Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Hart v. Safeway, Inc. (No. 08-1487)
Supreme Court brief2009
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
(1) Supreme Court U.S.
081487MAR9 - 2009
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
No.
In The
Supreme Court of the GAmnied States
——__—_———-~- @ ——— —__ —_--—
Curtis Hart,
Petitioner,
V.
SAFEWAY INC.,
Respondent,
¢
On Petition For, Remedy by, Writ Of Certiorari
to
To THIS STATE’s SUPREME ‘COURT’ de-facto in Oregon
for
Mandamus to the United State Legislature or Executive
to stay “domestic Violence” in Oregon.
e —
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
*
Curtis Hart
General Delivery
Madras, Oregon 97741
541 - 475 - 3488
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Expanding on Oberg, 512 US 414, 430 (1994):
“Oregon’s [unique] abrogation of well established
common law protections against arbitrary depravation
of property raises the presumption that 'ITS' procedures
violate the Due Process Clause.” Premises, on LUTZET,
132 OR 185, In re AH LEE, 5 F. 899, and STATE V.
COCHRAN, 55 OR 157; decreeing unconstitutional-ACT
empowering GOVERNMENT de-facto is made
constitutional, by public acquiescence.
For example, persons who usurp, in Oregon, as
'JUDGES' and 'JUSTICES' in 'COURTS' (THEY admit are de-
facto) argue they are ‘judges de-facto’ with jurisdiction
to decree their TRIBUNALS de jure (ORS 1.002; APP 29).
Oregon’s unique bias, by it’s very nature, creates
obstructions of Justice, which violate the U.S.
Constitution. ARTICLE IV [VII]:
“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States [trial by jury].” Viz: “The United States shall
vuarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion. .. against domestic Violence”
2. Does Due Process require State Courts to exist.
in Law, or otherwise prohibit ‘judicial' attacks upon an
individual who exposes a shadow GOVERNMENT de-
facto, by uncloaking and/or disrobing persons
pretending to be State Judges and/or Justices who are
corrupted by unlawful arbitrary powers?
il
7, Are this Court’s Justices, subject to ARTICLE
III, and/or ARTICLE IV compelled to take an
original action (e.g. a Writ of Error) or otherwise
obligated to mandate remedies when a shadow
GOVERNMENT de-facto admits bias, against a
Citizen, or subjects, to obstruct Justice?
Are not all subsidiary questions fairly included
in my challenge to arguments of THIS STATE’s
shadow GOVERNMENTde-facto’s claim to exist via
plain usurpation?
Said questions presented raise issues with this
Court's Jurisdiction under Writ of Certiorari. See.,
Part II; RULE 10: “Review on writ. of certiorari is not
a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.”
(c) a state court [tribunal in Oregon] has decided an
important question of federal law that has not
been, but should [must] be, [can only be] settied
by this Court, |because said} decided an
important federal question in a way that
conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court:
the United States Constitution of America.
This Court's Clerks (1)Assert: “State Courts
exist in Oregon and ‘Other Jurisdiction’ applies only to
states suing other states. You cannot file an Original
Action.” (2)Returned petition with directions to alter
format (directive included textual changes).
Thereafter, Complaint for recusal denied in Oregon.
28 U.S. C. § 2403(a), § 2403(b) and § 1251 May Apply.
TRESS ESOS HE EEE ROSE REET RE EEE OR ERE HEMET E EEE TEER TORE EERE SEES ERSTE EHEEEEETEREEEEEHHEE STH EHH EEE
il
IDENTIFICATION OF KNOWN PARTIES &
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Petitioner:
Appears on cover.
Respondents:
The Defendants fall into two categories.
SAFEWAY INC., a Delaware Corporation operating in
Oregon under permit from THIS STATE in Oregon.
BODYFELT MOUNT STROPE, LLP.
707 SW Washington St., Suite 1100
Portland, Oregon 97205
503 - 243 - 1022
And
Highest TRIBUNAL of the JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
|[departure-from what is meant] of government in THIS
STATE (defined by ORS 1.002 (1), 131.205, as
GOVERNMENT de-facto) supplanting by assuming
appearance of the State (a.k.a. Supreme 'COURT' de
facto) 'JUSTICES' therein.
SUPREME COURT BUILDING
1163 State Street
Salem, Oregon 97301-2563
THIS STATE’S JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT represented by:
ATTORNEY GENERAL SOLICITOR GENERAL
John R. Kroger Jerry Libz
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
1162 Court St... NE 1163 Court St., NE
Salem, Oregon 97301 Salem, Oregon 97301
503 - 378 - 6313 503 - 378 - 4402
1\
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Ia oe
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .--------------------- rm sia
PETITION FOR WRIT -----------------0----s---e20--- ;
OPINIONS BELOW ---------------- eee
BASIS FOR JURISDICTION IN THIS COURT- 2
PROVISIONS INVOLVED -------------------- 2
RELIEF FROM - - - PROCEEDING {60 (b)} ------ 2
BRIEF -ON JURISDICTION «:-..-........-.....-..- 3
CADMES FOR FRTITION ise onidecrcccccnss. 7
STATEMENT OF THE CASE -------------------- 13
PRINCIPAL APPLICATION OF RULE OR LAW - 20
REMEDY ---2cnccnccccnnnsccnennsennnccesnnteccceseceesene 20)
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ------ 21
CUNT TLISIOIIN «cs -ccesccceccccvscsdesenveebesducsaucsnsnns 24
SHOCKINGLY EXCESSIVE — covcecccecccccoences 25
APPENDIXES: App.
Judgments, Orders, or Decrees - - - - - 1 — 12.
The United States Constitution - ---- 13 15.
Fea. RK. Cir. P. 60 (Dp) ++ - - «<2 220 -- 16.
Supplants of Oregon Annotated - - - - - 17 — 34.
\
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 ---------------- 4
Atlantic Line, 332 U.S. 167 ---------------- 4
Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 US 146 - - 13
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 ---- 5
BURKNOLDER v STATE, 242 OR 276--- 16
CAREY V LINCOLN LOAN CoO., 203 OR APP 399 - 1,5,8,23,
25.
CAREY V LINCOLN LOAN CO., 342 OR 530 ---- 1,8,9,20
23, 25
Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 24 ---- 19
Christianson v Colt, 486 US 800, 818 ------ 19
CLINE, 10 OR 230 ---------------------- --- 7
COCHRAN, 55 OR 157 ---------------------- 7
Cooke v. U.S. 267 US 517, 539 ------------- ey
Crawford v. U.S. 212 us 183, 196 --------- 12
Douglas, 380 U.S. 415 _ ------------------ 4.6,17
Ford v. Georgia, 498 US 411, 423 ---------- i3
Gibbs, 383 US 715 -----------------+-------------- 18
HARRIS, 599 P.2d 456, 458 ----------------- 14
HART 699 P2d 1113 ---------------------- ~e- 5
Heller, 554 US ___ (2008) --------------------- 20
Hildreth’s Heirs - 1J.J.Marsh 206 (1829 Kt)- 6
HITZ, 766 P.2d 373, 376 (1988 OR) ------- 13
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 US 414 - 8
In re AH LEE, 5 F. 899 _ ----------------- 1,7
In re Murchison, 349 US 133 ---------------- 12
Johnson v Avery, 89 S. Ct. 747 -------------- 18
LaChance v Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 ----- 5, 15
Lee v Kemna, 534 US 362 ------------------- 15,16,17
18,19
Lincoln Loan v City of Portland, No.06-790 - 29
Vi
Lilieberg , 486 US 837 ------------------------ 15
Logan v. Zimmerman, 455 U.S. 422 ---- 5
LUTZ ET,1320R185 — ----------------- 1,19{S}
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 - 1]
Maty, 303 US 187 (1938) ----------------------- 18
Mayberry v. Pennsylvaniz 400 US 455 - - 12
Melo v U.S. 505 F 2d 1026 ------------------.-- 19
Microsoft, 503 US 1301 -----------------+------- 25
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 US 449 ---------- 13, 18
Nemaizer v Baker, 793 F 2d 58, 65 ---------- 22
New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 ---------- 4
Oberg, 512 US 414, 430 (1994) -------- i.8
O’Neal, 512 US 482 ----------------------------- 19
Osborne v Ohio, 495 US 103, 125 ---------- 16, 19
Owen v Independence, 445 us 622 ----------- 18
Philip Morris v. Williams No.07-1216 ----- 24
RE CONDUCT OF COLIER, 295 OR 320- 16
Reid, 354 US 1& Ryder, 515 US 177 ---------- 22
Scheuer v- Rhodes, 416 US 232 ---------------- 18
SMOTHERS, 332 OR 83 ------------------------ 17
State AMICI in Philip Morris No.07-1216- 21
STATE V. COCHRAN, 550R 157 © -------- i
STATE v DOERN, 967 P.2d 1230 ---------- 13
STATE EX REL. LINCOLN LOAN V. COURT - 8
STATE v MACK, 183 P.3d 191, 194 ------- 13
STATE v MARTIN, 897 P.2d 1187 -------- 14
STATE v PALMER, 35 OR APP 125 -------- 18
Taylor v. Hays, 418 US 488 ----------------- 12
Texus v White, 74 US 700 (1868) ------------ i
U.S. v Tuttjung, 235 F 3d 330, 335 ---------- 22
Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 ------------ -eeeee 6
Yates, 484 US 211 -----------------------+-----+- 10
Vii
The State of Oregon Constitution -------- Inclusive
BILL OF RIGHTS .-------------------..--- . 19
ARTICLE VII ------------------------- 45 ey O
ORS 1.002 ---------------------------------------- l
ORS 31.731 ---)--------------------- ere rere ener ee 21
ORCP 15B(2) --------------+------------ 220222222 14,16
ORCP D4B www nnn enn nnnnnn nnn nnn nne ene een nn ee 17
The United States Constitution ----------
ARTICLE III il
ARTICLE IV wwwnn nee e eo eee eee 3,
ARTICLE VII ~~ -----+-------------
ARTICLE XIII ___}------------------
AMENDMENTS
ARTICLE FIRST | ------------------- 22
ARTICLE FIFTH ------------------- 22
ARTICLE SEVENTH = ---------- 22
ARTICLE FOURTEENTH --------- 22
The FEDERALIST No. 80 ----------------- 3
The FEDERALIST No. 83 ----------------- 23
IM. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 (rev. ed. 1937)- - 4
W. WIECEK, GUARANTEE CLAUSE ch.2- 4
16B.C.Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice
and procedure Sec. 4027,(2d ed. 1996) ------- 10
PETITION FOR WRIT
Petitioner MOVES for Disinfection, of an
INFECTION of the spinal column ofthe Law of the Land.
