Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Holtzer v. Davis
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= 09-730 DEC 17 2009
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
an The
Supreme Court of the United States
KEVIN C. HOLTZER,
Petitioner,
V.
BARRY DAVIS, Warden,
Respondent.
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Sixth Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
F. MARTIN TIEBER
Counsel of Record
TIEBER LAW OFFICE
246 E. Saginaw Street
East Lansing, MI 48823
(517) 339-0454
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 226 6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Petitioner is serving a mandatory, non-parolable
life sentence, or “death in prison.” On federal habeas
review he argued that his state postconviction issues,
which were not run on direct review, should not be
procedurally defaulted, because they pertain directly
to the core question of guilt or innocence, and because
direct appeal counsel was ineffective. Did the Sixth
Circuit err in refusing to grant a certificate of
appealability under these circumstances?
li
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Question Presented For Review ....................:0006 i
Table cf Ai aiiiietscnesccscccccccsccoees iv
Reference to Decisions Below .....................0.cs0008 1
Statement Of JUriGdictioOn ........cccccccrerssorsvesssccoeees 1
Statutory Provision Involved....................e.cceeeeees 1
StateweOe’ Ge Ge era dess vesseccceccccsccscese 2
Argument for Granting the Writ....................0066 4
Comeh eins crassa EET iabebasasctscvecsecesccees 18
APPENDIX
October 7, 2009 unpublished Order of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit denying a certificate of appealability,
Holtzer v. Davis (No. 09-1411)................eeeeeeee App. 1
March 11, 2009 unpublished Opinion and
Order of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Michigan denying
writ of habeas corpus, Holtzer v. Davis (No.
2:06-cv-169; 2009 WL 723881).................eeeee App. 6
November 3, 2008 unpublished Magistrate’s
Report and Recommendation to deny the
writ, Holtzer v. Davis (United States District
Court for the Western District of Michigan,
No. SGC eda actecsacnscccesccess. App. 10
ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS -— Continued
Page
June 6, 2006 original Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus and Brief in Support, with
Appendices, Record Entry No. 1, filed in the
Federal District Court for the Western
District of Michigan, Holtzer v. Davis (No.
Re OIE sis haisisissacecsntandbvanstebaavieaatieaneeiane App. 27
lv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233
SII ihriaisd Cab hisghucdanleduclaseapeaveusudakicadinnmencisdstwialsadeiaiaae 8
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)........... 4,5,7,8
Jimenez v. Quarterman, __._ U.S. __; 129
Se es dacambecanawenesnaunale 8
Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 105 F.3d
I I TN a caida ciccaeinnienseiscanecenvescoisdennesien 5
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)............... 5,6
Roper v. Weaver, 550 U.S. 598 (2007) ........ TROON E DR re 8
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000)................... 5,6
Webster v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___ (No. 08-10314;
2009 WL 4111159, decided November 30,
MET sadiskicecciciaceddasssiastisberinccbucrasceeaaredematalinieiniate 8
STATUTES
I aa he sie assesids alabama maneeeaneel 1
I te as ate ea es 5
SN as Old saadapasbaaaaenne 2
NE Me I ao iss saccacednensixanavwincexsaxwiurivedenbiaavnuine 1
Be Ne ee I vo varisccccusccvuinacensehvabeccstsndencanvasens 12
I ii cassatncrenisindesindcensbidnibunctectaskcesaiaseipesd@oadeniee 1
Be 5 os ack cecsoninendanamncandubiontsaumacebiamubundade 1,2
Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act
OF I, I BI ci caccti sissies cuvesducadvarvasiedeaddevisye 3,5
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
ee EC Es sacedencbacunueabanacaubontea 12, 15
Re Me MI WU obo ccnseveivedsceentenesinesénsceens 2,10, 17
re I ET ho oni icscxcestsvevonsvnctacusencousenss 12,15
OTHER AUTHORITIES
2 Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice
and Procedure (5th Ed.) §35.4Db..................cceeeeeeeee eee 8
1
REFERENCE TO DECISIONS BELOW
The March 11, 2009 Opinion and Order of the
United States District Court for the Western District
of Michigan is unpublished (Case no. 2:06-cv-169;
2009 WL 723881). The October 7, 2009 Order of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
denying a certificate of appealability is unpublished
(Case no. 09-1411). Both of these decisions are repro-
duced in the appendix to this petition.
+
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioner seeks review of the October 7, 2009
dispositive order of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit denying his certificate of
appealability. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
<
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
28 U.S.C. § 22583:
(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 before a district judge, the
final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by
the court of appeals for the circuit in which the
proceeding is held.
(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final
order in a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant
to remove to another district or place for commitment
2
or trial a person charged with a criminal offense
against the United States, or to test the validity of
such person’s detention pending removal proceedings.
(cX1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be
taken to the court of appeals from —
(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in
which the detention complained of arises out of
process issued by a State court; or
(B) the final order in a proceeding under § 2255.
(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under
paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.
(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph
(1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy
the showing required by paragraph (2).
S
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Kevin Holtzer, filed his Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Federal District Court
for the Western District of Michigan on June 6, 2006.
Federal jurisdiction for this filing was under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Mr. Holtzer’s petition asserted that he
was denied the right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution,
3
through the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, was
denied due process of law through trial counsel’s
failure to explore and present available defenses, was
denied due process of law through the prosecutor’s
egregious and repeated misconduct, was denied due
process of law and his right to a fair trial through
admission of unsound science to reach critical and
inaccurate conclusions, and was denied the effective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal where signifi-
cant and obvious critical issues were neglected.’
On March 11, 2009, the district court issued an
Opinion and Order Approving Magistrate Judge’s
Report and Recommendation (to deny the writ), and a
Judgment dismissing Mr. Holtzer’s petition, and
denying a Certificate of Appealability as to all issues
raised.
On October 7, 2009, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued an Order denying
Petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability.
¢
' Petitioner also filed an issue concerning the standard of
review under the AEDPA but did not seek a certificate of
appealability as to that issue.
4
ARGUMENT FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Petitioner Holtzer has been Sentenced
by a Michigan State Court to Mandatory
Non-Parolable Life, or “Death in Pris-
on.” Due to Ineffective Assistance of
Direct Appeal Counsel, Petitioner did
Not Raise Critical Outcome Deter-
minative Issues on Direct Appeal. These
Issues Were Raised in State Post-
conviction, and Procedurally Defaulted.
Because These Procedurally Defaulted
Issues Pertain Directly to the Core
Question of Guilt or Innocence, and
Because Petitioner Has a Debatable
Argument that Ineffective Assistance of
Direct Appeal Counsel Should Con-
stitute Cause to Overcome any Pro-
cedural Default, Petitioner Asserts it
was Error to Deny a Certificate of
Appealability, and Asks this Court to
Remand for Review by the Sixth
Circuit.
The question for the Sixth Circuit in assessing
whether to grant a certificate of appealability was not
whether Mr. Holtzer could prevail, but whether Mr.
Holtzer had raised issues which were within the
realm of judicial debatability to the extent that a
certificate of appealability should have been granted.
In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983),
this Court set forth the standard governing issuance
of a certificate as probable cause. A habeas corpus
5
petitioner appealing from the denial of a § 2254
petition had to make “a substantial showing of the
‘, denial of a federal right” to obtain a certificate of
probable cause.
The Barefoot standard was codified in Section
102 of the Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996. The key provision states that an appeal
may not be taken unless the court issues a certificate
of appealability (COA) in habeas proceedings arising
out of state court convictions. The COA shall issue
only if the application has made a _ substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right, and
the certificate should indicate which specific issue or
issues satisfy the required showing. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c).
The standard for issuance of a certificate of
appealability and for a certificate of probable cause
are the same. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322
(2003) (“by enacting AEDPA, using the specific stan-
dards the Court had elaborated earlier for the
threshold test, Congress confirmed [the Barefoot
standard]”); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483
(2000). See also Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority,
105 F.3d 1063 (6th Cir. 1997). The new law states
that certificates may issue “only if the applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.”
In Miller-El, Justice Kennedy (writing for the
Court) again stressed that the COA process is a
gateway process which was never intended to be a
6
“ruling on the merits of petitioner’s claim.” Jd. at 331.
Under the prevailing standard, a petition must “show
that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or for
that matter agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further.’” Jd. at 336 (quoting Slack, 529
U.S. at 484).
The Miller-Eil Court went on to note that “the
threshold inquiry does not require full consideration
of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the
claims.” Jd. at 336. In fact this Court affirmatively
noted that § 2253 forbids it. “When a court of appeals
sidesteps this process by first deciding the merits of
an appeal, and then justifies its denial of a certificate
of appealability based on its adjudication of the actual
merits, it is in essence deciding an appeal without
jurisdiction.” Jd. at 336-37. The Miller-El Court went
on to note:
“(Ojur opinion in Slack held that a certificate
of appealability does not require a showing
that the appeal will succeed. Accordingly, a
court of appeals should not decline the
application for a certificate of appealability
merely because it believes the applicant will
not demonstrate an entitlement to relief. The
holding in Slack would mean very little if
appellate review were denied because the
prisoner did not convince a judge, or, for that
matter, three judges, that he or she would
prevail. It is consistent with § 2253 that a
certificate of appealability will issue in some
7
instances where there is no certainty of
ultimate relief. After all, when a certificate of
appealability is sought, the prisoner ‘has
already failed in that endeavor.’” Jd. at 337
(quoting Barefoot, at 893 n.4).
The Miller-El Court overruled the Fifth Circuit’s
refusal to grant the COA. “We do not require peti-
tioner to prove, before the issuance of a certificate of
appealability, that some jurists would grant the
petition for habeas corpus.” Jd. at 338. In fact the
Court stated that in some cases, the law required the
issuance of a certificate of appealability even though
“every jurist of reason might agree” after plenary
consideration that the petitioner will not prevail.
The Barefoot Court approved the following
remarks from an earlier Georgia federal case: “obvi-
ously, the petitioner need not show that he should
prevail on the merits. He has already failed in that
endeavor. Rather, he must demonstrate that the
issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a
court could resolve the issues in a different manner.”
463 U.S. at 893, fn. 4. Thus, in defining the sub-
stantial showing standard, this Court instructed that
lower federal courts may not deny applications for
probable cause certificates solely because they have
already denied the petitions on the merits.
A leading habeas commentator has urged that
the COA should be granted if the appeal presents
questions of substance, i.e., at least one issue that is
“debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could
resolve in a different manner, that is adequate to
8
deserve encouragement to proceed further; that is not
squarely foreclosed by statute, rule, or authoritative
court decision, or’... [that is not] lacking any factual
basis in the record.” See 2 Liebman, Federal Habeas
Corpus Practice and Procedure (5th Ed.) § 35.4b,
p. 1076-77. Mr. Holtzer meets this standard. As the
Barefoot Court noted: “A court of appeals should be
confident that petitioner’s claim is squarely foreclosed
by statute, rule, or authoritative court decision, or is
lacking any factual basis in the record of the case,
before dismissing it as frivolous.” 463 U.S. at 894.
Where a certificate of appealability has been
denied on procedural grounds, a petitioner must show
not only that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial
of a constitutional right, but also that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the district
court was correct in its procedural ruling. Jimenez uv.
Quarterman, __ U.S. __; 129 S. Ct. 681, 684, fn. 3
(2009), citing Slack, supra at 473. Petitioner asserts
that he has made this dual showing, and notes that
this Court has not hesitated to reverse COA denials
when, as here, such action is appropriate. Webster v.
Cooper, __ U.S. __ (No. 08-10314; 2009 WL 4111159,
decided November 30, 2009); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarter-
man, 550 U.S. 233 (2007); Roper v. Weaver, 550 U.S.
598, 604 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).’
* While Justice Scalia, in dissent, focuses on capital cases
as deserving of special scrutiny with respect to a COA denial, it
(Continued on following page)
9
Mr. Holtzer continues to serve his non-parolable
life sentence while this petition is pending; his
purpose is not to “harass,” but to obtain a ruling
on his federal constitutional claims. The screening
process is designed to prevent undebatable claims
from being appealed. The standards for the issuance
of a certificate of appealability are met with respect to
the following issues for the reasons stated, infra.
ISSUE I - INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL
COUNSEL
Each of the issues presented by Mr. Holtzer are
primarily fact driven, and the IAC issue is no ex-
ception.* In this case Petitioner Holtzer argues that
should be pointed out that Petitioner Holtzer is serving
Michigan’s most severe sentence, mandatory, non-parolable life,
often termed “death in prison.”
* Due to the import of the facts it is important for Petitioner
to respond to the repeated claims of the district court, in its
March 11, 2009 Opinion and Order, that Petitioner misrepre-
sented the record below. Initially, at p. 1 of its Opinion and
Order, the district court chides Petitioner for claiming “it was
inappropriate” or “error” for the magistrate to rely on the fact
statement issued by the Michigan Court of Appeals in this case
in 2003. A review of Petitioner’s objections to the magistrate
judge’s R & R will show that such an argument was never made.
Petitioner merely pointed out that the issues being considered
by the Michigan appellate court were not the issues being raised
on habeas. The district court, at p. 2 of its Opinion and Order,
asserted that Petitioner “misrepresents the trial court’s deci-
sion” in claiming that the state trial court found good cause for
failing to raise the issues currently put forward on direct appeal
because they lacked merit, and thus focused on the prejudice
(Continued on following page)
10
he was denied the right to the effective assistance of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and his due process right to a
fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, where trial counsel was not prepared for trial,
and made several, outcome-determinative prepara-
tory errors. Trial counsel failed to adequately prepare
and put forward a substantial defense by not dealing
with hair transference issues, and by not properly
assessing the “blood” evidence purporting to link
Petitioner to the assault. The failure to bring in a
qualified criminalist for the defense to counter the
presence of three hairs (two claimed to belong to
Petitioner Holtzer allegedly found in the room where
the deceased’s body was found and one claimed to
belong to the deceased allegedly found in Holtzer’s
condominium unit) was critical.
aspects. However, Petitioner merely quoted the state trial court
directly. The fact that the state trial court demonstrated a
misunderstanding of the cause and prejudice standard for
overcoming procedural default does not support an accusation of
misrepresentation when Petitioner clearly noted that the state
trial court’s ruling was grounded in “lack of merit in issues
raised.” Finally, the district court, without pointing to any
particular language used by Petitioner, and without reference to
any particular part of the record, charged that Petitioner
“consistently misrepresented the testimony and record in this
case” with respect to the blood/luminol issue. Contrary to the
district court’s assertion, Petitioner is not arguing that the
prosecutor claimed luminol testing was conclusive for blood, but
that the prosecutor repeatedly argued blood was present without
sufficient basis in the record.
11
As fully detailed in the brief in support of
Petitioner Holtzer’s original habeas petition, included
‘in the appendix, these preparatory and investigatory
failures led to a failure to put forward a critical
defense expert, and an inability to appropriately chal-
lenge the prosecution’s proofs. Trial defense counsel
was also ineffective for failing to object to prose-
cutorial misconduct and to the introduction of junk
science in the form of luminol “blood” evidence.
The federal magistrate judge’s Report and Rec-
ommendation, adopted by the district court, im-
properly defaults this issue, claiming that cause is
not established through ineffective assistance of
direct appeal counsel as the issue holds no merit. The
lack of merit is premised, initially, on the claim that
presentation of Petitioner’s expert in relation to hair
transfer evidence would “have added little, if any,
value to the defense.” The magistrate judge also
found that the luminol/blood issues were dealt with
through cross examination.
Petitioner urges that these conclusions are surely
debatable by reasonable jurists after a close look at
the record in this case. Petitioner urges this Court to
fully review the detailed fact statement and the
statement of this issue in the brief supporting his
original habeas petition, attached in the appendix.
The full record will conclusively establish that the
prosecution was able to use the presence of three
hairs at various locations, and the improper claim
that blood evidence tied Petitioner to the crime, to
base this conviction. There was no other convincing
12
evidence in this case. And a qualified expert, as
shown by the report appended to Petitioner’s original
habeas brief as Appendix C, and included in the
appendix to this petition, would have been able to
demonstrate to the jury that the “blood” evidence was
misstated and prejudicially exaggerated, and the hair
evidence, given the transference issues in this case,
was completely lacking in probative value.
A certificate of appealability should have been
granted by the Sixth Circuit as to this issue.
