Appendix — Pharmacia Corp. v. Alaska Electrical Pension Fund
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APPENDIX A
PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 07-4500 & 07-4564
ALASKA ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND; CITY OF
SARASOTA FIREFIGHTERS’ PENSION FUND;
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS
LOCAL 132 PENSION PLAN; NEW ENGLAND HEALTH
CARE EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND; PACE INDUSTRY
UNION-MANAGEMENT PENSION FUND; CHEMICAL
VALLEY PENSION FUND OF WEST VIRGINIA,
as Class Representatives, on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated
Vv.
PHARMACIA CORPORATION; PFIZER, INC.; FRED HASSAN;
Dr. G. STEVEN GEIS; CARRIE COX
Alaska Electrical Pension Fund; City of Sarasota
Firefighters’ Pension Fund; International Union of
Operating Engineers Local 132 Pension Plan; New
England Health Care Employees Pension Fund;
Pace Industry Union-Management Pension Fund;
Chemical Valley Pension Fund of West Virginia,
Appellants in 07-4500
Pharmacia Corporation; Pfizer, Inc.;
Fred Hassan; Dr. G. Steven Geis; Carrie Cox,
Appellants in 07-4564
2a
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civil Nos. 3-03-cv-01519, 3-03-cv-01691,
3-03-cv-01808, 3-03-cv-01964,
3-03-cv-02149, 3-03-cv-02283)
District Judge: The Honorable Anne E. Thompson
Argued: November 21, 2008
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and
RESTANI, Judge
(Opinion Filed: January 30, 2009)
Eric A. Isaacson, Esq. (Argued)
Arthur C. Leahy, Esq.
Matthew P. Montgomery, Esq.
Coughlin, Stoia, Geller, Rudman & Robbins
655 West Broadway
Suite 1900
San Diego, CA 92101-0000
Peter S. Pearlman, Esq.
Cohn, Lifland, Pearlman, Herrmann & Knopf
Park 80 Plaza West One
Saddle Brook, NJ 07663-0000
Counsel for Appellants/Cross Appellees
Gregg S. Levin, Esq.
Joshua C. Littlejohn, Esq.
Joseph F. Rice, Esq.
Ann K. Ritter, Esq.
* Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States
Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
3a
Motley Rice
28 Bridgeside Boulevard
P.O. Box 1792
Mount Pleasant, SC 29465-0000
Counsel for Appellant/Cross Appellee
Pace Industry Union-Management Pension Fund
Jonathan M. Hoff, Esq. (Argued)
Jason M. Halper, Esq.
Joshua R. Weiss, Esq.
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft
One World Financial Center
New York, NY 10038-0000
William A. Dreier, Esq.
Steven A. Karg, I, Esq.
Robert Mahoney, Esq.
Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus
721 Route 202-206
P.O. Box 5933
Bridgewater, NJ 08807-0000
Counsel for Appellees/Cross Appellants
OPINION OF THE COURT
BARRY, Circuit Judge
In this securities fraud class action, plaintiffs al-
lege that defendants violated §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by making, with
scienter, materially false statements about a clinical
study of Celebrex, a popular anti-inflammatory medi-
cation. In particular, defendants are alleged to have
misled investors by distorting the study’s results with
the intent to show that Celebrex had a better safety
profile than similar medications. Finding the action
to be untimely, the District Court granted summary
4a
judgment to defendants. This appeal and cross-appeal
followed.
I. Factual Background
Celecoxib, known and marketed commercially as
Celebrex, is an anti-inflammatory prescription drug
sold by defendant Pharmacia Corporation. Substan-
tially more expensive than many other nonsteroidal
anti-inflammatory drugs (“NSAIDs”), Celebrex’s
promise was rooted in the hope that it would cause
fewer gastrointestinal (“GI”) side-effects than the less
costly NSAIDs.’ To help the hope become a reality,
defendants’ commissioned a long-term clinical study
of Celebrex’s effect on the GI system, the Celecoxib
Long-term Arthritis Safety Study (“CLASS study”).
This litigation focuses on the aftermath of that study.
