Opposition Brief — Cundiff v. United States (No. 08-1376)
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‘Vv JUL 8 - 2009
No. 08-1376 Lorene cr es cus: |
In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
TEORGE RUDY CUNDIFF AND CHRISTOPHER SETH
CUNDIFF, PETITIONERS
vr.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
VO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SUXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
ELENA KAGAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JOHN ©. CRUDEN
Acting Assistant Altorney
General
IELLEN J. DURKEE
JENNIFER SCHELLER NEUMANN
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
4
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the wetlands at issue in this case are
“waters of the United States” within the meaning of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, as amended by
the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat.
1566 (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seg.) (CWA); 33 U.S.C. 1362(7).
2. Whether a determination by the United
States Department of Agriculture that petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest had begun converting wetlands
to farming use before December 23, 1985, eliminated the
need to obtain a CWA permit for petitioners’ activities.
3. Whether the district court correctly dismissed
petitioners’ takings counterclaims for lack of jurisdic-
tion.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Arr Prods. Co., 336
Ses ee 68 00S Oa aE hen eee whee 10
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481
CAE ews oo henna o 5 eh aeen teats Ree ee va 4
Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. FAA, 525 F.3d 1299
ee EE 5 0s > oh boa a ew a eke eten ss 15
Northern Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496
I’.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
SN 5 oo cc ce ee ee a oe oe 10
Rapamnos v. Unated States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) ... 4,5, 7, 11
Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc’y v. Metacon Gun Club,
Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. Conn. 2007), appeal
pending, No. 07-0755CV (2d Cir.) ............00005- 13
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 631 U.S. 159 (2001) .... 4
United States v. Brace, 41 F. 3d 117 (3d Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1158 (1995) ............... 13, 14
Unated States v. Gerke Hacavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723
(7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 45 (2007) ..... 10
United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. S75 GGT)... ccc cccn caves 9
(1Tt)
IV
Cases-——-Continued: Page
United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925) ......... 10
United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316 (Sth Cir.), cert.
eo ap ee eee ee 9
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
ee I kok eros Sa a eee Wak eee ess vac ens 3
Limited States v. Robison, 505 F.8d 1208 (11th Cir.
2007), cert. denied sub nom, United States v.
McWane, lic., 129 S. Ct. 630 (2008) ................. 9
Constitution, statutes, regulations and rule:
U.S. Const. Amend. V (Takings Clause) ............... 15
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, as amended
by Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (33 U.S.C.
1251 et seq.):
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Food Security Act of 1983, 16 U.S.C. 3821 ef seq.:
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Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
No. 08-1376
GEORGE RUDY CUNDIFF AND CHRISTOPHER SETH
CUNDIFF, PETITIONERS
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-33a)
is reported at 555 F.3d 200. The opinion of the district
court on statutory coverage (Pet. App. 34a-48a) is re-
ported at 480 F. Supp. 2d 940. The opinions of the dis-
trict court finding petitioners liable and dismissing their
counterclaims are unreported. The opinion of the dis-
trict court on the appropriate remedy (Pet. App. 49a-
63a) is unreported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
February 4, 2009. The petition for a writ of certiorari
was filed on May 5, 2009. The jurisdiction of this Court
is invoked under Z8 U.S.C. 1254(1).
(1)
2
STATEMENT
1. a. Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816, as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.)
(CWA or the Act), “to restore and maintain the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s wa-
ters.” 38 U.S.C. 1251(a). Section 301(a) of the CWA
prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant by any person”
except in compliance with the Act. 33 U.S.C. 1811(a).
“Discharge of a pollutant” is defined as “any addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source.” 383 U.S.C. 1362(12). “Pollutant” is defined to
include not only traditional contaminants but also solids
such as “dredged spoil, * * * rock, sand [and] cellar
dirt.” 33 U.S.C. 13862(6). The CWA defines the term
“navigable walters” to mean “the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. 1862(7).
The United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
and the United States Environmental Protection Agen-
cy (EPA) share responsibility for implementing and en-
forcing the CWA. The Corps and EPA have promul-
gated substantively equivalent regulatory definitions
of the term “waters of the United States.” See 33
C.F.R. 328.8(a) (Corps definition); 40 C.F.R. 230.3(s)
(EPA definition). Those definitions encompass, inter
alia, traditional navigable waters, which include waters
susceptible to use in interstate commerce, see 33 C.F.R.
