Opposition Brief — CropLife America v. Baykeeper

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Nos. 09-533 and

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

CROPLIFE AMERICA, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

BAYKEEPER, ET AL.

AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

BAYKEEPER, ET AL.

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

FOR THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT

IN OPPOSITION

ELENA KAGAN

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

IGNACIA S. MORENO

Assistant Attorney General

THOMAS LORENZEN

ALAN GREENBERG

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

This case involves a challenge to a regulation promul-

gated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

The EPA’s responsibilities include the administration of

both the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Federal In-

secticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). The

challenged EPA rule interpreted the CWA not to re-

quire permits for the application of pesticides, in a man-

ner consistent with the relevant requirements of the

FIFRA, either directly to waters of the United States or

over, including near, such waters to control pests. The

question presented is as follows:

Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding

that the text of the CWA unambiguously foreclosed

EPA’s rule.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Altman v. Town of Amherst, 47 Fed. Appx. 62

SE akc cceneus Ks usd en eReev eens se 655545 5

Association to Protect Hammersly, Eld, & Totten

Inlets v. Taylor Res., Inc., 299 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir.

EE 6b oh ba 0 kok SA OeRaE Oka AOTC REA Okes ERs 12

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States,

Sy SE oc cidivcews veaendbbesee wns s 13

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ..... 7

Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199

I Ei ct Saban ci keesieensiees 13, 14, 15

Fairhurst v. Hagener, 422 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2005) ..... 5

Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d

ee ED oi kc dK cae aA Maen On ees cee dese 4

League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains

Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181

rT ee 4

No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York,

BG Fe Gee ee, BI og osc ccc vecccsscsccesvese 5

Statutes and regulations:

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seg. ............5. 2

(III)

IV

Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page

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Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,

Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 ...........cccceeees 3

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40 C.F.R.:

Pt. 122:

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Miscellaneous:

68 Fed. Reg. (2003):

oun 5550 abs ae Se Awe * Rees oes ee 5, 6

BSP reney Denar ae CA Ae ans 5, 6

70 Fed. Reg. (2005)

5) A aa GPa A ar Per erg arene ge 6

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page

71 Fed. Reg. (2006):

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

No. 09-533

CROPLIFE AMERICA, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

BAYKEEPER, ET AL.

No. 09-547

AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

Vv.

BAYKEEPER, ET AL.

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

FOR THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT

IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-25a)

is reported at 553 F.3d 927.’

' References to “Pet. App.” are to the appendix ts the petition for a

writ of certiorari filed in No. 09-533.

(1)

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

January 7, 2009. A petition for rehearing was denied on

August 3, 2009 (Pet. App. 64a-65a). The petitions for a

writ of certiorari were filed on November 2, 2009

(a Monday). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. Since the enactment of the Clean Water Act

(CWA or Act), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seg., in 1972, the Envi-

ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) has not required

persons applying pesticides directly to or over waters of

the United States for the purpose of controlling pests to

obtain a CWA permit. That longstanding practice was

codified in the 2006 EPA final rule at issue in this case.

Pet. App. 26a-63a.

a. CWA Section 301(a) states that “the discharge of

any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful” unless

the discharge is in compliance with certain other provi-

sions of the Act. 33 U.S.C. 1311(a). The Act defines the

term “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any

pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”

33 U.S.C. 1362(12). The Act defines the term “pollut-

ant,” in turn, as “dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator

residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions,

chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive mate-

rials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand,

cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural

waste discharged into water.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(6). A

“point source” is a “discernible, confined and discrete

conveyance.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(14).

The primary way that a person may discharge a pol-

lutant without running afoul of the Act is to obtain a per-

3

mit pursuant to CWA Section 402, 33 U.S.C. 1342, which

establishes the National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-

tion System (NPDES). Subject to certain conditions,

EPA and approved States “may, after opportunity for

public hearing issue a permit for the discharge of any

pollutant, or combination of pollutants.” 33 U.S.C.

1342(a)(1). In addition to individual NPDES permits,

EPA issues general permits that can cover entire classes

of discharges by similarly situated dischargers. Dis-

chargers who comply with the terms of the general per-

mit, including specified technology and water-quality-

based effluent limitations, do not require individual per-

mits for any discharges within the covered class. 40

C.F.R. 122.28.