According to the complaint, the results of the
CLASS study were a disappointment to defendants:
Celebrex did not show the desired reduction in GI
side-effects as compared to the other drugs studied.
Fearing a decrease in sales and stock price, defen-
dants allegedly undertook to distort the results of the
study so that it would appear that Celebrex pos-
sessed a better GI safety profile than, in fact, it did.
Towards this end, in April 2000, defendants released
only the results from the first six months of the
' Unlike traditional NSAIDs, which inhibit both the COX-1
and COX-2 enzymes, Celebrex is a selective COX-2 inhibitor.
Because the inhibition of COX-1 enzymes often leads to negative
GI side-effects, it was hoped that selective COX-2 inhibitors
would not possess the harmful side-effects associated with tradi-
tional NSAIDs.
? Defendants include Pharmacia Corp., Pfizer, Inc., and indi-
vidual defendants Fred Hassan, Steven Geis, and Carrie Cox.
5a
CLASS study; those results, divorced from the entire
set of data, were capable of positive construction.
Defendants released the truncated results of the
CLASS study with great fanfare, declaring that the
study “shows that Celebrex has a truly exceptional
safety profile,” and that “the long-term outcome data
paints a clear and compelling picture of Celebrex’s
safety versus NSAIDs.” (Joint App. (“JA”) 59, 64.)
Some documents issued by defendants noted that the
CLASS study lasted a full thirteen months, but the
reason for excising the last seven months from the
analysis was not revealed.
Scientists affiliated with defendants then drafted
an article based on the truncated results and submit-
ted it for publication to the Journal of the American
Medical Association (“JAMA”). As would become
known only later, however, neither defendants nor
the articie’s authors informed JAMA that the data in
the article was incomplete. In September 2000,
JAMA published the article, which reached the fol-
lowing conclusion: “The overall incidence of GI symp-
toms experienced by patients taking [Celebrex] was
significantly lower than by those taking NSAIDs, as
was the rate of withdrawal [from the study] due to GI
intolerability.” Ud. at 45.)
Defendants hoped to convince the FDA to allow
Celebrex to be marketed without the standard GI
warning label required for other NSAIDs, and so
submitted the complete data from the CLASS study
to the FDA in June 2000. FDA staff members, in
preparation for hearings on the warning label issue,
reviewed the data. On February 6, 2001, the reports
of those staff members were published on the FDA’s
website, alongside defendants’ own report. Defen-
dants’ report defended the decision to use only the
6a
truncated data, asserting that data after the six-
month point was biased in favor of the comparator
drugs:
The GI safety data presented are for the six-
month treatment timepoint based on the analysis
of risk factors prespecified in the protocol. In
brief, a disproportionate withdrawal of patients
at high risk of an ulcer complication from the en-
tire study was observed after six months (deple-
tion of susceptibles). Additionally, a significantly
greater withdrawal of patients on diclofenac for
GI intolerance occurred during the initial six
months of the study. The withdrawal of patients
for GI intolerance prematurely removed a group
at high risk for ulcer complications and sympto-
matic ulcers from the diclofenac treatment arm
(informative censoring).
Ud. at 381.)
The FDA staff reports, stating in part as follows,
disagreed with defendants’ reliance on the truncated
data:
e A rheumatologist’s report stated that it was
“unclear” that the rationale put forth by
defendants “represented a significant bias in
assessment of the outcome.” (/d. at 631.)
e A gastroenterologist’s report stated that defen-
dants’ “rationale for analyzing the first 6 months
as a meaningful endpoint independent of the
success at the study completion is not convinc-
ing.” Ud. at 472.) However, this report also stated
that “(t]he six-month analysis will be reviewed
only as a potentially supportive analysis.” Ud. at
482.)
7a
e A statistician’s report rejected the six-month
analysis as “not valid,” and asserted that there
was “no reason to include information only in the
first 6 months.” (/d. at 666.)
