Opposition Brief — Cundiff v. United States (No. 08-1376)

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No. 08-1376 Lorene cr es cus: |

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

TEORGE RUDY CUNDIFF AND CHRISTOPHER SETH

CUNDIFF, PETITIONERS

vr.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

VO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SUXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

ELENA KAGAN

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

JOHN ©. CRUDEN

Acting Assistant Altorney

General

IELLEN J. DURKEE

JENNIFER SCHELLER NEUMANN

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

4

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the wetlands at issue in this case are

“waters of the United States” within the meaning of the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of

1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, as amended by

the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat.

1566 (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seg.) (CWA); 33 U.S.C. 1362(7).

2. Whether a determination by the United

States Department of Agriculture that petitioners’

predecessor-in-interest had begun converting wetlands

to farming use before December 23, 1985, eliminated the

need to obtain a CWA permit for petitioners’ activities.

3. Whether the district court correctly dismissed

petitioners’ takings counterclaims for lack of jurisdic-

tion.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Arr Prods. Co., 336

Ses ee 68 00S Oa aE hen eee whee 10

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481

CAE ews oo henna o 5 eh aeen teats Ree ee va 4

Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. FAA, 525 F.3d 1299

ee EE 5 0s > oh boa a ew a eke eten ss 15

Northern Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496

I’.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.

SN 5 oo cc ce ee ee a oe oe 10

Rapamnos v. Unated States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) ... 4,5, 7, 11

Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc’y v. Metacon Gun Club,

Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. Conn. 2007), appeal

pending, No. 07-0755CV (2d Cir.) ............00005- 13

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United

States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 631 U.S. 159 (2001) .... 4

United States v. Brace, 41 F. 3d 117 (3d Cir. 1994),

cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1158 (1995) ............... 13, 14

Unated States v. Gerke Hacavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723

(7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 45 (2007) ..... 10

United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. S75 GGT)... ccc cccn caves 9

(1Tt)

IV

Cases-——-Continued: Page

United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925) ......... 10

United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316 (Sth Cir.), cert.

eo ap ee eee ee 9

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,

ee I kok eros Sa a eee Wak eee ess vac ens 3

Limited States v. Robison, 505 F.8d 1208 (11th Cir.

2007), cert. denied sub nom, United States v.

McWane, lic., 129 S. Ct. 630 (2008) ................. 9

Constitution, statutes, regulations and rule:

U.S. Const. Amend. V (Takings Clause) ............... 15

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of

1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, as amended

by Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (33 U.S.C.

1251 et seq.):

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Food Security Act of 1983, 16 U.S.C. 3821 ef seq.:

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Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 08-1376

GEORGE RUDY CUNDIFF AND CHRISTOPHER SETH

CUNDIFF, PETITIONERS

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-33a)

is reported at 555 F.3d 200. The opinion of the district

court on statutory coverage (Pet. App. 34a-48a) is re-

ported at 480 F. Supp. 2d 940. The opinions of the dis-

trict court finding petitioners liable and dismissing their

counterclaims are unreported. The opinion of the dis-

trict court on the appropriate remedy (Pet. App. 49a-

63a) is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

February 4, 2009. The petition for a writ of certiorari

was filed on May 5, 2009. The jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked under Z8 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

1. a. Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86

Stat. 816, as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977,

Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.)

(CWA or the Act), “to restore and maintain the chemi-

cal, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s wa-

ters.” 38 U.S.C. 1251(a). Section 301(a) of the CWA

prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant by any person”

except in compliance with the Act. 33 U.S.C. 1811(a).

“Discharge of a pollutant” is defined as “any addition

of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point

source.” 383 U.S.C. 1362(12). “Pollutant” is defined to

include not only traditional contaminants but also solids

such as “dredged spoil, * * * rock, sand [and] cellar

dirt.” 33 U.S.C. 13862(6). The CWA defines the term

“navigable walters” to mean “the waters of the United

States, including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. 1862(7).

The United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)

and the United States Environmental Protection Agen-

cy (EPA) share responsibility for implementing and en-

forcing the CWA. The Corps and EPA have promul-

gated substantively equivalent regulatory definitions

of the term “waters of the United States.” See 33

C.F.R. 328.8(a) (Corps definition); 40 C.F.R. 230.3(s)

(EPA definition). Those definitions encompass, inter

alia, traditional navigable waters, which include waters

susceptible to use in interstate commerce, see 33 C.F.R.

