Opposition Brief — Jones v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC (No. 08-1450)
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Supteme Court, U.S.
FILED
No. 08-1450 AUG 2 1 2009
OFFICE OF THE SLE. ‘x
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Wnited States
LAVON JONES, JR.,
Petitioner,
9)
BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC,
Respondent.
On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
JEROME SCHREIBSTEIN
Law OFFICE OF JEROME SCHREIBSTEIN
275 Battery Street, 18th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 875-3355
Attorneys for Respondent
224710 ce
COUNSEL PRESS
(S00) 274-3321 * (S00) 359-6859
ai.
a
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Do the challenged decisions of the District Court
and Ninth Circuit, properly applying long-standing
jurisprudence in granting summary judgment in
favor of Respondent in a garden-variety
employment discrimination case, call for re-
examination of summary judgment principles in the
context of employment discrimination suits in total,
where there has not even been error shown below?
Should this Court grant review to consider
amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 to
create a special rule for employment discrimination
cases?
22
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT RULE 29.6
Respondent Bayer HealthCare LLC is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Bayer Corporation, an Indiana
corporation. Bayer Corporation is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Bayer AG, a German corporation whose
shares are publicly traded on the Frankfurt exchange.
Til
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENUGD «nce cicsseccises i
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT RULE
it co eee ee Cae eR OEE Cee ess il
Tess She GE ek eos x oa es 0s Fee iii
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ......... ix
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............... 1
Bi. TEMS OE TI Ce oss noice Sees ek 1
B. Statement of Relevant Facts ........... 1
l. Bayer’s Hematology/Cardiology
Global Business Unit ..... 2.2.2... ]
2. Petitioner Is Hired and Understands
his Bayer employment Is Governed
by Certain Rules of Conduct ....... 3
3. Bayer Promotes Petitioner and Pays
for his Technical Education ........ 4
4. Petitioner Has an Extensive History
of Interpersonal and Performance
Problems at Bayer, Including at Least
One Conflict with an African-
American Co-worker ........6...6.. 4
iv
Contents
Petitioner Is Selected to Be an HVAC
Mechanic-C; Later Promoted to
PUNE oe aa aos ea tana
The Crucial Importance of the HVAC
Systems at the Berkeley Site ......
Petitioner Was Extensively Trained
in the Requirements of Accurate
Record-keeping, Safety Protocols,
and Other Important Requirernents
of the HVAC Mechanic Position ....
In His Relatively Brief HVAC
Tenure, Petitioner Has Numerous
Inter-personal Problems with Co-
Workers, Violates Critical Policies and
Standards, Is Insubordinate,
and Is (Unsurprisingly) Lawfully
Terminated for These Reasons .....
a. Petitioner’s Rocky Probationary
a re he a
b. Petitioner Has a Loud, Profane
Altercation with a Co-worker ...
ec. Petitioner Is Counseled for His
Failure to Follow Equipment
Release and Lockout/Tagout
yg. a a re
Contents
Page
d. Petitioner Fails to Show up for
Critical Work Assignment on
January 6, 2008 after Working
Unauthorized Double Time the
Prior Evening; He Is Suspended
for Three Days as a Result ..... 11
e. Petitioner Abandons a Work
Assignment on January 24,
EE ia cok ee eee eee 13
f, In January 2003, Petitioner
Approaches Supervisor Smith
about the Possibility of a Further
Promotion; in Evaluating this
Request, the Company Learns
that Petitioner Has Improperly
Recorded the Completion of
Work, a Serious SOP Violation
which, in Context with Petitioner’s
Entire Bayer Work History,
Leads to His Lawful Termination
9. Petitioner Was Treated Equally with
Respect to All Terms and Conditions
of his Bayer Employment .......... 15
D.
vi
Contents
10. Petitioner Files EEOC Charge
Alleging Discrimination in Terms and
Conditions of Employment; Charge Is
Found Without Merit; Petitioner
Seeks Reconsideration and EEOC
Upholds Findings that Petitioner
Has No Evidence of Race
SPUMUIIIIINEENS 35k 5 8 Sh eb cess uevewies
The District Court’s Grant of Summary
Judgment in Respondent’s Favor ......
The Ninth Circuit Affirms .............
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ...
I.
Li.
THERE IS NO CONFLICT AMONG
py geo Ei yy a na ae
THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE AN
IMPORTANT FEDERAL QUESTION,
NOR DOES THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DECISION DEPART FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ..........
A. Summary Judgment Standards Are
Weil Established and Require no
PIO <5 65.55.5645 53 4405 8434008
Page
16
16
19
19
20)
ITI.
vil
Contents
B. Second Circuit Jurisprudence Does
Not Suggest a New or Different
Summary Judgment Standard for
Employment Discrimination Cases ...
C. Summary Judgment, as with Many
Other Procedural Devices Employed
By District Courts, Does Not Violate
the Seventh Amendment ..........
D. Petitioner’s Incomplete and
Misleading Use of Statistics Does Not
Provide an Appropriate Basis for a
Grant of Review Here .............
kK. Supreme Court Review Is Not
Intended to Correct Factual Errors
in Lower Court Decisions ..........
THE LOWER COURTS CORRECTLY
APPLIED LONG-STANDING LAW TO
THE FACTS BELOW IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT .............
A. Petitioner Does Not Even Assign
Error Concerning the Disposition of
his Discrimination-Based Claims ...
B. The Lower Courts Correctly Held
that Petitioner Had Not Adduced
Sufficient Evidence to Sustain his
Retaliation-Based Claims ..........
Page
23
31
vill
Cited Authorities
Page
1. The District Court Did Not Err
in Determining that Proximity
Evidence Alone Was Insufficient
to Create Triable Issue on
Respondent’s Supposed
Retaliatory Intent ............. 33
No
The Ninth Cireuit Did Not
Commit Reversible Error in its
Characterization of Richard
Smith’s Role in the Union
Meeting/Termination Process .. 36
3. The District Court Did Not Err in
Ignoring Supposed Factual
Conflicts in Record in Granting
Summary Judgment on
Petitioner’s Retaliation Claims .. 37
CONC LAFSEUEN 00s bienesedeecens £030 e6 eae 40
ix
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases:
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242
or 25
Burkes v. Wisconsin Dep't. of Transp., 464 F.3d
744 (7 Cir. 2006) 2... cee eee 26
Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d
1044 (9 Cir. 1995) 2.2... ee ce cee 39
Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968 (9" Cir.
2003) . cece cece ce ccccuueceeuueeeeevuueees 35
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) ........ 27
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S.
MU EIOUR) cccccccccccresccccescvesovesece 26, 27
Fogerty v. MGM Group Holdings Corp., 379 F.3d
348 (6 Cir. 2004) 2... ee ee ee ee ee eee 38
Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, Ltd.
Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219 (2™ Cir. 1994) ...22, 23, 24
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) .... 27
Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining
Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1981)... ec eee eee e ee ee 27
x
Cited Authorities
Page
Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551
Cr Re I ea ccbaceses ckenen saan saeneues 24
Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1484 (9" Cir.
|} ae ery ee ry 40
Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092 (9 Cir. 2002) .. 25
Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F.3d 792 (9 Cir.