These reports were prepared to assist the FDA’s
Arthritis Advisory Committee (“Advisory Committee”)
in deciding whether to recommend the label change
sought by defendants. The day after the publication
of the reports, the Advisory Committee held hearings
on the issue, and ultimately declined to recommend
the label change. The staff reports and the Advisory
Committee’s recommendation received substantial
media attention. The market also took note of the
disappointing outcome: between February 6-8, 2001,
the price of Pharmacia’s stock dropped approximately
9.0%.
After these events, defendants issued a series of
positive statements about Celebrex’s GI safety profile
as well as about the chances for a label change. De-
fendants claimed, for example, that the CLASS study
data presented a “compelling case” for a label change,
and that because the CLASS study was “an extremely
rigorous and complex trial,” it was “difficult for the
{Advisory Committee] to analyze.” Ud. at 171, 1519.)
Financial analysts also continued to rate Pharma-
cia’s stock positively. Even while noting the reduced
chances for a label change and the disagreement over
the results of the CLASS study, JP Morgan, Merrill
Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bank of America all]
continued to rate Pharmacia’s stock as a “buy” or
“strong buy.” Several analysts noted the challenge to
defendants’ use of truncated data: JP Morgan wrote
that the staff reports called the six-month analysis
“unjustified and invalid,” and Bloomberg News wrote
that defendants were only able to show a benefit “by
8a
looking at selected parts of the data—a practice dis-
couraged by the [FDA].” (/d. at 714, 719.)
Months later, on August 5, 2001, the Washington
Post reported that defendants had withheld the full
CLASS study data from JAMA. In the article,
JAMA’s editor described herself as “disheartened”
and stated that “a level of trust . . . was, perhaps,
broken.” Ud. at 203.) Additionally, a scientist who
wrote an editorial published in conjunction with the
JAMA article stated that he was “flabbergasted”
when he saw the complete data; another scientist
“said he complained to JAMA after noticing differ-
ences between the published [JAMA] report and the
data presented to the FDA.” (/d. at 203-04.)
After the Washington Post article raised the red
flag of impropriety, other sources began to question
defendants’ good faith. For example, an article from
The Sunday Times noted that the scandal involving
the CLASS study had inspired medical journals to
“stop drug firms from ‘cheating’ on medical studies.”
(Id. at 1360.) On June 1, 2002, an article in the Brit-
ish Medical Journal called the “explanations for [the]
serious irregularities [in the JAMA article] . . . inade-
quate.” (id. at 757.) The article also stated that
“{plublishing and distributing overoptimistic short
term data using post hoc changes to the protocol,
while omitting disappointing long term data of two
trials ... is misleading.” (/d.) Following the publica-
tion of this article, the price of Pharmacia’s stock
dropped 7% in three days.
II. Procedural History
This action was initiated on April 7, 2003, when
the first securities fraud class action complaint was
filed. Related actions were shortly thereafter consoli-
9a
dated into it. The District Court denied defendants’
motion to dismiss and granted plaintiffs’ motion for
class certification, but shortened the class period by
more than a year, finding that investors could not
have reasonably relied on defendants’ alleged misre-
presentations after February 6, 2001, the date on
which the FDA staff reports were published.
Defendants subsequently moved for summary
judgment on statute of limitations grounds, asserting
that if reliance was unreasonable after February 6,
2001, plaintiffs must necessarily have been on in-
quiry notice of their claims at that time. Because the
first securities fraud suit was filed on April 7, 2003,
and the statute of limitations for § 10(b) claims is two
years, see 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b), defendants asserted
that plaintiffs’ claims were untimely. The District
Court agreed, and granted defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
The cross-appeals of the parties are now before us
for our consideration.
Ill. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 78aa. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the
Court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and the decision to deny their
motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449
F.3d 502, 510 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006); Farber v. City of Pat-
terson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006). The decision
to certify a class action and the determination of the
class period are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213
F.3d 124, 136 (3d Cir. 2000).
10a
IV. Legal Analysis
There are a number of issues before us on these
appeals. Plaintiffs challenge, first and foremost, the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment on sta-
tute of limitations grounds. Plaintiffs also dispute the
Court’s determination of the class period. On cross-
appeal, defendants assert that the Court erred in de-
nying their motion to dismiss, and in granting plain-
tiffs’ motion for class certification. We address each of
these issues in turn.