ISSUE II - PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
As a second ground for relief Petitioner argued
that his due process right to a fair trial under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments was denied when
the prosecutor committed egregious misconduct by
improperly claiming, with no basis in the evidence,
that luminol testing revealed the victim’s blood
throughout the Petitioner’s condominium unit, and
that Petitioner tracked the victim’s blood back to his
unit from the crime scene. Other clear prosecutorial
misconduct occurred when the prosecutor testified to
critical facts not in evidence, and elicited the fact that
Petitioner Holtzer was silent at arrest. Fact mis-
statements in relation to this issue by the state trial
court constitute an independent ground for grant of
the writ under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
The federal magistrate judge, affirmed by the
federal district judge, defaulted Petitioner’s prose-
cutorial misconduct issue, again finding no merit,
13
because, as to the blood statements, it was claimed
the prosecutor did not overstate the issue, as he
simply argued the evidence supported his conclusion
that blood was present. The magistrate judge, like
the state trial judge, misses the point here when he
states, at p. 9 of the Report and Recommendation,
that:
“Defense counsel did a very good job of
showing that the luminol testing could not
conclusively indicate blood, but the testi-
mony did establish that luminol could
indicate the presence of blood. In fact,
the prosecutor argued that blood was
found in petitioner’s condominium based
upon luminol testing, which the prose-
cutor admitted was not conclusive....
Similarly the prosecutor never stated with
certainty that there existed a blood pattern
of footsteps leading to petitioner’s condo-
minium unit, but simply argued the
evidence supported such a conclusion.”
The highlighted sections of the magistrate’s
Report and Recommendation exhibit a lack of under-
standing of the science of luminol testing, and of the
import of Petitioner’s argument here. Luminol,
without follow up testing, which was never done here,
simply cannot indicate the presence of blood, and
therefore the prosecutor’s argument that blood was
found in Petitioner’s condominium based on the
juminol testing was wrong, highly improper, and
extremely prejudicial.
14
The crux of this issue is whether the prosecutor
at trial exaggerated the impact of the luminol
“evidence” in this case. The district court improperly
claimed that Petitioner misstated the record because
the prosecutor at trial only suggested luminol was
presumptive for blood:
“
... Petitioner has consistently misrepre-
sented the testimony and record in this case.
Petitioner argues that luminol testing does
not indicate the presence of blood. Petitioner
cannot point to any testimony that indicates
that luminol testing was conclusive for blood.
Petitioner wants the court to imply that the
prosecutor was making that claim.” Opinion
and Order, p. 2.
Petitioner asserts that the record supports his
claims in this regard, as detailed in his fully
documented fact statement in the original brief in
support of the habeas petition, included in the
appendix to this petition, and would urge this Court
to fully review the facts. As an example, at p. 7 of that
brief, Petitioner points directly to the prosecutor’s
opening argument statement that “[o]n that brown
rug Connie Swander obtained a glow from the
Luminol, indicating that blood was there, couldn’t
see it, but the Luminol glowed.” (T 10/11/99 189-190,
emphasis added). In closing argument the state trial
prosecutor told the jury that “the Luminol glows
only where there’s blood.” (T 10/21/99 26-28).
Certainly this is pointing to claims by the trial
prosecutor that luminol testing was conclusive for
15
blood. And this strongly indicates that the prose-
cutorial misconduct on this critical point is an issue
that is debatable among reasonable jurists. Again,
Petitioner would refer to the detailed fact statement,
Issue II, and the expert report at Appendix C, of his
previously filed brief, included in the appendix to this
petition.
Petitioner also urges the debatability of the other
components of his prosecutorial misconduct argument
(unsupported and improper claim that pubic hairs
came from Darlene Wilson, and unconstitutional
reference to Petitioner’s silence, failure to turn him-
self in, and failure to question his own guilt). Given
the paucity of convicting evidence, and the limited
probative value of the evidence that was admitted,
these constitutionally improper arguments by the
prosecutor must be seen as outcome determinative.
Petitioner would again urge this Court to examine
the detail on these issues, fully documented with
record references, in the previously filed supporting
brief.
Petitioner Holtzer urges that a certificate of
appealability should have been granted by the Sixth
Circuit with respect to the prosecutorial misconduct
argument.
ISSUE III - DUE PROCESS DENIED THROUGH
JUNK SCIENCE
Petitioner argued that he was denied his federal
due process right to a fair trial under the Fifth and
16
Fourteenth Amendments where scientifically un-
sound luminol testing was used to make the unreli-
able and heavily prejudicial claim that the blood of
the victim was found in his condominium unit. The
lack of confirmatory testing and the misstatement of
the power of another testing method (leucocrystalviolet)
led the prosecution to serve up highly prejudicial
conclusions to the jury, conclusions which were in fact
baseless.
Again, this is a fact based issue and Petitioner
has indicated above that the critical “blood” evidence
was exaggerated impermissibly, and that the record
fully supports this claim. The magistrate judge, in his
R & R, adopted by the district court, urged that “(t]he
prosecutor simply argued that the positive luminol
test results could have been blood” and “the prose-
cutor never argued that the luminol testing con-
clusively established the presence of blood.” Though
some brief witness examination in this case suggested
the presumptive nature of this testing, the import of
these brief references were buried under an ava-
lanche of prosecutorial claims, like those outlined
above, that the luminol testing showed clearly “that
blood was there” and “that Mr. Holtzer took Kaylee
Bruce’s blood with him to his condominium.” Peti-
tioner will rely on the record as to these points as
fully detailed in his previously filed brief in support of
the petition. A certificate of appealability should have
been granted by the Sixth Circuit on this point.
17
ISSUE IV - INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF DI-
RECT APPEAL COUNSEL
Petitioner urges that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution when direct
appeal counsel failed to raise the issues outlined
above, which must be seen as significant, obvious,
and outcome determinative. The federal district
court’s opinion and order did not speak to this issue,
while the magistrate judge simply concluded, based
on his review of Issues I-III, that failure to raise these
issues did not constitute ineffective assistance of
direct appeal counsel due to their lack of merit, a
conclusion echoed by the Sixth Circuit. Petitioner, as
outlined above, urges that this is a point debatable
among reasonable jurists on this record and urges
that this Court grant his petition for writ of certiorari
and send this matter back to the Sixth Circuit with
direction to grant a certificate of appealability on this
issue as well. The issues discussed above would have
resulted in a different outcome on direct appeal had
they been raised.
18
CONCLUSION
THEREFORE, Petitioner Kevin Holtzer respect-
fully requests that this Court grant this petition for a
writ of certiorari and remand this matter to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
for full review of his issues.
Respectfully submitted,
F. MARTIN TIEBER
Counsel of Record
TIEBER LAW OFFICE
246 E. Saginaw Street
East Lansing, Michigan 48823
(517) 339-0454
Dated: December 17, 2009
App. 1
No. 09-1411
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
KEVIN C. HOLTZER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
ORDER
(Filed Oct. 7, 2009)
v.
BARRY DAVIS, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
Nee Nee Nee ee ee ee “ee”
Kevin C. Holtzer, a Michigan prisoner proceeding
through counsel, applies for a certificate of appeal-
ability (COA), pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 22(b), in
order to appeal a district court’s denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Following a jury trial in 1999, Holtzer was con-
victed of first-degree felony murder and sentenced to
a mandatory term of life in prison without the
possibility of parole. The Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction, and the Michigan Supreme
Court denied leave to appeal. Holtzer thereafter filed
a motion for relief from judgment, which the trial
court denied under Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)\(3). Both the
Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Su-
preme Court denied leave to appeal based on failing
to meet the burden of entitlement under Mich. Ct. R.
6.508(D).
In 2008, Holtzer filed a § 2254 petition, raising
five grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of
App. 2
trial counsel; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; (3) viola-
tion of his due process rights by the admission of
unsound luminol testing evidence; (4) ineffective as-
sistance of appellate counsel; and (5) the application
of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) because it is unconstitutional.
The magistrate judge issued a report and rec-
ommendation (R & R) to deny the petition with
prejudice, finding that Holtzer procedurally defaulted
his claims and that his ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claim failed to suffice as cause to
excuse the default. And in light of finding that
Holtzer procedurally defaulted grounds one through
four, the magistrate judge reasoned that Holtzer’s
fifth ground for relief was irrelevant to his analysis.
Following objections, the district court issued an
order approving and adopting the R & R, dismissing
the petition, and denying a COA. Holtzer now seeks a
COA from this court, arguing that ineffective assis-
tance of appellate counsel provided cause for his
procedural default and that prejudice was shown by
an examination of the merits of each issue.
A prisoner seeking to appeal the denial of his
§ 2254 petition must first obtain a COA by making “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1MA) and (cX(2). To satisfy
this standard when, as here, relief has been denied on
a procedural ground, the petitioner must demonstrate
that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right and that jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the district court was
App. 3
correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Holtzer has not met this
standard.
“Federal courts will not consider the merits of
procedurally defaulted claims, unless the petitioner
demonstrates cause for the default and prejudice re-
sulting therefrom, or that failing to review the claim
would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 805-06 (6th Cir.
2006) (internal citations omitted). Since both cause
and prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural
default, the failure to establish cause eliminates the
need to consider prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 494-95 (1986).
To establish cause, the petitioner must present
a substantial reason to excuse the default. “Demon-
strating cause requires showing that an ‘objective fac-
tor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts
to comply’ with the state procedural rule.” Franklin v.
Anderson, 434 F.3d 412, 417 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). The district court’s findings
of fact in this regard are subject to a clearly erroneous
standard of review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Amadeo uv.
Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 223 (1988); Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d
155, 161 (6th Cir. 1994).
Holtzer argues that appellate counsel's ineffective
assistance, i.e., failing to raise grounds one through
three on direct appeal, should suffice as cause to
excuse his procedural default. This court has held
that, in the procedural default context, ineffective
App. 4
assistance of counsel may constitute cause for failing
to properly present a claim before a state court.
Williams, 460 F.3d at 800 (internal citation omit-
ted). Holtzer presented his ineffective-assistance-of-
appellate-counsel claim as an independent claim in
his motion for relief from judgment, which was his
first opportunity to raise the claim. See Edwards uv.
Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452 (2000).
“A defendant is entitled to the effective assis-
tance of counsel in his first appeal of right,” which is
judged under the standard set forth in Strickland uv.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Mapes v. Tate, 388
F.3d 187, 191 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citations
omitted). “In order to establish a Sixth Amendment
violation, it must be shown both that counsel’s repre-
sentation fell below an objective standard of reason-
ableness, and that his deficiencies prejudiced the
defendant.” Jd. at 194 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687-88). The performance and prejudice components
of the Strickland test are considered mixed questions
of law and fact, and are thus subject to de novo
review. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698; Mapes, 388 F.3d
at 190.
The scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly
deferential and “counsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Mapes, 388
F.3d at 191. “Counsel’s failure to raise an issue on
appeal could only be ineffective assistance if there is
a reasonable probability that inclusion of the issue
App. 5
would have changed the result of the appeal.” Wilson
v. Parker, 515 F.3d 682, 707 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting
McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 699 (6th Cir.
2004)), petition for cert. filed, No. 08-10636 (May 26,
2009). “If there is a reasonable probability that [the
defendant] would have prevailed on appeal had the
claim been raised, we can then consider whether
the claim’s merit was so compelling that appellate
counsel’s failure to raise it amounted to ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel.” Jd. (quoting McFar-
land, 356 F.3d at 700).
For the reasons set forth by the magistrate judge
and district court, jurists of reason would not debate
the district court’s finding that appellate counsel ren-
dered effective assistance. Because Holtzer has failed
to show a reasonable probability that inclusion of the
three grounds for relief on direct appeal would have
changed the result of the appeal, his ineffective-
assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim fails to suffice
as cause to excuse his procedural default.
Accordingly, Holtzer’s COA application is denied.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
/s/ Leonard Green
Leonard Green
Clerk
App. 6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
KEVIN CARTER HOLTZER,
Petitioner, Case No. 2:06-cv-169
> HON.
BARRY DAVIS, R. ALLAN EDGAR
Respondent. /
OPINION AND ORDER APPROVING
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Court has reviewed the Report and Rec-
ommendation filed by the United States Magistrate
Judge in this action. The Report and Recommen-
dation was duly served on the parties, and the Court
has received objections from Petitioner. In accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court has performed
de novo consideration of those portions of the Report
and Recommendation to which objection has been
made. The Court now finds the objections to be
without merit.
Petitioner objects to “each and every point” in the
Report and Recommendation. According to Petitioner,
it was inappropriate for the Court to quote the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals’ factual summary because the
issues presented in the petition filed in this Court are
different than the issues presented on appeal to
the Michigan Court of Appeals. Petitioner does not
App. 7
identify any factual error made by the Michigan
Court of Appeals and does not claim that the
Michigan Court of Appeals’ opinion was misquoted by
this Court. Petitioner has not explained why the facts
as presented by the Michigan Court of Appeals are
not relevant to his petition or why it was error for the
Magistrate Judge to rely on those facts.
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the
Court find that Petitioner procedurally defaulted on
the issues presented in this petition. Petitioner main-
tains that the last reasoned state court opinion was
the trial court’s decision and maintains that decision
found good cause existed for not raising the issues
presented. Petitioner misrepresents the trial court’s
decision. In fact, the trial court stated that because
the issues were without merit, it would have been
pointless to raise them on appeal. More importantly,
the last reasoned state court decision came from the
Michigan Supreme Court, which denied petitioner
leave to appeal under MCR 6.508(D).
Petitioner also asserts that the Magistrate Judge
erred in recommending that his ineffective assistance
of counsel claims should be dismissed. According to
Petitioner, it was constitutional error for defense
counsel to not present contradicting expert testimony
on the hair transference issue and the luminol test-
ing. These issues were addressed effectively during
cross-examination by defense counsel. The conclusion
that there was no constitutional error is supported by
the record.
App. 8
Similarly, in addressing the prosecutorial miscon-
duct issue regarding the luminol testing, Petitioner
has consistently misrepresented the testimony and
record in this case. Petitioner argues that luminol
testing does not indicate the presence of blood. Peti-
tioner cannot point to any testimony that indicates
that luminol testing was conclusive for blood. Peti-
tioner wants the court to imply that the prosecutor
was making that claim. The testimony presented at
trial was that luminol testing was a first line test for
blood and could possibly detect the presence of blood.
The point that it was not a conclusive test for blood
was brought out repeatedly by both the prosecutor
and defense counsel. Even petitioner has conceded in
this petition that he wanted further expert testimony
provided to point out that luminol testing could
indicate only a possibility of blood. Such testimony
would be nothing more than cumulative, as everyone
was in agreement that luminol testing could not
conclusively detect the presence of blood. Everyone
has conceded that further testing was necessary to
conclusively establish the existence of blood evidence.
Petitioner claims that given the lack of evidence
against him, prosecutorial misconduct was conclu-
sively established regarding the improper prosecu-
torial claim that pubic hairs came from Darlene
Wilson. Petitioner also claims prosecutorial error for
references made to petitioner’s silence and references
made because of petitioner’s failure to turn himself
in to police. Petitioner has not established that any
of these claims rise to the level of prosecutorial
App. 9
misconduct. Moreover, there existed significant
evidence that pointed to petitioner’s guilt.
Petitioner claims that the AEDPA is unconstitu-
tional. Petitioner procedurally defaulted his claims.
Accordingly, even if the Court concluded that the
AEDPA was unconstitutional, petitioner could be af-
forded no relief. The petition is dismissed because the
issues presented were procedurally defaulted.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Report
and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Docket
#56) is approved and adopted as the opinion of the
court.
Dated: 3/11/09 /s/ R. Allan Edgar
R. ALLAN EDGAR
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE
App. 10
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
KEVIN CARTER HOLTZER,
Petitioner, Case No. 2:06-cv-169
sy HON.
BARRY DAVIS, R. ALLAN EDGAR
Respondent. /
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
(Filed Nov. 3, 2008)
Petitioner Kevin Carter Holtzer filed this petition
for writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of
his state court conviction for first degree murder.
Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial and on
November 16, 1999, was sentenced to life imprison-
ment. Petitioner’s appeal was denied by the Michigan
Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court
denied leave to appeal. Petitioner then presented the
issues raised in this petition in a motion for relief
from judgment. The motion for relief from judgment
was denied by the trial court on March 22, 2005. Both
the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan
Supreme Court denied leave to appeal because peti-
tioner failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief un-
der MCR 6.508(D). Respondent argues that petitioner
has procedurally defaulted the issues presented in
this petition.
