrepresents the trial court’s deci-

sion” in claiming that the state trial court found good cause for

failing to raise the issues currently put forward on direct appeal

because they lacked merit, and thus focused on the prejudice

(Continued on following page)

10

he was denied the right to the effective assistance of

counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution, and his due process right to a

fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-

ments, where trial counsel was not prepared for trial,

and made several, outcome-determinative prepara-

tory errors. Trial counsel failed to adequately prepare

and put forward a substantial defense by not dealing

with hair transference issues, and by not properly

assessing the “blood” evidence purporting to link

Petitioner to the assault. The failure to bring in a

qualified criminalist for the defense to counter the

presence of three hairs (two claimed to belong to

Petitioner Holtzer allegedly found in the room where

the deceased’s body was found and one claimed to

belong to the deceased allegedly found in Holtzer’s

condominium unit) was critical.

aspects. However, Petitioner merely quoted the state trial court

directly. The fact that the state trial court demonstrated a

misunderstanding of the cause and prejudice standard for

overcoming procedural default does not support an accusation of

misrepresentation when Petitioner clearly noted that the state

trial court’s ruling was grounded in “lack of merit in issues

raised.” Finally, the district court, without pointing to any

particular language used by Petitioner, and without reference to

any particular part of the record, charged that Petitioner

“consistently misrepresented the testimony and record in this

case” with respect to the blood/luminol issue. Contrary to the

district court’s assertion, Petitioner is not arguing that the

prosecutor claimed luminol testing was conclusive for blood, but

that the prosecutor repeatedly argued blood was present without

sufficient basis in the record.

11

As fully detailed in the brief in support of

Petitioner Holtzer’s original habeas petition, included

‘in the appendix, these preparatory and investigatory

failures led to a failure to put forward a critical

defense expert, and an inability to appropriately chal-

lenge the prosecution’s proofs. Trial defense counsel

was also ineffective for failing to object to prose-

cutorial misconduct and to the introduction of junk

science in the form of luminol “blood” evidence.

The federal magistrate judge’s Report and Rec-

ommendation, adopted by the district court, im-

properly defaults this issue, claiming that cause is

not established through ineffective assistance of

direct appeal counsel as the issue holds no merit. The

lack of merit is premised, initially, on the claim that

presentation of Petitioner’s expert in relation to hair

transfer evidence would “have added little, if any,

value to the defense.” The magistrate judge also

found that the luminol/blood issues were dealt with

through cross examination.

Petitioner urges that these conclusions are surely

debatable by reasonable jurists after a close look at

the record in this case. Petitioner urges this Court to

fully review the detailed fact statement and the

statement of this issue in the brief supporting his

original habeas petition, attached in the appendix.

The full record will conclusively establish that the

prosecution was able to use the presence of three

hairs at various locations, and the improper claim

that blood evidence tied Petitioner to the crime, to

base this conviction. There was no other convincing

12

evidence in this case. And a qualified expert, as

shown by the report appended to Petitioner’s original

habeas brief as Appendix C, and included in the

appendix to this petition, would have been able to

demonstrate to the jury that the “blood” evidence was

misstated and prejudicially exaggerated, and the hair

evidence, given the transference issues in this case,

was completely lacking in probative value.

A certificate of appealability should have been

granted by the Sixth Circuit as to this issue.

ISSUE II - PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

As a second ground for relief Petitioner argued

that his due process right to a fair trial under the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments was denied when

the prosecutor committed egregious misconduct by

improperly claiming, with no basis in the evidence,

that luminol testing revealed the victim’s blood

throughout the Petitioner’s condominium unit, and

that Petitioner tracked the victim’s blood back to his

unit from the crime scene. Other clear prosecutorial

misconduct occurred when the prosecutor testified to

critical facts not in evidence, and elicited the fact that

Petitioner Holtzer was silent at arrest. Fact mis-

statements in relation to this issue by the state trial

court constitute an independent ground for grant of

the writ under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

The federal magistrate judge, affirmed by the

federal district judge, defaulted Petitioner’s prose-

cutorial misconduct issue, again finding no merit,

13

because, as to the blood statements, it was claimed

the prosecutor did not overstate the issue, as he

simply argued the evidence supported his conclusion

that blood was present. The magistrate judge, like

the state trial judge, misses the point here when he

states, at p. 9 of the Report and Recommendation,

that:

“Defense counsel did a very good job of

showing that the luminol testing could not

conclusively indicate blood, but the testi-

mony did establish that luminol could

indicate the presence of blood. In fact,

the prosecutor argued that blood was

found in petitioner’s condominium based

upon luminol testing, which the prose-

cutor admitted was not conclusive....

Similarly the prosecutor never stated with

certainty that there existed a blood pattern

of footsteps leading to petitioner’s condo-

minium unit, but simply argued the

evidence supported such a conclusion.”

The highlighted sections of the magistrate’s

Report and Recommendation exhibit a lack of under-

standing of the science of luminol testing, and of the

import of Petitioner’s argument here. Luminol,

without follow up testing, which was never done here,

simply cannot indicate the presence of blood, and

therefore the prosecutor’s argument that blood was

found in Petitioner’s condominium based on the

juminol testing was wrong, highly improper, and

extremely prejudicial.

14

The crux of this issue is whether the prosecutor

at trial exaggerated the impact of the luminol

“evidence” in this case. The district court improperly

claimed that Petitioner misstated the record because

the prosecutor at trial only suggested luminol was

presumptive for blood:

“

... Petitioner has consistently misrepre-

sented the testimony and record in this case.

Petitioner argues that luminol testing does

not indicate the presence of blood. Petitioner

cannot point to any testimony that indicates

that luminol testing was conclusive for blood.

Petitioner wants the court to imply that the

prosecutor was making that claim.” Opinion

and Order, p. 2.

Petitioner asserts that the record supports his

claims in this regard, as detailed in his fully

documented fact statement in the original brief in

support of the habeas petition, included in the

appendix to this petition, and would urge this Court

to fully review the facts. As an example, at p. 7 of that

brief, Petitioner points directly to the prosecutor’s

opening argument statement that “[o]n that brown

rug Connie Swander obtained a glow from the

Luminol, indicating that blood was there, couldn’t

see it, but the Luminol glowed.” (T 10/11/99 189-190,

emphasis added). In closing argument the state trial

prosecutor told the jury that “the Luminol glows

only where there’s blood.” (T 10/21/99 26-28).

Certainly this is pointing to claims by the trial

prosecutor that luminol testing was conclusive for

15

blood. And this strongly indicates that the prose-

cutorial misconduct on this critical point is an issue

that is debatable among reasonable jurists. Again,

Petitioner would refer to the detailed fact statement,

Issue II, and the expert report at Appendix C, of his

previously filed brief, included in the appendix to this

petition.

Petitioner also urges the debatability of the other

components of his prosecutorial misconduct argument

(unsupported and improper claim that pubic hairs

came from Darlene Wilson, and unconstitutional

reference to Petitioner’s silence, failure to turn him-

self in, and failure to question his own guilt). Given

the paucity of convicting evidence, and the limited

probative value of the evidence that was admitted,

these constitutionally improper arguments by the

prosecutor must be seen as outcome determinative.

Petitioner would again urge this Court to examine

the detail on these issues, fully documented with

record references, in the previously filed supporting

brief.

Petitioner Holtzer urges that a certificate of

appealability should have been granted by the Sixth

Circuit with respect to the prosecutorial misconduct

argument.

ISSUE III - DUE PROCESS DENIED THROUGH

JUNK SCIENCE

Petitioner argued that he was denied his federal

due process right to a fair trial under the Fifth and

16

Fourteenth Amendments where scientifically un-

sound luminol testing was used to make the unreli-

able and heavily prejudicial claim that the blood of

the victim was found in his condominium unit. The

lack of confirmatory testing and the misstatement of

the power of another testing method (leucocrystalviolet)

led the prosecution to serve up highly prejudicial

conclusions to the jury, conclusions which were in fact

baseless.

Again, this is a fact based issue and Petitioner

has indicated above that the critical “blood” evidence

was exaggerated impermissibly, and that the record

fully supports this claim. The magistrate judge, in his

R & R, adopted by the district court, urged that “(t]he

prosecutor simply argued that the positive luminol

test results could have been blood” and “the prose-

cutor never argued that the luminol testing con-

clusively established the presence of blood.” Though

some brief witness examination in this case suggested

the presumptive nature of this testing, the import of

these brief references were buried under an ava-

lanche of prosecutorial claims, like those outlined

above, that the luminol testing showed clearly “that

blood was there” and “that Mr. Holtzer took Kaylee

Bruce’s blood with him to his condominium.” Peti-

tioner will rely on the record as to these points as

fully detailed in his previously filed brief in support of

the petition. A certificate of appealability should have

been granted by the Sixth Circuit on this point.

17

ISSUE IV - INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF DI-

RECT APPEAL COUNSEL

Petitioner urges that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-

ment to the United States Constitution when direct

appeal counsel failed to raise the issues outlined

above, which must be seen as significant, obvious,

and outcome determinative. The federal district

court’s opinion and order did not speak to this issue,

while the magistrate judge simply concluded, based

on his review of Issues I-III, that failure to raise these

issues did not constitute ineffective assistance of

direct appeal counsel due to their lack of merit, a

conclusion echoed by the Sixth Circuit. Petitioner, as

outlined above, urges that this is a point debatable

among reasonable jurists on this record and urges

that this Court grant his petition for writ of certiorari

and send this matter back to the Sixth Circuit with

direction to grant a certificate of appealability on this

issue as well. The issues discussed above would have

resulted in a different outcome on direct appeal had

they been raised.

18

CONCLUSION

THEREFORE, Petitioner Kevin Holtzer respect-

fully requests that this Court grant this petition for a

writ of certiorari and remand this matter to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

for full review of his issues.

Respectfully submitted,

F. MARTIN TIEBER

Counsel of Record

TIEBER LAW OFFICE

246 E. Saginaw Street

East Lansing, Michigan 48823

(517) 339-0454

Dated: December 17, 2009

App. 1

No. 09-1411

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

KEVIN C. HOLTZER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

ORDER

(Filed Oct. 7, 2009)

v.

BARRY DAVIS, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

Nee Nee Nee ee ee ee “ee”

Kevin C. Holtzer, a Michigan prisoner proceeding

through counsel, applies for a certificate of appeal-

ability (COA), pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 22(b), in

order to appeal a district court’s denial of his 28

U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Following a jury trial in 1999, Holtzer was con-

victed of first-degree felony murder and sentenced to

a mandatory term of life in prison without the

possibility of parole. The Michigan Court of Appeals

affirmed the conviction, and the Michigan Supreme

Court denied leave to appeal. Holtzer thereafter filed

a motion for relief from judgment, which the trial

court denied under Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)\(3). Both the

Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Su-

preme Court denied leave to appeal based on failing

to meet the burden of entitlement under Mich. Ct. R.

6.508(D).

In 2008, Holtzer filed a § 2254 petition, raising

five grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of

App. 2

trial counsel; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; (3) viola-

tion of his due process rights by the admission of

unsound luminol testing evidence; (4) ineffective as-

sistance of appellate counsel; and (5) the application

of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) because it is unconstitutional.

The magistrate judge issued a report and rec-

ommendation (R & R) to deny the petition with

prejudice, finding that Holtzer procedurally defaulted

his claims and that his ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim failed to suffice as cause to

excuse the default. And in light of finding that

Holtzer procedurally defaulted grounds one through

four, the magistrate judge reasoned that Holtzer’s

fifth ground for relief was irrelevant to his analysis.

Following objections, the district court issued an

order approving and adopting the R & R, dismissing

the petition, and denying a COA. Holtzer now seeks a

COA from this court, arguing that ineffective assis-

tance of appellate counsel provided cause for his

procedural default and that prejudice was shown by

an examination of the merits of each issue.

A prisoner seeking to appeal the denial of his

§ 2254 petition must first obtain a COA by making “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1MA) and (cX(2). To satisfy

this standard when, as here, relief has been denied on

a procedural ground, the petitioner must demonstrate

that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would

find it debatable whether the district court was

App. 3

correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Holtzer has not met this

standard.

“Federal courts will not consider the merits of

procedurally defaulted claims, unless the petitioner

demonstrates cause for the default and prejudice re-

sulting therefrom, or that failing to review the claim

would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 805-06 (6th Cir.

2006) (internal citations omitted). Since both cause

and prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural

default, the failure to establish cause eliminates the

need to consider prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477

U.S. 478, 494-95 (1986).

To establish cause, the petitioner must present

a substantial reason to excuse the default. “Demon-

strating cause requires showing that an ‘objective fac-

tor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts

to comply’ with the state procedural rule.” Franklin v.

Anderson, 434 F.3d 412, 417 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). The district court’s findings

of fact in this regard are subject to a clearly erroneous

standard of review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Amadeo uv.

Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 223 (1988); Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d

155, 161 (6th Cir. 1994).

Holtzer argues that appellate counsel's ineffective

assistance, i.e., failing to raise grounds one through

three on direct appeal, should suffice as cause to

excuse his procedural default. This court has held

that, in the procedural default context, ineffective

App. 4

assistance of counsel may constitute cause for failing

to properly present a claim before a state court.

Williams, 460 F.3d at 800 (internal citation omit-

ted). Holtzer presented his ineffective-assistance-of-

appellate-counsel claim as an independent claim in

his motion for relief from judgment, which was his

first opportunity to raise the claim. See Edwards uv.

Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452 (2000).

“A defendant is entitled to the effective assis-

tance of counsel in his first appeal of right,” which is

judged under the standard set forth in Strickland uv.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Mapes v. Tate, 388

F.3d 187, 191 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citations

omitted). “In order to establish a Sixth Amendment

violation, it must be shown both that counsel’s repre-

sentation fell below an objective standard of reason-

ableness, and that his deficiencies prejudiced the

defendant.” Jd. at 194 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687-88). The performance and prejudice components

of the Strickland test are considered mixed questions

of law and fact, and are thus subject to de novo

review. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698; Mapes, 388 F.3d

at 190.

The scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly

deferential and “counsel is strongly presumed to have

rendered adequate assistance and made all significant

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional

judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Mapes, 388

F.3d at 191. “Counsel’s failure to raise an issue on

appeal could only be ineffective assistance if there is

a reasonable probability that inclusion of the issue

App. 5

would have changed the result of the appeal.” Wilson

v. Parker, 515 F.3d 682, 707 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting

McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 699 (6th Cir.

2004)), petition for cert. filed, No. 08-10636 (May 26,

2009). “If there is a reasonable probability that [the

defendant] would have prevailed on appeal had the

claim been raised, we can then consider whether

the claim’s merit was so compelling that appellate

counsel’s failure to raise it amounted to ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel.” Jd. (quoting McFar-

land, 356 F.3d at 700).

For the reasons set forth by the magistrate judge

and district court, jurists of reason would not debate

the district court’s finding that appellate counsel ren-

dered effective assistance. Because Holtzer has failed

to show a reasonable probability that inclusion of the

three grounds for relief on direct appeal would have

changed the result of the appeal, his ineffective-

assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim fails to suffice

as cause to excuse his procedural default.