Congress authorized EPA to promulgate regulations

to administer the NPDES program. 33 U.S.C. 1361(a).

EPA regulations include a list of discharges that do not

require NPDES permits. 40 C.F.R. 122.3.

b. Three days after Congress enacted the CWA, it

passed comprehensive amendments to the Federal In-

secticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),

Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973, which regulates the

sale, distribution, and use of pesticides through a regis-

tration program. Before registering a pesticide, EPA

must determine, inter alia, that the pesticide “will per-

form its intended function without unreasonable adverse

effects on the environment,” and that “when used in ac-

cordance with widespread and commonly recognized

practice [the pesticide] will not generally cause unrea-

sonable adverse effects on the environment.” 7 U.S.C.

136a(c)(5). FIFRA defines the term “unreasonable ad-

verse effects on the environment” to include “any unrea-

sonable risk to man or the environment, taking into ac-

count the economic, social, and environmental costs and

4

benefits of the use of any pesticide,” including water-

quality and other ecological effects. 7 U.S.C. 136(bb).

If there are risks of concern, EPA considers which miti-

gation measures (e.g., establishing a buffer between the

area sprayed and a water body, or lowering the pro-

posed application rate to reduce toxicity to non-target

species) are necessary to reduce those risks. In per-

forming the FIFRA analysis, EPA examines, inter alia,

the ingredients of a pesticide, the intended type of appli-

cation site and directions for use, and supporting scien-

tific studies. 7 U.S.C. 136a(c); see 40 C.F.R. Pts. 152,

156, 158.

2. Since 2000, several cases in the Second and Ninth

Circuits have raised the question whether the CWA re-

quires NPDES permits for certain pesticide applica-

tions. Although the Ninth Circuit held in two cases that

a pesticide applicator was required to obtain an NPDES

permit, neither decision contained a square holding in-

terpreting the term “pollutant” in a manner inconsistent

with the EPA rule that is at issue in this case. See

Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 248 F.3d

526, 5382-533 (2001) (determining chemical residue from

herbicide application to be a pollutant, but without ana-

lyzing whether it constituted point-source pollution);

League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Bio-

diversity Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1184 n.2

(2002) (assuming that the parties did not dispute that

insecticide applied above navigable waters qualified as

a pollutant); see also Pet. App. 49a-5la. In 2005, the

Ninth Circuit, relying in part on EPA’s interim interpre-

tation, held that chemical “pesticides that are applied to

water for a beneficial purpose and in compliance with

FIFRA, and that produce no residue or unintended ef-

fects, are not ‘chemical wastes,’ and thus are not ‘pollut-

5

ants’ regulated by the CWA.” Fairhurst v. Hagener,

422 F.3d 1146, 1150-1151 (2005). Neither of the perti-

nent Second Circuit decisions reached the merits of the

question presented in this case, let alone foreclosed EPA

from interpreting the Act not to require permits for the

type of pesticide applications at issue. Indeed, one of

those decisions essentially called on EPA to resolve the

issue. See Altman v. Town of Amherst, 47 Fed. Appx.

62, 67 (2002) (“Until the EPA articulates a clear inter-

pretation of current law—among other things, whether

properly used pesticides released into or over waters of

the United States can trigger the requirement for

NPDES permits * * * —the question of whether prop-

erly used pesticides can become pollutants that violate

the CWA will remain open.”); No Spray Coalition, Inc.

v. City of New York, 351 F.3d 602, 605-606 (2003) (re-

serving the “complex question” whether a pesticide ap-

plication to waters of the United States constitutes a

CWA discharge of a pollutant).

Taken together, those decisions created uncertainty

among the regulated community and other affected citi-

zens about the applicability of the NPDES permit pro-

gram to certain pesticide applications. Pet. App. 30a-

32a. In 2003, EPA sought to resolve that uncertainty by

addressing the issue administratively. See 68 Fed. Reg.

48,385 (2003). In an Interim Statement and Guidance,

EPA identified two circumstances for which it had con-

cluded that pesticides applied to waters of the United

States consistent with all relevant requirements of

FIFRA are not “pollutants” under the CWA and there-

fore do not require an NPDES permit. /d. at 48,387.

The first circumstance was the application for pest-con-

trol purposes of pesticides directly to waters protected

by the CWA. /bid. The second circumstance was the

6

application of pesticides to control pests that are present

over waters of the United States where the application

results in a portion of the pesticides being deposited to

covered waters. /bid.

