Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Rodriguez v. United States (No. 09-237)

\5 1

=~ fs

(i) Supreme Court, U.S.

rite

No.09-237 AUG 23 2009

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

In Re: Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.,

Petitioner.

On Petition For Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.

Counsel for Petitioner

Member o’ the Bar of this Court since

September 11, 1992

7924Payton Forest Trail

Annandale, Virginia 22003-1560

Telephone: 571.423.5066

E-Mail: isidoror@earthlink.net

i

In retaliation for Isidoro Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”)

petitioning Congress, the General Assembly of VA, and

law enforcement for an inquiry into the malfeasance of

obstructing his substantive Federal statutory rights as

a father, and litigating for damages, Beltway

Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder and Rodriguez’s former

client filed fraudulent bar complaints with the Virginia

State Bar Disciplinary Board (““VSBDB”). In violation

of the limited administrative authority granted to the

Virginia State Bar by the General Assembly, the

attorney discipline system created by the General

Assembly under Va. Code, and Rodriguez’s statutory

rights, the VSBDB issued avoid order in November

2006 revoking Rodriguez’ license for litigating to

enforce his statutory rights against the government

and his former client. The Supreme Court of Virginia

affirmed the vord order, and this Court denied cert in

2007. On June 3, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit, after a hearing

disbarred Rodriguez based on the VSBDB vord order.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Whether the Vord Order Doctrine under

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), and

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714 (1877), prohibit

disbarring Rodriguez based on the VSBDB’s vaid

order?

II. Whether Rodriguez has been denied of his right

to substantive and procedural due process in

accordance the holding of Selling v. Redford, 243

U.S. 46 (1917), and, Theard v. Unrted States,

354 U.S. 278 (1957), by denying impartial Fed

il

eral judicial review of the VSBDB vord order?

IJJ. Whether the District of Columbia Circuit vio-

lated 18 U.S.C. §§ 4, 241, 242, and 1513, by

concealing and not informing law enforcement of

the issuance and enforcement of the VSBDB void

order to deprive Rodriguez of his right to em-

ployment as an independent federal civil litiga-

tor, as well as violated 18 U.S.C. § 3771, by

refusing to protect Rodriguez?

PARTY TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The caption of the case does contain the name of

the only party, who is not a corporation.

111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ....... 1

PARTY TO THE PROCEEDING .......cessees ll

Seabees OF CAIN RUPE oss ck cee sees y 85 il

Seema OF AU Tete 6 oc ce ee sees ness Vili

CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW ........... }

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............. 1

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE 29.4 ....... 1

CONSTITUTIONS, FEDERAL AND VIRGINIA

STATUTES INVOLVED ARE PUBLISHED IN THE

ADEPILINEPUIIE AT TEtes IME? . wc eee ees l

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................. ]

A. Preliminary Statement ............ 1

B. Proceedings o_o the VSBDE ...... 4

©. Proceedings before the D.C. Circuit .. 5

REASONS FOR GRANTING

THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................. 6

I. VIOLATION OF THE VO/D ORDER DOCTRINE

SY "Suee tA See oc ee 6

1V

A. The Vord Order Doctrine in Federal Courts .... 7

B. The Vord Order Doctrine in Virgimia Courts ... 8

Il. THE VOJD ORDER DOCTRINE AND THE STAN-

DARD OF SELLING AND THEARD........... 13

lil. THERE IS NO PROOF THAT RODRIGUEZ IS

GUILTY OF ANY MISCONDUCT TO PERMIT

DISBARMENT BY THE D.C. CIRCUIT......... 16

IV. VIOLATION OF THE RULES ENABLING ACT

ee Re Bes EE in ose wee a es we ey 17

V. EGREGIOUS CRIMINAL TRESPASSING UPON

RODRIGUEZ FEDERAL RIGHTS ............ 18

CONCLUSION

Vv

TABLE OF CONTENT OF APPENDIX’

Per Curiam Order of the U. S. Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia, Docket No. 08-7134,

June 3, 2009 Jn re Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.,

denying rehearing en banc and affirming

reciprocal disbarment................. A-l

Unpublished Per Curiam Order of reciprocal

disbarment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

D.C. Cir., Docket No. 08-7134, April 21, 2009, Jn

re Isidoro Rodriguez, — based on the VSBDB

I on rt 2 eae ne ake ee ees A-2

November 28, 2006, VSBDB Void order, In re

sidoro Rodriguez, Esq., ..............-- A-4

Criminal Complaint against Bob McDonnell,

Leroy Rountree Hassell, et a/. for violation of Va.

Code §§ 18.2-481(5), 2-482, and, 499, by acts of

treason, misprision of the felony, obstructing

justice and business conspiracy filed July 7, 2009

with the Office of the Governor, Fairfax County

Police, the Fairfax Commonwealth Attorney and

Fairfax County Magistrate Office (See

http://home.earthlink.net/~treason/) ... A-32

'“A-" references are to relevant Orders in the Appendix.

vl

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM?

U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

og are rr ee are Add-A

re Add-B

Fourteenth Amendment ................. Add-B

FEDERAL CIVIL STATUTES INVOLVED

Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 ....... Add-1

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 46 Add-1]

FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES VIOLATED

iv cacwedsedveiavunes Add-2

i a ce Add-2

ST BORE occ vi ei ence daeeedcsuvas Add-3

ee ere Add-3

Tt ga ee Add-3

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

‘wy oo Bb: Bap. 5 oak >.) i rs Add-4

*““Add-" references are to the Addendum

+ * . ~ . | - : :

> PP eT Br TF eral & ~~ am > — iG —_ ia. al

255 Lok: a i ae aire Add-4

ie oe | 1, es rene Add-6

CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA INVOLVED

Article I, § 11. Due Process of Law ......... Add-7

Article 1, § 12. Right to Petition ............ Add-7

Article VI, § 5. Rules of practice and procedure Add-7

Article VI, § 7. Selection ...ofjudges....... Add-8

VIRGINIA CRIMINAL STATUTES VIOLATED

Va. Code § 18.2-481. Treason defined; how proved and

EE pg) a's go ha Soe a ak Ce ee eG Add-8

Va. Code §18.2-482. Misprision of treason .... Add-8

Va. Code § 18.2-499. Combination to injure others in

their reputation, trade, business or profession Add-9

VIRGINIA CIVIL CODE INVOLVED

Va. Code § 54.1-3910. Organization and government of

Vitti THUREO BOOP oc ee eee ees Add-9

Va. Code § 54.1-3915. Restrictions as to rules and

I a co os ee ents ete ee ea ee Add:-9

Va. Code § 54.1°3935. Procedure for revocation of

ee ee ee a ee ee Add-9

vill

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Cases:

De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81

ee ee ee ee as 8 Ore 15

Earle v. McVeigh, 91US 503, 23 L Ed 398 (1999) . 12

Amchem Products, Inc. v. Winsor,, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 2244

aR aide Ay AIG Peg a hey Ag aa a Ya 17

Barnes v. American Fert. Co., 144 Va. 692, 705, 130

ee PD cc ii ve ccc cee ee pescese 12

Canter v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196 (4 Cir 2006) ..... 3

Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964)

alate aaa EE ak oe AS 8 oe ees 22

Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364 ................ 13

Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529 ................. 13

Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 379 ............ 14

Ex parte Secombe, 19 How.9 .............. 13

Ferry Co. v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 428, 432, 83

OR hee Ty 2” ares 12

Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh(33 Va.) 619 ............ 10

Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)

In re Disharment of Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 at 288, 73

S.Ct. 676, 97 L.Ed. 1013 (1953)

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. and Isidoro Rodriguez Hazbun

v. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children

et al, D.C. No. 03-0120 (Roberts, J.)

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Editor-in-Chief, Legal Times,

et al, DC Ct. Of App. No. 07°5234 .............. 5

Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974) 7, 13

Lopez v. First Union, 129 F3.rd. 1186 (11th Cir. 1997)

Mine Workers v. I[ilinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 88

S.Ct. 353, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967)

Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 387 S.E.2d 753 (1990)

Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken and Improvement Co., |

How (59 U.S.) 272 (1856)

N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458

U.S. 50 (1982)

Nguyen v. United States, 5:

Organization JD Ltda. v. Assist U.S. Attorney Arthur

P. Hutand U.S. Dept of Justice, 2nd Cir. No. 93-6019

and 96-6145

Pennoyer v. Neff 95 US 714 (1877) . .

Schware Vv. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353

U.S. 232, 239, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957)

Thatcher v. United States, 212 F. 801

Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957)

U.S. v. Murphy 768 F.2d 1518 (7™ Cir. 1985) .... 23

United States v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto 542, 92 U.S. 542,

23 L.Ed. 588 (1876).

Federal Codé:

Va. Code § 18.2-48]

28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) and (b) . .

Fed R. App. P. 46

18 U.S.C. § 4

18 U.S.C. §§ 241

18 U.S.C. §§ 242

18 U.S.C. § 1001

18 U.S.C. § 535

X1

Rules Enabling Act 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)....... 6, 18

Virginia Constitution:

gt ree a ere 6, 15

en ee 6

Va. Code:

VA Code § 54.1° 3OIO ... wc ccc cc ccc eees 6,11, 18

VA Cee SB O4.2° BOIS 4. wn cc cee nce ess OG oe Ie

VA Ce © OG.E* BOO occ ec ct cece e recess 6,11, 18

Misc. Material:

To ae Deke eetewes 9

4 Blackstone, Commentaries 140-41 ........... 17

John Dickenson and Thomas Jefferson, Declaration of

Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms, Continental]

Congress (U.S.), Jul. 6, 1775.

Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory

Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rule making, 69

N.C. L. Rev. 795, 798-800 (1991) ay 17

Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial Power and the Rules

Enabling Act, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 733, 735 (1995) 17

Restatements, Judgments & 4(b) 12

X11

When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original

Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings? R.H.C.

Virginia Law Review, Vol 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp.

yg | ey ee Ah bea a ; a0

CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW

The void Disbarment Orders of the U. S. Court

of Appeals for the District Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”), and

of the Panel are reproduced respectively at A—1 and A-

2. The vordorder of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary

Board (“VSBDB”) is reproduced at A-4.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The void order of the D.C. Circuit denying en

bancrehearing of the Panel’s vordorder was entered on

June 3, 2009. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

pursuant 28 U.S.C. §§1254(1) and 2072.

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE 29.4

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) and (b), as well

as 18 U.S.C. § 4, and Va. Code §§ 18.2-482, the Court is

informed that this Petition has been served upon the

Solicitor General of the United States and the Attorney

General of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

CONSTITUTIONS, FEDERAL AND VIRGINIA

STATUTES INVOLVED ARE IN THE ADDENDUM

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Preliminary Statement

Court records confirms that attorneys in DOJ,’

‘See Criminal Complaints filed with Federal law enforce

ment on August 10, 2009, in Va., D.C., NY, CO, and PA, at

l

the VSBDB, and the Office of the Attorney General of

Virginia, Jane and John Doe conspired with Beltway

Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder to file a fraudulent bar

complaint against Rodriguez, issue the VSBDB’s void

order disbarring Rodriguez for exercising his federal

rights, and for judges in both Federal and Virginia

courts deny Rodriguez access to impartial judicial

review of the VSBDB void order-to cover-up treason.‘

The objective of the criminal conspiracy was to

punish Rodriguez by depriving him of his business,

profession, and right toemployment as an independent

federal civil litigator,’ in retaliation for:

http://home.earthlink. net/~malfesance).

* See A-32, and at http://home.earthlink.net/~treason/-- Rodriguez's

Virginia Criminal Complaint against Bob McDonnell er a/. for

Treason, Obstruction of Justice, and Misprision of a Felony filed on

July 7, 2009.

°Rodriguez has an extensive civil litigation record against the

United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for violation of the

statutory rights of U.S. citizens, resident and nonresident Hispan-

ics. See Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995)(DOJd

surreally argued that a DEA agent outside of the US was not

negligent for causing a car accident while driving drunk and

having sex); Organization JD Ltda. v. Assist U.S. Attorney Arthur

P. Hui and DOJ, 2nd Cir. No. 93-6019 and 96-6145: and, Lopez v.

First Union, 129 F3rd. 1186 (11th Cir. 1997)(Banks and DOJ liable

for unlawful interception of wire communication and access to

account information without a warrant); Cooperative Multiactive

de Empeados de Distribuidores de Drogas (Coopservir Ltda.” v.

Newcomb, et al, D.C. Cur. No 99°5190, S Ct. No 99-1893 (DOdJd's

issuance of bill of attainder under War Powers Act agatnst

Hispanics U.S. citizens and nonresidents).