DOE Sakon newek <0 cceedeaen Code 33, 34
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
SOE da aebedeeGesceucuesesara Teens ous 22, 23, 40
Miller v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 797 F.2d 727
Pn Re Sia ec bs doo eu Sheu oeeeEn ceases 35
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
SO Ws AOE 6 6-cecccutvubecaescadeses 25
Porter v. California Dept. of Corrections,
419 F.3d 885 (9™ Cir. 2005) .........cecccve 35
Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406
POR SE kcbacaven>dasecdevacverhaueeun 24
Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Comm. Coll. Dist.,
934 F.2d 1104 (9 Cir, 1991) .......ccecccces 25
Xl
Cited Authorities
Page
U.S. v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) .............. 31
Vilarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d
BOG CE Gs OUD cvcc cc cccvcececcccceseoss 39
Wallis v. J.R. Stmplot Co., 26 F.3d 885 (9" Cir.
Dis. 6t aac aeo chs Cee ee Seem Tes Cad 25, 40
United States Constitution:
United States Constitution,
Seventh Amendment .................. aed 27
Statutes:
oa fois. , ae eee Ae rae 29
Re Eat Ser rere re ae ae 29
— gtk Soe)” reer ern e rrr 29
California Fair Employment and Housing Act ... 18
Rules:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ...... 29
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ......i, 19, 20, 28
federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) ...... . Z]
xii
Cited Authorities
Page
United States Supreme Court Rule 10(a) .... 20, 28
United States Supreme Court Rule 29.6 ...... 11
Other Authorities:
California Constitution, Article Il, section 8 ... 18
Discharge Is Now Major Focus of Job
Discrimination Suits, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
BUG, BG CHM, B, SUES cece ccvecnccsacesser 29
Marika F. X. Litras, Ph.D., Civil Rights
Compluints in U.S. District Courts, 1990-98,
PG EPG es COM, BO coc cvccecsvecescssss 29
Office of Human Resources and Statistics,
Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics
i. Pe | ae 29
Report on Summary Judgment Practice Across
Districts with Variations in Local Rules
pe a rer eer 27, 28, 30
Ll. Eisenberg and M. Schlanger, The Reliability
of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis,
78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1455 (2008) ......... 27-28
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Petitioner Lavon Jones, Jr. (herein, “Petitioner’”’)
contends that respondent Bayer HealthCare LLC
(herein, “Respondent” or “Bayer”) discriminated against
him in the terms and conditions of his employment as
an HVAC (Heating/Ventilation/Air-conditioning)
mechanic by treating him disparately and less favorably
than non-African-Americans in a variety of matters,
including training, the provision of tools, and the supply
of uniforms. Petitioner claims that Respondent
ultimately denied him a promotion and terminated him
because of his race and in retaliation for his protests
and his oppositional protected conduct. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of
California, the Honorable Jeffrey S. White presiding
(herein, the “District Court”), granted summary
judgment for Respondent and the Ninth Cireuit Court
of Appeals affirmed and, later, denied en banc review.
Petitioner now seeks United States Supreme Court
review by his within Petition for Writ of Certzorari
(herein, the “Petition”).
B. Statement of Relevant Facts ‘
1. Bayer’s Hematology/Cardiology Global
Business Unit
The Bayer site at which Petitioner worked in
Berkeley, California houses Respondent’s Hematology/
Cardiology Global Business Unit and employs
approximately 1,500 workers. The site is involved in the
2
research, development, and producticn of finished
pharmaceutical products, including Kogenate FS.
Kogenate FS is a drug principally used by hemophiliacs
to help clot their blood; it is a life-sustaining and, in some
cases, a life-saving product. (ER!/496-497.)
Bayer, as a producer of finished pharmaceuticals for
human use, must follow rigorous internal Standard
Operating Procedures (“SOPs”) that are consonant with
Good Manufacturing Practices (“GMPs”) which, in turn,
are mandated by applicable provisions of the United
States Code of Federal Regulations and parallel
regulations of comparable European regulatory
agencies and of other regions of the world. Bayer’s
practices and processes in this regard are subject to
scrutiny and review by the United States Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”), and like agencies in other
nations. Prominent among these regulations are
requirements of vigilant self-policing, including with
regards to accurate manufacturing documentation. (ER/
497, 15; EF R/615:20-616:9.) If a regulatory audit were to
uncover inaccurate record-keeping at the Bayer
Berkeley site, it could lead to monetary sanctions or even
a suspension of production, threatening business
sustainability, Bayer’s ability to employ its large, local
work force and, most importantly, the health, safety, and
welfare of its patient community. (E R/497, 1 5.)
' “ER” refers to Excerpts of Record as submitted by
Petitioner to the Ninth Circuit.
3
2. Petitioner Is Hired and Understands his Bayer
employment Is Governed by Certain Rules of
Conduct
Petitioner was offered and accepted a position as a
General Worker for Bayer, starting in February 1997.
(ER/575:4-9.) His duties in this position were janitorial
in nature. (ER/584:14-58:5.) He had no HVAC duties.
(E R/585:6-14.)
Petitioner was subject to the terms and conditions
of his Bayer Company agreement, which, inter alia,
obligated him to follow Company rules, policies
and procedures. (ER/580:21-582:9; ER/1041-1044
(esp., 1 13).) Petitioner also understood that he was
required to follow certain “Company Rules.” (E.R/582:10-
583:14; ER/503, 508-510°; ER/1045-1047.) These rules
included prohibitions on:
¢ using any abusive or profane language to
any supervisor, employee or visitor (ER/
1045-1047, p. 2, 1 12, left column)
¢ unauthorized absenteeism or tardiness or
failure to promptly report the reasons for
such matters (7d. at 11 14, left column)
¢ failing to observe safety rules and
regulations (zd. at { 6, right column)
¢ falsifying personnel or medical records
(id. at 18, right column)
* FR/509 is mis-stamped ER/638 on the ER as served on
Respondent’s counse!.
4
e refusing or failing to perform [a] job as
assigned by supervisor (7d. at 11 14, right
column).
Petitioner understood he could be terminated for
violating these rules. (E.R/1045-1047.)
3. Bayer Promotes Petitioner and Pays for his
Technical Education
In August 1999, Petitioner enrolled in the Sequoia
Institute. (ER/592:17-593:1.) Bayer paid all of
Petitioner’s tuition at Sequoia. (ER/593:2-6.) On or
about September 8, 2000, Petitioner completed a low-
grade Climate Control and Refrigeration Technology
Program at Sequoia. (E.R/593:18-595:21; ER/1049-1053.)
This was the only HVAC training Petitioner ever had
and he had no HVAC work experience at the time of his
matriculation. (ER/595:22-596:18; ER/597:7-24.)
4. Petitioner Has an Extensive History of
Interpersonal and Performance Problems at
Bayer, Including at Least One Conflict with
an African-American Co-worker
Throughout his Bayer employment, there were
numerous incidents where Petitioner’s poor
interpersonal skills affected his work environment. For
example, in a dispute between Petitioner and employee
Michael Timberlake, also African-American, Petitioner
was accused of spreading rumors and gossiping about
Timberlake. Timberlake sent Petitioner an e-mail
requesting he not engage in such conduct; they both
then met with HK representative Sherri O’Driscoll (then
5
Vierra) and ultimately resolved the issues. (ER/589:11-
592:16; ER/1048.)
5. Petitioner Is Selected to Be an HVAC
Mechanic-C; Later Promoted to B-Level
In October 2000, shortly after receiving his
certificate from Sequoia, Petitioner applied for an
HVAC-C level position. (EF R/610:2-611:2; ER/1066-1069.)
He understood this to be an entry level, «pprentice
position; the lowest in the department. (EF. R/611:21-25;
SER*/001:1-2.) Part of the assessment process for the
hiring supervisor, Ron Roberts, was to measure the
ability of each candidate to absorb and retain
information as this was to be a position that would entail
a significant learning curve. (ER/515, 93.)