A. Inquiry Notice and the Statute of Limitations
The District Court determined that investors were
on inquiry notice of possible securities fraud as of
February 2001. The statute of limitations will begin
to run when the plaintiff is on inquiry notice.
“Whether the plaintiffs, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have known of the basis for their
claims depends on whether they had sufficient infor-
mation of possible wrongdoing to place them on in-
quiry notice or to excite storm warnings of culpable
activity.”’ Benak ex rel. Alliance Premiere Growth
Fund v. Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., 435 F.3d 396,
400 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). The inquiry notice determination requires a
“totally objective” analysis that pinpoints the time at
which “a reasonable investor of ordinary intelligence
would have discovered the information [demonstrat-
ing possible liability] and recognized it as a storm
warning.” Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc.,
260 F.3d 239, 252 (3d Cir. 2001).
* Plaintiffs do not contend that they “exercised reasonable
due diligence and yet were unable to discover their injuries.”
Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody, & Co., Inc., 260 F.3d 239, 252 (3d
Cir. 2001). Thus, if we find storm warnings of fraud, plaintiffs’
claims are untimely.
lla
In line with this objective analysis, plaintiffs are
“presumed to have read prospectuses, quarterly re-
ports, and other information relating to their invest-
ments.” Jd. However, the hypothetical reasonable in-
vestor need not be a scientific expert; to the contrary,
the relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable investor
of “ordinary intelligence” would have recognized the
available information as indicative of possible fraud.
Id.
Inquiry notice seeks to deter putative plaintiffs
from sitting on their hands, awaiting the discovery of
the elusive smoking gun. Inquiry notice will thus be
triggered when plaintiffs “should have discovered the
general fraudulent scheme,” In re NAHC, Inc. Secs.
Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1326 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal
citations and quotations omitted), and “cannot avoid
the time bar simply by claiming they lacked know-
ledge of the details or narrow aspects of the alleged
fraud.” Benak, 435 F.3d at 400 (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
Our recent decision in Jn re Merck & Co., Inc. Se-
curities, Derivative, & ‘ERISA’ Litigation, 543 F.3d
150 (3d Cir. 2008) (hereinafter “Merck”) informs our
decision here. In Merck, we were faced with a similar
set of factual circumstances: after a long-term clinical
study of Merck’s own blockbuster drug, Vioxx, the
company published a questionable interpretation of
the study’s results, allegedly in order to boost Vioxx’s
sales and Merck’s stock price. The questionable in-
terpretation advanced by Merck attempted to explain
why patients taking Vioxx experienced a higher rate
of negative cardiovascular events than patients tak-
ing the study’s comparator drug, naproxen. This so-
called naproxen hypothesis emphasized the possibil-
ity that naproxen had a positive impact on the cardi-
12a
ovascular system, and discounted the possibility that
Vioxx had a negative impact.
The science behind this explanation was debatable,
and, consequently, the FDA scolded Merck for its re-
peated promotion of the naproxen hypothesis. In a
public warning letter issued to Merck, the FDA called
the marketing campaign for Vioxx “false, lacking in
fair balance, or otherwise misleading . . . . and [mi-
nimizing of] the potentially serious cardiovascular
findings.” Jd. at 156 (internal citations and quota-
tions omitted). The FDA ordered Merck to send let-
ters to doctors in order “to correct false or misleading
impressions and information.” 7d. at 157. Despite the
public nature of these strong words, as well as, inter
alia, news reports questioning the naproxen hypothe-
sis and consumer lawsuits alleging negative cardi-
ovascular effects from Vioxx, we found that investors
were not on inquiry notice of securities fraud.
Most importantly for our purposes here, Merck
found that inquiry notice, in securities fraud suits,
requires storm warnings indicating that defendants
acted with scienter. “Thus, to trigger storm warnings
of culpable activity, in the context of a claim alleging
falsely-held opinions or beliefs, investors must have
sufficient information to suspect that the defendants
engaged in culpable activity, i.e., that they did not
hold those opinions or beliefs tn earnest.” Id. at 166
(emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
Accordingly, for investors to be on inquiry notice of
§ 10(b) claims, there must be some indication that de-
fendants did not, in fact, hold the views expressed.