2

(i) Rodriguez litigating for damages under the

Federal and Virginia Tort Claims Act, and the Racke-

teer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §1961 et seq., for the violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1204 (Add-3), by the government’s obstruction

of his federal statutory rights as a father to compel the

securing of visitations with his Son pursuant to Article

21 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of

International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980 (“Treaty”),

the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42

U.S.C. § 11601(a) & § 11602(1) and (7); Congressional

Joint Concurrent Resolution 293, May 23, 2000; and,

the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforce-

ment Act (““UCCJEA”) VA Code § 20-146.01 et seg. See

Canter v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196 (4" Cir, March 2006);°

(ii) Rodriguez petitioning Congress, the General

Assembly of Virginia (“General Assembly”), and law

enforcement for an investigation of the criminal viola-

tion 18 U.S.C. §§ 4 and 1204 (Add-2) by the govern:

ment’s obstruction of his rights as a father.; and,

(iii) Rodriguez opposing the confirmation of John

G. Roberts as Chief Justice for making false statement

to Congress violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 4, 1001 and 1204,

by as to Rodriguez's Federal Tort and civil RICO action

for damages for the obstruction of his rights as a father.

"In Jsidoro Rodriguez, Esq. and Isidoro Rodriguez-Hazbun

v. NCMEC, et al, D.C. No. 03-0120 (Roberts, J.)(“ Rodriguez I),

District Judge Roberts conspired with DOJ et a/, to stay for more

than twenty-six (26) months the compelling of compliance with the

Treaty and Va. UCCJEA, to deny access to an impartial jury trial

and court by summary dismissal of tort and civil RICO action.

3

B. Proceedings before the VSBDB

In 2003, DOJ’s independent contractor, the

National Center for Missing and Exploited Children,

acting as an instrumentality of DOJ, retained Beltway

attorneys/lobbyists Mr. Eric Holder, Ms. D. Jean Veta,

and Covington & Burling LLP, Ms. Susan Brinkerhoff,

and Proskauer Rose LLP (“Holder et a/.”), from the

District of Columbia mailed tothe VSBDB a fraudulent

bar complaint against Rodriguez for litigating to

enforce his rights as a father under the Treaty and Va.

UCCJEA (A-12). Also, Holder et a/. conspired by use of

the mail and wire communication with Rodriguez's

former client for them also to file a frauduleat bar

complaint for Rodriguez litigating to enforce his

perfected statutory property right under Va. Code §

54.1-3932 in his Virginia Attorneys Lien on approx. $3

to $10 Billion treasure troves sunk off the coast of the

Republic of Colombia (A-4).

On November 28, 2006, based on the fraudulent

bar complaints filed for litigating to enforce his statu-

tory rights the VSBDB issued a void order revoking

Rodriguez license to practice law in Virginia (A-4). The

VSBDB posted the vosd order on the Internet and

mailed it to federal courts in and outside of Virginia.

The VSBDB void order was affirmed by the S. Ct. Va.

on June 28, 2007. This Court denied a petition for

certiorari, /sidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Supreme Court of

Virgtnia et al, (S. Ct. No. 07-419, Nov. 2, 2007).

es Proceedings before the D.C. Circuit

On December 18, 2006, Rodriguez gave notice of

the VSBDB void order to all of the federal courts to

which he was a member to request a show cause

hearing, and to seek their protection as a victim pursu’

ant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (Add-6).

Subsequently on June 17, 2007, based on the

evidence of the obstruction of his rights as a father and

the interstate criminal conspiracy of the D.C. Ct. of

App. Committee on Admissions (“Committee”) to

enforce the VSBDB void order to deprive Rodriguez of

his right to a public hearing on his waver application

and right to employment in D.C., a second civil RICO

action was filed in the U.S. District Court for the

District of Columbia for damages for the conspiracy to

punish him for exercising his Federal and Virginia

statutory rights. /szdoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Editor-in-

Chief Legal Times, et al., DC Dist Ct. No 07-cev-0975

(Friedman, J.) (Rodriguez II); DC Ct. Of App. No. 07-

5234; cert denied Docket No. 08-411. See also denial of

Writ of Mandamus pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4 and

3771, Docket No 08-339.’

An Order to Show Cause was issued by the D.C.

Circuit on June 18, 2008. After Rodriguez filed his

opposition to the imposition of any discipline based on

District Judge Paul L. Friedman summarily dismissed

this action by: (i) holding lack of venue in D.C.--despite Holder et

al. and the Committee acted from D.C.; and, (ii) holding absolutely

ministerial and judicial immune from suit for tortious and criminal

acts. On appeal the Special Panel selected by Defendant John G.

Roberts refused pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d), to protect

Rodriguez as a victim of the violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242,

and i513, and denied him of the right to seek £’in Banc consider:

ation of their order

the VSBDB void order, oral argument was held on

April 7, 2009. The Panel’s Order of Disbarment was

issued on April 21, 2009 (A-2). The Petition for Rehear-

ing Hn Banc was denied on June 3, 2009 (A-1).

REASONS FOR GRANTING

THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Rodriguez calls for the exercise of this Court's

power of supervision over the D.C. Circuit to vacate

their void order of disbarment because it is a far

departure, if not the total disregard of the federal

court’s oath and duty to provide impartial judiczal

review of the VSBDB void order issued in violation of

Rodriguez's federal statutory rights and Va. Code §§

18.2°-482, as mandated by the Vord Order Doctrine

under Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), and

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714 (1877), as well as Selling

v. Redford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917), Theard v. United States,

354 U.S. 278 (1957), the Rules Enabling Act 28 U.S.C.

§ 2072(b)(“Rules Enabling Act”), and FRAP Rule 46.

I. VIOLATION OF THE VOID ORDER DOC-

TRINE BY THE D.C. CIRCUIT.

Based on the evidence of violation of Art. V1, § 1,

§ 5, and § 7 of the Virginia Constitution, Va. Code §§

18.2-481(5), 2-482, 499, 54.1-3910, 3915, and 3935, as

well as 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 241, 242, 1341, 1343, 1513,

1951, and 1962, the essential issue before this Court-

pursuant to its duty to provide impartial judicial

review under the Void Order Doctrine-is to determine

whether there has been a violation of Rodriguez’s right

to substantive and procedural due process, which

prohibit the D.C. Circuit from giving reciprocal effect to

the VSBDB void order.

A. The Vord Order Doctrine in Federal Courts.

As explained by Chief Justice Marshall in

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Crunch 137, 140 (1803), a

legislative act or judicial order which is"repugnant to

the constitution is vord."

In a brilliant display of deductive logic the Chief

Justice stated that impartial judicial review is a

constitutional imperative pursuant to the fundamental

principles of our constitutional system giving limited

authority to both Federal and Virginia governments:

first, that the people had united to establish a limited

government; second, that they organized it into three

departments and assigned certain powers to each,

while at the same time setting limits to the exercise of

those powers; and, third, these limits were expressed in

a written constitution, which would be a _ useless

document “if these limits may, at any time, be passed

by those intended to be restrained.” /d. at 140.°

Later this Court held that an invalid and void

order can be attacked in any proceeding where they

come into issue. Pennoyer v. Neff 95 US 714 (1877);

and, Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 710 (6th Cir.

°As Federalist 47, states the Virginia's Constitution

declares, “that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments

shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise powers

properly belonging to the other... .” Washington Square Press, p

109.

1974)(“a void judgment is no judgment at all and is

without legal effect”) (Emphases added).

Consistent with recently this Court in Neuyen v.

United States, 539 U.S. 69 (2003), held that any

decision of an improperly constituted judicial body

must be vacated, i.e. judicial authority cannot be

delegated (Judici officilum sum excedenti non paretur,

"To a judge who exceeds his office or jurisdiction no

obedience is due").”

In Nguyen, supra, this Court assessed a series of

judgments rendered by a federal appellate court panel

on which a "non Article [IJ judge" served. Jd. at 69.

Vacating this group of judgments, this Court reasoned

that an appellate panel that included a non-Article III

judge proved an "impermissible" and "unauthorized"

decisional body, one that necessarily conflicted with a

"strong policy concerning the proper administration of

judicial business." Nguyenat 81. Because the "validity"

of the relevant judicial body was fundamentally flawed,

and because this "plain defect" was incurable, Nguyen

explained, the decisions reached by that body must be

vacated. Nguyen at 83.

B. The Vord Order Doctrine in Virginia.

In Virginia, as in the federal courts, “[a] void

"As early as The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027,

1038-41 (K.B. 1613), Sir Edward Coke found that judges cannot

act outside of their jurisdiction/judicial capacity, and if they did

their order would be both vord, and a cause of action.

8

judgment is one that has been .. . entered by a court

that did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter."

Rook v. Rook, 233 V. 92, 353 S.E2d 756, 758

(1987)(Emphasis added).

As explained in Nelson v. Warden, 262 Va. 276,

552 S.E.2d 73 (2001),

Subject matter jurisdiction is granted by consti-

tution or statute, it cannot be waived, and any

judgment rendered without it is void ab initio.

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised

at any time, in any manner, before any court, or

by the court itself.

Regarding the VSBDB void order, under Article

VI § 1 and § 7 of the Constitution of Virginia the

General Assembly has the exclusive power and author-

ity to establish and give subject matter jurisdiction to

“courts of records” and appoint judges in Virginia.

Also, in Virginia the jurisdiction and judicial

power to revoke an attorney’s license is controlled

exclusively by the General Assembly. As explained in

Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 137 Va. 249,

119 S.E. 55 (1923),

Independent of statutory authority, ali courts of

record in Virginia have inherent power in a

proper case to suspend or annul the license of an

attorney practicing in the particular court which

pronounces the sentence of disbarment. The

power to go further and make suspension or

revocation of license effective in all other court

of the Commonwealth must be conferred by

statute. Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619.

(Emphases added).

The General Assembly enacted Va. Code §

54.1-3935, to establish the exclusive procedure for

attorney discipline beyond the limits of the Fisher's

Case, supra., When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals

Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings?

R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924),

pp. 246-248."

Under Va. Code § 54.1°3910 and 3935, the

General Assembly gave to the Virginia State Bar

limited administrative authority only to aid a court of

record upon request by conducting investigation and

''Va. Code § 54.1-3935(A). Procedure for revocation of license- A.

{f the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any circuit court of

this Commonwealth observes, or if a complaint, verified by

affidavit is made by any person to such court, that any attorney

has... violated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility,

the court may assign the matter to the Virginia State Bar for

investigation. Upon receipt of the report of the Virginia State Bar,

the court may issue a rule against such attorney to show cause

why his license to practice law shall not be revoked. If the com-

plaint, verified by affidavit, is made by a district committee of the

Virginia State Bar, the court shall issue a rule against the attorney

to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked.

A. If the rule [to show cause] is issued by the Supreme

Court ... the rule shall be returnable to the Circuit Court of the

City of Richmond. At the time the rule is issued by the Supreme

Court, the Chief Justice shall designate three circuit court judges

to hear and decide the case... . In proceedings under this scction,

the court shall adopt the Rules and Procedures described in Part

Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13 of the Rules of Court

10

prosecution of a bar complaint filed with the court. See

Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), at

footnote 2.

Article VI, § 5 of the Constitution of Virginia,

and VA. Code § 54.1°3915, the Supreme Court of

Virginia has neither authority to delegate judicial

power to the VSBDB nor the power to create an attor-

ney disciplinary system in violation of that established

by the General Assembly under Va. Code § 54.1-3935.

A rule of the Supreme Court of Virginia cannot

usurp this exclusive legislative power to create a court,

appoint judges, and establish an attorney disciplinary

system.'!

Consequently, because the VSBDB was never

created by the General Assembly as any part of the

attorney disciplinary system under Va. Code §

54.1-3935, it has neither the jurisdiction as “court,” nor

judicial power of a “judge,” to conduct any attorney

disciplinary proceedings.'* Also, even the three judge

panel created by Supreme Court of Virginia is a viola:

tion of Va. Code § 54.1-3935(B), and is without juris-

—

‘In Virginia it is “well recognized rule of construction that

if a Rule of the Supreme Court [of Virginial is at variance with a

statutory enactment, the terms of the statute must prevail.” 1996

Va. AG 23, at page 2.

'* See, N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,

458 U.S. 50, 83-85 (1982) (holding that delegation to adjunct

bankruptcy judges of powers beyond those conferred to non-Article

III judges rendered an entire administrative scheme unconstitu:

tional).

1]

diction to revoke an attorney’s license outside of Rich:

mond, Va.

In total disregard of the Va. Constitution, Va.

Code, and Federal and Virginia case law, the D.C.

Circuit disbarred Rodriguez by giving reciprocal effect

to the VSBDB voidorder-thereby transforming the void

order into a valid order. But, this act of the D.C.

Circuit is itself a violation of the Vord Order Doctrine.

As explained in Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 167-

170, 387 S.E.2d 753 (1990),

The term jurisdiction embraces .. . subject

matter jurisdiction, which is the authority

granted by the constitution or statute to adjudr

cate a class of cases or controversies. ...While a

court always has jurisdiction to determine

whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, a

judgment on the merits made without subject

matter jurisdiction is null and void. Barnes v.

American Fert. Co., 144 Va. 692, 705, 130 S.E.