Accordingly, Holtzer’s COA application is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/s/ Leonard Green

Leonard Green

Clerk

App. 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

NORTHERN DIVISION

KEVIN CARTER HOLTZER,

Petitioner, Case No. 2:06-cv-169

> HON.

BARRY DAVIS, R. ALLAN EDGAR

Respondent. /

OPINION AND ORDER APPROVING

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court has reviewed the Report and Rec-

ommendation filed by the United States Magistrate

Judge in this action. The Report and Recommen-

dation was duly served on the parties, and the Court

has received objections from Petitioner. In accordance

with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court has performed

de novo consideration of those portions of the Report

and Recommendation to which objection has been

made. The Court now finds the objections to be

without merit.

Petitioner objects to “each and every point” in the

Report and Recommendation. According to Petitioner,

it was inappropriate for the Court to quote the Michi-

gan Court of Appeals’ factual summary because the

issues presented in the petition filed in this Court are

different than the issues presented on appeal to

the Michigan Court of Appeals. Petitioner does not

App. 7

identify any factual error made by the Michigan

Court of Appeals and does not claim that the

Michigan Court of Appeals’ opinion was misquoted by

this Court. Petitioner has not explained why the facts

as presented by the Michigan Court of Appeals are

not relevant to his petition or why it was error for the

Magistrate Judge to rely on those facts.

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the

Court find that Petitioner procedurally defaulted on

the issues presented in this petition. Petitioner main-

tains that the last reasoned state court opinion was

the trial court’s decision and maintains that decision

found good cause existed for not raising the issues

presented. Petitioner misrepresents the trial court’s

decision. In fact, the trial court stated that because

the issues were without merit, it would have been

pointless to raise them on appeal. More importantly,

the last reasoned state court decision came from the

Michigan Supreme Court, which denied petitioner

leave to appeal under MCR 6.508(D).

Petitioner also asserts that the Magistrate Judge

erred in recommending that his ineffective assistance

of counsel claims should be dismissed. According to

Petitioner, it was constitutional error for defense

counsel to not present contradicting expert testimony

on the hair transference issue and the luminol test-

ing. These issues were addressed effectively during

cross-examination by defense counsel. The conclusion

that there was no constitutional error is supported by

the record.

App. 8

Similarly, in addressing the prosecutorial miscon-

duct issue regarding the luminol testing, Petitioner

has consistently misrepresented the testimony and

record in this case. Petitioner argues that luminol

testing does not indicate the presence of blood. Peti-

tioner cannot point to any testimony that indicates

that luminol testing was conclusive for blood. Peti-

tioner wants the court to imply that the prosecutor

was making that claim. The testimony presented at

trial was that luminol testing was a first line test for

blood and could possibly detect the presence of blood.

The point that it was not a conclusive test for blood

was brought out repeatedly by both the prosecutor

and defense counsel. Even petitioner has conceded in

this petition that he wanted further expert testimony

provided to point out that luminol testing could

indicate only a possibility of blood. Such testimony

would be nothing more than cumulative, as everyone

was in agreement that luminol testing could not

conclusively detect the presence of blood. Everyone

has conceded that further testing was necessary to

conclusively establish the existence of blood evidence.

Petitioner claims that given the lack of evidence

against him, prosecutorial misconduct was conclu-

sively established regarding the improper prosecu-

torial claim that pubic hairs came from Darlene

Wilson. Petitioner also claims prosecutorial error for

references made to petitioner’s silence and references

made because of petitioner’s failure to turn himself

in to police. Petitioner has not established that any

of these claims rise to the level of prosecutorial

App. 9

misconduct. Moreover, there existed significant

evidence that pointed to petitioner’s guilt.

Petitioner claims that the AEDPA is unconstitu-

tional. Petitioner procedurally defaulted his claims.

Accordingly, even if the Court concluded that the

AEDPA was unconstitutional, petitioner could be af-

forded no relief. The petition is dismissed because the

issues presented were procedurally defaulted.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Report

and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Docket

#56) is approved and adopted as the opinion of the

court.

Dated: 3/11/09 /s/ R. Allan Edgar

R. ALLAN EDGAR

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

App. 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

NORTHERN DIVISION

KEVIN CARTER HOLTZER,

Petitioner, Case No. 2:06-cv-169

sy HON.

BARRY DAVIS, R. ALLAN EDGAR

Respondent. /

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

(Filed Nov. 3, 2008)

Petitioner Kevin Carter Holtzer filed this petition

for writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of

his state court conviction for first degree murder.

Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial and on

November 16, 1999, was sentenced to life imprison-

ment. Petitioner’s appeal was denied by the Michigan

Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court

denied leave to appeal. Petitioner then presented the

issues raised in this petition in a motion for relief

from judgment. The motion for relief from judgment

was denied by the trial court on March 22, 2005. Both

the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan

Supreme Court denied leave to appeal because peti-

tioner failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief un-

der MCR 6.508(D). Respondent argues that petitioner

has procedurally defaulted the issues presented in

this petition.

App. 11

The Michigan Court of Appeals summarized the

facts:

Defendant was convicted of brutally mur-

dering eighteen-year-old Kaylee Bruce at the

Beach Condominiums in Traverse City,

where she worked as a desk clerk and

defendant was a monthly rental. Her body

was found by the maintenance supervisor on

the morning of February 17, 1998. She had

suffered nineteen lacerations that extended

to the bone, multiple facial and skull frac-

tures, severe neck injuries consistent with

strangulation, severe blunt force injuries to

the torso, chest, abdomen and pelvis, and

extensive internal bleeding. Additionally, a

metal rod had been forced into the decedent’s

vagina with such force that it lacerated her

vagina and penetrated two inches into her

pelvic bone. it was opined that it had been

necessary to drive the rod with a mallet or

kick it multiple times with a sturdy shoe to

drive it into the bone. The decedent was still

alive when this injury was inflicted. Ad-

ditionally, the blood on her breasts had been

smeared as if someone had stroked her

breasts. Additionally, money was missing

from the office where the decedent worked.

There was a series of bloody footprints at the

scene, all made from the same type of foot-

wear, a pair of size 12 or 12-'2 Caterpillar

work boots. These boots were similar in style

to a pair that defendant had recently owned;

defendant’s boots were not found, however,

and no comparison was able to be made.

App. 12

Defendant was seen wearing the boots before

February 14, but wore different, new boots to

work on February 17. Additionally, a tire

valve core was found near the decedent’s

body; defendant worked at a Tire Factory

store owned by his father. There was evi-

dence that it was common for tire valve cores

to become caught in the tread of Caterpillar

boots worn by store employees.

Defendant moved out of the Beach Condo-

miniums about a week after the murder and

did not report to work as scheduled on

February 26. He did return to work about

two weeks later. However, in March 1998,

defendant purchased an Amtrak ticket in

Toledo under a false name, for passage to

Carbondale, Indiana, with a changeover in

Chicago. Defendant was taken into custody

by the FBI in Chicago.

Defendant’s felony-murder conviction was

based upon the predicate felonies of third-

degree criminal sexual conduct and second-

degree criminal sexual conduct. A third the-

ory of felony murder based upon a predicate

felony of larceny was rejected by the jury.

In addition to the evidence set out above, the

prosecutor introduced evidence based on mi-

tochondrial DNA (mtDNA) from hairs found

at the crime scene and in defendant’s

bedroom. The admissibility of this evidence

forms most of defendant’s arguments on ap-

peal. At issue is mtDNA testing on three

hairs. Two hairs subsequently determined to

App. 13

belong to defendant were found at the crime

scene and are referred to as the “pubic hair”

and the “torso hair.” Additionally, a hair

identified as belonging to the victim was

found in defendant’s bedroom and is referred

to as the “bedroom hair.”

Petitioner maintains that his conviction was ob-

tained in violation of his federal rights. The respon-

dent has filed an answer and has complied with Rule

5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the

United States District Courts. The parties have

briefed the issues and the matter is now ready for

decision. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), au-

thorizing United States Magistrate Judges to submit

proposed findings of fact and recommendations for

disposition of prisoner petitions, I am recommending

that this petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

Petitioner has raised the following issues in his

petition:

I. Ineffective assistance of counsel,

II. Prosecutorial misconduct,

lif. A violation of due process when scien-

tifically unsound luminol testing was

introduced as evidence,

IV. Ineffective assistance of appellate coun-

sel, and

V. The court should not apply 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)\(1), if it precludes relief, be-

cause that standard is unconstitutional.

App. 14

Pursuant to the AEDPA, an application for writ

of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is in-

carcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot he

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudi-

cated on the merits in state court unless the adjudica-

tion: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly es-

tablished federal law as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a deci-

sion that was based upon an unreasonable determi-

nation of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases

decided by the United States Supreme Court. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). This provision marks a “significant

change” and prevents the district court from looking

to lower federal court decisions in determining

whether the state decision is contrary to, or an un-

reasonable application of, clearly established federal

law. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir.

1998). To justify a grant of habeas corpus relief under

this provision of the AEDPA, a federal court must find

a violation of law “clearly established” by holdings of

the Supreme Court, as opposed to its dicta, as of the

time of the relevant state court decision. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Recently, the

Supreme Court held that a decision of the state court

is “contrary to” such clearly established federal law “if

the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by this Court on a question of law or if the

state court decides a case differently than this Court

App. 15

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”

Id. A state court decision will be deemed an “un-

reasonable application” of clearly established federal

law “if the state court identifies the correct governing

legal principle from this Court’s decisions but un-

reasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.” Jd. A federal habeas court may not

find a state adjudication to be “unreasonable” “simply

because that court concludes in its independent judg-

ment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or in-

correctly.” Jd. at 412. Rather, the application must

also be “unreasonable.” Jd. Further, the habeas court

should not transform the inquiry into a subjective one

by inquiring whether all reasonable jurists would

agree that the application by the state court was

unreasonable. Jd. at 410 (disavowing Drinkard uv.

Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996)). Rather,

the issue is whether the state court’s application of

clearly established federal law is “objectively un-

reasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.

The AEDPA requires heightened respect for state

factual findings. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1134

(6th Cir. 1998). The habeas corpus statute has long

provided that the factual findings of the state courts,

made after a hearing, are entitled to a presumption of

correctness. This presumption has always been ac-

corded to findings of state appellate courts, as well as

the trial court. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546

(1981); Smith v. Ago, 888 F.2d 399, 407 n.4 (6th Cir.

1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 961 (1990). Under the

App. 16

AEDPA, a determination of a factual issue made by

a state court is presumed to be correct. The peti-

tioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d

358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S.

1040 (1999).

When a state-law default prevents further state

consideration of a federal issue, the federal courts are

ordinarily precluded from considering that issue on

habeas corpus review. See Yist v. Nunemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107

(1982). The Sixth Circuit applies a four-part test to

determine whether a claim is procedurally defaulted:

(1) the court must first determine that there is a state

procedural rule that is applicable to the petitioner’s

claim and that the petitioner failed to comply with

the rule; (2) the court must decide whether the state

courts actually enforced the state procedural rule;

(3) the default must be an “independent and ade-

quate” state ground on which the state can rely to

foreclose review of a federal constitutional claim; and

(4) if the foregoing are met, the petitioner must

demonstrate cause for his failure to follow the rule

and that he was actually prejudiced by the alleged

constitutional error. Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337,

348 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d

135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); accord Greer v. Mitchell, 264

F.3d 663, 672 (6th Cir. 2001). There may be an

“exceptional case in which exorbitant application of

a generally sound rule renders the state ground

App. 17

inadequate to stop consideration of a _ federal

question.” Lee v. Kemna, 122 S.Ct. 877, 878 (2002). A

petitioner may also excuse a default by making a

colorable claim of innocence; that is, he has shown

that any constitutional error “probably” resulted in

the conviction of one who was actually innocent.

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 322 (1995) (citing

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986)). This

exception is reserved for a very narrow class of cases,

based on a claim of “new reliable evidence.” Schlup,

513 U.S. at 315, 324.

The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for

relief for judgment under MCR 6.508(D)(3) and con-

cluded that there lacked good cause and/or prejudice

to overcome the failure to raise the issues in the

initial appeal. More importantly, the Michigan Court

of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court ex-

pressly stated that it denied petitioner’s motion for

relief for judgment and application for leave to appeal

on the basis that petitioner failed to “meet the burden

of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR

6.508(D).” Under MCR 6.508(D)(2) and (3), a defen-

dant may not collaterally attack a conviction based

upon claims that were decided against him in a prior

appeal or that could have been raised on direct

appeal. For claims that could have been raised, the

defendant is entitled to relief only if he can establish

“good cause” for failing to raise the grounds on appeal

and “actual prejudice,” as shown by a “reasonably

likely chance of acquittal” or an “irregularity so offen-

sive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process

App. 18

that the conviction should not be allowed to stand.”

MCR 6.508(D\(3)(a)-(b). In assessing how “firmly” a

state procedurai rule has been established, the criti-

cal inquiry is whether, viewed from the time of the

petitioner’s later significant actions or inaction, the

petitioner could be deemed to have been apprised of

the procedural rule’s existence. Luberda v. Trippett,

211 F.3d 1104, 1006-1007 (6th Cir. 2000). Because

MCR 6.508(D) was enacted in 1989 and petitioner’s

conviction and appeals took place some time there-

after, MCR 6.508(D) was a “firmly established”

procedural rule for purposes of petitioner’s action. See

Luberda, 211 F.3d at 1007; Rogers v. Howes, 144 F.3d

990, 994 (6th Cir. 1998).

As cause for his default, petitioner asserts that

his appellate counsel should have raised the de-

faulted issues in an appeal of right. Petitioner argues

that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to hire

an additional expert witness to testify about hair

transfer issues and luminol testing. Petitioner has

presented a report from an expert that indicates that

there was nothing about the hair evidence that could

show that it came from either petitioner or the victim.

Petitioner’s expert also explains how hair generally

can be transferred from location to location without

any foul play involved. Further, petitioner’s expert

report states that luminol testing can indicate only

the possibility that blood is present and would need

confirmation by some additional testing. In fact, the

expert report states: “[t]o have enough blood on shoes

or feet to produce a stain which soaked through a rug

App. 19

or carpet, as described in the Laboratory Reports and

accompanying notes seems entirely improbable.” Peti-

tioner argues that it was constitutional error not to

present contrary expert testimony on the scientific

analysis of the hair and blood evidence.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of coun-

sel claim, a convicted defendant must demonstrate

(1) that counsel’s errors were so serious that counsel

was not functioning as counsel guaranteed by the

Sixth Amendment, and (2) that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional er-

rors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

688-96 (1984). Stated another way, this court is to

decide whether the alleged failures of petitioner’s trial

counsel were such egregious errors as to constitute

ineffectiveness and whether the alleged failures were

materially prejudicial. The Sixth Circuit has ex-

plained:

The question for reviewing courts is whether

counsel’s errors have likely undermined the

reliability of, and confidence in, the result.

