Opposition Brief — Jones v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC (No. 08-1450)

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Supteme Court, U.S.

FILED

No. 08-1450 AUG 2 1 2009

OFFICE OF THE SLE. ‘x

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Wnited States

LAVON JONES, JR.,

Petitioner,

9)

BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC,

Respondent.

On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

JEROME SCHREIBSTEIN

Law OFFICE OF JEROME SCHREIBSTEIN

275 Battery Street, 18th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94111

(415) 875-3355

Attorneys for Respondent

224710 ce

COUNSEL PRESS

(S00) 274-3321 * (S00) 359-6859

ai.

a

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Do the challenged decisions of the District Court

and Ninth Circuit, properly applying long-standing

jurisprudence in granting summary judgment in

favor of Respondent in a garden-variety

employment discrimination case, call for re-

examination of summary judgment principles in the

context of employment discrimination suits in total,

where there has not even been error shown below?

Should this Court grant review to consider

amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 to

create a special rule for employment discrimination

cases?

22

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT RULE 29.6

Respondent Bayer HealthCare LLC is a wholly

owned subsidiary of Bayer Corporation, an Indiana

corporation. Bayer Corporation is a wholly owned

subsidiary of Bayer AG, a German corporation whose

shares are publicly traded on the Frankfurt exchange.

Til

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENUGD «nce cicsseccises i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT RULE

it co eee ee Cae eR OEE Cee ess il

Tess She GE ek eos x oa es 0s Fee iii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ......... ix

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............... 1

Bi. TEMS OE TI Ce oss noice Sees ek 1

B. Statement of Relevant Facts ........... 1

l. Bayer’s Hematology/Cardiology

Global Business Unit ..... 2.2.2... ]

2. Petitioner Is Hired and Understands

his Bayer employment Is Governed

by Certain Rules of Conduct ....... 3

3. Bayer Promotes Petitioner and Pays

for his Technical Education ........ 4

4. Petitioner Has an Extensive History

of Interpersonal and Performance

Problems at Bayer, Including at Least

One Conflict with an African-

American Co-worker ........6...6.. 4

iv

Contents

Petitioner Is Selected to Be an HVAC

Mechanic-C; Later Promoted to

PUNE oe aa aos ea tana

The Crucial Importance of the HVAC

Systems at the Berkeley Site ......

Petitioner Was Extensively Trained

in the Requirements of Accurate

Record-keeping, Safety Protocols,

and Other Important Requirernents

of the HVAC Mechanic Position ....

In His Relatively Brief HVAC

Tenure, Petitioner Has Numerous

Inter-personal Problems with Co-

Workers, Violates Critical Policies and

Standards, Is Insubordinate,

and Is (Unsurprisingly) Lawfully

Terminated for These Reasons .....

a. Petitioner’s Rocky Probationary

a re he a

b. Petitioner Has a Loud, Profane

Altercation with a Co-worker ...

ec. Petitioner Is Counseled for His

Failure to Follow Equipment

Release and Lockout/Tagout

yg. a a re

Contents

Page

d. Petitioner Fails to Show up for

Critical Work Assignment on

January 6, 2008 after Working

Unauthorized Double Time the

Prior Evening; He Is Suspended

for Three Days as a Result ..... 11

e. Petitioner Abandons a Work

Assignment on January 24,

EE ia cok ee eee eee 13

f, In January 2003, Petitioner

Approaches Supervisor Smith

about the Possibility of a Further

Promotion; in Evaluating this

Request, the Company Learns

that Petitioner Has Improperly

Recorded the Completion of

Work, a Serious SOP Violation

which, in Context with Petitioner’s

Entire Bayer Work History,

Leads to His Lawful Termination

9. Petitioner Was Treated Equally with

Respect to All Terms and Conditions

of his Bayer Employment .......... 15

D.

vi

Contents

10. Petitioner Files EEOC Charge

Alleging Discrimination in Terms and

Conditions of Employment; Charge Is

Found Without Merit; Petitioner

Seeks Reconsideration and EEOC

Upholds Findings that Petitioner

Has No Evidence of Race

SPUMUIIIIINEENS 35k 5 8 Sh eb cess uevewies

The District Court’s Grant of Summary

Judgment in Respondent’s Favor ......

The Ninth Circuit Affirms .............

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ...

I.

Li.

THERE IS NO CONFLICT AMONG

py geo Ei yy a na ae

THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE AN

IMPORTANT FEDERAL QUESTION,

NOR DOES THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DECISION DEPART FROM THE

ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF

JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ..........

A. Summary Judgment Standards Are

Weil Established and Require no

PIO <5 65.55.5645 53 4405 8434008

Page

16

16

19

19

20)

ITI.

vil

Contents

B. Second Circuit Jurisprudence Does

Not Suggest a New or Different

Summary Judgment Standard for

Employment Discrimination Cases ...

C. Summary Judgment, as with Many

Other Procedural Devices Employed

By District Courts, Does Not Violate

the Seventh Amendment ..........

D. Petitioner’s Incomplete and

Misleading Use of Statistics Does Not

Provide an Appropriate Basis for a

Grant of Review Here .............

kK. Supreme Court Review Is Not

Intended to Correct Factual Errors

in Lower Court Decisions ..........

THE LOWER COURTS CORRECTLY

APPLIED LONG-STANDING LAW TO

THE FACTS BELOW IN GRANTING

SUMMARY JUDGMENT .............

A. Petitioner Does Not Even Assign

Error Concerning the Disposition of

his Discrimination-Based Claims ...

B. The Lower Courts Correctly Held

that Petitioner Had Not Adduced

Sufficient Evidence to Sustain his

Retaliation-Based Claims ..........

Page

23

31

vill

Cited Authorities

Page

1. The District Court Did Not Err

in Determining that Proximity

Evidence Alone Was Insufficient

to Create Triable Issue on

Respondent’s Supposed

Retaliatory Intent ............. 33

No

The Ninth Cireuit Did Not

Commit Reversible Error in its

Characterization of Richard

Smith’s Role in the Union

Meeting/Termination Process .. 36

3. The District Court Did Not Err in

Ignoring Supposed Factual

Conflicts in Record in Granting

Summary Judgment on

Petitioner’s Retaliation Claims .. 37

CONC LAFSEUEN 00s bienesedeecens £030 e6 eae 40

ix

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242

or 25

Burkes v. Wisconsin Dep't. of Transp., 464 F.3d

744 (7 Cir. 2006) 2... cee eee 26

Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d

1044 (9 Cir. 1995) 2.2... ee ce cee 39

Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968 (9" Cir.

2003) . cece cece ce ccccuueceeuueeeeevuueees 35

Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) ........ 27

Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S.

MU EIOUR) cccccccccccresccccescvesovesece 26, 27

Fogerty v. MGM Group Holdings Corp., 379 F.3d

348 (6 Cir. 2004) 2... ee ee ee ee ee eee 38

Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, Ltd.

Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219 (2™ Cir. 1994) ...22, 23, 24

Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) .... 27

Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining

Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1981)... ec eee eee e ee ee 27

x

Cited Authorities

Page

Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551

Cr Re I ea ccbaceses ckenen saan saeneues 24

Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1484 (9" Cir.

|} ae ery ee ry 40

Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092 (9 Cir. 2002) .. 25

Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F.3d 792 (9 Cir.