902, 906 (1925). Likewise, any subsequent

proceeding based on such a defective judgment

is void ora nullity. Ferry Co. v. Commonwealth,

196 Va. 428, 432, 83 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1954).

(Emphasis added).

Consequently, neither the Supreme Court of

Virginia, nor the D.C. Circuit, nor this Court can

transform the VSBDB void order into as valid one in

violation of the Vord Order Doctrine and the mandate

under Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), and

Pennoyer v. Neff 95 US 714 (1877).

II. THE VOJD ORDER DOCTRINE AND THE

STANDARD OF SELLING AND THEARD.

The genes of the Vord Order Doctrine is rooted in

the concern for due process concerns. This is because

the general definition of due process is, “the right to a

fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide

the case.” Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, at

page 538 (8 ed. 1999). (Emphasis added)."*

Also, the Court held that: “Disbarment, designed

to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty

imposed. .. .[Thus, t]hese are adversary proceedings of

a quasi‘criminal nature.” Jn re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544,

550°551 (1968). Accordingly, compliance with the

requirement of both substantive and procedural due

process attach to not only the VSBDB, but too the

proceeding before the D.C. Circuit-and this Court.

Therefore, pursuant tothe Void Order Doctrine

in Virginia, as well as in Federal court given that the

order of the VSBDB is contrary to the Virginia constitu

tion and Va. Code, its order is vosd in its entirety and

inoperative as if it had no existence from the time of its

issuance it can be attacked in the show cause proceed:

ing before the D.C. Circuit. Pennoyer v. Neff 95 US

714 (1877), see/ also Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701,

‘Chief Justice Marshallin £yx parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529 at

532, announced that federal judicial review will interpose itself in

State disbarment proceedings when they are “irregularity in the

mode of proceeding.” See a/so, Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9; Fx

parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364: and, Thatcher v. United States, 212 F

801, 804

13

710 (6th Cir. 1974)(‘a void judgment is no judgment at

all and is without legal effect”) (Emphases added).

Thus, it would be a violation of the constitutional

protections of due process, for the D.C. Circuit to

transform the VSBDB vordorder into a valid judgment

rendered by a court with judicial authority and jurisdic:

tion. See Restatements, Judgments § 4(b); See a/so,

Earle v. McVeigh, 91US 503, 23 L Ed 398 (1999)."*

This is confirmed by the holding in Se//ing v.

Redford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917), which states that solely by

the action of “a court” with jurisdiction may one who

has secured admission in a federal court be disbarred

from practicing before it or any Federal Court."

'* The Court held that the standard in determining if a violation of

due process has occurred is, “to see whether this process conflicts

with any of the [Constitutional] provisions. If not found to be sc,

we must look to those statute law .’ Murray's Lessee v.

Hoboken and Improvement Co., 18 How (59 U.S.) 272, 276°277

(1856).

' The federal court is to assure that the state proceeding was

first, not “wanting in due process,” by a lack of “notice and

opportunity to be heard”: second, that there not an “infirmity of

proof to established the want of fair private and professional

character as to give rise to a clear conviction on Our part that we

could not, consistently with our duty, accept as final the conclusion

on that subject,” or third, “that some other grave reason existed

which should convince us that to allow the natural consequences

of the judgment to have their effect would conflict with the duty

which rests upon us not to disbar except upon the conviction that,

under the principles of right and justice, we were constrained so

to do. /d. At 51

14

Furthermore, in 7Vheard v. United States, 354

U.S. 278 (1957), the Court held that while a lawyer is

admitted into a federal court by way of a state court, he

is not automatically sent out of the federal court by the

same route, and, the "principles of right and justice"

require a federal court not to enforce automatic disbar-

ment of a lawyer unless the standards defined in

Selling, supra, followed.'®

In total disregard of controlling law, the D.C.

Circuit gave reciprocal effect to the VSBDB void order

despite the evidence: first, that the VSBDB was not a

“court” with jurisdiction, but by an entity created as

part of an unauthorized attorney disciplinary system in

violation of Article VI § 1, § 5, and § 7 of the Constitu-

tion of Virginia, and Va. Code §§ 54.1-3910,3915, and

3935; second, the VSBDB vo/d order was issued based

on Holder et al. ’sfraudulent bar complaint filed against

Rodriguez for petitioning Congress,"’ and litigating for

'SIn In re Disbarment of Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 at 288, 73

S.Ct. 676, 97 L.Ed. 1013 (1953), the Court reconfirmed that

disbarment by a state does not automatically disbar members of a

Federal bar. Also, in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New

Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 239, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957), the

Court went on to hold at footnote 5, “[wle need not enter into a

discussion whether the practice of Jaw is a "right" or ‘privilege.

Regardless of how the State's grant of permission to engage in this

occupation is characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person

cannot be prevented from practicing except for valid reasons.

Certainly the practice of law is not a matter of the State's grace.”

Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 379 (Emphasis added).

In McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 486 (1985), the

Court recognized that the right to petition Congress requires

stringent protection. "The very idea of a government, republican

15

damages for the malfeasance.

Consequently, the D.C. Circuit’s order failed to

comply with FRAP 46 in determining that the VSBDB

was to be given reciprocal effect, and amounts to

judicial fiat contrary to both the Federal and Virginia

Constitution. The D.C. Circuit’s order is itself vordand

an invalid order, Kole v. City of Chesapeake, 439

S.E.2d 405, 408-09 (Va. 1994).

Ill. THERE IS NO PROOF THAT RODRIGUEZ IS

GUILTY OF ANY MISCONDUCT TO PERMIT

DISBARMENT BY THE D.C. CIRCUIT.

At the outset, it is important to underscore that

during Rodriguez’s litigation to enforce his statutory

rights no court declared his actions as either frivolous

or abusive."

in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably

for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a

redress of grievances." U/nrted States v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto 542, 92

U.S. 542, 552, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1876). The right to petition is "among

the most precious of the liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,"

Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 222, 88S.Ct. 353,

356, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967), and except in the most extreme

circumstances citizens cannot be punished for exercising this right

"without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and

justice which le at the base of all civil and political institutions,”

De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364, 87 S.Ct. 255, 260, 81 I..Ed.

278 (1937).

‘Part 6, § 1V, § 13 (G)(1)(a)(1) and (5) of the Rules of the S. Ct.

Va. specifically prohibit the VSBDB from even investigating the

actions of an attorney which arc in comphance with and “pro-

tected by superseding law.”

16

Thus, there is no proof of misconduct for which

the D.C. Circuit could have legally based its revoking

Rodriguez right to practice before this Federal court.

Despite these prohibition, the D.C. Circuit gave

reciprocal effect to the VSBDB vord order issued to

deprive and punished Rodriguez for litigating to

enforce his substantive statutory rights as a father

under Treaty and Va. UCCJEA, and to enforce his

property rights in his perfected statutory Virginia

Attorney’s Lien (A-4 and A-13).

IV. VIOLATION OF THE RULES ENABLING ACT

BY THE D.C. CIRCUIT.

To place some control on the Judicial Branch’s

violation of the rights of citizens, Congress “flex[ed] its

legislative muscle in the procedural rule making

arena,” by passing the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §

2072 (1982). Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial Power and the

Rules Enabling Act, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 733, 735 (1995);

see also Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience:

Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rule

Making, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 795, 798-800 (1991) (discuss-

ing “enhanced public participation and scrutiny .. . [in]

judicial rule formation”).

The Court has held that the Federal Rules of

Appellate procedure must be interpreted in keeping

with the Rules Enabling Act, which prohibit said Rules

from abridging or modifying Rodriguez's substantive

statutory rights-under both Federal and Virginia civil

and criminal code. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Winsor,

117 S.Ct. 2231, 2244 (1997).'”

In the instant action the evidence is that D.C.

Circuit violated this prohibition by giving reciprocal

effect to the VSBDB void order which has punished

Rodriguez for exercising his substantive federal rights

to: first, petition the General Assembly and Congress

for an investigation and litigating to enforce his statu-

tory rights (A-13). Thus, there has been a violation of

the express prohibition of Congress under the Rules

Enabling Act.

¥ EGREGIOUS CRIMINAL _TRESPASSING

UPON RODRIGUEZ’ FEDERAL RIGHTS.

The D.C. Circuit has permitted the depriving of

Rodriguez's substantive rights under the U.S. and

Virginia Constitutions, federal statute, and the Code of

Virginia, by giving reciprocal effect to the VSBDB void

order, and by refusing to protect Rodriguez from a

criminal conspiracy to deny access to an impartial civil

jury trial,” and court to litigate his accusation of mal-

'"RULES ENABLING ACT--28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) The Supreme

Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice

and procedure... in the United States...courtsof appeal. (b)

Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive

right. ...

*° In 1789, Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to Thomas Paine: “I

consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by men,

by which the government can be held to the principles of its

constitution.” Jefferson saw tr’al by jury as the greatest power

that the people have, and the only way the people had to person

18

feasance actionable under both tort law and civil

RICO”!

These acts of malfeasance are detailed in Rodri-

guez’s Virginia criminal Complaint (A-32), and his five

Federal criminal complaints allege on going violations

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 4, 201, 241, 242, 1341, 1343, 1513, 1951,

and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-

tions Act (“RICO”) — 18 U.S.C. §1962( ¢ ) and (d), as

well as Va. Code § 18.2-481(5), 2-482, and, 499. A

review of just four of these criminal statutes confirm

the following:

First, Conspiracy Against Rights, 18 U.S.C. §

241," made it unlawful for the Federal and Virginia

government attorneys and judges to conspire with

Beltway lobbyists/ attorneys Holder et al, to agree

together to injure Rodriguez in Virginia in retaliation

for the free exercise or enjoyment, or having exercised

his right or privilege as a father and independent

federal civil litigator secured to .:1m by the Constitu

ally and directly prevent government employees from flagrantly

ignoring constitutional restraints and oppressing the people with

excessive and often ridiculous laws and regulations i.e. ike the

VSBDB usurping judicial authority to issue void order against

Rodriguez for exercising his federal rights.

“'“The oppression and tyrannical partiality of judges,

justices, and other magistrates, in the administration and under

the colour of their office [could be prosecuted] either by impeach:

ment in parliament, or by information in the court of king's bench."

4 Blackstone, Commentaries 140-41.

“United States Department of Justice website,

http’//www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/241fin.php (Visited July 29, 2009).

19

tion, Treaty and Federal statutes.

Although Section 241 does not require that one

of the conspirators commit an overt act prior to the

conspiracy becoming a crime-here the overt act has

been the obstruction of Rodriguez rights as a father and

attorney by the issuance of the VSBDB voidorder, and

the denial of access to an impartial jury trial and court

to stop the malfeasance. |

Second, 18 U.S.C. § 242, makes it a crime for the

Federal and Virginia government attorneys and judges,

and Beltway lobbyists/attorneys (i.e. Virginia Bar

Associations), acting under color of any law to willfully

deprive Rodriguez of his rights as a father and attorney

or privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States-based on giving effect to the VSBDB void

order.”®

The Sixth Circuit held that, “[United States v.

Screws established] that once a due process right has

been defined and made specific by court decisions, the

right 1s encompassed by § 242.” United States v.

Lanier, 33 F.3d 639, 1994 CO6 40712, J 69 (6th Cir.

1994). The Lanier court made it clear that the judge

didn’t have to be thinking in constitutional terms; thus,

if a judge signed an order depriving a litigant of his

rights with knowledge of its cffects, he has earned a

vacation in ‘Club Fed.’

*S LInited States Department of Justice website visited August 20,

2009, http://www.usdo).gov/crt/erim/242fin. htm.

20

Third, 18 U.S.C. § 1513, makes it a crime for

Federal and Virginia government attorneys and judges,

as well as Beltway Lobbyists/Attorneys to conspire to

retaliate and interference with the Rodriguez right to

lawful employment as an independent federal civil

litigator for providing to a iaw enforcement officer

information relating to the commission of the Federal

offense. http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml.

Fourth, 18 U.S.C. §4, Misprision of a Felony,

made it a crime for the D.C. Circuit having evidence

and knowledge of the criminal conspiracy, to both

conceal and fail to advise law enforcement to

investigate, arrest, indict, and prosecute.”*

Rather, in total disregard of the above

prohibition and the evidence in the record confirming

that the VSBDB’s void order has been the linchpin of

the criminal conspiracy to punish and _ silence

Rodriguez for being an independent federal civil rights

litigation, the D.C. Circuit gave reciprocal effect to the

VSBDB void order.

Stated another way, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 8§ 4,

241, 242, and 1315, the D.C. Circuit is prohibited from

giving reciprocal effect to the VSBDB vord order issued

as part of a conspiracy to punish Rodriguez for

repairing to federal courts to enforce his Federal

statutory rights as a parent and attorney, because, a

“right ... granted by Congress and cannot be taken

*4 See A-32. Va. Code§ 18.2-451(5), makes it a crime for a

court to, “[rlesisting the execution of the laws under color of its

authority.” (Emphasis added)

ya

—

away by the State.” (Emphasis added). Donovan v. City

of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964).