328.3(a)(1), 40 C.F .R. 230.5(s)(1); “[t]ributaries” of tradi-

tional navigable waters, see 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(5),

40 C.F.R. 230.3(s)(5); and wetlands “adjacent” to other

3

covered waters, see 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(7), 40 C.F.R.

230.3(s)(7).'

Section 404(a) of the CWA authorizes the Secretary

of the Army, acting through the Corps, or a State with

an approved program, to issue a permit “for the dis-

charge of dredged or fill material into the navigable wa-

ters at specified disposal sites.” 33 U.S.C. 1344(a). The

Act provides limited exemptions from this permit re-

quirement. 33 U.S.C. 1344(f)(1). Even when the dis-

charge of dredged or fill material qualifies for an exemp-

tion, a permit is still required under the CWA’s recap-

ture provision if the purpose of the discharge is to

“bring|| an area of the navigable waters into a use to

which it was not previously subject, where the flow or

circulation of navigable waters may be impaired or

the reach of such waters be reduced.” 33 U.S.C.

1344(f)(2). The United States may bring a civil enforce-

ment action in district court against any person who vio-

lates the CWA by discharging dredged or fill material

into covered wetlands without a permit. 33 U.S.C.

1319(b) and (d). In such an action, the government may

seek injunctive relicf and civil penalties. /bid.

b. This Court has recognized that Congress, in en-

acting the CWA, “evidently intended to repudiate limits

that had been placed on federal regulation by earlier

water pollution control statutes and to exercise its pow-

ers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least

some waters that would not be deemed ‘navigable’ under

the classical understanding of that term.” United States

l

‘To avoid confusion between the term “navigable waters” as defined

in the CWA, see 33 U.S.C. 1362(7), and the traditional use of the term

“navigable waters” to describe waters that are, have been, or could be

used for interstate or foreign commerce, see 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(1), this

brief will refer Lo the latter as “traditional navigable waters,”

4

v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133

(1985) (Riverside Bayview); see International Paper Co.

v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 486 n.6 (1987). In Solid Waste

Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army

Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (SWANCC), the

Court held that use of “isolated” nonnavigable intrastate

ponds by migratory birds was not by itself a sufficient

basis for the exercise of federal regulatory jurisdiction

under the CWA. /d. at 166-174. The Court noted, ana

did not cast doubt upon, its prior holding in Riverside

Bayview that the CWA’s coverage extends beyond wa-

ters that are “navigable” in the traditional sense. See

id, at 172.

Most recently, the Court again construed the CWA

term “waters of the United States” in Rapanos yv. Uni-

ted States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). Rapanos involved two

consolidated cases in which the CWA had been applied

to actual or proposed pollutant discharges into wetlands

adjacent to nonnavigable tributaries of traditional navi-

gable waters. See 7d. at 729-730 (plurality opinion). All

Members of the Court agreed that the term “waters of

the United States” encompasses some waters that are

not navigable in the traditional sense. See id. at 73

(plurality opinion); 7d. at 767-768 (Kennedy, J., coneur-

ring in the judgment); id. at 793 (Stevens, J., dissent-

ing’).

A four-Justice plurality in Rapanos interpreted the

term “waters of the United States” as covering “rela-

tively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bod-

ies of water,” 547 U.S. at 739 (plurality opinion), that are

connected to traditional navigable waters, 7d. at 742, as

well as wetlands with a continuous surface connection

5

to such water bodies, ibid.” Justice Kennedy interpre-

ted the term to encompass wetlands that “possess a ‘sig-

nificant nexus’ to waters that are or were navigable in

fact or that could reasonably be so made.” Jd. at 759

(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167); see id. at 779-780. In addi-

tion, Justice Kennedy concluded that the Corps’ asser-

Lion of jurisdiction over “wetlands adjacent to navigable-

in-fact waters” may be sustained “by showing adjacency

alone.” Jd. at 780. The four dissenting Justices, who

would have affirmed the court of appeals’ application of

the pertinent regulatory provisions, concluded that the

term “waters of the United States” encompasses, inter

alia, all tributaries and wetlands that satisfy either the

plurality’s standard or that of Justice Kennedy. See id.