DOE Sakon newek <0 cceedeaen Code 33, 34

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

SOE da aebedeeGesceucuesesara Teens ous 22, 23, 40

Miller v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 797 F.2d 727

Pn Re Sia ec bs doo eu Sheu oeeeEn ceases 35

Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,

SO Ws AOE 6 6-cecccutvubecaescadeses 25

Porter v. California Dept. of Corrections,

419 F.3d 885 (9™ Cir. 2005) .........cecccve 35

Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406

POR SE kcbacaven>dasecdevacverhaueeun 24

Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Comm. Coll. Dist.,

934 F.2d 1104 (9 Cir, 1991) .......ccecccces 25

Xl

Cited Authorities

Page

U.S. v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) .............. 31

Vilarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d

BOG CE Gs OUD cvcc cc cccvcececcccceseoss 39

Wallis v. J.R. Stmplot Co., 26 F.3d 885 (9" Cir.

Dis. 6t aac aeo chs Cee ee Seem Tes Cad 25, 40

United States Constitution:

United States Constitution,

Seventh Amendment .................. aed 27

Statutes:

oa fois. , ae eee Ae rae 29

Re Eat Ser rere re ae ae 29

— gtk Soe)” reer ern e rrr 29

California Fair Employment and Housing Act ... 18

Rules:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ...... 29

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ......i, 19, 20, 28

federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) ...... . Z]

xii

Cited Authorities

Page

United States Supreme Court Rule 10(a) .... 20, 28

United States Supreme Court Rule 29.6 ...... 11

Other Authorities:

California Constitution, Article Il, section 8 ... 18

Discharge Is Now Major Focus of Job

Discrimination Suits, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)

BUG, BG CHM, B, SUES cece ccvecnccsacesser 29

Marika F. X. Litras, Ph.D., Civil Rights

Compluints in U.S. District Courts, 1990-98,

PG EPG es COM, BO coc cvccecsvecescssss 29

Office of Human Resources and Statistics,

Administrative Office of the United States

Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics

i. Pe | ae 29

Report on Summary Judgment Practice Across

Districts with Variations in Local Rules

pe a rer eer 27, 28, 30

Ll. Eisenberg and M. Schlanger, The Reliability

of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis,

78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1455 (2008) ......... 27-28

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case

Petitioner Lavon Jones, Jr. (herein, “Petitioner’”’)

contends that respondent Bayer HealthCare LLC

(herein, “Respondent” or “Bayer”) discriminated against

him in the terms and conditions of his employment as

an HVAC (Heating/Ventilation/Air-conditioning)

mechanic by treating him disparately and less favorably

than non-African-Americans in a variety of matters,

including training, the provision of tools, and the supply

of uniforms. Petitioner claims that Respondent

ultimately denied him a promotion and terminated him

because of his race and in retaliation for his protests

and his oppositional protected conduct. The United

States District Court for the Northern District of

California, the Honorable Jeffrey S. White presiding

(herein, the “District Court”), granted summary

judgment for Respondent and the Ninth Cireuit Court

of Appeals affirmed and, later, denied en banc review.

Petitioner now seeks United States Supreme Court

review by his within Petition for Writ of Certzorari

(herein, the “Petition”).

B. Statement of Relevant Facts ‘

1. Bayer’s Hematology/Cardiology Global

Business Unit

The Bayer site at which Petitioner worked in

Berkeley, California houses Respondent’s Hematology/

Cardiology Global Business Unit and employs

approximately 1,500 workers. The site is involved in the

2

research, development, and producticn of finished

pharmaceutical products, including Kogenate FS.

Kogenate FS is a drug principally used by hemophiliacs

to help clot their blood; it is a life-sustaining and, in some

cases, a life-saving product. (ER!/496-497.)

Bayer, as a producer of finished pharmaceuticals for

human use, must follow rigorous internal Standard

Operating Procedures (“SOPs”) that are consonant with

Good Manufacturing Practices (“GMPs”) which, in turn,

are mandated by applicable provisions of the United

States Code of Federal Regulations and parallel

regulations of comparable European regulatory

agencies and of other regions of the world. Bayer’s

practices and processes in this regard are subject to

scrutiny and review by the United States Food and Drug

Administration (“FDA”), and like agencies in other

nations. Prominent among these regulations are

requirements of vigilant self-policing, including with

regards to accurate manufacturing documentation. (ER/

497, 15; EF R/615:20-616:9.) If a regulatory audit were to

uncover inaccurate record-keeping at the Bayer

Berkeley site, it could lead to monetary sanctions or even

a suspension of production, threatening business

sustainability, Bayer’s ability to employ its large, local

work force and, most importantly, the health, safety, and

welfare of its patient community. (E R/497, 1 5.)

' “ER” refers to Excerpts of Record as submitted by

Petitioner to the Ninth Circuit.

3

2. Petitioner Is Hired and Understands his Bayer

employment Is Governed by Certain Rules of

Conduct

Petitioner was offered and accepted a position as a

General Worker for Bayer, starting in February 1997.

(ER/575:4-9.) His duties in this position were janitorial

in nature. (ER/584:14-58:5.) He had no HVAC duties.

(E R/585:6-14.)

Petitioner was subject to the terms and conditions

of his Bayer Company agreement, which, inter alia,

obligated him to follow Company rules, policies

and procedures. (ER/580:21-582:9; ER/1041-1044

(esp., 1 13).) Petitioner also understood that he was

required to follow certain “Company Rules.” (E.R/582:10-

583:14; ER/503, 508-510°; ER/1045-1047.) These rules

included prohibitions on:

¢ using any abusive or profane language to

any supervisor, employee or visitor (ER/

1045-1047, p. 2, 1 12, left column)

¢ unauthorized absenteeism or tardiness or

failure to promptly report the reasons for

such matters (7d. at 11 14, left column)

¢ failing to observe safety rules and

regulations (zd. at { 6, right column)

¢ falsifying personnel or medical records

(id. at 18, right column)

* FR/509 is mis-stamped ER/638 on the ER as served on

Respondent’s counse!.

4

e refusing or failing to perform [a] job as

assigned by supervisor (7d. at 11 14, right

column).

Petitioner understood he could be terminated for

violating these rules. (E.R/1045-1047.)

3. Bayer Promotes Petitioner and Pays for his

Technical Education

In August 1999, Petitioner enrolled in the Sequoia

Institute. (ER/592:17-593:1.) Bayer paid all of

Petitioner’s tuition at Sequoia. (ER/593:2-6.) On or

about September 8, 2000, Petitioner completed a low-

grade Climate Control and Refrigeration Technology

Program at Sequoia. (E.R/593:18-595:21; ER/1049-1053.)

This was the only HVAC training Petitioner ever had

and he had no HVAC work experience at the time of his

matriculation. (ER/595:22-596:18; ER/597:7-24.)

4. Petitioner Has an Extensive History of

Interpersonal and Performance Problems at

Bayer, Including at Least One Conflict with

an African-American Co-worker

Throughout his Bayer employment, there were

numerous incidents where Petitioner’s poor

interpersonal skills affected his work environment. For

example, in a dispute between Petitioner and employee

Michael Timberlake, also African-American, Petitioner

was accused of spreading rumors and gossiping about

Timberlake. Timberlake sent Petitioner an e-mail

requesting he not engage in such conduct; they both

then met with HK representative Sherri O’Driscoll (then

5

Vierra) and ultimately resolved the issues. (ER/589:11-

592:16; ER/1048.)

5. Petitioner Is Selected to Be an HVAC

Mechanic-C; Later Promoted to B-Level

In October 2000, shortly after receiving his

certificate from Sequoia, Petitioner applied for an

HVAC-C level position. (EF R/610:2-611:2; ER/1066-1069.)

He understood this to be an entry level, «pprentice

position; the lowest in the department. (EF. R/611:21-25;

SER*/001:1-2.) Part of the assessment process for the

hiring supervisor, Ron Roberts, was to measure the

ability of each candidate to absorb and retain

information as this was to be a position that would entail

a significant learning curve. (ER/515, 93.)