Also, in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6

Wheat. 264, 404 (1821), this Court stated:

“The judiciary cannot, ... decline the exercise of

jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that

which is not given. The one or the other would be

treason to the constitution.”

Thus, although the Judiciary Act of 1925 (43

Stat. 936), delegated to the U.S. Supreme Court the

authority of “discretionary appellate jurisdiction,” it did

not give it authority to violate the Constitution and

federal statutes.

However, the evidence in court records,”

establish that since 2003 the Court under the

stewardship of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Roberts,

has undertaken a pattern and practice to either

negligently or crimin-ally abuse its discretion by

The 3 and 4" Circuit were allowed by this Court to also assume

away the Void Order Doctrine, by denying Cert., thereby

permitting the granting of reciprocal affect to the VSBDB void

order. See /n the Matter of Isidoro Rodriguez, S.Ct Docket No. 08-

942, filed January 18, 2009, cert denied, May 17, 2009. See a/so,

Motion for [njunction to Third Circuit denied U.S. Sup. Ct. Docket

No. 08A858 (May 4, 2009), and Petition for Certiorari to Third

Circuit, denied Docket No. 08-1121(May 18, 2009). See a/so,

Rodriguez v. Hassell, et al, Docket Nos. 0714, and 08-574: and

Docket Nos. 03-971,05-545, 05-1059, 05-5130, 05-5202, 07A142,

07A370, 07-419, O7A601, 08-339, 08A399, 08-411, 08-574, O8A838,

08-942.

permitting noncompliance with Rodriguez rights under

the Treaty and Va UCCJEA, and by fostering the

atmosphere of permitting DOJ et a/, to retaliate

against Rodriguez as a victim of the on going interstate

federal criminal conspiracy to punish him for exercising

his federal statutory rights.”

There are only a few expianations for this, and

all of them are bad.

Bottom line, in the instant action judges have

committed a felony by obstructing Rodriguez’ rights as

a father, by issuing and enforcing the VSBDB void

order to deprive him of his right to employment as an

independent federal litigator, and deny him access to

an impartial jury trial and court—and their colleagues

looked the other way.

While no judge should ever be subjected to a

criminal Complaint for an honest mistake, the evidence

presented cannot possibly be so characterized. The

“In perhaps the high-water mark of American

jurisprudence, while confronting the scourge of McCarthyism,

Justice Douglas wrote, "[ilt is not without significance that most of

the provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural. It is procedure

that spells much of the difference between rule by law and rule by

whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to strict procedural

safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal justice

under law." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,

341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring). This axiom is an

indispensable feature of Anglo-American jurisprudence, as lord

Chief Justice Goddard adds: “Time and again this court has said

that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen

to be done... ." Rex v. Justices of Bodmin, 1 K. B. 321, 325 (1947)

23

record confirms a criminal conspiracy to deprive

Rodriguez of his right to substantive and procedural

due process by the Federal and Virginia courts aiding

and abetting DOJ et al’s criminal enterprise in

violation of the Constitutions of the United States and

Virginia, as well as Federal and Virginia civil/criminal]

laws. U.S. v. Murphy 768 F.2d 1518 (7" Cir. 1985). See

A-32.

CONCLUSION

While every breach of the public trust is a matter

for concern, few can be more grievous than those

committed by our judiciary. As famed 19th-century

orator Daniel Webster rightly noted:

There can be no office in which the sense of

responsibility is more necessary than in that of

a judge; especially of those judges who pass, in

the last resort, on the lives, liberty, and

property of every man. The judiciary power, on

the other hand, acts directly on individuals. The

injured may suffer without sympathy or the hope

of redress. The last hope of the innocent, under

accusation and in distress, is in the integrity of

his judges. If this fail, all fails; and there is no

remedy on this side the bar of Heaven.?’

We cannot long survive the unbridled tyranny of

a judiciary incollusion with government attorneys that

*” Daniel Webster, The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster,

(Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1851). Vol. III, pp. 6-7.

24

is above and beyond the law.

A judge and government attorney are bound by

honor and oath to uphold and defend the Constitution.

However, the record confirms that something has gone

wrong in the management of both Federal and Virginia

government attorney and judges by this Court

permitting the “[resisting] the execution of [Art. VI, § 1,

§ 5, and § 7 of the Virginia Constitution and Va. Code

§ 54.1-3935] under color of [their] authority.”

The basic tenet that government is not to be

used for personal enrichment and the extending of

benefits to the corrupt. Government and the Judicial

Branch are to work to ensure that public officials are

using their office to further the public interest and not

to enrich themselves or others.

As this Court has previously observed: “[A]

democracy is effective only if the people have faith in

those who govern, and that faith is bound to be

shattered when high officials and their appointees

engage in activities which arouse suspicions of

malfeasance and corruption.” l/nited States v. Miss.

Valley Generating Co:, 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961).

The Court is a public institution in this republic,

and it has a duty to promote respect for the law and to

impose a sentence that is serious enough to do so. “If

the vaunted rule of law can no longer protect us from

the tyranny of irritated ministers and judges,”’by

declaring both government attorney and judges

absolutely immune from suit for malfeasance,” it

might as well not even exist at all.

Pursuant to the Vozd Order Doctrine the D.C.

Circuits order is itself void by reciprocally enforcing of

the VSBDB void order issued to damage Rodriguez’

business, profession and right to employment as an

independent federal litigator in retaliation for his

petitioning Congress and the General Assembly of

Virginia, as well as for his litigating to enforce his

federal and Virginia statutory rights as a father and

rights as an attorney.

For the above reasons, in the interest of justice

this Court must grant the Petition. Furthermore, the

Court must comply with 18 U.S.C. §§ 4, and 3771, to

protect Rodriguez as a victim from the on going federal

criminal conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

241,242, and1513, to enforce the VSBDB void by the

federal courts to deprive him of his right toemployment

as an independent federal civil litigation attorney.

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodriguez, ,

Admitted to the Bar of

The United States Supreme Court, Sept. 11, 1992

28 John Dickenson and Thomas Jefferson, Declaration of Causes

and Necessity for Taking Up Arms, Continental Congress (U.S.),

Jul. 6, 1775. (Emphasis added)

26

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENT

Per Curiam Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia, Docket No. 08-7134,

June 3, 2009 Jn re Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.,

denying rehearing en banc and affirming

reciprocal disbarment

Unpublished Per Curiam Order of reciprocal

disbarment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

D.C. Cir., Docket No. 08-7134, April 21, 2009, Jn

re I!sidoro Rodriguez, Esq., based on the VSBDB

void order A-2

November 28, 2006, VSBDB Void order, /n re

[sidoro Rodriguez, Esq.,

Criminal Complaint against Bob McDonnell, .

Leroy Rountree Hassell, et a/. for violation of Va

Code §§ 18.2°481(5), 2-482, and, 499, by acts of

treason, misprision of the felony, obstructing

justice and business conspiracy filed July 7, 2009

with the Office of the Governor, Fairfax County

Police, the Fairfax Commonwealth Attorney and

Fairfax County Magistrate Office (See

http://home.earthlink.net/~treason/) ... A°32

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT No. 08-7134

In re: Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.

Present: Sentelle, Chief Judge, and Ginsburg,

Henderson, Rogers, Tatel, Garland,* Brown, Griffith,

and Kavanaugh, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of respondent’s petition for

rehearing en banc, and the absence by any member of

the court for a vote, it is

ORDERED that the petition is denied

FOR THE COURT,

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

/s/Michael C. McGrail

Deputy Judge

Dated: June 3, 2009

“Circuit Judge Garland did not participate in thi

matter

Al

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT No. 08-7134

In re: Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.

BEFORE: Rogers, Tatel and Griffith, Crreuit Judges

Upon consideration of the order of the Virginia

State Bar Disciplinary Board dated November 28,

2006, revoking respondent’s license to practice law in

the Commonwealth of Virginia, and on the breif and

oral argument of respondent, it is

ORDERED that respondent Isidoro Rodriguez be

disbarred and, accordingly, that he be prohibited from

the practice of law before the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Respondent has not demonstrated, and the Court does

not find, that the Virginia Stat Bar disciplinary

proceeding suffered from a lack of due process or

infirmity of proof, that disbarment would result in

grave injustice, or that substantially different

discipline is warranted. See D.C. CIR. RULES app. II,

RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT IV(c).

It is

FURTHER ORDERED that respondent Isidoro

Rodriguez be prohibited from holding himself out to be

an attorney at law licensed to practice before the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition

will not be published.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT,

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

/s/Michael C. McGrail

Deputy Judge

Dated: April 21, 2009

VIRGINIA:

BEFORE THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR

DISCIPLINARY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ

VSB DOCKET NOS. 04-052-0794 and 04-052-1044

ORDER OF VIRGINIA STATE BAR

DISCIPLINARY BOARD

THIS MATTER came on to be heard on the 26th

and 27th days of October, 2006, before a panel of the

Disciplinary Board consisting of James L Banks, Jr.,

lst Vice-Chair, presiding,(the “Chair”’), Wilham C.

Boyce Jr, Glenn M. Hodge, William F. (Hover, and

Stephen A. Wannall, Lay member. The Virginia State

Bar (“VSB” or “Bar’) was represented by Noel D.

Sengel, Senior Assistant Bar Counsel. The Respondent,

Isidro Rodriguez, appeared in person and represented

himself. The Chair polled the members of the Board

Panel as to whether any of them was aware of any

personal or financial interest or bias which would

preclude any of them from fairly hearing this matter

and serving on the panel, to which inquiry each

member; including the Chair, responded in the

negative. Donna T. Chandler, RPR, RMR, CCR of

Chandler & Ralasz, court reporter. P.O. Box 9349,

Richmond, Virginia, 23227, (804-730-1222) after being

duly sworn, reported the hearing and transcribed the

proceedings.

The matter came hefore the Board on the

Subcommittee Determinat.on (Corrected Certification)

by the Fifth District Committee

Section II]

At the beginning of the proceedings the

Respondent renewed his motion for the members of

the panel ‘to disqualify themselves as_ being

interested patties for the reasons stated in his

written motion previously filed. Upon consideration

of this motion it was denied by the Panel for the

reasons previously stated in the Board’s Order of

August 8,2006 that originally addressed

Respondent's Motion to Recuse and Disqualify

Members of the Disciplinary Board Within the

Jurisdiction of N. Virginia and the U.S. Dist. Ct. for

the RD. of Va. so to Assure Impartiality.

FINDINGS OF FACT

VSB Exhibits 1-92 were admitted during the

course of the hearing without objection. The

Respondent's Exhibits 1-42 were admitted during

the course of the hearing without objection or over

Bar counsel’s objection. The VSB presented evidence

through its witnesses, the Respondent

cross-examined the witnesses and _ thereafter

testified on his own behalf. After consideration of

the exhibits and the testimony the Board makes the

following findings of fact on the basis of clear and

convincing evidence:

VSBNo. 04-052-0794

1. At all times relevant hereto, Isidoro

Rodriguez, hereinafter the “Respondent”, has been

an attorney licensed to practice law in the

Commonwealth of Virginia and his address of record

with the Virginia State Bar has been 7924 Peyton

A‘d

Forest Trail, Annandale, VA 22003-1560. VSB Ex. 1.

The Respondent received paper notice of this

proceeding as required by ‘Part Six, IV, 13 (E) and

(I)(a) of the Rules of Virginia Supreme Court. VSB Ex.

a

Z. The Complainant, Jack MHarbeston,

hereinafter referred to as “Harbeston”, was the

managing director of Sea Search Armada (“SSA”) a

Cayman Island entity that invests in and conducts

searches for sunken treasure ships and engages in the

salvage and the recovery of their contents. Sometime

prior to 1988 SSA had discovered what it thought to be

the remains of sunken Spanish ships off the coast of

Colombia. SSA had been unable to have its rights to

any sunken treasure recognized by the government of

Columbia and was looking for legal representation in

Colombia to assert its claims. Harbeston sought

assistance from the Eronomic Officer at the United

States Embassy in Bogota, Colombia for names of

attorneys who could represent SSA The Economic

Officer provided Harbeston with a list of attorneys in

Colombia which included the Respondent as a member

of the partnership of Devis and Rodriguez. Harbeston

subsequently contacted the Respondent regarding

possible legal representation. In his c-nversation with

the Respondent, Harbeston learned that Devis, a

Colombian attorney, would handle any litigation on

behalf of SSA in the Colombian courts. Harbeston was

looking for an American attorney, if possible, because

of his concerns as to the potentially divided loyalty of a

Colombian attorney. In correspondence between the

Respondent and Harbeston, Respondent noted that he

was the only attorney licensed in the United States

working in Colombia and as such his firm was subject

AG

to the same standards as law firm in the United States;

that unlike any other firm in Colombia his firm “must

comply with the State of Virginia Bar Association's

Ethics of Professional Responsibility.” VSB Ex. 4.