Therein, redress from loss of constitutional protections
and remedy related to physical injuries.
OPINIONS BELOW
Petitioner Hart sued for remedy from bodily
injury, caused by negligence (or deliberate disregard)
and subsequent contract violations by SAFEWAY Inc.
CIRCUIT 'COURT’ de-facto in Oregon situated defendant
beyond jury trial(suit); CIRCUIT transcript - p.13.
“T don’t think I have any choice under the
circumstances . . . motion to dismiss the
complaint will be allowed.” App. 1, 2 Aug 3 '06.
Petitioner appealed and filed opening brief, then was
compelled by late introduction of transcript to move to
correct transcript. CIRCUIT argued lack of jurisdiction
to correct transcript; App 3, (see App 5).
APPEALS'COURT’ de-facto admits unlaw fulness of
'ITS' existence is a valid argument; then rejected
Petitioner's challenge that their bias rises to the level
mandating recusal under Federal Law; App 5; 6; 7.
“Appellant’s objections are overruled, and
respondent is awarded... $721.28.” For Hart’s
criminal Contempt of 'COURTS'; App 4; 11.
7/30/07 - 1/11; 4/16; 6/30; 8/25;10/3; 12/10/08- 4/8/09:
SUPREME 'COURT' de-facto: (1)denied review; App 10.
(2)Reconsideration denied; App 8; 9. (3)Petitioner on
review’s declaration, and recusal denied: App 12.
BASIS FOR JURISDICTION IN THIS COURT
The denial of Federal Constitutional Rights by
highest TRIBUNAL in Oregon affirming APPEALS
‘COURT’s' denial of Federal Rights was opened and
reaffirmed by TRIBUNAL’s order dated April 8, 2009.
A petition for remedy was filed to this Court
within 90-days of date of (12/10/08) affirming. The
Clerk's office remanded with directives to modify.
When THIS STATES highest TRIBUNAL (a.k.a. SUPREME
COURT) in Oregon finalized by reaffirming denial of all
remedy, this Court's Clerk indicated “clock reset on
timeliness.”"App 12. Regardless, petition is timely;
submitted within 60-days of this Court's remand.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the
United States Constitution inclusive; and 28 U.S.C. §§
1651; 1254(1); 2101; 2106; 2201; 2241& 2; 2254; 1257;
Act of 1789; 237: 42 § 1983. R. of U.S. Civ. P. 60(b).
PROVISIONS INVCLVED
See App [C] 13 to 15 specifically: ARTICLES: I; IV; VI
and AMENDMENTS: I; IV: V; VII; XIII; XIV.
RULE 60. Directing:
RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT OR ORDER
(b) Grounds for Relief froma Final Judgment,
Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just
terms, the Court may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: App 16.
BRIEF - ON JURISDICTION
The Framers of the Constitution, for the People,
of the United States of America, intended that Our
supreme Court Justices’ [ARTICLE II]}-
“Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, ... Controversies
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”
THE FEDERALIST No. 80; Alexander Hamilton:
“The reasonableness of the agency of the national
courts in cases in which the State tribunals
cannot be supposed to be impartial, speaks for
itself. No man ought to be a judge in his own
cause, or in any cause in respect to which he
has the least interest or bias. This principle has
no inconsiderable weight in designating the federa!
courts as the proper tribunals for the determination
of controversies between different States and their
citizens. And it ought to have the same
operation in regard to some cases between
citizens of the same State.”
United States Constitution ARTICLE IV, § 4.
In a letter (April, 1787) to Randolph, James Madison
suggested that “an article ought to be inserted
expressly guaranteeing the tranquility of the states
against internal as well as external dangers
[usurpation]. Unless the Union be organized efficiently
on republican principles innovations of a much more
objectionable form may be obtruded.”
Randolph wanted to stipulate “that no State be
at liberty to form any other than a Republican Govt.
Wilson then moved, “as a better expression of the idea,
almost the present language of ARTICLE IV, Section
4, which was adopted. 1 M. FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 193-194, 206 (rev. ed. 1937). Randolph asserted:
“The Resoln. has 2 Objects. (1.) to secure Republican
Government. (2.) to suppress domestic commotions.
He urged the necessity of both these provisions.”
Following speakers alluded to the dangers of monarchy
being created peacefully as necessitating the provision.
See W. WIECEK, GUARANTEE CLAUSE ch. 2 (1972).
No ‘political question’ relating to which of two
governments is de jure - exists, herein. Because,
whether a party preserved a constitutional claim Is a
question of federal law. See, Douglas, 380 U.S. 415,
422: Atlantic Line, 332 U.S. 168, 173 (1947). If
political overtones intrude, this Court raised, without
deciding, the possibility that the guarantee clause is
justiciable; interpreter of “domestic Violence” as a
restraint on states. New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 183-85 (1992): Asheroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463
Action of APPEALS COURT de-facto in Oregon was
in contravention of ARTICLE VI, U. S. Constitution,
notwithstanding, 1s depriving plaintiffin error ofrights
without due process of law, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment; also, in contravention of the
Fifth Amendment. This Court (also) has jurisdiction
under section 709 of the Revised Statutes.
Petitioner asserts that CAREY, 203 OR APP 399
and 342 OR 530 are “abrogations, repugnant to the
United States Constitution.” In that, biased persons
deciding CAREY allege to enact ‘SEVEN AMENDMENTS ' in
a signal so-called Article by extrajudicial! FIAT.
Thus, petitioner in aid of this Court's
Jurisdiction, challenges said statute on the grounds
that ‘IT’ supplants, unlawfully replaces via_ plain
usurpation, the State of Oregon, causing bias so-called
JUDICIAL ACTS in his common law action. The core of
Due Process a “meaningful opportunity to be heard,”
(LaChance, 522 U.S. 262, 266) is obstructed.
Under the Constitution, one of this Court’s
characteristic roles is to interpret the Law. To shirk
this responsibility. merely because of significant
political overtones, would so shock the American
public, the World, as tu destroy confidence in the
\Inited States of America
This Court held that Due Process protects all
“civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either
as defendants hoping to protect their property or as
plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances.” Logan v.
Zimmerman, 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982). As stated in
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971), “due
process requires, at a minimum, that absent a
countervailing state interest of overriding significance,
persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty
through the judicial process must be given a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Also, to protect
offenders from violent retaliation (See 699 P2d 1113).
6
This Court should intervene as the procedural]
bar invoked in Oregon is not an adequate state ground
for ‘JUDGMENT’. The adequacy of a state law bar to a
due process challenge is “itself a federal question.”
Douglas, 380 U.S. at 422.
The sufficiency of a state-law procedural rule to
bar a federal constitutional claim turns not on the state
court's characterization of that rule but rather on
whether the rule meets the established constitutional
standards foradequacy. As Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24
explained:
“Whatever [traps THIS STATE] springes the State may
set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that
the State confers, the assertion of Federal rights,
when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be
defeated under the name of local practice.”
In the words of Hildreth’s Heirs v. M’Intire’s
Devisee, 1 J.J.Marsh. 206 (1829 Kt): There is no
[Oregon] government in action, excepting GOVERNMENT
de facto; because all the attributes of sovereignty, have.
by usurpation, been transferred from those who had
been legally invested with them, to OTHERS, who,
sustained by a power above the forms of law, claim to
ACT, and do act in their stead.
Federal judges should give consideration to
lawful state court decisions, but they must find for
themselves the state law if highest tribunal in a State
has spoken in contravention of Law, or decided within
a period or manner which raise questions about the
continued viability of the decision.
7
CAUSES FOR PETITION
Petitioner Hart attacks (in every proceeding in
Oregon (when bias infects)) the validity of pretend
‘COURTS' de-facto that supplant the State of Oregon.
Usurpers argued that even if their so-called
APPEALS “COURT de-facto” does not exist in Law, they
are not disqualified, by Federal Law from obstructing
his appeal and denying Hart all rights to remedy in his
bodily injury case. Moreover, these usurpers imposed
acriminal contempt fine of $721.28, to obstruct Hart's
Federal First Amendment protected activities.
An 1878-ACT, held to be unconstitutional (In re
Ah Lee, 5 F. 899), by which the Oregon Suprume[SIC]
Court was unlawfully replaced (supplanted) by a new
Supreme 'COURT' (CLINE, 10 OR 230); created what was
arguably an inferior TRIBUNAL subject to Circuit Court
supervisory control; see. Oregon ARTICLE. VII § 9.
As COCHRAN, 55 OR 157, recognizes, said inferior
tribunal status was negated by usurping (unlawfully
replacing) the State Constitution with ‘ARTICLE SEVEN
(AMENDMENTS). See., App 17 to 34 [{S} 1 - 18].
Said (AMENDMENTS), usurped all of the State of
Oregon Government with GOVERNMENT de-facto. By
supplanting the Constitutional Courts with 'I'ls' own
'COURTS' de-facto, THISSTATE (as) GOVERNMENT de-facto
took on the appearance of, and acts in some ways as,
the State of Oregon Government; with the exception
that no checks and balances on THIS STATE
Confederation (super-legislature 'COURT’) exist.
8
GOVERNMENT de-facto in Oregon is unique in the
United States “for abrogation of well established
common law protections against arbitrary depravation
of property raising the presumption that 'TTS'
procedures violate the Due Process Clause.” Honda
Motor Co., v. Oberg, 512 US 414, 430 (1994); STATE EX
REL RICO, 355 P.2D 105 (1953) (“We may just as well
face the facts of judicial life in Oregon. They are not
the same as in other states - our courts do not exercise
all the inherent powers of the common law). App 28.
By holding in CAREY V. LINCOLN LOAN CO., 203 OR
APP 399; 342 OR 530 (2007), that 'ARTICLE SEVEN
(AMENDMENTS)' is now LAW, THIS STATE’s JUDGES and
JUSTICES decreed THEMSELVES as super-legislature.