Petitioner was hired into the C-level position,
notwithstanding the HVAC Department’s serious
concerns with his competencies for the job based on his
inability to demonstrate he had retained any of his
training at Sequoia. (ER/608:18-609:3; ER/515, 1 4.) In
connection with this hiring process, and in all of his
dealings with him, Petitioner had no memory of Roberts
ever making any derogatory remark concerning
Petitioner’s race or that of any other employee.
(ER/612:23-613:23.) Petitioner was later promoted to a
B-level mechani~ position at the instance of Richard
Smith, who succeeded Roberts as the department
supervisor. (ER/532, 115; ER/538; ER/654:24-656:9.)
3 “SER” refers to Supplemental Excerpts of Record as
submitted by Respondent to the Ninth Circuit.
6
6. The Crucial Importance of the HVAC Systems
at the Berkeley Site
Respondent’s pharmaceutical manufacturing
process is dependent upon certain production steps
being conducted in “clean room” environments as
achieved, in part, through its HVAC systems. A clean
room environment is one with exceptionally low levels
of particulates, dust, germs, and other potential
contaminates. This helps ensure the manufacture of
contaminate-free drugs that are safe for human use.
(ER/516, 1 5.)
The HVAC systems and the mechanics who maintain
them are thus critical in Respondent’s production
processes and to ensure compliance with regulatory
authority, GMPs, and Respondent’s own SOPs. Indeed,
if the HVAC systems malfunction, production may be
stopped. On a more drastic level, a poorly maintained
or poorly functioning HVAC system could jeopardize the
sale and distribution of the Kogenate FS product line
to patients as a result of product contamination. For
many patients, this is a life sustaining drug, for which
they have few (if any) alternatives. Thus, a significant
HVAC issue could impact patient health as well posing
business and other economic consequences to
Respondent. (ER/516, 1 6.)
7
7. Petitioner Was Extensively Trained in the
Requirements of Accurate Record-keeping,
Safety Protocols, and Other Important
Requirements of the HVAC Mechanic
Position
Petitioner was provided extensive training on the
requirements and importance of accurate record-
keeping. (ER/614:1-622:10; ER/1070-1072; Appellee’s
Supplemental Excerpts of Record — Under Seal (“Sealed
Excerpts”), SER/287-304.) Petitioner understood that
a failure to adhere to Bayer SOPs could, under certain
circumstances, lead to termination. (EH R/622:11-623:14.)
In addition, among the most fundamental safety
processes on which Petitioner was trained and qualified,
were the steps involved when an HVAC mechanic
services or maintains a piece of production equipment
(7.e., HVAC equipment that is used in or concerning site
facilities where product is actually being manufactured
as opposed to equipment not integral to such systems).
One such fundamental process involves the equipment
“release” from the local production supervisor to the
mechanic. This release ensures critical notification to
production personnel and approval that certain
equipment will be out of service for repair/maintenance.
Bayer has a specific training protocol for this step upon
which Petitioner was trained and qualified. (EF. R/623:15-
625:2; ER/1073; ER/626:20-628:11; ER/651:9-653:16;
Sealed Excerpts, SER/305-308; ER/516, 4 7.)
In addition, following the production release of the
equipment to the mechanic, the mechanic must comport
with what is known as the “Site Lockout/Tagout
8
Procedure.” This procedure, which is required for the
mechanic’s own safety, involves disconnecting any “hot”
(electrically charged) unit that is to be worked on and
physically placing a lock and tag on the unit so that it
cannot be re-connected until the maintenance or service
is complete. Petitioner was trained and qualified on this
procedure as well. (ER/625:3-630:19; ER/1074-1083; ER/
516-517, 18; ER/520-527.)
8. In His Relatively Brief HVAC Tenure,
Petitioner Has Numerous Inter-personal
Problems with Co-Workers, Violates Critical
Policies and Standards, Is Insubordinate, and
Is (Unsurprisingly) Lawfully Terminated for
These Reasons
a. Petitioner’s Rocky Probationary Period
At the time of his hire into the HVAC Department,
Petitioner was the only C- level mechanic. (E.R/631:23-
632:6.) He began working in the department in February
2001. (EF R/630:20-23.)
Within his first 60 days, several of the senior HVAC
mechanics came to department supervisor Roberts to
report challenges that they were experiencing with
Petitioner, including his: (a) lack of concentration on
instructions, (b) disengagement from the process, where
he seemed to drift in and out and, as noted by supervisor
Roberts, frequently did not even make eye contact
during instruction, (c) lengthy disappearances when sent
to retrieve tools and parts, and (d) excessive use of
phones and beepers for personal matters. Roberts met
with Petitioner to discuss these issues and he suggested
9
there might be some classes that he could arrange for
Petitioner to improve his inter-personal dealings with
the group; Petitioner refused, instead requesting a
meeting with the group to which Roberts agreed. (ER/
517; ER/633:19-636:22.)
At the meeting, which Petitioner attended with his
Union representatives, several of his co-workers raised
issues with Petitioner’s lack of focus and use of cell
phones, among other things. (E R/636:20-639:15.) At his
deposition in this matter, Petitioner had no factual basis
— just his own inferences and feelings — for concluding
that this criticism was the product of a discriminatory
motive. (ER/639:16-641:3.)
Because of the issues that had arisen in the
department, it was offered to Petitioner that he could
extend his 75-day probationary period without any
formal documentation of his noted performance
deficiencies; it was also suggested that Petitioner take
an interpersonal skills class. (ER/517, 1 10.) Petitioner
declined these options at which point he was formally
taken off of probation and counseled by his management
and Human Resources relative to the issues that had
been addressed with him. (EF R/642:23-650:3; ER/1084;
ER/517, 110.)
b. Petitioner Has a Loud, Profane
Altercation with a Co-worker
On or about November 8, 2001, Joe Haberstroh, a
seasoned HVAC mechanic, reported a loud, profane
altercation he had with Petitioner. At Smith’s request,
Haberstroh prepared a written summary of the events.
10
(E R/532-533, 11 6, ER/540.) Haberstroh reported in
addition to the confrontational, profane (Petitioner
reportedly called Haberstroh a “motherfucker” at least
three times), and threatening nature of the interchange,
that he had to remind Petitioner relative to compliance
with the site Lockout/Tagout procedure before working
on a “hot” fan unit. Smith asked Petitioner (more than
once) te also submit a written account of events but he
failed to do so. (EF. R/532-533, 1 6; ER/662:20-663:1.)
A meeting was convened among Smith, Roberts
(who was still a “consultant” to the group and
occasionally facilitated on personnel matters), and
Haberstroh, along with Petitioner and his Union
representatives. (ER/663:13-664:1.) At the meeting,
Petitioner again refused to acknowledge any fault in the
confrontation. Additionally at the meeting, Smith
revealed that one of the reasons that another senior
mechanic, James Rowe, had recently left the department
was that he did not wish to work with Petitioner any
longer and Smith was concerned about any further
losses of senior nechanics in the department. (EK R/664:2-
665:23; ER/533, 17; ER/542-543.)
c. Petitioner Is Counseled for His Failure
to Follow Equipment Release and
Lockout/Tagout Procedures
In early November 2001, Petitioner was assigned
to replace a drive belt on an exhaust fan. Petitioner
completed and certified the work order without
indicating that there had been a release of the
equipment from production or any indication that there
had been compliance with the Lockout/Tagout
1]
procedure. (ER/656:10-661:14; ER/1085-1086.)