328.3(a)(1), 40 C.F .R. 230.5(s)(1); “[t]ributaries” of tradi-
tional navigable waters, see 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(5),
40 C.F.R. 230.3(s)(5); and wetlands “adjacent” to other
3
covered waters, see 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(7), 40 C.F.R.
230.3(s)(7).'
Section 404(a) of the CWA authorizes the Secretary
of the Army, acting through the Corps, or a State with
an approved program, to issue a permit “for the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into the navigable wa-
ters at specified disposal sites.” 33 U.S.C. 1344(a). The
Act provides limited exemptions from this permit re-
quirement. 33 U.S.C. 1344(f)(1). Even when the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material qualifies for an exemp-
tion, a permit is still required under the CWA’s recap-
ture provision if the purpose of the discharge is to
“bring|| an area of the navigable waters into a use to
which it was not previously subject, where the flow or
circulation of navigable waters may be impaired or
the reach of such waters be reduced.” 33 U.S.C.
1344(f)(2). The United States may bring a civil enforce-
ment action in district court against any person who vio-
lates the CWA by discharging dredged or fill material
into covered wetlands without a permit. 33 U.S.C.
1319(b) and (d). In such an action, the government may
seek injunctive relicf and civil penalties. /bid.
b. This Court has recognized that Congress, in en-
acting the CWA, “evidently intended to repudiate limits
that had been placed on federal regulation by earlier
water pollution control statutes and to exercise its pow-
ers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least
some waters that would not be deemed ‘navigable’ under
the classical understanding of that term.” United States
l
‘To avoid confusion between the term “navigable waters” as defined
in the CWA, see 33 U.S.C. 1362(7), and the traditional use of the term
“navigable waters” to describe waters that are, have been, or could be
used for interstate or foreign commerce, see 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(1), this
brief will refer Lo the latter as “traditional navigable waters,”
4
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133
(1985) (Riverside Bayview); see International Paper Co.
v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 486 n.6 (1987). In Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (SWANCC), the
Court held that use of “isolated” nonnavigable intrastate
ponds by migratory birds was not by itself a sufficient
basis for the exercise of federal regulatory jurisdiction
under the CWA. /d. at 166-174. The Court noted, ana
did not cast doubt upon, its prior holding in Riverside
Bayview that the CWA’s coverage extends beyond wa-
ters that are “navigable” in the traditional sense. See
id, at 172.
Most recently, the Court again construed the CWA
term “waters of the United States” in Rapanos yv. Uni-
ted States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). Rapanos involved two
consolidated cases in which the CWA had been applied
to actual or proposed pollutant discharges into wetlands
adjacent to nonnavigable tributaries of traditional navi-
gable waters. See 7d. at 729-730 (plurality opinion). All
Members of the Court agreed that the term “waters of
the United States” encompasses some waters that are
not navigable in the traditional sense. See id. at 73
(plurality opinion); 7d. at 767-768 (Kennedy, J., coneur-
ring in the judgment); id. at 793 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing’).
A four-Justice plurality in Rapanos interpreted the
term “waters of the United States” as covering “rela-
tively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bod-
ies of water,” 547 U.S. at 739 (plurality opinion), that are
connected to traditional navigable waters, 7d. at 742, as
well as wetlands with a continuous surface connection
5
to such water bodies, ibid.” Justice Kennedy interpre-
ted the term to encompass wetlands that “possess a ‘sig-
nificant nexus’ to waters that are or were navigable in
fact or that could reasonably be so made.” Jd. at 759
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167); see id. at 779-780. In addi-
tion, Justice Kennedy concluded that the Corps’ asser-
Lion of jurisdiction over “wetlands adjacent to navigable-
in-fact waters” may be sustained “by showing adjacency
alone.” Jd. at 780. The four dissenting Justices, who
would have affirmed the court of appeals’ application of
the pertinent regulatory provisions, concluded that the
term “waters of the United States” encompasses, inter
alia, all tributaries and wetlands that satisfy either the
plurality’s standard or that of Justice Kennedy. See id.