Said loss of a Republican Form of Government,
in Oregon, is established by CAREY (SUPRA), unless the
United States Government entered into a treaty
recognizirig GOVERNMENT de-facto’s Confederation in
Oregon as de jure. See also, STATE EX REL. LINCOLN
LOAN Co., V. COURT OF APPEALS, 336 OR 9 (2003).
The United States Congress’ mere recognition of
Representatives is not sufficient, nor is “implied
subsequent verification’ by subjects acting as
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, as the U.S. Constitution’s bar is
absolute - on such abuse of power for personal gain.
Hence, petitioner Hart, moved for a finding of
facts and law (Declaration) on his Federal rights; filing
a demand Complaint seeking recusal of the so-called
JUDGES/JUSTICES he has publicly embarrassed.
9
The continued failure of THIS STATE’s supreme
JUSTICES to show cause for jurisdiction, while arguing
jurisdiction de-facto, embroiled us in public displays of
my contempt for 1HEM; removing any possibility that
THEY are without bias in any case in which I am a
party. Petitioner now seeks redress, via equity, or
mandamus, in the only Court available.
“Even if CAREY [V. LINCOLN LOAN CO., 342 OR
530] does not dispose fully of [our bias] appellant’s
argument regarding the [un}lawfulness of the existence
of this court, the court rejects appellant’s argument
that his challenge means that the judges of the court
[de-facto*f/n] have such a personal interest in the
challenge that they are disqualified [for bias under
Federal Law] from deciding the appeal.”
(*F/N) See footnote-5 CAREY, [App {S} 29].
Paraphrasing Justice Scalia: Perhaps the Court
is so enamoured of judges in general that it forgets that
they are officers of the Government, and hence proper
objects of that healthy suspicion of the power of
government to corrupt, which possessed the Framers
and is embodied in the Constitution; an obligation on
U. S. Citizens too impose as a check and balance to
preserve the Union.
This Court’s cases use a variety of phrases to
describe when a State’s process is “adequate” or
“inadequate” to preclude federal court review. These
phrases form a haphazard patchwork that has drawn
considerable public criticism.
10
A coherent formulation of law which takes into
account the underlying policies, the Constitution, and
is consistent with most current precedents, is needed.
A palpable rule, which petitioner believes would
resolve his case, is one along the lines proposed by
Professor Wright, et al. That is:
A 'pro se' should have notice that a rule exists
and applies to his situation and ought to have a
reasonable opportunity to present all federal
claims. See 16B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Section
4027, pp. 386- 387, 392 (2d ed. 1996).
This formulation would give states latitude to
form and enforce their own consistent procedural rules
for the presentation of claims, state and federal. It
would also enable the federal courts to step in when
state rules are manipulated to evade federal law, to
discriminate against federal rights, or to facilitate
invidious discrimination against disfavored
Individuals. Petitioner's questioning jurisdiction
makes him a Contemnor of COURTS de-facto.
Federal principles allow - because of cause and
prejudice - this Court to consider whether Justice was
served by JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT in Oregon. Since THIS
STATE’s 'COURTS' considered the merits of the federal
claim, the U.S. supreme Court has a duty to grant the
relief that federal law requires. According to, Yates.
484 US. 211. .
Fair trials are too important a part of Our free
society to let ACTIVISTS pretending to be judges
enact ‘CONSTITUTIONAL’ changes THEY prefer.
1 |
One of the indictments of the Declaration of
Independence against King George III was that he had
"subject[ed] us to a Jurisdiction foreign to our
Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws" in
approving statute law "(flor depriving us, in many
Cases, of Benefits of Trial by Jury" (in bias-COURTS).
There are cases indicating that no denial of
Federal rights occurs, by unconstitutional ACT, if the
highest 'STATE-COURT' de-facto holds ITSELF to be de
jure. Some Federal cases hold unconstitutional ACT
creating 'COURT' de-facto makes person assuming to act
a 'judge' de-facto. Other cases hold no government can
lawfully subject individuals to unrestrained arbitrary
exercises of government powers. {Marbury} To what
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose are
American Constitutions (in writing) if these limits
may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be
restrained. Which case is right - Law? App 20.
The provision is not that no State shall pass an
ACT impairing the obligation of contracts (unless by
subsequent implied verification the people can be
assumed to have acted), for that power is absolutely
inhibited to any state. An ACT in conflict with the
supreme Law of the Land is a nullity (void). And is it
not equally clear that provisions contained in a State
Constitution which subject the State obligations to an
unconstitutional control can not be obligatory? Hence,
Petitioner as Contemnor claimed that ACTS used to
deny him a Court of Law impair the obligations of
contracts. This claim, as such, is an appeal to the
United States Constitution.
12
This Court held recusal mandatory: Jn _ re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133; Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,
400 U.S. 455: Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488.
Recognizing that Due Process hars a ‘judge' from
“awarding costs” when the contemnor and 'JUDGE'
become “embroiled in a running controversy.”
The first law a judge must apply is the
Constitution as defined by those who agreed to it.
Judge, therefore, must declare in support of the Law:
otherwise, COURT becomes de-facto; 'JUDGE' a usurper.
“Care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive
conclusions” (Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517,
539). See, Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183,
196: (‘Bias ... might exist in the mind of one... who
was quite positive that he had no bias”). American
cases or controversies jurisprudence is based on laws,
irrespective of the character of litigants, or the
personal predelictions of judges.
Causes to be decided:
(1) Is CIRCUIT dismissal predicated on bias, or was
dismissal otherwise in violation of Federal Due Process
of Law: in that dismissal was an excessive award to
defendant SAFEWAY Inc., t.e., defendant beyond suit?
(2) Ifbias had not existed in APPEALS COURT de-facto
against petitioner, is there some logical argument for
APPEALS COURT'’s ACTS in visclation of the State of
Oregon and the United States Constitutions?
(3) Can lawful or de-facto officers enact constitutional
changes that result in affirming the creation of their
COURT without violating Due Process of Law?
13
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the adequacy of notice, for due
process purposes, when Defendant’s Counsels makes
fraudulent ex-parte statements to obtain dismissal of
lawsuit obstructing Plaintiffs right to a jury trial.
Therein, the right to notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Petitioner's Natural and
Constitutional Rights are violated by application of
procedures in Oregon that are above the Law of the
Land.
A state rule that is novel or applied
inconsistently is inadequate to preclude consideration
of a federal claim. See, e.g., Barr v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958). “Novelty in
procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart
review in this Court applied for by those who, in
justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication
in state courts of their federal constitutional rights.”
Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423 (1991). Indeed,
even where a state procedural rule is “sensible” in the
abstract, Ford, at 422, it cannot bar consideration of a
federal claim if it is not applied “evenhandedly to all
similar claims.” Hathorn 457 U.S. 255, 263 (1982).
HITZ, 766 P.2d 373, 376 (1988 OR): (EfScient
procedures are instruments for, not obstacles to,
deciding the merits.”). “[W]here the broad legal issue
has heen adequately identified to the trial court, the
issue will be preserved for purposes of appeal. STATE
V. MACK, 183 P.3d 191, 194 (2008 OR APP).
14
Said, is true even if counsel has not identified
“the source for his position,” STATE V. DOERN, 967 P.2d
1230, 1233 (1998 OR APP), or “ma[de] an argument in
support of [it].” STATE V. MARTIN, 897 p.2d 1187, 1189
(1995 OR APP). Discussion between the court and
counsel is deemed sufficient to “find that the issue was
brought to the trial court’s attention.” HARRIS, 599 p.2d
456, 458 (1979 OR).
SAFEWAY’s Counsel fraudulently argued ex-
parte, see “TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAL”
(T/S), that petitioner obstructed process:
T/S P. 4. “He put forth a series of stipulations
including that after every single answer he gave, we
then had to stop and give him a written interpretation
of what our interpretation of his answer meant. And
he proceeded to say that if the judge ruled against him
.and kept him from those stipulations that he would
refuse to participate in the deposition.”
SAFEWAY Counsel’s fraud upon CIRCUIT biased
processing in-favor of dismissal. Petitioner’s failure to
file his second amended complaint within 10-days, was
not the controlling function of dismissal. CIRCUIT
waived ORCP 15 B(2) by not complaining when first
amended complaint was not filed within 10-days; had
CIRCUIT believed 10-day limitation applied ‘IT’ would
have so-stated when it directed petitioner to remove
one-line-of-text from first amended complaint.
SAFEWAY Counsel's ex-parte fraud, declared on
appeal when -“TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAL”
was introduced, after petitioner's opening brief filed.
15
CIRCUIT dismissal was affirmed without
comment; appeals 'COURT' Counsel advised petitioner
to “look at what defendant asked for.”. SAFEWAY
requested: “The trial court’s judgment should be
affirmed because plaintiff has not preserved his claim
of error.” Even if no claim of error was preserved, a
contention denied by Petitioner, the bias infection of
Counsel’s ex parte fraud was not discoverable until
after appeal was taken; therefore, “plainly untenable.”
Appeals 'COURT' de-facto demonstrated 'ITS' bias
against petitioner in a number of ways but few rise to
the level of denying a party a jury trial because he
failed to raise an issue prior to appeal, that could not
be raised until discovered on appeal. If 'THEIR' illogic
is carried to the extreme, in THEIR DEPARTMENT de-
facto, a party must complain about a_ possible
appearance of bias prior to any knowledge.
This Court's review in Liljeberg, 486 U.S. 837,
counters said illogic. In Oregon a party may challenge
jurisdiction at any time. The “fundamental
requirement of due process” is “the opportunity to be
heard’ at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.” LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266.
In Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002), this
Court noted “exceptional cases in which exorbitant
application of a generally sound rule renders the state
grounds inadequate to stop consideration of a federal
question.” The Court identified three considerations
that led it to conclude that Lee's case fit that mold.
Each of those three factors apples with at least equal
16
force to denial of petitioner Hart's Due Process Rights
and/or protection.
First, “when the trial judge denied Lee’s motion
-- judge stated a reason that could not have been
countered.” Jd. at 381. To Hart’s CIRCUIT statements:
“[E]ven the paperwork that they filed requesting this
dismissal tends to indicate that dismissal of the case
would not really be within the limitations that allow
for a right to a remedy under these circumstances. In
other-words, a denial of such - of all remedies.’ T/S P.
11. CIRCUIT responded, T/S P. 13.
“| don't think I have any choice under the
circumstances. Defendant's motion to
dismiss complaint will be allowed.”
See, Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990),
“ee
[W]e may reach Osborne’s due process claim .. .. The
trial judge, in no uncertain terms, rejected counsel's
argument that the statute was overbroad.”
Second, the Court noted in Lee that “no
published .. . decision directs flawless compliance”
with the state rules cited. Jd. at 382.
Again, the same is true here. SAFEWAY moved
for dismissal under ORCP 15B(2) claiming “Plaintiff
simply has not amended his pleading within the time
[10-days] required under the rules.” However, ORCP
15B(2) “is procedural, not substantive [essential], and
intended to apply to disciplinary matters only.” Citing:
IN RE CONDUT OF COLIER, 295 OR 320, (1983). See
BURKHOLDER V STATE 1.A.C. 242 OR 276; (“a trial COURT
may, in its discretion, allow a reply to be made after
17
the time limited by the procedural statutes.) Which is
why SAFEWAY switched on appeal to seek dismissal
under ORCP 54B.
Third, the Court explained in Lee (/d. at 385) the
defendant “substantially complied” with the state rule
by asking for a_ continuance. Even a rule of
“undoubted legitimacy’ ceases to be a bar where it 1s
“substantially met” by invocation of a federal right.
Here, THISSTATE’'s 'RULE' was substantially met
by (See T/S P. 12.):
“I would prefer to continue with an amendment to
the complaint, and try to comply with the
(indiscernible) that are set forth under amending
that complaint, that have already been set forth.”
The unanswered question raised by said
“indiscernible” 1s why did CIRCUIT hold that dismissal!
was mandatory (“I don’t think I have any choice under
the circumstances’) when the U.S. Constitution and
the State remedy clause - State of Oregon Constitution,
Article I, BILL OF RIGHTS, § 10, counters dismissal:
“As to those rights, the remedy clause provides, in
mandatory terms, that remedy by due course of law
shall be available to every person in the event of
injury. SMOTHERS: 332 OR 83 (2001). Douglas, 380 @
422: “Anobjection which is ample and timely to bring
the alleged federal error to the attention of the
trial court and enable it to take appropriate
corrective action 1s sufficient to serve legitimate
state interests, and therefore sufficient to
preserve the claim for review here.”
1s
Lee’s three considerations are applicable to Hart's
Complaint about bias appellate review in Oregon:
First, the dismissal of Lee’s motion, “stated a
reason that could not have been countered.” When
Appeals 'COURT' de-facto demonstrated bias, redress
via recusal was filed. TJ'HEIR response acknowledges
bias: “Even if CAREY does not dispose fully of
appellant's argument regarding the lawfulness of the
existence of this COURT.” 'COURT' de-facto’s JUDGES
argued that their bias is allowed: “COURT rejects
appellant’s [contemnor’s] arguments that his challenge
means that the judges [usurpers] of said COURT |[de-
facto] have such a personal interest [bias] in the
challenge that they are disqualified from deciding the
appeal’ by Federal Law. [App 6; 7.]
See; Owen v. Independence, 100 S.C.T. 1398, 445 US
622: Officers of the court have no immunity, when
violating a Constitutional right, from liability. For
they are deemed to know the law; and:
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) Expounds
upon Owen: “A bill of attainder...'ACT which inflects
punishment without judicial [lawful] trial”
Second, in Lee - no published state decision
directs flawless compliance with rules. Even if, STATE
V PALMER, 35 OR APP 125 (“defendant appearing pro se
must inform himself of and comply with court rules”)
is extended to civil plaintiffs, this application violates
federal due process. See, NAACP, 371 U.S. 415; Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715; and Johnson v. Avery, 89 S. Ct. 747
(1969) - Maty, 303 U.S. 197 (1938)
1Y
"Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving
at fair and just settlements of controversies. They
should not raise barriers which prevent the
achievement of that end. . . a just judgment."
Third, Lee “substantially complied” with the
state rule by challenging the ruling in clear terms.
See: Christianson v. Colt.. 486 U.S. 800, 818 and Melo
v. U.S. 505 F 2d 1026: “Once jurisdiction is challenged.
the court cannot proceed when it clearly appears that
the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority
to reach merits.”
See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 125 (1990)
(an objection which is ample and timely to bring the
alleged federal error to the attention of the lower court
and enable it to take appropriate corrective action is
sufficient to serve legitimate state interests). Herein,
appeals 'COURT' application of a stricter rule serves no
legitimate state interest and is therefore inadequate as
a matter of federal law. “[A] federal constitutional!
error can[not] be held harmless [unless] the court [is]
able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18.
24 (1967). O'Neal, 513 U.S. 432 applies the Chapman
standard, “civil and criminal harmless error standards
do not differ in their treatment of grave doubt as to the
harmlessness of errors affecting substantial rights.”
The State of Oregon Constitution also precludes
LAW impairing obligations of contracts. Article I, BILL
OF RIGHTS, Section 20: Section 21: Section 22, limits
suspension of laws to “Authority of the Legislative
20
Assembly:” Section 17, guarantees jury will decide
facts relating to injury and standing of parties; Section
10, § 1, 1s a_ prohibition guaranteeing de-jure
Constitutional Courts. Article IV, § 20: CAREY, 342 OR
530; - ENACTMENT via IMPLIED VERIFICATION - “shall be
void” - not in title of sub-ACT 'amendment' of VOID.
Oregon; ARTICLE I - BILL OF RIGHTS,
Section 17. Jury trial in civil cases.
In all civil cases the right of Trial by Jury shall remain
inviolate. Federal Law guarantees jury trial.
PRINCIPAL APPLICATION OF RULE OR LAW
(HELLER, 554 U.S. (2008)]:
The very enumeration of rights in Constitutions takes
out of the hands of government including judiciary
the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the
right is realiy worth insisting upon. Constitutional
rights are enshrined with the scope they were
understood to have when the People announced them.
Therefore, it is not up to future legislatures (temporary
voting majorities) or future judges to decide that the
Law is too broad or limiting.
REMEDY
The U.S. Supreme Court must fashion Equity
when what operates as State 'COURTS' are biased. As
remand to THISSTATE has resulted in a disability of the
U.S. supreme Court to carry a judgment into effect.
U.S. ARTICLE IV, Section 4, Subsection 2, dictates
action when the Court, expounding on_ the
Constitution, defines domestic Violence. Domestic
Violence, mandates Legislature or Executive action.
21
a
Hence, remedies in Hart’s case should be segmented,
assuming the Court defines domestic Violence, as
supplanting the State (People) of Oregon.
“The State AMICI in PHILIP MORRIS v.
WILLIAMS, No. 07-1216: “notes that, by statute, THIS
STATE is entitled to a portion of the punitive damages
award” REv. Or. Stat. § 31.731. “#.E.. JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT’s controller (OR. SUPREME COURT) has
about one hundred million reasons not to reduce that
punitive damage award. Loss of judicial integrity is
not limited to Oregon; see, No. 08-22, MASSEY COAL.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
It is the function of the United States supreme
Court, as the interpreter of the Constitution of
America, to say what is or 1s not “domestic Violence”
and to protect judicially the Constitution, thus, to
restrain the power of government(s) to corrupt.
Where errors of constitutional dimension occur,
judgment shall be vacated as void. Fed. Rule 60.
Purported judgments rendered by incompetent COURTS
de-facto are nullities and absent reversal deprive
parties of fundamental property rights and procedural
Due Process of Law. In order to render a judgment, a
court must be vested with some portion of the judicial
power limited by the sovereign People; otherwise the
proceeding is not a judicial proceeding and cannot yield
a judgment that can be carried into effect lawfully. As
enabled in this Court's decisions on when recusal is
mandatory.
i)
nN
The source of all judicial jurisdiction in Oregon
is found in the State Constitution and laws enacted in
comphance with the Constitution(s). Unlke the
United States Constitution, ARTICLE VII [original] of
the Oregen Constitution does not grant power to any
branch to create secret (undisclosed) courts. App 21.
The Oregon Constitution, as approved by the
U.S. Congress, prohibits what currently exists as super
legislature’s shadow GOVERNMENT de-facto that
supplants the State of Oregon in the form of 'SUPREME
COURT’s' JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT. App 22.
This Court’s holdings (Reid - Ryder) recognize
that legislative and judicial encroachments on the
jurisdiction of civil (common law) and military courts
as to deprive a party of the right to jury trial or
otherwise impose possibie bias of our treasured
constitutional protections (contained in U.S. Article III,
and the First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments), “which
were designed to protect persons from oppressive
governmental practices” are unconstitutional. Jd., 354
US 1 at 21-22 and 515 US 177. App 19.
Therefore, ACTS of shadow GOVERNMENT de-facto
are repressible in this Court because a void judgment
occurs where there is a plain usurpation of power. See
United States v. Tuttjung, 235 F3d 330, 335 (7'" Cir
2000), cert den 533 US 931, 121S Ct 2554, 150 L Ed 2d
721 (2001) (Judgment is void if court entered a decree
“not within the powers granted to it by the Law’):
Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F2d 58, 65 (2" Cir 1986) (“no
arguable basis’ for jurisdiction exists).
23
Petitioner has cited Constitutional violations
(1st, 5th, 7th, and 14th Amendments, and A. IV § 4,
the U.S. Constitution). This then is a writ of error to
what pretends to be the Supreme Court of Oregon, 'IT'
being highest tribunal supplanting the State of Oregon
(ORS 1.002); for denying review of APPEALS 'COURT's'
claim to jurisdiction - based on CAREY 342 OR 530.
Thus, the question is the validity of usurpation
of the State of Oregon Constitution. That-is-to-say,
creation in CAREY 203 OR APP 399 and CAREY 342 OR 530
(2007) of a new means by which shadow GOVERNMENT
de-facto can 'AMEND' the State and _ Federal
Constitutions. App 30.
Said ACTS being repugnant to the United States
Constitution, and the resulting denial of Due Process
being against the title, rights, privileges, or exemptions
specially set up-and claimed by Hart; this Court should
proceed under Article III, Original Jurisdiction (State
ex rel) and inform the Legislature or Executive, as the
taint from Oregon is infecting the spinal column of
American democracy. 1
' The Federalist No. 83, p. 426 (M. Beloff ed. 1987).
Alexander Hamilton wrote that "[t]he friends and
adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree
in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set
upon the trial by jury: Or if there is any difference
between them, it consists in this, the former regard it as
a valuable safeguard to liberty, the latter represent it as
the very palladium of free government."