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842-43

(1993). “An error by counsel, even if pro-

fessionally unreasonable, does not warrant

setting aside the judgment of a criminal

proceeding if the error had no effect on the

[ultimate] judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691, quoted in Smith v. Jago, 888 F.2d 399,

404-05 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S.

961 (1990). In evaluating petitioner’s claim,

“a court must indulge a strong presumption

App. 20

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance.”

Id. at 689. “Counsel is constitutionally

ineffective only if performance below pro-

fessional standards caused the defendant to

lose what he otherwise would probably have

won.” United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222,

229 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied,

113 S.Ct. 2969 (1993). Thus, the deter-

minative issue is not whether petitioner’s

counsel was ineffective but whether he was

so thoroughly ineffective that defeat was

“snatched from the jaws of victory.” See id.

West v. Seabold, 73 F.3d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1996).

In the opinion of the undersigned, there was no

constitutional error by deciding not to call additional

experts to testify about hair transfer or luminol evi-

dence. Testimony was brought out at trial that

hundreds of hair samples were taken as evidence and

most of those samples were dissimilar to either the

victim’s hair or petitioner’s hair. Additional testimony

about hair transference issues could have added little,

if any, value to the defense. Similarly, even the prose-

cutor, when questioning witness Swander, brought

out testimony that luminol evidence was not con-

clusive for blood and that other stains would result in

a positive luminol test result. Witness Swander

testified that luminol was a first test to determine the

possibility of a blood stain. On cross examination,

defense counsel brought out further testimony that

luminol could not be denied for blood and would react

to other substances. In fact, witness Swander could

App. 21

not testify that the positive luminol findings were

blood stains without additional testing. Further, de-

fense counsel brought out testimony that stains taken

from blinds in petitioner’s rented condominium that

indicated a positive luminol test did not test positive

for blood upon further laboratory testing. Defense

counsel further discussed these issues in his closing

statement to the jury.

Petitioner argues that there were repeated

instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Ultimately, the

issue for the Court is whether the prosecutor’s con-

duct denied petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S. Ct. 940

(1982). See also United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380

(6th Cir. 1994) (adopting test for evaluation of prose-

cutorial misconduct on direct review); Serra ov.

Michigan Department of Corrections, 4 F.3d 1348 (6th

Cir. 1993) (applying similar test to habeas action).

Inappropriate remarks or conduct by a prosecutor

constitute a matter of constitutional concern only

when it is egregious enough to deprive the defendant

of a fair trial. See United States v. Chambers, 944

F.2d 1253 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1217

(1992); United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1400

(6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992);

Paprocki v. Foltz, 869 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1989).

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor committed

misconduct by stating that blood was found in peti-

tioner’s condominium unit and that footprints were

found leading to petitioner’s condominium unit. Cer-

tainly, it was the prosecution theory that blood was

App. 22

found in petitioner’s condominium unit and that a

pattern of blood was found that indicated footprints.

It was the prosecution theory that the blood came

from petitioner’s boots which picked up the blood

from the crime scene and transferred blood to the

carpeting as petitioner returned to his unit after

committing the crime. Defense counsel did a very

good job of showing that the luminol testing could not

conclusively indicate blood, but the testimony did

establish that luminol could indicate the presence of

blood. In fact, the prosecutor argued that blood was

found in petitioner’s condominium based upon lumi-

nol testing, which the prosecutor admitted was not

conclusive. Defense counsel in his closing argument

made similar arguments regarding the lack of

conclusiveness of luminol testing for blood. Similarly,

the prosecutor never stated with certainty that there

existed a blood pattern of footsteps leading to peti-

tioner’s condominium unit, but simply argued the

evidence supported such a conclusion.

Petitioner also argues that it was improper for

the prosecutor to a make a statement that two pubic

hairs found at the crime scene might have been from

Darlene Wilson. Neither petitioner nor the victim

were the source of those hairs. No testing was done to

indicate that the hairs came from Darlene Wilson.

Darlene Wilson did testify that she and petitioner

were intimate when he visited her just hours before

the murder was believed to take place. The prose-

cutor suggested that it was simply a reasonable

explanation that the hairs could have come from

App. 23

Darlene Wilson in his rebuttal closing argument.

Petitioner also argues that the prosecutor improperly

used petitioner’s silence upon arrest and petitioner’s

failure to turn himself into police when he learned

that he was wanted for murder as evidence of

petitioner’s guilt. The prosecutor did not commit

misconduct on these issues. Contrary to petitioner’s

argument, the prosecutor did not improperly use peti-

tioner’s silence as evidence of guilt. The statement

that petitioner “sat there quietly, didn’t say anything,

and basically showed no emotion,” was made by a

witness and was not responsive to the prosecutor’s

question. The prosecutor did not comment on peti-

tioner’s silence and did not commit misconduct on

this issue. Further, the prosecutor’s comment about

petitioner’s behavior was not misconduct.

Petitioner argues that testimony and evidence

introduced regarding luminol testing violated his

right to a fair trial by causing prejudice. Petitioner

characterizes luminol testing as junk science and

without evidentiary value. Certainly, the luminol

testing was conducted as a first line test for blood.

The testimony clearly indicated that it was only a

first line test and that it was not a conclusive test for

blood. The prosecutor simply argued that the positive

luminol test results could have been blood. Contrary

to petitioner’s argument, the prosecutor never argued

that the lumino! testing conclusively established the

presence of blood. The luminol testing was admitted

for its value and that was simply as a first line test

for possible blood presence. The fact that further

App. 24

testing was not conducted was admitted as evidence

and defense counsel addressed the luminol evidence

effectively on cross examination and in his closing

argument.

Under the circumstances of this case, appellate

counsel’s decision not to raise these issues does not

establish ineffective assistance of counsel. In the

opinion of the undersigned, petitioner cannot estab-

lish cause or prejudice to excuse his procedural

default of these issues.

Since this recommendation is based upon peti-

tioner’s procedural default of the issues presented in

this petition, petitioner’s assertion that 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1) is unconstitutional has no relevance to

this analysis. The recommendation would be the

same even if 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) never existed.

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that peti-

tioner’s claims are without merit and therefore

recommends that this Court dismiss the petition with

prejudice.

In addition, if Petitioner should choose to appeal

this action, I recommenc that a certificate of appeal-

ability be denied as to each issue raised by the

Petitioner in this application for habeas corpus relief

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the court must deter-

mine whether a certificate of appealability should be

granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has

demonstrated a “substantial showing of a denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

App. 25

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has dis-

approved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of

appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir.

2001). Rather, the district court must “engage in a

reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine

whether a certificate is warranted. Jd. Fach issue

must be considered under the standards set forth by

the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently,

the [sic]

The undersigned recommends that the court

deny petitioner’s application on [sic] based upon his

procedural default. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484,

when a habeas petition is denied on procedural

grounds, a certificate of appealability may issue only

“when the prisoner shows, at least, [1] that jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the petition

states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional

right and [2} that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the district court was correct in its

procedural ruling.” Both showings must be made to

warrant the grant of a certificate. ‘'d. The under-

signed concludes that reasonable jurists could not

debate that each of petitioner’s claims are properly

dismissed as defaulted. Petitioner has not established

that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing

to bring issues of ineffective assistance of counsel,

prosecutorial misconduct or improper admission of

luminol evidence in the first appeal. “Where a plain

procedural bar is present and the district court

is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a

App. 26

reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the

district court erred in dismissing the petition or that

the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further.”

Id. The court also finds that reasonable jurists could

not find it debatable that the Petitioner failed to

present a valid claim of a denial of a constitutional

right. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that

the court deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

NOTICE TO PARTIES: Objections to this Report

and Recommendation must be served on opposing

parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within

ten (10) days of receipt of this Report and Recom-

mendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b\1)\(C); Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to file timely

objections constitutes a waiver of any further right to

appeal. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th

Cir. 1981). See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985).

/s/ Timothy P. Greeley

TIMOTHY P. GREELEY

UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated: November 3, 2008

App. 27

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

KEVIN CARTER Civil Action No.

HOLTZER, 2:06CV-169

Petitioner, HON. R. Allan Edgar

-y- U.S. District Judge

BARRY D. DAVIS, Timothy P. Greeley

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Respondent. /

F. MARTIN TIEBER (P25485)

Attorney for Petitioner

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(Filed Jun. 6, 2006)

Petitioner Kevin Carter Holtzer was charged,

through a complaint and warrant authorized on March

12, 1998, with first degree murder (Mich. Comp. Laws

750.316) in the beating death of Kaylee Bruce, which

occurred on February 16, 1998, at the Beach Condo-

miniums in Traverse City, Michigan.

Petitioner Holtzer was arraigned in Grand

Traverse County, Michigan, Circuit Court on April 27,

1998, and a plea of not guilty was entered.

A jury trial took place in Grand Traverse County

Circuit Court (sitting in White Cloud, Newaygo County,

after change of venue) before the Honorable Thomas G.

Power from October 11, 1999 through October 21,

1999. Mr. Holtzer was found guilty of first degree

App. 28

murder (one count supported by two theories,

premeditation/deliberation and felony murder, see

T 10/21/99 110-111). Petitioner Holtzer did not testify

in his own behalf at trial. Judge Power sentenced

Petitioner to mandatory non-parolable life in prison

on November 16, 1999. The Grand Traverse County

Circuit Court docket number for this case is 98-

007603-FC.

Petitioner Holtzer (Prisoner No. 291530) is a

citizen of the United States, is domiciled in Michigan,

and is currently unconstitutionally detained and im-

prisoned by the Respondent, Barry D. Davis, Warden,

at the Newberry Correctional Facility, Newberry,

Michigan (Luce County).

Procedural History in State Court on Direct

Appeal and Postconviction

Direct appeal was taken to the Michigan Court of

Appeals. On February 25, 2003, that court issued a

published opinion affirming Petitioner Kevin Holtzer’s

conviction and sentence. People v. Holtzer, 660 N.W.2d

405 (Mich. Ct App. 2003). (Docket No. 223984).’ On

March 15, 2003, Petitioner filed a timely application

for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court.

An order denying leave to appeal was issued on

’ On direct appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals

Petitioner Holtzer raised four issues relating to mitochondrial

DNA evidence admitted against him at trial, and a fifth issue

complaining of a deniai of his right to a speedy trial.

App. 29

September 25, 2003. People v. Holtzer, 669 N.W.2d

816 (Mich. 2003) (Docket No. 123477).’

Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment

(Mich. Ct. Rule 6.500 et seq.) in the trial court on

December 3, 2004. The trial court Decision and Order

denying the motion for relief from judgment was

issued March 22, 2005 (attached to Brief in Support

as Appendix A). Petitioner Holtzer filed a timely

application for leave in the Michigan Court of Appeals,

which was denied by that court. People v. Holizer,

Docket No. 261940 (Mich. Ct. App. October 14, 2005).

(Attached to Brief in Support as Appendix B).

Petitioner next, on December 5, 2005, filed a timely

Application for Leave to Appeal in the Michigan

Supreme Court. The issues currently before this

Court were raised in the leave application filed in the

Michigan Supreme Court. On May 30, 2006, that

court denied leave to appeal. People v. Holtzer, N.W.2d

(Mich. 2006) (Docket No. 130003). (Attached to Brief

in Support as Appendix B).

* Petitioner Holtzer did not raise the speedy trial issue in

the Michigan Supreme Court. Direct review ended 90 days after

denial of leave, on December 24, 2003, when the period within

which Mr. Holtzer could have petitioned for a writ of certiorari

to the United States Supreme Court expired. See Clay v. United

States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003); Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283

(6th Cir. 2000); Abela v. Martin, 348 F.3d 164 (6th Cir. 2003);

Wyche v. United States, 317 F. Supp 2d 1 (D. D.C. 2004).

App. 30

This Petition is Timely

As noted above, footnote 2, direct review ended

on December 24, 2003. At that point Petitioner

Holtzer’s petition in this Court was due December 24,

2004. On December 3, 2004, Petitioner filed a state

postconviction motion under Mich. Ct. Rule 6.500.

This filing tolled the habeas clock with 21 days

remaining. Petitioner timely proceeded through the

state appellate courts after his postconviction motion

was denied in the trial court. This process culminated

in the denial of leave by the Michigan Supreme Court

on May 30, 2006 (See order, attached to Brief in

Support of this Petition as Appendix B). Thus Peti-

tioner’s habeas petition was due in this Court 21 days

after May 20, 2006, or on June 20, 2006. This petition

is being filed on June 5, 2006.

Counsel Representing Petitioner at Various

Stages

At trial Petitioner was represented by Larry C.

Willey (P28870) and Raymond E. Beckering III

(P45800). On direct appeal in the Michigan Court of

Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court, Petitioner

was represented by Michael C. Moran (P 17950). On

state postconviction and in the current habeas

proceedings in this Court, Petitioner was and is

represented by F. Martin Tieber (P25485).

App. 31

Issues Raised on State Direct Appeal and in

State Postconviction

As previously noted, on direct appeal to the

Michigan Court of Appeals Mr. Holtzer raised four

issues relating to mitochondrial DNA evidence ad-

mitted against him at trial, and a fifth issue

complaining of a denial of his right to a speedy trial.

The speedy trial issue was raised in the Michigan

Court of Appeals but not in the Michigan Supreme

Court. None of these direct appeal issues are

being raised on habeas before this Court.

Petitioner raised the following four issues in

state postconviction:

I. APPELLANT HOLTZER WAS DENIED

HIS STATE AND FEDERAL DUE

PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (US

CONST, AM V; CONST 1963, ART I, § 17)

WHERE SCIENTIFICALLY UNSOUND

LUMINOL TESTING WAS IMPROP-

ERLY USED TO MAKE THE UNRELI-

ABLE AND HEAVILY PREJUDICIAL

CLAIM THAT THE BLOOD OF THE

VICTIM WAS FOUND IN HIS CONDO-

MINIUM UNIT.

IL APPELLANT HOLTZER WAS DENIED

HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER

THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTI-

TUTIONS (US CONST, AMS V, XIV;

CONST 19638, ART 1, §20) WHEN

THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN

SEVERE AND REPEATED OUTCOME-

DETERMINATIVE MISCONDUCT.

App. 32

Hil. APPELLANT HOLTZER WAS DENIED

THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE FED-

ERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS

(US CONST, AM VI; CONST 1963,

ART 1, §20) WHERE HIS TRIAL

ATTORNEY, WITH NO STRATEGIC

PURPOSE, MADE SEVERAL OUTCOME-

DETERMINATIVE ERRORS.

IV. APPELLANT HOLTZER WAS DENIED

THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE

FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-

TIONS (US CONST, AM VI; CONST 1963,

ART I, § 20) WHERE HIS APPELLATE

COUNSEL NEGLECTED STRONG,

CRITICAL ISSUES WHICH MUST BE

SEEN AS SIGNIFICANT AND OBVIOUS.