EPA solicited public comment on the Interim State-

ment and Guidance. 68 Fed. Reg. at 48,385. After con-

sidering the public comments, EPA issued a final Inter-

pretive Statement confirming its interim position. 70

Fed. Reg. 5095-5096 (2005). At the same time, EPA

published notice of a proposed rulemaking to incorpo-

rate the substance of the Interpretative Statement into

EPA regulations, and it solicited public comment on the

proposed rulemaking. /d. at 5093.

On November 27, 2006, EPA issued its final rule.

71 Fed. Reg. 68,483. The rule revised EPA’s NPDES

regulations to add a paragraph to the list of discharges

in 40 C.F.R. 122.3 that do not require NPDES permits.

71 Fed. Reg. at 68,492. The rule covered the application

of pesticides, “consistent with all relevant requirements

under FIFRA (2.¢., those relevant to protecting water

quality),” in the following two circumstances:

1. The application of pesticides directly to waters of

the United States in order to control pests. Ex-

amples of such applications include applications

to control mosquito larvae, aquatic weeds, or oth-

er pests that are present in waters of the United

States.

2. The application of pesticides to control pests that

are present over waters of the United States, in-

cluding near such waters, where a portion of the

pesticides will unavoidably be deposited to waters

of the United States in order to target the pests

effectively; for example, when insecticides are

7

aerially applied to a forest canopy where waters

of the United States may be present below the

canopy or when pesticides are applied over or

near water for control of adult mosquitoes or

other pests.

Thid. (40 C.F.R. 122.3(h)).

EPA further concluded that “if there are residual

materials resulting from pesticides that remain in the

water after the application and its intended purpose

(elimination of targeted pests) have been completed,

these residual materials are * * * pollutants under

CWA section 502(6) because they are wastes of the pes-

ticide application.” 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,487. EPA ex-

plained, however, that such applications “do not require

NPDES permits” because, “while the discharge of the

pesticide is from a point source (generally a hose or an

airplane), it is not a pollutant at the time of the dis-

charge. * * * Instead, the residual should be treated

as a nonpoint source pollutant.” /bid.

3. After various parties petitioned for review of

EPA’s rule in 11 different courts of appeals, the peti-

tions were consolidated in the Sixth Circuit. Applying

the principles set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.

NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the court of appeals vacated

the rule. Pet. App. la-25a.

a. The court of appeals stated that the first question

under Chevron is whether the CWA unambiguously in-

cludes pesticides within its definition of “pollutant.”

Pet. App. 14a. The court interpreted the term “chemical

waste,” part of the Act’s definition of “pollutant,” to in-

clude discarded, superfluous, or excess chemicals. /d. at

16a. Applying that interpretation, the court concluded

that so long as a chemical pesticide is intentionally ap-

plied to waters to perform a useful purpose and leaves

8

no excess portions after performing its intended pur-

pose, it is not a “pollutant” and therefore does not re-

quire an NPDES permit. Jbid. At the same time, the

court concluded that excess chemical pesticide and pesti-

cide residue—+.e., any portions of the pesticide that re-

main in the water after the pest-control purpose has

been served—“unambiguously fall within” the term

“chemical waste” and therefore are “pollutant[s}” under

the CWA. /d. at 16a-18a.

EPA had recognized that excess or residual portions

of a discharged pesticide are “pollutant[s]” within the

meaning of the CWA. The agency had concluded, how-

ever, that the application of a pesticide that leaves such

a residue does not require a CWA permit because such

portions are neither excess nor residual (and therefore

are not “pollutant[s]”) at the time of the discharge. EPA

contended that such residues are properly viewed as

non-point source pollutants. The court of appeals re-

jected that conclusion, finding it contrary to the CWA’s

plain language and purpose. The court held that, when

pesticide discharges result in the entry of excess or re-

sidual portions into waters of the United States, those

discharges require a permit because excess or residual

pesticides are pollutants discharged from a point source,

as they are introduced into the water by the applicator

from a point source. Pet. App. 21a-24a.

b. The court of appeals also addressed the question

whether the term “biological materials,” another compo-

nent of the CWA definition of “pollutant,” includes bio-

logical pesticides applied to control pests. Pet. App.