App. 11
The Michigan Court of Appeals summarized the
facts:
Defendant was convicted of brutally mur-
dering eighteen-year-old Kaylee Bruce at the
Beach Condominiums in Traverse City,
where she worked as a desk clerk and
defendant was a monthly rental. Her body
was found by the maintenance supervisor on
the morning of February 17, 1998. She had
suffered nineteen lacerations that extended
to the bone, multiple facial and skull frac-
tures, severe neck injuries consistent with
strangulation, severe blunt force injuries to
the torso, chest, abdomen and pelvis, and
extensive internal bleeding. Additionally, a
metal rod had been forced into the decedent’s
vagina with such force that it lacerated her
vagina and penetrated two inches into her
pelvic bone. it was opined that it had been
necessary to drive the rod with a mallet or
kick it multiple times with a sturdy shoe to
drive it into the bone. The decedent was still
alive when this injury was inflicted. Ad-
ditionally, the blood on her breasts had been
smeared as if someone had stroked her
breasts. Additionally, money was missing
from the office where the decedent worked.
There was a series of bloody footprints at the
scene, all made from the same type of foot-
wear, a pair of size 12 or 12-'2 Caterpillar
work boots. These boots were similar in style
to a pair that defendant had recently owned;
defendant’s boots were not found, however,
and no comparison was able to be made.
App. 12
Defendant was seen wearing the boots before
February 14, but wore different, new boots to
work on February 17. Additionally, a tire
valve core was found near the decedent’s
body; defendant worked at a Tire Factory
store owned by his father. There was evi-
dence that it was common for tire valve cores
to become caught in the tread of Caterpillar
boots worn by store employees.
Defendant moved out of the Beach Condo-
miniums about a week after the murder and
did not report to work as scheduled on
February 26. He did return to work about
two weeks later. However, in March 1998,
defendant purchased an Amtrak ticket in
Toledo under a false name, for passage to
Carbondale, Indiana, with a changeover in
Chicago. Defendant was taken into custody
by the FBI in Chicago.
Defendant’s felony-murder conviction was
based upon the predicate felonies of third-
degree criminal sexual conduct and second-
degree criminal sexual conduct. A third the-
ory of felony murder based upon a predicate
felony of larceny was rejected by the jury.
In addition to the evidence set out above, the
prosecutor introduced evidence based on mi-
tochondrial DNA (mtDNA) from hairs found
at the crime scene and in defendant’s
bedroom. The admissibility of this evidence
forms most of defendant’s arguments on ap-
peal. At issue is mtDNA testing on three
hairs. Two hairs subsequently determined to
App. 13
belong to defendant were found at the crime
scene and are referred to as the “pubic hair”
and the “torso hair.” Additionally, a hair
identified as belonging to the victim was
found in defendant’s bedroom and is referred
to as the “bedroom hair.”
Petitioner maintains that his conviction was ob-
tained in violation of his federal rights. The respon-
dent has filed an answer and has complied with Rule
5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts. The parties have
briefed the issues and the matter is now ready for
decision. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), au-
thorizing United States Magistrate Judges to submit
proposed findings of fact and recommendations for
disposition of prisoner petitions, I am recommending
that this petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.
Petitioner has raised the following issues in his
petition:
I. Ineffective assistance of counsel,
II. Prosecutorial misconduct,
lif. A violation of due process when scien-
tifically unsound luminol testing was
introduced as evidence,
IV. Ineffective assistance of appellate coun-
sel, and
V. The court should not apply 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)\(1), if it precludes relief, be-
cause that standard is unconstitutional.
App. 14
Pursuant to the AEDPA, an application for writ
of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is in-
carcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot he
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudi-
cated on the merits in state court unless the adjudica-
tion: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly es-
tablished federal law as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a deci-
sion that was based upon an unreasonable determi-
nation of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases
decided by the United States Supreme Court. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). This provision marks a “significant
change” and prevents the district court from looking
to lower federal court decisions in determining
whether the state decision is contrary to, or an un-
reasonable application of, clearly established federal
law. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir.
1998). To justify a grant of habeas corpus relief under
this provision of the AEDPA, a federal court must find
a violation of law “clearly established” by holdings of
the Supreme Court, as opposed to its dicta, as of the
time of the relevant state court decision. Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Recently, the
Supreme Court held that a decision of the state court
is “contrary to” such clearly established federal law “if
the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that
reached by this Court on a question of law or if the
state court decides a case differently than this Court
App. 15
has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”
Id. A state court decision will be deemed an “un-
reasonable application” of clearly established federal
law “if the state court identifies the correct governing
legal principle from this Court’s decisions but un-
reasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner’s case.” Jd. A federal habeas court may not
find a state adjudication to be “unreasonable” “simply
because that court concludes in its independent judg-
ment that the relevant state-court decision applied
clearly established federal law erroneously or in-
correctly.” Jd. at 412. Rather, the application must
also be “unreasonable.” Jd. Further, the habeas court
should not transform the inquiry into a subjective one
by inquiring whether all reasonable jurists would
agree that the application by the state court was
unreasonable. Jd. at 410 (disavowing Drinkard uv.
Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996)). Rather,
the issue is whether the state court’s application of
clearly established federal law is “objectively un-
reasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.
The AEDPA requires heightened respect for state
factual findings. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1134
(6th Cir. 1998). The habeas corpus statute has long
provided that the factual findings of the state courts,
made after a hearing, are entitled to a presumption of
correctness. This presumption has always been ac-
corded to findings of state appellate courts, as well as
the trial court. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546
(1981); Smith v. Ago, 888 F.2d 399, 407 n.4 (6th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 961 (1990). Under the
App. 16
AEDPA, a determination of a factual issue made by
a state court is presumed to be correct. The peti-
tioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption of
correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d
358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S.
1040 (1999).
When a state-law default prevents further state
consideration of a federal issue, the federal courts are
ordinarily precluded from considering that issue on
habeas corpus review. See Yist v. Nunemaker, 501
U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107
(1982). The Sixth Circuit applies a four-part test to
determine whether a claim is procedurally defaulted:
(1) the court must first determine that there is a state
procedural rule that is applicable to the petitioner’s
claim and that the petitioner failed to comply with
the rule; (2) the court must decide whether the state
courts actually enforced the state procedural rule;
(3) the default must be an “independent and ade-
quate” state ground on which the state can rely to
foreclose review of a federal constitutional claim; and
(4) if the foregoing are met, the petitioner must
demonstrate cause for his failure to follow the rule
and that he was actually prejudiced by the alleged
constitutional error. Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337,
348 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d
135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); accord Greer v. Mitchell, 264
F.3d 663, 672 (6th Cir. 2001). There may be an
“exceptional case in which exorbitant application of
a generally sound rule renders the state ground
App. 17
inadequate to stop consideration of a _ federal
question.” Lee v. Kemna, 122 S.Ct. 877, 878 (2002). A
petitioner may also excuse a default by making a
colorable claim of innocence; that is, he has shown
that any constitutional error “probably” resulted in
the conviction of one who was actually innocent.
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 322 (1995) (citing
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986)). This
exception is reserved for a very narrow class of cases,
based on a claim of “new reliable evidence.” Schlup,
513 U.S. at 315, 324.
The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
relief for judgment under MCR 6.508(D)(3) and con-
cluded that there lacked good cause and/or prejudice
to overcome the failure to raise the issues in the
initial appeal. More importantly, the Michigan Court
of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court ex-
pressly stated that it denied petitioner’s motion for
relief for judgment and application for leave to appeal
on the basis that petitioner failed to “meet the burden
of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D).” Under MCR 6.508(D)(2) and (3), a defen-
dant may not collaterally attack a conviction based
upon claims that were decided against him in a prior
appeal or that could have been raised on direct
appeal. For claims that could have been raised, the
defendant is entitled to relief only if he can establish
“good cause” for failing to raise the grounds on appeal
and “actual prejudice,” as shown by a “reasonably
likely chance of acquittal” or an “irregularity so offen-
sive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process
App. 18
that the conviction should not be allowed to stand.”
MCR 6.508(D\(3)(a)-(b). In assessing how “firmly” a
state procedurai rule has been established, the criti-
cal inquiry is whether, viewed from the time of the
petitioner’s later significant actions or inaction, the
petitioner could be deemed to have been apprised of
the procedural rule’s existence. Luberda v. Trippett,
211 F.3d 1104, 1006-1007 (6th Cir. 2000). Because
MCR 6.508(D) was enacted in 1989 and petitioner’s
conviction and appeals took place some time there-
after, MCR 6.508(D) was a “firmly established”
procedural rule for purposes of petitioner’s action. See
Luberda, 211 F.3d at 1007; Rogers v. Howes, 144 F.3d
990, 994 (6th Cir. 1998).
As cause for his default, petitioner asserts that
his appellate counsel should have raised the de-
faulted issues in an appeal of right. Petitioner argues
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to hire
an additional expert witness to testify about hair
transfer issues and luminol testing. Petitioner has
presented a report from an expert that indicates that
there was nothing about the hair evidence that could
show that it came from either petitioner or the victim.
Petitioner’s expert also explains how hair generally
can be transferred from location to location without
any foul play involved. Further, petitioner’s expert
report states that luminol testing can indicate only
the possibility that blood is present and would need
confirmation by some additional testing. In fact, the
expert report states: “[t]o have enough blood on shoes
or feet to produce a stain which soaked through a rug
App. 19
or carpet, as described in the Laboratory Reports and
accompanying notes seems entirely improbable.” Peti-
tioner argues that it was constitutional error not to
present contrary expert testimony on the scientific
analysis of the hair and blood evidence.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim, a convicted defendant must demonstrate
(1) that counsel’s errors were so serious that counsel
was not functioning as counsel guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment, and (2) that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional er-
rors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
688-96 (1984). Stated another way, this court is to
decide whether the alleged failures of petitioner’s trial
counsel were such egregious errors as to constitute
ineffectiveness and whether the alleged failures were
materially prejudicial. The Sixth Circuit has ex-
plained:
The question for reviewing courts is whether
counsel’s errors have likely undermined the
reliability of, and confidence in, the result.
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842-43
(1993). “An error by counsel, even if pro-
fessionally unreasonable, does not warrant
setting aside the judgment of a criminal
proceeding if the error had no effect on the
[ultimate] judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
691, quoted in Smith v. Jago, 888 F.2d 399,
404-05 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
961 (1990). In evaluating petitioner’s claim,
“a court must indulge a strong presumption
App. 20
that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.”
Id. at 689. “Counsel is constitutionally
ineffective only if performance below pro-
fessional standards caused the defendant to
lose what he otherwise would probably have
won.” United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222,
229 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 2969 (1993). Thus, the deter-
minative issue is not whether petitioner’s
counsel was ineffective but whether he was
so thoroughly ineffective that defeat was
“snatched from the jaws of victory.” See id.
West v. Seabold, 73 F.3d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1996).
In the opinion of the undersigned, there was no
constitutional error by deciding not to call additional
experts to testify about hair transfer or luminol evi-
dence. Testimony was brought out at trial that
hundreds of hair samples were taken as evidence and
most of those samples were dissimilar to either the
victim’s hair or petitioner’s hair. Additional testimony
about hair transference issues could have added little,
if any, value to the defense. Similarly, even the prose-
cutor, when questioning witness Swander, brought
out testimony that luminol evidence was not con-
clusive for blood and that other stains would result in
a positive luminol test result. Witness Swander
testified that luminol was a first test to determine the
possibility of a blood stain. On cross examination,
defense counsel brought out further testimony that
luminol could not be denied for blood and would react
to other substances. In fact, witness Swander could
App. 21
not testify that the positive luminol findings were
blood stains without additional testing. Further, de-
fense counsel brought out testimony that stains taken
from blinds in petitioner’s rented condominium that
indicated a positive luminol test did not test positive
for blood upon further laboratory testing. Defense
counsel further discussed these issues in his closing
statement to the jury.
Petitioner argues that there were repeated
instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Ultimately, the
issue for the Court is whether the prosecutor’s con-
duct denied petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S. Ct. 940
(1982). See also United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380
(6th Cir. 1994) (adopting test for evaluation of prose-
cutorial misconduct on direct review); Serra ov.
Michigan Department of Corrections, 4 F.3d 1348 (6th
Cir. 1993) (applying similar test to habeas action).
Inappropriate remarks or conduct by a prosecutor
constitute a matter of constitutional concern only
when it is egregious enough to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial. See United States v. Chambers, 944
F.2d 1253 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1217
(1992); United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1400
(6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992);
Paprocki v. Foltz, 869 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1989).
Petitioner argues that the prosecutor committed
misconduct by stating that blood was found in peti-
tioner’s condominium unit and that footprints were
found leading to petitioner’s condominium unit. Cer-
tainly, it was the prosecution theory that blood was
App. 22
found in petitioner’s condominium unit and that a
pattern of blood was found that indicated footprints.
It was the prosecution theory that the blood came
from petitioner’s boots which picked up the blood
from the crime scene and transferred blood to the
carpeting as petitioner returned to his unit after
committing the crime. Defense counsel did a very
good job of showing that the luminol testing could not
conclusively indicate blood, but the testimony did
establish that luminol could indicate the presence of
blood. In fact, the prosecutor argued that blood was
found in petitioner’s condominium based upon lumi-
nol testing, which the prosecutor admitted was not
conclusive. Defense counsel in his closing argument
made similar arguments regarding the lack of
conclusiveness of luminol testing for blood. Similarly,
the prosecutor never stated with certainty that there
existed a blood pattern of footsteps leading to peti-
tioner’s condominium unit, but simply argued the
evidence supported such a conclusion.
Petitioner also argues that it was improper for
the prosecutor to a make a statement that two pubic
hairs found at the crime scene might have been from
Darlene Wilson. Neither petitioner nor the victim
were the source of those hairs. No testing was done to
indicate that the hairs came from Darlene Wilson.
Darlene Wilson did testify that she and petitioner
were intimate when he visited her just hours before
the murder was believed to take place. The prose-
cutor suggested that it was simply a reasonable
explanation that the hairs could have come from
App. 23
Darlene Wilson in his rebuttal closing argument.
Petitioner also argues that the prosecutor improperly
used petitioner’s silence upon arrest and petitioner’s
failure to turn himself into police when he learned
that he was wanted for murder as evidence of
petitioner’s guilt. The prosecutor did not commit
misconduct on these issues. Contrary to petitioner’s
argument, the prosecutor did not improperly use peti-
tioner’s silence as evidence of guilt. The statement
that petitioner “sat there quietly, didn’t say anything,
and basically showed no emotion,” was made by a
witness and was not responsive to the prosecutor’s
question. The prosecutor did not comment on peti-
tioner’s silence and did not commit misconduct on
this issue. Further, the prosecutor’s comment about
petitioner’s behavior was not misconduct.
Petitioner argues that testimony and evidence
introduced regarding luminol testing violated his
right to a fair trial by causing prejudice. Petitioner
characterizes luminol testing as junk science and
without evidentiary value. Certainly, the luminol
testing was conducted as a first line test for blood.
The testimony clearly indicated that it was only a
first line test and that it was not a conclusive test for
blood. The prosecutor simply argued that the positive
luminol test results could have been blood. Contrary
to petitioner’s argument, the prosecutor never argued
that the lumino! testing conclusively established the
presence of blood. The luminol testing was admitted
for its value and that was simply as a first line test
for possible blood presence. The fact that further
App. 24
testing was not conducted was admitted as evidence
and defense counsel addressed the luminol evidence
effectively on cross examination and in his closing
argument.
Under the circumstances of this case, appellate
counsel’s decision not to raise these issues does not
establish ineffective assistance of counsel. In the
opinion of the undersigned, petitioner cannot estab-
lish cause or prejudice to excuse his procedural
default of these issues.
Since this recommendation is based upon peti-
tioner’s procedural default of the issues presented in
this petition, petitioner’s assertion that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1) is unconstitutional has no relevance to
this analysis. The recommendation would be the
same even if 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) never existed.
Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that peti-
tioner’s claims are without merit and therefore
recommends that this Court dismiss the petition with
prejudice.
In addition, if Petitioner should choose to appeal
this action, I recommenc that a certificate of appeal-
ability be denied as to each issue raised by the
Petitioner in this application for habeas corpus relief
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the court must deter-
mine whether a certificate of appealability should be
granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has
demonstrated a “substantial showing of a denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
App. 25
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has dis-
approved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of
appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir.