at 810 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

2. Petitioners own two tracts of land in Muhlenberg

County, Kentucky, that together contain approximately

188 acres of wetlands. Pet. App. 3a, da. Those wetlands

are adjacent to Pond and Caney Creeks, which are trib-

utaries of the Green River, a traditional navigable wa-

ter. /d. at 19a. Shortly after petitioner George Rudy

Cundiff (Cundiff) purchased the southern tract in 1990,

he began clearing the wetlands of trees, excavating

drainage ditches, and placing the dredged spoil and oth-

cr material into the wetlands next to the ditches. /d. at

3a-4a. Cundiff did not obtain a permit from the Corps

for his activities. /d. at 4a. The Corps issued a cease

and-desist letter to Cundiff in October 1991. Jbid. De-

~ The Rapanos plurality noted that its reference to “relatively perm-

anent” waters “dlid| not necessarily exclude streams, rivers, or lakes

that might dry up in extraordinary circumstances, such as drought,” or

“seasonal rivers, which contain continuous flow during some months of

the year but no flow during dry months.” 547 U.S. at 732 n.é.

6

spite additional directives to stop his activities, Cundiff

continued to discharge dredged spoil into the wetlands

on the southern tract. /d. at 5a.

In 1998, Cundiff’s son, petitioner Christopher Seth

Cundiff (Seth Cundiff), purchased the tract immediately

to the north of his father’s property. Pet. App. 5a. With

Seth Cundiff’s knowledge, Cundiff quickly began exca-

vating that tract and redepositing the spoil into the wet-

lands. Jbid. Federal and state officials repeatedly in-

formed petitioners that they were required to obtain

permits for their activities, but petitioners ignored those

instructions and continued their activities without a

CWA permit. /d. at 5a-6a. Ln total, petitioners dug ap-

proximately 11,900 linear feet of ditches on both tracts

and redeposited that materia] into approximately 5.3

acres of wetlands. /d. at 25a. Petitioners’ activitics pre-

vented the wetlands at the site from performing their

prior functions, such as providing wildlife habitat and

filtering and treating contaminants and toxins, including

acid mine drainage, before they entered nearby water-

ways. ld. at a4a.

3. The United States brought suit against petition-

ers, alleging that they had violated Section 301(a) of the

CWA by discharging pollutants into waters of the Uni-

ted States without a permit. Pet. App. 6a. The district

court granted the government’s motion for summary

judgment on liability. bid. In granting the motion, the

district court rejected petitioners’ contention that they

were not required to obtain a CWA permit because their

predecessor-in-interest had obtained a determination

from the United States Department of Agriculture

(USDA) that he had begun converting wetlands to farm

ing use before December 28, 1985. Mem. Op. and Order,

Civ. Action No. 4:01CV-6-M at 9-10 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 24,

“~

‘

2003). The district court explained that “the sole pur-

pose” of that determination was “to prevent the loss of

USDA benefits,” and that “the clear language of the”

application form for the determination stated that “[t]he

granting of [the] request . . . does not remove other

legal requirements that may be required under State or

Federal waters laws.” /d. at 10 (quoting Pets. Resp. Br.

Exh. M) (emphasis added by district court).

The district court also dismissed petitioners’ coun-

terclaims against the United States, including their

claims that the government’s actions constituted a tak-

ing of petitioners’ property without just compensation.

Mem. Op. and Order on Mot. to Dismiss Counterclaims,

Civ. Action No. 4:01CV-6-M (W.D. Ky. Sep. 12, 2001).

The court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the

takings counterclaims because petitioners sought more

than $10,000 in relief. Jd. at 4-5 & n.4.

After a bench trial, the court enjoined petitioners

from discharging pollutants into waters of the United

States, and it ordered petitioners to restore the wet-

lands on their properties. Pet. App. 49a-68a. The court

also imposed a civil penalty of $225,000 against Cundiff,

but it suspended $200,000 of that amount on the condi-

tion that Cundiff adequately implemented the restora-

tion plan. Jd. at 60a-62a.

Petitioners appealed. While the appeal was pending,

this Court issued its decision in Rapanos, supra. Pet.

App. 6a. The court of appeals remanded the case to al

low the district court to reconsider, in light of Rapanos,

whether petitioners’ wetlands are covered by the CWA.

Ibid. On remand, the district court held that the United

States may establish CWA jurisdiction over wetlands

under either the standard set forth in the Rapanos plu-

rality opinion or the standard identified in Justice Ken

8

neay’s concurrence. /7. at 41a. The district court found

that petitioners’ wetlands were covered by the CWA

under both standards. /d. at 42a-48a.