18a-20a. Citing the dictionary definition of “material,”

the court concluded that the “plain, unambiguous na-

ture” of the statutory text compelled the conclusion that

biological pesticides qualify as biological materials. Jd.

9

at 18a-19a. The court of appeals also relied on Con-

gress’s use of the term “biological materials,” rather

than “biological wastes,” to justify the court’s different

treatment of biological and chemical pesticides. /d. at

19a-20a (emphasis added).

4. EPA moved to stay the mandate for two years in

order to avoid significant disruption to (i) EPA and

those States that administer NPDES permit programs,

and (ii) the thousands of persons and businesses nation-

wide who apply pesticides to or over, including near,

waters protected by the CWA. EPA explained that the

stay would provide it and state permitting authorities

time to develop and issue general CWA permits contain-

ing appropriate terms to govern the discharge of pesti-

cides to covered waters in a more administratively work-

able manner. Pet. App. 105a-123a. The court of appeals

granted EPA’s motion and stayed issuance of the man-

date until April 9, 2011.

ARGUMENT

Petitioners contend that the court of appeals disre-

garded settled principles governing the deference owed

to agency interpretations, and that the court’s construc-

tion of the CWA is in tension with decisions of this Court

and other courts of appeals. 09-533 Pet. 14-22; 09-547

Pet. 13, 20, 25-28. Although the government agrees that

the court of appeals misapplied Chevron to EPA’s 2006

rule, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling does not conflict with any

decision of this Court or another court of appeals. And

while the decision below potentially applies to thousands

of applications of pesticides to or over, including near,

waters protected by the CWA, the court of appeals’ two-

year stay of its mandate has provided time to EPA and

authorized States to mitigate the administrative burdens

10

resulting from the decision. Indeed, EPA is currently in

the process of developing general permits governing the

types of pesticide applications covered by its rule. Fur-

ther review is therefore unwarranted.

1. Although the court of appeals recited the correct

standard of review under Chevron (Pet. App. 9a-10a), it

misapplied that standard to EPA’s rule. Contrary to the

court of appeals’ conclusion, the relevant CWA terms do

not unambiguously foreclose EPA’s interpretation. Con-

gress defined the term “pollutant” to encompass 16 spe-

cific items. 33 U.S.C. 1362(6); see p. 2, supra. None of

the 16 items clearly encompasses pesticides applied to

waters, in a manner consistent with FIFRA require-

ments, in order to control pests. In particular, Con-

gress’s use of the terms “chemical wastes” and “biologi-

cal materials” does not indicate a clear intent to cover

the application of pesticides to covered waters under the

circumstances specified in EPA’s rule.

a. Although the court of appeals viewed the term

“chemical waste” as unambiguous and therefore did not

rely on EPA’s interpretation as reflected in the 2006

regulation, the court’s construction of that term with

respect to chemical pesticides is consistent with EPA’s

rule. Both EPA and the court of appeals determined

that pesticides intentionally applied to or over, including

near, water to perform a particular useful purpose (7.e.,

control pests) are not chemical wastes if they leave no

residue after performing their intended purpose. See 71

Fed. Reg. at 68,487; Pet. App. 16a-17a. Both EPA and

the court further concluded that any pesticide residue

remaining in the water after the intended purpose has

been served constitutes “chemical waste” and is there-

fore a “pollutant” within the meaning of the CWA. /bid.

11

The court of appeals departed from EPA’s 2006 rule,

however, when it concluded that the CWA unambigu-

ously classifies excess or residual pesticide as a pollut-

ant discharged from a point source. The court of ap-

peals stated that “it is clear that under the meaning of

the Clean Water Act, pesticide residue or excess pesti-

cide * * * is a pollutant discharged from a point source

because the pollutant is introduced into a water from the

outside world by the pesticide applicator from a point

source.” Pet. App. 23a-24a (internal quotation marks

omitted). The court rejected EPA’s conclusion that,

because such an excess or residue becomes a “chemical

waste” (and therefore a “pollutant”) only at some time

after discharge, it should be treated as a nonpoint

source pollutant. Compare zd. at 2la-25a, with 71 Fed.

Reg. at 68,487; see p. 7, supra.