24
This concern to the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction exists as Petitioner is a Citizen of the
United States, residing in Oregon, and Respondent
THIS STATE’S SUPREME 'COURT' de-facto supplanting
Oregon, is GOVERNMENT de-facto. Which in case
number 07-1216 (Philip Morris v. Williams), has
refused to follow this Court’s remand.
Ergo, this Court's lack of ability to compel
appears to require application of Original Jurisdiction
or Mandamus to the U. S. Legislature or Executive,
should this Court find the ACTS in Oregon to be
“domestic Violence.”
CONCLUSION
When the 13-Colonies asserted the Laws of
Nature (being defined by developing common law) as
superior to the King’s Law, by ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION they created a GOVERNMENT de-facto.
This usurpation, believed to be a better form by the
Colonist, was acknowledged by the King of England in
exchange for all mineral rights in America. Ergo,
GOVERNMENT de-facto became de jure.
However, said Articles of Confederation did not
restrain human nature, so persons in public offices
abused power for their own (KINGLY) benefit. The
Founders resolved most forms of abuses of the People
when the United States Constitution of America
replaced the Confederation, thus guaranteeing a
separation of powers of Government and providing
checks on abuses of trust by public officers.
25
However, if State Constitutions can be changed
as alleged in CAREY 203 OR APP 399 and 342 OR 530,
what then prevents a temporary majority from a
hostile nation (or corporation) from usurping a State
and supplanting the State Constitution?
And, if they are successful, what is to prevent
said hostile majority from continuing the process in
another State? Eventually, if this process is allowed
to continue, the Federal Courts will be compromised by
members hostile to the interests of the People of the
United States of America; invoking involuntary
servitude, such as now prevails in Oregon. App 18.
ARTICLE IV, charging “the United States shall”
does not exempt the Judicial Branch from explaining
what is or is not “domestic Violence.” This Case
provides an opportunity to enlighten the World on why
the Founders believed the United States of America’s
experiment of restraint on human nature can and
should continue (to prevent violence). App 34.
SHOCKINGLY EXCESSIVE
The decision whether a judge's impartiality can
“reasonably be questioned” is to be made in light of the
facts as they existed, and not as they were surmised or
reported. See, Microsoft, 503 U.S. 1301.
Petitioner filed Complaint against SAFEWAY
Inc., for injuries (his bodily injury occurred on or about
Aug. 25, 2003). resulting from SAFEWAY’s operation
of a grocery store in Oregon.
26
Bodily injury came about from either negligence
or deliberate disregard for safety of shoppers. Bodily
injury is supported by statements of Witnesses.
SAFEWAY Inc., has not denied negligence.
SAFEWAY’s doctor confirmed painful injury to Hart’s
sacroiliac joint that “will require periodic treatments
for the rest of your life.”
SAFEWAY Inc., moved for amendments to
Hart's Complaint. The first amended Complaint was
filed about 45-days after grant of SAFEWAY’s motion.
SAFEWAY Inc., moved, in response, to strike
the amended complaint. CIRCUIT ordered Hart to
exclude: “manipulates employees and lawsuits to
minimize payments on claims instead of
preventing accidents through better
training and supervision”
and to plead contract violations with more certainty.
Petitioner sought an extension of time when his
father was injured (then died). SAFEWAY Inc., moved
for dismissal or extension of time to prepare for trial:
arguing Hart has not filed a second amended complaint
as required under {a 10-day filing option} ORCP 15 B(2).
SAFEWAY’s Counsel did not mail said motion to Hart
in a timely manner.
CIRCUIT stated (during oral arguments on
SAFEWAY’s motion to dismiss):
T/S-P.13. “I don't think I have any choice
under the circumstances .. . motion to dismiss
the complaint will be allowed.”
27
[TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAL (T/S) is
incomplete/inaccurate. [App 5]
Before SAFEWAY’s dismissal with prejudice,
without costs, filed, Hart moved for reconsideration;
citing violation of federal due process and filed second
amended Complaint. [App 2.]
Pro tem CIRCUIT JUDGE Redman derives most of
his income by representing Corporations. Ergo,
awarding SAFEWAY INC., immunity to suit, should be
viewed with suspicion, as Redman appears biased.
On 'APPEAL' due process violations were raised
in opening brief. After opening brief filed SAFEWAY’s
Counsel moved to supplement with TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAL. T/S - P. 4., establishes that
Counsel, for SAFEWAY Inc., cx-parte, perpetrated a
fraud upon CIRCUIT 'COURT' to bias 'IT in favor of
dismissal. Counsel had previously focused JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT's attent?en on Hart’s efforts to return
Oregon to a State in good standing under the United
States Constitution.
Do THIS STATE’s - DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE — ACTIVISTS’
Ac Ts... bias, violate Law?
Petitioner, when injured by SAFEWAY Inc.,
sought remedy via THIS STATE’s CIRCUIT 'COURT' -
proceeding under the directives of - Texas v. White, 74
U.S. 700 (1868). However, the problem with assuming
that some extrajudicial FIAT, of GOVERNMENT de-facto,
can be held de jure when reviewed by Lawful
28
authority, presupposes that GOVERNMENT de-facto
action will be transparent in regard to when the
interest of said GOVERNMENT de-facto will be served by
said FIAT. The lack of confidence, then, is in how to
prevent obstructions of Justice that render jurisdiction
moot. One option could be salutary contracts, as used
by Governor (President) Jefferson. Another lies in our
faith in the absolute integrity of judicial process to
protect an Individual’s life - property rights.
WHEREFOR Petitioner MOVES:
1. For redress in the form of an order directing
defendant SAFEWAY Inc., to pay double the
damages requested in second Amended
Compliant.
bo
For legal expenses and interest dating from said
injuries.
3. For release from custody of shadow
GOVERNMENT de-facto in Oregon; reversal of so-
called cost award to SAFEWAY, issued for
Hart’s Contempt of 'COURTS' usurping Oregon.
4. For what other relief the United States supreme
Court deems Just and Equitable.
For Application to the Legislature, or of the
Executive, if the Court determines “domestic
Violence” is occurring in Oregon.
ef
Charged, May 8, 2009, By - /S/
Curtis Hart
IYO
APPENDIX A [not attached] please designate
certiorari case number 06-790 (LINCOLN LOAN CO. YV.
THE CITY OF PORTLAND, OR) that documents usurpation
-the fact that no State of Oregon Courts are
available as App. A and make it a part herein.
App. |
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF
OREGON FOR THE COUNTY OF CLACKAMAS
Curtis Hart, | Case No. CV 05 080502
Plaintiff, | ORDER GRANTING
Vv | DEFENDANT
SAFEWAY, INC., | SAFEWAY, INC.’S
Defendant. | MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS MATTER came before the court on July
10, 2006, before the Honorable James Redmond[SIc*}],
on defendant Safeway, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss or in
the Alternative Postpone Trial Date. Plaintiff
appeared pro se and Defendant appeared through its
attorney, Barry M. Mount and Jennifer A. Durham.|[*]
The court having heard arguments, read_ the
memoranda submitted by the parties, and being fully
advised in the premises, now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Safeway's
Motion to Dismiss is granted and this case is
dismissed, and Safeway's alternative Motion to
Postpone is moot.
aug
DATED this _3_ of duty: 2006
_?T W~rt 7? Circuit Court Judge
[*Mr. Redman set on the case not “Redmond”
SUBMITTED BY: Barry M. Mount, OSB No. 69127
of Attorneys for Defendant Safeway, Inc.
* Not to be confused with so-called Justice DODRHAM
App. 2
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE STATE OF OREGON
FOR THE COUNTY OF CLACKAMAS
Curtis Hart, Plaintiff, | Case No. CV 05 080502
Vv |
SAFEWAY, INC., | GENERALJUDGMENT
Defendant. | OF DISMISSAL
Based upon the ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT SAFEWAY, INC.’S MOTION TO
DISMISS in the above-entitled matter,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
that this case is dismissed with prejudice and without
costs to any party,
aug
DATED this 3 duty, 2006.
_?T Kom?
Circuit Court Judge
SUBMITTED BY:
Barry M. Mount, OSB No. 69127
of Attorneys for Defendant Safeway, Inc.
App. 3
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE STATE OF OREGON
FOR THE COUNTY OF CLACKAMAS
Curtis Hart, Plaintiff, Case No. CV 05 080502
|
Vv | ORDER ON
SAFEWAY, INC., | PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
Defendant. | ON JURISDICTION
THIS MATTER came before the court on June
11, 2007, before the Honorable James E. Redman, on
plaintiffs “Motion on Jurisdiction via Show Cause and
transcript Dispute.’ Plaintiff appeared pro se and
defendant appeared through its attorneys. Pamela Jd.
Stendahi and Jennifer A. Durham. The court having
heard arguments, read the memoranda submitted by
the parties, and being fully advised in the premises
now therefore, finds that this court lacks jurisdiction
because this action is pending in the court of appeals,
and based upon ORS 19.270, and there fore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that plaintiffs motion is abated.
DATED this _ of June, 2007.
JAMES E. REDMAN
Circuit Court Judge
SUBMITTED BY:
Pamela J. Stendahi, OSB No. 894160
Of Attorneys for Defendant Safeway, Inc.
App. 4
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF OREGON
Curtis Hart, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Vv
SAFEWAY, INC., Defendant-Respondent.
Clackamas County Circuit Court No.
CV05080502
Court of Appeals No, A133212
ORDER DENYING “COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY ARBITRATION ON SHOW
CAUSE FOR JURISDICTION”
To the extent that appellant purports to initiate
an original declaratory relief action in this court, the
complaint is dismissed, because ;the Court of Appeals
does not have jurisdiction to entertain a declaratory
rehef action. In the alternative, appellant requests
that this court transfer the case to federal court.
Appellant does not identify to which federal court the
case should be transferred. In any event, appellant
does not identify any legal authority for an
intermediate state appellate court to transfer a case to
any federal court and the court is not aware of any
such authority. Appellant's request for a transfer on
the case to federal court is denied.
Appellant's reply brief is due 21 days from the
date of this order.
Jul 30 2007 /s/ David V. Brewer
DAVID V. BREWER, CHIEF JUDGE
c: Curtis Hart [&] Pamela J. Stendahi
App. 5
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF OREGON
Curtis Hart, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
SAFEWAY, INC., Defendant-Respondent.