4. Petitioners took a second appeal, and the court of

appeals affirmed. Pet. App. la-33a. The court held that

it was unnecessary to decide whether Justice Kennedy’s

standard or the Rapanos plurality’s standard governs

CWA coverage because petitioners’ wetlands are cov-

ered “under both Justice Kennedy’s and the plurality’s

tests.” Jd. at 16a.

The court of appeals also held that petitioners’ activi-

ties do not qualify for any of the exceptions to the

CWA’s permit requirements. Pet. App. 26a-27a. The

court further noted that, even if petitioners’ activities

had qualified for one of the statutory exemptions, peti-

tioners “would still have been required to get a permit

under the ‘recapture provision,’ 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2),”

because the purpose of their activities was to “‘bring[]

an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it

was nol previously subject,’ and the ‘flow or eirculation

of navigable waters may be impaired or the reach

of such waters reduced.’” /d. at 27a (quoting 33 U.S.C.

1344(f)(2)).

The court of appeals also affirmed the dismissal of

petitioners’ takings counterclaims. Pet. App. 30a. The

court explained that the “Tucker Act gives the Court of

Federal Claims exclusive subject matter jurisdiction

over takings claims seeking more than $10,000.” /bid.

Because petitioners sought more than $10 million for all

of their counterclaims and had not limited their takings

counterclaims to an amount within the jurisdictional

threshold, the court of appeals held that “their takings

counterclaims were properly dismissed.” /bid.

9

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct and

does not conflict with any decision of this Court or any

other court of appeals. Further review is not warranted.

1. a. Petitioners contend (Pet. 4-20) that the Court

should grant review to resolve a conflict among the eir-

cuits as to the proper application of Rapanos. Although

the courts of appeals disagree as to the proper standard

under Rapanos for determining whether a wetland is

coverec by the CWA, this case does not present a suil-

able oppertunity to resolve that conflict. As both courts

below correctly determined, petitioners’ wetlands are

covered by the CWA under any of the competing stan-

dards. Pet. App. l6a, 48a. The choice among those stan-

dards therefore would not affect the disposition of this

case.

The First Circuit has held that the CWA covers all

waters that satisfy either the standard announced by the

Rapanos plurality or the “significant nexus” standard

described in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. See (/222-

ted States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 60-66 (2006), cert.

denied, 128 S. Ct. 375 (2007). The Eleventh Circuit, in

contrast, has held that CWA coverage may be estab-

lished only under the standard in Justice Kennedy’s Ra-

panos concurrence. See United States v. Robison, 505

F.3d 1208, 1219-1222 (2007), cert. denied sub nom. Uni-

ted States v. McWane, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 630 (2008). No

court of appeals has adopted petitioners’ view (see Pet.

7-9), that the Rapanos plurality opinion sets forth the

controlling legal standard.”

* Three other courts of appeals, in addition to the Sixth Cireuitin this

case, have discussed the question without definitively resolving it. See

United States v. Lueas, 516 F.3d 316, 326-327 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

10

This Court recently denied the government’s petition

for a writ of certiorari in McWane, which asked the

Court to resolve the circuit conflict. The government

continues to believe that this Court’s clarification of the

proper application of Rapanos may be warranted in an

appropriate case. The present case, however, does not

provide a suitable opportunity to decide which of the

competing standards controls. The court of appeals con-

cluded that the evidence established CWA covevage un-

der both the Rapanos plurality’s standard and that of

Justice Kennedy, and it expressly declined to choose

among the competing standards because that choice

would make no difference to the outcome of this case.

Pet. App. 16a-17a.

b. Petitioners argue that review should be grant-

ed because “the United States failed to prove that [peti-

tioners| had met either the plurality’s standard or the

standard of Justice Kennedy.” Pet. 10. The district

court and the court of appeals concluded, however, that

both standards were satisified. See Pet. App. 16a-17a,

48a. Petitioners’ fact-bound disagreement with the con-

current determinations of the two lower courts does not

warrant this Court’s review. See Graver Tank & Mfg.

Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949):

United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925). In

any event, petitioners’ objections to the rulings below

lack merit.

