Writ of Habeas Corpus — Moses, In re (No. 09-644)

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09 644

NOV 30 2009

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

App. No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

IN RE: C. LYNN MOSES,

Petitioner

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241

AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

ARTICLE I, § 9

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Blake S. Atkin*

ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.

837 South 500 West, Suite 200

Bountiful, Utah 84010

Telephone: (801) 533-0300

Facsimile: (801) 533-0380

Attorney for Petitioner C. LYNN MOSES

*Counsel of Record

i

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether your Petitioner is being held

unlawfully and unconstitutionally having been

convicted of violating the Clean Water Act for having

maintained for twenty years, under contract with

Teton County, a flood control channel! through

uplands where no wetlands are located; when the

regulations that existed in 1980 when he first

undertook that maintenance put this flood control

device outside the jurisdiction of the Clean Water

Act; and after this Court’s decision in Rapanos v.

United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006), and even after

promulgating regulations requiring an individualized

analysis of Clean Water Act jurisdiction, using

criteria that definitely exclude this upland ditch from

such jurisdiction, no government agency, prosecutor,

nor any Court has undertaken the analysis to

determine whether this upland ditch your Petitioner

maintained that carries water for less than two

months cut of the year, was within the jurisdiction of

the Clean Water Act.

il

LIST OF PARTIES TO CONVICTION

Petitioner C. Lynn Moses was the Defendant

in this matter.

Respondent United States of America was the

Plaintiff in this matter.

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR

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LIST OF PARTIES TO CONVICTION................... li

PRR IE CAFE EE iis ces ids voeserersytercemeereenes lil

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIBG....................... Vv

CITATIONS OF THE OFFICIAL AND

UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE COURTG......... vl

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES

ADAUF BRP IN cscs sscxevncecavacssccsivecsareesengaes vi

REASON WHY APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT MADE TO DISTRICT

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FACTS RELATING TO DETENTION OF

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APPENDIX

Declaration of Bill Scott with accompanying

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MO WEGIOIIOE GECICIOD vcs s vidcnsses ves acesceccsessaese: la

Letter from Lynn Moses to the Corps of

ics occa take cgannes tatscs peasdaucoushucnsasese 14a

Clean Water Act Jurisdiction following the

U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos v.

United States and Carabell v. United

aera ss sak vias byuaia reas stad cunvebdaracessiaed oun 17a

Excerpt from Trial Record...................0086. 43a

Excerpt from Trial Record...................0000. 45a

Excerpt from Trial Record...............seessee0 47a

Vv

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 S.Ct. 906,

EE ot ig es raul ekacuwcesiwar ics See 3

Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379,

382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884)..................000. 3

Rapanos _v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208

Paani ak ap ans ox eye ena mendcck vexon don eceanienn 1,1,4,5,8,9

U.S. v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984 (9tb Cir. 2007)............. v1

U.S. v. Moses, _F.Supp. __, 2009 WL 735638 (D.

Ne eee vi

STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND RULES:

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WE BGI occ csvnscscisccerscccreccscivlenndncs 1

RE TE in as bh ceca tuahantsapansdeasidntascxeuasaands vu,8

ae be SR gt sg) Sr ere Ore eon ..10

United States Constitution, Article I, § 9............0... v1

United States Supreme Court Rules, Rule 20......... vi

Vi

CITATIONS OF THE OFFICIAL AND

UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE COURTS

U.S. v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984 (9 Cir. 2007)

U.S. v. Moses, _F.Supp. __, 2009 WL 735638 (D.

Idaho 2009)

BASIS FOR THE COURT'S JURISDICTION

This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked pursuant

to the United States Constitution Article I Section

9; 28 U.S.C. § 2241; and United States Supreme

Court Rules, Rule 20.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES |

AND REGULATIONS

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, ARTICLE 1, § 9:

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of

Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require

it.

28 U.S.C. § 2241:

(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be

granted by the Supreme Court, any

justice thereof, the district courts and

Vil

any circuit judge within their respective

jurisdictions. The order of a _ circuit

judge shall be entered in the records of

the district court of the district wherein

the restraint complained of is had.

33 U.S.C. § 1251

(a) Restoration and maintenance of chemical,

physical and biological integrity of Nation's waters;

national goals for achievement of objective.

The objective of this chapter is to restore and

maintain the chemical, physical, and_ biological

integrity of the Nation's waters.

l

REASON WHY APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT MADE TO DISTRICT

COURT

The jurisdictional question presented by this

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was presented to

the District Court in a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. The District Court, in denying that motion,

refused to address the jurisdictional issue claiming

that it had been answered on direct appeal and

therefore it could deny the motion without

addressing the jurisdictional issue. While it is true

that the issue has been repeatedly addressed to the

Courts and to the two agencies involved—the EPA

and the Army Corps of Enginecrs, to date, no one has

answered the question presented. Such dodging of

the issue is unbecoming a Court of these United

States and leads the Petitioner to doubt the

possibility of a fair hearing on the issue before the

District Court. The rule of law set out by this Court

in its Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208

(2006), decision needs to be applied to your

Petitioner's case. When that is done there is no

logical way to find that the removal, when no water

is present, of last year’s gravel washed down from an

upland ditch in order to control flood waters that run

at most, for two months of the year and that do not

wash any of the disturbed gravel into a navigable

water has a significant nexus to the physical,

biological, or chemical integrity of a navigable water

of the United States. Your Petitioner deserves to

have his question about jurisdiction answered, and it

is apparent from reading the Court of Appeals

2

decision and the District Court’s denial of the 2255

motion that the lower court’s are not going to answer

it.

FACTS RELATING TO DETENTION OF

PETITIONER

Petitioner, C. Lynn Moses, reported to the

Bureau of Prisons to begin an eighteen (18) month

sentence on August 6, 2008. He currently is on home

confinement and is scheduled to begin a one year

period of supervised release beginning on November

26, 2009.

The conviction and sentence is Ulegal because

it is based on a conviction for which there was no

jurisdiction. Mr. Moses, as president of a

homeowner's association, was convicted of violating

the Clean Water Act by performing flood control

activities, required by contract between’ the

homeowner's association and Teton County, in an

area watered only intermittently (less than two

months out of the year); that contains no wetlands:

and which has never been determined to be within

the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act. In fact,

when the flood control activities began in 1980, the

Army Corps of Engineers specifically determined

that the area was not within its jurisdiction under

the Clean Water Act.' The procedure spelled out in

the agency regulations for changing that

! Teton County invited the Army Corps of Engineers to solve the

flood control problem in the area. The Corps of Engineers

specifically denied jurisdiction. Thereafter, the county required

Mr. Moses, by contract, to perform the flood control activities

for which this indictment followed.

determination was never followed and there has

never been a determination of jurisdiction under the

Clean Water Act over the area in question.

Our Constitution, with its Bill of Rights and

other guarantees of human dignity and freedom,

would be meaningless were it not for the procedural

due process guarantees that are guaranteed by our

Constitution and held strictly sacrosanct by this

Court. Many totalitarian regimes throughout the

world have touted constitutional guarantees that on

paper sound as profound as our own, but since there

are no procedural guarantees of fairness in their

systems of justice, their constitutions are a “paper

tiger” and the fine sounding guarantees have no true

worth.

There is perhaps no more_ important

procedural guarantee than that of jurisdiction. The

requirement of jurisdiction is so essential to ordered

government that it is the one defect in a proceeding

that cannot be waived, and is raised sua sponte by

the Courts whenever it is recognized. Kontrick v.

Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 S.Ct. 906, 915 (2004),

citing Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S.

379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884) (challenge

to a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction may be

made at any stage of the proceedings, and the court

should raise the question sua sponte). If this Court

upholds and condones the continued detention of Mr.

Moses when the Government has failed to make a

determination of jurisdiction under the Clean Water

Act, which its own regulations require, it will be

condoning a mockery of our constitutional way of

life .2

The conviction in this case centered around

the Petitioner’s activities in 2002, 2003, and 2004, in

cleaning a flood channel that had been established in

1980. In 1980, when the flood channel in question

was established, Mr. Moses and Teton County

inquired of the Corps of Engineers whether a permit

was required for the flood control work. They were

told that because the area received water only

intermittently, the Corps of Engineers had no

jurisdiction. See, Declaration of Bill Scott with

accompanying newspaper articles (Appendix, infra,

pp. la-13a).