Clackamas County Circuit Court CV045080502
A133212
ORDER ACKNOWLEDGING INACCURACIES
IN ORDER BUT AFFIRMING RULING;
ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS
I
By order dated July 30.2007, the court disposed
of appellant’s “Motion to Determine Jurisdiction and
Show Cause, Why Transcript and Bias Should be
Allowed”. Appellant has filed a paper entitled “Please
Show Cause for Obstructing Process” in which he
points out that the order incorrectly suggests that he
designated a transcript of oral proceedings in the trial
court as part of the record on appeal. Appellant is
correct that he did not designate any transcript, but,
rather, respondent moved to supplement the record
with a transcript of a particular hearing. However,
that does not change the court’s ruling that, if
appellant contends that the transcript inaccurately
depicts the oral proceedings of the hearing, his remedy
was to file timely a motion te correct the transcript.
Appellant argues that he timely filed a motion that
challenged the accuracy of the transcript. If so, it
appears that, by order entered on June 25, 2007, the
court - disposed of that motion.
App. 6
Appellant also disputes that Carey v. Lincoln
Loan Co., 342 Or 530 (2006), disposes of his challenge
to the lawfulness of this court, or at least the
lawfulness of this court making rulings in this case. If
the court understands appellant's argument, he
contends that (1) this court does not lawfully exist; (2)
appellant is challenging the lawfulness of the existence
of this court; (3) the judges of this court have a
personal interest in the outcome of the appeal; and (4)
therefore, the judges are disqualified from making
rulings in the case. Because Carey disposes of the first
premise of appellant’s argument, his argument fails.
Even if Carey does not dispose fully of appellant’s
argument regarding the lawfulness of the existence of
this court, the court rejects appellant's argument that
his challenge means that the judges of the court have
such a personal interest in the challenge that they are
disqualified from deciding the appeal.
To the extent that appellant intended his filing
to be a motion for reconsideration of the July 30, 2007,
order, except as to corrections noted in this order, the
July 30, 2007, order is reaffirmed.
a.
Appellant also has filed a four-page document
partially entitled “Objection to Filing Briefin De-Facto
‘Court of Appeals” in which he requests that all judges
of this court remove themselves from the case,
reiterating his argument that (1) this court does not
lawfully exist: (2) appellant is challenging the
lawfulness of the existence of this court; (3) the judges
App. 7
of this court have a personal interest in the outcome of
this appeal; and (4) therefore, the judges are
disqualified from making rulings in the case. The
motion is denied on the same grounds as indicated in
Part I of this order.
ITI.
Appellant further has filed a one-page document
so partially entitled “Objection to Filing Reply Brief
in De-Facto 'Court of Appeals” in which, on the same
grounds, appellant objects to the court establishing a
period of 21 days in which appellant should file his
reply brief. The objection is overruled.
ITI.
Appellant’s reply brief is due 21 days from the
date of this order. Appellant’s failure to file a reply
brief within that time will result in the appeal being
submitted to the court for decision without a reply
brief. No motion filed by appeliant will toll the due
date of appellant’s reply brief.
Jan 11 2008 /si DVB _|
DAVID V. BREWER,
CHIEF JUDGE
C: Curtis Hart
Pamela J. Stendahi
App. 8
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OREGON
Curtis Hart, Plaintiff-Relator,
SAFEWAY, INC., Defendant-Adverse Party.
Clackamas County Circuit Court
CV05080502
S055695
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
Upon consideration by the court.
The court construes relator’s “response to adverse
partys memorandum in opposition to petition for
alternative writ. of mandamus” as a petition for
reconsideration, and orders that it be denied.
April 16, 2008 s/
CHIEF JUSTICE
Pamela J Stendahi
Curtis Hart
App. 9
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OREGON
Curtis Hart, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Petitioner on Review,
V
SAFEWAY, INC., Defendant-Respondent,
Respondent on Review.
Court of Appeals
A133212
S055695
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
Upon consideration by the court.
The court has considered the petition for
reconsideration and orders that it be denied.
December 10, 2008/s/ P~~~ Bn~~y
CHIEF JUSTICE
C: Pamela J Stendahi
Curtis Hart
App. 10
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OREGON
Curtis Hart, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Petitioner on Review,
Vv
SAFEWAY, INC., Defendant-Respondent,
Respondent on Review.
Court of Appeals
A133212
S055695
ORDER DENYING REVIEW
Upon consideration by the court.
The court has considered the petition for review
and orders that it be denied.
October 3, 2008 /s/ R~i~ Ki~te~n
PRESIDING JUSTICE
Cc: Pamela J Stendahi
Curtis Hart
App. I1
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF OREGON
Curtis Hart, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
SAFEWAY, INC., Defendant-Respondent.
Clackamas County Circuit Court CV05080502
A133212
ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO HOLD IN
ABEYANCE AND
ORDER AWARDING COSTS
AND DISBURSEMENTS
Respondent, who prevailed on appeal, has filed
a cost bill in the amount of $721.28. Appellant has
filed objections, and has moved for the court to hold
respondent's cost bill in abeyance pending resolution of
a petition for review in the Supreme Court. The
motion is denied.
Appellant's objections are overruled, and
respondent is awarded costs in the amount requested,
$721.28.
AUG 25 2008 /s/ Ri~~ H~~~~
RICK HASELTON, PRESIDING JUDGE
Cc: Curtis Hart
Pamela J. Stendahi
App. 12
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OREGON
Curtis Hart, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Petitioner on Review,
y
SAFEWAY, INC., Defendant-Respondent,
Respondent on Review.
Court of Appeals
A133212
S055695
ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND
DEMAND FOR RECUSAL
Upon consideration by the court.
Petitioner on review’s “motion for declaration of
rights, and demand for recusal’ is denied.
April 8, 2009 ~ N~ ~~]
Gillete
PRESIDING
JUSTICE
C: Pamela J Stendahi
Curtis ~ Hart
App. 13 [C page 1]
The United States Constitution of America:
ARTICLE I:
§10. NoState shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance,
or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque or
Reprisal: coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of
Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto
Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State, without the Consent of Congress... .,
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War,
unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger
as will not admit of delay.
ARTICLE IV:
§2. The Citizens ofeach State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States.
§4. The United States shall guarantee toevery State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and
shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic Violence.
ARTICLE VI:
42. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
App. 14 [C page 2]
Amendment:
J. Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
IV. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
V. No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury. except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law, nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
VII. In suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
App. 15 [C page 3]
United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.
XIII. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shail have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
U.S., or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
XIV. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life. liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law
App. 16 [C page 4]
Fed. Rule Civ. P. 60(b)
RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT OR ORDER
(B) Grounds for Relief froma Final Judgment,
Order or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the
court may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons:
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that , with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b):
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by
an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied; released, or
discharged; it 1s based on an earlier judgment
that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
App. 17 {S} 1]
SUPPLANTS (USURPATIONS) OF
THE STATE OF OREGON COURTS
ANNOTATED - 2009
The State of Oregon Supreme Court, as
proffered by the People of Oregon, and approved by the
UInited States Legislature, was usurped (supplanted)
via 1878-ACT. CLINE V. GREENWOOD, 10 OR 230 (1882):
Although invested with the same supreme judicial
power, it is not the same supreme court which existed
prior to implementation of the 1878-ACT.
Under the ACT of 1878, providing for election of
supreme and circuit judges in distinct classes, the
election was postponed until the next general election.
By virtue of an emergency clause, 1878-ACT took effect
from and after its approval by the governor. In the
meantime, OFFICES created by 1878-ACT were filled by
appointment by the governor.
1878-ACT violated the State of Oregon and United
States Constitutions.
IN re AH LEE, 5 F. 899 (1880):
Held, 1878-ACT was unconstitutional, because the
population of Oregon was less than 200,000, and that
the appointments by the governor were therefore
invalid, and also because the constitution only
authorized the selection of such judges by election, still
the persons so appointed under 1878-ACT and
performing the duties of the judges of said COURTS
were judges de facto... person thus appointed should
take upon himself the duties of that OFFICE, he would
be a judge of the supreme COURT de-facto.
App. 18 {S} 2
BURT v. WINONA, 31 Minn. 472, 18 N.W. 285:
But I am unable to concur in the views expressed in
the majority opinion, that even if the ACT creating the
COURT was never constitutionally passed, still it would
be a de facto COURT. The logical result of this would be
that the person assuming to act as JUDGEof that COURT
would be an officer de facto, and the judgments of the
COURT as valid as those of a legal court.
There are many cases to the effect that a person
holding an office under an unconstitutional LAW is an
officer de facto, but I think that in every one it will be
found that there was a legal office, and that the law
only went to the mode or manner of filling it.
As suggested in the opinion, the de facto
doctrine is founded on reasons of public policy and
necessity, but it must have some reasonable limits,
unless we are ready to recognize practical
revolution and legislative right to ignore all
constitutional barriers. [18 N.W. 285]
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886);
Ruling Case Law, Mckinney (1917) P.518:
If the Constitution controls
there never can be COURTS de-facto.
STATE EX REL MCINTIER AND HULL V. BALMER, 336 OR 1
(2003):
By the ACT- “the 1878 Legislative Assembly adopted
a general LAW that completely reorganized the judicial
branch... created two ‘distinct classes' of COURTS, (1)
a Supreme COURT; and (2) a separate trial division of
the judiciary consisting of ‘circuit judges’. Hence, to
App. 19 {Sj 3]
the present day, JUDGES of this [ARTICLE SEVEN
(AMENDED)] SUPREME 'COURT' [supplanting the State]
of Oregon have been part of a ‘distinct class' that the
[SUPER] legislature [GOVERNMENT de-facto] chose to
have the people elect from the state as a whole.”
Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995):
The de facto officer doctrine which confers validity
upon acts performed under the color of official title
even though it is later discovered that the legality of
the actor’s appointment or election to {a valid] office is
deficient. cannot. be invoked to authorize the actions of
the judges in question. Held:
The Court of Military Appeals erred in according
de facto validity to the actions of the civilian
judges petitioner challenged the composition of
that COURT as violative of the Appointments
Clause of the Constitution.