Petitioner was counseled for his failure to comply with
these important procedures, which could have
jeopardized Respondent’s product and Petitioner’s
safety. (ER/533, 1 8; ER/545-546; ER/666:8-669:8, ER/
1087-1090.) At the time of this counseling, Petitioner
denied that he had failed to comply with the procedures,
instead claiming that he had in fact complied but that
he just had no way to prove it. (/d.)
d. Petitioner Fails to Show up for Critical
Work Assignment on January 6, 20038 after
Working Unauthorized Double Time the
Prior Evening; He Is Suspended for
Three Days as a Result
On December 26, 2002, Petitioner was assigned to a
work crew to do some preventative maintenance on
Building B60 during the winter shutdown. It was
explained to Petitioner (and the crew) that the work
would span five days and would require 3:00 a.m. start
times. Petitioner was given a schedule of the work
activities and raised no objection as to the assignment.
(ER/670:13-672:4; ER/533, 1 9.)
On January 5, 2003, a Sunday, Petitioner was
scheduled to work eight hours. Without any express
authorization, he worked an additional three hours -
earning double time. Petitioner attempted to justify the
excess hours being worked, stating that he stayed to
complete some open work orders, though no one had
requested the work orders be completed that day.
(E R/672:5-676:21; ER/1091; ER/534, 1 10.) He
understood that weekend overtime needed to be
approved by the supervisor. (Ek. R/670:7-12.)
12
The following morning, January 6, 2003, Petitioner
was scheduled to participate — as part of the previously
scheduled winter shutdown work - in a timed procedure
involving the maintenance of an air handler unit which
procedure was to begin at 3:00 a.m. With a timed
procedure such as this, it is critical to have all assigned
members of the team present as the failure to meet the
time conditions may lead to the issuance of a
Discrepancy Event Report (“DER” -— now commonly
called in the industry an “IR” - Incident Report); a
DER/IR can cause regulatory issues and is deemed a
serious matter by Bayer, which Petitioner also
understood. (ER/534, 1 11; ER/678:19-679:12.) Instead
of reporting to work on time, Petitioner left a voice mail
message on Smith’s cell phone indicating he was not
coming in at 3:00 a.m.; that he would be in at his “regular
time” — 7:00 a.m., not because he was ill or on account of
other extenuating circumstances, but because he did
not feel as if he should have to work his scheduled shift
due to his seniority. (ER/676:22-678:18.) Smith did not
play the voice mail until 5:00 a.m. and he was,
unsurprisingly, unable to replace Petitioner on the shift;
the short-handed crew barely completed the work on
time. (ER/534, 1 12.)
On January 7, 2003, Petitioner was issued a three-
day suspension for the failure to attend to his work
duties and for working unauthorized overtime.
(ER/677:4-681:20, ER 1092.) Although Petitioner stated
he believed that his race had led to the imposition of
this discipline, he could not identify anyone who had been
treated more favorably by Bayer under comparable
circumstances. (E R/682:3-683:23.) Nor could Petitioner
13
identify any facts which would establish that the
discipline was in retaliation for any legally protected
activity. (E R/684:8-18.)
e. Petitioner Abandons a Work Assignment
on January 24, 2003
On January 24, 2003, Petitioner was required to
assist two other mechanics with a process involving a
tunnel sterilizer unit. He unilaterally determined the
job did not require his participation. Without prior
supervisor approval, Petitioner left his co-workers alone
on the task for a meeting he had set up with HR.
(E R/692:4-694:9.) Yet, Petitioner nonetheless advised
HR Consultant Joe Gallagher that his supervisor had
authorized the meeting. (ER/500, 1 5; ER/534, 97 13.)
f In January 2003, Petitioner Approaches
Supervisor Smith about the Possibility of
a Further Promotion; in Evaluating this
Request, the Company Learns that
Petitioner Has Improperly Recorded the
Completion of Work, a Serious SOP
Violation which, in Context with
Petitioner’s Entire Bayer Work History,
Leads to His Lawful Termination
In January 2003, Petitioner made an inquiry of
Smith regarding a possible further promotion.
(E R/685:4-20; ER/686:22-688:1; ER/1093.) In order to
evaluate Petitioner’s request, Smith determined,
inter alia, to examine some recent preventative
maintenance work Petitioner had been assigned,
including filter change-outs. Smith did a visual
14
inspection of the area and determined that the filters
on one fan unit had not been changed; he then pulled
the paper work and saw that Petitioner had closed a
work order, submitted his time entry and completed a
log book indicating the work had been performed on
January 24, 2003. (E R/688:22-691:2; ER/1094-1096.)
Smith also determined that there were not enough
filters checked out of inventory supply for the month
for Petitioner to have completed the change out.
(ER/291:10-293:7.) When questioned by Smith,
Petitioner stated he had changed the filters and
completed the documentation accordingly. (E R/534-535,
14.) At deposition, Petitioner coule not account for the
fact that there were dirty filters in the unit when his
paperwork indicated to the contrary. Despite repeated
questioning, Petitioner would not attest that he had in
fact changed the filters. (EF R/698:2-699:12; E.R/1094
1095.)
At deposition, Petitioner also conceded that
completion of a work order for work not done would be
an instance of document falsification and a violation of
Bayer policy. (E. R/697:23-698:1.)
Smith advanced the issue and conferred with IIR
Consultant Gallagher. The two discussed the history of
Petitioner’s Bayer employment, his past disciplinary
problems, including interpersonal issues and the three-
day suspension of a few weeks earlier, his abandonment
of job duties only days before, and the serious
documentation violation relative to the building
maintenance which would not have otherwise been
discovered (were it not for Smith’s inspection) and could
have led to a compromised production environment.
Under all of the facts, it was determined that
Petitioner’s employment would be terminated.
Gallagher and Smith also consulted with Joe Nitz, the
superintendent over the maintenance group (which
included the HVAC Department), who approved of the
termination decision in consultation with then
Department Manager Enrique Martinez. (EF R/535; E R/
548-549; ER/500-501; EF R/529; ER/513, 1 3.)
Petitioner testified that he thought the unfulfilled
promotion request and the termination were both
racially motivated but — again — could not identify any
statements, comments, or actions that would indicate
or suggest a racial motive for the actions; only his own
interpretation of the facts. (EF R/695:17-696:14; ER/
700:19-707:1.) Nor could Petitioner identify any evidence
indicating a retaliatory motive on Bayer’s part. (ER/
759:1-777:17, ER/1097-1127.)
9. Petitioner Was Treated Equally with Respect
to All Terms and Conditions of his Bayer
Employment
Petitioner was provided equal access to tools,
overtime, training, computer access, and promotion —
and subject to discipline - pursuant to Bayer policy and
business needs; no allocation of such was on the basis of
race. (ER/501, 9 7; ER/513, 7 4; ER/517-518, 91 11; ER/
535, 116; ER/530, 1 6.)
16
10. Petitioner Files EEOC Charge Alieging
Discrimination in Terms and Conditions of
Employment; Charge Is Found Without
Merit; Petitioner Seeks Reconsideration and
EEOC Upholds Findings that Petitioner Has
No Evidence of Race Discrimination
On June 24, 2002, Petitioner filed a Charge of
Discrimination with the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EK EOC), alleging
that he had been discriminated against in the terms and
conditions of his Bayer employment on account of his
race. (ER/1135.) On December 16, 2002, the EEOC
dismissed the Charge, finding a lack of any evidence to
sustain a violation. (ER/1132.) Also on December 16,
2002, Petitioner filed additional, voluminous materials
with the EEOC (SER/002-262); because the deadline for
submissions had passed, the EEOC treated the
submission as a request for reconsideration. (ER/1128-
1130.) On January 29, 2003, the EEOC affirmed its
earlier finding that Petitioner had failed to establish any
cognizable discrimination on Respondent’s part.