Though requested, no hearing was granted by the

trial court, the Michigan Court of Appeals, or the

Michigan Supreme Court on postconviction. As

described above, denials were issued by the state trial

court, the Michigan Court of Appeals, and the

Michigan Supreme Court as to these issues.

This Petitioner has exhausted the issues raised

herein.

Petitioner Kevin Holtzer did not file a petition for

certiorari.

Other than the appeals to the Michigan Court of

Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court and the state

postconviction action under Mich. Ct. Rule 6.500

App. 33

et seq. just described and the present Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, no other petitions, appli-

cations or motions have been filed with respect to this

judgment in any state or federal court.

Federal Constitutional Issues before this Court

Again, the four issues run in state postconviction

are now presented to this Court. None of these issues

were run on state direct review. These issues are not,

however, procedurally defaulted, either because the

state trial court, in the last reasoned state court

opinion, decided the issues on the merits, or because

any default was excused through the ineffective

assistance of state trial counsel and state direct

appeal counsel, issues which have themselves now

been thoroughly exhausted.

In this case Petitioner Holtzer argues that he

was denied the right to the effective assistance of

counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and his due process right to a fair

trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,

where trial counsel was not prepared for trial, and

made several, outcome-determinative preparatory

errors. Trial counsel failed to adequately prepare and

put forward a substantial defense by not dealing with

hair transference issues and by not properly

assessing the “blood” evidence purporting to link

Petitioner to the assault. The failure to bring in a

qualified criminalist for the defense to counter the

presence of three hairs (two claimed to belong to

App. 34

Petitioner Holtzer allegedly found in the room where

Kaylee Bruce’s body was found and one claimed to

belong to Bruce allegedly found in Holtzer’s condo-

minium unit) was critical. These preparatory and

investigatory failures led to a failure to put forward a

critical defense expert and an inability to appropriately

challenge the prosecution’s proofs. Petitioner also

claims that trial defense counsel was constitutionally

ineffective due to additional trial errors laid out in

detail in the Brief in Support of this Petition.

As a second ground for relief Petitioner argues

that her due process right to a fair trial under the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments was denied when

the prosecutor committed egregious misconduct by

improperly claiming, with no basis in the evidence,

that luminol testing revealed the victim’s blood

throughout the Petitioner’s condominium unit and

that Petitioner tracked the victim’s blood back to his

unit from the crime scene. Other clear prosecutorial

misconduct occurred when the prosecutor testified to

critical facts not in evidence and elicited the fact that

Petitioner Holtzer was silent at arrest. Fact misstate-

ments in relation to this issue by the state trial court

constitute an independent ground for grant of the

writ under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Third, Petitioner was denied his federal due

process right to a fair trial under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments where scientifically unsound

luminol testing was used to make the unreliable and

heavily prejudicial claim that the blood of the victim

was found in his condominium unit. The lack of

App. 35

confirmatory testing and the misstatement of the

power of another testing method (leucocrystalviolet)

led the prosecution to serve up highly prejudicial

conclusions to the jury, conclusions which were in fact

baseless.

Fourth, Petitioner urges that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment to the United States which must be seen

as significant and obvious. These issues are 1-3,

described above.

Issue V claims that the 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)

standard of review requirement is unconstitutional

for several reasons.

As noted above, Petitioner Holtzer’s continued

confinement is unconstitutional in several respects.

As described in detail in the Brief in Support, as to

each of the asserted legal grounds for relief, Petitioner

Holtzer satisfies the standard of review set forth in

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Several unreasonable determi-

nations of fact by the state trial court provide an

additional ground to grant the writ under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2). In addition, as to each and every asserted

ground for relief, the identified error was not harm-

less under the governing legal standard.

Petitioner Holtzer has not filed any previous

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this or any

other federal district court. Petitioner has no future

sentence to serve after completion of the sentence

imposed by the judgment under attack.

App. 36

WHEREFORE, Petitioner Kevin Holtzer requests

that Respondent be required to appear and answer the

allegations of this Petition, that after full consid-

eration, this Court relieve Petitioner Holtzer of the

unconstitutional restraint on his liberty, and that this

Court grant such other, further and different relief as

the Court may deem just and proper under the

circumstances, as well as grant eral argument and an

evidentiary hearing in this matter.

Respectfully Submitted,

BY: /s/ F. Martin Tieber

F. MARTIN TIEBER

(P25485)

246 E. Saginaw Street

East Lansing, MI 48823

(517) 339-0454

marty@tieberlaw.com

Dated: June 5, 2006

App. 37

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

KEVIN CARTER HOLTZER, Civil Action No.

Petitioner, HON. R. ALLAN EDGAR

USS. District Judge

-V-

Timothy P. Greeley

ARRY D.

- a USS. Magistrate Judge

/

F. MARTIN TIEBER (P25485)

Attorney for Petitioner

Respondent.

/

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(Filed Jun. 6, 2006)

BY: F. MARTIN TIEBER (P25485)

246 E. Saginaw Street

East Lansing, MI 48823

(517) 339-0454

marty@fmtieberlaw.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIEG .............cccccccseseecees i

{T.

Itt.

App. 38

PETITIONER WAS DENIED EFFEC-

TIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (US

CONST. AMENDS. VI, XIV), AND A

FAIR TRIAL, WHERE HIS TRIAL

ATTORNEY, WITH NO STRATEGIC

PURPOSE, MADE SEVERAL OUTCOME-

DETERMINATIVE ERRORG..........000ee0

PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHT

TO A FAIR TRIAL (U.S. CONST. A-

MENDS. V, XIV) WAS VIOLATED WHEN

THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN SE-

VERE AND REPEATED OUTCOME-

DETERMINATIVE MISCONDUCT..........

PETITIONER HOLTZER WAS DENIED

HIS FEDERAL DUE PROCESS RIGHT

TOA FAIR TRIAL (U.S. CONST., AMS.

V, XIV) WHERE SCIENTIFICALLY UN-

SOUND LUMINOL TESTING WAS IM-

PROPERLY USED TO MAKE THE

UNRELIABLE AND HEAVILY PREJU-

DICIAL CLAIM THAT THE BLOOD OF

THE VICTIM WAS FOUND IN HIS

CONDOMINIUM UNIT ........ccccrcccsseeeeeees

PETITIONER HOLTZER WAS DENIED

THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (U.S. CONST.

AM. VI) WHERE HIS APPELLATE

COUNSEL NEGLECTED STRONG,

CRITICAL ISSUES WHICH MUST BE

SEEN AS SIGNIFICANT AND OBVI-

15

34

44

App. 39

V. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE

STANDARD OF REVIEW SET FORTH

IN 28 U.S.C. §2254(D)(1) PRECLUDES

RELIEF IN THIS ACTION, THE

COURT SHOULD NOT APPLY THAT

STANDARD BECAUSE IT IS UNCONSTI-

TUTIONAL, AND THE COURT SHOULD

GRANT THE WRIT UNDER A DE

NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW ........... 59

BEL TI Fe eee 6 TEED veccncccccccccccccsvcccccessecocsence 64

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Abela v. Martin, 348 F.3d 164 (6th Cir. 2003)............ iv

Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915 (6th Cir.

Gy ARIS te nee even Re RO ee 31, 43, 54

Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858)....... 61

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).............cccceeeeeees 28

Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2003) ...... 29

Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir.

SINS cts cise diceeuetensabacan vacosaereateesanodeewaniersdcecunaaceuked 22

Barnes v. Elo, 231 F.3d 1025 (6th Cir. 2000) ............. 22

Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2005)........... 35, 36

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) ................... 40

Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1104 (3rd

a ree Socata eo aaa y nenion path ae iene ein cee 21

Bigelow v. Williams, 367 F.3d 562, 566 (6th Cir.

|, RARE REE eEC OEMe eral ab AAS 9) caren t En OR 24

App. 40

Brenk v. State, 847 S.W.2d 1 (Ark. 1993)................... 48

Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283 (6th Cir.

UII ios oct vinahacuesadunuaoruasaamaadiaielieineniaeakasaniaadabbssies iv

Bryant v. Scott, 28 F.3d 1411, 1417-1419 (5th

I I gia aaa a eee Aas 24

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294

REREAD RRtereicceeeene ce aae Aen ane eT Ue NT, NATAL NRA D OE DEORE 23

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536

5 I RRERSE SRE RES Soa pe enone evar NTE Uw NC TCT EOD CUE er ENERO 60

Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522 (2008)................ iv

Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1237 (10th

NE I hccidapitececcoautacetodatectentbe teed yh teaetecuaaars 36, 37

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756 (1991) ...... 56

Conklin v. Schofield, 366 F.3d 1191, 1208 (11th

RI ara ee cae ee a 25

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986)..................... 44

Crisp v. Duckworth, 743 F.2d 580 (7th Cir.

SEEN Las cusddaccaaiceuntceadatudiniebadaiacoaxdieeeisaaaesiananssimnins 23

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)..... passim

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)........ 34, 36

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,

gS RRR SA Sorin nas 50, 54

Davis v. Straub, 430 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2005)............ 62

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642

Ratan kccansuddrcaccmeuseanken cc buesdeeicasecintusecmedament 34, 35, 36

Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 787 (6th Cir.

App. 41

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991)...............ccec000s 44

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-400 (1984)............ 56

Eze v. Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110, 127-132 (2d

CRD, TIED cts enssincescvcoveniacsintoaseameadeandicaaaman 29

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-05 (1963),

overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykies,

GS Tass Fie ST cence cutnsceousacsibnctebeascnneaie 62

Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir.

TIDE) tnescccansetebsntsaiseumanbincusaiianicaaaana 24

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)............... 15

Green v. White, 232 F.3d 671, 672 (9th Cir.

BE occnsevcnisascisdacecsvevtacscsdeetaaaibanaiasananaenne 12

Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2001).......... 22

Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1169-70 (6th

Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1132 (1998)........ 24

Harris v. State, 133 S.W.3d 760 (Tex. App.

BIE): oscocoeussreasancusonaccetnagisessidaneiesaneia aia 48

Hicks v. Straub, 377 F.3d 538, 551 (6th Cir.

PEPE? wcncconccinduscdoussisesesveniaszee secant 31, 43, 55

Hodge v. Hurley, 426 F.3d 368 (6th Cir. 2005)........... 30

Houston v. Lockhart, 982 F.2d 1246 (8th Cir.

RIED nvcscoscscavvnvvccresvateessodiabeosamaaleeee 57

Irons v. Carey, 408 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2005)............. 59

Johnson v. Wainwright, 806 F.2d 1479, 1486

(llth Cir. 1987) cert den 108 S.Ct. 872

(BIBI F nvsncenscosnsineicestivenssassiseneeeeeee 34, 35

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983)................. 56

App. 42

Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir.

Nr iiss ccscacuscencbuscesesosvcosesessossesececons 29

Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir.

EET SEE 22

Leonard v. Michigan, 287 F. Supp. 2d 765, 791

Nei c sn. cccacesessnsccesessonesbecevsseseoes 29

Manning v. Huffman, 669 F.3d 720 (6th Cir.

EET cuss scesscsccesesscosvssieccevscsecosecccsvonesesens 56

Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 427-28 (6th Cir.

sss sis c ccna scesncensscesonsesovonecescsoccces 57

Mapes v. Tate, 388 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 2004)............... 57

Maples v. Steagall, 340 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir.

cd cscnscccconaconsencbeosecocconesessces passim

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)............. 60

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat)

acs cnsnccosnsscussescosoesneveees seces 61

Martinez v. Lamango, 515 U.S. 417, 430 (1995)........ 60

Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003)....21, 22

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n 14

cs os cosceunousseonoonseecess 15

McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F. 3d 1302, 1311 (6th

Cir. 1996)........ i a ss cess sceupeenenckeecores 56

Mowbray, 943 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex. App. 1996)....... 48

Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir.

ao ss snsubonenconenncocnnseeceeees 26

Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809 (5th Cir.

aca s cccosnnenenunvencsneseoceorcoese 22

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986)....31, 43, 55

App. 43

Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300 (7th Cir.

ENED encnnsinisniovscadseamesanaeiaaeamebeaasiaiaiiielamanaamamiimed 57

People v. Gearns & Thomas, 577 N.W.2d 422

(Mich. 1998), overruled on other grounds

People v. Lukity, 596 N.W.2d 607 (Mich.

SPIE <occssensctusciesupneeaevsiaebunianmmaentaaaamsaaanaa ane 47, 48

People v. Grant, 684 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 2004) .......... 28

People v. Pickens, 521 N.W.2d 797 (Mich. 1994) ...15, 23

People v. Reed, 535 N.W.2d 496 (Mich. 1995)............ 56

People v. Tanner, 660 N.W.2d 746 (Mich. Ct.

App. 2003) rev'd on other grounds 671

a ene ee a seenemenbecounes 25

People v. Watson, 288 P.2d 184 (Cal. App. 1956),

vacated on other grounds 299 P.2d 243 (Cal.

BEE cotnenocinedticnenenignins camecancancceeenen ana ee edad 48

People v. Wooten, 725 N.Y.S.2d 767 (S. Ct. N.Y

ENED snsusounsisdeein bionecauanmnceeumanemniieusanihameamenaein aaa 48

Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376, 390-392 (6th

a 29

Rosario v. Kuhlman, 839 F.2d 918, 925 (2d Cir.

SII? ciniisticndentbcesadtnaesackoraducdonmmataminuiimenaaenmains 44, 46

Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974)................... 56

Ruimveld v. Birkett, 404 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th

IE IED, oc ccnsonkcecnnestaisaksniananeaaaiainiaumseaaeendie 13, 14

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986) ............... 56

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982)...............:ee 35

Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2001)........ 22

Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 476 (5th Cir.

PIU) sunccosaruuchsusesssennensensdsoenesssssnnobeisenaetnensaiansannnaaal 28

App. 44

State v. Butler, 24 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App.

a i 26

State v. Fukusaku, 946 P.2d 32 (Haw. 1997)........ 48, 50

State v. Moody, 573 A.2d 716 (Conn. 1990)................ 50

Stouffer v. Reynolds, 214 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th

ELE eae ee a ne ae TY AND 27

Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668

STI ics ats acecohanaedandahaneanaealedeimanemmmeaninimnanieth 15, 16, 18

Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-409 (1988)......... 23

Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 850 (6th Cir.

I isi iii etic deaesabediahdeeltineniseuidieei 12, 13

Thomas v. State, 374 So.2d 508, 514 (Fla. Sup.

is - TTI in\sasiibesicestaissirttideldccectdamniadadeaniebubenemindiiaimadsddanmadines 26

United States v. Barbour, 813 F.2d 1232, 1234

ERIE STITT Tn cicacsiatic succueniosiasidnnmenamabsciaaahaisnneibmnddaiiees 23

United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1383-90

I ala eae aneegabin 35

United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 395 (10th

Sian TEE cisaeh sondeceansbceninniauinestiineiemmdnmninnimeanaiiaaencnada 57

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) ....15, 16, 17

United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204

ee a aA Raden Re Set NCR pa 23

United States v. Hill, 41 M.J. 596 (A.C.C.A.