Petitioner was hired into the C-level position,

notwithstanding the HVAC Department’s serious

concerns with his competencies for the job based on his

inability to demonstrate he had retained any of his

training at Sequoia. (ER/608:18-609:3; ER/515, 1 4.) In

connection with this hiring process, and in all of his

dealings with him, Petitioner had no memory of Roberts

ever making any derogatory remark concerning

Petitioner’s race or that of any other employee.

(ER/612:23-613:23.) Petitioner was later promoted to a

B-level mechani~ position at the instance of Richard

Smith, who succeeded Roberts as the department

supervisor. (ER/532, 115; ER/538; ER/654:24-656:9.)

3 “SER” refers to Supplemental Excerpts of Record as

submitted by Respondent to the Ninth Circuit.

6

6. The Crucial Importance of the HVAC Systems

at the Berkeley Site

Respondent’s pharmaceutical manufacturing

process is dependent upon certain production steps

being conducted in “clean room” environments as

achieved, in part, through its HVAC systems. A clean

room environment is one with exceptionally low levels

of particulates, dust, germs, and other potential

contaminates. This helps ensure the manufacture of

contaminate-free drugs that are safe for human use.

(ER/516, 1 5.)

The HVAC systems and the mechanics who maintain

them are thus critical in Respondent’s production

processes and to ensure compliance with regulatory

authority, GMPs, and Respondent’s own SOPs. Indeed,

if the HVAC systems malfunction, production may be

stopped. On a more drastic level, a poorly maintained

or poorly functioning HVAC system could jeopardize the

sale and distribution of the Kogenate FS product line

to patients as a result of product contamination. For

many patients, this is a life sustaining drug, for which

they have few (if any) alternatives. Thus, a significant

HVAC issue could impact patient health as well posing

business and other economic consequences to

Respondent. (ER/516, 1 6.)

7

7. Petitioner Was Extensively Trained in the

Requirements of Accurate Record-keeping,

Safety Protocols, and Other Important

Requirements of the HVAC Mechanic

Position

Petitioner was provided extensive training on the

requirements and importance of accurate record-

keeping. (ER/614:1-622:10; ER/1070-1072; Appellee’s

Supplemental Excerpts of Record — Under Seal (“Sealed

Excerpts”), SER/287-304.) Petitioner understood that

a failure to adhere to Bayer SOPs could, under certain

circumstances, lead to termination. (EH R/622:11-623:14.)

In addition, among the most fundamental safety

processes on which Petitioner was trained and qualified,

were the steps involved when an HVAC mechanic

services or maintains a piece of production equipment

(7.e., HVAC equipment that is used in or concerning site

facilities where product is actually being manufactured

as opposed to equipment not integral to such systems).

One such fundamental process involves the equipment

“release” from the local production supervisor to the

mechanic. This release ensures critical notification to

production personnel and approval that certain

equipment will be out of service for repair/maintenance.

Bayer has a specific training protocol for this step upon

which Petitioner was trained and qualified. (EF. R/623:15-

625:2; ER/1073; ER/626:20-628:11; ER/651:9-653:16;

Sealed Excerpts, SER/305-308; ER/516, 4 7.)

In addition, following the production release of the

equipment to the mechanic, the mechanic must comport

with what is known as the “Site Lockout/Tagout

8

Procedure.” This procedure, which is required for the

mechanic’s own safety, involves disconnecting any “hot”

(electrically charged) unit that is to be worked on and

physically placing a lock and tag on the unit so that it

cannot be re-connected until the maintenance or service

is complete. Petitioner was trained and qualified on this

procedure as well. (ER/625:3-630:19; ER/1074-1083; ER/

516-517, 18; ER/520-527.)

8. In His Relatively Brief HVAC Tenure,

Petitioner Has Numerous Inter-personal

Problems with Co-Workers, Violates Critical

Policies and Standards, Is Insubordinate, and

Is (Unsurprisingly) Lawfully Terminated for

These Reasons

a. Petitioner’s Rocky Probationary Period

At the time of his hire into the HVAC Department,

Petitioner was the only C- level mechanic. (E.R/631:23-

632:6.) He began working in the department in February

2001. (EF R/630:20-23.)

Within his first 60 days, several of the senior HVAC

mechanics came to department supervisor Roberts to

report challenges that they were experiencing with

Petitioner, including his: (a) lack of concentration on

instructions, (b) disengagement from the process, where

he seemed to drift in and out and, as noted by supervisor

Roberts, frequently did not even make eye contact

during instruction, (c) lengthy disappearances when sent

to retrieve tools and parts, and (d) excessive use of

phones and beepers for personal matters. Roberts met

with Petitioner to discuss these issues and he suggested

9

there might be some classes that he could arrange for

Petitioner to improve his inter-personal dealings with

the group; Petitioner refused, instead requesting a

meeting with the group to which Roberts agreed. (ER/

517; ER/633:19-636:22.)

At the meeting, which Petitioner attended with his

Union representatives, several of his co-workers raised

issues with Petitioner’s lack of focus and use of cell

phones, among other things. (E R/636:20-639:15.) At his

deposition in this matter, Petitioner had no factual basis

— just his own inferences and feelings — for concluding

that this criticism was the product of a discriminatory

motive. (ER/639:16-641:3.)

Because of the issues that had arisen in the

department, it was offered to Petitioner that he could

extend his 75-day probationary period without any

formal documentation of his noted performance

deficiencies; it was also suggested that Petitioner take

an interpersonal skills class. (ER/517, 1 10.) Petitioner

declined these options at which point he was formally

taken off of probation and counseled by his management

and Human Resources relative to the issues that had

been addressed with him. (EF R/642:23-650:3; ER/1084;

ER/517, 110.)

b. Petitioner Has a Loud, Profane

Altercation with a Co-worker

On or about November 8, 2001, Joe Haberstroh, a

seasoned HVAC mechanic, reported a loud, profane

altercation he had with Petitioner. At Smith’s request,

Haberstroh prepared a written summary of the events.

10

(E R/532-533, 11 6, ER/540.) Haberstroh reported in

addition to the confrontational, profane (Petitioner

reportedly called Haberstroh a “motherfucker” at least

three times), and threatening nature of the interchange,

that he had to remind Petitioner relative to compliance

with the site Lockout/Tagout procedure before working

on a “hot” fan unit. Smith asked Petitioner (more than

once) te also submit a written account of events but he

failed to do so. (EF. R/532-533, 1 6; ER/662:20-663:1.)

A meeting was convened among Smith, Roberts

(who was still a “consultant” to the group and

occasionally facilitated on personnel matters), and

Haberstroh, along with Petitioner and his Union

representatives. (ER/663:13-664:1.) At the meeting,

Petitioner again refused to acknowledge any fault in the

confrontation. Additionally at the meeting, Smith

revealed that one of the reasons that another senior

mechanic, James Rowe, had recently left the department

was that he did not wish to work with Petitioner any

longer and Smith was concerned about any further

losses of senior nechanics in the department. (EK R/664:2-

665:23; ER/533, 17; ER/542-543.)

c. Petitioner Is Counseled for His Failure

to Follow Equipment Release and

Lockout/Tagout Procedures

In early November 2001, Petitioner was assigned

to replace a drive belt on an exhaust fan. Petitioner

completed and certified the work order without

indicating that there had been a release of the

equipment from production or any indication that there

had been compliance with the Lockout/Tagout

1]

procedure. (ER/656:10-661:14; ER/1085-1086.)