(ER/778:13-779:19; ER/780:6-781:2; ER/1128-1132.)
C. The District Court’s Grant of Summary Judgment
in Respondent’s Favor
On November 3, 2006, Respondent moved for
summary judgmeut. Its Motion was granted on March
21, 2007. (Appendix B to Petition (“App. B”) at 26.)
The District Court determined that there was no
triable issue of fact on Petitioner’s first, third, fifth, and
sixth claims for relief wherein Petitioner alleged that
17
he had been denied promotion and ultimately terminated
on account of his race. Bayer established that Petitioner
could not even make out his minimal prima facie case.
Petitioner offered no proof he was competently
performing his position (or suited for a promotion) at
the time of the challenged employment actions. Indeed,
the undisputed evidence was that he had (1) been
involved in confrontations with co-workers and
reprimanded for poor attitude, attendance and
performance, (2) unilaterally determined not to show up
for work for a critical time-controlled maintenance
procedure, (3) left a job assignment without supervisor
approval, and (4) failed to comply with employer-
mandated documentation policies pertaining to HVAC
maintenance. In addition, Petitioner adduced no
evidence that anyone similarly situated as he — but
outside of the protected class - had been dealt with ina
more favorable way by Respondent. (App. B at 12-19.)
Even had he made a prima facie race discrimination
showing, Petitioner was unable to present meaningful
evidence of pre-text or discriminatory intent to refute
Bayer’s showing of legitimate bases for not promoting
him, for terminating him, and for other claimed
discriminatory employment terms and conditions.
Instead, Petitioner chiefly relied on matters of his own
impressions concerning people’s motives, an innocuous
constructive comment by a Bayer supervisor suggesting
Petitioner make eye contact while interacting with group
members and receiving instructions, and a statistically
incompetent evaluation of the demographics of his work
unit. These matters were found inadequate and the
District Court entered summary judgment in Bayer’s
favor on Petitioner’ race claims and his derivative public
18
policy wrongful termination eighth (in part)* claim for
relief. (App. B at 19-22.)
Petitioner’ retaliation (second, seventh and eighth
(in part)) claims were found similarly wanting. Petitioner
principally relied on the ostensible temporal nexus
between his “protected conduct” and Bayer’s
complained of actions to establish the causal linkage
element of his prima facie showing, but the more than
seven-month passage of time between the filing of his
EEOC Charge and the termination of his employment,
against the backdrop of numerous intervening events
of his own poor job performance, was found by the
District Court to foreclose any such inference.
Moreover, even had he made his prima facie retaliation
case, Petitioner was unable to establish a triable issue
on the ultimate requisite element of retaliatory motive
as against Bayer’s unrebutted showing of the
performance issues leading directly to his termination.
(App. B at 22-24.)®
* Petitioner’s Eighth Claim for Relief comprises allegations
of retaliation and unequai treatment based on “race or color or
national origin” in violation of provisions of the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act and Article I, section 8, of the
California Constitution. Despite the pleading allegation, there
was no pursuit by Petitioner of any theory of national origin
discrimination or any evidence adduced below in such regard.
® As an alternative basis for the grant of summary
judgment, the District Court held that Petitioner’s untruthful
statements about his education on his original employment
application would have led to termination under settled Bayer
policy, and thus the termination was justified as a matter of law
under the so-called “after-acquired evidence rule.” (App. B at
24-25.)
19
D. The Ninth Circuit Affirms
In an opinion filed on December 1, 2008, the Ninth
Circuit of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s grant
of summary judgment. (Appendix A to Petition
(“App. A”) at 2-4.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the
discrimination claims, finding there was no triable issue
demonstrated concerning Petitioner’s claimed
acceptable job performance or that others similarly
situated, but outside the protected class, had been more
favorably treated. (App. A at 2-3.) In addition, Petitioner
failed to adduce material, competent evidence of pretext
in regards to his retaliation claim and — even had he —
he was unable to rebut Respondent’s demonstration of
numerous legitimate bases for the termination. (App. A
at 3-4.) The Ninth Circuit later denied en banc review.
(Appendix C to Petition.)
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case does not
warrant further review. The decision does not conflict
with any decision of this Court or any other courts of
appeals. It concerns the proper entry of summary
judgment in a garden-variety employment discrimination
case and there is nothing exceptional about how the
District Court or the Ninth Circuit applied the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (at times, “Rule 56”)
standards. On the merits, moreover, the decision is
clearly correct; Petitioner cannot show any error with
regards to the manner in which his retaliation claims
were adjudicated and does not even purport to do so
with regards to his discrimination claims. This case is
illustrative of exactly why the summary judgment
20
procedure exists — to avoid wasting judicial resources
on trying a case where one party has insufficient
evidence. And, such procedure does not run afoul of
Seventh Amendment rights to a jury trial.
Moreover, Petitioner’s call for re-examination of
summary judgment jurisprudence — and implicitly, a
judicially-made super-standard under Rule 56 for
granting summary judgment in employment
discrimination actions - is based largely on the musings
of several commentators and a statistical report which
reveals no clear signal. There is no demonstrated need
for a special summary judgment rule in employment
discrimination cases and it would not be the province of
this Court to create one.
I. THERE IS NO CONFLICT AMONG THE
CIRCUITS
There is no circuit split on the standards to be used
by federal district courts under Rule 56, and Petitioner
does not contend otherwise.° (See Petition at 26 (relying
solely on an asserted need for this Court to exercise its
supervisory powers under Supreme Court Rule 10(a).)
° To the extent that Petitioner suggests that there is a more
nuanced application of existing summary judgment principles
in the Second Circuit, that argument is discussed, infra, at II.B.
II. THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE AN
IMPORTANT FEDERAL QUESTION, NOR
DOES THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION
DEPART FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
21
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Summary Judgment Standards Are Well
Established and Require no Modification
Petitioner declares a need for this Court to set forth
the proper standards to be applied in determining
whether to grant summary judgment in employment
discrimination cases. (Petition at 25.) But, the summary
judgment standards to be applied to any summary
judgment motion are entrenched in our jurisprudence
and are in no need of revision:
First, summary judgment may not be
granted unless “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56 (c).
Second, the burden is upon the moving
party to demonstrate that no genuine issue
respecting any material fact exists.
Third, all ambiguities must be resolved
and all inferences drawn in favor of the
party against whom summary judgment is
sought.
22
¢ Fourth, the moving party may obtain
summary judgment by showing that little
or no evidence may be found in support of
the nonmoving party’s case. When no
rational jury could find in favor of the
nonmoving party because the evidence to
support its case is so slight, there is no
genuine issue of material fact and a grant
of summary judgment is proper.
¢ Finally, the trial court’s task at the
summary judgment motion stage of the
litigation is carefully limited to discerning
whether there are any genuine issues of
material fact to be tried, not to deciding
them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this
point to issue-finding; it does not extend
to issue-resolution.
See Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, Ltd.
Partnership, 22 F.8d 1219, 1223-24 (2? Cir. 1994)
(citations omitted) (“Gallo”). These same criteria were
utilized by the District Court in this case when it granted
Respondent’s motion for summary judgment. (App. B
at 11-12.)
As applied to an employment discrimination case in
particular, this Court articulated the order and allocation
of proof in the seminal case of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1978). The plaintiff bears
the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
the alleged discrimination, which has the effect of
creating alegal presumption of unlawful discrimination.