at 810 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2. Petitioners own two tracts of land in Muhlenberg
County, Kentucky, that together contain approximately
188 acres of wetlands. Pet. App. 3a, da. Those wetlands
are adjacent to Pond and Caney Creeks, which are trib-
utaries of the Green River, a traditional navigable wa-
ter. /d. at 19a. Shortly after petitioner George Rudy
Cundiff (Cundiff) purchased the southern tract in 1990,
he began clearing the wetlands of trees, excavating
drainage ditches, and placing the dredged spoil and oth-
cr material into the wetlands next to the ditches. /d. at
3a-4a. Cundiff did not obtain a permit from the Corps
for his activities. /d. at 4a. The Corps issued a cease
and-desist letter to Cundiff in October 1991. Jbid. De-
~ The Rapanos plurality noted that its reference to “relatively perm-
anent” waters “dlid| not necessarily exclude streams, rivers, or lakes
that might dry up in extraordinary circumstances, such as drought,” or
“seasonal rivers, which contain continuous flow during some months of
the year but no flow during dry months.” 547 U.S. at 732 n.é.
6
spite additional directives to stop his activities, Cundiff
continued to discharge dredged spoil into the wetlands
on the southern tract. /d. at 5a.
In 1998, Cundiff’s son, petitioner Christopher Seth
Cundiff (Seth Cundiff), purchased the tract immediately
to the north of his father’s property. Pet. App. 5a. With
Seth Cundiff’s knowledge, Cundiff quickly began exca-
vating that tract and redepositing the spoil into the wet-
lands. Jbid. Federal and state officials repeatedly in-
formed petitioners that they were required to obtain
permits for their activities, but petitioners ignored those
instructions and continued their activities without a
CWA permit. /d. at 5a-6a. Ln total, petitioners dug ap-
proximately 11,900 linear feet of ditches on both tracts
and redeposited that materia] into approximately 5.3
acres of wetlands. /d. at 25a. Petitioners’ activitics pre-
vented the wetlands at the site from performing their
prior functions, such as providing wildlife habitat and
filtering and treating contaminants and toxins, including
acid mine drainage, before they entered nearby water-
ways. ld. at a4a.
3. The United States brought suit against petition-
ers, alleging that they had violated Section 301(a) of the
CWA by discharging pollutants into waters of the Uni-
ted States without a permit. Pet. App. 6a. The district
court granted the government’s motion for summary
judgment on liability. bid. In granting the motion, the
district court rejected petitioners’ contention that they
were not required to obtain a CWA permit because their
predecessor-in-interest had obtained a determination
from the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) that he had begun converting wetlands to farm
ing use before December 28, 1985. Mem. Op. and Order,
Civ. Action No. 4:01CV-6-M at 9-10 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 24,
“~
‘
2003). The district court explained that “the sole pur-
pose” of that determination was “to prevent the loss of
USDA benefits,” and that “the clear language of the”
application form for the determination stated that “[t]he
granting of [the] request . . . does not remove other
legal requirements that may be required under State or
Federal waters laws.” /d. at 10 (quoting Pets. Resp. Br.
Exh. M) (emphasis added by district court).
The district court also dismissed petitioners’ coun-
terclaims against the United States, including their
claims that the government’s actions constituted a tak-
ing of petitioners’ property without just compensation.
Mem. Op. and Order on Mot. to Dismiss Counterclaims,
Civ. Action No. 4:01CV-6-M (W.D. Ky. Sep. 12, 2001).
The court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the
takings counterclaims because petitioners sought more
than $10,000 in relief. Jd. at 4-5 & n.4.
After a bench trial, the court enjoined petitioners
from discharging pollutants into waters of the United
States, and it ordered petitioners to restore the wet-
lands on their properties. Pet. App. 49a-68a. The court
also imposed a civil penalty of $225,000 against Cundiff,
but it suspended $200,000 of that amount on the condi-
tion that Cundiff adequately implemented the restora-
tion plan. Jd. at 60a-62a.
Petitioners appealed. While the appeal was pending,
this Court issued its decision in Rapanos, supra. Pet.
App. 6a. The court of appeals remanded the case to al
low the district court to reconsider, in light of Rapanos,
whether petitioners’ wetlands are covered by the CWA.
Ibid. On remand, the district court held that the United
States may establish CWA jurisdiction over wetlands
under either the standard set forth in the Rapanos plu-
rality opinion or the standard identified in Justice Ken
8
neay’s concurrence. /7. at 41a. The district court found
that petitioners’ wetlands were covered by the CWA
under both standards. /d. at 42a-48a.