Over the next twenty years, as new personnel

would join the Corps, some would suggest Mr. Moses

needed a permit to continue maintenance of the flood

control channel. Mr. Moses would remind them of

the events that had occurred in the early 80’s and the

Corp’s determination at that time that it did not

have jurisdiction of this area. See, Letter from Lynn

2 In an attempt at ill timed humor, the Court of Appeals

revealed its failure to grasp the issue Mr. Moses has repeatedly

sought to be answered. In trying to laugh away the

government's failure to apply a site specific analysis to this case

the Court stated that even if Moses was misled by the

Government’s initial failure to assert jurisdiction over this area,

his “sang-froid” when it later asserted jurisdiction showed

either his courage or his “foolhardiness.”. What the Court

missed is that once this area was determined to not be within

Clean Water Act jurisdiction, it required a site specific analysis

to bring it back into the jurisdiction of the Corps and the EPA.

That was true under the 1980 regulations and, as Rapanos

found, that requirement never changed. Is it foolhardy for a

citizen to expect his government to follow its own regulations

before imprisoning him?

Moses to the Corps of Engineers, (App., infra, pp.

14a-16a). The government would then go away,

sometimes for several years, until the next new faces

appeared in the agency.

In 2002, 2003, and 2004, a new sct of faces,

this time at the Environmental Protection Agency

(“EPA”), an agency that had never before asserted

jurisdiction, threatened Mr. Moses, the president of

the home owners association with criminal

prosecution unless he stopped his contractually

required maintenance of the flood control channel.

Mr. Moses again reminded them of the determination

made in the early 80’s that the Corps had no

jurisdiction, but this time the agency continued with

this prosecution even though there has never been an

agency determination, by either the Corps of

Engineers nor the EPA, that the area in question is

within the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act.

The United States Supreme Court made it

clear in Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208

(2006), that Clean Water Act jurisdiction does not

reach to everything wet, but that there are in fact

limits to federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water

Act. After Rapanos, the Corps of Engineers and the

EPA issued guidelines to its operatives on how to go

about determining jurisdiction over areas that are

not clearly within the jurisdiction of the Clean Water

Act. See, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction following the

U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos v. United

States and Carabell v. United States, (App., infra,

pp. 17a-42a). Despite those guidelines, neither the

EPA nor the Corps of Engineers has ever applied the

criteria in those guidelines to the arca in question in

6

order to make a determination whether there is

Clean Water Act jurisdiction of the area in which Mr.

Moses performed flood control activities. Without

such a determination his detention is without

jurisdiction and is illegal.

Had the agencies undertaken the

jurisdictional analysis required by the Court’s

Rapanos decision and their own regulations they

would have determined that they do not have

jurisdiction over this area and the travesty of justice

that this petition is attempting to remedy would

never have been an issue.

In Clean Water Act Jurisdiction following the

U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos v. United

States and Carabell v. United States, (App., infra,

pp. 17a-42a), the EPA and the Corps of Engineers

set out the criteria by which a determination to

assert jurisdiction over an intermittent stream is to

be judged. Under their own criteria, a significant

nexus between Mr. Moses’ activity and the physical,

biological, or chemical integrity of a navigable water

of the United States is not to be had.

First, the Agencies set out those features over

which they will not assert jurisdiction. Mr. Moses’

flood control channel fits directly into this

description:

The Agencies generally will not assert

jurisdiction over the following features:

kk t&

Ditches (including roadside ditches) excavated

wholly in and draining only uplands and that do not

carry a relatively permanent flow of water.

See, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction following the U.S.

7

Supreme Court's decision in Rapanos v. United

States and Carabell v. United States, (App., infra, p.

18a).

The Agencies defined “relatively permanent

flow of water” as “waters that flow year round or that

have a continuous flow at least seasonally (e.g.,

typically three months).” Clean Water Act

Jurisdiction following the U.S. Supreme Court's

decision in Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v.

United States, (App., infra, p. 27). This fundamental

criterion immediately removes Mr. Moses’ activities

in this flood control channel from consideration. Mr.

Moses’ activities were to dig a ditch, albeit a big one,

in which to control the flood waters that would

normally flow through the area in a plane. The

government stipulated at the trial court level that

there are no wetlands in this area. See, Excerpt from

Trial Record, (App., infra, pp. 43a ~— 44a). Therefore

what the evidence showed at trial is a ditch that

drains only uplands. The evidence at trial was that

this channel was used for flood control purposes for

only two months, in the years when there was any

flow at all. See, Excerpt from Trial Record, (App.,

infra, pp. 45a°46a). This upland ditch that does not

carry a continuous flow for at least three months is

viewed by the agencies as being outside their

jurisdiction. Clean Water Act Jurisdiction following

the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos v.

United States and Carabell v. United States, (App.,

infra, pp. 17a-42a).

If that were not enough, even if the agency

were to consider this channel on a case-by-case basis,

its own criteria would weed out this prosecution.

8

In order to assert jurisdiction, the agencies

must determine that a particular activity or feature

has a significant nexus to the purpose of the Clean

Water Act which is to preserve the physical,

chemical, and biological integrity of the Nations

navigable waters. 33 U.S.C §1251. This

determination is, of course, required by the Kennedy

concurrence in Rapanos.

It is undisputed that the area where Moses

built this flood control channel is not a navigable

water of the United States so that what he did had

no impact on the physical integrity of a navigable

water of the United States.

Likewise, there is no suggestion that Mr.

Moses introduced any chemical or biological agent

whatever into the area. Even the trees that were

used as log jams were trees washed down with the

latest flood. Thus, there can be no argument that his

actions affected the chemical or biological integrity of

a navigable water of the United States.

This conclusion becomes more _ painfully

obvious when the Court considers that’ the

undisputed evidence at trial was that even the gravel

that he is accused of disturbing through his annual

maintenance of the flood channel never made it to

the Teton River — the navigable river into which the

flood waters of the channel may sometimes reach.

There is no aquatic environment in this area. See,

See, Excerpt from Trial Record, (App., infra, pp. 47a-

48a). And there are no wetlands through the area of

this flood control channel. See, Excerpt from Trial

Record, (App., infra, pp. 43a — 44a). There simply

can be no argument made that Mr. Moses’ activities

9

had any effect on the physical, chemical, or biological

integrity of any navigable water of the United States.

Therefore there is no jurisdiction under the Clean

Water Act and the sentence in this case 1s illegal.

To this point, the government and the Courts’

answer to Mr. Moses’ jurisdictional challenge has

been to deflect the question by stating it has already

been answered. But this Court cannot ignore these

fundamental issues of jurisdiction and still contend

that we are part of a civilized nation. Mr. Moses has

repeatedly asked each court that has reviewed his

case to address the jurisdictional issues, but no one

can point to any decision—either by the District

Court or by the Court of Appeals—where the Court

has addressed the requirement that the agencics

undertake a site specific review of this area only

intermittently blessed with water, to determine

whether there is a significant nexus between Moses’

activities thereon and the physical, biological, or

chemical integrity of a navigable water of the United

States. See, Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct.

2208 (2006). Mr. Moses’ demands, that a

jurisdictional determination be made, fell on deaf

ears when he repeatedly, over a twenty year period,

asked the agencies to do it before the prosecution was

brought, and his arguments that Clean Water Act

jurisdiction be determined before he pay the price of

conviction were likewise ignored by the Courts. If

there was any doubt before Rapanos, there is no

doubt now, that jurisdiction over intermittent water

can only be exercised after a site specific review of

the area involved. The early review of this area

resulted in an agency determination that there was

10

no jurisdiction, and no such site specific review has

ever been made thereafter to reverse that first

determination.

The regulations that existed in 1980 when the

flood control activity first began would have allowed

the Corps of Engineers to exercise jurisdiction over

this area, but only after the District Engineer made a

site specific determination that such exercise of

jurisdiction was justified. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (1977),

footnote 3. Apparently, such a site specific analysis

was made at that time and the Corps determined

that it did not have jurisdiction. See, Declaration of

Bill Scott with accompanying newspaper articles

(Appendix, infra, pp. 1a-13a). In “Flood Hearing

Stirs Controversy”, Bill Scott stated, “[clontacted by

telephone in Walla Walla, Washington, a district

spokesman for the Corps is looking into the situation,

and if it determines Teton Creek to be _ not

intermittent, it will claim jurisdiction over the

matter, the spokesman said”. See, “Flood Hearing

Stirs Controversy’ news article attached to

Declaration of Bill Scott, (App., infra, pp. 7a-13a).

There is no evidence that that initial determination

that there was no Clean Water Act jurisdiction,

because this area was only intermittent, has ever

been reversed by any later. site specific

determination.

CONCLUSION

Because there is no demonstrated Clean Water

Act jurisdiction over the area in which Mr. Moses

performed his flood control activities, his immediate

release from any further impediment of this

conviction must be immediately ordered.

1]

DATED this 25 day of November, 2009.

ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.

a

Blake S. Atkin

ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.