United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232,

ee ee ee ee A canasuunuesonneidenal 34, 35

United States v. Osuorji, 32 F.3d 1186, 1191

u ( 2 | ae en 34, 35

App. 45

United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998)........... 54

Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 962-63 (6th

STITT natisthndnenisanicusociehuniiaininiaadapendaisinbedesaesaiseicanees 44

Washington v. Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689 (6th Cir.

ISAT S BR do eer a e e Nev 40

Washington v. Texas, 338 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) ............. 23

Watson v. Teets, 355 U.S. 846 (1957)..............ccceceeeeeee 48

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003)................. 24, 29

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000)....... 12,13

Wyche v. United States, 317 F. Supp 2d 1 (D.

ena iv

Wynne v. Renico, 279 F. Supp. 2d 866, 879 (E.D.

EEE: MITT icciudirccesutasidaietess vauaapinssncilasces 14, 33, 43, 55

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 468

SUES iscasadiennatensaananaaimaiassedidniosesdesbbetnkevseretbousianesen 60

Young v. State, 871 S.W.2d 373 (Ark. 1994)............... 50

CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, COURT RULES

TT Fn cca pecpediibeucasiosbeosiiuen 3,15

a a sauacubriuavasanaaune 3, 34

I I - n.s ccdcesabunsebncsooooneneveanneoienii 12

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)........0......0. ee eens 12

ta? Ui EE cs sc ce npslenbeneneesanovennedenednecs 12

Be is sccccncocccsseresreosscsecsoenobevevenes passim

es SII 5 cscsccsdensosmneesrneesenoosseecoenaceoscssesencs 40

Be Sls IEEE sbesceecnssconvensscosserseosenseesees 32, 38, 54

App. 46

Mich. Comp. Laws 750.316 ................ sabi enebaaseacentenbiaen iii

IIE iccnuvag stnerbaccntcnacssnelapeotuninsees sinaaeebaientaselanmmen 37

} #

STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED

WHETHER PETITIONER WAS DENIED EF-

FECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (US

CONST. AMENDS. VI, XIV), AND A FAIR

TRIAL, WHERE HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY, WITH

NO STRATEGIC PURPOSE, MADE SEVERAL

OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE ERRORS.

WHETHER PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS

RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (U.S. CONST.

AMENDS. V, XIV) WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE

PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN SEVERE AND

REPEATED OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE MIS-

CONDUCT

WHETHER PETITIONER HOLTZER WAS DE-

NIED HIS FEDERAL DUE PROCESS RIGHT

TO A FAIR TRIAL (U.S. CONST., AMS. V, XIV)

WHERE SCIENTIFICALLY UNSOUND LUMI-

NOL TESTING WAS IMPROPERLY USED TO

MAKE THE UNRELIABLE AND HEAVILY

PREJUDICIAL CLAIM THAT THE BLOOD OF

THE VICTIM WAS FOUND IN HIS CON-

DOMINIUM UNIT.

WHETHER PETITIONER HOLTZER WAS DE-

NIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION (U.S. CONST. AM. VI) WHERE

HIS APPELLATE COUNSEL NEGLECTED

STRONG, CRITICAL ISSUES WHICH MUST

BE SEEN AS SIGNIFICANT AND OBVIOUS.

App. 47

5. WHETHER, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW SET FORTH IN

28 U.S.C. §2254(D\(1) PRECLUDES RELIEF IN

THIS ACTION, THE COURT SHOULD NOT

APPLY THAT STANDARD BECAUSE IT IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND THE COURT

SHOULD GRANT THE WRIT UNDER A DE

NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Kevin Carter Holtzer was charged

with first degree murder (Mich. Comp. Laws 750.316)

in the beating death of Kaylee Bruce, which occurred

on February 16, 1998, at the Beach Condominiums in

Traverse City, Michigan.

A jury trial took place in Grand Traverse County

Circuit Court (sitting in White Cloud, Newaygo

County, after change of venue) before the Honorable

Thomas G. Power from October 11, 1999 through

October 21, 1999. Mr. Holtzer was found guilty of first

degree murder (one count supported by two theories,

premeditation/deliberation and felony murder, see T

10/21/99 110-111) and sentenced to mandatory non-

parolabie life in prison by Judge Power on November

16, 1999.

Direct appeal was taken to the Michigan Court

of Appeals. On February 25, 2003, that court issued

a published opinion affirming Petitioner Kevin

Holtzer’s conviction and sentence. People v. Holizer,

App. 48

660 N.W.2d 405 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).’ On March 15,

2003, Petitioner filed a timely application for leave to

appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. An order

denying leave to appeal was issued on September 25,

2003. People v. Holtzer, 669 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. 2003)

(Docket No. 123477).’

Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment

(Mich. Ct. Rule 6.500 et seq.) in the trial court on

December 3, 2004. The trial court Decision and Order

denying the motion for relief from judgment was

issued March 22, 2005 (attached as Appendix A).

Petitioner Holtzer filed a timely application for leave

in the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied

by that court. People v. Holtzer, No. 261940 (Mich. Ct.

App. October 14, 2005). (Attached as Appendix B).

Petitioner next, on December 5, 2005, filed a

timely Application for Leave to Appeal in the

Michigan Supreme Court. The issues currently before

this Court were raised in the leave application filed in

* On direct appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals Mr.

Holtzer raised four issues relating to mitochondrial DNA evi-

dence admitted against him at trial, and a fifth issue com-

plaining of a denial of his right to a speedy trial.

* Mr. Holtzer did not raise the speedy trial issue in the

Michigan Supreme Court. Direct review ended 90 days after

denial of leave, on December 24, 2003, when the period within

which Mr. Holtzer could have petitioned for a writ of certiorari

to the United States Supreme Court expired. See Clay v. United

States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003); Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283

(6th Cir. 2000); Abela v. Martin, 348 F.3d 164 (6th Cir. 2003);

Wyche v. United States, 317 F. Supp 2d 1 (D. D.C. 2004).

App. 49

the Michigan Supreme Court. On May 30, 2006, that

court denied leave to appeal. People v. Holtzer, __

N.W.2d ___ (Mich. 2006) (Docket No. 130003).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Introduction

Kevin Holtzer was charged with first degree

murder in the February 16, 1998 killing of Kaylee

Bruce at the Beach Condominiums in Traverse City.

Petitioner Holtzer was a monthly renter and Ms.

Bruce was a desk clerk at the condominium units

when the killing occurred. The defense did not contest

the fact that the killing was extremely brutal (T

10/11/99 226-238).

Petitioner Holtzer was connected to the crime

through scant circumstantial evidence. Robbery was

the apparent motive as money was missing from the

cash box at the Beach Condominiums (T 10/11/99

288-289). However, Petitioner was working at one of

his father’s many Tire Factory stores and has been

represented by retained counsel throughout the

lengthy trial, appellate and postconviction proceed-

ings in this case. Multiple searches and seizures were

conducted of Petitioner’s condo unit, his car, the

condo office where the killing occurred and Peti-

tioner’s girlfriend’s residence in an attempt to connect

Petitioner to the crime (T 10/12/99 85-139). These

efforts were largely fruitless. Two sets of keys found

near Bruce’s body were not connected to Petitioner (T

10/12/99 37).

App. 50

The prosecutor focused on “boot” testimony,

claiming that Petitioner had a pair of boots “very

similar” to those that left prints at the scene, boots

which Petitioner discarded near the time of Bruce’s

killing. However, investigators could not rule out

other boots as having left these prints (T 10/12/99

141-142). Moreover, several witnesses testified that

Petitioner’s boots were defective as they had been

covered with white paint during remodeling of the

Tire Factory store (T 10/12/99 164-175, 201-203, 210-

213, 223-227, 238-239, 245-246).

The prosecutor also seized on the fact that

Petitioner left the Traverse City area, ending up in

Chicago where he was arrested on March 1, 1998,

after learning that he was wanted for murder (T

10/13/99 116-126, 153-157). The key convicting evi-

dence was the hair and blood evidence, discussed

below. Petitioner Kevin Holtzer denied involvement

in Bruce’s murder (T 10/13/99 175).

B. ir i e Issues

Three pieces of hair were the subject of extensive

hearings on the prepriety of mitochondrial DNA

analysis by two labs (LabCorp and Mitotyping), at

least one of which was running validation studies at

the time the hairs in question were being analyzed.

Over defense objection the hairs were admitted

against Kevin Holtzer at trial and became the

primary convicting evidence against him.

App. 51

The three hairs consisted of two pubic hairs

found in the office area of the Beach Condominiums,

where Bruce’s body was found, which were claimed

to contain DNA consistent with that of Petitioner

Holtzer, and one head hair found in Petitioner

Holtzer’s condominium unit said to contain DNA

consistent with that of the victim, Bruce. One of the

pubic hairs claimed to be consistent with Holtzer was

said to have been found attached to a spent tire valve

core. Mr. Holtzer worked at u tire store.

In opening argument, the prosecutor focused on

these three hairs (which were referred to as the torso

hair, the pubic hair and the bedroom hair) as the key

evidence linking Mr. Holtzer to the murder of Kaylee

Bruce (T 10/11/99 190-192, 194-197).

A number of hairs were found on Holtzer’s

clothing, including two pubic hairs. Most of these

hairs were found to be dissimilar to Holtzer and

Bruce (T 10/14/99 67-69). One of two pubic hairs

found could have belonged to Holtzer but neither

matched Bruce (T 10/14/99 69). Other hairs, head and

pubic, found in Holtzer’s condo unit, in the drain and

on the floor mat, did not match Bruce (T 10/14/99 69-

73). A large number of hairs from Holtzer’s vehicle

were examined and none of them were similar to

Bruce (T 10/14/99 74). Fifty to seventy-five hairs were

collected from Holtzer’s bathtub drains and none

were found to be similar to Bruce (T 10/14/99 74-75).

Fifty to sixty hairs were collected from Holtzer’s sink

drain and none were found to be similar to Bruce (T

10/14/99 75). Fifty to sixty hairs from Holtzer’s dryer

App. 52

and twenty-five to thirty from his washer agitator

were examined and none were found to be similar to

Bruce (T 10/14/99 76).

After the murder, a “whole bunch of hairs” were

collected from “body wraps,” including two pubic

hairs which could not be matched to either Holtzer or

Bruce and at least one other hair that did not match

either Holtzer or Bruce (T 10/14/99 77-79). None of

these hairs were matched to Holtzer.

Of the two pubic hairs claimed to match Holtzer

und said to be found in the room where the body was

found (one was allegedly found on Bruce’s torso), only

one was sent on to a second lab (Mitotyping) for

confirmation of mtDNA results after extensive hear-

ings revealed severe problems with the testing at the

first lab (LabCorp) (T 10/15/99 129).

Mr. Holtzer had been living in a monthly rental

unit at the Beach Condominiums for nearly three

months at the time of Bruce’s death, having moved

in on November 20, 1997 (T 10/11/99 303). His unit

(106) was entered on a daily basis by housekeeping

personnel at the Beach Condominiums in order to

exchange towels and to remove the garbage. Once a

* The body wraps were clean sheets that were used to wrap

the body of the deceased (T 10/12/99 98). While the source of

these sheets is not clear it is likely that sheets borrowed from

the Beach Condominiums were utilized as detectives described

borrowing and using sheets from the Condominiums to perform

other crime scene functions at and around the location where

the body was discovered (T 10/12/99 23-24).

App. 53

week the unit was thoroughly cleaned (including

vacuuming and mopping of the floors) (T 10/13/99 43).

The pubic hair that was attached to a tire valve

core‘ was found in an area of the utility room (behind

the front desk) of the Beach Condominiums separate

from the body of Bruce. It was found to the left of the

doorway while Bruce’s body was “around on the

opposite side of the door” (T 10/12/99 38-39). The hair

was separated from the valve core at the lab and the

technician who did the separation could not say

“whether it was pinched in there, or stuck by blood,

but it was attached to it.”

The office area and utility room where Kaylee

Bruce worked and where her body was found was

regularly utilized by employees, including house-

keeping staff, as the time clock was in this area and

employees would punch in and punch out (T 10/11/99

281). The utility room contained a Small “freezer”

unit and coffee supplies and would presumably be

* A detective testified that the valve core at issue was a

common item readily available from a variety of retail outlets:

“they all basically look alike” (T 10/12/99 115-116).

* It seems apparent from this account that the evidence

technician who found the pubic hair attached to the tire valve

core could not determine whether there was any agent at all

causing the two items to be attached, as the hair could have

been “pinched” into the core. The mention of blood, in the

absence of any serological analysis, or even any analysis to

determine if any agent caused the hair to be stuck to the valve

core, was highly prejudicial and apparently without basis in

fact.

App. 54

regularly visited by employees who wished to obtain

access to these items (T 10/12/99 12). The time clock

utilized by employees was located in the same room

(utility room with water heater) where Bruce’s body

was found (T 10/11/99 285; 298; 10/12/99 29). Five to

seven different employees handled cleaning chores at

the Beach Condominiums and the employee assigned

to handle cleaning chores in Mr. Holtzer’s unit would

change from day to day (T 10/13/99 48).

Kaylee Bruce had repeated personal contact with

Mr. Holtzer (T 10/11/99 295-297). Holtzer would often

lock himself out of his room and at times “someone

would walk him down with the master key” to let him

in. It was likely that Kaylee Bruce had to perform

this service for Holtzer in the course of her employ-

ment at the Beach Condominiums (T 10/11/99 304-

306).

During pretrial hearings in this case the trial

court stated:

“[Olne would not expect the victim’s hair to

be in the Defendant’s condominium, so that

had some probative value ... and the pubic

hair at the scene of the crime was said to

have a sequence the same as the Defen-

dant’s, and, obviously, one would not expect

to have his DNA at the scene of the crime,

that would have probative value ... ” (MT

6/10/99 36).

App. 55

C. “Blood” and Lumino tin

In opening argument, the prosecutor told the

jury:

“At Mr. Holtzer’s condominium unit, how-

ever, the police, with the assistance of the

state police crime laboratory personnel, in

particular, Connie Swander, who does se-

rology work and other trace evidence work

for the Michigan State Police, went inside

Mr. Holtzer’s condominium, and with a

substance, she'll explain to you, it’s called

Luminol, it’s something that reacts with

blood, reacts with other materials, but it

does show a reaction to blood, it actually

luminesces, it lights up, it glows when it’s

contacted with blood, blood that you can’t see

with the naked eye, blood that’s been cleaned

up, you use Luminol and get a reaction, and

see if there’s blood present.

So they went inside Mr. Holtzer’s condo-

minium Unit 106. Inside is a brown throw

type rug, like a mat that you would have

inside your door. On that brown rug Connie

Swander obtained a glow from the Luminol,

indicating that blood was there, couldn’t see

it, but the Luminol glowed.” (T 10/11/99 189-

190).

The prosecutor continued along these lines, telling

the jury that the luminol glow (and therefore blood)

continued throughout Mr. Holtzer’s unit and even

outside onto his deck (T 10/11/99 199).