2001). Rather, the district court must “engage in a
reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine
whether a certificate is warranted. Jd. Fach issue
must be considered under the standards set forth by
the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently,
the [sic]
The undersigned recommends that the court
deny petitioner’s application on [sic] based upon his
procedural default. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484,
when a habeas petition is denied on procedural
grounds, a certificate of appealability may issue only
“when the prisoner shows, at least, [1] that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and [2} that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” Both showings must be made to
warrant the grant of a certificate. ‘'d. The under-
signed concludes that reasonable jurists could not
debate that each of petitioner’s claims are properly
dismissed as defaulted. Petitioner has not established
that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to bring issues of ineffective assistance of counsel,
prosecutorial misconduct or improper admission of
luminol evidence in the first appeal. “Where a plain
procedural bar is present and the district court
is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a
App. 26
reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the
district court erred in dismissing the petition or that
the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further.”
Id. The court also finds that reasonable jurists could
not find it debatable that the Petitioner failed to
present a valid claim of a denial of a constitutional
right. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that
the court deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.
NOTICE TO PARTIES: Objections to this Report
and Recommendation must be served on opposing
parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within
ten (10) days of receipt of this Report and Recom-
mendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b\1)\(C); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to file timely
objections constitutes a waiver of any further right to
appeal. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th
Cir. 1981). See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985).
/s/ Timothy P. Greeley
TIMOTHY P. GREELEY
UNITED STATES
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated: November 3, 2008
App. 27
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
KEVIN CARTER Civil Action No.
HOLTZER, 2:06CV-169
Petitioner, HON. R. Allan Edgar
-y- U.S. District Judge
BARRY D. DAVIS, Timothy P. Greeley
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Respondent. /
F. MARTIN TIEBER (P25485)
Attorney for Petitioner
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(Filed Jun. 6, 2006)
Petitioner Kevin Carter Holtzer was charged,
through a complaint and warrant authorized on March
12, 1998, with first degree murder (Mich. Comp. Laws
750.316) in the beating death of Kaylee Bruce, which
occurred on February 16, 1998, at the Beach Condo-
miniums in Traverse City, Michigan.
Petitioner Holtzer was arraigned in Grand
Traverse County, Michigan, Circuit Court on April 27,
1998, and a plea of not guilty was entered.
A jury trial took place in Grand Traverse County
Circuit Court (sitting in White Cloud, Newaygo County,
after change of venue) before the Honorable Thomas G.
Power from October 11, 1999 through October 21,
1999. Mr. Holtzer was found guilty of first degree
App. 28
murder (one count supported by two theories,
premeditation/deliberation and felony murder, see
T 10/21/99 110-111). Petitioner Holtzer did not testify
in his own behalf at trial. Judge Power sentenced
Petitioner to mandatory non-parolable life in prison
on November 16, 1999. The Grand Traverse County
Circuit Court docket number for this case is 98-
007603-FC.
Petitioner Holtzer (Prisoner No. 291530) is a
citizen of the United States, is domiciled in Michigan,
and is currently unconstitutionally detained and im-
prisoned by the Respondent, Barry D. Davis, Warden,
at the Newberry Correctional Facility, Newberry,
Michigan (Luce County).
Procedural History in State Court on Direct
Appeal and Postconviction
Direct appeal was taken to the Michigan Court of
Appeals. On February 25, 2003, that court issued a
published opinion affirming Petitioner Kevin Holtzer’s
conviction and sentence. People v. Holtzer, 660 N.W.2d
405 (Mich. Ct App. 2003). (Docket No. 223984).’ On
March 15, 2003, Petitioner filed a timely application
for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court.
An order denying leave to appeal was issued on
’ On direct appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals
Petitioner Holtzer raised four issues relating to mitochondrial
DNA evidence admitted against him at trial, and a fifth issue
complaining of a deniai of his right to a speedy trial.
App. 29
September 25, 2003. People v. Holtzer, 669 N.W.2d
816 (Mich. 2003) (Docket No. 123477).’
Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment
(Mich. Ct. Rule 6.500 et seq.) in the trial court on
December 3, 2004. The trial court Decision and Order
denying the motion for relief from judgment was
issued March 22, 2005 (attached to Brief in Support
as Appendix A). Petitioner Holtzer filed a timely
application for leave in the Michigan Court of Appeals,
which was denied by that court. People v. Holizer,
Docket No. 261940 (Mich. Ct. App. October 14, 2005).
(Attached to Brief in Support as Appendix B).
Petitioner next, on December 5, 2005, filed a timely
Application for Leave to Appeal in the Michigan
Supreme Court. The issues currently before this
Court were raised in the leave application filed in the
Michigan Supreme Court. On May 30, 2006, that
court denied leave to appeal. People v. Holtzer, N.W.2d
(Mich. 2006) (Docket No. 130003). (Attached to Brief
in Support as Appendix B).
* Petitioner Holtzer did not raise the speedy trial issue in
the Michigan Supreme Court. Direct review ended 90 days after
denial of leave, on December 24, 2003, when the period within
which Mr. Holtzer could have petitioned for a writ of certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court expired. See Clay v. United
States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003); Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283
(6th Cir. 2000); Abela v. Martin, 348 F.3d 164 (6th Cir. 2003);
Wyche v. United States, 317 F. Supp 2d 1 (D. D.C. 2004).
App. 30
This Petition is Timely
As noted above, footnote 2, direct review ended
on December 24, 2003. At that point Petitioner
Holtzer’s petition in this Court was due December 24,
2004. On December 3, 2004, Petitioner filed a state
postconviction motion under Mich. Ct. Rule 6.500.
This filing tolled the habeas clock with 21 days
remaining. Petitioner timely proceeded through the
state appellate courts after his postconviction motion
was denied in the trial court. This process culminated
in the denial of leave by the Michigan Supreme Court
on May 30, 2006 (See order, attached to Brief in
Support of this Petition as Appendix B). Thus Peti-
tioner’s habeas petition was due in this Court 21 days
after May 20, 2006, or on June 20, 2006. This petition
is being filed on June 5, 2006.
Counsel Representing Petitioner at Various
Stages
At trial Petitioner was represented by Larry C.
Willey (P28870) and Raymond E. Beckering III
(P45800). On direct appeal in the Michigan Court of
Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court, Petitioner
was represented by Michael C. Moran (P 17950). On
state postconviction and in the current habeas
proceedings in this Court, Petitioner was and is
represented by F. Martin Tieber (P25485).
App. 31
Issues Raised on State Direct Appeal and in
State Postconviction
As previously noted, on direct appeal to the
Michigan Court of Appeals Mr. Holtzer raised four
issues relating to mitochondrial DNA evidence ad-
mitted against him at trial, and a fifth issue
complaining of a denial of his right to a speedy trial.
The speedy trial issue was raised in the Michigan
Court of Appeals but not in the Michigan Supreme
Court. None of these direct appeal issues are
being raised on habeas before this Court.
Petitioner raised the following four issues in
state postconviction:
I. APPELLANT HOLTZER WAS DENIED
HIS STATE AND FEDERAL DUE
PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (US
CONST, AM V; CONST 1963, ART I, § 17)
WHERE SCIENTIFICALLY UNSOUND
LUMINOL TESTING WAS IMPROP-
ERLY USED TO MAKE THE UNRELI-
ABLE AND HEAVILY PREJUDICIAL
CLAIM THAT THE BLOOD OF THE
VICTIM WAS FOUND IN HIS CONDO-
MINIUM UNIT.
IL APPELLANT HOLTZER WAS DENIED
HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER
THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTI-
TUTIONS (US CONST, AMS V, XIV;
CONST 19638, ART 1, §20) WHEN
THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN
SEVERE AND REPEATED OUTCOME-
DETERMINATIVE MISCONDUCT.
App. 32
Hil. APPELLANT HOLTZER WAS DENIED
THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE FED-
ERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
(US CONST, AM VI; CONST 1963,
ART 1, §20) WHERE HIS TRIAL
ATTORNEY, WITH NO STRATEGIC
PURPOSE, MADE SEVERAL OUTCOME-
DETERMINATIVE ERRORS.
IV. APPELLANT HOLTZER WAS DENIED
THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS (US CONST, AM VI; CONST 1963,
ART I, § 20) WHERE HIS APPELLATE
COUNSEL NEGLECTED STRONG,
CRITICAL ISSUES WHICH MUST BE
SEEN AS SIGNIFICANT AND OBVIOUS.
Though requested, no hearing was granted by the
trial court, the Michigan Court of Appeals, or the
Michigan Supreme Court on postconviction. As
described above, denials were issued by the state trial
court, the Michigan Court of Appeals, and the
Michigan Supreme Court as to these issues.
This Petitioner has exhausted the issues raised
herein.
Petitioner Kevin Holtzer did not file a petition for
certiorari.
Other than the appeals to the Michigan Court of
Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court and the state
postconviction action under Mich. Ct. Rule 6.500
App. 33
et seq. just described and the present Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, no other petitions, appli-
cations or motions have been filed with respect to this
judgment in any state or federal court.
Federal Constitutional Issues before this Court
Again, the four issues run in state postconviction
are now presented to this Court. None of these issues
were run on state direct review. These issues are not,
however, procedurally defaulted, either because the
state trial court, in the last reasoned state court
opinion, decided the issues on the merits, or because
any default was excused through the ineffective
assistance of state trial counsel and state direct
appeal counsel, issues which have themselves now
been thoroughly exhausted.
In this case Petitioner Holtzer argues that he
was denied the right to the effective assistance of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and his due process right to a fair
trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
where trial counsel was not prepared for trial, and
made several, outcome-determinative preparatory
errors. Trial counsel failed to adequately prepare and
put forward a substantial defense by not dealing with
hair transference issues and by not properly
assessing the “blood” evidence purporting to link
Petitioner to the assault. The failure to bring in a
qualified criminalist for the defense to counter the
presence of three hairs (two claimed to belong to
App. 34
Petitioner Holtzer allegedly found in the room where
Kaylee Bruce’s body was found and one claimed to
belong to Bruce allegedly found in Holtzer’s condo-
minium unit) was critical. These preparatory and
investigatory failures led to a failure to put forward a
critical defense expert and an inability to appropriately
challenge the prosecution’s proofs. Petitioner also
claims that trial defense counsel was constitutionally
ineffective due to additional trial errors laid out in
detail in the Brief in Support of this Petition.
As a second ground for relief Petitioner argues
that her due process right to a fair trial under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments was denied when
the prosecutor committed egregious misconduct by
improperly claiming, with no basis in the evidence,
that luminol testing revealed the victim’s blood
throughout the Petitioner’s condominium unit and
that Petitioner tracked the victim’s blood back to his
unit from the crime scene. Other clear prosecutorial
misconduct occurred when the prosecutor testified to
critical facts not in evidence and elicited the fact that
Petitioner Holtzer was silent at arrest. Fact misstate-
ments in relation to this issue by the state trial court
constitute an independent ground for grant of the
writ under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
Third, Petitioner was denied his federal due
process right to a fair trial under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments where scientifically unsound
luminol testing was used to make the unreliable and
heavily prejudicial claim that the blood of the victim
was found in his condominium unit. The lack of
App. 35
confirmatory testing and the misstatement of the
power of another testing method (leucocrystalviolet)
led the prosecution to serve up highly prejudicial
conclusions to the jury, conclusions which were in fact
baseless.
Fourth, Petitioner urges that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States which must be seen
as significant and obvious. These issues are 1-3,
described above.
Issue V claims that the 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
standard of review requirement is unconstitutional
for several reasons.
As noted above, Petitioner Holtzer’s continued
confinement is unconstitutional in several respects.
As described in detail in the Brief in Support, as to
each of the asserted legal grounds for relief, Petitioner
Holtzer satisfies the standard of review set forth in
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Several unreasonable determi-
nations of fact by the state trial court provide an
additional ground to grant the writ under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2). In addition, as to each and every asserted
ground for relief, the identified error was not harm-
less under the governing legal standard.
Petitioner Holtzer has not filed any previous
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this or any
other federal district court. Petitioner has no future
sentence to serve after completion of the sentence
imposed by the judgment under attack.
App. 36
WHEREFORE, Petitioner Kevin Holtzer requests
that Respondent be required to appear and answer the
allegations of this Petition, that after full consid-
eration, this Court relieve Petitioner Holtzer of the
unconstitutional restraint on his liberty, and that this
Court grant such other, further and different relief as
the Court may deem just and proper under the
circumstances, as well as grant eral argument and an
evidentiary hearing in this matter.
Respectfully Submitted,
BY: /s/ F. Martin Tieber
F. MARTIN TIEBER
(P25485)
246 E. Saginaw Street
East Lansing, MI 48823
(517) 339-0454
marty@tieberlaw.com
Dated: June 5, 2006
App. 37
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
KEVIN CARTER HOLTZER, Civil Action No.
Petitioner, HON. R. ALLAN EDGAR
USS. District Judge
-V-
Timothy P. Greeley
ARRY D.
- a USS. Magistrate Judge
/
F. MARTIN TIEBER (P25485)
Attorney for Petitioner
Respondent.
/
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(Filed Jun. 6, 2006)
BY: F. MARTIN TIEBER (P25485)
246 E. Saginaw Street
East Lansing, MI 48823
(517) 339-0454
marty@fmtieberlaw.com
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIEG .............cccccccseseecees i
{T.
Itt.
App. 38
PETITIONER WAS DENIED EFFEC-
TIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (US
CONST. AMENDS. VI, XIV), AND A
FAIR TRIAL, WHERE HIS TRIAL
ATTORNEY, WITH NO STRATEGIC
PURPOSE, MADE SEVERAL OUTCOME-
DETERMINATIVE ERRORG..........000ee0
PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHT
TO A FAIR TRIAL (U.S. CONST. A-
MENDS. V, XIV) WAS VIOLATED WHEN
THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN SE-
VERE AND REPEATED OUTCOME-
DETERMINATIVE MISCONDUCT..........
PETITIONER HOLTZER WAS DENIED
HIS FEDERAL DUE PROCESS RIGHT
TOA FAIR TRIAL (U.S. CONST., AMS.
V, XIV) WHERE SCIENTIFICALLY UN-
SOUND LUMINOL TESTING WAS IM-
PROPERLY USED TO MAKE THE
UNRELIABLE AND HEAVILY PREJU-
DICIAL CLAIM THAT THE BLOOD OF
THE VICTIM WAS FOUND IN HIS
CONDOMINIUM UNIT ........ccccrcccsseeeeeees
PETITIONER HOLTZER WAS DENIED
THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (U.S. CONST.
AM. VI) WHERE HIS APPELLATE
COUNSEL NEGLECTED STRONG,
CRITICAL ISSUES WHICH MUST BE
SEEN AS SIGNIFICANT AND OBVI-
15
34
44
App. 39
V. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
STANDARD OF REVIEW SET FORTH
IN 28 U.S.C. §2254(D)(1) PRECLUDES
RELIEF IN THIS ACTION, THE
COURT SHOULD NOT APPLY THAT
STANDARD BECAUSE IT IS UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL, AND THE COURT SHOULD
GRANT THE WRIT UNDER A DE
NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW ........... 59
BEL TI Fe eee 6 TEED veccncccccccccccccsvcccccessecocsence 64
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Abela v. Martin, 348 F.3d 164 (6th Cir. 2003)............ iv
Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915 (6th Cir.
Gy ARIS te nee even Re RO ee 31, 43, 54
Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858)....... 61
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).............cccceeeeeees 28
Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2003) ...... 29
Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir.
SINS cts cise diceeuetensabacan vacosaereateesanodeewaniersdcecunaaceuked 22
Barnes v. Elo, 231 F.3d 1025 (6th Cir. 2000) ............. 22
Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2005)........... 35, 36
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) ................... 40
Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1104 (3rd
a ree Socata eo aaa y nenion path ae iene ein cee 21
Bigelow v. Williams, 367 F.3d 562, 566 (6th Cir.
|, RARE REE eEC OEMe eral ab AAS 9) caren t En OR 24
App. 40
Brenk v. State, 847 S.W.2d 1 (Ark. 1993)................... 48
Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283 (6th Cir.
UII ios oct vinahacuesadunuaoruasaamaadiaielieineniaeakasaniaadabbssies iv
Bryant v. Scott, 28 F.3d 1411, 1417-1419 (5th
I I gia aaa a eee Aas 24
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294
REREAD RRtereicceeeene ce aae Aen ane eT Ue NT, NATAL NRA D OE DEORE 23
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536
5 I RRERSE SRE RES Soa pe enone evar NTE Uw NC TCT EOD CUE er ENERO 60
Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522 (2008)................ iv
Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1237 (10th
NE I hccidapitececcoautacetodatectentbe teed yh teaetecuaaars 36, 37
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756 (1991) ...... 56
Conklin v. Schofield, 366 F.3d 1191, 1208 (11th
RI ara ee cae ee a 25
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986)..................... 44
Crisp v. Duckworth, 743 F.2d 580 (7th Cir.