837 South 500 West, Suite 200

Bountiful, Utah 84010

Telephone: (801) 533-0300

Facsimile: (801) 533-0380

Attorney for Petitioner

APPENDIX

la

Blake S. Atkin (ISB# 6903)

7579 North Westside Highway

Clifton, Idaho 83228

Telephone: (208) 747-3414

ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.

136 South Main Street, Suite A401

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Telephone: (801) 533-0300

Fax: (801) 533-0380

Attorney for Defendant

UNITED STATES DISTRCIT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF IDAHO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

“wae

C. LYNN MOSES,

Defendant.

DECLARATION OF BILL SCOTT

CR No. 05-0061-B-BLW

I, Bill Scott, under penalty of perjury, depose

and state as follows:

2a

1. I am over the age of 18 years of age and am

competent to testify about the matters set forth

herein. I make this declaration on the basis of

personal knowledge.

2. I am an independent party and have no

personal interest in the outcome of this case.

3. As a reporter I hold myself to the highest

ethical standards and stand by the truthfulness of

the articles that are published under my name.

4, J attended a public hearing on June 9, 1982

regarding the flooding that had taken place the year

prior and was imminently expected in Driggs, Idaho.

E.R. pg. 77

5. At the meeting, I took notes and recorded the

events that took place in my notes and shortly after

ihe meeting, and provided the information for the

article on June, 11, 1982 entitled A Driggs fears

worsening flood dangers, @ that appeared in the

Idaho Post Register attached hereto as Exhibit “A.”

6. I authored the attached article that appeared

on June 17, 1982 in the Teton Valley News attached

hereto as Exhibit “B.”

‘2 The articles accurately set out what took place

at the meeting that took place on June 9, 1982 as I

was in attendance at the meeting.

3a

8. I attended the meeting as a _ news

correspondent and had no financial stake in the

outcome of the meeting.

I declare under penalty of perjury and upon personal

knowledge that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated this 28 day of March, 2006, Idaho Falls, Idaho.

_T/s/

BILL SCOTT

E.R. pg. 78

Exhibit A

Driggs fears worsening flood dangers

By BILL SCOTT

Post- Register correspondent

DRIGGS — One year after flood waters nearly

invaded Driggs, residents and local irrigators are

fearful of a worse flood this year and blaming each

other for the predicament.

At a public hearing here Wednesday some

residents blamed the increased flood danger on

stream channeling in a subdivision on the creck.

These concerns were discussed with officials of

several government agencies, in an effort to

determine where the responsibility lies.

Lynn Moses, developer of The Aspens

subdivision, which straddles Teton Creek one-half

mile east of the city limits, placed the blame for last

year’s flood on inadequate culveris under the county

4a

road bordering his property. Others blamed Moses,

for doing the channelization work The Teton County

Board of Commissioners and its Planning and Zoning

Commission for approving the subdivision in the first

place; the Driggs City Council for the same reason;

the Bureau of Water Resources and Corps of

Engineers for allowing the channelization work to be

done; and mother nature for dropping a heavy

cloudburst in Teton County at the wrong time.

Main channel

Teton Creek enters the subdivision property in

one main channel; and splits into three channels

within the property boundaries. The county road

(Driggs Cemetery rd.) bordering the property has

three sets if culveris, one at each channel. Work done

by the developer closed off the two smaller channels

and deepened the main channel. When last year’s

cloudburst hit, water ran over the banks, onto the

road, and into town.

The channelization work was done without

Knowledge of or permission from the Bureau of

Water Resources or the Corps of Engineers, and

representative of both agencies at the hearing said

they had no jurisdiction in the matter because they

classify the stream as intermittent and therefore

permits for such work are not required.

Teton County Planning Administrator Dan

Letham said the subdivision was approved

“contingent upon channelization” of the stream bed.

Given warning

“The developers were adequately warned that

this area floods,” Lethan said, adding that they were

told to set up a homeowner's association which would

have stream maintenance as “a continuous project.”

Sa

“Lynn (Moses) indicated he had permits to do

the channelization,” Letham said. “It’s. their

responsibility,” he added.

Lowell Curtis, chairman of the Teton County

Board of Commissioners, said the county had been

unaware that the water was being restricted to one

channel. “We can’t go in there and divert water,”

back into the other channels, Curtis said. He laid

responsibility for that on the developers.

Several lifetime residents of the area testified

that the subdivision property is known to flood

almost every year. One said it was “God's way” for

the stream to split into three channels and “they've

molested that.”

Flood plan

Water used to backup into the subdivision,

which some referred to as a flood plan, rather than

move onto the road and into town.

“Anybody that’s lived here knows that’s a flood

plan,” one said, a sentiment also expressed by others.

No homes have been built in the subdivision, which

is owned by Moses, Charles Peak and Mark

Rockefeller, all of Teton County. Last year’s flood

damaged the subdivision property, however, and

Moses earlier this year filed a claim for $1,200 for

damages. The claim was denied.

Irrigators at the hearing said they were fearful

the channelization would interfere with headgates

and canals downstream from the subdivision. Those

whose canals come from upstream of the subdivision

were concerned as well, worried that they may be

forced to take more water in their canals than they

can handle if another flood condition arises, resulting

in flood damage to other areas.

6a

Authority unclear

No clear authority or responsibility was

determined at the hearing, which Curtis had called

to “answer questions and speak to concerns.”

Establishing such authority would partially depend

on whether the stream should be classified as

intermittent or continuous, and whether the

subdivision property should be considered a flood

plain.

Irrigation water taken from the creek leaves it

dry much of the year, prompting the government

agencies to classify it as intermittent and therefore

out of their jurisdiction. However, the stream would

flow year round if the water was not diverted.

County Attorney Russell Webb said that leaves the

legal classification in question. Webb also said that

what he described as “very strong language” in the

county’s subdivision ordinance leaves “a_ serious

question in my mind whether the subdivision is

legal.” The ordinance provides that for subdivisions

within a flood plan, “the developer shall demonstrate

conclusively...that such development will not present

a hazard to life, limb or property.”

Lots of snow

With water content of the snow in the

mountains this year higher than average and much

higher than last year, the one point agreed upon by

those present was that the potential for more serious

flooding is there. So far, cool weather has kept water

flow down, but county Civil Defense Director Jim

Park said he was “very seriously concerned about the

flood threat this year.”

E.R. pg. 79

7a

Exhibit B

Flood Hearing Stirs Controversy

By Bill Scott

Staff Writer

Just over one year ago, on June 9, 1981, warm

weather and a cloudburst in Teton Canyon sent

waters swirling down Teton creek, overflowing the

banks, running down the roads and in to the edge of

Driggs.

This year, with mountain snows deeper than

average and much deeper than last year, many are

nervously eyeing the weather and fearful of an even

worse flood.

At a public hearing at the courthouse last

week, many laid the blame for the seriousness of last

year’s flooding on stream channelization work done

by the developers of the Aspen subdivision, which

borders Teton Creek about one-half mile east of the

city limits.

Officials of several government agencies, local,

state and federal, attended the hearing at the

request of the Teton County Board of Commissioners,

which called the hearing, and spent nearly 3 % hours

in a buck-passing session which left responsibility for

the flood situation as far up in the air as it had been

prior to the hearing. While the consensus appeared

to be that the channelization work had exacerbated

the problem, none would take the responsibility for

having allowed the work to be done, no facts were

presented to prove responsibility on any side, and no

solutions to the problem were reached.

In further developments since the hearing, one

agency says it may have jurisdiction the matter, but

8a

as yet has not decided what to do about it. Other

agencies continue to deny responsibility, and the

developers of the subdivision have _ refuted

statements made at the hearing, saying they were

based on hearsay and conjecture.

The Aspens subdivision is owned by three

men, Lynn Moses, Mark Rockefeller and Charlie

Peak, all of Teton County. It comprises 30 lots on 50

acres, and was approved as a subdivision about two

years ago by the Teton County Planning and Zoning

Commission, and the Teton County Board of

Commissioners.

The area was known to flood during high

water periods, and the subdivision was approved

“contingent upon channelization” of Teton Creek,

according to Dan Letham, Teton County subdivision

ordinance administrator, who testified at the

hearing. Letham said he understood there was to be

no

Continued on page 7

E.R. pg. 80

Flood Controversy

Continued from page 1

re-routing of the stream, just channel enlargement,

and that “Lynn (Moses) indicated he had permits for

the work.”

Ernest Carlsen, assistant regional supervisor

of the Idaho Department of Water Resources in Idaho

Falls, and Harold Borgers of the US. Army Corps of

Engineers, both testified at the hearing that they

had no knowledge of the stream work and had not

been asked for permits. Both also said that permits

would not have been required in any case, because

9a

they classified the stream as intermittent and

therefore out of their jurisdictions.