Inquiry notice requires storm warnings of “culpable
activity.” See Benak, 435 F.3d at 400. Under § 10(b),
a corporation does not engage in culpable activity
13a
unless it acted with scienter.* Scienter is not inciden-
tal to § 10(b), it is elemental.°
In support of a finding of inquiry notice in Febru-
ary 2001, defendants point to the drop in the price of
Pharmacia’s stock, the FDA staff reports, uhe Advi-
sory Committee meeting, analyst reports discussing
the events at the FDA, and the fact that the full
length of the CLASS study had long been publicly
known. Whatever else those facts may have indicated,
they did not provide storm warnings of possible fraud.
For one thing, the drop in stock price following the
events of February 6-8, 2001 did not indicate fraud or
even the possibility of fraud. Rather, the drop in price
is easily explained by the fact that the market had
been expecting that the FDA would approve a label
change. When the Advisory Committee issued a neg-
“ Thus, as defamation is not assault, so is § 10(b) not § 11.
Section 11 does not require a plaintiff to plead or to prove scien-
ter; § 10(b) does. This is a distinction with a difference, both in
terms of what a plaintiff must show for recovery and in terms of
what information must be available for inquiry notice to take
hold. We did not find it necessary in Merck to discuss § 11, nor
do we find it necessary to do so here. Were this is a § 11 case,
which it is not, the evidence in the public realm as of February
2001 might well have given rise to storm warnings of misstate-
ments, and thus triggered the second step of the inquiry notice
analysis—the duty to investigate potential claims.
° “To state a valid claim under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant (1) made a misstatement or an omis-
sion of a material fact (2) with scienter (3) in connection with the
purchase or the sale of a security (4) upon which the plaintiff
reasonably relied and (5) that the plaintiffs reliance was the
proximate cause of his or her injury.” Semerenko v. Cendant
Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added); see
also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring
more than evidence of negligence in § 10(b) cases).
l4a
ative recommendation, the market reacted accor-
dingly. But mere investor disappointment does not
ipso facto imply fraud.
Neither, in our view, does the content of the FDA
staff reports suggest fraud. Defendants rely on a
handful of words in those reports: to wit, “not valid,”
“unclear,” and “not convincing.” (JA 666, 631, 472.)
But the staff reports span over 250 pages of highly
complex scientific and statistical analysis. These few
words and phrases, lacking in accusatory intent and
buried like needles in a haystack, could not give rise
to storm warnings of fraud.°®
The Advisory Committee meeting and concomitant
negative recommendation also could not give rise to
storm warnings of fraud; indeed, the transcript of the
Advisory Committee meeting explicitly supports a
finding that the experts believed that the dispute be-
tween defendants and the FDA was a good faith, legi-
timate scientific dispute. We note, for example, the
following statements made at the Advisory Commit-
tee meeting:
[FDA Representative]: Just to add a couple of
other comments to that, . . . I don’t think that
there were differences between us and the com-
pany that were meaningful in terms of the find-
ings of the analyses that were done.
We spent more time describing certain analyses
and the company spent more time describing
other analyses, but I don’t think there is any dis-
pute that we have with what the company pre-
sented, and I think that the company under-
stands where we were coming from with our
® Additionally, one of the staff reports described the disputed
six-month model as a “potentially supportive analysis.” (JA 482.)
15a
analyses, and I don’t think that they are off target
either in terms of how the compariy sees them.
Ud. at 1189.)
{Advisory Committee Consu!tant]: The challenge
here for me is that it seems to me everybody is
speaking truth. I agree with everyone who speaks.
1 agree with the sponsor and their emphasis, I
agree with the FDA in their description ... . It
depends on which piece of this you pick out.
(id. at 1154 (emphasis added).)