3. SSA subsequently hired the firm of Devis and

Rodriguez. By agreement dated October 20, 1988, the

parties entered into a representation agreement

prepared by Rodriguez which set forth the terms of the

engagement including a fee arrangement on an hourly

basis that had beén discussed prior to the execution of

the agreement. VSB Ex. 7. By affidavit dated October

21, 1988, Harbeston, as managing Director of SSA,

authorized the law firm of Devis and Rodriguez to act

as SSA’s legal representative to pursue its claims in

Colombia.

4. Inorder for SSA to proceed with its claims in

Colombia, SSA was required to appoint an agent with

broad powers to represent SSA. By agreement dated

December 16, 1988, executed in the District of

Columbia, SSA appointed the Respondent as its legal

representative in Colombia. Respondent's Ex. 8.

However, Harbeston and SSA were concerned with the

scope of the general power of attorney appointing

Rodriguez as its agent in Colombia (Respondent’s Ex.

8) and sought to limit his authority by advising the

Respondent that he could only act upon the written

authorization of Harbeston. By letter dated December

14, 1988, the Respondent acknowledged this limitation

on his authority, noting that any violation of the

restriction “will result in an action before The Virginia

Bar Ethics Committee”. VSB Ex. 9. By memorandum

dated December 13, 1988, Harbeston advised all law

firms employed by 58.4, including Devis and Rodriguez,

that John Erlichman would coordinate and manage all

A‘7

litigation by SSA. VSB Ex. 8.

5. By letter dated Januaryl0, 1989 SSA

authorized Respondent as its legal representative in

Colombia to file a lawsuit against the Republic of

Colombia to confirm its rights to the sunken ships. VSB

Ex. 12. Thereafter, Devis proceeded to pursue SSA’s

claims in the courts of Colombia with apparent skill

and professionalism to the satisfaction of SSA.

Harbeston soon became _ dissatisfied with the

Respondent’s performance because of actions he took

without written authorization but nevertheless

continued the representation arrangement because of

his satisfaction with Devis’ performance as a litigator.

By memorandum to Respondent dated June 9, 1989,

(VSB Ex. 13) Harbeston reaffirmed that Respondent

was to take no action on behalf of SSA without

Harbeston’s written authorization as Respondent had

acknowledged by his December 14,1988 letter.

Sometime thereafter, but prior to January 1990, the

law firm of Rodriguez and Devis had dissolved but

Devis continued to represent SSA in its ongoing

litigation against the Republic of Colombia. By

agreement dated January 3, 1991, Respondent, acting

as attorney for SSA, entered into a professional services

agreement with Devis to continue with the litigation on

behalf of SSA against the Republic of Colombia. This

agreement changed the fee arrangement to a

contingency fee arrangement whereby Devis would

receive 20% of any recovery. VSB Ex. 14. Devis and the

Respondent then entered into an agreement to share

any contingent fee recovery.

6. By request dated January 3, 1990, the

Respondent sought a legal ethics opinion from the

A’8

VSB that as a Virginia attorney who had entered into

a contract in Idaho to be performed in a foreign

country, whether he could terminate his representation

because the client had failed to pay his fee and could

sue the client to collect such a fee. The VSB Ethics

Committee gave its opinion on the issue (LEO 1325)

that under the facts presented, the Respondent could

terminate his representation and sue the client for fees,

with the opinion concluding with the customary notice

that it was an advisory opinion and not binding on any

court. VSB Ex. 18.

7. Devis continued the litigation successfully as

the case made its way through the Colombian judicial

system as the Colombian government appealed each

adverse decision. Respondent does not appear to have

played any role in the litigation. By letter dated March

24,2000 Devis advised Respondent not to use his name

in Respondent’s professional activities, and that

Harbeston was upset with Respondent’s activities and

wanted to revoke the power of attorney. VSB Ex. 15.

Devis acknowledged he would honor their contingent

fee sharing arrangement By letter dated April 6,2000,

Harbeston revoked the general power of attorney from

SSA to Respondent (which he had forgotten to do

earlier), stating that neither SSA nor its related

entities owed Respondent any legal fees and that any

understanding relating to fees was in the agreement

between Devis and Respondent to share any

contingency fee. VSB Ex. 16.

8. In September of 2000 the Respondent filed

suit against SSA in the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Virginia seeking to enforce a

claim for attorney’s fees in the amount of $4.5 million

against SSA. VSB Ex. 19, The Respondent testified

A-9

that he based the amount of his attorney’s fee claim on

the annual salary ($300,000 to $400,000) of a legal

representative of a United States company in a foreign

land for a period of 12 years. Included as defendants in

this litigation were Harbeston, related entities to SSA

and Devis. None of the defendants were residents of the

Commonwealth of Virginia. The Respondent basis for

jurisdiction by the federal court in Virginia was the fact

that he was a Virginia attorney, Virginia Code Section

54.1-3932 grants an attorney a lien for fees and LEO

1325 which said he could sue his client. The defendants

in this litigation obtained the services of Harrison

Pledger, a Virginia attorney, who filed a motion to

dismiss based on the lack of personal jurisdiction over

the defendants. This motion was granted and the suit

was dismissed. The Respondent then appealed to the

Feurth Circuit Court of Appeals and that court

affirmed the District Court’s ruling. The Respondent

then petitioned for a Writ of Certiorari in the United

States Supreme Court but that petition was denied.

9. After the denial of The Writ of Certiorari by

the United States Supreme Court the Respondent filed

a slightly different law suit in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

against the defendants in the earlier suit and also

added several other defendants who were investors in

SSA or related entities. VSB Ex. 20. The District Court

dismissed this second law suit, finding that the

Respondent had failed to plead additional facts to the

first suit to give the court personal jurisdiction over any

of the defendants. This ruling was affirmed on appeal

to the Fourth Circuit The Respondent then sought a

Writ of Certiorarr from the United States Supreme

Court which was also denied.

A-10

10. While the appeal of the second lawsuit was

pending, the Respondent filed a third similar lawsuit -

this time in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County against

SSA. In this third lawsuit the Respondent named the

defendants in the second law suit and Harrison Pledger

and his law firm as defendants. VSB Ex. 21. This law

suit was also dismissed but the court denied the

defendants’ motions for sanctions.

11. The Respondent created a website which

displayed false and misleading information regarding

his relationship with SSA and his participation in the

litigation in Colombia. VSB Ex 24 & 25. On the site,

the Respondent claimed that in 1988, at the request of

the United States Department of State, he became

SSA's legal representative and managing attorney

responsibie for managing alternative dispute resolution

negotiations and outside counsel! in litigation against

the government of Colombia, posts he claims he held

until 2000. These assertions are not true. On his

resume, the Respondent listed a LLM Civil law degree

from the University of Bordeaux. While the Respondent

attended a class at the University of Bordeaux, he

never received a degree from that university. The

Respondent also listed an American Trial Lawyers

Ultimate Trial Lawyer Certification. There is no such

certification. The basis for Respondent’s claim is the

fact that he attended a one week continuing legal

education program sponsored byte Association of Trial

Lawyers of American titled “Ultimate Trial Advocacy”.

12. Respondent, in 2004,while communicating

with the U.S. State Department regarding Freedom of

Information Act (“FOIA”) requests he had made for

information relating te SSA litigation, represented that

he was the attorney for SSA notwithstanding the fact

A-1]

that Harbeston had revoked his authority in 2000. VSB

Ex. 23. Respondent claimed that since the power of

attorney filed with the Colombian government had

never been terminated he was not making a

misrepresentation in his FOIA request.

VSB Docket No. 04-502-1044

1. The Respondent lived for many years in

Colombia and had married Amalin Hazbun Escaf a

citizen of Colombia. One son was born of the marriage.

The marriage ultimately ended in a divorce in

Colombia with the wife/mother obtaining custody of the

son by order of a Colombian court with visitation rights

to the Respondent.

2. The Respondent subsequently returned to the

United States where he has been living and his son

visited him pursuant to the visitation rights granted by

the Colombian Court. In 2001 while the son was

visiting the Respondent the Respondent refused to

return his son to Colombia and filed an action in the

Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Fairfax

County to gain custody of his son.

3. In 2001, subsequent to the filing of

Respondent’s suit in the Juvenile and Domestic

Relations Court in Fairfax County, Respondent’s

ex-wife filed an action in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, under the

Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child

Abduction (the “Hague Convention”) and_ the

International Child Abduction Remedies Act (““TCARA”)

in order to secure the return to Colombia of her son.

VSB Ex. 34. In this litigation she was represented by

Patrick Stiehm, a Virginia attorney who had

A‘12

undertaken this representation pro bono at the request

of the National Center for Missing and Exploited

Children (“NCMEC”). NCMEC is a non _ profit

corporation that acts as a neutral in facilitating the

processing of claims under the Hague Convention and

ICARA. When Stiehm initially contacted Respondent to

inform him of the pending litigation, Respondent told

Stiehm that his pro bono representation would cost

Stiehn “a big chunk of change.” In keeping with this

threat, Respondent immediately filed a motion for

sanctions against Stiehn (VSB Ex. 35) but that motion

was denied. VSB Ex. 38. However, Respondent’s

subsequent litigation described herein, which included

Stiehm as a defendant, resulted in Stiehm incurring

significant legal expenses to respond to meritless and

vexatious litigation.. After a bench trial the Court ruled

that the Respondent had kept the child in Virginia in

violation of his ex-wife’s custody rights. VSB Ex. 39.

The Court ordered that the child be removed from the

Respondent's custody and returned to the child’s

mother in Celombia The Respondent’s appeals to the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States

Supreme Court were denied. After all appeals and

stays were denied the son was reunited with his mother

and left for Colombia in June of 2002.

4. In January of 2003, the Respondent filed suit

in the District Court for the District of Columbia

against numerous defendants, including NCMEC,

several employees of NCMEC, the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Circuit Court of

Fairfax County, the Court of Appeals of Virginia, the

District Court for the District of Columbia, the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,

A-13

various judges, a court clerk, the United States

Department of State, Patrick Stiehm and Stephen

Cullen (an attorney who had assisted Stiehm in the

Virginia litigation) claiming a constitutional conspiracy

by the defendants against him in his litigation in

Virginia. VSB Ex. 43. Staff members of NCMEC had

been witnesses in the Virginia litigation and NCMEC

had provided legal representation to witnesses in the

litigation in Virginia. In filing this litigation in which

Respondent and his son were named as plaintiffs,

Respondent who is not licensed to practice in the

District of Columbia and had not obtained an order to

appear pro hoc vice, attempted

to act as attorney for his son.

5. In March of 2003, the Respondent filed a

Writ of Mandamus in an attempt to compel NCMEC

to take actions to force the country of Colombia to

grant the Respondent access to his son. VSB Ex. 64.

By letter dated September 24,2003, Warren L.

Dennis, Esquire, counsel for NCMEC, informed the

Clerk of the United States Supreme Court that

NCMEC would not be filing a responsive brief to the

Respondent's Writ because, inter alia, it had no

power to compel the government of the country of

Colombia to do anything. VSB Ex. 65. Upon receipt

of a copy of the letter, the Respondent called Mr.

Dennis’s office and left a voice mail message in

which he threatened to file an ethics complaint

because the letter falsely characterized the

Respondent's Virginia litigation. Also, by letter

dated September 29,2003, the Respondent gave

notice of his intent to file a judicial complaint and

District of Columbia Bar complaint against those

involved in the litigation unless facts already proved

A-14

were proved within twenty-four (24) hours. VSB Ex 67.

6. In the District of Columbia litigation the

Respondent repeatedly filed pleadings with no basis in

law or fact. VSB Ex. 43 - 81. In an amended complaint

(VSB Ex. 72) Respondent asserted a claim under the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act

(RICO) 18 U.S.C. 1961. Included as defendants in the

complaint were the United States Supreme Court; the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit;

the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia, the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia, the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia, the Virginia

Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals of Virginia and

the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. Respondent’s

actions in the D.C. litigation clearly demonstrates his

use of the legal system to harass and intimidate anyone

whom he considered to have been involved in the

Virginia litigation that returned his son to Colombia

and to re-litigate the Virginia case.

7. Respondent’s actions in naming NCMEC and

some of its employees as defendants in this litigation

cost NCMEC over $160,000 in legal expenses and

riearly bankrupted the organization. Throughout the

course of this litigation, the Respondent misrepresented

his credentials as a lawyer and his license status in

the District of Columbia and New York to the courts

and opposing parties. The Respondent graduated from

law school in 1976. He was first licensed to practice law

in the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1982. Virginia is

the only jurisdiction in which Respondent has a license

to practice law. The Respondent listed a number of

governmental and quasi governmental legal jobs in the

District of Columbia on his resume between the years

A*15

1976 and 1982 requiring a valid law license in the

United States, during which period he was not licensed

to practice law anywhere in the United States. The

Respondent also noted on various documents that he

practiced law in the District of Columbia for a period

of time after his licensure in Virginia, but has never

been licensed in the District of Columbia.