Jd. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then
23
the defendant bears the burden of offering a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action. /d. If the defendant meets this burden, the
presumption created by the prima facie case is
rebutted, and the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff
to show the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for
the employment action was a pretext for the alleged
unlawful discrimination. /d.
Review is unwarranted in this case because the
District Court correctly concluded that not only did
Petitioner fail to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination in his employment discrimination claims,
neither did Petitioner demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact on the issue of pretext on his retaliation
claim. (App. B.) These decisions were reached based on
existing and well-defined summary judgment standards
as applicable to employment discrimination actions.
B. Second Circuit Jurisprudence Does Not
Suggest a New or Different Summary
Judgment Standard for Employment
Discrimination Cases
Petitioner asserts that summary judgment is
granted disproportionately in favor of employers and
that the Supreme Court, through its supervisory powers
(see S. Ct. Rule 10(a)), should accept review in order to
“'. . require that the lower courts adopt the Second
Circuit’s requirement and exercise caution in granting
summary judgment when an employer’s intent is at
issue.” (Petition at 27.) Petitioner relies primarily upon
Gallo, supra, 22 F.3d. 1219, to support this argument.
The court in Gallo, however, in its own words, did
24
nothing more than “repeat” the same long-standing,
and oft-cited, standards governing every summary
judgment motion, 2d. at 1223-24; the same criteria that
were set forth by the District Court in this case. (App.
B at 11-12.)
Also in Gallo, the Second Circuit cautioned trial
courts confronted with a summary judgment motion in
the employment discrimination context: “A trial court
must be cautious about granting summary judgment to
an employer where, as here, its intent is at issue.
Because writings directly supporting a claim of
intentional discrimination are rarely, if ever, found
among an employer’s corporate papers, affidavits and
depositions must be carefully scrutinized for
circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show
discrimination.” Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223-24. Petitioner
suggests that review is warranted in order for this Court
to “adopt” this cautionary remark made by the Second
Circuit.
But this cautionary approach to summary judgment
motions in employment discrimination cases is not
limited to the Second Circuit. The Ninth Circuit “has
set a high standard for the granting of summary
judgment in employment discrimination cases.”
Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410
(9 Cir. 1996). In particular, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has
instructed that district courts must be cautious in
granting summary judgment for employers on
discrimination claims.” See Lam v. University of
Hawazii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1564 (9 Cir. 1994) (“‘[w]e require
very little evidence to survive summary judgment’ in a
discrimination case, ‘because the ultimate question is
25
one that can only be resolved through a [“]searching
inquiry|”}] — one that is most appropriately conducted
by the factfinder’”’) (quoting, Sischo-Nownejad v.
Merced Comm. Coll. Dist., 9384 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9'" Cir.
1991)).”
Moreover, the Supreme Court has already
articulated this cautionary approach as applied to
summary judgment motions where motive and intent
are at issue. “[SJummary judgment is to be granted with
great caution; for ‘it is only when the witnesses are
present and subject to cross-examination that their
credibility and the weight to be given their testimony
can be appraised.’” Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (antitrust
litigation) (internal citation omitted); see also, Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (libel
action involving First Amendment).
Finally, it is notable that the District Court here
specifically referenced the minimal showing required of
an employment discrimination plaintiff to survive
summary judgment. “At summary judgment, the degree
of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case is
‘minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a
preponderance of the evidence.’ Lyons v. England, 307
F.3d 1092, 1112 (9" Cir. 2002) (quoting Wallis v. J.R.
Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9™ Cir. 1994) [(“Wallis”’)].)
Although the burden for establishing a prima facie case
is an easy one to satisfy, Plaintiff has failed to do so.”
(App. B at 14-15.) Thus, Petitioner was not held to an
unduly harsh standard that requires revisiting, only to
a minimal standard which he failed to meet.
26
C. Summary Judgment, as with Many Other
Procedural Devices Employed By District
Courts, Does Not Violate the Seventh
Amendment
Petitioner also argues that this Court should accept
review in order to exercise its supervisory powers to
“'.. emphasize the implications of the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial when deciding summary
judgment motions ... .” (Petition at 27.) Respondent
does not dispute that there is a right to a jury trial in
any civil rights case where damages are at issue. This
right is guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution. To the extent that Petitioner is suggesting
that the summary judgment standard under the Federal
Rules violates the Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial, this Court held long ayo that it does not. Indeed,
such contentions have been rejected for more than one
hundred years. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United
States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902); Burkes v. Wisconsin Dep.
of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 759 (7 Cir. 2006) stating that
“It|he Supreme Court has made it abundantly
clear that summary judgment has a proper
role to play in civil cases, and thus granting
Summary judgment does not violate a
plaintiff’s right to due process. We have also
stated that summary judgment and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 do not violate the
Seventh Amendment, as this argument...
flies in the face of firmly established law’’)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
~]
There have been many procedural devices
developed since 1791 which have diminished the civil
jury’s historic domain and not one of them has been
found to violate the Seventh Amendment. See Galloway
vy. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-93 (1943) (directed
verdict does not violate the Seventh Amendment);
Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283
U.S. 494, 497-98 (1931) (retrial limited to question of
damages does not violate the Seventh Amendment, even
though there was no practice at common law for setting
aside a verdict in part); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United
States, supra, 187 U.S. at 319-21 (summary judgment
does not violate the Seventh Amendment); Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87 (1935) (remittitur did not
violate Seventh Amendment). Thus, Petitioner’s
argument that review should be granted in order to
emphasize the implications of the Seventh Amendment
right to jury trial when deciding summary judgment
motions should be rejected as long since moot.
D. Petitioner’s Incomplete and Misleading Use
of Statistics Does Not Provide an Appropriate
Basis for a Grant of Review Here
To support his argument that summary judgment
is granted disproportionately to employers, Petitioner
relies primarily on statistics recently published by the
Federal Judicial Center. See Report on Summary
Judgment Practice Across Districts with Variations in
Local Rules (August 13, 2008) (hereinafter, the
“Report”). The data included in the Report, however,
were not designed for research into civil justice,
litigation theory, or any substantive area of law. T.
Kisenberg and M. Schlanger, The Reliability of the
~
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An
Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1455, 1462 (2003). Instead, the data were prepared “as
a means of assessing the potential impact of proposed
amendments to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure” having to do with the potential Rule
inclusion of a separate statement of undisputed material
facts. See the Report at 1. Furthermore, like many large
data sets, the Federal Judicial Center data are not
completely accurate (id. at 1458), and Petitioner's
selective citations from the Report are misleading.
Petitioner de-emphasizes (by contrasting contract and
tort cases), for example, that out of all employment
discrimination cases filed, only 11-15% are terminated
by summary judgment. The Report, Table 12, p. 17. This
can only mean that the vast majority of employment
discrimination cases either are resolved by a factfinder
or settlement.
Furthermore, Petitioner relies upon these statistics
to support his argument that this Court should accept
review to either (1) reiterate the summary judgment
standards for federal district courts, or (2) articulate a
new summary judgment standard specifically for
employment discrimination cases. Review is not
warranted for either reason.
As set forth above, the Rule 56 standards are well
established, and to the extent that Petitioner is
suggesting Rule 56 be applied differently to employment
discriminaticn cases, or that summary judgment for
employment discrimination cases be prohibited or
limited in any way, such an argument must be rejected.
Modifying the federal rules of civil procedure is not
29
accomplished by seeking review of a case by the
Supreme Court. Instead, such modifications are
governed by procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. sections
2072, 2073, and 2074.