4. Petitioners took a second appeal, and the court of
appeals affirmed. Pet. App. la-33a. The court held that
it was unnecessary to decide whether Justice Kennedy’s
standard or the Rapanos plurality’s standard governs
CWA coverage because petitioners’ wetlands are cov-
ered “under both Justice Kennedy’s and the plurality’s
tests.” Jd. at 16a.
The court of appeals also held that petitioners’ activi-
ties do not qualify for any of the exceptions to the
CWA’s permit requirements. Pet. App. 26a-27a. The
court further noted that, even if petitioners’ activities
had qualified for one of the statutory exemptions, peti-
tioners “would still have been required to get a permit
under the ‘recapture provision,’ 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2),”
because the purpose of their activities was to “‘bring[]
an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it
was nol previously subject,’ and the ‘flow or eirculation
of navigable waters may be impaired or the reach
of such waters reduced.’” /d. at 27a (quoting 33 U.S.C.
1344(f)(2)).
The court of appeals also affirmed the dismissal of
petitioners’ takings counterclaims. Pet. App. 30a. The
court explained that the “Tucker Act gives the Court of
Federal Claims exclusive subject matter jurisdiction
over takings claims seeking more than $10,000.” /bid.
Because petitioners sought more than $10 million for all
of their counterclaims and had not limited their takings
counterclaims to an amount within the jurisdictional
threshold, the court of appeals held that “their takings
counterclaims were properly dismissed.” /bid.
9
ARGUMENT
The decision of the court of appeals is correct and
does not conflict with any decision of this Court or any
other court of appeals. Further review is not warranted.
1. a. Petitioners contend (Pet. 4-20) that the Court
should grant review to resolve a conflict among the eir-
cuits as to the proper application of Rapanos. Although
the courts of appeals disagree as to the proper standard
under Rapanos for determining whether a wetland is
coverec by the CWA, this case does not present a suil-
able oppertunity to resolve that conflict. As both courts
below correctly determined, petitioners’ wetlands are
covered by the CWA under any of the competing stan-
dards. Pet. App. l6a, 48a. The choice among those stan-
dards therefore would not affect the disposition of this
case.
The First Circuit has held that the CWA covers all
waters that satisfy either the standard announced by the
Rapanos plurality or the “significant nexus” standard
described in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. See (/222-
ted States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 60-66 (2006), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 375 (2007). The Eleventh Circuit, in
contrast, has held that CWA coverage may be estab-
lished only under the standard in Justice Kennedy’s Ra-
panos concurrence. See United States v. Robison, 505
F.3d 1208, 1219-1222 (2007), cert. denied sub nom. Uni-
ted States v. McWane, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 630 (2008). No
court of appeals has adopted petitioners’ view (see Pet.
7-9), that the Rapanos plurality opinion sets forth the
controlling legal standard.”
* Three other courts of appeals, in addition to the Sixth Cireuitin this
case, have discussed the question without definitively resolving it. See
United States v. Lueas, 516 F.3d 316, 326-327 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
10
This Court recently denied the government’s petition
for a writ of certiorari in McWane, which asked the
Court to resolve the circuit conflict. The government
continues to believe that this Court’s clarification of the
proper application of Rapanos may be warranted in an
appropriate case. The present case, however, does not
provide a suitable opportunity to decide which of the
competing standards controls. The court of appeals con-
cluded that the evidence established CWA covevage un-
der both the Rapanos plurality’s standard and that of
Justice Kennedy, and it expressly declined to choose
among the competing standards because that choice
would make no difference to the outcome of this case.
Pet. App. 16a-17a.
b. Petitioners argue that review should be grant-
ed because “the United States failed to prove that [peti-
tioners| had met either the plurality’s standard or the
standard of Justice Kennedy.” Pet. 10. The district
court and the court of appeals concluded, however, that
both standards were satisified. See Pet. App. 16a-17a,
48a. Petitioners’ fact-bound disagreement with the con-
current determinations of the two lower courts does not
warrant this Court’s review. See Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949):
United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925). In
any event, petitioners’ objections to the rulings below
lack merit.
Petitioners contend (10-18) that their wetlands do
not satisfy the Rapanos plurality’s requirement of a con-
tinuous surface connection with the adjacent creeks be-
129 S. Ct. 116 (2008); Northern Cal. Rover Watch v. Coty of Healdsburg,
496 F.3d 993, 1000-1001 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1225
(2008); Unated States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.30 723, 725 (7th
Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct 45 (2007)
11
cause the wetlands are at a higher elevation than the
creeks for much of the year. Nothing in the Rapanos
plurality opinion, however, requires that wetlands and
the traditional navigable waters or tributaries to which
the wetlands connect be at the same elevation. Rather,
as the court of appeals correctly held, the plurality’s
standard requires “that the adjacent channel] contains a
‘wate[r] of the United States,’” a standard clearly met
here, and that the wetlands have “a continuous surface
connection with that water, making it difficult to deter-
mine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”
Pet. App. 19a (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742).