8. During this litigation, the Respondent filed

pleadings and attempted to represent his minor sonon

several occasions in the District of Columbia litigation,

despite the fact there was a conflict of interest between

the father and son, despite the fact that the Respondent

would be a witness in the case and despite the fact that

the judge instructed the Respondent to cease

representing his son. VSB Ex 48 & 50. The

Respondent's law partner also attempted to represent

the son but the court refused to permit that

representation.

I. MISCONDUCT

The Certification for VSB Docket No.

04-052-0794 charges violations of the following

provisions of the Virginia Rules of Professional

Conduct:

RULE 1.2 Scope of Representation

(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions

concerning the objectives of representation, subject to

paragraphs (b), (c), and (d), and shall consult with the

client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.

A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision, after

consultation with the lawyer, whether to accept an offer

of settlement of a matter. Inacriminal case, the lawyer

shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation

A’16

with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to

waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.

RULE 1.5 Fees

(a) A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be

considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee

include the following:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and

difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill

requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that

the acceptance of the particular employment. will

preclude other employment by the lawyer,

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for

similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained:

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or

by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client:

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the

lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

RULE 1.16 Declining Or Terminating

Representation

(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer

shall not represent a client or where representation has

commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of

a client if:

(3) the lawyer is discharged.

RULE 3.4 Fairness To Opposing Party And

Counsel

A lawyer shall not:

(I) file a suit, initiate criminal charges, assert a

A-17

position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other

action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or

when it is obvious that such action would serve merely

to harass or maliciously injure another.

RULE 7.1 Communications And Advertising

Concerning A Lawyer's Services

(a)A lawyer shall not, on behalf of the lawyer or

any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the firm,

use or participate in the use of any form of public

communication if such communication contains a false,

fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive statement or

claim. Forexample, acommunication or advertisement

violates this Rule if it:

(1) contains misleading fee information:

(2) states or implies that the outcome of a

particular legal matter was not or will not be related to

its facts or merits;

(3) compares the lawyer’s services with other

lawyers services, unless the comparison can be

factually substantiated: :

(4) contains an endorsement by a celebrity or

public figure who is not a client of the firm without

disclosure (I) of the fact that the speaker is not a client

of the lawyer or the firm, and (ii) whether the speaker

is being paid for the appearance or endorsement; or

(5) contains a portrayal of a client by a

non-client without a disclosure that the depiction is a

dramatization.

In the determination of whether a

communication or advertisement violates this Rule, the

communication or advertisement shall be considered in

its entirety including any qualifying statements or

disclaimers contained therein.

A-18

RULE 8.4 Misconduct

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(b) commit a criminal or deliberately wrongful

act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,

trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer;

(c) engage in »rofessional conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation:;

The Certification for VSB Docket No.

04-052-1044 charges violations of the following

provisions of the Virginia Rules of Professional

Conduct:

RULE 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule

(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the

representation of that client may be naterially limited

by

the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a

third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation

will not be adversely affected: and

(2) the client consents after consultation. When

representation of multiple clients in a single matter is

undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation

of the implications of the common representation and

the advantages and risks involved.

RULE 3.1 Meritorious Claims And Contentions

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or

assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a

basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes

a good faith argument for an extension, modification or

reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in

a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a

proceeding that could result in incarceration may

nevertheless so defend the result in incarceration may

A-19

nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require

that every element of the case be established.

RULE 3.3 Candor Toward The Tribunal

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly

(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal;

(2) fail to disclose a fact to a tribunal when disclosure

is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent

act by the client, subject to Rule 1.6;

(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal controlling legal

authority in the subject jurisdiction known to the

lawyer to be adverse to the position of the client ard

not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If

a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to

know of its falsity; the lawyer shall take reasonable

remedial measures.

RULE 3.4 Fairness To Opposing Party And

Counsel

A lawyer shall not:

(d) Knowingly disobey or advise a client to disregard a

standing rule or a ruling of a tribunal made in the

course of a proceeding, but the lawyer may take steps,

in good faith, to test the validity of such rule or ruling.

(h) Present or threaten to present criminal or

disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage ina

civil matter.

(I) File a suit, initiate criminal charges, assert a

position, conduct a defense, delay a trail, or take other

action on behalf of the chent when the lawyer knows or

when it is obvious that such action would serve merely

to harass or maliciously injure another. Effective

danuary 1,2004

(4) Present or threaten to present criminal or

disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in a

A-20

civil matter,

(k) File a suit, initiate criminal charges, assert a

position, conduct a defense, delay a trail, or take other

action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or

when it is obvious that such action would serve merely

to harass or maliciously injure another.

RULE 3.7 Lawyer As Witness

(a) A lawyer shall not act as an advocate in an

adversarial proceeding in which the lawyer is likely to

be a necessary witness except where:

(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested

issue;

(2) the testimony relates tothe nature and value

of legal services rendered in tne case; or

(3) disqualification of the lawyer wouid work

substantial hardship on the client.

RULE 44 Respect For Righis Of Third Persons

In representing a chent, a lawyer shall not use

means that have no purpose other than to embarrass,

delay; or burden a third person, or use methods of

obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such

a person.

RULE 5.5 Unauthorized Practice Of Law

(a) A lawyer shall not:

(1) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so

violates the regulation of the legal profession in that

jurisdiction; or

(2) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in

the performance of activity that constitutes the

unauthorized practice of law.

RULE 7.1. Communications Concerning A

Lawyer's Services

(a) A lawyer shall not, on behalf os thelawyer or

any other lawyer affiliated with the lawver or the firm,

A-21

use or participate in the use of any form -of public

communication if such communication contains a false,

fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive statement or

claim. Forexample, acommunication violates this Rule

if it:

(1) contains false or misleading fee information:

or

(2) states or implies that the outcome of a

particular legal matter was not OR will not be related

to its facts or merits; or

(3) compares the lawyer's services with other

lawyers’ services, unless the comparison can be

factually substantiated; or

(4) is likely to create an unjustified expectation

about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or

implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means

that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other

law. ,

RULE 7.4 Communication Of Fields Of Practice

And Certification |

Lawyers may state, announce or hold themselves

out as limiting their practice in a particular area or

field of law so long as the communication of such

limitation of practice is in accordance with the

standards of this Rule, Rule 7.1, and Rule 7.3, as

appropriate. A lawyer shai! not state or imply that the

lawyer has been recognized or certified as a specialist

in a particular field of law except as follows:

(a) A lawyer admitted to engage in patent

practice before the United States Patent and

Trademark Office may use te designation “Patent

Attorney” or a substantially similar designation:

(b) A lawyer engaged in Admiralty practice may

use as a designation “Admiralty,” “Proctor in

A-22

Admiraity” or a substantially similar designation:

(c) A lawyer who has been certified by the

Supreme Court of Virginia as a specialist in some

capacity may use the designation of being so certified,

e.g., “certified mediator” or a substantially similar

designation;

(d) Alawyer may communicate the fact that the

lawyer has been certified as a specialist in a field of law

by a named organization, provided that the

communication clearly states that there is no procedure

in the Commonwealth of Virginia for approving

certifying organizations. Effective Nov. 1,2002

(a) A lawyer admitted to engage in patent

practice before the United States Patent and

Trademark Office may use the designation “Patent

Attorney” or a substantially similar designation:

(b) A lawyer engaged in Admiralty practice may

use as a designation “Admiralty,” “Proctor in

Admiralty” or a substantially similar designation:

(c) A lawyer who has been certified by the

Supreme Court of Virginia as a specialist in some

capacity may use the designation of being so certified,

e.g., “certified mediator” or a substantially similar

designation;

(d) Alawyer may communicate the fact that the

lawyer has been certified as a specialist in a field of law

by a named organization, provided that the

communication clearly states that there is no procedure

in the Commonwealth of Virginia for approving

certifying organizations.

RULE 8.4 Misconduct

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(b) commit a criminal or deliberately wrongful act that

reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,

trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer;

( c ) engage in professiona) conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation:;

Effective Mar. 25, 2003

(b) commit a criminal or deliberately wrongful act that

reflects adversely on the lawyer's’ honesty,

trustworthiness or fitness to practice law.

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,

deceit or misrepresentation which reflects adversely on

the lawyer’s fitness to practice law; |

{il. DISPOSITION

Upon review of the forgoing finding of facts, the

exhibits presented by Bar Counsel on behalfof the VSB

as Exhibits 1- 92, the exhibits presented by the

Respondent as The Respondent’s Exhibits 1-42, the

evidence from witnesses presented on behalfofthe VSB

and evidence presented by the Respondent in the form

of his own

testimony, and at the conclusion of the evidence

regarding misconduct, the Board recessed to deliberate.

After deliberation the Board reconvened and stated

that it had found by clear and convincing evidence that

the Respondent had violated The following Rules of

Professional Conduct: in Docket No. 04-052-0794, Rule

1.2(a); 1.5(a); 1.16(a)(3); 3.40); 7.1(a); 8.4(b) & Cc); in

Docket No. 04-052-1044. Rule 1.7(b) 1-2;. 3.1; 3.4

(d)(h)()G); 3.7(a)(1-3); 4.4 and 8(b) and (c).

The Board stated that the Bar had failed toprove

by clear and convincing evidence any violation of the

following the Rules of Professional Conduct: 3.3(a)1-4:

5.5(a)l-2; 7.1(a) 1-4; 7.4¢a)(b)(c)(d); and effective Nov. 1,

2002 7.4(a)(b)(c)(d).

The bases for the Boards finding of violation of

the Rules of Professional Conduct are as follows:

VSB Docket No. 04-052-0794

(a) The Respondent violated Rule 1.2(a) (Scope

of Representation) in that his authorization to act on

behalf of his client SSA was limited, but he nonetheless

acted without written authorization from his client.

Furthermore, after he had been discharged by SSA, he

wrote the Department of Siate claiming to be the

managing attorney of SSA, which was not the case. He

also made a FOIA request without any authorization.

(b) The Respondent violated Rule 1.5(a) 1-8

(Fees) with his claim of a fee of 4.5 million dollars.

Respondent acknowledged that the fee arrangement

was a contingent fee arrangement and no recovery had

been made. Therefore, there was no basis to claim a fee.

Furthermore, the amount of the fee, $4.5 million, does

not appear to have any reasonable relationship to work

actually performed which is necessary for a recovery on

a quantum merit basis. Respondent testified that he

determined the amount based upon what the salary

would be for a legal representative for a U.S. company

operating in a foreign country.

(c) The Respondent violated Rule 1.16 (a)(3)

(Declining or Terminating Representation) by

representing that he was SSA’s managing attorneyin a

FOIA request (VSB Ex. 23), which he made well after

SSA had terminated their relationship.

(d) The Respondent violated Rule 3.4(1)

(Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel) by tiling the

litigation in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia and the Circuit Court of

A-25

Fairfax County, Virginia. [t should appear to any

reasonably competent lawyer that the courts did not

have jurisdiction over the parties named as defendants.

Even giving the Respondent the benefit of the doubt as

to the first suit, he received a ruling that the court

lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants which

was upheld on appeal. He nonetheless filed a second

suit with the same infirmity seeking the same recovery.

Furthermore, his suit in the Circuit Court of Fairfax

County, Virginia, included as a defendant Harrison

Pledger and his law firm, merely because Mr. Pledger

had acted as defense counsel] in the two suits in the

federal court

(e) The Respondent violated Rule 7.1(a) 1-5

(Communication Concerning a Lawyer's Services) by

misrepresentation on his website and resume. VSB

Exhibits 24 and 25 show that Mr. Rodriguez, on the

website he created, misrepresented his relationship

with SSA. He misrepresented what he did fer SSA and

how he became employed by SSA. He misrepresented

his education by listing an LLM civil law degree from

the University of Bordeaux. He improperly claimed a

certification (the American Trial Lawyer Ultimate Trial

Lawyer Certification) where no such certification

exists.

(f) The Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b) and

8.4(c) (Misconduct) by representing in his FOIA request

that he was the managing attorney for SSA, when the

evidence shows that he clearly was not.

VSB Docket No. 04-052-1044

(a) The Respondent violated Rule 1.7(b) 1-2

(Conflict of interest) in his attempt to represent his son

A-26

in the District Court for the District of Columbia and

his continued actions to do so even in the face of a court

ruling that there was a conflict.