SEEN Las cusddaccaaiceuntceadatudiniebadaiacoaxdieeeisaaaesiananssimnins 23
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)..... passim
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)........ 34, 36
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
gS RRR SA Sorin nas 50, 54
Davis v. Straub, 430 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2005)............ 62
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642
Ratan kccansuddrcaccmeuseanken cc buesdeeicasecintusecmedament 34, 35, 36
Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 787 (6th Cir.
App. 41
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991)...............ccec000s 44
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-400 (1984)............ 56
Eze v. Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110, 127-132 (2d
CRD, TIED cts enssincescvcoveniacsintoaseameadeandicaaaman 29
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-05 (1963),
overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykies,
GS Tass Fie ST cence cutnsceousacsibnctebeascnneaie 62
Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir.
TIDE) tnescccansetebsntsaiseumanbincusaiianicaaaana 24
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)............... 15
Green v. White, 232 F.3d 671, 672 (9th Cir.
BE occnsevcnisascisdacecsvevtacscsdeetaaaibanaiasananaenne 12
Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2001).......... 22
Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1169-70 (6th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1132 (1998)........ 24
Harris v. State, 133 S.W.3d 760 (Tex. App.
BIE): oscocoeussreasancusonaccetnagisessidaneiesaneia aia 48
Hicks v. Straub, 377 F.3d 538, 551 (6th Cir.
PEPE? wcncconccinduscdoussisesesveniaszee secant 31, 43, 55
Hodge v. Hurley, 426 F.3d 368 (6th Cir. 2005)........... 30
Houston v. Lockhart, 982 F.2d 1246 (8th Cir.
RIED nvcscoscscavvnvvccresvateessodiabeosamaaleeee 57
Irons v. Carey, 408 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2005)............. 59
Johnson v. Wainwright, 806 F.2d 1479, 1486
(llth Cir. 1987) cert den 108 S.Ct. 872
(BIBI F nvsncenscosnsineicestivenssassiseneeeeeee 34, 35
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983)................. 56
App. 42
Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir.
Nr iiss ccscacuscencbuscesesosvcosesessossesececons 29
Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir.
EET SEE 22
Leonard v. Michigan, 287 F. Supp. 2d 765, 791
Nei c sn. cccacesessnsccesessonesbecevsseseoes 29
Manning v. Huffman, 669 F.3d 720 (6th Cir.
EET cuss scesscsccesesscosvssieccevscsecosecccsvonesesens 56
Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 427-28 (6th Cir.
sss sis c ccna scesncensscesonsesovonecescsoccces 57
Mapes v. Tate, 388 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 2004)............... 57
Maples v. Steagall, 340 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir.
cd cscnscccconaconsencbeosecocconesessces passim
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)............. 60
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat)
acs cnsnccosnsscussescosoesneveees seces 61
Martinez v. Lamango, 515 U.S. 417, 430 (1995)........ 60
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003)....21, 22
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n 14
cs os cosceunousseonoonseecess 15
McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F. 3d 1302, 1311 (6th
Cir. 1996)........ i a ss cess sceupeenenckeecores 56
Mowbray, 943 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex. App. 1996)....... 48
Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir.
ao ss snsubonenconenncocnnseeceeees 26
Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809 (5th Cir.
aca s cccosnnenenunvencsneseoceorcoese 22
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986)....31, 43, 55
App. 43
Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300 (7th Cir.
ENED encnnsinisniovscadseamesanaeiaaeamebeaasiaiaiiielamanaamamiimed 57
People v. Gearns & Thomas, 577 N.W.2d 422
(Mich. 1998), overruled on other grounds
People v. Lukity, 596 N.W.2d 607 (Mich.
SPIE <occssensctusciesupneeaevsiaebunianmmaentaaaamsaaanaa ane 47, 48
People v. Grant, 684 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 2004) .......... 28
People v. Pickens, 521 N.W.2d 797 (Mich. 1994) ...15, 23
People v. Reed, 535 N.W.2d 496 (Mich. 1995)............ 56
People v. Tanner, 660 N.W.2d 746 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2003) rev'd on other grounds 671
a ene ee a seenemenbecounes 25
People v. Watson, 288 P.2d 184 (Cal. App. 1956),
vacated on other grounds 299 P.2d 243 (Cal.
BEE cotnenocinedticnenenignins camecancancceeenen ana ee edad 48
People v. Wooten, 725 N.Y.S.2d 767 (S. Ct. N.Y
ENED snsusounsisdeein bionecauanmnceeumanemniieusanihameamenaein aaa 48
Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376, 390-392 (6th
a 29
Rosario v. Kuhlman, 839 F.2d 918, 925 (2d Cir.
SII? ciniisticndentbcesadtnaesackoraducdonmmataminuiimenaaenmains 44, 46
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974)................... 56
Ruimveld v. Birkett, 404 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th
IE IED, oc ccnsonkcecnnestaisaksniananeaaaiainiaumseaaeendie 13, 14
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986) ............... 56
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982)...............:ee 35
Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2001)........ 22
Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 476 (5th Cir.
PIU) sunccosaruuchsusesssennensensdsoenesssssnnobeisenaetnensaiansannnaaal 28
App. 44
State v. Butler, 24 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App.
a i 26
State v. Fukusaku, 946 P.2d 32 (Haw. 1997)........ 48, 50
State v. Moody, 573 A.2d 716 (Conn. 1990)................ 50
Stouffer v. Reynolds, 214 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th
ELE eae ee a ne ae TY AND 27
Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668
STI ics ats acecohanaedandahaneanaealedeimanemmmeaninimnanieth 15, 16, 18
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-409 (1988)......... 23
Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 850 (6th Cir.
I isi iii etic deaesabediahdeeltineniseuidieei 12, 13
Thomas v. State, 374 So.2d 508, 514 (Fla. Sup.
is - TTI in\sasiibesicestaissirttideldccectdamniadadeaniebubenemindiiaimadsddanmadines 26
United States v. Barbour, 813 F.2d 1232, 1234
ERIE STITT Tn cicacsiatic succueniosiasidnnmenamabsciaaahaisnneibmnddaiiees 23
United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1383-90
I ala eae aneegabin 35
United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 395 (10th
Sian TEE cisaeh sondeceansbceninniauinestiineiemmdnmninnimeanaiiaaencnada 57
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) ....15, 16, 17
United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204
ee a aA Raden Re Set NCR pa 23
United States v. Hill, 41 M.J. 596 (A.C.C.A.
United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232,
ee ee ee ee A canasuunuesonneidenal 34, 35
United States v. Osuorji, 32 F.3d 1186, 1191
u ( 2 | ae en 34, 35
App. 45
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998)........... 54
Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 962-63 (6th
STITT natisthndnenisanicusociehuniiaininiaadapendaisinbedesaesaiseicanees 44
Washington v. Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689 (6th Cir.
ISAT S BR do eer a e e Nev 40
Washington v. Texas, 338 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) ............. 23
Watson v. Teets, 355 U.S. 846 (1957)..............ccceceeeeeee 48
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003)................. 24, 29
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000)....... 12,13
Wyche v. United States, 317 F. Supp 2d 1 (D.
ena iv
Wynne v. Renico, 279 F. Supp. 2d 866, 879 (E.D.
EEE: MITT icciudirccesutasidaietess vauaapinssncilasces 14, 33, 43, 55
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 468
SUES iscasadiennatensaananaaimaiassedidniosesdesbbetnkevseretbousianesen 60
Young v. State, 871 S.W.2d 373 (Ark. 1994)............... 50
CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, COURT RULES
TT Fn cca pecpediibeucasiosbeosiiuen 3,15
a a sauacubriuavasanaaune 3, 34
I I - n.s ccdcesabunsebncsooooneneveanneoienii 12
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)........0......0. ee eens 12
ta? Ui EE cs sc ce npslenbeneneesanovennedenednecs 12
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es SII 5 cscsccsdensosmneesrneesenoosseecoenaceoscssesencs 40
Be Sls IEEE sbesceecnssconvensscosserseosenseesees 32, 38, 54
App. 46
Mich. Comp. Laws 750.316 ................ sabi enebaaseacentenbiaen iii
IIE iccnuvag stnerbaccntcnacssnelapeotuninsees sinaaeebaientaselanmmen 37
} #
STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED
WHETHER PETITIONER WAS DENIED EF-
FECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (US
CONST. AMENDS. VI, XIV), AND A FAIR
TRIAL, WHERE HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY, WITH
NO STRATEGIC PURPOSE, MADE SEVERAL
OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE ERRORS.
WHETHER PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (U.S. CONST.
AMENDS. V, XIV) WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE
PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN SEVERE AND
REPEATED OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE MIS-
CONDUCT
WHETHER PETITIONER HOLTZER WAS DE-
NIED HIS FEDERAL DUE PROCESS RIGHT
TO A FAIR TRIAL (U.S. CONST., AMS. V, XIV)
WHERE SCIENTIFICALLY UNSOUND LUMI-
NOL TESTING WAS IMPROPERLY USED TO
MAKE THE UNRELIABLE AND HEAVILY
PREJUDICIAL CLAIM THAT THE BLOOD OF
THE VICTIM WAS FOUND IN HIS CON-
DOMINIUM UNIT.
WHETHER PETITIONER HOLTZER WAS DE-
NIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION (U.S. CONST. AM. VI) WHERE
HIS APPELLATE COUNSEL NEGLECTED
STRONG, CRITICAL ISSUES WHICH MUST
BE SEEN AS SIGNIFICANT AND OBVIOUS.
App. 47
5. WHETHER, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW SET FORTH IN
28 U.S.C. §2254(D\(1) PRECLUDES RELIEF IN
THIS ACTION, THE COURT SHOULD NOT
APPLY THAT STANDARD BECAUSE IT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND THE COURT
SHOULD GRANT THE WRIT UNDER A DE
NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Kevin Carter Holtzer was charged
with first degree murder (Mich. Comp. Laws 750.316)
in the beating death of Kaylee Bruce, which occurred
on February 16, 1998, at the Beach Condominiums in
Traverse City, Michigan.
A jury trial took place in Grand Traverse County
Circuit Court (sitting in White Cloud, Newaygo
County, after change of venue) before the Honorable
Thomas G. Power from October 11, 1999 through
October 21, 1999. Mr. Holtzer was found guilty of first
degree murder (one count supported by two theories,
premeditation/deliberation and felony murder, see T
10/21/99 110-111) and sentenced to mandatory non-
parolabie life in prison by Judge Power on November
16, 1999.
Direct appeal was taken to the Michigan Court
of Appeals. On February 25, 2003, that court issued
a published opinion affirming Petitioner Kevin
Holtzer’s conviction and sentence. People v. Holizer,
App. 48
660 N.W.2d 405 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).’ On March 15,
2003, Petitioner filed a timely application for leave to
appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. An order
denying leave to appeal was issued on September 25,
2003. People v. Holtzer, 669 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. 2003)
(Docket No. 123477).’
Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment
(Mich. Ct. Rule 6.500 et seq.) in the trial court on
December 3, 2004. The trial court Decision and Order
denying the motion for relief from judgment was
issued March 22, 2005 (attached as Appendix A).
Petitioner Holtzer filed a timely application for leave
in the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied
by that court. People v. Holtzer, No. 261940 (Mich. Ct.
App. October 14, 2005). (Attached as Appendix B).
Petitioner next, on December 5, 2005, filed a
timely Application for Leave to Appeal in the
Michigan Supreme Court. The issues currently before
this Court were raised in the leave application filed in
* On direct appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals Mr.
Holtzer raised four issues relating to mitochondrial DNA evi-
dence admitted against him at trial, and a fifth issue com-
plaining of a denial of his right to a speedy trial.
* Mr. Holtzer did not raise the speedy trial issue in the
Michigan Supreme Court. Direct review ended 90 days after
denial of leave, on December 24, 2003, when the period within
which Mr. Holtzer could have petitioned for a writ of certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court expired. See Clay v. United
States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003); Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283
(6th Cir. 2000); Abela v. Martin, 348 F.3d 164 (6th Cir. 2003);
Wyche v. United States, 317 F. Supp 2d 1 (D. D.C. 2004).
App. 49
the Michigan Supreme Court. On May 30, 2006, that
court denied leave to appeal. People v. Holtzer, __
N.W.2d ___ (Mich. 2006) (Docket No. 130003).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Introduction
Kevin Holtzer was charged with first degree
murder in the February 16, 1998 killing of Kaylee
Bruce at the Beach Condominiums in Traverse City.
Petitioner Holtzer was a monthly renter and Ms.
Bruce was a desk clerk at the condominium units
when the killing occurred. The defense did not contest
the fact that the killing was extremely brutal (T
10/11/99 226-238).
Petitioner Holtzer was connected to the crime
through scant circumstantial evidence. Robbery was
the apparent motive as money was missing from the
cash box at the Beach Condominiums (T 10/11/99
288-289). However, Petitioner was working at one of
his father’s many Tire Factory stores and has been
represented by retained counsel throughout the
lengthy trial, appellate and postconviction proceed-
ings in this case. Multiple searches and seizures were
conducted of Petitioner’s condo unit, his car, the
condo office where the killing occurred and Peti-
tioner’s girlfriend’s residence in an attempt to connect
Petitioner to the crime (T 10/12/99 85-139). These
efforts were largely fruitless. Two sets of keys found
near Bruce’s body were not connected to Petitioner (T
10/12/99 37).
App. 50
The prosecutor focused on “boot” testimony,
claiming that Petitioner had a pair of boots “very
similar” to those that left prints at the scene, boots
which Petitioner discarded near the time of Bruce’s
killing. However, investigators could not rule out
other boots as having left these prints (T 10/12/99
141-142). Moreover, several witnesses testified that
Petitioner’s boots were defective as they had been
covered with white paint during remodeling of the
Tire Factory store (T 10/12/99 164-175, 201-203, 210-
213, 223-227, 238-239, 245-246).
The prosecutor also seized on the fact that
Petitioner left the Traverse City area, ending up in
Chicago where he was arrested on March 1, 1998,
after learning that he was wanted for murder (T
10/13/99 116-126, 153-157). The key convicting evi-
dence was the hair and blood evidence, discussed
below. Petitioner Kevin Holtzer denied involvement
in Bruce’s murder (T 10/13/99 175).
B. ir i e Issues
Three pieces of hair were the subject of extensive
hearings on the prepriety of mitochondrial DNA
analysis by two labs (LabCorp and Mitotyping), at
least one of which was running validation studies at
the time the hairs in question were being analyzed.
Over defense objection the hairs were admitted
against Kevin Holtzer at trial and became the
primary convicting evidence against him.
App. 51
The three hairs consisted of two pubic hairs
found in the office area of the Beach Condominiums,
where Bruce’s body was found, which were claimed
to contain DNA consistent with that of Petitioner
Holtzer, and one head hair found in Petitioner
Holtzer’s condominium unit said to contain DNA
consistent with that of the victim, Bruce. One of the
pubic hairs claimed to be consistent with Holtzer was
said to have been found attached to a spent tire valve
core. Mr. Holtzer worked at u tire store.
In opening argument, the prosecutor focused on
these three hairs (which were referred to as the torso
hair, the pubic hair and the bedroom hair) as the key
evidence linking Mr. Holtzer to the murder of Kaylee
Bruce (T 10/11/99 190-192, 194-197).
A number of hairs were found on Holtzer’s
clothing, including two pubic hairs. Most of these
hairs were found to be dissimilar to Holtzer and
Bruce (T 10/14/99 67-69). One of two pubic hairs
found could have belonged to Holtzer but neither
matched Bruce (T 10/14/99 69). Other hairs, head and
pubic, found in Holtzer’s condo unit, in the drain and
on the floor mat, did not match Bruce (T 10/14/99 69-
73). A large number of hairs from Holtzer’s vehicle
were examined and none of them were similar to
Bruce (T 10/14/99 74). Fifty to seventy-five hairs were
collected from Holtzer’s bathtub drains and none
were found to be similar to Bruce (T 10/14/99 74-75).
Fifty to sixty hairs were collected from Holtzer’s sink
drain and none were found to be similar to Bruce (T
10/14/99 75). Fifty to sixty hairs from Holtzer’s dryer
App. 52
and twenty-five to thirty from his washer agitator
were examined and none were found to be similar to
Bruce (T 10/14/99 76).