Moreover, Rule 56, along with several other
procedural devices (e.g., motions to dismiss for failure
to state a claim (Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6)) available to
federal district ccurts, serve the vital role of managing
their dockets. The workload of federal district courts
has grown substantially in recent decades for the same
reasons that have increased demands upon the
Supreme Court to hear cases upon appeal. In the two
decades between 1971 and 1991, employment law cases
saw a staggering 400 percent increase in the federal
district courts. Discharge Is Now Major Focus of Job
Discrimination Suits, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 164,
at A-3 (Aug. 23, 1991). Between 1990 and 1998, the
number of employment civil rights claims increased by
an additional 300 percent. Marika F. X. Litras, Ph.D.,
Civil Rights Complaints in U.S. District Courts, 1990-
98, NCJ 173427, Jan. 2000, at 2. It is no secret that
employment-related litigation has increased by an
astonishing rate throughout the last three decades and
currently represents a significant portion of the federal
judicial caseload. In 2002, for example, employment
litigation represented nearly 14 percent of the more
than one-quarter million cases filed in United States
District Courts. See, Office of Human Resources and
Statistics, Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics March 31,
2002, at 44-46 (2002).
30
Given the multitude of employment discrimination
cases filed each year, summary judgment continues to
be an important procedural tool for district courts to
help manage their ever-increasing docket. Indeed, the
Report stands for no contrary proposition and, if, as
Petitioner suggests (though the Report does not
necessarily bear this out), summary judgment is granted
more frequently in employment discrimination cases
versus run-of-the mill common law contract and tort
claims, it may well be argued that the statistics prove’
that the latter are more likely to have merit, or at least
factual disputes at their core.
E. Supreme Court Review Is Not Intended to
Correct Factual Errors in Lower Court
Decisions
Petitioner failed to convince the District Court and
the Ninth Circuit that his case had any merit. The within
Petition is simply seeking a “third bite at the apple.”
But, this is not an appropriate basis for Supreme Court
review.
“The function of this Court is not primarily to
correct factual errors in lower court decisions,
but instead to resolve important questions of
federal law and to exercise supervisory power
over lower federal courts. Our institutiona!
role properly is focused on ensuring clarity
and uniformity of legal doctrine, and not on
the case-specific process of reviewing the
’ As Mark Twain is oft-quoted as saying, “There are lies,
damned lies and statistics.”
ol
application of law to the particul: rized facts
of individual disputes — one of the functions
performed quite capably by the federal courts
of appeals.”
U.S. v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 34 (1985).
Petitioner here improperly seeks review by the
Supreme Court to correct perceived factual errors made
by both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. This request should be denied.
lil. THE LOWER COURTS CORRECTLY APPLIED
LONG-STANDING LAW TO THE FACTS
BELOW IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
The decisions of the District Court and the Ninth
Circuit below not only do not implicate a circuit split or
call for a re-examination of summary judgment principles
insofar as employment discrimination cases are
concerned, they were correctly decided.
A. Petitioner Does Not Even Assign Error
Concerning the Disposition of his
Discrimination-Based Claims
The District Court determined that Petitioner had
not raised a prima facie case of employment
discrimination because he was notable to establish a
triable issue of fact as to whether (a) he was performing
work in a manner acceptable to Respondent, and (b)
others outside of the protected class, but otherwise
similarly situated, were treated more favorably. (App.
32
B at 14-18.) Even had Petitioner created a triable issue
under his prima facie case, the District Court further
determined that Petitioner could not establish a triable
factual question on the ultimate issue of discriminatory
intent, where he could not rebut with substantive,
competent evidence that Respondent terminated
Petitioner’s employment on account of an escalating
series of performance issues. (App. B. at 19-22.) The
Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding no triable issue created
on Petitioner’s discrimination claims. (App. A at 2.)
In his Petition, Petitioner tacitly concedes the
propriety of the lower courts’ summary disposition of
his discrimination claims. Petitioner states that “[t]he
present case exemplifies the need for review of the
question of whether summary judgment is being used
improperly and the (s?c.) for the establishment of the
standards for its use... ,” but does so exclusively by
“focus[ing] on the decision of the lower courts on the
issue of retaliation.” (Petition at 27.) Thus, no error by
the lower courts is urged by Petitioner concerning his
discrimination claims in seeking Supreme Court review.
B. The Lower Courts Correctly Held that
Petitioner Had Not Adduced Sufficient
Evidence to Sustain his Retaliation-Based
Claims
In focusing on the issue of retaliation, Petitioner’s
central contention is that the District Court erroneously
granted summary judgment and violated Rule 56
standards (and relevant jurisprudence) by improperly
weighing conflicting evidence and deciding matters of
disputed fact. The Ninth Circuit rejected these same
33
contentions and, as noted above, Supreme Court review
is not appropriate to simply give Petitioner a third
chanez to convince a court that a triable factual issues
exists in this instance. Further, the ostensible errors
pointed to by Petitioner are not that at all; but instead
comprise misstatements or misunderstandings of the
record and non-material factual discrepancies not
warranting trial.
1. The District Court Did Not Err in
Determining that Proximity Evidence
Alone Was Insufficient to Create Triable
Issue on Respondent’s Supposed
Retaliatory Intent
Petitioner chides the District Court for overlooking
or ignoring evidence that Petitioner had raised a prior
discrimination charge in a Union grievance that
preceded his termination by a matter of weeks, and had
been criticized at a Union-conducted meeting by co-
workers very shortly before his termination. The
District Court determined that the significant passage
of time - more than seven months - between
Petitioner’s initial filing of his EEOC Charge and his
employment termination — precluded a finding of causal
nexus on this basis. (App. B at 23-24; citing, inter alia,
Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F:3d 792, 808 (9" Cir.
2003) (“Manatt”) (holding that nine-month period of
time between protected activity and alleged retaliatory
conduct was too long to create an inference of
retaliation).) From this, Petitioner concludes the District
Court erred in finding that too much time had passed
between Petitioner’s legally protected activity and his
termination to raise a triable issue on the basis of
so-called proximity evidence.
34
But, the grievance did not constitute additional
protected activity (beyond the EEOC Charge); it merely
referenced pending protected conduct. More
particularly, in grieving the three-day suspension
imposed upon Petitioner by Respondent for (a) his
failure to appear for work for an important, time-
controlled maintenance procedure (because he did not
feel as if he should have to do so); and (b) his working of
unauthorized overtime, Petitioner wrote as to the
nature of his grievance: “Vindictive behavior transpired
from a pending EEOC charge prompt (sic) from the
violation of Title VII.” (ER/412 (emphasis supplied).)
Thus, there was no additional protected conduct on
which to predicate a temporal argument.
Even more pertinently, the grievance followed the
disciplinary action by Respondent. In order to
circumstantially establish the necessary element of
causation on a retaliation claim, the protected conduct
must precede the employer’s challenged disciplinary
action. Temporal proximity is established by showing a
close linkage in time of an adverse action following on
the heels of protected conduct. See Manatt, supra, 339
I'3d at 802. With regards to Petitioner’s referenced
grievance, the converse was the case — first, Respondent
imposed discipline (the suspension) and only then did
Petitioner re-raise the issue of his then pending EEOC
Charge. In a related vein, the supposed co-worker
harassing comments were not protected activity (at least
not on Petitioner’s part) and thus there is no relevance
on the issue of proximity regarding Respondent’s
supposed retaliatory intent.