(b) The Respondent violated Rule 3.1

(Meritorious Claims and Contentions) by his litigation

in the District Court for the District of Columbia and

his actions in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County,

Virginia. The complaint filed by the Respondent with

all the parties he named as defendants standing alone

shows that the Respondent has violated this Rule. The

numerous’ pleadings filed thereafter further

demonstrate that the Respondent's aim was to punish

anyone who had any connection with the litigation filed

by his former wife to regain custody of their son. Any

attorney who had in any way appeared in that

litigation ended up being named as a defendant

NCMEC and several of its staff were named as

defendants resulting in a legal cost to NCMEC alone of

$160,090.00 Attorney Patrick Stiehm who had taken

Respondent's ex-wife’s case pro bono was named as a

defendant thereby making good on Respondent’s claim

that Stiehm’s representation would cost him a “big

chunk of change.”

Furthermore, in litigation in Fairfax County,

Respondent subpoenaed two members of NCMEC as

witnesses for a hearing involving his efforts to file a

Statement of the Case for an appeal, when these two

staff members had nothing to do with the Fairfax

litigation. While the subpocnas were quashed they

nevertheless had the effect of harassing the NCMEC

staff members. Remarkably this is the only instance in

which the Respondent was sanctioned by a court.

Perhaps if he had been sanctioned earlier, either

by the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia or the District Court for the District

of Columbia, such action would have put a stop to

Respondent’s unwarranted and vexatious conduct.

Unfortunately neither of the courts saw fit to impose

sanctions.

(c) The Respondent violated Rule 3.4(d)(h(i)Qj)

(Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel) by the

following conduct: (1) by continuing to attempt to

represent his son in the District of Columbia litigation

in the face of a court ruling, in violation of Rule 3.4(d);

(2) by threatening the NCMEC attorney with a bar

complaint and filing a criminal complaint with the FBI,

in violation of 3.4(h); (3) by filing a motion for sanctions

against Patrick Stichm and naming Stiehm as a

defendant in the District of Columbia litigation and by

his entire course of conduct inthe District of Columbia

litigation, in violation of Rule 3.44){j);

(d) The Respondent violated Rule 3.7(a) 1-3

(Lawyer as Witness) by acting as an advocate when he

was a necessary witness in the Eastern District of

Virginia litigation.

(e) The Respondent violated Rule 4.4 (Respect

for the Rights of Third Persons) by the whole course of

litigation in the District Court for the Dhistrict of

Columbia. In addition, his subpoena of Ms. Brinkerhoff

and Mr. Dennis to the Fairfax Circuit Court for a

bearing on the Statement of Facts to be sukmitted for

appeal further demonstrates a violation of this Rule.

(f) The Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b) and 8.4(

c ) (Misconduct) in asserting a RICO claim and by his

letter to the FBI

Thereafter, the Board received further evidence

of aggravation and mitigation from the Bar and the

Respondent, including the Respondent's prior

A-28

disciplinary record. The Board recessed to deliberate

what sanction to impose upon its findings of

misconduct by the Respondent.

After due deliberation the Board reconvened to

announce the sanction imposed. The Chair announced

the sanction as REVOCATION.

The Board in reaching its decision of revocation

recognized that the violation of certain of the Rules

such as Rule 1.5(a), 7.1, and 8.4(b) & (cc) standing

alone may not merit the ultimate sanction of

revocation. However, the Respondent's conduct by

pursuing litigation in Virginia in Docket No.

004-052-0794 and in the District of Columbia in Docket

No. 04°052-1044 is conduct that cannot be tolerated.

While a court through sanctions can protect itself from

such conduct by a deceitful and unprincipled attorney,

the public must look to the VSB for protection. The

other violations demonstrate Respondent’s complete

disregard for the Rules of Professional Conduct

Furthermore the Respondent was defiant to any

criticism of his conduct in pursuing what can only be

described as meritless and vexatious litigation. This

same defiance was evident to the Board as the

tespondent sought to justify his conduct. Therefore the

Board concluded that the sanction of revocation was the

only remedy by which the public and bar could be

adequately protected.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the

Respondent's license to practice law in_ the

Commonwealth of Virginia is revoked, effective October

27, 2006.

It is further ORDERED that the Respondent

must comply with the requirements of Part Six, § IV, ‘

13(M) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.

A:29

The Respondent shall forthwith give notice by certified

mail, return receipt requested, of the revocation of his

license to practice law in the Commonwealth of

Virginia, to all clients for whom he is currently

handling matters and to all opposing attorneys and

presiding judges in pending litigation. The Respondent

shall also make appropriate arrangements for the

disposition of matters then in his care in conformity

with the wishes of his client The Respondent shall give

such notice within 14 days of the effective date of the

revocation, and make such arrangements as are

required herein within 45 days of the effective date of

the revocation. The Respondent shall also furnish proof

to the Bar within 60 days of the effective day of the

revocation that such notices have been timely given

and such arrangements made for the disposition of

matters.

It is further ORDERED that ifthe Respondent is

not handling any client matters on the effective date of

October 27,2006, he shall submit an affidavit to that

effect to the Clerk of the Disciplinary System at the

Virginia State Bar. All issues concerning the adequacy

of the notice and arrangements required by Paragraph

13 (M) shall be determined by the Virginia State Bar

Disciplinary Board, unless the Respondent makes a

timely request for hearing before a three-judge court.

It is further ORDERED that pursuant to Part

Six, §IV, ¥ 13,B.8.c. of the Rules of the Supreme Court

of Virginia, the Clerk of the Disciplinary System shall

assess all costs against the Respondent.

It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the

Disciplinary System shall mail an attested copy of this

order to the Respondent at his address of record with

the Virginia State Bar, being 7924 Peyton Forest Trail,

A-30

Annandale, VA 22003-1560, by certified mail, return

receipt requested, and by regular mail to Noel 0.

Sengel, Bar Couns:#l, Virginia State Bar, Suite 310, 100

North Pitt Street, Alexandria, Virginia, 22314-3133.

ENTERED this 28th day of November, 2006

VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD

James Leroy Banks., Jr. 1° Vice Chair

IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA:

IN FAIRFAX COUNTY

Governor Timothy Kaine

Patrick Henry Bldg.

Richmond, Virginia 23219

Commonwealth Attorney Raymond F. Morrogh, Jr.,

Fairfax County Virginia

Jennings Building Judicial Center

4110 Chain Bridge Rd. #123

Fairfax, VA 22030

Colonel David M. Rohrer, Chief of Police

Fairfax County

4100 Chain Bridge Rd.

Fairfax, VA 22030

Fairfax County Magistrate Office

Fairfax Adult Detention Center

10520 Judicial Drive

Fairfax, Va 22030

CITIZEN’S CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR

TREASON AND MISPRISION OF A FELONY

1, Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., the undersigned

complainant is a citizen fo the United States by birth,

a resident of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Fairfax

County since 2000, and in my capacity as a member of

the Bar in good standing of the United States Supreme

Court, the U.S. Ct. of App for 2°? and Fed. Cir., U.S.

Tax Court, and from 1982 until 2006 a member in good

standing of the Virginia State Bar, being duly sworn

A-32

does state the following as true and correct to the best

of my knowledge and belief.

Count One

From on or about January 2003 until March

2007, in the Commonwealth of Virginia Mr. Bob

McDonnell, Esq., Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr.,

Hon. Barbara Milano Keenan, Hon. Lawrence L.

Koontz, Jr., Hon. Cynthia D. Kinser, Hon. Donald W.

Lemons, Hon. G. Steven Agee, Hon. Barbara Milano

Keenan, and Jane Does and John Does 1-20, acting

outside of their ministerial and judicial capacity and

jurisdiction did conspire with each other and with

others to devise and participate in a scheme to obstruct

justice, participate in treason, the misprision ofa felony

treason, and other acts of treason in violation of Va.

Code § 18.2-481(5),' and 2-482,” by “[resisting] the

execution of the [Hague Convention on the Civil

Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980

(“Treaty”); and, Virginia’s Uniform Child Custody

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Va. Code § 20-146.1

et seg.(“UCCJEA”)] under color of [their] authority,” so

to obstruct my statutory rights asa father to visitations

'Va. Code § 18.2-481. Treason defined; how proved and punished.

— Treason shall consist only in: (5) Resisting the execution of

the laws under color of its authority. Such treason, if proved by

the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or by

confession in court, shall be punishable as a Class 2 telony. (Code

1950, § 18.1-418: 1960, c. 358; 1975, cc. 14, 15.)

* Va. Code18.2-482. Misprision of treason., states that, “[i]f any

person knowing of sucn treason shall not, as soon as may be, give

information thereof to the Governor, or some conserva-tor of the

peace, he shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.

A:-33

in criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1204.

Count Two

From on or about October 2006 to the present, in

the Commonwealth of Virginia Mr. Bob McDonnell,

Esq., Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., Hon. Barbara

Milano Keenan, Hon. Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr., Hon.

Cynthia D. Kinser, Hon. Donald W. Lemons, Hon. G.

Steven Agee, Hon. Barbara Milano Keenan, Hon. DT

Still, Hon. Leslie Alden, Ms. Karen Ann Gould, Esq.,

Mr. Seth Guggenheim, Esq., Ms. Noel D. Senge), Esgq.,

Mr. James Leroy Banks, Jr., Esq., Mr. William Carlyle

Boyce Jr., Esq., Mr. William Ethan Glover, Esq., Mr.

Glenn M. Hodge, Esq., Mr. Stephen A. Wannall, Mr.

Davis J. Gogal, Esq., Mr. Daniel M. Rathbun, Esq., Mr.

Edward V. O’Connor, Jr, Esq., Mr. John W, di Zerega,

The Hon. William E. Thro, Catherine Crooks Hill, Esq.,

Ms. Elizabeth B. Peay, Esq., Ms. K, Kupke, Mr. J. T.

Ezell, Mr. Coleman Walsh, Jr. and Jane Does and John

Does 1-20, acting outside of their ministerial and

judicial capacity and jurisdiction did conspire with each

other and with others to violate their oaths of office to

devise and participate in a scheme to obstruct justice,

misprision of a felony treason, and other acts of treason

in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-481(5), 2-482, by

“[resisting] the execution of [Art. VI, § 1, § 5, and § 7 of

the Virginia Constitution and Va. Code § 54.1-3935]

under color of [their] authority,” so to obstruct justice

by concealing the felony of treason by the usurping of

the power to establish inferior “courts granted only to

the General Assembly under Art. VI, § 1, § 5, and § 7 of

the Virginia Constitution,” by the Virginia Supreme

Court’s unlawful delegating authority to the Virginia

State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) to establish a

“kangaroo court” to discipline attorneys in violations of

A-34

Va. Code §§ 54.1-3910, 3915, and 3935, (see:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAkEfjcA5sQ-2009

statement Northern VA Delegates).

Count Three

From on or about November 27, 2006 to the

present in the Commonwealth of Virginia Mr. Bob

McDonnell, Esq., Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr.,

Hon. Barbara Milano Keenan, Hon. Lawrence L.

Koontz, Jr., Hon. Cynthia D. Kinser, Hon. Donald W.

Lemons, Hon. G. Steven Agee, Hon. Barbara Milano

Keenan, Hon. DT Still, Hon. Leslie Alden , Ms. Karen

Ann Gould, Esq., Mr. Seth Guggenheim, Esq., Ms. Noel

D. Sengel, Esq., Mr. James Leroy Banks, Jr., Esq., Mr.

William Carlyle Boyce Jr., Esq., Mr. William Ethan

Glover, Esq., Mr. Glenn M. Hodge, Esq., Mr. Stephen A.

Wannall, Mr. Davis J. Gogal, Esq., Mr. Daniel M.

Rathbun, Esq., Mr. Edward V. O’Connor, Jr, Esq., Mr.

John W, di Zerega, The Hon. William E. Thro,

Catherine Crooks Hill, Esq., and Jane Does and John

Does 1-20, participating in the misprision of a felony

treason by issuing and enforcing of an unlawful void

order by the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board to

punish, injure and deprive undcrsign counsel of his

business, profession, perfected property right in his

perfected Virginia Attorney’s Lien on sunken treasure

trove, and right to employment as an attorney, in

retaliation for his petitioning the General Assembly

and litigating to enforce statutory rights as a father

and attorney, thereby acting outside of their

ministerial and judicial capacity and jurisdiction to

conspire with each other and with others to violate

their oaths of office to devise and participate in a

scheme to obstruct justice, misprision of a felony

treason, and other acts of treason in violation of Va.

A:35

Code § 18.2-481(5), 2-482, by “[resisting] the execution

of [Art. VI, § 1, § 5, and § 7 of the Virginia Constitution

and Va. Code § 54.1-3935] under color of [their]

authority,” in violation of Va. Code §18.2-482, by

participating in an on going business conspiracy in

violation of Va. Code § 18.2-499,* so to not comply with

their oaths as public official or person selected to be a

public official, by directly or indirectly, corruptly

demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive

or accept anything of value personally or for any other

person or entity, in return for:

a. being influenced in the performance of any

official act;

F. being influenced to commit or aid in

committing, or to collude in, or allow, any fraud,

or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud,

on the United States; or

c. being induced to do or omit to do any act in

°Va Code § 18.2-499. Combination to injure others in their

reputation, trade, business or profession: right of employees: (a)

Any two or more persons who shall combine, associate, agree,

mutually undertake or concert together for the purpose of wilfully

and maliciously injuring another in his reputation, trade, business

or profession by any means whatever, or for the purpose of wilfully

and maliciously compelling another to do or perform any act

against his will, or preventing or hindering another form doing or

performing any lawful act, shall be jointly and severally guilty of

a Class 3 misdemeanor. Such punishment shall be in addition to

any civil relief recoverable under § 18.2-500.