Petitioner was counseled for his failure to comply with

these important procedures, which could have

jeopardized Respondent’s product and Petitioner’s

safety. (ER/533, 1 8; ER/545-546; ER/666:8-669:8, ER/

1087-1090.) At the time of this counseling, Petitioner

denied that he had failed to comply with the procedures,

instead claiming that he had in fact complied but that

he just had no way to prove it. (/d.)

d. Petitioner Fails to Show up for Critical

Work Assignment on January 6, 20038 after

Working Unauthorized Double Time the

Prior Evening; He Is Suspended for

Three Days as a Result

On December 26, 2002, Petitioner was assigned to a

work crew to do some preventative maintenance on

Building B60 during the winter shutdown. It was

explained to Petitioner (and the crew) that the work

would span five days and would require 3:00 a.m. start

times. Petitioner was given a schedule of the work

activities and raised no objection as to the assignment.

(ER/670:13-672:4; ER/533, 1 9.)

On January 5, 2003, a Sunday, Petitioner was

scheduled to work eight hours. Without any express

authorization, he worked an additional three hours -

earning double time. Petitioner attempted to justify the

excess hours being worked, stating that he stayed to

complete some open work orders, though no one had

requested the work orders be completed that day.

(E R/672:5-676:21; ER/1091; ER/534, 1 10.) He

understood that weekend overtime needed to be

approved by the supervisor. (Ek. R/670:7-12.)

12

The following morning, January 6, 2003, Petitioner

was scheduled to participate — as part of the previously

scheduled winter shutdown work - in a timed procedure

involving the maintenance of an air handler unit which

procedure was to begin at 3:00 a.m. With a timed

procedure such as this, it is critical to have all assigned

members of the team present as the failure to meet the

time conditions may lead to the issuance of a

Discrepancy Event Report (“DER” -— now commonly

called in the industry an “IR” - Incident Report); a

DER/IR can cause regulatory issues and is deemed a

serious matter by Bayer, which Petitioner also

understood. (ER/534, 1 11; ER/678:19-679:12.) Instead

of reporting to work on time, Petitioner left a voice mail

message on Smith’s cell phone indicating he was not

coming in at 3:00 a.m.; that he would be in at his “regular

time” — 7:00 a.m., not because he was ill or on account of

other extenuating circumstances, but because he did

not feel as if he should have to work his scheduled shift

due to his seniority. (ER/676:22-678:18.) Smith did not

play the voice mail until 5:00 a.m. and he was,

unsurprisingly, unable to replace Petitioner on the shift;

the short-handed crew barely completed the work on

time. (ER/534, 1 12.)

On January 7, 2003, Petitioner was issued a three-

day suspension for the failure to attend to his work

duties and for working unauthorized overtime.

(ER/677:4-681:20, ER 1092.) Although Petitioner stated

he believed that his race had led to the imposition of

this discipline, he could not identify anyone who had been

treated more favorably by Bayer under comparable

circumstances. (E R/682:3-683:23.) Nor could Petitioner

13

identify any facts which would establish that the

discipline was in retaliation for any legally protected

activity. (E R/684:8-18.)

e. Petitioner Abandons a Work Assignment

on January 24, 2003

On January 24, 2003, Petitioner was required to

assist two other mechanics with a process involving a

tunnel sterilizer unit. He unilaterally determined the

job did not require his participation. Without prior

supervisor approval, Petitioner left his co-workers alone

on the task for a meeting he had set up with HR.

(E R/692:4-694:9.) Yet, Petitioner nonetheless advised

HR Consultant Joe Gallagher that his supervisor had

authorized the meeting. (ER/500, 1 5; ER/534, 97 13.)

f In January 2003, Petitioner Approaches

Supervisor Smith about the Possibility of

a Further Promotion; in Evaluating this

Request, the Company Learns that

Petitioner Has Improperly Recorded the

Completion of Work, a Serious SOP

Violation which, in Context with

Petitioner’s Entire Bayer Work History,

Leads to His Lawful Termination

In January 2003, Petitioner made an inquiry of

Smith regarding a possible further promotion.

(E R/685:4-20; ER/686:22-688:1; ER/1093.) In order to

evaluate Petitioner’s request, Smith determined,

inter alia, to examine some recent preventative

maintenance work Petitioner had been assigned,

including filter change-outs. Smith did a visual

14

inspection of the area and determined that the filters

on one fan unit had not been changed; he then pulled

the paper work and saw that Petitioner had closed a

work order, submitted his time entry and completed a

log book indicating the work had been performed on

January 24, 2003. (E R/688:22-691:2; ER/1094-1096.)

Smith also determined that there were not enough

filters checked out of inventory supply for the month

for Petitioner to have completed the change out.

(ER/291:10-293:7.) When questioned by Smith,

Petitioner stated he had changed the filters and

completed the documentation accordingly. (E R/534-535,

14.) At deposition, Petitioner coule not account for the

fact that there were dirty filters in the unit when his

paperwork indicated to the contrary. Despite repeated

questioning, Petitioner would not attest that he had in

fact changed the filters. (EF R/698:2-699:12; E.R/1094

1095.)

At deposition, Petitioner also conceded that

completion of a work order for work not done would be

an instance of document falsification and a violation of

Bayer policy. (E. R/697:23-698:1.)

Smith advanced the issue and conferred with IIR

Consultant Gallagher. The two discussed the history of

Petitioner’s Bayer employment, his past disciplinary

problems, including interpersonal issues and the three-

day suspension of a few weeks earlier, his abandonment

of job duties only days before, and the serious

documentation violation relative to the building

maintenance which would not have otherwise been

discovered (were it not for Smith’s inspection) and could

have led to a compromised production environment.

Under all of the facts, it was determined that

Petitioner’s employment would be terminated.

Gallagher and Smith also consulted with Joe Nitz, the

superintendent over the maintenance group (which

included the HVAC Department), who approved of the

termination decision in consultation with then

Department Manager Enrique Martinez. (EF R/535; E R/

548-549; ER/500-501; EF R/529; ER/513, 1 3.)

Petitioner testified that he thought the unfulfilled

promotion request and the termination were both

racially motivated but — again — could not identify any

statements, comments, or actions that would indicate

or suggest a racial motive for the actions; only his own

interpretation of the facts. (EF R/695:17-696:14; ER/

700:19-707:1.) Nor could Petitioner identify any evidence

indicating a retaliatory motive on Bayer’s part. (ER/

759:1-777:17, ER/1097-1127.)

9. Petitioner Was Treated Equally with Respect

to All Terms and Conditions of his Bayer

Employment

Petitioner was provided equal access to tools,

overtime, training, computer access, and promotion —

and subject to discipline - pursuant to Bayer policy and

business needs; no allocation of such was on the basis of

race. (ER/501, 9 7; ER/513, 7 4; ER/517-518, 91 11; ER/

535, 116; ER/530, 1 6.)

16

10. Petitioner Files EEOC Charge Alieging

Discrimination in Terms and Conditions of

Employment; Charge Is Found Without

Merit; Petitioner Seeks Reconsideration and

EEOC Upholds Findings that Petitioner Has

No Evidence of Race Discrimination

On June 24, 2002, Petitioner filed a Charge of

Discrimination with the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EK EOC), alleging

that he had been discriminated against in the terms and

conditions of his Bayer employment on account of his

race. (ER/1135.) On December 16, 2002, the EEOC

dismissed the Charge, finding a lack of any evidence to

sustain a violation. (ER/1132.) Also on December 16,

2002, Petitioner filed additional, voluminous materials

with the EEOC (SER/002-262); because the deadline for

submissions had passed, the EEOC treated the

submission as a request for reconsideration. (ER/1128-

1130.) On January 29, 2003, the EEOC affirmed its

earlier finding that Petitioner had failed to establish any

cognizable discrimination on Respondent’s part.