HOLMAN ETAL. V. LUTZ ET, 132 OR 185 (1930):
The persons appointed as JUDGES under this
1878-ACT, although its unconstitutionality be
admitted, and that therefore they are not judges de
jure or of right, are nevertheless, acting as judges of
constitutionally created and existing courts. .. or
acquiescence by the public in the ACTS of such OFFICER
for such a length of time as to raise the presumption
of colorable [bad] right by election ur appointment.
MCINTIER V FORBS, 322 OR 426, 436; EKWALL V
STADELMAN, 146 OR 449, 450:
“The very enumeration of limitations on office in the
State of Oregon Constitution excludes the idea that, in
App. 20 {S} 4]
the adoption of the constitution, the People intended
that there should be any other qualifications. As was
said by Madison in the convention which framed the
Constitution:”
“The qualifications of electors and elected are
fundamental articles in a republican government,
and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the
legislature could regulate those of either, it can by
degrees subvert the Constitution.”
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803):
“To what purpose are powers limited, and to what
purpose is that limitation committed to writing if these
limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to
be restrained? The distinction between a Government
with limited and unlimited powers is abolished if those
limits do not confine the persons on whom they are
imposed and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of
equal obligation.”
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821):
“The Constitution and laws of a State, so far as they
are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the
United States, are absolutely void.”
The State of Oregon Constitution precludes so-called
COURTS de-facto.
Article I, fa] BILL OF RIGHTS, Section [(S.)]10.
Administration of justice.
No court shall be secret, but justice shall be
administered, openly and without purchase,
completely and without delay, and every man
shall have remedy by due course of law for injury
App. 21 {8} 5]
done him in his person, property, or reputation.
A prohibition: No court shall be - Secret: —
unconstitutional, ulterior, undisclosed, unexpressed,
unwritten, hidden, obscure, covert, stealthy, concealed.
Adjective, laying behind what is
manifest or avowed.
The Oregon Constitution also prevents
extrajudicial COURTS by assigning power.
Article VII:
Section 1. Courts in which judicial power vested.
The Judicial power of the State shall be vested in a
Suprume (sic) Court, Circuits Courts, and County
Courts, which shall be Courts of Record having general
jurisdiction, to be defined, limited, and regulated by
law in accordance with this Constitution.—dJustices of
the Peace may also be invested with limited Judicial
powers, and Municipal Courts may be created to
administer the regulations of incorporated towns, and
cities.—
Section 2. The Supreme Court shall consist of Four
Justices to be chosen in districts by the electors
thereof, who shall be citizens of the United States, and
who shall have resided in the State at least three years
next preceding their election, and after their election to
reside in thei respective districts:—The number of
Justices, the Districts may be increased, but shall not
exceed five until the white population of the State shall
amount to One Hundred Thousand, and shall never
exceed seven; and the boundaries of districts may be
changed, but no Change of Districts, shall have the
effect to remove a Judge from office, or require (sic)
him to change his residence without his consent.—
App. 22 {S} 6]
Section 5. Chief Justice. The Judge who has the
shortest term to serve, or the oldest of several having
such shortest term, and not holding by appointment
shall be the Cheif (sic) Justice.
Section 6. Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court shall
have jurisdiction only to revise the final decisions of
the Circuit Courts, and every cause shall be tried, and
every decision shall be made by those Judges only, or
a majority of them, who did not try the cause, or make
the decision in the Circuit Court.—
Section 8. Circuit court. The Circuits Courts shall be
held twice at least in each year in each County
organized for judicial purposes, by one of the Justices
of the Supreme Court at times to be appointed by law;
and at such other times as may be appointed by the
Judges severally in pursuance of law.—
Section 9. Jurisdiction of circuit courts. All
judicial power, authority, and jurisdiction not vested by
this Constitution, or by laws consistent therewith,
exclusively in some other Court shall belong to the
Circuit Courts, and they shall have appellate
jurisdiction, and supervisory control over the County
Courts, and all other inferior Courts, Officers, and
tribunals.—
Section 10. Supreme and circuit judges; election
in classes. When the white population of the State
shall amount to Two Hundred Thousand the
Legislative Assembly, may provide for the election of
Supreme, and Circuit Judges, in distinct classes, one of
which classes shall consist of three Justices of the
Supreme Court, who shall not perform Circuit duty,
and the other class shall consist of the necessary
number of Circuit Judges, who shall hold full terms
App. 23 {S} 7]
without allotment, and who shall take the same oath
as the Supreme Judges.—
Section 21. Oath of office of Supreme Court
Judges. Every judge of the Supreme Court before
entering upon the duties of his office shall take,
subscribe, and transmit to the Secretary of State the
following oath.—I do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the
United States, and the constitution of the State of
Oregon, and that I will faithfully, and impartially
discharge the duties of a Judge of the Supreme, and
Circuits Courts of said, State according to the best of
my ability, and that I will not accept any other office,
except Judicial offices during the term for which I have
been elected.— [See SEVEN (AMENDED) '7 OATH to THIS
STATE!]
1878-ACT is also unconstitutional in ‘ITS'
application: Article VII: Section (S.) 10; only authorizes
“Legislative Assembly, may provide for the election of
Supreme, and Circuit Judges, in distinct classes.”
To read a limitation - as a grant to create courts
- impairs the obligations of the contracts (State and
Federal Constitutions); disregards the plain language
in S. 2: (Supreme Court shall consist of Four Justices
but shall never exceed seven) which confirms, S. 2
is not replaced by S. 10. Nothing in Oregon’s
Constitution supports the view that legislatures, or
judges, are granted power to create extrajudicial
‘COURTS’.
App. 24 {S} 8]
SMOTHERS V. GRESHAM TRANSFER, INC., 332 OR 83
(1999):
*115. Constitutions are contracts, Oregon’s
Constitution is generally one of limitation, therefore to
be construed according to the beliefs and usage of
language applicable when adopted. Every word must
be considered to have importance; though, the
Constitution is construed as a whole.
*91. The Oregon Constitution was adopted in 1859.
The principle that the law makes available a remedy
for injury comes from the common law.
*95. The common law protected individuals by
placing substantive restraints on both the Crown and
Parliament. History also had taught the American
colonists that ... their rights were not safe from the
arbitrary exercise of government power unless they
were embodied in positive law. SMOTHERS at *101.
*105. Constitution writers realized that unrestrained
state legislative power was as much a threat to the
security of individual rights as unrestrained
parliamentary and royal power had been.
*106. One of the notable features of all state
constitutions that were drafted in the mid-nineteenth
century was the mistrust of legislative power.
*113. Like their Indiana counterparts, the drafters of
the Oregon Constitution were leery of legislative
power.
App. 25 {S} 9]
Expounding on the Oregon Constitution given said
drafter’s mistrust of Legislative Assembly power; we
must read Article VII, Section (S.) 10, as authorizing:
“Legislative Assembly may provide for the election of
Supreme, and Circuit Judges, in distinct classes
[units], one of which classes [units] shall consist of
three [district elected (S. 2)] Justices of the Supreme
Court, who shall not perform Circuit duty, [the other
Justices, of the Supreme Ccurt (elected from up to
four state inclusive districts) will continue to serve
Circuits (S. 8)] and the other [election class [sub-unit]
provided] shall consist, of the necessary number of
Circuit Judges [as may be set by the Supreme Judges
severally in pursuance of law (S. 8)],who shall hold
full terms without allotment, and who shall take the
same [(S. 21)] oath as the Supreme Judges.”
The Oregon Judicial Branch, A. VII, formed on
the proper respect of government, limited the political
abuse of election of Justices to districts. If Legislative
Assembly activated Sec. 10, each of the three Justices,
who shall not perform Circuit duty, would be elected
from, and representative of, one third of Oregon.
The (up to four) Justices (who shall perform
Circuits duty) are elected from, in contact with, and
representative of one fourth of Oregon t.e., their
districts cross-section (? ##,) Oregon. Said Justices are
assisted by as many Circuit Judges as necessary.
However, Circuit Courts (via Section 9, primarily:
“have appellate jurisdiction, and supervisory control
over the County Courts, and all other inferior Courts
Officers, and tribunals.”
App. 26 {S} 10]
Thus, district-elections limits ‘judge’s' affect
(bias) on judicial promulgations. See, Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339; The Law of Torts, 1642-1643:
“The presence of malice and the intention to deprive a
person of his constitutional rights he exercises no
discretion or individual judgment; he acts no longer as
a judge, but as a 'minister' of his own prejudices.”
STATE V. COCHRAN, 55 OR 157 (1909):
Assumes, 1878-ACT “writes into the State
Constitution new provisions.” Applying the same
reasoning COCHRAN argues ‘made provision for a
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT on the supposition that Article
VII, Section 10 supplants Section 2. Then recognizing
that S. 5, continues to regulate (‘the judge who has the
shortest term to serve, or the oldest of several having
such shortest term ... shall be the Chief Justice),
conflicts — ‘so long as there are but three justices, there
cannot be two holding terms of equal length. I[f, as
contended, when the ACT of 1878 brought Section 10
into operation, *190 1878-ACT blotted out all trace of
Section 2; such annihilation, would also have carried
with it Section 5. (And, Sections, 6, 8, 9, & 21; also,
eliminates Article XVIII and Article I, BILL OF
RIGHTS, Section 10; in-effect revolutionize the State
of Oregon Constitution).
Said COCHRAN case premises on fact - 1878-ACT
supplanted with supreme 'COURT' de-facto, but left
Circuit Courts with supervisory and appellate
jurisdiction over said inferior supreme TRIBUNAL. To
maintain their government de-facto ACTIVISTS
“proposed amendment including a proposed change of
App. 27 {S} 15]
our entire judicial system.” The proposals to
revolutionize the State Constitution, by “the judiciary
committee (always composed of lawyers) in both
branches of the Legislature” failed. Said proposals
were then packaged as 'ARTICLE SEVEN (AMENDED)' to
the 1910-voters; who rejected 'IT'. Fraud was used to
make 'IT' appear to have passed; see, CAREY, 203 OR
APP 399 - STATE EX REL. LINCOLN LOAN, 336 OR 9 (2003).
STATE EX REL WERNMARK V. HOPKINS, 213 OR “ 637:
With adoption of ARTICLE SEVEN (AMENDED), the parts
of .he original Article VII which bore that numeral and
in conflict with it were, of course, repealed. The other
parts which did not conflict with the NEW and which
were complementary to the LATTER remained in force
but were degraded in rank to the point where the
legislature [(super legislature) t.e., SUPREME COURT de-
facto] is authorized to repeal or amend them. FEHI V.