Petitioners contend (10-18) that their wetlands do

not satisfy the Rapanos plurality’s requirement of a con-

tinuous surface connection with the adjacent creeks be-

129 S. Ct. 116 (2008); Northern Cal. Rover Watch v. Coty of Healdsburg,

496 F.3d 993, 1000-1001 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1225

(2008); Unated States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.30 723, 725 (7th

Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct 45 (2007)

11

cause the wetlands are at a higher elevation than the

creeks for much of the year. Nothing in the Rapanos

plurality opinion, however, requires that wetlands and

the traditional navigable waters or tributaries to which

the wetlands connect be at the same elevation. Rather,

as the court of appeals correctly held, the plurality’s

standard requires “that the adjacent channel] contains a

‘wate[r] of the United States,’” a standard clearly met

here, and that the wetlands have “a continuous surface

connection with that water, making it difficult to deter-

mine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”

Pet. App. 19a (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742).

The district court found the latter requirement satis-

fied based on evidence that “there [is] no clear demarca-

tion between waters and wetlands” at petitioners’ site.

Pet. App. 47a. The court of appeals agreed with that

determination, noting the district court’s finding that a

channel in petitioners’ wetlands “provides a largely un-

interrupted permanent surface water flow between the

wetlands and traditional waterways,” id. at 2la, and

“that the water flows through the channel into Pond

Creek for all but a few weeks a year,” id. at 19a. The

court of appeals also noted that the district court had

found “additional (and substantial) surface connections

between the wetlands and permanent water bodies ‘dur-

ing storm events, bank full periods, and/or ordinary high

flows,’ which provide “additional evidence” of a contin-

uous surface connection. Jd. al 2la-22a. The connec-

tions found by the courts below establish CWA coverage

of the wetlands under the Rapanos plurality’s standard.

Petitioners also contend (Pct. 18-20) that the govern-

ment failed to establish a “significant nexus,” within the

meaning of Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in

Rupanos, between their wetlands and traditional naviga-

Zz

ble waters. That argument lacks merit. As both the

district court and the court of appeals concluded, the

wetlands have the requisite “significant nexus” to tradi-

tional navigable waters because those wetlands “per-

form significant ecological functions in relation to the

Green River” and its tributaries, Pond and Caney

Creeks. Pet. App. 17a; see id. at 42a-44a. Those func-

tions include filtering acid mine runoff and sediment

from a nearby abandoned mine, storing water that af-

fects the “frequency and extent of flooding” on the

Green River, and providing an “important habitat for

plants and wildlife.” /d. at 18a.

Petitioners argue (Pet. 18-20) that the government’s

evidence was insufficient to establish a significant nexus

because the government did not conduct any soil, water,

or other laboratory tests. As the court of appeals ex-

plained, however, laboratory tests are not necessary to

establish CWA coverage under Justice Kennedy’s stan-

dard. Pet. App. 19a. Although “a district court could

find such evidence persuasive, [petitioners] point to

nothing—-no expert opinion, no research report or arti-

cle, and nothing in any of the various Rapanos opin-

ions—to indicate that [laboratory testing] is the sole

method by which a significant nexus may be proved.”

Tbhid.

Petitioners also contend that, under Justice Ken-

nedy’s standard, wetlands are covered by the CWA only

if they “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and

biological integrity of the other covered waters.” Pet. 18

(emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).

Contrary to that contention, a significant effect on any

of those elements would be sufficient to establish a sig-

nificant nexus. Cf. 33 U.S.C. 1251(a) (objective of Act “is

to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and bio-

13

logical integrity of the Nation’s waters”). In any event,

both the district court and the court of appeals found a

significant effect on all three elements. See Pet. App.

17a-19a, 43a-44a.*

2. Petitioners also argue (Pet. 21-23) that they were

not required to obtain a CWA permit beeause the prior

owner of their land had obtained a determination from

the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)

that conversion of the wetlands to farming use had be-

gun before December 23, 1985. That argument lacks

merit and does not warrant this Court’s review.

The Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA), 16 U.S.C. 3821,

denies certain benefits to farm program subsidy partici-

pants who convert wetlands in order to grow crops. See

Uinited States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 121 (3d Cir. 1994),

cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1158 (1995). The law recognizes,

* Petitioners assert (Pet. 13-14, 19-20) that the deeision below eon-

flicts with Siamsbury-Avon Preservation Society v. Metacon Gun Club,

lnc , 472 F. Supp. 2d 219 (1). Conn. 2007) (Simsbury), appeal pending,

No. 07-0795CV (2d Cir.). A conflict. between the decision below and a

district court decision would not warrant this Court’s review. See &. Ct.

R. 10. In any event, there is no conflict. Contrary to petitioner’s con-

tention (Pet. 13-14), the district court in Simsbury did not adopt

petitioners’ proposed rule that wetlands and adjacent waters must be

at the same elevation to have a continuous surface connection The

court found insufficient evidence of a continuous surface connection be-

cause the flow between the wetlands and the adjacent water was “inter-

mittent.” Samsbury, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 228-229 (citution omitted).