App. 56

The prosecutor claimed in opening statement

that there was blood on the rug in Mr. Holtzer’s

condominium unit because of the luminol reaction

and because DNA was extracted from the stain

sample on the rug (T 10/11/99 192-193).° The prose-

cutor finished his opening statement with a claim

that Mr. Holtzer “took Kaylee Bruce’s blood with him

to his condominium” (T 10/11/99 197).

Michigan State Police forensic scientist Connie

Swander testified that luminol would react to sub-

stances other than blood, but differently (T 10/14/99

20-21). Swander testified to luminol reactions through-

out Petitioner Holtzer’s unit and out onto the deck

and responded affirmatively to the prosecutor’s ques-

tion as to whether “luminol is used to detect blood

that has been cleaned up” (T 10/14/99 22-27). Possibly

speaking hypothetically, Swander stated that “there

actually is some real dilute blood still down in the

carpet” (T 10/14/99 28).

Swander noted the need to take samples back to

the lab for additional testing to determine if indeed

they contained blood after a positive luminol reaction

(T 10/14/99 57), but then noted that she did not take

any of the material from inside or outside Petitioner

Holtzer’s unit back to the lab for further analysis (T

10/14/99 59-62). She claimed she got reactions to a

leucocrystalviolet test (which she claimed was in fact

* It appears that no serology testing was done on this

material (T 10/14/99 59-62, 124-128).

App. 57

specific for blood)’ on two “very small” stains on

Petitioner’s deck, stains which were “actually worked

into the wood” (T 10/14/99 61).

Swander stated that even though she got a

reaction to certain evidence from both luminol and

“TMB” at the scene, she was able to rule out the

presence of blood on this evidence during further

testing at her lab (T 10/14/99 63-64).

Marcia Eisenburg, vice president and senior

director at LabCorp, later testified that Kaylee Bruce

was excluded as a contributor to a stain on the carpet

(pink carpet identified as Exhibit 47) (T 10/14/99 116-

117). With respect to a stain from Mr. Holtzer’s brown

rug or mat, Eisenburg could not indicate what type of

human body fluid caused it (T 10/14/99 124-128).

In closing argument the prosecutor stated:

Now, there is also something that he couldn’t

get rid of, not then, and not in this trial, the

” It seems Swander’s claims in this respect were not accu-

rate. According to the Sourcebook in Forensic Serology, Immu-

nology, and Biochemistry, by R.E. Gaensslen, Ph.D., August,

1983, distributed by the U.S. Department of Justice, National

Institute of Justice, Leucocrystal Violet reacts with “many

chemical oxidants” and thus is “not more specific for blood than

most of the other catalytic tests.” See pertinent sections of the

Sourcebook, attached as Appendix F. This critical misstatement

by Swander, which suggested to the jury that there could have

been nothing other than bloodstains on Petitioner Holtzer’s

deck, was sufficient in and of itself to require the grant of a new

trial.

App. 58

blood in his condo, human blood in his

condominium. The blood on the brown rug,

just the brown rug, that’s the first thing

inside his condominium, three different

places where Luminol glowed when tested by

Connie Swander. And I’m going to get to

Luminol, and whether that’s blood in a

minute. But what we had on that rug,

and how you can leave blood stains on a

rug, are by stepping on the rug.

... [AJnd the Luminol glows only where

there’s blood, or some element that it

reacts with, but that’s what she saw.:

Now, following that, inside of the condo-

minium we had more Luminol reactions. And

these again could not be developed to show

footprints, but there was a pattern, full

dimensional patterns, not drops, not splat-

ters, not like something spilled, and they

were in an order which suggested a

stride. ...

Well, you know, the first question you

ask is, what’s blood doing there?

And it’s blood on the brown rug,

because it was capable of giving a DNA

extraction. Now, someone might want to

argue it’s saliva, or some other fluid, but this

is where you have to start employing your

own common sense. There’s DNA in that

stain that it reacted to Luminol. Luminol

glows when it contacts blood. The stain that

glowed showed DNA. Doesn’t that equal a

App. 59

blood stain, just by use of your common

sense?

Now, the question is, whose blood is it?

.»» Three alleles means there’s more

than one person’s blood there, more

than one person’s DNA.” (T 10/21/99 26-

28).

D. Additional act nt to Current

Issue ed on deral H s

On direct examination of the officer in charge of

the case, the prosecutor elicited the fact that, after

arrest, Mr. Holtzer “sat there quietly, didn’t say any-

thing, and basically showed no emotion” (T 10/13/99

75). In closing argument the prosecutor emphasized

Petitioner Holtzer’s claimed failure to question the

police on the morning that Bruce’s body was found (T

10/21/99 14). The prosecutor later told the jury that

Mr. Holtzer’s failure to go to the police and question

them when he found out that he was wanted for

murder showed his guilt (T 10/21/99 20). Finally, the

prosecutor, near the end of his rebuttal closing

argument, told the jury that the “mysterious pubic

hairs in the body covers” came from Darlene Wilson,

asserting that “there wasn’t that much time between

this killing and the time that Kevin Holtzer had his

conjugal visit with Darlene Wilson” (T 10/21/99 67).

App. 60

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review for a habeas petition is

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). That section provides

that the writ may be granted if the state appeal:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable applica-

tion of, clearly established federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States, or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.

This habeas petition is predicated upon these

standards.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) presents an independent

ground permitting the grant of the writ if the state

court decision was based on an unreasonable deter-

mination of the facts. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 386 (2000). See also, Green v. White, 232 F.3d

671, 672 (9th Cir. 2000). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) should

be read in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)

which allows the presumption of correctness as to

state court factual determinations to be dislodged by

clear and convincing evidence.

As used in the federal habeas statute, the phrase

“clearly established federal law” refers to the holdings

of the United States Supreme Court. See Taylor v.

Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 850 (6th Cir. 2002). However,

“clearly established law under the Act encompasses

App. 61

more than just bright-line rules laid down by the

[Supreme] Court.” Jd. It also includes “the legal

principles and standards flowing from those rules.”

Ruimveld v. Birkett, 404 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir.

2005). Accordingly, “the lack of an explicit statement

of a particular rule by the Supreme Court is not

determinative.” Jd.

Habeas relief is warranted where a state court

decision is either “contrary to” or “an unreasonable

application of” clearly established federal law. A

decision is “contrary to” federal law in two situations:

where the state court “applies a rule that contradicts

the governing law set forth in” Supreme Court

decisions, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06

(2000), or where the state court “decided a case

differently than the Supreme Court has decided on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Dorchy v.

Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 787 (6th Cir. 2005).

The habeas statute also grants relief where the

state court decision is an “unreasonable application —

of” federal law. A state court unreasonably applies

federal law where it “correctly identifies the correct

governing legal rule from [the Supreme Court’s] cases

but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular state prisoner’s case.” Ruimveld, 404 F.3d

at 1010. This provision does not require that the

Supreme Court must have previously decided the

very case that a lower court has before it. Rather, an

unreasonable application occurs where “the state

court either unreasonably extends a legal principle

from {the Supreme Court’s] precedent to a new

App. 62

context where it should not apply or unreasonably

refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Jd.

Finally, where a state court does not assess the

merits of a constitutional claim that was presented to

it, the deference due under AEDPA “does not apply.”

Maples v. Steagall, 340 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2003);

Wynne v. Renico, 279 F. Supp. 2d 866, 879 (ED. Mich.

2003).

ARGUMENT

I. PETITIONER WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (US CONST.

AMENDS. VI, XIV), AND A FAIR TRIAL,

WHERE HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY, WITH NO

STRATEGIC PURPOSE, MADE SEVERAL

OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE ERRORS.

The United States Supreme Court’s standard for

reviewing ineffective assistance claims is fully set

forth in the companion cases of United States v.

Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); and Strickland uv.

Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984). The Michigan

Supreme Court adopted these standards in reviewing

tks similar Michigan constitutional protections. People

v. Pickens, 521 N.W.2d 797 (Mich. 1994). See also,

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n14

(1970). Indeed, the right to the effective assistance

of counsel is longstanding and of paramount impor-

tance. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

App. 63

As the United States Supreme Court recognized in

Cronic, supra at 653-654:

Lawyers in criminal cases ‘are necessities,

not luxuries.’ Their presence is essential

because they are the means through which

the other rights of the person on trial are

secured. Without counsel, the right to a trial

itself would be ‘of little avail,’ as this Court

has recognized repeatedly. ‘Of all the rights

that an accused person has, tne right to be

represented by counsel is by far the most

pervasive for it affects his ability to assert

any other rights he may have.’ (Citations

omitted).

In the Cronic case the Court discussed the

history of the Sixth Amendment and emphasized that

the right was not to “counsel,” but rather to “the

assistance of counsel for the Petitioner’s defense.”

The Court cited earlier authority to emphasize the

entitlement to both “a reasonably competent attorney”

and advice “within the range of competence de-

manded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Cronic, 466

U.S. at 655. The Court in Cronic, at 654-655,

reviewed part of the history of the Sixth Amendment,

and emphasized that the right was to “actual

‘Assistance’ ‘for’ the accused’s ‘defence,’” and “to

assure ‘Assistance’ at trial, when the accused was

confronted with both the intricacies of the law and

the advocacy of the public prosecutor.” Throughout

the opinions there is an unmistakable focus upon the

fairness of the trial.

App. 64

The Strickland test.

In Strickland, supra, the United States Supreme

Court definitively laid out the tests to determine

whether a criminal defendant was afforded due

process when he or she claims that counsel was

ineffective. The Court clearly stated that these tests

are to be used by state and federal courts in inter-

preting the federal constitutional guarantee of

counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

In the Strickland case David Washington, after

tendering a plea at the guilt phase and waiving an

advisory jury at his capital sentencing hearing, was

sentenced to death by a Florida judge. Washington

later argued that his attorney was ineffective at the

sentencing hearing. Washington asserted that his

attorney should have, among other things, investi-

gated and presented chaiacter witnesses, requested a

presentence report, and asked for a continuance to

obtain a psychiatric report.

The Supreme Court in Strickland left no doubt

that the federal constitution demands effective

counsel in state prosecutions:

In a long line of cases ... this Court has

recognized that the Sixth Amendment right

to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to

protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.

The Constitution guarantees a fair trial

through the Due Process Clauses, but it de-

fines the basic elements of a fair trial largely

through the several provisions of the Sixth

App. 65

Amendment, including the Counsel clause.

Id. at 684-685.

The Court went on to hold that the right to coun-

sel plays a “crucial role” given our adversarial system

of justice — counsel’s abilities (skill and knowledge)

are fully required to meet the prosecution’s case. /d.

at 685. Counsel is required to ensure that the trial is

fair. Jd. at 685. For that reason, the right to counsel

means, under the federal constitution, the right to

effective counsel. Jd. at 686. Noting the various

ways in which the state can interfere, the Court

emphasized that the right to counsel under the Sixth

Amendment can be denied “simply” by a failure of

“adequate legal assistance.” Jd. at 686, citing Cuyler

v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980).

Recognizing that little guidance had been pro-

vided to the lower courts on how to assess the

adequacy of counsel’s performance when a general

“actual ineffectiveness” claii: is brought, the Court

emphasized that the key determinant is whether a

fair trial was provided. The question is whether

counsel’s performance errors undermined the proper

functioning of the adversarial system to the point

where “the trial cannot be relied on as having

produced a just result.” Strickland, supra at 686.

To aid the inquiry, the Court in Strickland set out

a two part test:

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient. This requires

showing that counsel made errors so serious

App. 66

that counsel was not functioning as the

“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the

Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant

must show that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. This requires showing

that counsel’s errors were so serious as to

deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial

whose result is reliable. Jd. at 687

The non-specific “objective standard of reasonabie-

ness” is utilized in assessing counsel’s performance

under this two part test. Jd. at 688. “The proper

measure of attorney performance remains simply

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”

Td. at 688.

The Court, though giving a nod to the ABA Stan-

dards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 through 4-8.6, clearly

stated that no particular set of rules governed assess-

ment of counsel’s performance. A case by case

analysis, highly deferential, should be employed. Jd.

at 688-689. In order to prevail a defendant must

overcome a presumption that counsel’s actions were

the result of sound strategy. Jd. at 689.

The Strickland Court outlined the duties of the

deciding court:

A convicted defendant making a claim of

ineffective assistance must identify the acts

or omissions of counsel that are alleged not

to have been the result of reasonable pro-

fessional judgment. The court must then

determine whether, in light of all the cir-

cumstances, the identified acts or omissions

App. 67

were outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance. In making that deter-

mination, the court should keep in mind that

counsel’s function, as elaborated in pre-

vailing professional norms, is to make the

adversarial testing process work in the

particular case. At the same time, the court

should recognize that counsel is strongly

presumed to have rendered adequate assis-

tance and made all significant decisions in

the exercise of reasonable professional

judgment. Jd. at 690.

The Court emphasized the importance of counsel’s

investigatory duties, and, though agreeing that stra-

tegic choices made “after thorough investigation of

law and facts relevant to plausible options” are

sacrosanct, “choices made after less than complete

investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent

that reasonable professional judgments support the

limitations on investigation.” Jd. at 690-691. A

decision not to investigate must be “directly assessed

for reasonableness.” Jd. at 691.

As to prejudice, the Court rejected a stringent

standard that would require a defendant to show that

his attorney’s lacking performance “more likely than

not” changed the verdict. Noting that effective coun-

sel is “one of the crucial assurances that the result of

the proceeding is reliable,” the Court opted for the

standard utilized in government non-disclosure and

interference cases:

App. 68

The defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional! errors, the result of the pro-

ceeding would have been different. A rea-

sonable probability is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

at 694.

The Strickland Court stressed the importance of

assessing the totality of the evidence in a case in

making this determination:

In making this determination, a court hearing

an ineffectiveness claim must consider the

totality of the evidence before the judge or

jury. Some of the factual findings will have

been unaffected by the errors, and factual

findings that were affected will have been

affected in different ways. Some errors will

have had a perverse effect on the inferences

to be drawn from the evidence, altering the

entire evidentiary picture, and some will have

had an isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a

verdict or conclusion only weakly sup-

ported by the record is more likely to

have been affected by errors than one

with overwhelming record support.

Taking the unaffected findings as a given,

and taking due account of the effect of the

errors on the remaining findings, a court

making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the

defendant has met the burden of showing

that the decision reached would reasonably

likely have been different absent the errors.

Id. at 695-696, emphasis added.

App. 69

The Court repeatedly stressed the importance of

the “fundamental fairness” of the proceeding. Noting

the deference owed in this habeas action, and that a

clearly erroneous standard is generally employed in

assessing federal district court findings, the Strick-

land’ Court stated that both the performance and

prejudice aspects involve mixed questions of law and

fact. Applying the review standards to Mr. Washing-

ton’s case, the Court found no indication of a lack of

investigation or knowledge on the part of Washington’s

lawyer. And, as to prejudice, the evidence that

Washington claimed was neglected at his capital

sentencing proceeding “would barely have altered the

sentencing profile.” Jd. at 700. The Court held that

Mr. Washington’s lawyer was constitutionally effective.