(ER/778:13-779:19; ER/780:6-781:2; ER/1128-1132.)

C. The District Court’s Grant of Summary Judgment

in Respondent’s Favor

On November 3, 2006, Respondent moved for

summary judgmeut. Its Motion was granted on March

21, 2007. (Appendix B to Petition (“App. B”) at 26.)

The District Court determined that there was no

triable issue of fact on Petitioner’s first, third, fifth, and

sixth claims for relief wherein Petitioner alleged that

17

he had been denied promotion and ultimately terminated

on account of his race. Bayer established that Petitioner

could not even make out his minimal prima facie case.

Petitioner offered no proof he was competently

performing his position (or suited for a promotion) at

the time of the challenged employment actions. Indeed,

the undisputed evidence was that he had (1) been

involved in confrontations with co-workers and

reprimanded for poor attitude, attendance and

performance, (2) unilaterally determined not to show up

for work for a critical time-controlled maintenance

procedure, (3) left a job assignment without supervisor

approval, and (4) failed to comply with employer-

mandated documentation policies pertaining to HVAC

maintenance. In addition, Petitioner adduced no

evidence that anyone similarly situated as he — but

outside of the protected class - had been dealt with ina

more favorable way by Respondent. (App. B at 12-19.)

Even had he made a prima facie race discrimination

showing, Petitioner was unable to present meaningful

evidence of pre-text or discriminatory intent to refute

Bayer’s showing of legitimate bases for not promoting

him, for terminating him, and for other claimed

discriminatory employment terms and conditions.

Instead, Petitioner chiefly relied on matters of his own

impressions concerning people’s motives, an innocuous

constructive comment by a Bayer supervisor suggesting

Petitioner make eye contact while interacting with group

members and receiving instructions, and a statistically

incompetent evaluation of the demographics of his work

unit. These matters were found inadequate and the

District Court entered summary judgment in Bayer’s

favor on Petitioner’ race claims and his derivative public

18

policy wrongful termination eighth (in part)* claim for

relief. (App. B at 19-22.)

Petitioner’ retaliation (second, seventh and eighth

(in part)) claims were found similarly wanting. Petitioner

principally relied on the ostensible temporal nexus

between his “protected conduct” and Bayer’s

complained of actions to establish the causal linkage

element of his prima facie showing, but the more than

seven-month passage of time between the filing of his

EEOC Charge and the termination of his employment,

against the backdrop of numerous intervening events

of his own poor job performance, was found by the

District Court to foreclose any such inference.

Moreover, even had he made his prima facie retaliation

case, Petitioner was unable to establish a triable issue

on the ultimate requisite element of retaliatory motive

as against Bayer’s unrebutted showing of the

performance issues leading directly to his termination.

(App. B at 22-24.)®

* Petitioner’s Eighth Claim for Relief comprises allegations

of retaliation and unequai treatment based on “race or color or

national origin” in violation of provisions of the California Fair

Employment and Housing Act and Article I, section 8, of the

California Constitution. Despite the pleading allegation, there

was no pursuit by Petitioner of any theory of national origin

discrimination or any evidence adduced below in such regard.

® As an alternative basis for the grant of summary

judgment, the District Court held that Petitioner’s untruthful

statements about his education on his original employment

application would have led to termination under settled Bayer

policy, and thus the termination was justified as a matter of law

under the so-called “after-acquired evidence rule.” (App. B at

24-25.)

19

D. The Ninth Circuit Affirms

In an opinion filed on December 1, 2008, the Ninth

Circuit of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s grant

of summary judgment. (Appendix A to Petition

(“App. A”) at 2-4.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the

discrimination claims, finding there was no triable issue

demonstrated concerning Petitioner’s claimed

acceptable job performance or that others similarly

situated, but outside the protected class, had been more

favorably treated. (App. A at 2-3.) In addition, Petitioner

failed to adduce material, competent evidence of pretext

in regards to his retaliation claim and — even had he —

he was unable to rebut Respondent’s demonstration of

numerous legitimate bases for the termination. (App. A

at 3-4.) The Ninth Circuit later denied en banc review.

(Appendix C to Petition.)

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case does not

warrant further review. The decision does not conflict

with any decision of this Court or any other courts of

appeals. It concerns the proper entry of summary

judgment in a garden-variety employment discrimination

case and there is nothing exceptional about how the

District Court or the Ninth Circuit applied the Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (at times, “Rule 56”)

standards. On the merits, moreover, the decision is

clearly correct; Petitioner cannot show any error with

regards to the manner in which his retaliation claims

were adjudicated and does not even purport to do so

with regards to his discrimination claims. This case is

illustrative of exactly why the summary judgment

20

procedure exists — to avoid wasting judicial resources

on trying a case where one party has insufficient

evidence. And, such procedure does not run afoul of

Seventh Amendment rights to a jury trial.

Moreover, Petitioner’s call for re-examination of

summary judgment jurisprudence — and implicitly, a

judicially-made super-standard under Rule 56 for

granting summary judgment in employment

discrimination actions - is based largely on the musings

of several commentators and a statistical report which

reveals no clear signal. There is no demonstrated need

for a special summary judgment rule in employment

discrimination cases and it would not be the province of

this Court to create one.

I. THERE IS NO CONFLICT AMONG THE

CIRCUITS

There is no circuit split on the standards to be used

by federal district courts under Rule 56, and Petitioner

does not contend otherwise.° (See Petition at 26 (relying

solely on an asserted need for this Court to exercise its

supervisory powers under Supreme Court Rule 10(a).)

° To the extent that Petitioner suggests that there is a more

nuanced application of existing summary judgment principles

in the Second Circuit, that argument is discussed, infra, at II.B.

II. THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE AN

IMPORTANT FEDERAL QUESTION, NOR

DOES THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION

DEPART FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL

21

COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

A. Summary Judgment Standards Are Well

Established and Require no Modification

Petitioner declares a need for this Court to set forth

the proper standards to be applied in determining

whether to grant summary judgment in employment

discrimination cases. (Petition at 25.) But, the summary

judgment standards to be applied to any summary

judgment motion are entrenched in our jurisprudence

and are in no need of revision:

First, summary judgment may not be

granted unless “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56 (c).

Second, the burden is upon the moving

party to demonstrate that no genuine issue

respecting any material fact exists.

Third, all ambiguities must be resolved

and all inferences drawn in favor of the

party against whom summary judgment is

sought.

22

¢ Fourth, the moving party may obtain

summary judgment by showing that little

or no evidence may be found in support of

the nonmoving party’s case. When no

rational jury could find in favor of the

nonmoving party because the evidence to

support its case is so slight, there is no

genuine issue of material fact and a grant

of summary judgment is proper.

¢ Finally, the trial court’s task at the

summary judgment motion stage of the

litigation is carefully limited to discerning

whether there are any genuine issues of

material fact to be tried, not to deciding

them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this

point to issue-finding; it does not extend

to issue-resolution.

See Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, Ltd.

Partnership, 22 F.8d 1219, 1223-24 (2? Cir. 1994)

(citations omitted) (“Gallo”). These same criteria were

utilized by the District Court in this case when it granted

Respondent’s motion for summary judgment. (App. B

at 11-12.)

As applied to an employment discrimination case in

particular, this Court articulated the order and allocation

of proof in the seminal case of McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1978). The plaintiff bears

the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of

the alleged discrimination, which has the effect of

creating alegal presumption of unlawful discrimination.