The district court found the latter requirement satis-
fied based on evidence that “there [is] no clear demarca-
tion between waters and wetlands” at petitioners’ site.
Pet. App. 47a. The court of appeals agreed with that
determination, noting the district court’s finding that a
channel in petitioners’ wetlands “provides a largely un-
interrupted permanent surface water flow between the
wetlands and traditional waterways,” id. at 2la, and
“that the water flows through the channel into Pond
Creek for all but a few weeks a year,” id. at 19a. The
court of appeals also noted that the district court had
found “additional (and substantial) surface connections
between the wetlands and permanent water bodies ‘dur-
ing storm events, bank full periods, and/or ordinary high
flows,’ which provide “additional evidence” of a contin-
uous surface connection. Jd. al 2la-22a. The connec-
tions found by the courts below establish CWA coverage
of the wetlands under the Rapanos plurality’s standard.
Petitioners also contend (Pct. 18-20) that the govern-
ment failed to establish a “significant nexus,” within the
meaning of Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in
Rupanos, between their wetlands and traditional naviga-
Zz
ble waters. That argument lacks merit. As both the
district court and the court of appeals concluded, the
wetlands have the requisite “significant nexus” to tradi-
tional navigable waters because those wetlands “per-
form significant ecological functions in relation to the
Green River” and its tributaries, Pond and Caney
Creeks. Pet. App. 17a; see id. at 42a-44a. Those func-
tions include filtering acid mine runoff and sediment
from a nearby abandoned mine, storing water that af-
fects the “frequency and extent of flooding” on the
Green River, and providing an “important habitat for
plants and wildlife.” /d. at 18a.
Petitioners argue (Pet. 18-20) that the government’s
evidence was insufficient to establish a significant nexus
because the government did not conduct any soil, water,
or other laboratory tests. As the court of appeals ex-
plained, however, laboratory tests are not necessary to
establish CWA coverage under Justice Kennedy’s stan-
dard. Pet. App. 19a. Although “a district court could
find such evidence persuasive, [petitioners] point to
nothing—-no expert opinion, no research report or arti-
cle, and nothing in any of the various Rapanos opin-
ions—to indicate that [laboratory testing] is the sole
method by which a significant nexus may be proved.”
Tbhid.
Petitioners also contend that, under Justice Ken-
nedy’s standard, wetlands are covered by the CWA only
if they “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the other covered waters.” Pet. 18
(emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).
Contrary to that contention, a significant effect on any
of those elements would be sufficient to establish a sig-
nificant nexus. Cf. 33 U.S.C. 1251(a) (objective of Act “is
to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and bio-
13
logical integrity of the Nation’s waters”). In any event,
both the district court and the court of appeals found a
significant effect on all three elements. See Pet. App.
17a-19a, 43a-44a.*
2. Petitioners also argue (Pet. 21-23) that they were
not required to obtain a CWA permit beeause the prior
owner of their land had obtained a determination from
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
that conversion of the wetlands to farming use had be-
gun before December 23, 1985. That argument lacks
merit and does not warrant this Court’s review.
The Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA), 16 U.S.C. 3821,
denies certain benefits to farm program subsidy partici-
pants who convert wetlands in order to grow crops. See
Uinited States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 121 (3d Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1158 (1995). The law recognizes,
* Petitioners assert (Pet. 13-14, 19-20) that the deeision below eon-
flicts with Siamsbury-Avon Preservation Society v. Metacon Gun Club,
lnc , 472 F. Supp. 2d 219 (1). Conn. 2007) (Simsbury), appeal pending,
No. 07-0795CV (2d Cir.). A conflict. between the decision below and a
district court decision would not warrant this Court’s review. See &. Ct.
R. 10. In any event, there is no conflict. Contrary to petitioner’s con-
tention (Pet. 13-14), the district court in Simsbury did not adopt
petitioners’ proposed rule that wetlands and adjacent waters must be
at the same elevation to have a continuous surface connection The
court found insufficient evidence of a continuous surface connection be-
cause the flow between the wetlands and the adjacent water was “inter-
mittent.” Samsbury, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 228-229 (citution omitted).