Applying the Strickland tests to the asserted

errors of counsel in this case requires that Mr.

Holtzer’s request for a writ of habeas corpus must be

granted.

The only portion of a state court’s decision on

such claims that are entitled to deference are findings

of fact. Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1104 (3rd

Cir. 1996) (discussing Section 104(3)(d)\(2) of the

AEDPA). However, no deference is required if the

decision “was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented” in the

state court. Id.

App. 70

The need for a hearing

Recently, the United States Supreme Court has

outlined the critical need to develop a testimonial

record post-conviction on the issue of ineffective assis-

tance of trial counsel. In Massaro v. United States,

538 U.S. 500 (2003), the Court discussed the need to

show “that counsel's actions were not supported by a

reasonable strategy and that the error was prejudi-

cial.” Id. at 505. In other words a hearing is necessary

to show that the Strickland standards have been met.

The Massaro Court went on to specify why a post-

conviction hearing on the point was needed:

The evidence introduced at trial, however,

will be devoted to issues of guilt or innocence,

and the resulting record in many cases will

not disclose the facts necessary to decide

either prong of the Strickland analysis. Id. at

505.

Federal courts have consistently held that it is

error when a state court fails to allow a defendant,

who has diligently sought a hearing, the opportunity

to develop a factual base for issues he is attempting

to raise on appeal. Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663 (6th

Cir. 2001), Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir.

2001), Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809 (5th Cir.

2000), Barnes v. Elo, 231 F.3d 1025 (6th Cir. 2000),

Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1999).

Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006).

In this case Petitioner Holtzer has requested an

evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in this

App. 71

habeas petition at each stage of the state court sys-

tem, from the trial court, through both of Michigan’s

appellate courts. The request for a hearing has been

repeatedly denied. Petitioner is not at fault and this

Court should grant an evidentiary hearing in this

case."

Failure to Present a Substantial Defense

There is no failure of advocacy more basic, or

damaging, than the failure to pursue and present a

substantial defense. Washington v. Texas, 338 U.S.

14, 19 (1967); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,

294 (1973). In Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-409

(1988), the Court held that “(t]he need to develop all

relevant facts in the adversary system is both fun-

damental and comprehensive.” Even the Michigan

Supreme Court recognized, in Pickens, supra at 803,

that “Michigan law has long required that defense

counsel present a reasonable defense.”

The necessity of pretrial investigation and prepa-

ration cannot be overstated, or even compensated for

by skill and experience. Strickland’s performance

standard of reasonableness requires counsel to make

pertinent factual and legal inquiries, and to allow

adequate time for trial preparation and development

of strategies and defenses. As the court put the

* The Appendix material (Appendices C through E) focusing

on hair transference and blood analysis matters are submitted

in support of Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing.

App. 72

matter in United States v. Barbour, 813 F.2d 1232,

1234 (D.C. Cir. 1987), quoting from Crisp uv.

Duckworth, 743 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1984):

Effective representation hinges on adequate

investigation and pretrial preparation ...

(for) investigation may help an attorney

develop or even discover a defense, locate a

witness or unveil impeachment evidence. /d.

at 583 (citing United States v. DeCoster, 487

F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).”

In Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir.

1993), the 8th Circuit found counsel ineffective for

failing to investigate. The court was particularly con-

cerned with the failure to prepare the case properly:

|Ajithough we generally give great deference

to an attorney’s informed strategic choices,

we closely scrutinize an attorney’s pre-

paratory choices. Jd. at 726.

See also Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1169-

70 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. dented, 523 U.S. 1132 (1998).

In Bryant v. Scott, 28 F.3d 1411, 1417-1419 (5th

Cir. 1994), the court found that trial defense counsel’s

failure to investigate potential alibi witnesses was

not a strategic choice and was “unprofessional con-

duct falling below the standard of a reasonably

competent attorney practicing under prevailing

professional norms.” The court concluded that the

failure to investigate failed the performance prong of

the Strickland test. Indeed, the United States

Supreme Court has recently held that the entire

App. 73

strategy inquiry in relation to an assessment of an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is dependent

on adequate investigatory efforts by counsel. See,

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). See also

Bigelow v. Williams, 367 F.3d 562, 566 (6th Cir. 2004)

(“the respect that attorneys’ strategic decisions in a

criminal trial will receive is proportionate to the

extent of the investigation they in fact conducted”).

Trial counsel’s failure to adequately prepare and

put forward a substantial defense by dealing with the

hair transference issues and by properly assessing

the “blood” evidence clearly amounted to a failure of

constitutional magnitude. The failure to bring in a

qualified criminalist for the defense to counter the

presence of three hairs (two claimed to belong to

Petitioner Holtzer allegedly found in the room where

Kaylee Bruce’s body was found and one claimed to

belong to Bruce allegedly found in Holtzer’s condo-

minium unit) was critical. There can be no doubt,

looking at the information provided by a nationally

acclaimed expert in this area (Appendix C)’ and

* Report, Review of Crime Scene Hair and Blood Stain

Evidence, December 1, 2004 by Peter D. Barnett, D-ABC,

Criminalist, Forensic Science Associates. See also, CV of Peter

Barnett, attached as Appendix D, and the Fact Statement on

Hair Transference provided to Mr. Barnett, attached as

Appendix E. Mr. Barnett’s report is a preliminary report and

Petitioner Holtzer urges this Court to order an evidentiary

hearing in this matter so that the testimony of Mr. Barnett can

be taken on the critical points noted in his report. If an

evidentiary hearing is granted the defense would request that

Mr. Barnett be permitted to view the scene and the physical

evidence in this case prior to testifying.

App. 74

considering the exceptional importance given this

hair evidence by the prosecution, that it was not “safe

to proceed to trial” without a defense expert to coun-

ter this evidence. See People v. Tanner, 660 N.W.2d

746 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) rev’d on other grounds 671

N.W.2d 728 (Mich. 2003)."°

Mr. Barnett’s preliminary report (Appendix C) is

indeed critical and notes, at p. 3, that “[tjJhere is

nothing about any of these hairs [the pubic hair, the

torso hair and the bedroom hair] to provide strong

evidence that they were shed during the commission

of the crime by either the perpetrator or Ms. Bruce.”

Barnett details the many ways these hairs could have

come to be located where they were allegedly found in

an innocent manner. This is absolutely vital infor-

mation. If the jury had been provided with this

information at trial, through an acclaimed criminalist

with impeccable credentials, Mr. Holtzer would have

had a reasonably likely chance of acquittal. Espe-

cially if the jury was not repeatedly told, improperly,

that the victim’s blood was in Mr. Holtzer’s condo-

minium (Issue III, infra). These matters were the

heart and substance of the prosecution’s case and had

to have substantially impressed the jury, considering

that we live in an era where CSI is on television in

'° Stated another way, expert assistance for the defense is

required where, without it, a criminal defendant would be de-

nied “an adequate opportunity fairly to confront the state’s case

and to present his defense.” Conklin v. Schofield, 366 F.3d 1191,

1208 (11th Cir. 2004).

App. 75

some form nearly every evening. The need for a

credentialed defense expert to drive home the point to

the jury that the hair and luminol evidence was

extremely minimal on these facts was essential.

Indeed, courts across the country have noted the

acceptance and importance of hair transference

evidence. The cross-transference of hair evidence was

crucial to the state’s case against the petitioner in

Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir. 1999).

The same was true in Thomas v. State, 374 So.2d 508, -

514 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1979). In State v. Butler, 24 S.W.2d

21 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000), the court discussed the de-

fense theory of hair transference as bearing on the

ultimate decision not to reverse due to faulty, un-

scientific hair comparison testimony. And the prosecu-

tion used a hair transference theory to explain the

presence of a hair fragment of African-American

origin, not belonging to the defendant, in the victim’s

bedroom, in Cherry v. Moore, 829 So.2d 873 (Fla.

S. Ct. 2002). In this case it was not safe to proceed to

trial without a hair transference expert, and Mr.

Holtzer did not have an adequate opportunity to fairly

confront the state’s case and to present his defense

without such an expert.

Another reason why defense counsel’s failure to

investigate and secure a qualified criminalist must be

seen as reversible ineffective assistance of counsel

involves the improper luminol and leucocrystalviolet

evidence (see Issue III, infra). See Peter Bamett’s

detailed discussion on this point in his report,

Appendix C. Not only would Barnett have been able

App. 76

to debunk the prosecutor’s hair evidence; he would

have cast severe doubt on the prosecutor’s dramatic

and constant claims that Mr. Holtzer had brought

Kaylee Bruce’s blood back to his condominium unit.

But for defense counsel’s failure in this regard, Peti-

tioner would have been able to gut the key compo-

nents of the prosecutor’s case against him. Failure to

investigate and bring in a credentialed criminalist

was outcome determinative under these facts.

In Stouffer v. Reynolds, 214 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th

Cir. 2000) the failure to obtain funds to hire a defense

expert was among counsel’s deficiencies resulting in

reversal. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).

See also People v. Grant, 684 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 2004)

where the Michigan Supreme Court held that the

failure of defense counsel to investigate critical mat-

ters required the grant of a new trial.

In Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 476 (5th Cir.

2004) the court recently determined that the failure

of defense counsel to investigate and retain a bal-

listics expert, when that type of expert was critical to

the defense, violated Strickland:

The Supreme Court recently determined that

“[iJn assessing the reasonableness of an at-

torney’s investigation ... a court must

consider not only the quantum of evidence

already known to counsel, but also whether

the known evidence would lead a reasonable

attorney to investigate further.” ... We also

agree with Soffar that his defense counsel

were deficient in not seeking out a ballistics

App. 77

expert when there were such readily ap-

parent discrepancies between the ballistics

evidence and the State’s theory of the case.

The State’s theory relied heavily on ballistics

evidence to show a correlation between the

statement attributed to Soffar and the crime

scene. Yet Soffar’s defense counsel never even

consulted with a ballistics expert. Defense

counsel were aware of the inconsistencies

between Garner’s statements and Soffar’s

confessions regarding both the number of

shots fired and the location of the victims

when the shootings occurred. The defense

counsel also were aware from the prose-

cution’s file that the police recovered bullets

and bullet fragments weighing less than the

total weight of five bullets, which tended to

corroborate Garner’s account of the events.

Considering this, it was objectively un-

reasonable for defense counsel to fail to

consult with a ballistics expert to determine

whether they could develop expert testimony

as to physical evidence that tended to

undermine the credibility and reliability of

Soffar’s confessions. (citations omitted)

See also, Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862 (9th

Cir. 2003), where the failure to investigate a crime

scene and secure the services of a criminalist and a

forensic pathologist were deemed reversible error based

on ineffective assistance of counsel; and Leonard v.

Michigan, 287 F.Supp. 2d 765, 791 (W.D. Mich.

2003), where defense counsel’s failure to investigate

through consultation with a DNA expert was deemed

App. 78

a denial of the constitutional right to the effective

assistance of counsel.

In this case the funds were available without

having to ask for them from the trial court. Trial

counsel’s failure was an investigatory one. Reasona-

ble professional judgment will not support a failure to

explore the need for an expert witness under these

facts. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Eze v.

Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110, 127-132 (2d Cir. 2003);

Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376, 390-392 (6th Cir.

2003); Kenley v. Armontrout, 987 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir.

1991).

Failure to Object to Junk Science and Prose-

cutorial Misconduct

Trial counsel also erred in failing to object to the

use of luminol testing where no confirmatory testing

was done (Issue III, infra) and in failing to object to

critical prosecutorial misconduct (Issue II, infra). The

luminol issue is important as this purported evidence

must be seen as the most effective information at

trial substantiating Mr. Holtzer’s involvement in

Bruce’s murder. There is no other way to explain her

blood in his condominium unit. Clearly, however, the

luminol testing “evidence” should never have been

admitted at Holtzer’s trial as it does not establish the

presence of blood, has no relevance, and is severely

prejudicial. The failure to object to the prosecutor’s

improper use of this evidence to claim that Bruce’s

blood was found in Holtzer’s condominium unit also

App. 79

meets the Strickland prejudice prong. Nor was trial

counsel’s conduct in failing to object to the prose-

cutor’s clearly improper remarks when the prosecutor

chastised Mr. Holtzer for his arrest silence and for his

failure to come forward with his version of events

(See Issue II, infra) at or above Strickland’s objective

standard of reasonableness. Hodge v. Hurley, 426

F.3d 368 (6th Cir. 2005).

The failures of trial counsel must be considered

outcome determinative under Strickland’s prejudice

prong. Bringing in a criminalist on transference and

to debunk the blood “evidence” would have changed

the course of trial as the defense would have broken

the back of the primary evidence relied upon by the

state — the three hairs and the blood claim. Moreover,

elimination of the improper luminol evidence, in ad-

dition to a reasonable explanation for the presence of

the three hairs, would have eliminated the ability of

the prosecution to claim that there was physical

evidence of Mr. Holtzer’s guilt. The errors of trial de-

fense counsel outlined above denied Mr. Holtzer a fair

trial and the writ should be granted. Minimally, this

Court should order an evidentiary hearing on this

issue which Petitioner three times requested in the

state courts and three times was refused.

AEDPA Review Standards

Petitioner raises ineffective assistance of counsel

— an issue that was not raised on direct appeal.

This issue was thoroughly exhausted in Michigan’s

App. 80

postconviction process and Petitioner asserts that the

trial court’s substantive treatment of these matters

prevents application of a procedural bar. See Abela v.

Martin, 380 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2004). Even if this

Court considers a procedural default, Petitioner as-

serts that he has established cause (through a claim

of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel, a

claim which itself has been completely exhausted in

postconviction) and prejudice to excuse the default.

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986); Hicks v.

Straub, 377 F.3d 538, 551 (6th Cir. 2004).

This Court must look to the last reasoned state

court opinion on the point before implementing

AEDPA standard of review limitations. The last

reasoned state court opinion is the state trial court’s

Decision and Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for

Relief from Judgment (attached as Appendix A). This

cursory Decision and Order, issued on March 22, 2005,

is full of snide comments, irrelevant observations and

erroneous statements. It is full of unsupportable and

unreasonable determinations of fact, allowing grant

of the writ independently under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2)

(See Issue II, infra).

With respect to the LAC issue, the state trial

court focuses on the fact that both trial defense

counsel were “experienced criminal defense counsel of

considerable repute.” Unfortunately, experience and

reputation do not insulate one from committing

constitutionally significant error. It is not who the

defense attorney is that matters, it is what that

attorney does. The state trial court also seems to be

App. 81

impressed by the fact that trial counsel were re-

tained, another irrelevant point despite the trial

court’s incredulity at the “intellectual bankruptcy” of

IAC “as a doctrine” due to the fact that “retained

counsel seem to commit ineffective assistance with a

stunning regularity rarely seen among appointed

counsel.” The trial court then sets out the Michigan

postconviction court rule for half a page and finds,

contrary to logic, that Petitioner has shown good

cause for failure to raise the issues, presumably in-

cluding the IAC issue, on direct appeal since they are

meritless. The court treats the issue substantively in

one conclusory sentence:

As for “actual prejudice,” these alleged

irregularities were in fact not improperly

handled at trial by counsel or the Court.