Jd. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then

23

the defendant bears the burden of offering a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment

action. /d. If the defendant meets this burden, the

presumption created by the prima facie case is

rebutted, and the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff

to show the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for

the employment action was a pretext for the alleged

unlawful discrimination. /d.

Review is unwarranted in this case because the

District Court correctly concluded that not only did

Petitioner fail to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination in his employment discrimination claims,

neither did Petitioner demonstrate a genuine issue of

material fact on the issue of pretext on his retaliation

claim. (App. B.) These decisions were reached based on

existing and well-defined summary judgment standards

as applicable to employment discrimination actions.

B. Second Circuit Jurisprudence Does Not

Suggest a New or Different Summary

Judgment Standard for Employment

Discrimination Cases

Petitioner asserts that summary judgment is

granted disproportionately in favor of employers and

that the Supreme Court, through its supervisory powers

(see S. Ct. Rule 10(a)), should accept review in order to

“'. . require that the lower courts adopt the Second

Circuit’s requirement and exercise caution in granting

summary judgment when an employer’s intent is at

issue.” (Petition at 27.) Petitioner relies primarily upon

Gallo, supra, 22 F.3d. 1219, to support this argument.

The court in Gallo, however, in its own words, did

24

nothing more than “repeat” the same long-standing,

and oft-cited, standards governing every summary

judgment motion, 2d. at 1223-24; the same criteria that

were set forth by the District Court in this case. (App.

B at 11-12.)

Also in Gallo, the Second Circuit cautioned trial

courts confronted with a summary judgment motion in

the employment discrimination context: “A trial court

must be cautious about granting summary judgment to

an employer where, as here, its intent is at issue.

Because writings directly supporting a claim of

intentional discrimination are rarely, if ever, found

among an employer’s corporate papers, affidavits and

depositions must be carefully scrutinized for

circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show

discrimination.” Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223-24. Petitioner

suggests that review is warranted in order for this Court

to “adopt” this cautionary remark made by the Second

Circuit.

But this cautionary approach to summary judgment

motions in employment discrimination cases is not

limited to the Second Circuit. The Ninth Circuit “has

set a high standard for the granting of summary

judgment in employment discrimination cases.”

Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410

(9 Cir. 1996). In particular, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has

instructed that district courts must be cautious in

granting summary judgment for employers on

discrimination claims.” See Lam v. University of

Hawazii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1564 (9 Cir. 1994) (“‘[w]e require

very little evidence to survive summary judgment’ in a

discrimination case, ‘because the ultimate question is

25

one that can only be resolved through a [“]searching

inquiry|”}] — one that is most appropriately conducted

by the factfinder’”’) (quoting, Sischo-Nownejad v.

Merced Comm. Coll. Dist., 9384 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9'" Cir.

1991)).”

Moreover, the Supreme Court has already

articulated this cautionary approach as applied to

summary judgment motions where motive and intent

are at issue. “[SJummary judgment is to be granted with

great caution; for ‘it is only when the witnesses are

present and subject to cross-examination that their

credibility and the weight to be given their testimony

can be appraised.’” Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting

System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (antitrust

litigation) (internal citation omitted); see also, Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (libel

action involving First Amendment).

Finally, it is notable that the District Court here

specifically referenced the minimal showing required of

an employment discrimination plaintiff to survive

summary judgment. “At summary judgment, the degree

of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case is

‘minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a

preponderance of the evidence.’ Lyons v. England, 307

F.3d 1092, 1112 (9" Cir. 2002) (quoting Wallis v. J.R.

Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9™ Cir. 1994) [(“Wallis”’)].)

Although the burden for establishing a prima facie case

is an easy one to satisfy, Plaintiff has failed to do so.”

(App. B at 14-15.) Thus, Petitioner was not held to an

unduly harsh standard that requires revisiting, only to

a minimal standard which he failed to meet.

26

C. Summary Judgment, as with Many Other

Procedural Devices Employed By District

Courts, Does Not Violate the Seventh

Amendment

Petitioner also argues that this Court should accept

review in order to exercise its supervisory powers to

“'.. emphasize the implications of the Seventh

Amendment right to jury trial when deciding summary

judgment motions ... .” (Petition at 27.) Respondent

does not dispute that there is a right to a jury trial in

any civil rights case where damages are at issue. This

right is guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the

Constitution. To the extent that Petitioner is suggesting

that the summary judgment standard under the Federal

Rules violates the Seventh Amendment right to jury

trial, this Court held long ayo that it does not. Indeed,

such contentions have been rejected for more than one

hundred years. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United

States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902); Burkes v. Wisconsin Dep.

of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 759 (7 Cir. 2006) stating that

“It|he Supreme Court has made it abundantly

clear that summary judgment has a proper

role to play in civil cases, and thus granting

Summary judgment does not violate a

plaintiff’s right to due process. We have also

stated that summary judgment and Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56 do not violate the

Seventh Amendment, as this argument...

flies in the face of firmly established law’’)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

~]

There have been many procedural devices

developed since 1791 which have diminished the civil

jury’s historic domain and not one of them has been

found to violate the Seventh Amendment. See Galloway

vy. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-93 (1943) (directed

verdict does not violate the Seventh Amendment);

Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283

U.S. 494, 497-98 (1931) (retrial limited to question of

damages does not violate the Seventh Amendment, even

though there was no practice at common law for setting

aside a verdict in part); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United

States, supra, 187 U.S. at 319-21 (summary judgment

does not violate the Seventh Amendment); Dimick v.

Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87 (1935) (remittitur did not

violate Seventh Amendment). Thus, Petitioner’s

argument that review should be granted in order to

emphasize the implications of the Seventh Amendment

right to jury trial when deciding summary judgment

motions should be rejected as long since moot.

D. Petitioner’s Incomplete and Misleading Use

of Statistics Does Not Provide an Appropriate

Basis for a Grant of Review Here

To support his argument that summary judgment

is granted disproportionately to employers, Petitioner

relies primarily on statistics recently published by the

Federal Judicial Center. See Report on Summary

Judgment Practice Across Districts with Variations in

Local Rules (August 13, 2008) (hereinafter, the

“Report”). The data included in the Report, however,

were not designed for research into civil justice,

litigation theory, or any substantive area of law. T.

Kisenberg and M. Schlanger, The Reliability of the

~

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An

Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev.

1455, 1462 (2003). Instead, the data were prepared “as

a means of assessing the potential impact of proposed

amendments to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure” having to do with the potential Rule

inclusion of a separate statement of undisputed material

facts. See the Report at 1. Furthermore, like many large

data sets, the Federal Judicial Center data are not

completely accurate (id. at 1458), and Petitioner's

selective citations from the Report are misleading.

Petitioner de-emphasizes (by contrasting contract and

tort cases), for example, that out of all employment

discrimination cases filed, only 11-15% are terminated

by summary judgment. The Report, Table 12, p. 17. This

can only mean that the vast majority of employment

discrimination cases either are resolved by a factfinder

or settlement.

Furthermore, Petitioner relies upon these statistics

to support his argument that this Court should accept

review to either (1) reiterate the summary judgment

standards for federal district courts, or (2) articulate a

new summary judgment standard specifically for

employment discrimination cases. Review is not

warranted for either reason.

As set forth above, the Rule 56 standards are well

established, and to the extent that Petitioner is

suggesting Rule 56 be applied differently to employment

discriminaticn cases, or that summary judgment for

employment discrimination cases be prohibited or

limited in any way, such an argument must be rejected.

Modifying the federal rules of civil procedure is not

29

accomplished by seeking review of a case by the

Supreme Court. Instead, such modifications are

governed by procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. sections

2072, 2073, and 2074.