Thus, the critical question is whether the portion of

a chemical pesticide that ultimately becomes excess or

residue is a “pollutant” at the time it is released from

the point source, or whether it becomes a “pollutant”

only after the pesticide has served its intended purpose

and the excess takes on the character of “waste.” The

court of appeals identified no provision of the CWA that

speaks directly to that question. The court’s conclusion

that the CWA unambiguously foreclosed EPA’s inter-

pretation—notwithstanding the Act’s silence as to the

temporal issue of when such pesticide loses its character

as product and becomes a pollutant; EPA’s past practice

of not requiring permits for such discharges (p. 2, su-

pra); and FIFRA’s specific regulation of pesticide use

(pp. 3-4, supra)—reflects an erroneous application of

Chevron.

b. The court of appeals also erred in holding, con-

trary to EPA’s rule, that the CWA term “biological ma-

12

terials” unambiguously encompasses biological pesti-

cides. Pet. App. 18a-20a. As the Ninth Circuit previ-

ously concluded, the CWA is ambiguous on whether that

term, read in conjunction with the other items specified

in the definition of “pollutant,” includes all biological

material (waste or not) within its scope. See Association

to Protect Hammersly, Eld, & Totten Inlets v. Taylor

Resources, Inc., 299 F.3d 1007, 1016 (2002) (holding that

natural byproducts of live mussels grown on harvesting

rafts were not “biological materia!s”). ‘The court below

nevertheless found clear congressional intent to include

biological pesticides within the term “biological materi-

als,” even though few biological pesticides existed at the

time Congress adopted this definition. Compare Pet.

App. 18a-19a, with 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,486. The court of

appeals’ decision also creates the peculiar result that,

although a chemical pesticide (except for excess or resi-

due) applied to waters for pest control is not a “pollut-

ant,” a biological pesticide applied to the same waters in

the same manner for the same purpose is a “pollutant.”

That result is particularly anomalous in light of EPA’s

assessment that biological pesticides generally pose less

serious adverse environmental consequences than chem-

ical pesticides. /bid.; see Valent Bicsciences Amicus Br.

11-12.

ec. Notwithstanding the court of appeals’ errors, the

decision below does not warrant this Court’s review.

The court of appeals recited the correct standard under

Chevron and did not purport to articulate a new analytic

framework for review of agency rules. Pet. App. 9a-10a.

The result below does not conflict with a decision of this

Court or any other court of appeals. The court below

was the first to review the validity of EPA’s 2006 final

rule, and no court of appeals has held that pesticide ap-

13

plications to navigable waters resulting in chemical resi-

due or involving biological pesticides do not require an

NPDES permit. See pp. 4-5, supra. And, as explained

below (pp. 15-16, infra), EPA is in the process of fash-

ioning a regulatory response to mitigate the impact of

the court of appeals’ decision.

2. In addition to challenging the court of appeals’

application of Chevron principles to EPA’s rule, petition-

ers in No. 09-533 contend that the court’s interpretation

of the CWA term “chemical waste” conflicts with this

Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe

Railway v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009), and

with the Second Circuit’s decision in Cordiano v.

Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.8d 199 (2009). Pet. 17-

22. Petitioners’ reliance on those decisions is misplaced.

In Burlington Northern, the Court interpreted the

phrase “arrange for disposal” as used in the Compre-

hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). Specifically, the Court

held that a manufacturer had not “arrange[d] for dis-

posal” of pesticide that had spilled during its transfer

from the delivery truck to the customer’s storage tanks.

129 S. Ct. at 1875-1879. Relying on the intent element

implicit in the CERCLA term “arrange for,” the Court

explained that the manufacturer had not entered into

the transaction with “the intention that at least.a portion

of the product be disposed of during the transfer pro-

cess.” Jd. at 1880.

Although the purpose of a pesticide discharge is rele-

vant to whether the discharge involves a “chemical

waste” within the meaning of the CWA, this Court’s de-

cision in Burlington Northern does not speak directly to

the question presented here. As discussed above (pp.

10-11, supra), the Sixth Circuit agreed with EPA’s con-

14

clusion, as reflected in the 2006 rule, that chemical pesti-

cides do not constitute “chemical waste” within the

meaning of the CWA unless some excess or residue re-

mains after the pesticide has accomplisned its intended

purpose. And nothing in Burlington Northern sheds

meaningful light on whether such excess or residue

has been discharged into covered waters from a point

source. Moreover, the ultimate question whether there

has been a “discharge of any pollutant” under the

CWA differs on its face from the question whether

someone has “arrange[d] for disposal” of a pollutant

under CERCLA. For example, the spilled pesticide at

issue in Burlington Northern, like the excess or residual

pesticide discussed in the EPA rulemaking and in the

decision below, would constitute a “pollutant” within the

meaning of the CWA if it had been spilled into waters cf

the United States.