Moses testified that he had not asked for

permits because he knew the stream was

intermittent and _ therefore permits were not

required. In a subsequent conversation with the

Teton Valley News he said he had not told Letham

that they had permits, but “may have told him we

could get permits if we needed then,” and that

Letham “may have misunderstood the statement.”

Contacted by telephone in Walla Walla,

Washington, a district spokesman for the Corps is

looking into the situation, and if i1t determines Teton

Creek to be not intermittent, it will claim jurisdiction

over the matter, the spokesman said.

“We are just becoming familar with it. The

only thing I can tell you now is that at the present

time it appears we will be sending a ‘cease and

desist’ order to the developers,” the spokesman said.

He said if the stream is classified as year-around, the

channelization work would be in violation of the

federal Clean Water Act of 1977, which prohibits fill

work below a stream’s high water mark without a

section 404 permit from the Department of the Army.

E.R. pg. 81

No determination has been made as to how the

situation will be resolved, the spokesmen said. “We'll

work out how to resolve the violation or whatever has

been determined there,” the spokesmen said.

Moses and Rockefeller maintain that the

stream is intermittent, and would be even without

irrigation diversion.

10a

“The stream here is dry for eight to ten months

of the year, and never runs in the winter, even

though there is no diversion then,” Moses said. The

stream does run year around through Alta, he said,

but hits a subsurface hard-pan layer and disappears

underground for several miles after it crosses into

Idaho.

Lavell Johmson, a watermaster for the Grand

Teton Canal which is diverted from Teton Creek in

Wyoming and runs into Idaho, testified at the

hearing that right now the stream loses 360 cubic

feet per second (c.f.s.) between the Alta school house

and the culverts at the lower end of the subdivision,

and the water is going into the aquifer.

Moses and Rockefeller said no re-routing of the

channel was done, but the main channel was cleaned

out and deepened, and in two locations in the

subdivision, old channels were cleaned out and re-

opened. They said the channel running through the

subdivision

E.R. pg 82

was capable of carrying flood-level flows, but that the

water backs up at the county road at the lower end of

the subdivision (the Driggs Cemetery Road) because

the culverts there are inadequate to carry the flow.

They say county officials have known about

the inadequacy since before the subdivision was

approved, but have refused to replace the culverts

with a bridge which could handle the flow.

The Idaho Department of Water Resources

maintains records of peak flows in Teton Creek, both

above and below irrigation diversions. Last year’s

lia

peak flow, recorded below the Grand Teton Canal

diversion on June 9, was estimated at 1,900 c.f.s.

The previous recorded high at that point was 880

c.f.s., recorded June, 28, 1968. Typical recorded peak

flows, since 1950 have been less than 600 c.f.s.

George Matejko, a hydrologist for the U.S.

Forest Service, testified at the hearing that the 100-

year flood level would be about 1,300 c.f.s., and

classified last year’s level as “at least a 135-year

flood.” The maximum water carrying capacity of the

culverts under the county road below the subdivision

is 785 c.f.s., according to engineer Arnold

Woolstenhulme, who performed hydrologic study for

the developers prior to their stream work. Concrete

and gravel obstruct, part of the flow through the

culverts now, Moses said, and trees and other debris

which high water carries downstream can further

obstruct flow through the culverts.

E.R. pg. 81

Thus, Moses claims, the culverts and the

country road act as a dam when flood waters come,

backing water into the subdivision and causing

damage to the subdivision property and possibly to

the town.

Earlier this year, Moses submitted a claim to

the county commissioners for $4,200, for damage to

subdivision property resulting from the flooding last

year. The claim was denied.

Jay Calderwood, county road _ supervisor,

testified at the hearing that channelization work by

the developers had restricted the flow to a single

channel, rather than thred channels which it had

12a

occupied in the past. The stream enters the

subdivision property in a single channel, but three

sets of culvers under the county road carry water

from three apparent channels out the bottom end of

the subdivision. Restricting the flow to one channel

increases flood problems, Calderwood said.

Moses’ and Rockefeller, in a _ subsequent

conversion with the Teton Valley News, refuted this

claim as well, saying the stream actually splits into

only two channels, and both channels have been

maintained. The third apparent channel splits off

where the water backs up at the comity road, they M,

and not within the subdivision boundaries. Water is

presently flowing through all three sets of culverts,

they said.

Ron Carlson, regional) supervisor of the Idaho

Department of Water Resources, contacted by

telephone on Idaho Falls, said

E.R. pg. 82

his department's position continues to be that the

situation is outside the jurisdiction of his

department. The stream is intermittent according to

his department’s definition, and therefore outside the

jurisdiction of the state stream channelization laws.

Also, he said, his department would not take

any action anyway because of a lack of funds. He

said determining the authority in this case would

likely have to be done in the courts, and a single

court case “would eat up our money for our stream

channelization program.”

The developers say the solution to the problem

would be to replace the culverts under the county

road with a bridge which could handle the peak flows

13a

and would be less likely to become blocked with

debris.

County officials have said they plan to install

a bridge, but no time has been set. Estimates of cost

for a bridge range from $15,000 to $40,000.

The flooding problem has become worse in

recent years because farmers are doing more

sprinkler irrigation and diverting less water into the

canals, resulting in a higher peak flow downstream,

according to Lavell Johnson.

The controversy over the matter is likely to

continue for years, and no simple answers are

apparent. At the hearing, Letham summed it up:

“Right* now, I don’t think any one individual can

solve it-passing the buck isn’t going to work. It’s got

to be handled together.”

E.R. pg. 83

14a

Continental Real Estate Co.

Investments and Exchanges

130 North Main Driggs, Idaho 83522

Telephone: (208) 354-8771

Fax: (208) 354-8113

April 25, 1996

Mr. Robert A. Brochu

Corps of Engineers

1820 E. 17% St. Suite 350

Idaho Falls, ID 83404

Re: Maintenance of Teton Creek Stream

Channel and

Irrigation Diversion in “The Aspens’.

Dear Rob:

I am _ responding to your inquiry

concerning our “County Mandated” stream

channel maintenance, that has been done

since 1980.

You have reported that the Corps of

Engineers no longer has any_ records

concerning their inquiry into the situation in

the early 1980’s. To shed some light on their

involvement, I send herewith a copy of the

Teton County Commissioners minutes of

September 7, 1983.

The meeting was to discuss’ the

replacement of some inadequate culverts with

a bridge large enough to avoid backing the

water up onto private property. They wanted

to be assured that the Aspen’s Homeowners

lSa

Association would continue to maintain the

channel so the water would be delivered where

they were going to build the new bridge.

Included also, is a copy of the November

28, 1983 Commissioners minutes further

elaborating on our duty to the County, to

maintain the channel if they built a new

bridge. The log diversion mentioned was to

protect an irrigation diversion point, which

was worked very well for 16 years.

You will also find a copy of the

referenced agreement that we made with

Teton County for perpetual maintenance of the

stream channel. We entered into this

agreement in good faith, only after we were

told the Corps of Engineers had no jurisdiction

over maintenance of the channel and the

irrigation diversion on the _ intermittent

stream. (Note: Letter from Watermaster

confirms its intermittent nature in spite of

upstream diversions.)

E.R. pg. 229

We continue to operate in good faith to

meet our obligation to Teton County as well as

our duty to protect the property of the

numerous homeowners in “The Aspens’.

Based on 16 years experience with this

obligation, we know that water quality has

been improved through the dramatic decrease

of soil erosion, as a result of our efforts. We

consider that an important factor in meeting

the intent of the Clean Water Act.

I trust this will satisfy your inquiry.

Enclosures

16a

Sincerely,

_Sfs/ =

C. Lynn Moses

President

Aspen Homeowners Assoc. Inc.

E. R. pg. 230

17a

CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION

FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURTS

DECISION IN

RAPANOS v. UNITED STATES & CARABELL v.

UNITED STATES

This memorandum provides guidance to EPA

regions and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers [“Corps”]

districts implementing the Supreme Court’s decision

in the consolidated cases Rapanos v. United States

and Carabell v. United States! (herein referred to

simply as “Rapanos”) which address the jurisdiction

over waters of the United States under the Clean

Water Act.2. The chart below summarizes the key

points contained in this memorandum. This

reference tool is not a substitute for the more

complete discussion of issues and guidance furnished

throughout the memorandum.

Summary of Key Points

The agencies will assert jurisdiction over the

following waters:

e Traditional navigable waters

e Wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable

waters

e Non-navigable tributaries of traditional

navigable waters that are _ relatively

permanent where the tributaries typically flow

year‘round or have continuous flow at least

seasonally (e.g., typically three months)

e Wetlands that directly abut such tributaries

' 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006)

? 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.