Moreover, Rule 56, along with several other

procedural devices (e.g., motions to dismiss for failure

to state a claim (Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6)) available to

federal district ccurts, serve the vital role of managing

their dockets. The workload of federal district courts

has grown substantially in recent decades for the same

reasons that have increased demands upon the

Supreme Court to hear cases upon appeal. In the two

decades between 1971 and 1991, employment law cases

saw a staggering 400 percent increase in the federal

district courts. Discharge Is Now Major Focus of Job

Discrimination Suits, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 164,

at A-3 (Aug. 23, 1991). Between 1990 and 1998, the

number of employment civil rights claims increased by

an additional 300 percent. Marika F. X. Litras, Ph.D.,

Civil Rights Complaints in U.S. District Courts, 1990-

98, NCJ 173427, Jan. 2000, at 2. It is no secret that

employment-related litigation has increased by an

astonishing rate throughout the last three decades and

currently represents a significant portion of the federal

judicial caseload. In 2002, for example, employment

litigation represented nearly 14 percent of the more

than one-quarter million cases filed in United States

District Courts. See, Office of Human Resources and

Statistics, Administrative Office of the United States

Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics March 31,

2002, at 44-46 (2002).

30

Given the multitude of employment discrimination

cases filed each year, summary judgment continues to

be an important procedural tool for district courts to

help manage their ever-increasing docket. Indeed, the

Report stands for no contrary proposition and, if, as

Petitioner suggests (though the Report does not

necessarily bear this out), summary judgment is granted

more frequently in employment discrimination cases

versus run-of-the mill common law contract and tort

claims, it may well be argued that the statistics prove’

that the latter are more likely to have merit, or at least

factual disputes at their core.

E. Supreme Court Review Is Not Intended to

Correct Factual Errors in Lower Court

Decisions

Petitioner failed to convince the District Court and

the Ninth Circuit that his case had any merit. The within

Petition is simply seeking a “third bite at the apple.”

But, this is not an appropriate basis for Supreme Court

review.

“The function of this Court is not primarily to

correct factual errors in lower court decisions,

but instead to resolve important questions of

federal law and to exercise supervisory power

over lower federal courts. Our institutiona!

role properly is focused on ensuring clarity

and uniformity of legal doctrine, and not on

the case-specific process of reviewing the

’ As Mark Twain is oft-quoted as saying, “There are lies,

damned lies and statistics.”

ol

application of law to the particul: rized facts

of individual disputes — one of the functions

performed quite capably by the federal courts

of appeals.”

U.S. v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 34 (1985).

Petitioner here improperly seeks review by the

Supreme Court to correct perceived factual errors made

by both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals. This request should be denied.

lil. THE LOWER COURTS CORRECTLY APPLIED

LONG-STANDING LAW TO THE FACTS

BELOW IN GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

The decisions of the District Court and the Ninth

Circuit below not only do not implicate a circuit split or

call for a re-examination of summary judgment principles

insofar as employment discrimination cases are

concerned, they were correctly decided.

A. Petitioner Does Not Even Assign Error

Concerning the Disposition of his

Discrimination-Based Claims

The District Court determined that Petitioner had

not raised a prima facie case of employment

discrimination because he was notable to establish a

triable issue of fact as to whether (a) he was performing

work in a manner acceptable to Respondent, and (b)

others outside of the protected class, but otherwise

similarly situated, were treated more favorably. (App.

32

B at 14-18.) Even had Petitioner created a triable issue

under his prima facie case, the District Court further

determined that Petitioner could not establish a triable

factual question on the ultimate issue of discriminatory

intent, where he could not rebut with substantive,

competent evidence that Respondent terminated

Petitioner’s employment on account of an escalating

series of performance issues. (App. B. at 19-22.) The

Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding no triable issue created

on Petitioner’s discrimination claims. (App. A at 2.)

In his Petition, Petitioner tacitly concedes the

propriety of the lower courts’ summary disposition of

his discrimination claims. Petitioner states that “[t]he

present case exemplifies the need for review of the

question of whether summary judgment is being used

improperly and the (s?c.) for the establishment of the

standards for its use... ,” but does so exclusively by

“focus[ing] on the decision of the lower courts on the

issue of retaliation.” (Petition at 27.) Thus, no error by

the lower courts is urged by Petitioner concerning his

discrimination claims in seeking Supreme Court review.

B. The Lower Courts Correctly Held that

Petitioner Had Not Adduced Sufficient

Evidence to Sustain his Retaliation-Based

Claims

In focusing on the issue of retaliation, Petitioner’s

central contention is that the District Court erroneously

granted summary judgment and violated Rule 56

standards (and relevant jurisprudence) by improperly

weighing conflicting evidence and deciding matters of

disputed fact. The Ninth Circuit rejected these same

33

contentions and, as noted above, Supreme Court review

is not appropriate to simply give Petitioner a third

chanez to convince a court that a triable factual issues

exists in this instance. Further, the ostensible errors

pointed to by Petitioner are not that at all; but instead

comprise misstatements or misunderstandings of the

record and non-material factual discrepancies not

warranting trial.

1. The District Court Did Not Err in

Determining that Proximity Evidence

Alone Was Insufficient to Create Triable

Issue on Respondent’s Supposed

Retaliatory Intent

Petitioner chides the District Court for overlooking

or ignoring evidence that Petitioner had raised a prior

discrimination charge in a Union grievance that

preceded his termination by a matter of weeks, and had

been criticized at a Union-conducted meeting by co-

workers very shortly before his termination. The

District Court determined that the significant passage

of time - more than seven months - between

Petitioner’s initial filing of his EEOC Charge and his

employment termination — precluded a finding of causal

nexus on this basis. (App. B at 23-24; citing, inter alia,

Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F:3d 792, 808 (9" Cir.

2003) (“Manatt”) (holding that nine-month period of

time between protected activity and alleged retaliatory

conduct was too long to create an inference of

retaliation).) From this, Petitioner concludes the District

Court erred in finding that too much time had passed

between Petitioner’s legally protected activity and his

termination to raise a triable issue on the basis of

so-called proximity evidence.

34

But, the grievance did not constitute additional

protected activity (beyond the EEOC Charge); it merely

referenced pending protected conduct. More

particularly, in grieving the three-day suspension

imposed upon Petitioner by Respondent for (a) his

failure to appear for work for an important, time-

controlled maintenance procedure (because he did not

feel as if he should have to do so); and (b) his working of

unauthorized overtime, Petitioner wrote as to the

nature of his grievance: “Vindictive behavior transpired

from a pending EEOC charge prompt (sic) from the

violation of Title VII.” (ER/412 (emphasis supplied).)

Thus, there was no additional protected conduct on

which to predicate a temporal argument.

Even more pertinently, the grievance followed the

disciplinary action by Respondent. In order to

circumstantially establish the necessary element of

causation on a retaliation claim, the protected conduct

must precede the employer’s challenged disciplinary

action. Temporal proximity is established by showing a

close linkage in time of an adverse action following on

the heels of protected conduct. See Manatt, supra, 339

I'3d at 802. With regards to Petitioner’s referenced

grievance, the converse was the case — first, Respondent

imposed discipline (the suspension) and only then did

Petitioner re-raise the issue of his then pending EEOC

Charge. In a related vein, the supposed co-worker

harassing comments were not protected activity (at least

not on Petitioner’s part) and thus there is no relevance

on the issue of proximity regarding Respondent’s

supposed retaliatory intent.