(b) Any person who attempts to procure the participation,

cooperation, agreement or other assistance of any one or more

persons to enter into any combination, association, agreement,

mutual understanding or concert prohibited in subsection (a) of

this section shall be guilty of a violation of this section and subject

tou the same penalties set out in subsection (a) hereof.

A-36

violation of the official duty of such official or person;

Directly or indirectly, corruptly demanded, sought,

received, accepted, or a greed to receive in return for

being influenced in the performance of any official act..

Count Four

From on.or about November 2007 to the present,

in the Commonwealth of Virginia Mr. Bob Mcdo, Ms.

Elizabeth B. Peay, Esq., Ms. K, Kupke, Mr. J. T. Ezell,

Mr. Coleman Wuish, Jr. and Jane Does and John Does

1-20, acting outside of their ministerial and judicial

capacity and jurisdiction pursuant to the Virginia

Unemployment, Compensation Act so to conspire with

each other and with others to violate their oaths of

office to devise und participate in a scheme to obstruct

justice, misprisi..i\ of a felony treason, and other acts of

treason in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-481(5), 2-482, by

“[resisting] the execution of [Art. VI, § 1, § 5, and § 7 of

the Virginia Constitution and Va. Code § 54.1-3935]

under color of [their] authority,” so to deprive

undersign counsel of his right to federal unemployment

compensation based conspiring to not undertake

independent review so to regard as valid the VSBDB

void order issucd in «lolation of Va. Code § 54.1-3910,

3915 and 3935.

Count Five

I further state that this complaint is based on

the following facts: SEE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT

Dated: July 4, 2009

Signature: __ [S/

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.

ADDENDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS

U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

First Amendment

Fifth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution ... Add-1

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment .:.... Add-]

FEDERAL CIVIL STATUTES INVOLVED

Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 ....... Add-1

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 46 Add-1

FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES VIOLATED

18 U.S.C. § 4

18 U.S.C. § 241

18 U.S.C. § 242

18 U.S.C. § 1204

18 U.S.C.§ 1513 ..... | | Add-3

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

iw (8 8 BO BOR Reon |) Add-4

i Uk FR oee | re Lees. 5

18 U.S.C. § 3771 ... ; _ Add-6

CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA INVOLVED

Article I, § 11. Due Process of Law

Article [, § 12. Right to Petition

Article VI, § 5. Rules of practice and procedure Add-7

Article VI, § 7. Selection ...of judges ....... Add-8

VIRGINIA CRIMINAL STATUTES VIOLATED

Va. Code § 18.2-481. Treason defined: how proved and

punished

Va. Code18.2-482. Misprision of treason ..... Add-8

Virginia Code § 18.2-499. Combination to injure others

in their reputation, trade, business or professiomAdd-9

VIRGINIA CIVIL CODE INVOLVED

Va. Code § 54.1-3910. Organization and government of

Waremee State GOP. we ee ee vac eeseets Add-9

Va. Code § 54.1-3915. Restrictions as to rules and

regulations

Add:9

Va. Code § 54.1-3935. Procedure for revocation of

license . Add-9

U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

First Amendment of the United States

Constitution, states in relevant part that, “Congress

shall make no law respecting. .. abridging the freedom

of speech, . . . and to petition the Government for a

redress of grievances.”

Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, states in relevant part that, “No person

shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law;... .”

The Due Process Clause of Section 1 of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, states in relevant part that, “No State

shal] make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United

States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

hberty, or property, without due process of law: nor

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the law.”

FEDERAL STATUTES VIOLATED

RULES ENABLING ACT:-28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) The

Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe

general rules of practice and procedure and rules of

evidence for cases in the United States district courts

(including proceedings before magistrate judges

thereof) and the courts of appeal.

(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or

modify any

substantive right. .

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 46(b)

Suspension or Disbarment

(1) Standard. A member of the court’s bar is

subject to suspension or disbarment by the court if the

member: (A) has been suspended or disbarred from the

practice by any other court: or (B) is guilty of conduct

unbecoming a member of the court’s bar.

(2) Procedure. The member must be given an

opportunity to show good cause, within the time

prescribed by the court, why the member should not be

suspended or disbarred.

(3) Order. The court must enter an appropriate

order after the member responds and a hearing is held,

if requested, or after the time prescribed for a response

expires, if no response is madc.

FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES VIOLATED

18 U.S.C. § 4 - Misprision of felony. Whoever,

having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony

cognizable by acourt of the United States, conceals and

does not as soon as possible make known the same to

some judge or other person in civilor military authority

under the United States, shall be fined under this title

or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 241 - Conspiracy against rights,

states in relevant part “lijf two or more person

conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any

person in any State in the free exercise or

enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by

the Constitution or laws of the United States, or

\dd--2

because of his having so exercised the same;... They

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more

than ten years, or both....

18 U.S.C. § 242 - Deprivation of rights under

color of law, states in relevant part that, “[w]hoever,

under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,

or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State .

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or

laws of the United States, ..., shall be fined under this

title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both .

18 U.S.C. § 1204 - International parental

kidnapping.--(a) Whoever. . . retains a child (who has

been in the United States) outside the United States

with intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental

rights shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not

more than 3 years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1513. Retaliating against a witness,

victim, or an informant, states in relevant part, “(e)

Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes

any action harmful to any _ person, including

interference with the lawful employment or livelihood

of any person, for providing to a law enforcement officer

any truthful information relating to the commission or

possible commission of any Federal offense, shall be

fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10

vears, or both

Crimes and Criminal Procedure Part | - Crimes

Chapter 96 - Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations (“RICO”) 18 U.S.C. § 1961 - Definitions

Add

As used in this chapter (1) "racketeering activity"

means... .) (B)any act which is indictable under any of

the following provisions of title 18, United States Code:

., section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice),

section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal

investigations), section 1511 (relating to the

obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section

1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or

an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating

against a witness, victim, or an informant),....

(2) "State" means any State of the United States,

the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto

Rico, any territory or possession of the United States,

any political subdivision, or any department, agency, or

instrumentality thereof;

(3) "person" includes any individual or entity

capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in

property

(4) “enterprise” includes any individual,

partnership, corporation, association, or other legal

entity, and any union or group of individuals associated

in fact although not a legal entity;

(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at

least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which

occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the

last of which occurred within ten vears (excluding any

period of imprisonment) after the commission ofa prior

act of racketeering activity; .

18 U.S.C. § 1962. Prohibited activities. (a) lt shall be

unlawful for any person who has received any income

derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racket

eering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt

in which such person has participated as a principal

Add--4

within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States

Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of

such income, or the proceeds of such income, in

acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or

operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the

activities of which affect, interstate or foreign

commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market

for purposes of investment, and without the intention

of controlling or participating in the control of the

issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be

unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the

issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his

immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any

pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an

unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the

aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities

of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in

fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the

issuer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a

pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of

an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or

indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise

which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,

interstate or foreign commerce.

(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or

associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the

activities of which affect, interstate or foreign

commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or

indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs

through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection

of unlawful debt.

(da) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to

violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c)

Add--5

of this section.

18 U.S.C. §3771. Crime victims’ rights

(a) Rights of Crime Victims.— A crime victim has the

following rights:

(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the

accused.....

(5) The reasonable right to confer with the

attorney for the Government in the case.

(6) The right to full and timely restitution as

provided in law.

(7) The right to proceedings free from

unreasonable delay.

(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with

respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.

(d) Enforcement and Limitations.—

(1) Rights.— The crime victim or the crime

victim’s lawful representative, and the attorney for the

Government may assert the rights described in

subsection (a). A person accused of the crime may not

obtain any form of relief under this chapter. . . .

(3) Motion for relief and writ of mandamus.—

The rights described in subsection (a) shall be asserted

in the district court in which .. . the crime occurred.

The district court shall take up and decide any motion

asserting a victim’s right forthwith. Ifthe district court

denies the relicf soughi, the movant may pctition the

court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. The court of

appeals may issue the writ on the order of a single

judge pursuant to circuit rule or the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure. The court cf appeals shall take up

and decide such application forthwith within 72 hours

after the petition has been filed. In no event shall

Add--6

proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of

more than five days for purposes of enforcing this

chapter. If the court of appeals denies the relief sought,

the reasons for the denial shall be clearly stated on the

record in a written opinion.

CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA INVOLVED

Article I, § 11. Due Process of Law; .. . ; provides, [t}hat

no person shall be deprived of his . . . property without

due process of law;....

Article I, § 12. Freedom of Speech and the press; right

to peaceably assemble, and to petition.

That the freedom of speech and of the press arc among

the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be

restrained except by despotic governments; that any

citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his

sentiments on a!! subjects, being responsible for the

abuse of that right; that the General Assembly shall

not pass any law abridging the freedom of speech or of

the press, nor the right of the people to peaceably to

assemble, and to petition the government for the

redress of grievances.

Article VI, § 1. Judicial power; jurisdicticn. — The

judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in

a Supreme Court and in such other courts of original or

appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme

Court as the General Assembly may ... establish.

(Emphasis added).

Article VI, § 5. Rules of practice and procedure. — The

Add--7

Supreme Court shall have the authority to make rules

governing the course of appeals and the practice and

procedures to be used in the courts of the

Commonwealth, but such rules shall not be in conflict

with the general law as the same shall, from time to

time, be established by the General

Assembly.(Emphasis added)

Article VI, § 7. Selection. .of judges. The justice of

the Supreme Court of shall be chosen by vote of the. .

. General Assembly. ... The judge of all other courts

of record shall be chosen by the ... General Assembly

.... (Emphasis added).

VIRGINIA CRIMINAL STATUTES VIOLATED

Va. Code § 18.2-481. Treason defined; how proved and

punished. — Treason shall consist only in: ... .(5)

Resisting the execution of the laws under color of its

authority. Such treason, if proved by the testimony of

two witnesses to the same overt act, or by confession in

court, shall be punishable as a Class 2 felony.

Va. Code18.2-482. Misprision of treason., states that,

“li]f any person knowing of such treason shall not, as

soon as may be, give information thereof to the

Governor, or some conserva‘tor of the peace, he shall be

guilty of a Class 6 felony.

Virginia Code § 18.2-499. Combination to injure

others in their reputation, trade, business or profession:

right of employees

(a) Any two or more persons who shall combine,

associate, agree, mutually undertake or concert

Add--8&

together for the purpose of wilfully and maliciously

injuring another in his reputation, trade, business or

profession by any means whatever, or for the purpose

of wilfully and maliciousiy compelling another to do or

perform any act against his will, or preventing or

hindering another form doing or performing any lawful

act, shall be jointly and severally guilty of a Class 3

misdemeanor. .

VIRGINIA CIVIL CODE INVOLVED

Va. Code § 54.1-3910. Organization and government

of Virginia State Bar. --The Supreme Court may

promulgate rules and regulations organizing and

governing the Virginia State Bar. The Virginia State

Bar shall act as an administrative agency of the Court

for the purpose of investigating and _ reporting

violations of rules and regulations adopted by the Court

under this article. . .

Va. Code § 54.1-3915. Restrictions as to rules and

regulations.---Not withstanding the _ foregoing

provisions of this article, the Supreme Court shall not

promulgate rules or regulations prescribing a code of

ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys

which are inconsistent with any statute; ....

Va. Code § 54.1-3935. Procedure for revocation of

license.

A. If the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,

or any circuit court of this Commonwealth observes, or

if a complaint, verified by affidavit is made by any

person to such court, that any attorney has... violated

Add--9

the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, the

court may assign the matter to the Virginia State Bar

for investigation. Upon receipt of the report of the

Virginia State Bar, the court may issue a rule against

such attorney to show cause why his license to practice

law shall not be revoked. If the complaint, verified by

affidavit, is made by a district committee of the

Virginia State Bar, the court shall issue a rule against

the attorney to show cause why his license to practice

law shall not be revoked.

B. If the rule [to show cause] is issued by the

Supreme Court... the rule shall be returnable to the

Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. At the time the

rule is issued by the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice

shall designate three circuit court judges to hear and

decide the case... . In proceedings under this section,

the court shall adopt the Rules and Procedures

described in Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13 of the

Rules of Court.

C. Bar Counsel of the Virginia State Bar shall

prosecute the case....

D. Upon the hearing, if the attorney is found

guilty by the court, his license to practice law in this

Commonwealth shall be revoked .... . (Emphasis

added)

Add--10