Decision and Order, Appendix A, p. 2.

Again, the trial court fails to import a procedural

bar here, freeing this Court to consider the issue

without the need for a showing of cause and preju-

dice. The state court’s substantive treatment of the

issue is clearly an unreasonable application of Strick-

land. The state trial court made conclusory claims

based on several unreasonable fact determinations.

This Court is thus empowered to review this issue de

novo. See Maples v. Steagall, 340 F.3d 433, 437 (6th

Cir. 2003); Wynne v. Renico, 279 F. Supp. 2d 866, 879

(E.D. Mich. 2003). The writ should be granted.

App. 82

II. PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO

A FAIR TRIAL (U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V,

XIV) WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE PROSE-

CUTOR ENGAGED IN SEVERE AND

REPEATED OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE

MISCONDUCT

The cumulative effect of repeated prosecutorial

misconduct denied Mr. Holtzer his due process right

to a fair trial. U.S. Const., Ams. V, VI, XIV.

The prosecutor’s misconduct exacerbated the

prejudice of the evidentiary errors in this case. A de-

fendant’s due process right to a fair trial is implicated

where the prosecutor resorts to improper and unjust

methods. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642

(1974). See also, Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168

(1986), where the prosecutor’s comments “so infected

the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process.”

When faced with a question of prosecutorial

misconduct at trial a reviewing court must decide

(1) whether the remarks considered in isolation were

improper, and (2) whether, in light of the entire

record, the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. See

e.g. United States v. Osuorji, 32 F.3d 1186, 1191 (7th

Cir. 1994); United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232,

1244 (7th Cir. 1996). See also, in the context of cross-

examination misconduct, Johnson v. Wainwright, 806

F.2d 1479, 1486 (11th Cir. 1987) cert den 108 S. Ct.

872 (1987).

App. 83

A defendant’s due process rights are infringed

when, as here, a prosecutor’s improper comments reach

the point where the trial is rendered fundamentally

unfair. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982). Smith

teaches that “the touchstone of due process analysis

in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the

fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prose-

cutor.” Id. at 219.

When faced with a question of prosecutorial

misconduct at trial a reviewing court must decide

(1) whether the remarks considered in isolation were

improper, and (2) whether, in light of the entire

record, the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. See

e.g. Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2005), United

States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1383-90 (6th Cir.

1994); United States v. Osuorji, 32 F.3d 1186, 1191

(7th Cir. 1994), United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d

1232, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996). See also, in the context of

cross-examination misconduct, Johnson v. Wainwright,

806 F.2d 1479, 1486 (llth Cir. 1987) cert den 108

S. Ct. 872 (1987).

In Donnelly, supra, Benjamin DeChirstoforo was

apprehended for a murder while riding in a car with a

dead body and a recently discharged firearm. He com-

plained of comments by the prosecutor expressing a

personal belief in guilt and discussing defendant’s

claimed motives for going to tnal. The Court con-

cluded that the comments did not render the trial so

fundamentally unfair that due process was denied. In

reaching that conclusion the Court suggested that the

improprieties claimed might have been “offered to

App. 84

rebut a somewhat personalized argument by respon-

dent’s counsel.” Jd. at 640 (See also Darden, supra at

182, excusing “invited” misconduct).

The Donnelly court took pains to point out that

there was no claim being made in that case that the

prosecutor’s misconduct “prejudiced a specific right”

under the federal constitution. 416 U.S. at 643 (See

also, Darden, supra at 182). Contrast that with the

fact that the prosecution in this case impermissibly

used Mr. Holtzer’s silence against him in direct viola-

tion of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), a clearly

delineated due process violation.

In order to determine whether the prosecutor’s

remarks infected the trial to the point where a due

process denial is found, a reviewing court should take

notice of the strength of the state’s case. Coleman v.

Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986).

Here the state’s case was marginal and at least

in part based on improper science (Issue III, infra).

The prosecutor’s claim that Kaylee Bruce’s blood was

to be found throughout Petitioner Holtzer’s condo-

minium unit, a claim that was unfounded on these

facts, was highly prejudicial and undoubtedly de-

prived Petitioner of his due process right to a fair

trial. As noted in Issue III, infra, and in Issue I,

supra, the presence of two of Mr. Holtzer’s hairs in

the room where Bruce’s body was found and the

presence of one of Bruce’s hairs in Holtzer’s condo-

minium unit is not surprising given the contact and

transference aspects inherent in the case facts. Mr.

App. 85

Holtzer had lived at the Beach Condominiums for

several months prior to Bruce’s death. Cleaning people

were in and out of his unit daily, changing towels and

sheets and cleaning Mr. Holtzer’s bathroom among

other cleaning chores, and they were also entering

the room where Bruce’s body was found daily. Given

the contacts between Holtzer and Bruce and con-

sidering the vast number of hairs examined from

multiple sources, it is actually surprising that more

hairs were not matched in this case, even if Mr.

Holtzer had nothing to do with Bruce’s death.

Considering the above it is clear that the claim

that luminol testing revealed blood (specifically

Bruce’s blood) throughout Mr. Holtzer’s condominium

unit must be seen as extremely prejudicial and,

indeed, outcome determinative. As detailed in Issue I,

supra, the prosecutor had no reasonable basis upon

which to make this constant claim to the jury in

Petitioner Holtzer’s case. Illuminating this problem

further are the misstatements by the trial court on

these points in his March 22, 2005 “Decision and

Order” (attached as Appendix A) after Petitioner

Holtzer’s current MCR 6:500 process briefing deline-

ated these matters in substantial detail. Of particular

concern are the trial court’s comments denying Mr.

Holtzer’s substantial claim regarding the improper

prosecutorial use of alleged blood evidence, evidence

that was critical in convicting Mr. Holtzer, that “the

DNA testing of the blood on the carpet in Mr. Holt-

zer’s condominium which confirmed that it was

human blood ... ” and that there were “luminol

App. 86

indicated footprints that led from the crime scene to

Mr. Holtzer’s condominium unit.” Decision and Order,

3/22/05, p. 3.

If either of the above quoted statements had a

grain of truth, they would be damaging to Mr. Holt-

zer’s claims here. Indeed the trial court placed great

reliance on these claims. Unfortunately they are to-

tally false, and clearly constitute an unreasonable

determination of fact on this record. With respect to

the first statement, as the trial court admits, there

was no DNA match to the victim from a stain on the

carpet in Mr. Holtzer’s condominium unit. The trial

court is obviously unaware that DNA testing does not

determine what type of bodily fluid created the stain

in the first instance. There was no serology testing

done here and even the state police technician that

testified about the stain admitted that she could not

determine whether the stain was blood (T 10/14/99

59-62, 124-128). To blithely state that DNA testing

confirmed that this stain was human blood when the

opposite point was such a large part of Appellant’s

argument here is beyond the pale, suggests the state

trial court may not have read the briefing, and vir-

tually demands that this Court grant the writ under

28 U.S.C. 2254(d\2) as this was clearly an un-

reasonable fact determination.

The second erroneous statement, important in

the state trial court’s analysis, is farther off base and

more damaging in its lack of accuracy. Footprints

from the crime scene, the condominium offices, to Mr.

App. 87

Holtzer’s unit, quite some distance, would be damn-

ing.

The first problem is that there were no “foot-

prints” at all. There were no shoe patterns, even just

outside Mr. Holtzer’s unit where police investigators

claim that there was a “weak luminescence” luminol

reaction (T 10/13/99 70-72). These were small spots in

a couple of areas (T 10/14/99 26-30). And, as de-

lineated thoroughly in Issue I, infra, many different

substances can cause a luminol reaction. A large

segment of the path between Mr. Holtzer’s condo-

minium unit and the crime scene was outdoors and

all attempts to do luminol testing in these areas was

unsuccessful (T 10/13/99 72-74). Indeed testing out-

side the office (the crime scene) with both leuco-

crystalviolet and luminol revealed no reaction (T

10/14/99 30-32, 61). State police found no blood on the

walkway outside the office (T 10/12/99 128).

To claim on this record that the prosecutor’s

highly damaging and improper comments were

rendered fair because there were luminol indicated

footprints leading from the crime scene to Mr.

Holtzer’s condominium unit is nothing short of

preposterous and renders the state trial court’s entire

three page offering useless and, again, based on an

unreasonable determination of fact. This Court

should grant the writ under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d((2).

If the state trial court and the prosecutor cannot

understand these critical evidentiary points, then it

is highly likely that the jury was swayed by the

App. 88

prosecutor’s misstatements to convict on this “false

positive” claim.

It is impermissible for the prosecutor to argue

facts beyond the evidence which was submitted to the

jury. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979); Wash-

ington v. Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689 (6th Cir. 2000). The

jury, in determining a defendant’s guilt or innocence,

may consider only evidence and sworn testimoay

adduced at trial and may not consider factors which

were not introduced as proof. Bell v. Wolfish, supra. A

prosecutor may not “testify” in closing arguments or

through cross-examination to facts which were not

introduced as evidence.

When the prosecutor told the jury that Mr.

Holtzer had carried Kaylee Bruce’s blood back to his

condominium, the prosecutor was in effect testifying

in argument. No case facts came remotely close to

establishing such a claim. As noted in Issue I, supra,

luminol testing is presumptive only and does not

establish the presence of blood. There are a number of

other substances that would react to luminol,

including vomit that had been treated with cleansing

agents and, even if not treated, that contained

vegetable matter or horseradish. Very small con-

centrations of these substances could cause a reaction

and the deposit could have been made years in the

past. Cleaning personnel walking through the unit

with bleach on their shoes could have registered the

same reactions to luminol. In short, the luminol

testing here, without any confirmatory test, did not

establish that any human blood, much less that

App. 89

Kaylee Bruce’s blood, was present in Mr. Holtzer’s

condominium unit. The claims of the prosecutor in

opening and closing argument were baseless and,

under these facts, extremely prejudicial. Petitioner

Holtzer’s due process right to a fair trial under the

federal constitution was clearly denied.

The prosecutor in this case did not stop at

improperly portraying the blood evidence to Mr.

Holtzer’s severe detriment. The prosecutor also

testified to facts not in evidence, crucial facts indeed,

when, without any basis, he told the jury that several

pubic hairs, not matched to Petitioner Holtzer or to

Bruce, found in the body wraps that were placed

around Bruce’s body by evidence technicians at the

scene, came from Darlene Wilson (T 10/21/99 67).

The prosecutor obviously made this claim, with

no basis in testing, to deflect attention and concern

from these unidentified hairs that the jury could

reasonably conclude, under these facts, could have

belonged to the actual] assailant or, conversely, could

lend credence to the notion that the presence of two of

Mr. Holtzer’s pubic hairs in the same setting did not

contain much probative value. By linking the hairs to

Mr. Holtzer, the prosecutor negated both of these

theories. The only problem here was that the

prosecutor had absolutely no basis for making this

linkage. What the prosecutor should have done was to

arrange for testing of the hairs in question against

those of Darlene Wilson. Why the prosecutor did not

do this would be the subject of sheer speculation.

Possibly there was reason to fear the result of such

App. 90

testing. We will likely never know. What is known is

that it was far easier to make the claim without

support. And making this claim without support

under these facts constituted a denial of Mr. Holtzer’s

due process right to a fair trial under the state and

federal constitutions.

Finally, the prosecutor’s elicitation of the fact

that Mr. Holtzer was silent upon arrest (T 10/13/99

75) and the prosecutor’s claims in argument that

Petitioner Holtzer’s failure to question the police on

the morning of the discovery of Bruce’s body and his

failure to go to police to question them when he found

out he was wanted for murder (T 10/21/99 14, 20)

should be considered as evidence of guilt, were clearly

impermissible.

A defendant’s silence at arrest is protected

conduct and cannot be elicited by the prosecution to

suggest guilt. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). The

prosecutor’s reference to Petitioner’s failure to come

forward with his version of events at any time prior

to trial crosses the Doyle line — Petitioner Holtzer was

under no obligation to assert his innocence before

trial. The United States Supreme Court has clearly

held that the use of a defendant’s post arrest silence

to suggest guilt is a violation of a defendant’s right to

due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.

This issue was thoroughly exhausted in Michi-

gan’s postconviction process and Petitioner asserts

that the trial court’s substantive treatment of these

matters prevents application of a procedural bar. See

App. 91

Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2004). Even if

this Court considers a procedural default, Petitioner

asserts that he has established cause (through a claim

of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel, a

claim which itself has been completely exhausted in

postconviction) and prejudice to excuse the default.

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986); Hicks v.

Straub, 377 F.3d 538, 551 (6th Cir. 2004).

The state courts made conclusory claims based on

several unreasonable fact determinations. This Court

is thus empowered to review this issue de novo. See

Maples v. Steagall, 340 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2003);

Wynne v. Renico, 279 F. Supp. 2d 866, 879 (E.D. Mich.

2003). The cumulative effect of the prosecutorial

misconduct was substantial and outcome determina-

tive. Mr. Holtzer’s federal due process right to a fair

trial was denied and the writ should be granted.

Ill. PETITIONER HOLTZER WAS DENIED HIS

FEDERAL DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A

FAIR TRIAL (U.S. CONST., AMS. V, XIV)

WHERE SCIENTIFICALLY UNSOUND

LUMINOL TESTING WAS IMPROPERLY

USED TO MAKE THE UNRELIABLE AND

HEAVILY PREJUDICIAL CLAIM THAT

THE BLOOD OF THE VICTIM WAS FOUND

IN HIS CONDOMINIUM UNIT.

Criminal defendants possess a due process right

to a fair trial, which may be denied by improper

evidentiary rulings. See U.S. Const., Ams. V, XIV. See

also Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 962-63 (6th

App. 92

Cir.1983). State court evidentiary violations may rise

to the level of a federal constitutional deprivation by

rendering a trial fundamentally unfair. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991), Crane v. Kentucky, 476

U.S. 683 (1986). Rosario v. Kuhiman, 839 F.2d 918,

925 (2d Cir. 1988). In this case junk science was im-

properly introduced to dramatically sway the jury on

key points, denying Petitioner Holtzer due process of

law under the federal constitution.

As detailed in the Statement of Facts, supra, the

prosecutor used luminol testing to tell the jury that

there was “blood” in Petitioner Holtzer’s condo-

minium unit, a key piece of the prosecutor’s case

against Mr. Holtzer. The prosecutor flatly stated that

the glow from the luminol indicated “that blood was

there” (T 10/11/99 190). The prosecutor claimed that

blood was found throughout Petitioner Holtzer’s

apartment and even outside on his deck. The prose-

cutor, in a twist of logic, suggested that because DNA

was extracted from a stain sample on a rug in Mr.

Holtzer’s condominium unit and because the stain

reacted to luminol, it was proven that there was blood

on the rug (T 10/11/99 192-193).”"

"In fact it appears the

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Holtzer v. Davis · 559 U.S. 939 | Frix