35

Moreover, Petitioner continues to misapprehend the

temporal proximity analysis at its threshold. As the Ninth

Circuit has stated, temporal proximity is not itself an

element of the prima facie retaliation case but, rather,

evidence upon which an inference of causation may be

drawn. Porter v. California Dept. of Corrections, 419 F.3d

885, 895 (9" Cir. 2005). Thus, any bright line rule on

temporal proximity has been rejected and, instead:

“Whether an adverse employment action is

intended to be retaliatory is a question of fact

that must be decided in the light of the timing

and the surrounding circumstances. In some

cases, the totality of the facts may form such a

clear picture that a district court would be

justified in granting summary judgment, either

for or against a plaintiff, on the issue of

retaliatory motive; but the length of time,

considered without regard to its factual setting,

is not enough by itself to justify a grant of

summary judgment.”

Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 978 (9" Cir. 2008).

Here, the record reflects that Petitioner had

pending an EEOC Charge for more than half of 2002,

but yet there was a series of escalating performance

deficiencies in January 2003 — effectively unrebutted in

the record — which preceded and precipitated

Respondent’s termination of Petitioner’s employment.

Accordingly, the finding that Petitioner had failed to

demonstrate prima facie causation by timing evidence

alone was proper here. See Miller v. Fairchild

Industries, Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 731 (9 Cir. 1986) (timing

36

evidence alone is not enough to withstand summary

judgment where employer has a legitimate stated basis

for its challenged actions).

2. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Commit

Reversible Error in its Characterization

of Richard Smith’s Role in the Union

Meeting/Termination Process

Petitioner also assigns error to the Ninth Circuit in

its reference to the lack of any evidence in the record

that Petitioner’s former supervisor Richard Smith (a)

made any affirmatively hostile comments at a referenced

Union meeting, and (b) communicated what occurred

at that meeting to other members of the management

team involved in the decision to terminate Petitioner.

(App. A at 3.) But, Petitioner points to no conflicting

evidence on these issues, only different facts, 7.e., that

Smith ostensibly agreed with criticisms of Petitioner as

voiced at the meeting and himself was involved in the

termination decision. Ultimately, however, the District

Court (App. B at 24) and Ninth Circuit (App. A at 3-4)

determined that there was no competent evidence to

rebut that Respondent acted to terminate based on the

performance issues raised, and the past record of

discipline. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit specifically found

that “[g]Jiven these legitimate and particularized bases

for termination, the fact that one of [Petitioner’s]

supervisors participated in a single allegedly hostile

union meeting is insufficient evidence of pretext to

survive summary judgment.” (App. A at 3-4 (emphasis

supplied).) Thus, whether a prima facie retaliation case

was originally raised is of no moment and does not justify

a grant of review by this Court.

37

3. The District Court Did Not Err in

Ignoring Supposed Factual Conflicts in

Record in Granting Summary Judgment

on Petitioner’s Retaliation Claims

Petitioner re-raises in his Petition six instances

where he claims the District Court ignored or

disregarded supposedly competent evidence on the

issue of pretext. But, these instances do not bear

scrutiny.

1. Petitioner states there was an evidentiary conflict

as to whether he was asked about (or whether there

was adequate investigation of) his state of mind in terms

of his misstatements on Respondent’s production

documents. HR Manager Joe Gallagher stated an

inquiry would have typically been posed of an employee

who would be permitted to provide his “side of the story.”

The undisputed evidence of record, however, is that

Smith did ask Petitioner if he changed the filters and

Petitioner stated he had done so. (EF R/534-535.) Thus,

there is no question that Petitioner completed the

Respondent’s production paperwork erroneously, which

was one of the reasons he was terminated as recognized

by the District Court. (App. B at 10.) It is not clear how

this amounts to a conflict or evidence of pretext in the

record.

2. Petitioner states there were also “[clonflicts” as

to who “checked up on his work” on January 24, 2003.

(Petition at 30.) In fact, there was no material conflict.

Co-worker James Jewell never testified that he

“inspected” the work. He testified that Smith told him

to take pictures, replace the filter, and copy the logbook

38

— none of which would make any sense if Smith had not

already inspected the work and determined that it had

not been completed by Petitioner, as Smith testified he

had done. (ER/184:10-186:7.) On the very narrow issue

of who actually took certain of the pictures as between

Smith and Jewell, even if the testimony were in conflict,

it does not serve to create a triable material factual

issue on the matter. [t is axiomatic that in the face of an

employer’s properly supported summary judgment

motion, the plaintiff may not avoid summary disposition

by pointing to minor or immaterial discrepancies in the

employer’s evidence. See, e.g., Fogerty v. MGM Group

Holdings Corp., 379 F.3d 348, 353 (6'" Cir. 2004)

(“[aJ nonmoving party may not avoid a properly

supported motion for summary judgment by simply

arguing that it relies solely or in part upon credibility

considerations. Instead, the nonmoving party must

present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly

supported motion for summary judgment”).

3. Petitioner states there are testimonial conflicts

as to whether he was ever asked about the filter job. As

stated above, there were not; at least not of a material

nature.

4. Petitioner states he believes he changed all of

the filters and he denies making deliberate

misstatements on production documents. Even leaving

aside the admissibility of the cited Petitioner’s self-

serving declaration testimony in this regard (as

contradicting his own prior deposition testimony

(see App. B at 16-17, n. 2 (evidence excluded by District

Court on the basis of this impermissible conflict)), the

issue is collateral. The question is not whether Petitioner

39

actually did engage in the charged misconduct, it is

whether Respondent believed that he had done so.

See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Aiy, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054,

1063 (9"" Cir. 2002) (irrelevant on issue of pretext whether

employee improperly left post as was contended by

employer as basis for termination; relevant issue was

employer’s uncontroverted conclusion that employee

had done so). Petitioner has adduced no competent

evidence to dispute Respondent’s evidence of such

convictions.

5. Petitioner states there is a conflict over whether

he was ever told by Gallagher to get permission from

his supervisor to come meet with him (Gallagher) on the

date in question. Petitioner does not, however, refute

Gallagher’s testimony that he (Petitioner) told

Gallagher that he had received supervisor permission

(ER/409:2-11), but had not in fact received such

permission. (ER/461.) Further, the imagined testimonial

conflict here is not material as the issue for Respondent

was the undisputed fact that Petitioner had left a job

assignment without supervisor approval.

6. Finally, Petitioner states that his supposed

struggles to get into and accepted in the HVAC

Department are relevant to the issue of retaliatory

intent on Respondent’s part and a jury should be

permitted to “conclude that [he] was seen as a

malcontent and trouble-maker who should be gotten rid

of because of his co-workers’ anger and hostility.”

(Petition at 32.) But, a triable issue may only be created

by admissible evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e);

Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049

(9th Cir. 1995) (only competent evidence is to be

40

considered in opposition to summary judgment).

Petitioner cannot create such an issue by speculating

concerning the actions of others. See Wallis, supra, 26

F.3d at 890 (upon employer’s legitimate showing, to

defeat summary judgment, plaintiff must then produce

“specific, substantial evidence of pretext”); Lindahl v.

Air France, 930 F.2d 1484, 1487-38 (9th Cir. 1991)

(“plaintiff cannot carry [the McDonnell Douglas] burden

simply by restating the prima facie case and expressing

an intent to challenge the credibility of the employer’s

witnesses on cross-examination.”) It was not error for

the lower courts to reject such an argument in opposition

to summary judgment here.

All told, even were this Court to determine that a

demonstration of error below were alone a proper basis

for review, Petitioner has failed to make any such

showing.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent respectfully

requests that the Court deny the Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

JEROME SCHREILBSYLEIN

LAW OFFICE OF JEROME SCHREIBSTEIN

275 Battery Street, 18th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94111

(415) 875-3355

Allorneys for Respondent

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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