18a

The agencies will decide jurisdiction over the

following waters based on a fact-specific analysis to

determine whether they have a significant nexus

with a traditional navigable water:

e Non-navigable tributaries that are not

relatively permanent

e Wetlands adjacent to non‘navigable

tributaries that are not relatively permanent

e Wetlands adjacent to but that do not directly

abut a relatively permanent non-navigable

tributary.

The agencies generally will not assert jurisdiction

over the following features:

e Swales or erosional features (e.g. gullies, small

washes characterized by low’ volume,

infrequent, or short duration flow)

e Ditches (including roadside ditches) excavated

wholly in and draining only uplands and that

do not carry a relatively permanent flow of

water

The agencies will apply the significant nexus

standard as follows:

e A significant nexus analysis will assess the

flow characteristics and function of the

tributary itself and the function performed by

all wetlands adjacent to the tributary to

determine if they significantly affect the

chemical, physical, and biological integrity of

downstream traditional navigable waters

e Significant nexus includes consideration of

hydrologic and ecologic factors.

Background

19a

Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (“CWA”

or “the Act”) “to restore and maintain the chemical,

physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's

waters.” One of the mechanisms adopted by

Congress to achieve that purpose is a prohibition on

the discharge of any pollutants, including dredged or

fill material, into “navigable waters” except in

compliance with other specified sections of the Act.‘

In most cases, this means compliance with a permit

issued pursuant to CWA §402 or §404. The Act

defines the term “discharge of a pollutant” as “any

addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from

any point sourcel,]"5 and provides that “[t}]he term

‘navigable waters’ means the waters of the United

States, including the territorial seas.”®

In Rapanos, the Supreme Court addressed

where the Federal government can apply the Clean

Water Act, specifically by determining whether a

wetland or tributary is a “water of the United

States.” The justices issued five separate opinions in

Rapanos (one plurality opinion, two concurring

opinions, and two dissenting opinions), with no single

opinion commanding a majority of the Court.

The Rapanos Decision

Four justices, in a plurality opinion authored

by Justice Scalia, rejected the argument that the

* 33 U.S. C. §1251(a)

* 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), § 1862(12)(A).

* 33 U.S.C § 1362(12)(A).

* 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). See also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) and 40

C.F.R. § 230.3(s).

20a

term “waters of the United States” is limited to only

those waters that are navigable in the traditional

sense and their abutting wetlands.? However, the

plurality concluded that the agencies’ regulatory

authority should extend only to “relatively

permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies

of water” connected to traditional navigable waters,

and to “wetlands with a _ continuous’ surface

connection to” such relatively permanent waters. ®

Justice Kennedy did not join the plurality’s

opinion but instead authored an opinion concurring

in the judgment vacating and remanding the cases to

the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.? Justice Kennedy

agreed with the plurality that the statutory term

“waters of the United States” extends beyond water

bodies that are traditionally considered navigable.'®

Justice Kennedy, however, found the plurality’s

interpretation of the scope of the CWA to be

“inconsistent with the Act’s text, structure, and

purposei,]” and he instead presented a different

standard for evaluating CWA jurisdiction over

"Id, at 2220.

"Id. at 2225-27

* Id. at 2236-52. While Justice Kennedy concurred in the Court's

decision to vacate and remand the cases to the Sixth Circuit, his

basis for remand was limited to the question of “whether the

specific wetlands at issue possess a significant nexus with

navigable waters.” 126S. Ct. at 2252. In contrast, the plurality

remanded the cases to determine both “whether the ditches and

drains near cach wetland are ‘waters,” and “whether the

wetlands in question are ‘adjacent’ to these ‘waters’ in the sense

of possessing a continuous surface connection....” Id, at 2235.

"Td. at 2241

2la

wetlands and other water bodies.'! Justice Kennedy

concluded that wetlands are “waters of the United

States” “if the wetlands, either alone or in

combination with similarly situated lands in the

region, significantly affect the chemical, physical,

and biological integrity of the other covered waters

more readily understood as ‘navigable.’ When, in

contrast, wetlands effects on water quality are

speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the

zone fairly encompassed by the statutory term

‘navigable waters.” !?

Four justices, in a dissenting opinion authored

by Justice Stevens, concluded that EPA’s and the

Corps’ interpretation of “waters of the United States”

was reasonable interpretation of the Clean Water

Act. }3

When there is no majority opinion in a

Supreme Court case, controlling legal principles may

be derived from those principles espoused by five or

more justices.'4 Thus, regulatory jurisdiction under

"Id. at 2246.

'2 Id. at 2248. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a separate concurring

opinion explaining his agreement with the plurality. See 126 S.

Ct. at 2235°36.

'" Id. at 2252-65. Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissenting

opinion explaining his agreement with Justice Stevens’ dissent.

See 126 S. Ct. at 2266.

'* See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977):

Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 685 (1994) (Souter, J.

concurring) (analyzing the points of agreement between

plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions to identify the

legal “test...that lower courts should apply,” under Marks, as

the holding of the Court); cf. League of United Latin American

22a

the CWA exists over a water body if either the

plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s standard is

satisfied.15 Since Rapanos, the United States has

filed pleadings in a number of cases interpreting the

decision in this manner.

The agencies are issuing this memorandum in

recognition of the fact that the EPA regions and

Corps districts need guidance to ensure that

jurisdictional determinations, permitting actions,

and other relevant actions are consistent with the

decision and supported by the administrative record.

Therefore, the agencies have evaluated the Rapanos

opinions to identify those waters that are subject to

CWA jurisdiction under the reasoning of a majority

of the justices. This approach is appropriate for a

guidance document. The agencies intend to more

broadly consider jurisdictional issues, including

clarification and definition of key terminology,

through rulemaking or other appropriate policy

process.

Citizens vs. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2607 (2006) (analyzing

concurring and dissenting opinions in a prior case to identify a

legal conclusion of a majority of the Court); Alexander v.

Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-282 (2001) (same).

'S 126 S. Ct. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Given that all

four justices who have joined this opinion would uphold the

Corps’ jurisdiction in both of these cases—and in all other cases

in which either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test is

satisfied—on remand each of the judgments should be

reinstated if either of those tests is met.”) (emphasis in

original).

23a

Agency Guidelines!®

To ensure that jurisdictional determinations,

administrative enforcement actions, and other

relevant agency actions are consistent with the

Rapanos decision, the agencies in this guidance

address which waters are subject to CWA § 404

jurisdiction.!7 Specifically, this guidance identifies

'© The CWA provisions and regulations described in this

document contain legally binding requirements. This guidance

does not substitute for those provisions or regulations, nor is it

a regulation itself. It does not impose legally binding

requirements on EPA, the Corps, or the regulated community,

and may not apply to a particular situation depending on the

circumstances. Any decisions regarding a particular water will

be based on the applicable statutes, regulations, and case law.

Therefore, interested persons are free to raise questions about

the appropriateness of the application of this guidance to a

particular situation, and the EPA and/or Corps will consider

whether or not the recommendations or interpretations of this

guidance are appropriate in that situation based on the statues,

regulations, and case law.

'7 This guidance focuses only on those provisions of the agencies’

regulations at issue in Rapanos—33 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(a)(1), (a)(5),

and (a)(7); 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.3(s)(1), (s)(5), and (s)(7). This

guidance does not address or affect other subparts of the

agencies’ regulations, or response authorities, relevant to the

scope of jurisdiction under the CWA. In addition, because this

guidance is issued by both the Corps and EPA, which jointly

administer CWA § 404, it does not discuss other provisions of

the CWA, including §§ 311 and 402, that differ in certain

respects from § 404 but share the definition of “waters of the

United States.” Indeed, the plurality opinion in Rapanos noted

that “...there is no reason to suppose that our construction today

significantly affects the enforcement of § 1342...The Act does

not forbid the ‘addition of any pollutant directly to navigable

waters from any point source,’ but rather the ‘addition of any

pollutant to navigable waters.” (emphasis in original) 126 S. Ct.

2208, 2227. EPA is considering whether to provide additional

24a

those waters over which the agencies will assert

jurisdiction categorically and on a case-by-case basis,

based on the reasoning of the Rapanos opinions.!§

EPA and the Corps will continually assess and

review the application of this guidance to ensure

nationwide consistency, reliability, and predictability

in our administration of the statute.

1. Traditional Navigable Waters (.e., “(a) (D

Waters”) and Their Adjacent Wetlands

Key Points

e The agencies will assert jurisdiction over

traditional navigable waters, which includes

all the waters described in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3

(a)(1), and 40 C.F.R. § 230.3 (s)(1).

e The agencies will assert jurisdiction over

wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable

waters, including over adjacent wetlands that

do not have a continuous surface connection to

traditional navigable waters.