JACKSON COUNTY, 117 OR 200, speaks to that effect. It
held that after the adoption of ARTICLE SEVEN
(AMENDED) so-called JUDGES “were not the incumbents
of constitutional offices.” [Became 'JUDGES' of JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT.| [PLAIN USURPATION].
STARR V. LAUNDRY, 155 OR 636, 643 (1936):
“In Oregon CIRCUIT COURTS are not supported by any
express constitutional provisions, nor does the
constitution expressly confer jurisdiction to issue
Injunction upon any TRIBUNAL. The original Article VIT
of Oregon has been supplanted in this respect by the
present ARTICLE SEVEN” AMENDMENTS, plural, violating
the State of Oregon Constitution; see, Article XVII.
App. 28 {S} 12]
STATE EX REL. RICCO v. BIGGS, 255 P.2d 1055 (1953):
“We may just as well face the facts of judicial life in
Oregon. They are not the same as in other states .
., OUR CIRCUIT COURTS do not exercise all the inherent
powers of the common law courts.” “Inherent powers
of common law courts . . . may be in Oregon the
substance of things hoped for, but they have little
relation to actualities here. I happen to be one of those
who would have it otherwise, but I do not believe that
the JUDGES of this [SUPREME] COURT have a commission
to remold our judicial system [i.e., 'THEIR' JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT] nearer to the heart's desire.”
See, STATE EX REL MADDEN V. CRAWFORD, 207 OR 76:
THIS STATE, identify by ORS 131.205, as GOVERNMENT
de-facto, supplants the power of the People (State) of
Oregon; is only GOVERNMENT created by the
constitution, ITSELF.
In-other-words, an unlawful replacement of the
State occurred when ARTICLE SEVEN AMENDMENTS
usurped, by fraudulent appearance in the Oregon
Constitution. As ARTICLE SEVEN (AMENDED),
designated “one supreme court” into which all
“judicial power of the state shall be vested.”
By import, new so-called ‘SUPREME COURT’ de-
facto supplants all policy-making (Governmental)
authority of the State. Holding dominion via JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT (departure-from-what-is-meant) of
Government. See, ORS 1.002, ' 1, defining THIS STATE’S
“Highest TRIBUNAL of JUDICIAL DEPARTMEN’”’
thereby, CONTROLLER of all policy in Oregon.
App. 29 {S} 13]
As said in Batchelor v, Cupp, 693 F.2d 859.
“The Attorney General asserts that the Oregon
Supreme Court [supplanting via ARTICLE SEVEN
(AMENDED)] is a_ policy-making COURT, not an
error-correcting court, and that it would be
inappropriate to require the Oregon SUPREME COURT to
review a petition to uncover mere trial errors, even
those of constitutional magnitude.”
CAREY V. LINCOLN LOAN CO., 203 OR APP 399, 125 P3d
814 (2006):
Defendant argues that none of ARTICLE SEVEN
(AMENDED) is part of the constitution because the
procedures that led to its purported adoption did not
comply with constitutional standards.
The consequence according to defendant, is that Article
VII (Original) is the only valid constitutional provision
governing the judiciary.
Thus, the courts that Article VII (Original), names are
the only constitutional permissible courts and the
legislature had no authority to create this COURT.
[Footnote (F/N)-5]
If defendant were correct, then the decisions of
this COURT since its creation in 1969 would
remain effective as those of a COURT de facto.
We would, however, have to stop functioning as
a COURT with regard to cases in which we have
not yet issued an appellate judgment.
The issue before us is not whether defendant's
challenge would have succeeded in 1910 but whether
it will succeed today. . . . The most significant
amendment to ARTICLE SEVEN (AMENDED) for the
App. 30 {S} 14]
purposes of this case, and the one on which we will
focus, was the adoption in 1962 of ARTICLE SEVEN
(AMENDED) [2b. . . or not to be].
In adopting § 2b, the people impliedly validated the
portion of § 1 that authorizes the [super] legislature to
create inferior COURT. If § 2b is itself valid, it validated
any violation of Article XVII, Section 1, that might
have occurred in the adoption of § 1.
We have not found any cases specifically dealing with
constitutional amendments that rely on defective
existing constitutional provisions.
However..., the Texas Supreme Court held that
the amendment validated the statute and thereby
validated the agreement at issue in the case. In doing
so. the court described the doctrine of implied
validation as providing that a_ constitutional
amendment will impliedly validate an existing ‘ACT’
that, without the amendment, would be beyond the
legislature's power to enact, so long as the validation
does not impair either the obligation of contracts or
vested rights. ... Thus, even if the adoption of ARTICLE
SEVEN (AMEND[MENTS]) was originally flawed - - - that
portion of it is now firmly established against a
challenge based on Article XVII, Section 1. [CAREY,
203, Supra]
THIS STATE’s APPEALS COURT de-facto deliberately
disregarded vested rights in Federal Due Process, 1.e.,
impartial judges.
App. 31 {S} 15]
Also, obligations of contracts, are violated by
application of 'IMPLIED SUBSEQUENT VALIDATION' -
Article IV, Section 22 -- Section 20:
Every Act shall embrace but one subject and
matters properly connected therewith, which
subject shall be expressed in the title. But if
any subject shall be embraced in an Act which
shall not be expressed in the title, such Act
shall be void only as to as much thereof as shall
not be expressed in the title.
THIS STATE’s “ONE SUPREME COURT" by ‘ITS' decree that
ARTICLE SEVEN (AMENDED) is now LAW, is the only
COURT de-facto created by, ITSELF. SEE STATE EX REL
MADDEN.
CAREY V. LINCOLN LOAN CO., 342 OR 530 (2007) [Made
unfit for U.S. cite; 154 p.3d 775]
Defendant argued that ARTICLE SEVEN (AMENDED) - -
which provides, in part, that “[t]he judicial power of the
state shall be vested in one supreme court and such
other courts as may from time to time be created by
law” - - was improperly adopted.
The COURTOF APPEALS rejected defendant’s argument,
holding that, even if the adoption of ARTICLE SEVEN
(AMENDED) were flawed, subsequent amendments to
that ARTICLE cured any defects... . We granted
defendant’s petition for review to consider defendant's
challenge to the constitutionality of the legislation that
created the COURT of Appeals. . .
§ 2 provided that the existing judicial system except as
expressly changed by the adoption of ARTICLE SEVEN
App. 32 {S} 16]
(AMENDED), would remain as it had been and also
granted the [new ONE] SUPREME COURT original
jurisdiction in mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus proceedings. § 3 contained a number of
provisions respecting the conduct of trials and appeals
from trial court decisions.
We now consider whether, assuming that the
initial adoption of ARTICLE SEVEN (AMENDED) in 1910
was improper [(1.e., unlawful)] people. . .cured defects.
The cases discussed above involve the subsequent
validation of defective statutes, rather than defective
constitutional provisions.
However, the same rational apples to the
people's constitutional authority to amend that organic
law: Irregularities in the people’s adoption of a
constitutional amendment may be cured by subsequent
constitutional amendments that the peopie enact that
implicitly validate the earlier, defective amendment.
Subsequent validation may not be sufficient to cure an
earlier defect if it would have the effect of impairing .
.. the obligation of contract or vested rights. . .
We therefore hold that ARTICLE SEVEN
(AMENDED) is NOW valid. [CAREY, 342 (2007)]
Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 350-351; Turner v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 466, 473:
Few, ifany, interests under the Constitution are
more fundamental than the right to a fair and
"impartial" trial, and an outcome affected by
extrajudicial statements on jurisdiction would
violate that fundament right.
App. 33 {S} 17]
HART V SAFEWAY INC., A133212 (2008):
“Even if CAREY [V. LINCOLN LOAN, 342 OR 530]
does not dispose fully of jour bias} appellant's
argument regarding the [un]lawfulness of the existence
of this COURT, the COURT rejects appellant’s argument
that his challenge means that 'JUDGES' [usurers] of this
COURT [de-facto*'’’] have such a personal [bias] interest
in the challenge that they are disqualified [by Federal
Law] from deciding the appeal.”
*See F/N-5 CAREY, 203 supra.
See, SMOTHERS; 332 Or 83 (2001):
124. “Oregon remedy clause identified absolute rights
respecting person, property, and reputation. ‘As to
those rights, the remedy clause provides, in
mandatory terms, that remedy by due course of
law shall be available to every person in the
event of injury.” [See, Article I, § 10, cited above,]
“The word 'remedy' refers both to a remedial process
for seeking redress for injury and to what is required
to restore a right that has been injured”
“legislature may abolish a common-law cause of 2ction,
so long as it provides a substitute remedial process in
the event of injury to the absolute rights.”
“Injury, in turn [spin], is a wrong or harm for which
a cause of action existed when the drafters wrote the
Oregon Constitution.” {[Emphasized]
*339. “ARTICLE I section 10, prescribes how justice
must be administered ia Oregon by identifying both a
prohibition (no court shall be secret [undisclosed])
and a directive (justice must be administered openly,
App. 34 {S} 18]
completely, and without purchase or delay).” The
“second clause protects rights respecting person,
property, and reputation by mandating affirmatively
that remedy by due course of law be available in the
event of injury to those rights.”
Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, {74 U.S. “ 733}
(1869); considered ACTS of CIVIL WAR, GOVERNMENT de-
facto, reasoning:
“That ACTS necessary to peace and good order
among citizens which would be valid if emanating
from a lawful government must be regarded in
general as valid when proceeding from an actual,
though unlawful, GOVERNMENT de-facto, and that
ACTS in furtherance of support of rebellion against
the United States, or intended to defeat the just
rights of citizens, and other ACTS of like nature,
must, in general, be regarded as invalid and void.”
STATE V. COCHRAN, 55 OR 157 (1909):
A peculiar situation confronts us at the very
threshold of this proceeding. The motion is not
addressed to those members of this body, who, it
is claimed by the plaintiff, are the constitutional
judges, but is addressed to the COURT, consisting
de facto of five persons; each claiming to be a
[SUPREME COURT de-facto] JUSTICE.
Withrow , 421 U.S. 35, 47.
“[P]robability of actual bias...is too high
to be constitutionally tolerable.”
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.