After the murder, a “whole bunch of hairs” were
collected from “body wraps,” including two pubic
hairs which could not be matched to either Holtzer or
Bruce and at least one other hair that did not match
either Holtzer or Bruce (T 10/14/99 77-79). None of
these hairs were matched to Holtzer.
Of the two pubic hairs claimed to match Holtzer
und said to be found in the room where the body was
found (one was allegedly found on Bruce’s torso), only
one was sent on to a second lab (Mitotyping) for
confirmation of mtDNA results after extensive hear-
ings revealed severe problems with the testing at the
first lab (LabCorp) (T 10/15/99 129).
Mr. Holtzer had been living in a monthly rental
unit at the Beach Condominiums for nearly three
months at the time of Bruce’s death, having moved
in on November 20, 1997 (T 10/11/99 303). His unit
(106) was entered on a daily basis by housekeeping
personnel at the Beach Condominiums in order to
exchange towels and to remove the garbage. Once a
* The body wraps were clean sheets that were used to wrap
the body of the deceased (T 10/12/99 98). While the source of
these sheets is not clear it is likely that sheets borrowed from
the Beach Condominiums were utilized as detectives described
borrowing and using sheets from the Condominiums to perform
other crime scene functions at and around the location where
the body was discovered (T 10/12/99 23-24).
App. 53
week the unit was thoroughly cleaned (including
vacuuming and mopping of the floors) (T 10/13/99 43).
The pubic hair that was attached to a tire valve
core‘ was found in an area of the utility room (behind
the front desk) of the Beach Condominiums separate
from the body of Bruce. It was found to the left of the
doorway while Bruce’s body was “around on the
opposite side of the door” (T 10/12/99 38-39). The hair
was separated from the valve core at the lab and the
technician who did the separation could not say
“whether it was pinched in there, or stuck by blood,
but it was attached to it.”
The office area and utility room where Kaylee
Bruce worked and where her body was found was
regularly utilized by employees, including house-
keeping staff, as the time clock was in this area and
employees would punch in and punch out (T 10/11/99
281). The utility room contained a Small “freezer”
unit and coffee supplies and would presumably be
* A detective testified that the valve core at issue was a
common item readily available from a variety of retail outlets:
“they all basically look alike” (T 10/12/99 115-116).
* It seems apparent from this account that the evidence
technician who found the pubic hair attached to the tire valve
core could not determine whether there was any agent at all
causing the two items to be attached, as the hair could have
been “pinched” into the core. The mention of blood, in the
absence of any serological analysis, or even any analysis to
determine if any agent caused the hair to be stuck to the valve
core, was highly prejudicial and apparently without basis in
fact.
App. 54
regularly visited by employees who wished to obtain
access to these items (T 10/12/99 12). The time clock
utilized by employees was located in the same room
(utility room with water heater) where Bruce’s body
was found (T 10/11/99 285; 298; 10/12/99 29). Five to
seven different employees handled cleaning chores at
the Beach Condominiums and the employee assigned
to handle cleaning chores in Mr. Holtzer’s unit would
change from day to day (T 10/13/99 48).
Kaylee Bruce had repeated personal contact with
Mr. Holtzer (T 10/11/99 295-297). Holtzer would often
lock himself out of his room and at times “someone
would walk him down with the master key” to let him
in. It was likely that Kaylee Bruce had to perform
this service for Holtzer in the course of her employ-
ment at the Beach Condominiums (T 10/11/99 304-
306).
During pretrial hearings in this case the trial
court stated:
“[Olne would not expect the victim’s hair to
be in the Defendant’s condominium, so that
had some probative value ... and the pubic
hair at the scene of the crime was said to
have a sequence the same as the Defen-
dant’s, and, obviously, one would not expect
to have his DNA at the scene of the crime,
that would have probative value ... ” (MT
6/10/99 36).
App. 55
C. “Blood” and Lumino tin
In opening argument, the prosecutor told the
jury:
“At Mr. Holtzer’s condominium unit, how-
ever, the police, with the assistance of the
state police crime laboratory personnel, in
particular, Connie Swander, who does se-
rology work and other trace evidence work
for the Michigan State Police, went inside
Mr. Holtzer’s condominium, and with a
substance, she'll explain to you, it’s called
Luminol, it’s something that reacts with
blood, reacts with other materials, but it
does show a reaction to blood, it actually
luminesces, it lights up, it glows when it’s
contacted with blood, blood that you can’t see
with the naked eye, blood that’s been cleaned
up, you use Luminol and get a reaction, and
see if there’s blood present.
So they went inside Mr. Holtzer’s condo-
minium Unit 106. Inside is a brown throw
type rug, like a mat that you would have
inside your door. On that brown rug Connie
Swander obtained a glow from the Luminol,
indicating that blood was there, couldn’t see
it, but the Luminol glowed.” (T 10/11/99 189-
190).
The prosecutor continued along these lines, telling
the jury that the luminol glow (and therefore blood)
continued throughout Mr. Holtzer’s unit and even
outside onto his deck (T 10/11/99 199).
App. 56
The prosecutor claimed in opening statement
that there was blood on the rug in Mr. Holtzer’s
condominium unit because of the luminol reaction
and because DNA was extracted from the stain
sample on the rug (T 10/11/99 192-193).° The prose-
cutor finished his opening statement with a claim
that Mr. Holtzer “took Kaylee Bruce’s blood with him
to his condominium” (T 10/11/99 197).
Michigan State Police forensic scientist Connie
Swander testified that luminol would react to sub-
stances other than blood, but differently (T 10/14/99
20-21). Swander testified to luminol reactions through-
out Petitioner Holtzer’s unit and out onto the deck
and responded affirmatively to the prosecutor’s ques-
tion as to whether “luminol is used to detect blood
that has been cleaned up” (T 10/14/99 22-27). Possibly
speaking hypothetically, Swander stated that “there
actually is some real dilute blood still down in the
carpet” (T 10/14/99 28).
Swander noted the need to take samples back to
the lab for additional testing to determine if indeed
they contained blood after a positive luminol reaction
(T 10/14/99 57), but then noted that she did not take
any of the material from inside or outside Petitioner
Holtzer’s unit back to the lab for further analysis (T
10/14/99 59-62). She claimed she got reactions to a
leucocrystalviolet test (which she claimed was in fact
* It appears that no serology testing was done on this
material (T 10/14/99 59-62, 124-128).
App. 57
specific for blood)’ on two “very small” stains on
Petitioner’s deck, stains which were “actually worked
into the wood” (T 10/14/99 61).
Swander stated that even though she got a
reaction to certain evidence from both luminol and
“TMB” at the scene, she was able to rule out the
presence of blood on this evidence during further
testing at her lab (T 10/14/99 63-64).
Marcia Eisenburg, vice president and senior
director at LabCorp, later testified that Kaylee Bruce
was excluded as a contributor to a stain on the carpet
(pink carpet identified as Exhibit 47) (T 10/14/99 116-
117). With respect to a stain from Mr. Holtzer’s brown
rug or mat, Eisenburg could not indicate what type of
human body fluid caused it (T 10/14/99 124-128).
In closing argument the prosecutor stated:
Now, there is also something that he couldn’t
get rid of, not then, and not in this trial, the
” It seems Swander’s claims in this respect were not accu-
rate. According to the Sourcebook in Forensic Serology, Immu-
nology, and Biochemistry, by R.E. Gaensslen, Ph.D., August,
1983, distributed by the U.S. Department of Justice, National
Institute of Justice, Leucocrystal Violet reacts with “many
chemical oxidants” and thus is “not more specific for blood than
most of the other catalytic tests.” See pertinent sections of the
Sourcebook, attached as Appendix F. This critical misstatement
by Swander, which suggested to the jury that there could have
been nothing other than bloodstains on Petitioner Holtzer’s
deck, was sufficient in and of itself to require the grant of a new
trial.
App. 58
blood in his condo, human blood in his
condominium. The blood on the brown rug,
just the brown rug, that’s the first thing
inside his condominium, three different
places where Luminol glowed when tested by
Connie Swander. And I’m going to get to
Luminol, and whether that’s blood in a
minute. But what we had on that rug,
and how you can leave blood stains on a
rug, are by stepping on the rug.
... [AJnd the Luminol glows only where
there’s blood, or some element that it
reacts with, but that’s what she saw.:
Now, following that, inside of the condo-
minium we had more Luminol reactions. And
these again could not be developed to show
footprints, but there was a pattern, full
dimensional patterns, not drops, not splat-
ters, not like something spilled, and they
were in an order which suggested a
stride. ...
Well, you know, the first question you
ask is, what’s blood doing there?
And it’s blood on the brown rug,
because it was capable of giving a DNA
extraction. Now, someone might want to
argue it’s saliva, or some other fluid, but this
is where you have to start employing your
own common sense. There’s DNA in that
stain that it reacted to Luminol. Luminol
glows when it contacts blood. The stain that
glowed showed DNA. Doesn’t that equal a
App. 59
blood stain, just by use of your common
sense?
Now, the question is, whose blood is it?
.»» Three alleles means there’s more
than one person’s blood there, more
than one person’s DNA.” (T 10/21/99 26-
28).
D. Additional act nt to Current
Issue ed on deral H s
On direct examination of the officer in charge of
the case, the prosecutor elicited the fact that, after
arrest, Mr. Holtzer “sat there quietly, didn’t say any-
thing, and basically showed no emotion” (T 10/13/99
75). In closing argument the prosecutor emphasized
Petitioner Holtzer’s claimed failure to question the
police on the morning that Bruce’s body was found (T
10/21/99 14). The prosecutor later told the jury that
Mr. Holtzer’s failure to go to the police and question
them when he found out that he was wanted for
murder showed his guilt (T 10/21/99 20). Finally, the
prosecutor, near the end of his rebuttal closing
argument, told the jury that the “mysterious pubic
hairs in the body covers” came from Darlene Wilson,
asserting that “there wasn’t that much time between
this killing and the time that Kevin Holtzer had his
conjugal visit with Darlene Wilson” (T 10/21/99 67).
App. 60
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for a habeas petition is
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). That section provides
that the writ may be granted if the state appeal:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of, clearly established federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States, or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on
an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.
This habeas petition is predicated upon these
standards.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) presents an independent
ground permitting the grant of the writ if the state
court decision was based on an unreasonable deter-
mination of the facts. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 386 (2000). See also, Green v. White, 232 F.3d
671, 672 (9th Cir. 2000). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) should
be read in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)
which allows the presumption of correctness as to
state court factual determinations to be dislodged by
clear and convincing evidence.
As used in the federal habeas statute, the phrase
“clearly established federal law” refers to the holdings
of the United States Supreme Court. See Taylor v.
Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 850 (6th Cir. 2002). However,
“clearly established law under the Act encompasses
App. 61
more than just bright-line rules laid down by the
[Supreme] Court.” Jd. It also includes “the legal
principles and standards flowing from those rules.”
Ruimveld v. Birkett, 404 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir.
2005). Accordingly, “the lack of an explicit statement
of a particular rule by the Supreme Court is not
determinative.” Jd.
Habeas relief is warranted where a state court
decision is either “contrary to” or “an unreasonable
application of” clearly established federal law. A
decision is “contrary to” federal law in two situations:
where the state court “applies a rule that contradicts
the governing law set forth in” Supreme Court
decisions, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06
(2000), or where the state court “decided a case
differently than the Supreme Court has decided on a
set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Dorchy v.
Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 787 (6th Cir. 2005).
The habeas statute also grants relief where the
state court decision is an “unreasonable application —
of” federal law. A state court unreasonably applies
federal law where it “correctly identifies the correct
governing legal rule from [the Supreme Court’s] cases
but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the
particular state prisoner’s case.” Ruimveld, 404 F.3d
at 1010. This provision does not require that the
Supreme Court must have previously decided the
very case that a lower court has before it. Rather, an
unreasonable application occurs where “the state
court either unreasonably extends a legal principle
from {the Supreme Court’s] precedent to a new
App. 62
context where it should not apply or unreasonably
refuses to extend that principle to a new context
where it should apply.” Jd.
Finally, where a state court does not assess the
merits of a constitutional claim that was presented to
it, the deference due under AEDPA “does not apply.”
Maples v. Steagall, 340 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2003);
Wynne v. Renico, 279 F. Supp. 2d 866, 879 (ED. Mich.
2003).
ARGUMENT
I. PETITIONER WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (US CONST.
AMENDS. VI, XIV), AND A FAIR TRIAL,
WHERE HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY, WITH NO
STRATEGIC PURPOSE, MADE SEVERAL
OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE ERRORS.
The United States Supreme Court’s standard for
reviewing ineffective assistance claims is fully set
forth in the companion cases of United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); and Strickland uv.
Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984). The Michigan
Supreme Court adopted these standards in reviewing
tks similar Michigan constitutional protections. People
v. Pickens, 521 N.W.2d 797 (Mich. 1994). See also,
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n14
(1970). Indeed, the right to the effective assistance
of counsel is longstanding and of paramount impor-
tance. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
App. 63
As the United States Supreme Court recognized in
Cronic, supra at 653-654:
Lawyers in criminal cases ‘are necessities,
not luxuries.’ Their presence is essential
because they are the means through which
the other rights of the person on trial are
secured. Without counsel, the right to a trial
itself would be ‘of little avail,’ as this Court
has recognized repeatedly. ‘Of all the rights
that an accused person has, tne right to be
represented by counsel is by far the most
pervasive for it affects his ability to assert
any other rights he may have.’ (Citations
omitted).
In the Cronic case the Court discussed the
history of the Sixth Amendment and emphasized that
the right was not to “counsel,” but rather to “the
assistance of counsel for the Petitioner’s defense.”
The Court cited earlier authority to emphasize the
entitlement to both “a reasonably competent attorney”
and advice “within the range of competence de-
manded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Cronic, 466
U.S. at 655. The Court in Cronic, at 654-655,
reviewed part of the history of the Sixth Amendment,
and emphasized that the right was to “actual
‘Assistance’ ‘for’ the accused’s ‘defence,’” and “to
assure ‘Assistance’ at trial, when the accused was
confronted with both the intricacies of the law and
the advocacy of the public prosecutor.” Throughout
the opinions there is an unmistakable focus upon the
fairness of the trial.
App. 64
The Strickland test.
In Strickland, supra, the United States Supreme
Court definitively laid out the tests to determine
whether a criminal defendant was afforded due
process when he or she claims that counsel was
ineffective. The Court clearly stated that these tests
are to be used by state and federal courts in inter-
preting the federal constitutional guarantee of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
In the Strickland case David Washington, after
tendering a plea at the guilt phase and waiving an
advisory jury at his capital sentencing hearing, was
sentenced to death by a Florida judge. Washington
later argued that his attorney was ineffective at the
sentencing hearing. Washington asserted that his
attorney should have, among other things, investi-
gated and presented chaiacter witnesses, requested a
presentence report, and asked for a continuance to
obtain a psychiatric report.
The Supreme Court in Strickland left no doubt
that the federal constitution demands effective
counsel in state prosecutions:
In a long line of cases ... this Court has
recognized that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to
protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.
The Constitution guarantees a fair trial
through the Due Process Clauses, but it de-
fines the basic elements of a fair trial largely
through the several provisions of the Sixth
App. 65
Amendment, including the Counsel clause.
Id. at 684-685.
The Court went on to hold that the right to coun-
sel plays a “crucial role” given our adversarial system
of justice — counsel’s abilities (skill and knowledge)
are fully required to meet the prosecution’s case. /d.
at 685. Counsel is required to ensure that the trial is
fair. Jd. at 685. For that reason, the right to counsel
means, under the federal constitution, the right to
effective counsel. Jd. at 686. Noting the various
ways in which the state can interfere, the Court
emphasized that the right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment can be denied “simply” by a failure of
“adequate legal assistance.” Jd. at 686, citing Cuyler
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980).
Recognizing that little guidance had been pro-
vided to the lower courts on how to assess the
adequacy of counsel’s performance when a general
“actual ineffectiveness” claii: is brought, the Court
emphasized that the key determinant is whether a
fair trial was provided. The question is whether
counsel’s performance errors undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial system to the point
where “the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.” Strickland, supra at 686.
To aid the inquiry, the Court in Strickland set out
a two part test:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires
showing that counsel made errors so serious
App. 66
that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant
must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing
that counsel’s errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable. Jd. at 687
The non-specific “objective standard of reasonabie-
ness” is utilized in assessing counsel’s performance
under this two part test. Jd. at 688. “The proper
measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”
Td. at 688.