— ————

guidance on these and other provisions of the CWA that may be

affected by the Rapanos decicion.

'® In 2001, the Supreme Court held that use of “isolated” non-

navigable intrastate waters by migratory birds was not by itself

a sufficient basis for the exercise of federal regulatory

jurisdiction under the CWA. See Solid Waste Agency _ of

Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). This guidance does not address

SWANCC, nor does it affect the Joint Memorandum regarding

that decision issued by the General Counsels of EPA and the

Department of the Army on January 10, 2003. See 68 Fed. Reg.

1991, 1995 (Jan. 15, 2003).

25a

EPA and the Corps will continue to assert

jurisdiction over “(alll waters which are currently

used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible

to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all

waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the

tide.”!9 These waters are referred to in this guidance

as traditional navigable waters.

The agencies will also continue to assert

jurisdiction over wetlands “adjacent” to traditional

navigable waters as defined in the agencies’

regulations. Under EPA and Corps regulations and

as used in this guidance, “adjacent” means

“bordering, contiguous, or neighboring.” Finding a

continuous surface connection is not required to

establish adjacency under this definition. The

Rapanos decision does not affect the scope of

jurisdiction over wetlands that are adjacent to

traditional navigable waters because at least five

justices agreed that such wetlands are “waters of the

United States.”20

2. Relatively Permanent Non-navigable Tributaries

of Traditional Navigable Waters and Wetlands with

' 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (a)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3 (s)(1). The “(a)(1)”

waters include all the “navigable waters of the United States,”

defined in 33 C.F.R. Part 329 and by numerous decisions of the

federal courts, plus all other waters that are navigable-in-fact

(e.g., the Great Salt Lake, UT and Lake Minnetonka, MN).

- Id. at 2248 (Justice Kennedy, concurring) (“As applied to

wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, the Corps’

conclusive standard of jurisdiction rests upon a reasonable

inference of ecologic interconnection, and the assertion of

jurisdiction for those wetlands is sustainable under the Act by

showing adjacency alone.”)

26a

a Continuous Surface Connection with Such

Tributaries

Key Points

The agencies will assert jurisdiction over non

navigable tributaries of traditional navigable

waters that are relatively permanent where

the tributaries typically flow year-round or

have continuous flow at least seasonally (e.g.,

typically three months).

The agencies will assert jurisdiction over those

adjacent wetlands that have a continuous

surface connection to such tributaries (e.g.,

they are not separated by uplands, a berm,

dike, or similar feature.)

27a

A non-navigable tributary?! of a traditional

navigable water is a non-navigable water body whose

waters flow into a traditional navigable water either

directly or indirectly by means of other tributaries.

Both the plurality opinion and the dissent would

uphold CWA _ jurisdiction over non-navigable

tributaries that are “relatively permanent’—waters

that typically (e.g., except due to drought) flow year-

round or waters that have a continuous flow at least

seasonally (e.g., typically three months).22 Justice

Scalia emphasizes that relatively permanent waters

do not include tributaries “whose flow is ‘coming and

” a tributary includes natural, man-altered, or man-made

water bodies that carry flow directly or indirectly into a

traditional navigable water. Furthermore, a tributary, for the

purpose of this guidance, is the entire reach of the stream that

is of the same order (i.e., from the point of confluence, where

two lower order streams meet to form the _ tributary,

downstream to the point such tributary enters a higher order

stream). The flow characteristics of a particular tributary will

be evaluated at the farthest downstream limit of such tributary

(i.e., the point the tributary enters a higher order stream). It is

reasonable for the agencies to treat the stream reach as a whole

in light of the Supreme Court’s observation that the phrase

“navigable waters’ generally refers to “rivers, streams, and

other hydrographic features.” 126 S. Ct. at 2222 (Justice Scalia,

quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131). The entire reach

of a stream is a reasonably identifiable hydrographic feature.

The agencies will also use this characterization of tributary

when applying the significant nexus standard under Section 3

of this guidance.

22 See 126 S. Ct. at 2221 n. 5 (Justice Scalia, plurality opinion)

(explaining that “relatively permanent” does not necessarily

exclude waters “that might dry up in extraordinary

circumstances such as drought” or “seasonal rivers, which

contain continuous flow during some months of the year but no

flow during dry months”).

28a

going at intervals...broken, fitful.”23 Therefore,

“relatively permanent” waters do not include

ephemeral tributaries which flow only in response to

precipitation and intermittent streams which do not

typically flow year-round or have continuous flow at

least seasonally. However, CWA jurisdiction over

these waters will be evaluated under the significant

nexus standard described below. The agencies will

assert jurisdiction over relatively permanent non-

navigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters

without legal obligation to make a significaat nexus

finding.

In addition, the agencies will assert

jurisdiction over those adjacent wetlands that have a

continuous surface connection with a relatively

permanent, non-navigable tributary, without the

legal obligation to make a significant nexus finding.

As explained above, the plurality opinion and the

dissent agree that such wetlands are jurisdictional.24

The plurality opinion indicates that “continuous

surface connection” is a “physical connection

requirement.”25 Therefore, a continuous’ surface

23 [d. (internal citations omitted).

24 Td. at 2226-27 (Justice Scalia, plurality opinion).

2% Id. at 2232 n.13 (referring to “our physical-connection

requirement” and later stating that Riverside Bayview does not

reject “the physical-connection requirement”) and 2234

(“Wetlands are ‘waters of the United States’ if they bear the

‘significant nexus’ of physical connection, which makes them as

a practical matter indistinguishable from waters of the United

States.”) (emphasis in original). See also 126 S. Ct. at 2230

(“adjacent” means “physically abutting”) and 2229 (citing to

Riverside Bayview as “confirm{ing] that the scope of ambiguity

of ‘the waters of the United States’ is determined by a wetland's

29a

connection exists between a wetland and a relatively

permanent tributary where the wetland directly

abuts the tributary (e.g., they are not separated by

uplands, a berm, dike or similar feature).26

3. Certain Adjacent Wetlands and Non-navigable

Tributaries That Are Not Relatively Permanent

Key Points

e The agencies will assert jurisdiction over

non-navigable, not relatively permanent

tributaries and their adjacent wetlands

where such tributaries and wetlands have

a significant nexus to a_ traditional

navigable water.

e Asignificant nexus analysis will assess the

flow characteristics and functions of the

tributary itself and the functions performed

by any wetlands adjacent to the tributary

to determine if the significantly affect the

physical connection to covered waters...”) (emphasis in original).

A continuous surface connection does not require surface water

to be continuously present between the wetland and the

tributary. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) and 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (defining

wetlands as “those areas that are inundated or saturated by

surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient

to support ... a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life

in saturated soil conditions”).

26 While all wetlands that meet the agencies’ definitions are

considered adjacent wetlands, only those adjacent wetlands

that have a continuous surface connection because they directly

abut the tributary (e.g, they are nut separated by uplands, a

berm, dike, or similar feature) are considered jurisdictional

under the plurality standard.

30a

chemical, physical and biological integrity

of downstream traditional navigable

waters.

“Similarly situated” wetlands include all

wetlands adjacent to the same tributary.

Significant nexus includes consideration of

hydrologic factors including the following:

o volume, duration, and frequency of

flow, including consideration of

certain physical characteristics of

the tributary.

© proximity to the traditional

navigable water

o size of the watershed

© average annual rainfall

© average annual winter snow pack

Significant nexus also includes

consideration of ecologic factors including

the following:

© potential of tributaries to carrv

pollutants and flood waters to

traditional navigable waters

0 provision of aquatic habitat that

supports a_ traditional navigable

water

o potential of wetlands to trap and

filter pollutants or store flood waters

© maintenance of water quality in

traditional navigable waters.

The following geographic features generally

are not jurisdictional waters:

o swales or erosional features (e.g.

gullies, smal] washes characterized

3la

by low volume, infrequent, or short

duration flow)

o ditches (including roadside ditches)

excavated wholly in and draining

only uplands and that do not carry a

relatively permanent flow of water.

The agencies will assert jurisdiction over the

following types of waters when they have a

significant nexus with a traditional navigable water:

(1) non-navigable tributaries that are not relatively

permanent,2’ (2) wetlands adjacent to non-navigable

tributaries that are not relatively permanent, and (3)

wetlands adjacent to, but not directly abutting, a

relatively permanent tributary (e.g., separated from

it by uplands, a berm, dike or similar feature).28 As

described below, the agencies will assess the flow

characteristics and functions of the tributary itself,

together with the functions performed by any

wetlands adjacent to that tributary, to determine

whether collectively they have a significant nexus

with traditional navigable waters.