Here, in contrast, the courts belew found “a largely uninterrupted per-
manent surface water flow.” Pet. App. 21a. Contrary to petitioners’
contention (Pet 19-20), the district court in Symsbury did not hold that
a party seeking to establish a “significant nexus” between wetlands and
adjacent waters must. introduce laboratory tests. Although the court
relied on laboratory “data from testing on lead concentrations,” 472 F
Supp. 2d at 229, it nowhere suggested that laboratory tests are the only
pernussible evidence of a “significant nexus.”
14
however, that wetlands converted prior to passage of the
FSA (December 23, 1985) remain eligible for farm pro-
gram benefits. 16 U.S.C. 3822(b)(1)(A). Petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest obtained a USDA determination
that conversion on his property had started before that
date. See C.A. App. 1062; Pet. 22.
As the district court correctly held, that determina-
tion did not obviate the need for petitioners to obtain a
CWA permit before discharging dredged or fill material
into their wetlands. See Mem. Op. and Order, Civ. Ac-
tion No. 4:01CV-6-M at 9-10 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 24, 2003).
The CWA lists the specific circumstanees in which
dredged or fill material may be discharged into covered
waters without a permit, 33 U.S.C. 1344(f)(1), and the
Act does not exempt discharges merely because a land-
owner has a USDA determination that he began conver-
sion of wetlands to farming use before December 23,
1985. The statutory and regulatory provisions under
which such USDA determinations are issued make
clear that the determinations simply exempt the recipi-
ents from ineligibility “for certain benefits provided by
the [USDA] and agencies and instrumentalities of
USDA.” 7 C.F.R. 12.1(a); see 16 U.S.C. 3821-3822;
7 C.F.R. Pt. 12. The application form filled out by peti-
tioners’ predecessor-in-interest stated that the “grant-
ing of a [determination] request does not remove other
legal requirements that may be required under State or
l’ederal water laws.” C.A. App. 1063; see Brace, 41 F.3d
at 127.
In any event, petitioners do not contend that the
court of appeals’ resolution of this issue conflicts with
any decision of this Court or another court of appeals.
Nor do they assert that the issue is one of general im-
portance. Petitioners also do not dispute the court of
15
appeals’ holding (Pet. App. 27a) that, even if petitioners
otherwise qualified for a CWA exemption, they would
still have needed a permit because of the CWA’s recap-
ture provision, which requires a permit for discharges of
dredged or fill material for the purpose of “bringing an
area of the navigable waters into a use to which it was
not previously subject, where the flow or circulation of
navigable waters may be impaired or the reach of such
waters be reduced.” 33 U.S.C, 1344(f)(2). Accordingly,
this issue does not warrant the Court’s review.
3. Petitioners also argue (Pet. 24-83) that the govern-
ment’s actions with respect to their wetlands effected a
taking of their property without just compensation, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Petitioners’ takings claim is not properly
before this Court. Neither the district court nor the
court of appeals addressed the merits of that claim. In-
stead, the district court dismissed the claim for lack of
jurisdiction, Mem. Op. and Order on Mot. to Dismiss
Counterclaims, Civ. Action No. 4:01CV-6-M at 4-5 (W.D.
Ky. Sep. 12, 2001), and the court of appeals affirmed
that dismissal, Pet. App. 30a.
The court of appeals’ resolution of the jurisdictional
question is correct. The Tucker Act vests the United
States Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction over
takings claims against the United States without regard
to the amount in controversy. 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1); see
Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. FAA, 525 F.3d 1299, 1304
(Fed. Cir. 2008). Feaeral district courts have concur-
rent jurisdiction over any such claims “not exceeding
$10,000 in amount.” 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2). Beeause peti-
tioners sought more than $10,000 on their takings claim,
the district court lacked jurisdiction over that claim.
Pet. App. 30a.
16
Petitioners do not discuss, much less dispute, the jur-
isdictiona! rulings of the courts below. Accordingly, peti-
tioners’ takings claim does not warrant this Court’s re-
view.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
ELENA KAGAN
Solicitor General
JOHN C. CRUDEN
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
ELLEN J. DURKEE
JENNIFER SCHELLER NEUMANN
Attorneys
JULY 2009
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.