The Court, though giving a nod to the ABA Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 through 4-8.6, clearly
stated that no particular set of rules governed assess-
ment of counsel’s performance. A case by case
analysis, highly deferential, should be employed. Jd.
at 688-689. In order to prevail a defendant must
overcome a presumption that counsel’s actions were
the result of sound strategy. Jd. at 689.
The Strickland Court outlined the duties of the
deciding court:
A convicted defendant making a claim of
ineffective assistance must identify the acts
or omissions of counsel that are alleged not
to have been the result of reasonable pro-
fessional judgment. The court must then
determine whether, in light of all the cir-
cumstances, the identified acts or omissions
App. 67
were outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance. In making that deter-
mination, the court should keep in mind that
counsel’s function, as elaborated in pre-
vailing professional norms, is to make the
adversarial testing process work in the
particular case. At the same time, the court
should recognize that counsel is strongly
presumed to have rendered adequate assis-
tance and made all significant decisions in
the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment. Jd. at 690.
The Court emphasized the importance of counsel’s
investigatory duties, and, though agreeing that stra-
tegic choices made “after thorough investigation of
law and facts relevant to plausible options” are
sacrosanct, “choices made after less than complete
investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent
that reasonable professional judgments support the
limitations on investigation.” Jd. at 690-691. A
decision not to investigate must be “directly assessed
for reasonableness.” Jd. at 691.
As to prejudice, the Court rejected a stringent
standard that would require a defendant to show that
his attorney’s lacking performance “more likely than
not” changed the verdict. Noting that effective coun-
sel is “one of the crucial assurances that the result of
the proceeding is reliable,” the Court opted for the
standard utilized in government non-disclosure and
interference cases:
App. 68
The defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional! errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different. A rea-
sonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.
at 694.
The Strickland Court stressed the importance of
assessing the totality of the evidence in a case in
making this determination:
In making this determination, a court hearing
an ineffectiveness claim must consider the
totality of the evidence before the judge or
jury. Some of the factual findings will have
been unaffected by the errors, and factual
findings that were affected will have been
affected in different ways. Some errors will
have had a perverse effect on the inferences
to be drawn from the evidence, altering the
entire evidentiary picture, and some will have
had an isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a
verdict or conclusion only weakly sup-
ported by the record is more likely to
have been affected by errors than one
with overwhelming record support.
Taking the unaffected findings as a given,
and taking due account of the effect of the
errors on the remaining findings, a court
making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the
defendant has met the burden of showing
that the decision reached would reasonably
likely have been different absent the errors.
Id. at 695-696, emphasis added.
App. 69
The Court repeatedly stressed the importance of
the “fundamental fairness” of the proceeding. Noting
the deference owed in this habeas action, and that a
clearly erroneous standard is generally employed in
assessing federal district court findings, the Strick-
land’ Court stated that both the performance and
prejudice aspects involve mixed questions of law and
fact. Applying the review standards to Mr. Washing-
ton’s case, the Court found no indication of a lack of
investigation or knowledge on the part of Washington’s
lawyer. And, as to prejudice, the evidence that
Washington claimed was neglected at his capital
sentencing proceeding “would barely have altered the
sentencing profile.” Jd. at 700. The Court held that
Mr. Washington’s lawyer was constitutionally effective.
Applying the Strickland tests to the asserted
errors of counsel in this case requires that Mr.
Holtzer’s request for a writ of habeas corpus must be
granted.
The only portion of a state court’s decision on
such claims that are entitled to deference are findings
of fact. Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1104 (3rd
Cir. 1996) (discussing Section 104(3)(d)\(2) of the
AEDPA). However, no deference is required if the
decision “was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented” in the
state court. Id.
App. 70
The need for a hearing
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has
outlined the critical need to develop a testimonial
record post-conviction on the issue of ineffective assis-
tance of trial counsel. In Massaro v. United States,
538 U.S. 500 (2003), the Court discussed the need to
show “that counsel's actions were not supported by a
reasonable strategy and that the error was prejudi-
cial.” Id. at 505. In other words a hearing is necessary
to show that the Strickland standards have been met.
The Massaro Court went on to specify why a post-
conviction hearing on the point was needed:
The evidence introduced at trial, however,
will be devoted to issues of guilt or innocence,
and the resulting record in many cases will
not disclose the facts necessary to decide
either prong of the Strickland analysis. Id. at
505.
Federal courts have consistently held that it is
error when a state court fails to allow a defendant,
who has diligently sought a hearing, the opportunity
to develop a factual base for issues he is attempting
to raise on appeal. Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663 (6th
Cir. 2001), Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir.
2001), Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809 (5th Cir.
2000), Barnes v. Elo, 231 F.3d 1025 (6th Cir. 2000),
Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1999).
Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006).
In this case Petitioner Holtzer has requested an
evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in this
App. 71
habeas petition at each stage of the state court sys-
tem, from the trial court, through both of Michigan’s
appellate courts. The request for a hearing has been
repeatedly denied. Petitioner is not at fault and this
Court should grant an evidentiary hearing in this
case."
Failure to Present a Substantial Defense
There is no failure of advocacy more basic, or
damaging, than the failure to pursue and present a
substantial defense. Washington v. Texas, 338 U.S.
14, 19 (1967); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
294 (1973). In Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-409
(1988), the Court held that “(t]he need to develop all
relevant facts in the adversary system is both fun-
damental and comprehensive.” Even the Michigan
Supreme Court recognized, in Pickens, supra at 803,
that “Michigan law has long required that defense
counsel present a reasonable defense.”
The necessity of pretrial investigation and prepa-
ration cannot be overstated, or even compensated for
by skill and experience. Strickland’s performance
standard of reasonableness requires counsel to make
pertinent factual and legal inquiries, and to allow
adequate time for trial preparation and development
of strategies and defenses. As the court put the
* The Appendix material (Appendices C through E) focusing
on hair transference and blood analysis matters are submitted
in support of Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing.
App. 72
matter in United States v. Barbour, 813 F.2d 1232,
1234 (D.C. Cir. 1987), quoting from Crisp uv.
Duckworth, 743 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1984):
Effective representation hinges on adequate
investigation and pretrial preparation ...
(for) investigation may help an attorney
develop or even discover a defense, locate a
witness or unveil impeachment evidence. /d.
at 583 (citing United States v. DeCoster, 487
F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).”
In Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir.
1993), the 8th Circuit found counsel ineffective for
failing to investigate. The court was particularly con-
cerned with the failure to prepare the case properly:
|Ajithough we generally give great deference
to an attorney’s informed strategic choices,
we closely scrutinize an attorney’s pre-
paratory choices. Jd. at 726.
See also Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1169-
70 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. dented, 523 U.S. 1132 (1998).
In Bryant v. Scott, 28 F.3d 1411, 1417-1419 (5th
Cir. 1994), the court found that trial defense counsel’s
failure to investigate potential alibi witnesses was
not a strategic choice and was “unprofessional con-
duct falling below the standard of a reasonably
competent attorney practicing under prevailing
professional norms.” The court concluded that the
failure to investigate failed the performance prong of
the Strickland test. Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court has recently held that the entire
App. 73
strategy inquiry in relation to an assessment of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is dependent
on adequate investigatory efforts by counsel. See,
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). See also
Bigelow v. Williams, 367 F.3d 562, 566 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“the respect that attorneys’ strategic decisions in a
criminal trial will receive is proportionate to the
extent of the investigation they in fact conducted”).
Trial counsel’s failure to adequately prepare and
put forward a substantial defense by dealing with the
hair transference issues and by properly assessing
the “blood” evidence clearly amounted to a failure of
constitutional magnitude. The failure to bring in a
qualified criminalist for the defense to counter the
presence of three hairs (two claimed to belong to
Petitioner Holtzer allegedly found in the room where
Kaylee Bruce’s body was found and one claimed to
belong to Bruce allegedly found in Holtzer’s condo-
minium unit) was critical. There can be no doubt,
looking at the information provided by a nationally
acclaimed expert in this area (Appendix C)’ and
* Report, Review of Crime Scene Hair and Blood Stain
Evidence, December 1, 2004 by Peter D. Barnett, D-ABC,
Criminalist, Forensic Science Associates. See also, CV of Peter
Barnett, attached as Appendix D, and the Fact Statement on
Hair Transference provided to Mr. Barnett, attached as
Appendix E. Mr. Barnett’s report is a preliminary report and
Petitioner Holtzer urges this Court to order an evidentiary
hearing in this matter so that the testimony of Mr. Barnett can
be taken on the critical points noted in his report. If an
evidentiary hearing is granted the defense would request that
Mr. Barnett be permitted to view the scene and the physical
evidence in this case prior to testifying.
App. 74
considering the exceptional importance given this
hair evidence by the prosecution, that it was not “safe
to proceed to trial” without a defense expert to coun-
ter this evidence. See People v. Tanner, 660 N.W.2d
746 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) rev’d on other grounds 671
N.W.2d 728 (Mich. 2003)."°
Mr. Barnett’s preliminary report (Appendix C) is
indeed critical and notes, at p. 3, that “[tjJhere is
nothing about any of these hairs [the pubic hair, the
torso hair and the bedroom hair] to provide strong
evidence that they were shed during the commission
of the crime by either the perpetrator or Ms. Bruce.”
Barnett details the many ways these hairs could have
come to be located where they were allegedly found in
an innocent manner. This is absolutely vital infor-
mation. If the jury had been provided with this
information at trial, through an acclaimed criminalist
with impeccable credentials, Mr. Holtzer would have
had a reasonably likely chance of acquittal. Espe-
cially if the jury was not repeatedly told, improperly,
that the victim’s blood was in Mr. Holtzer’s condo-
minium (Issue III, infra). These matters were the
heart and substance of the prosecution’s case and had
to have substantially impressed the jury, considering
that we live in an era where CSI is on television in
'° Stated another way, expert assistance for the defense is
required where, without it, a criminal defendant would be de-
nied “an adequate opportunity fairly to confront the state’s case
and to present his defense.” Conklin v. Schofield, 366 F.3d 1191,
1208 (11th Cir. 2004).
App. 75
some form nearly every evening. The need for a
credentialed defense expert to drive home the point to
the jury that the hair and luminol evidence was
extremely minimal on these facts was essential.
Indeed, courts across the country have noted the
acceptance and importance of hair transference
evidence. The cross-transference of hair evidence was
crucial to the state’s case against the petitioner in
Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir. 1999).
The same was true in Thomas v. State, 374 So.2d 508, -
514 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1979). In State v. Butler, 24 S.W.2d
21 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000), the court discussed the de-
fense theory of hair transference as bearing on the
ultimate decision not to reverse due to faulty, un-
scientific hair comparison testimony. And the prosecu-
tion used a hair transference theory to explain the
presence of a hair fragment of African-American
origin, not belonging to the defendant, in the victim’s
bedroom, in Cherry v. Moore, 829 So.2d 873 (Fla.
S. Ct. 2002). In this case it was not safe to proceed to
trial without a hair transference expert, and Mr.
Holtzer did not have an adequate opportunity to fairly
confront the state’s case and to present his defense
without such an expert.
Another reason why defense counsel’s failure to
investigate and secure a qualified criminalist must be
seen as reversible ineffective assistance of counsel
involves the improper luminol and leucocrystalviolet
evidence (see Issue III, infra). See Peter Bamett’s
detailed discussion on this point in his report,
Appendix C. Not only would Barnett have been able
App. 76
to debunk the prosecutor’s hair evidence; he would
have cast severe doubt on the prosecutor’s dramatic
and constant claims that Mr. Holtzer had brought
Kaylee Bruce’s blood back to his condominium unit.
But for defense counsel’s failure in this regard, Peti-
tioner would have been able to gut the key compo-
nents of the prosecutor’s case against him. Failure to
investigate and bring in a credentialed criminalist
was outcome determinative under these facts.
In Stouffer v. Reynolds, 214 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th
Cir. 2000) the failure to obtain funds to hire a defense
expert was among counsel’s deficiencies resulting in
reversal. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
See also People v. Grant, 684 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 2004)
where the Michigan Supreme Court held that the
failure of defense counsel to investigate critical mat-
ters required the grant of a new trial.
In Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 476 (5th Cir.
2004) the court recently determined that the failure
of defense counsel to investigate and retain a bal-
listics expert, when that type of expert was critical to
the defense, violated Strickland:
The Supreme Court recently determined that
“[iJn assessing the reasonableness of an at-
torney’s investigation ... a court must
consider not only the quantum of evidence
already known to counsel, but also whether
the known evidence would lead a reasonable
attorney to investigate further.” ... We also
agree with Soffar that his defense counsel
were deficient in not seeking out a ballistics
App. 77
expert when there were such readily ap-
parent discrepancies between the ballistics
evidence and the State’s theory of the case.
The State’s theory relied heavily on ballistics
evidence to show a correlation between the
statement attributed to Soffar and the crime
scene. Yet Soffar’s defense counsel never even
consulted with a ballistics expert. Defense
counsel were aware of the inconsistencies
between Garner’s statements and Soffar’s
confessions regarding both the number of
shots fired and the location of the victims
when the shootings occurred. The defense
counsel also were aware from the prose-
cution’s file that the police recovered bullets
and bullet fragments weighing less than the
total weight of five bullets, which tended to
corroborate Garner’s account of the events.
Considering this, it was objectively un-
reasonable for defense counsel to fail to
consult with a ballistics expert to determine
whether they could develop expert testimony
as to physical evidence that tended to
undermine the credibility and reliability of
Soffar’s confessions. (citations omitted)
See also, Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862 (9th
Cir. 2003), where the failure to investigate a crime
scene and secure the services of a criminalist and a
forensic pathologist were deemed reversible error based
on ineffective assistance of counsel; and Leonard v.
Michigan, 287 F.Supp. 2d 765, 791 (W.D. Mich.
2003), where defense counsel’s failure to investigate
through consultation with a DNA expert was deemed
App. 78
a denial of the constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel.
In this case the funds were available without
having to ask for them from the trial court. Trial
counsel’s failure was an investigatory one. Reasona-
ble professional judgment will not support a failure to
explore the need for an expert witness under these
facts. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Eze v.
Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110, 127-132 (2d Cir. 2003);
Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376, 390-392 (6th Cir.
2003); Kenley v. Armontrout, 987 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir.
1991).
Failure to Object to Junk Science and Prose-
cutorial Misconduct
Trial counsel also erred in failing to object to the
use of luminol testing where no confirmatory testing
was done (Issue III, infra) and in failing to object to
critical prosecutorial misconduct (Issue II, infra). The
luminol issue is important as this purported evidence
must be seen as the most effective information at
trial substantiating Mr. Holtzer’s involvement in
Bruce’s murder. There is no other way to explain her
blood in his condominium unit. Clearly, however, the
luminol testing “evidence” should never have been
admitted at Holtzer’s trial as it does not establish the
presence of blood, has no relevance, and is severely
prejudicial. The failure to object to the prosecutor’s
improper use of this evidence to claim that Bruce’s
blood was found in Holtzer’s condominium unit also
App. 79
meets the Strickland prejudice prong. Nor was trial
counsel’s conduct in failing to object to the prose-
cutor’s clearly improper remarks when the prosecutor
chastised Mr. Holtzer for his arrest silence and for his
failure to come forward with his version of events
(See Issue II, infra) at or above Strickland’s objective
standard of reasonableness. Hodge v. Hurley, 426
F.3d 368 (6th Cir. 2005).
The failures of trial counsel must be considered
outcome determinative under Strickland’s prejudice
prong. Bringing in a criminalist on transference and
to debunk the blood “evidence” would have changed
the course of trial as the defense would have broken
the back of the primary evidence relied upon by the
state — the three hairs and the blood claim. Moreover,
elimination of the improper luminol evidence, in ad-
dition to a reasonable explanation for the presence of
the three hairs, would have eliminated the ability of
the prosecution to claim that there was physical
evidence of Mr. Holtzer’s guilt. The errors of trial de-
fense counsel outlined above denied Mr. Holtzer a fair
trial and the writ should be granted. Minimally, this
Court should order an evidentiary hearing on this
issue which Petitioner three times requested in the
state courts and three times was refused.
AEDPA Review Standards
Petitioner raises ineffective assistance of counsel
— an issue that was not raised on direct appeal.
This issue was thoroughly exhausted in Michigan’s
App. 80
postconviction process and Petitioner asserts that the
trial court’s substantive treatment of these matters
prevents application of a procedural bar. See Abela v.