35
Moreover, Petitioner continues to misapprehend the
temporal proximity analysis at its threshold. As the Ninth
Circuit has stated, temporal proximity is not itself an
element of the prima facie retaliation case but, rather,
evidence upon which an inference of causation may be
drawn. Porter v. California Dept. of Corrections, 419 F.3d
885, 895 (9" Cir. 2005). Thus, any bright line rule on
temporal proximity has been rejected and, instead:
“Whether an adverse employment action is
intended to be retaliatory is a question of fact
that must be decided in the light of the timing
and the surrounding circumstances. In some
cases, the totality of the facts may form such a
clear picture that a district court would be
justified in granting summary judgment, either
for or against a plaintiff, on the issue of
retaliatory motive; but the length of time,
considered without regard to its factual setting,
is not enough by itself to justify a grant of
summary judgment.”
Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 978 (9" Cir. 2008).
Here, the record reflects that Petitioner had
pending an EEOC Charge for more than half of 2002,
but yet there was a series of escalating performance
deficiencies in January 2003 — effectively unrebutted in
the record — which preceded and precipitated
Respondent’s termination of Petitioner’s employment.
Accordingly, the finding that Petitioner had failed to
demonstrate prima facie causation by timing evidence
alone was proper here. See Miller v. Fairchild
Industries, Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 731 (9 Cir. 1986) (timing
36
evidence alone is not enough to withstand summary
judgment where employer has a legitimate stated basis
for its challenged actions).
2. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Commit
Reversible Error in its Characterization
of Richard Smith’s Role in the Union
Meeting/Termination Process
Petitioner also assigns error to the Ninth Circuit in
its reference to the lack of any evidence in the record
that Petitioner’s former supervisor Richard Smith (a)
made any affirmatively hostile comments at a referenced
Union meeting, and (b) communicated what occurred
at that meeting to other members of the management
team involved in the decision to terminate Petitioner.
(App. A at 3.) But, Petitioner points to no conflicting
evidence on these issues, only different facts, 7.e., that
Smith ostensibly agreed with criticisms of Petitioner as
voiced at the meeting and himself was involved in the
termination decision. Ultimately, however, the District
Court (App. B at 24) and Ninth Circuit (App. A at 3-4)
determined that there was no competent evidence to
rebut that Respondent acted to terminate based on the
performance issues raised, and the past record of
discipline. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit specifically found
that “[g]Jiven these legitimate and particularized bases
for termination, the fact that one of [Petitioner’s]
supervisors participated in a single allegedly hostile
union meeting is insufficient evidence of pretext to
survive summary judgment.” (App. A at 3-4 (emphasis
supplied).) Thus, whether a prima facie retaliation case
was originally raised is of no moment and does not justify
a grant of review by this Court.
37
3. The District Court Did Not Err in
Ignoring Supposed Factual Conflicts in
Record in Granting Summary Judgment
on Petitioner’s Retaliation Claims
Petitioner re-raises in his Petition six instances
where he claims the District Court ignored or
disregarded supposedly competent evidence on the
issue of pretext. But, these instances do not bear
scrutiny.
1. Petitioner states there was an evidentiary conflict
as to whether he was asked about (or whether there
was adequate investigation of) his state of mind in terms
of his misstatements on Respondent’s production
documents. HR Manager Joe Gallagher stated an
inquiry would have typically been posed of an employee
who would be permitted to provide his “side of the story.”
The undisputed evidence of record, however, is that
Smith did ask Petitioner if he changed the filters and
Petitioner stated he had done so. (EF R/534-535.) Thus,
there is no question that Petitioner completed the
Respondent’s production paperwork erroneously, which
was one of the reasons he was terminated as recognized
by the District Court. (App. B at 10.) It is not clear how
this amounts to a conflict or evidence of pretext in the
record.
2. Petitioner states there were also “[clonflicts” as
to who “checked up on his work” on January 24, 2003.
(Petition at 30.) In fact, there was no material conflict.
Co-worker James Jewell never testified that he
“inspected” the work. He testified that Smith told him
to take pictures, replace the filter, and copy the logbook
38
— none of which would make any sense if Smith had not
already inspected the work and determined that it had
not been completed by Petitioner, as Smith testified he
had done. (ER/184:10-186:7.) On the very narrow issue
of who actually took certain of the pictures as between
Smith and Jewell, even if the testimony were in conflict,
it does not serve to create a triable material factual
issue on the matter. [t is axiomatic that in the face of an
employer’s properly supported summary judgment
motion, the plaintiff may not avoid summary disposition
by pointing to minor or immaterial discrepancies in the
employer’s evidence. See, e.g., Fogerty v. MGM Group
Holdings Corp., 379 F.3d 348, 353 (6'" Cir. 2004)
(“[aJ nonmoving party may not avoid a properly
supported motion for summary judgment by simply
arguing that it relies solely or in part upon credibility
considerations. Instead, the nonmoving party must
present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly
supported motion for summary judgment”).
3. Petitioner states there are testimonial conflicts
as to whether he was ever asked about the filter job. As
stated above, there were not; at least not of a material
nature.
4. Petitioner states he believes he changed all of
the filters and he denies making deliberate
misstatements on production documents. Even leaving
aside the admissibility of the cited Petitioner’s self-
serving declaration testimony in this regard (as
contradicting his own prior deposition testimony
(see App. B at 16-17, n. 2 (evidence excluded by District
Court on the basis of this impermissible conflict)), the
issue is collateral. The question is not whether Petitioner
39
actually did engage in the charged misconduct, it is
whether Respondent believed that he had done so.
See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Aiy, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054,
1063 (9"" Cir. 2002) (irrelevant on issue of pretext whether
employee improperly left post as was contended by
employer as basis for termination; relevant issue was
employer’s uncontroverted conclusion that employee
had done so). Petitioner has adduced no competent
evidence to dispute Respondent’s evidence of such
convictions.
5. Petitioner states there is a conflict over whether
he was ever told by Gallagher to get permission from
his supervisor to come meet with him (Gallagher) on the
date in question. Petitioner does not, however, refute
Gallagher’s testimony that he (Petitioner) told
Gallagher that he had received supervisor permission
(ER/409:2-11), but had not in fact received such
permission. (ER/461.) Further, the imagined testimonial
conflict here is not material as the issue for Respondent
was the undisputed fact that Petitioner had left a job
assignment without supervisor approval.
6. Finally, Petitioner states that his supposed
struggles to get into and accepted in the HVAC
Department are relevant to the issue of retaliatory
intent on Respondent’s part and a jury should be
permitted to “conclude that [he] was seen as a
malcontent and trouble-maker who should be gotten rid
of because of his co-workers’ anger and hostility.”
(Petition at 32.) But, a triable issue may only be created
by admissible evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e);
Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049
(9th Cir. 1995) (only competent evidence is to be
40
considered in opposition to summary judgment).
Petitioner cannot create such an issue by speculating
concerning the actions of others. See Wallis, supra, 26
F.3d at 890 (upon employer’s legitimate showing, to
defeat summary judgment, plaintiff must then produce
“specific, substantial evidence of pretext”); Lindahl v.
Air France, 930 F.2d 1484, 1487-38 (9th Cir. 1991)
(“plaintiff cannot carry [the McDonnell Douglas] burden
simply by restating the prima facie case and expressing
an intent to challenge the credibility of the employer’s
witnesses on cross-examination.”) It was not error for
the lower courts to reject such an argument in opposition
to summary judgment here.
All told, even were this Court to determine that a
demonstration of error below were alone a proper basis
for review, Petitioner has failed to make any such
showing.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent respectfully
requests that the Court deny the Petition.
Respectfully submitted,
JEROME SCHREILBSYLEIN
LAW OFFICE OF JEROME SCHREIBSTEIN
275 Battery Street, 18th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 875-3355
Allorneys for Respondent
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.