The agencies’ assertion of jurisdiction over

non-navigable tributaries and adjacent wetlands that

have a significant nexus to traditional navigable

27 For simplicity, the term “tributary” when used alone in this

section refers to non-navigable tributaries that are not

relatively permanent.

28 As described in Section 2 of this guidance, the agencies will

assert jurisdiction, without the need for a significant nexus

finding, over all wetlands that are both adjacent and have a

continuous surface connection to relatively permanent

tributaries. See pp. 6-7, supra.

32a

waters is supported by five justices. Justice Kennedy

applied the significant nexus standard to the

wetlands at issue in Rapanos and Carabell:

“[Wletlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus

come within the statutory phrase ‘navigable waters,

if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with

similarly situated lands in the region, significantly

affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity

of other covered waters more readily understood as

‘navigable.”29 While Justice Kennedy's opinion

discusses the significant nexus standard primarily in

the context of wetlands adjacent to non-navigable

tributaries®®, his opinion also addresses Clean Water

Act jurisdiction over tributaries themselves. Justice

Kennedy states that, based on the Supreme Court’s

decisions in Riverside Bayview and SWANCC, “the

connection between a non-navigable water or

wetland may be so close, or potentially so close, that

Corps may deem the water or wetland a ‘navigable

29 Id. at 2248. When applying the significant nexus standard to

tributaries and wetlands, it is important to apply it within the

limits of jurisdiction articulated in SWANCC. Justice Kennedy

cites SWANCC with approval and asserts that the significant

nexus standard, rather than being articulated for the first time

in Rapanos, was established in SWANCC. 126 S. Ct. at 2246

(describing SWANCC as “interpreting the Act to require a

significant nexus with navigable waters”). It is clear, therefore,

that Justice Kennedy did not intend for the significant nexus

standard to be applied in a manner that would result in

assertion of jurisdiction over waters that he and the other

justices determined were not jurisdictional in SWANCC.

Nothing in this guidance should be interpreted as providing

authority to assert jurisdiction over waters deemed non-

jurisdictional by SWANCC.

30 126 S. Ct. at 2247-50.

33a

water under the Act....Absent a significant nexus,

jurisdiction under the Act is lacking.”*! Thus, Justice

Kennedy would limit jurisdiction to those waters that

have a significant nexus with traditional navigable

waters, although his opinion focuses on the specific

factors and functions the agencies should consider in

evaluating significant nexus for adjacent wetlands,

rather than for tributaries.

In considering how to apply the significant

nexus standard, the agencies have focused on the

integral relationship between the _ ecological

characteristics of tributaries and those of their

adjacent wetlands, which determines in part their

contribution to restoring and maintaining the

chemical, physical and biological integrity of the

Nation's traditional navigable waters. The ecological

relationship between tributaries and their adjacent

wetlands is well documented in the scientific

literature and reflects their physical proximity as

well as shared hydrological and _ biological

characteristics. The flow parameters and ecological

functions that Justice Kennedy describes as most

relevant to an evaluation of significant nexus result

from the ecological inter-relationship between

tributaries and their adjacent wetlands. For

example, the duration, frequency, and volume of flow

in a tributary, and subsequently the flow in

downstream navigable waters, is directly affected by

the presence of adjacent wetlands that hold

floodwaters, intercept sheet flow from uplands, and

then release waters to tributaries in a more even and

311d. At 2241 (emphasis added).

34a

constant manner. Wetlands may also help to

maintain more consistent water temperature in

tributaries, which is important for some aquatic

species. Adjacent wetlands trap and hold pollutants

that may otherwise reach tributaries (and

downstream navigable waters) including sediments,

chemicals, and other pollutants. Tributaries and

their adjacent wetlands provide habitat (e.g., feeding,

nesting, spawning, or rearing young) for many

aquatic species that also live in traditional navigable

waters.

When performing a _ significant nexus

analysis,?2 the first step is to determine if the

tributary has any adjacent wetlands. Where a

tributary has no adjacent wetlands, the agencies will

consider the flow characteristics and functions of

only the tributary itself in determining whether such

tributary has a significant effect on the chemical,

physical and biological integrity of downstream

traditional navigable waters. A _ tributary, as

characterized in Section 2 above, is the entire reach

of the stream that is of the same order (i.e., from the

point of confluence, where two lower order streams

meet to form the tributary, downstream to the point

52 [n discussing the significant nexus standard, Justice Kennedy

stated: “The required nexus must be assessed in terms of the

statute’s goals and purposes. Congress enacted the [CWA] to

‘restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological

integrity of the Nation’s waters..."126 S. Ct. at 2248.

Consistent with Justice Kennedy’s instruction, EPA and the

Corps will apply the significant nexus standard in a manner

that restores and maintains any of these three attributes of

traditional navigable waters.

35a

such tributary enters a higher order stream). For

purposes of demonstrating a connection to traditional

navigable waters, it is appropriate and reasonable to

assess the flow characteristics of the tributary at the

point at which water is in fact being contributed to a

higher order tributary or to a traditional navigable

water. If the tributary has adjacent wetlands, the

significant nexus evaluation needs to recognize the

ecological relationship between tributaries and their

adjacent wetlands, and their closely linked role in

protecting the chemical, physical, and_ biological

integrity of downstream traditional navigable

waters.

Therefore, the agencies will consider the flow

and functions of the tributary together with the

functions performed by all the wetlands adjacent to

that tributary in evaluating whether a significant

nexus is present. Similarly, where evaluating

significant nexus for an adjacent wetland, the

agencies will consider the flow characteristics and

functions performed by the tributary to which the

wetland is adjacent along with the functions

performed by the wetland and all other wetlands

adjacent to that tributary. This approach reflects the

agencies’ interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s term

“similarly situated” to include all wetlands adjacent

to the same tributary. Where it is determined that a

tributary and its adjacent wetlands collectively have

a significant nexus with traditional navigable

waters, the tributary and all of its adjacent wetlands

are jurisdictional. Application of the significant

nexus standard in this way is reasonable because of

its strong scientific foundation—that is, the integral

36a

ecological relationship between a tributary and its

adjacent wetlands. Interpreting the phrase “similarly

situated” to include all wetlands adjacent to the same

tributary is reasonable because such wetlands are

physically located in a like manner (i.e., lying

adjacent to the same tributary).

Principal considerations when evaluating

significant nexus include the volume, duration, and

frequency of the flow of water in the tributary and

the proximity of the tributary to a traditional

navigable water. In addition to any available

hydrologic information (e.g., gauge data, flood

predictions, historic records of water flow, statistical

data, personal observations/records, etc.), the

agencies may reasonably consider certain physical

characteristics of the tributary to characterize its

flow, and thus help to inform the determination of

whether or not a significant nexus is present between

the tributary and downstream traditional navigable

waters. Physical indicators of flow may include the

presence and characteristics of a reliable ordinary

high water mark (OQHWM) with a channel defined by

bed and banks.33 Other physical indicators of flow

33 See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(e). The OHWM also serves to define the

lateral limit of jurisdiction in a non-navigable tributary where

there are no adjacent wetlands. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.4(c). While

EPA regions and Corps districts must exercise judgment to

identify the OHWM on a case-by-case basis, the Corps’

regulations identify the factors to be applied. These regulations

have recently been further explained in Regulatory Guidance

Letter (RGL) 05-05 (Dec. 7, 2005). The agencies will apply the

regulations and the RGL and take other steps as needed to

ensure that the OHWM identification factors are applied

consistently nationwide.

37a

may include shelving, wracking, water staining,

sediment sorting, and sour.34 Consideration will also

be given to certain relevant contextual factors that

directly influence the hydrology of tributaries

including the size of the tributary’s watershed,

average annual rainfall, average annual witer snow

pack, slope, and channel dimensions.

In addition, the agencies will consider other

relevant factors, including the functions performed

by the tributary together with the functions

performed by any adjacent wetlands. One such factor

is the extent to which the tributary and adjacent

wetlands have the capacity to carry pollutants (e.g.,

petroleum wastes, toxic wastes, sediment) or flood

waters to traditional navigable waters, or to reduce

the amount of pollutants or flood waters that would

otherwise enter traditional navigable waters.*> The

agencies will also evaluate ecological functions

performed by the tributary and any adjacent

wetlands which affect downstream traditional

navigable waters, such as the capacity to transfer

nutrients and organic carbon vital to support

downstream foodwebs (e.g., macroinvertebrates

present in headwater streams convert carbon in leaf

34 See, Justice Kennedy's’ discussion of “physical

characteristics,” 126 S. Ct. at 2248-2249.