Here, in contrast, the courts belew found “a largely uninterrupted per-

manent surface water flow.” Pet. App. 21a. Contrary to petitioners’

contention (Pet 19-20), the district court in Symsbury did not hold that

a party seeking to establish a “significant nexus” between wetlands and

adjacent waters must. introduce laboratory tests. Although the court

relied on laboratory “data from testing on lead concentrations,” 472 F

Supp. 2d at 229, it nowhere suggested that laboratory tests are the only

pernussible evidence of a “significant nexus.”

14

however, that wetlands converted prior to passage of the

FSA (December 23, 1985) remain eligible for farm pro-

gram benefits. 16 U.S.C. 3822(b)(1)(A). Petitioners’

predecessor-in-interest obtained a USDA determination

that conversion on his property had started before that

date. See C.A. App. 1062; Pet. 22.

As the district court correctly held, that determina-

tion did not obviate the need for petitioners to obtain a

CWA permit before discharging dredged or fill material

into their wetlands. See Mem. Op. and Order, Civ. Ac-

tion No. 4:01CV-6-M at 9-10 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 24, 2003).

The CWA lists the specific circumstanees in which

dredged or fill material may be discharged into covered

waters without a permit, 33 U.S.C. 1344(f)(1), and the

Act does not exempt discharges merely because a land-

owner has a USDA determination that he began conver-

sion of wetlands to farming use before December 23,

1985. The statutory and regulatory provisions under

which such USDA determinations are issued make

clear that the determinations simply exempt the recipi-

ents from ineligibility “for certain benefits provided by

the [USDA] and agencies and instrumentalities of

USDA.” 7 C.F.R. 12.1(a); see 16 U.S.C. 3821-3822;

7 C.F.R. Pt. 12. The application form filled out by peti-

tioners’ predecessor-in-interest stated that the “grant-

ing of a [determination] request does not remove other

legal requirements that may be required under State or

l’ederal water laws.” C.A. App. 1063; see Brace, 41 F.3d

at 127.

In any event, petitioners do not contend that the

court of appeals’ resolution of this issue conflicts with

any decision of this Court or another court of appeals.

Nor do they assert that the issue is one of general im-

portance. Petitioners also do not dispute the court of

15

appeals’ holding (Pet. App. 27a) that, even if petitioners

otherwise qualified for a CWA exemption, they would

still have needed a permit because of the CWA’s recap-

ture provision, which requires a permit for discharges of

dredged or fill material for the purpose of “bringing an

area of the navigable waters into a use to which it was

not previously subject, where the flow or circulation of

navigable waters may be impaired or the reach of such

waters be reduced.” 33 U.S.C, 1344(f)(2). Accordingly,

this issue does not warrant the Court’s review.

3. Petitioners also argue (Pet. 24-83) that the govern-

ment’s actions with respect to their wetlands effected a

taking of their property without just compensation, in

violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Petitioners’ takings claim is not properly

before this Court. Neither the district court nor the

court of appeals addressed the merits of that claim. In-

stead, the district court dismissed the claim for lack of

jurisdiction, Mem. Op. and Order on Mot. to Dismiss

Counterclaims, Civ. Action No. 4:01CV-6-M at 4-5 (W.D.

Ky. Sep. 12, 2001), and the court of appeals affirmed

that dismissal, Pet. App. 30a.

The court of appeals’ resolution of the jurisdictional

question is correct. The Tucker Act vests the United

States Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction over

takings claims against the United States without regard

to the amount in controversy. 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1); see

Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. FAA, 525 F.3d 1299, 1304

(Fed. Cir. 2008). Feaeral district courts have concur-

rent jurisdiction over any such claims “not exceeding

$10,000 in amount.” 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2). Beeause peti-

tioners sought more than $10,000 on their takings claim,

the district court lacked jurisdiction over that claim.

Pet. App. 30a.

16

Petitioners do not discuss, much less dispute, the jur-

isdictiona! rulings of the courts below. Accordingly, peti-

tioners’ takings claim does not warrant this Court’s re-

view.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

ELENA KAGAN

Solicitor General

JOHN C. CRUDEN

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

ELLEN J. DURKEE

JENNIFER SCHELLER NEUMANN

Attorneys

JULY 2009

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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