Martin, 380 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2004). Even if this
Court considers a procedural default, Petitioner as-
serts that he has established cause (through a claim
of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel, a
claim which itself has been completely exhausted in
postconviction) and prejudice to excuse the default.
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986); Hicks v.
Straub, 377 F.3d 538, 551 (6th Cir. 2004).
This Court must look to the last reasoned state
court opinion on the point before implementing
AEDPA standard of review limitations. The last
reasoned state court opinion is the state trial court’s
Decision and Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for
Relief from Judgment (attached as Appendix A). This
cursory Decision and Order, issued on March 22, 2005,
is full of snide comments, irrelevant observations and
erroneous statements. It is full of unsupportable and
unreasonable determinations of fact, allowing grant
of the writ independently under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2)
(See Issue II, infra).
With respect to the LAC issue, the state trial
court focuses on the fact that both trial defense
counsel were “experienced criminal defense counsel of
considerable repute.” Unfortunately, experience and
reputation do not insulate one from committing
constitutionally significant error. It is not who the
defense attorney is that matters, it is what that
attorney does. The state trial court also seems to be
App. 81
impressed by the fact that trial counsel were re-
tained, another irrelevant point despite the trial
court’s incredulity at the “intellectual bankruptcy” of
IAC “as a doctrine” due to the fact that “retained
counsel seem to commit ineffective assistance with a
stunning regularity rarely seen among appointed
counsel.” The trial court then sets out the Michigan
postconviction court rule for half a page and finds,
contrary to logic, that Petitioner has shown good
cause for failure to raise the issues, presumably in-
cluding the IAC issue, on direct appeal since they are
meritless. The court treats the issue substantively in
one conclusory sentence:
As for “actual prejudice,” these alleged
irregularities were in fact not improperly
handled at trial by counsel or the Court.
Decision and Order, Appendix A, p. 2.
Again, the trial court fails to import a procedural
bar here, freeing this Court to consider the issue
without the need for a showing of cause and preju-
dice. The state court’s substantive treatment of the
issue is clearly an unreasonable application of Strick-
land. The state trial court made conclusory claims
based on several unreasonable fact determinations.
This Court is thus empowered to review this issue de
novo. See Maples v. Steagall, 340 F.3d 433, 437 (6th
Cir. 2003); Wynne v. Renico, 279 F. Supp. 2d 866, 879
(E.D. Mich. 2003). The writ should be granted.
App. 82
II. PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO
A FAIR TRIAL (U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V,
XIV) WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE PROSE-
CUTOR ENGAGED IN SEVERE AND
REPEATED OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE
MISCONDUCT
The cumulative effect of repeated prosecutorial
misconduct denied Mr. Holtzer his due process right
to a fair trial. U.S. Const., Ams. V, VI, XIV.
The prosecutor’s misconduct exacerbated the
prejudice of the evidentiary errors in this case. A de-
fendant’s due process right to a fair trial is implicated
where the prosecutor resorts to improper and unjust
methods. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642
(1974). See also, Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168
(1986), where the prosecutor’s comments “so infected
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process.”
When faced with a question of prosecutorial
misconduct at trial a reviewing court must decide
(1) whether the remarks considered in isolation were
improper, and (2) whether, in light of the entire
record, the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. See
e.g. United States v. Osuorji, 32 F.3d 1186, 1191 (7th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232,
1244 (7th Cir. 1996). See also, in the context of cross-
examination misconduct, Johnson v. Wainwright, 806
F.2d 1479, 1486 (11th Cir. 1987) cert den 108 S. Ct.
872 (1987).
App. 83
A defendant’s due process rights are infringed
when, as here, a prosecutor’s improper comments reach
the point where the trial is rendered fundamentally
unfair. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982). Smith
teaches that “the touchstone of due process analysis
in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prose-
cutor.” Id. at 219.
When faced with a question of prosecutorial
misconduct at trial a reviewing court must decide
(1) whether the remarks considered in isolation were
improper, and (2) whether, in light of the entire
record, the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. See
e.g. Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2005), United
States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1383-90 (6th Cir.
1994); United States v. Osuorji, 32 F.3d 1186, 1191
(7th Cir. 1994), United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d
1232, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996). See also, in the context of
cross-examination misconduct, Johnson v. Wainwright,
806 F.2d 1479, 1486 (llth Cir. 1987) cert den 108
S. Ct. 872 (1987).
In Donnelly, supra, Benjamin DeChirstoforo was
apprehended for a murder while riding in a car with a
dead body and a recently discharged firearm. He com-
plained of comments by the prosecutor expressing a
personal belief in guilt and discussing defendant’s
claimed motives for going to tnal. The Court con-
cluded that the comments did not render the trial so
fundamentally unfair that due process was denied. In
reaching that conclusion the Court suggested that the
improprieties claimed might have been “offered to
App. 84
rebut a somewhat personalized argument by respon-
dent’s counsel.” Jd. at 640 (See also Darden, supra at
182, excusing “invited” misconduct).
The Donnelly court took pains to point out that
there was no claim being made in that case that the
prosecutor’s misconduct “prejudiced a specific right”
under the federal constitution. 416 U.S. at 643 (See
also, Darden, supra at 182). Contrast that with the
fact that the prosecution in this case impermissibly
used Mr. Holtzer’s silence against him in direct viola-
tion of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), a clearly
delineated due process violation.
In order to determine whether the prosecutor’s
remarks infected the trial to the point where a due
process denial is found, a reviewing court should take
notice of the strength of the state’s case. Coleman v.
Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986).
Here the state’s case was marginal and at least
in part based on improper science (Issue III, infra).
The prosecutor’s claim that Kaylee Bruce’s blood was
to be found throughout Petitioner Holtzer’s condo-
minium unit, a claim that was unfounded on these
facts, was highly prejudicial and undoubtedly de-
prived Petitioner of his due process right to a fair
trial. As noted in Issue III, infra, and in Issue I,
supra, the presence of two of Mr. Holtzer’s hairs in
the room where Bruce’s body was found and the
presence of one of Bruce’s hairs in Holtzer’s condo-
minium unit is not surprising given the contact and
transference aspects inherent in the case facts. Mr.
App. 85
Holtzer had lived at the Beach Condominiums for
several months prior to Bruce’s death. Cleaning people
were in and out of his unit daily, changing towels and
sheets and cleaning Mr. Holtzer’s bathroom among
other cleaning chores, and they were also entering
the room where Bruce’s body was found daily. Given
the contacts between Holtzer and Bruce and con-
sidering the vast number of hairs examined from
multiple sources, it is actually surprising that more
hairs were not matched in this case, even if Mr.
Holtzer had nothing to do with Bruce’s death.
Considering the above it is clear that the claim
that luminol testing revealed blood (specifically
Bruce’s blood) throughout Mr. Holtzer’s condominium
unit must be seen as extremely prejudicial and,
indeed, outcome determinative. As detailed in Issue I,
supra, the prosecutor had no reasonable basis upon
which to make this constant claim to the jury in
Petitioner Holtzer’s case. Illuminating this problem
further are the misstatements by the trial court on
these points in his March 22, 2005 “Decision and
Order” (attached as Appendix A) after Petitioner
Holtzer’s current MCR 6:500 process briefing deline-
ated these matters in substantial detail. Of particular
concern are the trial court’s comments denying Mr.
Holtzer’s substantial claim regarding the improper
prosecutorial use of alleged blood evidence, evidence
that was critical in convicting Mr. Holtzer, that “the
DNA testing of the blood on the carpet in Mr. Holt-
zer’s condominium which confirmed that it was
human blood ... ” and that there were “luminol
App. 86
indicated footprints that led from the crime scene to
Mr. Holtzer’s condominium unit.” Decision and Order,
3/22/05, p. 3.
If either of the above quoted statements had a
grain of truth, they would be damaging to Mr. Holt-
zer’s claims here. Indeed the trial court placed great
reliance on these claims. Unfortunately they are to-
tally false, and clearly constitute an unreasonable
determination of fact on this record. With respect to
the first statement, as the trial court admits, there
was no DNA match to the victim from a stain on the
carpet in Mr. Holtzer’s condominium unit. The trial
court is obviously unaware that DNA testing does not
determine what type of bodily fluid created the stain
in the first instance. There was no serology testing
done here and even the state police technician that
testified about the stain admitted that she could not
determine whether the stain was blood (T 10/14/99
59-62, 124-128). To blithely state that DNA testing
confirmed that this stain was human blood when the
opposite point was such a large part of Appellant’s
argument here is beyond the pale, suggests the state
trial court may not have read the briefing, and vir-
tually demands that this Court grant the writ under
28 U.S.C. 2254(d\2) as this was clearly an un-
reasonable fact determination.
The second erroneous statement, important in
the state trial court’s analysis, is farther off base and
more damaging in its lack of accuracy. Footprints
from the crime scene, the condominium offices, to Mr.
App. 87
Holtzer’s unit, quite some distance, would be damn-
ing.
The first problem is that there were no “foot-
prints” at all. There were no shoe patterns, even just
outside Mr. Holtzer’s unit where police investigators
claim that there was a “weak luminescence” luminol
reaction (T 10/13/99 70-72). These were small spots in
a couple of areas (T 10/14/99 26-30). And, as de-
lineated thoroughly in Issue I, infra, many different
substances can cause a luminol reaction. A large
segment of the path between Mr. Holtzer’s condo-
minium unit and the crime scene was outdoors and
all attempts to do luminol testing in these areas was
unsuccessful (T 10/13/99 72-74). Indeed testing out-
side the office (the crime scene) with both leuco-
crystalviolet and luminol revealed no reaction (T
10/14/99 30-32, 61). State police found no blood on the
walkway outside the office (T 10/12/99 128).
To claim on this record that the prosecutor’s
highly damaging and improper comments were
rendered fair because there were luminol indicated
footprints leading from the crime scene to Mr.
Holtzer’s condominium unit is nothing short of
preposterous and renders the state trial court’s entire
three page offering useless and, again, based on an
unreasonable determination of fact. This Court
should grant the writ under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d((2).
If the state trial court and the prosecutor cannot
understand these critical evidentiary points, then it
is highly likely that the jury was swayed by the
App. 88
prosecutor’s misstatements to convict on this “false
positive” claim.
It is impermissible for the prosecutor to argue
facts beyond the evidence which was submitted to the
jury. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979); Wash-
ington v. Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689 (6th Cir. 2000). The
jury, in determining a defendant’s guilt or innocence,
may consider only evidence and sworn testimoay
adduced at trial and may not consider factors which
were not introduced as proof. Bell v. Wolfish, supra. A
prosecutor may not “testify” in closing arguments or
through cross-examination to facts which were not
introduced as evidence.
When the prosecutor told the jury that Mr.
Holtzer had carried Kaylee Bruce’s blood back to his
condominium, the prosecutor was in effect testifying
in argument. No case facts came remotely close to
establishing such a claim. As noted in Issue I, supra,
luminol testing is presumptive only and does not
establish the presence of blood. There are a number of
other substances that would react to luminol,
including vomit that had been treated with cleansing
agents and, even if not treated, that contained
vegetable matter or horseradish. Very small con-
centrations of these substances could cause a reaction
and the deposit could have been made years in the
past. Cleaning personnel walking through the unit
with bleach on their shoes could have registered the
same reactions to luminol. In short, the luminol
testing here, without any confirmatory test, did not
establish that any human blood, much less that
App. 89
Kaylee Bruce’s blood, was present in Mr. Holtzer’s
condominium unit. The claims of the prosecutor in
opening and closing argument were baseless and,
under these facts, extremely prejudicial. Petitioner
Holtzer’s due process right to a fair trial under the
federal constitution was clearly denied.
The prosecutor in this case did not stop at
improperly portraying the blood evidence to Mr.
Holtzer’s severe detriment. The prosecutor also
testified to facts not in evidence, crucial facts indeed,
when, without any basis, he told the jury that several
pubic hairs, not matched to Petitioner Holtzer or to
Bruce, found in the body wraps that were placed
around Bruce’s body by evidence technicians at the
scene, came from Darlene Wilson (T 10/21/99 67).
The prosecutor obviously made this claim, with
no basis in testing, to deflect attention and concern
from these unidentified hairs that the jury could
reasonably conclude, under these facts, could have
belonged to the actual] assailant or, conversely, could
lend credence to the notion that the presence of two of
Mr. Holtzer’s pubic hairs in the same setting did not
contain much probative value. By linking the hairs to
Mr. Holtzer, the prosecutor negated both of these
theories. The only problem here was that the
prosecutor had absolutely no basis for making this
linkage. What the prosecutor should have done was to
arrange for testing of the hairs in question against
those of Darlene Wilson. Why the prosecutor did not
do this would be the subject of sheer speculation.
Possibly there was reason to fear the result of such
App. 90
testing. We will likely never know. What is known is
that it was far easier to make the claim without
support. And making this claim without support
under these facts constituted a denial of Mr. Holtzer’s
due process right to a fair trial under the state and
federal constitutions.
Finally, the prosecutor’s elicitation of the fact
that Mr. Holtzer was silent upon arrest (T 10/13/99
75) and the prosecutor’s claims in argument that
Petitioner Holtzer’s failure to question the police on
the morning of the discovery of Bruce’s body and his
failure to go to police to question them when he found
out he was wanted for murder (T 10/21/99 14, 20)
should be considered as evidence of guilt, were clearly
impermissible.
A defendant’s silence at arrest is protected
conduct and cannot be elicited by the prosecution to
suggest guilt. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). The
prosecutor’s reference to Petitioner’s failure to come
forward with his version of events at any time prior
to trial crosses the Doyle line — Petitioner Holtzer was
under no obligation to assert his innocence before
trial. The United States Supreme Court has clearly
held that the use of a defendant’s post arrest silence
to suggest guilt is a violation of a defendant’s right to
due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
This issue was thoroughly exhausted in Michi-
gan’s postconviction process and Petitioner asserts
that the trial court’s substantive treatment of these
matters prevents application of a procedural bar. See
App. 91
Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2004). Even if
this Court considers a procedural default, Petitioner
asserts that he has established cause (through a claim
of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel, a
claim which itself has been completely exhausted in
postconviction) and prejudice to excuse the default.
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986); Hicks v.
Straub, 377 F.3d 538, 551 (6th Cir. 2004).
The state courts made conclusory claims based on
several unreasonable fact determinations. This Court
is thus empowered to review this issue de novo. See
Maples v. Steagall, 340 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2003);
Wynne v. Renico, 279 F. Supp. 2d 866, 879 (E.D. Mich.
2003). The cumulative effect of the prosecutorial
misconduct was substantial and outcome determina-
tive. Mr. Holtzer’s federal due process right to a fair
trial was denied and the writ should be granted.
Ill. PETITIONER HOLTZER WAS DENIED HIS
FEDERAL DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A
FAIR TRIAL (U.S. CONST., AMS. V, XIV)
WHERE SCIENTIFICALLY UNSOUND
LUMINOL TESTING WAS IMPROPERLY
USED TO MAKE THE UNRELIABLE AND
HEAVILY PREJUDICIAL CLAIM THAT
THE BLOOD OF THE VICTIM WAS FOUND
IN HIS CONDOMINIUM UNIT.
Criminal defendants possess a due process right
to a fair trial, which may be denied by improper
evidentiary rulings. See U.S. Const., Ams. V, XIV. See
also Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 962-63 (6th
App. 92
Cir.1983). State court evidentiary violations may rise
to the level of a federal constitutional deprivation by
rendering a trial fundamentally unfair. Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991), Crane v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 683 (1986). Rosario v. Kuhiman, 839 F.2d 918,
925 (2d Cir. 1988). In this case junk science was im-
properly introduced to dramatically sway the jury on
key points, denying Petitioner Holtzer due process of
law under the federal constitution.
As detailed in the Statement of Facts, supra, the
prosecutor used luminol testing to tell the jury that
there was “blood” in Petitioner Holtzer’s condo-
minium unit, a key piece of the prosecutor’s case
against Mr. Holtzer. The prosecutor flatly stated that
the glow from the luminol indicated “that blood was
there” (T 10/11/99 190). The prosecutor claimed that
blood was found throughout Petitioner Holtzer’s
apartment and even outside on his deck. The prose-
cutor, in a twist of logic, suggested that because DNA
was extracted from a stain sample on a rug in Mr.
Holtzer’s condominium unit and because the stain
reacted to luminol, it was proven that there was blood
on the rug (T 10/11/99 192-193).”"
"In fact it appears the
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