35 See, generally, 126 S. Ct. at 2248-53; see also 126 S. Ct. at

2249(“Just as control over the non-navigable parts of a river

may be essential or desirable in the interests of the navigable

portions, so may the key to flood control on a navigable stream

be found in whole or in part in flood control on its

tributaries....”) (citing to Oklahoma ex_rel. Phillips v. Guy F.

Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 524-25(1941)).

38a

litter making it available to species downstream),

habitat services such as providing spawning areas for

recreationally or commercially important species in

downstream waters, and the extent to which the

tributary and adjacent wetlands perform functions

related to maintenance of downstream water quality

such as sediment trapping.

After assessing the flow characteristics and

functions of the tributary and its adjacent wetlands,

the agencies will evaluate whether the tributary and

its adjacent wetlands are likely to have an effect that

is more than speculative or insubstantial on the

chemical, physical, and biological integrity of a

traditional navigable water. As the distance from the

tributary to the navigable water increases, it will

become increasingly umportant to document whether

the tributary and its adjacent wetlands have a

significant nexus rather than a_ speculative or

insubstantial nexus with a traditional navigable

water.

Accordingly, Corps districts and EPA regions

shall document in the administrative record the

available information regarding whether a tributary

and it adjacent wetlands have a significant nexus

with a traditional navigable water, including the

physical indicators of flow in a particular case and

available information regarding the functions of the

tributary and any adjacent wetlands. The agencies

will explain their basis for concluding whether or not

the tributary and its adjacent wetlands, when

considered together, have a more than speculative or

39a

insubstantial effect on the chemical, physical, and

biological integrity of a traditional navigable water.

Swales or erosional features (e.g., gullies,

small washes’ characterized by low’ volume,

infrequent, or short duration flow) are generally not

waters of the United States because they are not

tributaries or they do not have a significant nexus to

downstream traditional navigable waters. In

addition, ditches (including roadside ditches)

excavated wholly in and draining only uplands and

that do not carry a relatively permanent flow of

water are generally not waters of the United States

because they are not tributaries or they do not have a

significant nexus to downstream traditional

navigable waters.*6 Even when not jurisdictional

waters subject to CWA § 404, these geographic

features (e.g., swales, ditches) may still contribute to

a surface hydrologic connection between an adjacent

wetland and a traditional navigable water. In

addition, these geographic features may function as

point sources (i.e., “discernible, confined, and discrete

conveyances”), such that discharges of pollutants to

other waters through these features could be subject

to ‘a CWA regulations (e.g., CWA §§ 311 and

402).37

Certain ephemeral waters in the arid west are

distinguishable from the geographic features

described above where such ephemeral waters are

tributaries and they have a significant nexus to

36 See 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41217 (Nov. 13, 1986).

37 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (14).

40a

downstream traditional navigable waters. For

example, in some cases these ephemeral tributaries

may serve as a transitional area between the upland

environment and the traditiciial navigable waters.

During and following precipitation events, ephemeral

tributaries collect and transport water and

sometimes sediment from the upper reaches of the

landscape downstream to the traditional navigable

waters. These ephemeral tributaries may provide

habitat for wildlife and aquatic organisms in

downstream traditional navigable waters. These

biological and physical processes may further

support nutrient cycling, sediment retention and

transport, pollutant trapping and filtration, and

improvement of water quality, functions that may

significantly affect the chemical, physical, and

biological integrity of downstream traditional

navigable waters.

Documentation

As described above, the agencies will assert

CWA jurisdiction over the following waters without

the legal obligation to make a significant nexus

determination: traditional navigable waters and

wetlands adjacent thereto, non-navigable tributaries

that are relatively permanent waters, and wetlands

with a continuous surface connection with such

tributaries. The agencies will also decide CWA

jurisdiction over other non-navigable tributaries and

over other wetlands adjacent to non-navigable

tributaries based on a fact-specific analysis to

determine whether they have a significant nexus

with traditional navigable waters. For purposes of

CWA § 404 determinations by the Corps, the Corps

4la

and EPA are developing a revised form to be used by

field regulators for documenting the assertion or

declination of CWA jurisdiction.

Corps districts and EPA regions will ensure

that the information in the record adequately

supports any jurisdictional determination. The

record shall, to the maximum extent practicable,

explain the rationale for the determination, disclose

the data and information relied upon, and, if

applicable, explain what data or information received

greater or lesser weight, and what professional

judgment or assumptions were used in reaching the

determination. The Corps districts and EPA regions

will also demonstrate and document in the record

that a particular water either fits within a class

identified above as not requiring a significant nexus

determination, or that the water has a significant

nexus with a traditional navigable water. As a

matter of policy, Corps districts and EPA regions will

include in the record any available information that

documents the existence of a_ significant nexus

between a relatively permanent tributary that is not

perennial (and its adjacent wetlands if any) and a

traditional navigable water, even though a

significant nexus finding is not required as a matter

of law.

All pertinent documentation and analyses for

a given jurisdictional determination (including the

revised form) shall be adequately reflected in the

record and clearly demonstrate the bases _ for

42a

asserting or declining CWA jurisdiction.48 Maps,

aerial photography, soil surveys, watershed studies,

local development plans, literature citations, and

references from studies pertinent to the parameters

being reviewed are examples of information that will

assist staff in completing accurate jurisdictional

determinations. The level of documentation may vary

among projects. For example, jurisdictional

determinations for complex projects may require

additional documentation by the project manager.

s/ Benjamin H. Grumbles

Benjamin H. Grumbles

Assistant Administrator for Water

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

s/ John Paul Woodley, Jr.

John Paul Woodley, Jr.

Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Civil Works)

Department of the Army

38 For jurisdictional determinations and permitting decisions,

such information shall be posted on the appropriate Corps

website for public and interagency information.

43a

E.R. pg. 132

1

2

3

4

sentencing memorandum, has gone way

beyond 2002, 2003,

and 2004.

And in the presentence report, the probation

officer talks about how the Court could

enhance and

maybe should enhance the penalty in this case

based on

the fact that there is a 25-year history in this

case.

Now, if the Court is - -

THE COURT: No. I understand your

position.

Again, just so we're clear, Mr. Breitsameter,

the Government is willing to stipulate that

there was

no discharge into any wetlands arising out of

this

case; correct?

MR. BREITSAMETER: That’s correct, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: But you cannot bind the

Government

by way of a stipulation that the Government

perceives

discharges into wetlands as being more serious

than

discharges into other riparian non-wetland

areas?

MR. BREITSAMETER: To my knowledge,

we have

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

44a

not explored that issue and I am not prepared

to

stipulate to that.

THE COURT: All right. I will allow the

witness to testify factually as to his

understanding of

the Corps of Engineers’ views during the time

period

that he was employed there, and limit it in

that

fashion.

45a

E.R. pg. 225

l A. That’s correct.

2 Q. Have you observed the creek when there

is

3 water in the creek itself?

4 A. Oh, yes.

9) Q. Flowing?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And what time of the year does that 8

generally occur?

9 A. The creek usually starts to run about

first

10 week of May, and it runs on into July.

1] Q. Does the duration of the flow vary

depending

12 on the snow pack and the rainfall?

13 A. Quite a bit, yes. In a dry year, it will

flow |

14 for a while and shut down and then flow again.

A good

15 wet year may flow pretty much continually for

that

16 two-month period.

17 Q. And whether it does flow, Mr.

Fitzgerald, can

18 you describe for the jury what it’s like?

19 A. It can be a raging torrent when there is

a lot

20 of water in it. It can be a dangerous creek to

Cross.

21 My wite and I frequently sit on the back porch

that

46a

22 faces the creek, and we can hear big trees

coming down,

23 being eroded away and falling into the creek

and them

24 being moved downstream.

25 So it’s a major torrent when it’s flowing.

47a

E.R. pg. 117

1 this stream, correct, because of its intermittent

2 nature?

3 A: You mean in the reach that we’re

speaking of?

4 Q: Yes.

5 A: Yes, that’s correct.

6 Q: There is really no aquatic wildlife issue

with

7 regard to this stream; is there?

8 A: That’s correct.

9 MR. ATKIN: That's all I have.

10 THE COURT: Anything else, Mr.

Ocsterle?

11 MR. OESTERLE: No, our Honor.

12 THE COURT: You may step down, Mr.

Miller.

13 Thank you.

14 I assume the witness can be excused?

15 MR. ATKIN: Yes, Your Honor.

16 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, Your Honor.

17 THE COURT: Call your next witness. Mr.

Peak,

18 I assume?

19 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, Your Honor.

20 THE COURT: Mr. Peak, will you step

before the

21 clerk and be sworn.

22 CHARLES PEAK,

23 called on behalf of the Government, having

been first

24 duly sworn upon oath, was examined and

testified as

4&a

VAs) follows:

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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