In Metacon Gun Club, the Second Circuit addressed

a part of the definition of “solid waste” in the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)— spe-

cifically the term “discarded material,” which RCRA

regulations define as “abandoned” by being “[d]Jisposed

of.” 575 F.3d at 206-207 (citations omitted). The plain-

tiffs had brought claims under both RCRA and the CWA

arising from alleged lead contamination attributable to

the firing of bullets at a shooting range. Jd. at 202. The

Second Circuit first determined under RCRA that lead

shot used at a shooting range is not a “discarded mate-

rial” and therefore is not a solid waste. Jd. at 207-209.

Petitioners emphasize the Second Circuit’s inquiry into

the ordinary, intended use of a product. 09-533 Pet. 20-

21. As noted above, however, the Sixth Circnit’s con-

struction of the term “chemical waste” in whe CWA is

consistent with that in the EPArule. In any event, the

15

Second Circuit did not reject the plaintiffs’ CWA claims

on the ground that lead shot used for its intended pur-

poses is not a “pollutant.” Rather, the court found no

CWA liability for independent reasons, explaining that

the plaintiffs had not established that certain discharges

were from a point source or that other discharges were

into waters of the United States. Metacon Gun Club,

575 F.3d at 222-225.

3. In arguing that the decision below warrants fur-

ther review, petitioners emphasize the potentially wide-

spread impact of the court of appeals’ ruling. 09-533

Pet. 28-33; 09-547 Pet. 14-20. The court of appeals’ deci-

sion will make the NPDES permitting regime applicable

to thousands of pesticide applications that were not pre-

viously subject to CWA requirements. Pet. App. 106a-

107a, 126a-127a. But because the court of appeals has

stayed its mandate for two years to enable EPA and

authorized States to develop and issue general permits,

the regulatory burdens of the court of appeals’ decision

will be reduced.

Immediate issuance of the mandate by the court of

appeals likely would have caused significant disruption

to both regulators and the regulated community. EPA

and the States that administer the NPDES program

lack the resources to issue individual permits in a short

timeframe. Without NPDES permits and without a stay

of the mandate, the many persons and businesses na-

tionwide who apply pesticides to or over, including near,

waters of the United States would have faced a choice

between ceasing such applications or risking CWA viola-

tions.

For that reason, the government sought a stay of the

mandate from the court of appeals. As the government

explained at the time, EPA and authorized States plan

16

to create NPDES permits to cover a large number of

similarly situated dischargers in lieu of issuing an indi-

vidual permit to each discharger for the type of pesticide

applications addressed in EPA’s rule. Pet. App. 127a-

128a. EPA estimated that the development and issuance

of general permits would take two years, and it there-

fore requested a stay of the mandate until April 9, 2011.

Id. at 128a-129a.

The court of appeals’ grant of that motion mitigates

the potentially adverse consequences of its decision.

The two-year period should provide EPA and other au-

thorized permitting agencies sufficient time to develop

and issue general CWA permits to cover the activities at

issue. In light of the Sixth Circuit’s stay of the mandate,

there is no pressing need for this Court’s review.”

—— —— —_ = ———

* Petitioners also suggest that the opinion below could be read to

extend the CWA’s coverage to discharges having a more attenuated

connection to waters of the United States than the discharges ad-

dressed in EPA’s 2006 rule. 09-533 Pet. 29-30; 09-547 Pet. 15-17. The

possibility that future plaintiffs might invoke the Sixth Circuit’s de-

cision in substantially different (and currently hypothetical) factual cir-

cumstances does not independently warrant this Court’s review. In any

event, the opinion below is better read as limited to the issues actually

before the court of appeals: pesticide applications to or over, including

near, waters of the United States that are covered by EPA’s rule.

17

CONCLUSION

The petitions, for a writ of certiorari should be de-

nied.

Respectfully submitted.

ELENA KAGAN

Solicitor General

IGNACIA S. MORENO

Assistant Attorney General

THOMAS LORENZEN

ALAN GREENBERG

Attorneys

JANUARY 2010

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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