As should be evident by these statements, the Ad-
visory Committee simply did not believe that any-
thing untoward had occurred, and we obviously will
not expect more of the reasonable investor than we
would expect of experts on the FDA’s Advisory Com-
mittee.
Arguably the most troublesome pieces of evidence
came in the form of two analyst reports discussing
the events at the FDA: a JP Morgan report stated
that the use ot the truncated data was “unjustified
and invalid,” and Bloomberg News stated that defen-
dants could only show a benefit “by looking at se-
lected parts of the data—a practice discouraged by
the [FDA].” Ud. at 714, 719.) Yet even in conjunction
with the other evidence to which defendants point,
we simply cannot conclude that these statements
would alert a reasonable investor that fraud, as op-
posed to a mere disagreement over the best method of
scientific analysis, had occurred.
Defendants also argue that storm warnings existed
by February 2001 because no new information was
revealed at that time or later: it was always known
that the CLASS study lasted longer than six months.
16a
But while defendants had acknowledged in April
2000 that the study lasted 13 months, there was no
indication that they deliberately withheld data from
JAMA, or improperly massaged the data, until the
Washington Post article in August 2001. The mere
fact that the study lasted thirteen months, and that
there was a technical dispute between scientists
about whether to use the full data or only a portion of
the data, would not have provided storm warnings of
fraud to the reasonable investor.’
Finally, defendants’ own reassuring statements af-
ter the Advisory Committee meeting foreclose their
argument here. In reaction to the Advisory Commit-
tee’s negative recommendation, defendants defended
the results of the CLASS study, and their use of the
truncated data. Defendants stated that they had a
“compelling case” for a label change, and that it had
been “difficult for the [Advisory Committee] to ana-
lyze” the study because it was “an extremely rigorous
and complex trial.” Ud. at 171, 1519.)
These reassuring statements operate as a sort of
antidote to any storm warnings that may have ex-
isted. See, e.g., Merck, 543 F.3d at 167 n.14 (“We
have recognized that reassurances can dissipate
apparent storm warnings if an investor of ordinary
intelligence would reasonably rely on them to allay
the investor’s cuoncerns.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). Just as we require investors to
act upon public information indicating fraud, so, too,
‘ In a different context in this litigation, even defendants’
counsel acknowledged as much: “Well, what does that show?
That scientists can disagree on how you interpret the data. That
doesn’t make fraud. That means people have different interpre-
tations.” (JA 2028 (argument in opposition to class certification).)
lla
do we allow them to rely upon corporate statements
discounting the possibility of malfeasance.*
The totality of the evidence in the public realm as
of February 2001 did not indicate a possibility of
fraud or even hint at any malfeasance or intentional
impropriety; rather, the evidence only supported the
view that there existed a legitimate dispute over
scientific and statistical models.* But for inquiry no-
tice of § 10(b) claims, we require some reason to sus-
pect that defendants did not genuinely believe the ac-
curacy of their statements. No such evidence surfaced
until the publication of the Washington Post article
which stated that defendants withheld data from
JAMA.
We conclude that investors are not put on inquiry
notice of fraud when, in the context of this case, an
® Corporations are, of course, unlikely to admit to culpable
conduct, and we do not purport to state a rule that precludes a
finding of inquiry notice until they do so. But, under circums-
tances such as these, where the evidence of wrongdoing is
entirely speculative, reassuring statements are a_ relevant
consideration.
® Indeed, after the events of February 2001, reports portrayed
Celebrex’s outlook positively, and took seriously defendants’
truncated analysis. (See, e.g., JA 716 (JP Morgan analysis stat-
ing there is some “support(] [for Pharmacia’s] contention that
there was a [justified reason to limit the analysis to six months],
but the FDA statisticians dispute this”); id. at 1707-08 (calling
“the scientific evidence on this question . . . unclear”).)
Additionally, numerous financial analysts retained Pharma-
cia’s stock at a “buy” or “strong buy” rating. See Merck, 543 F.3d
at 157-58 (noting that, during the relevant period, “securities
analysts were of one voice in their projections for Merck and
Vioxx; . . . all maintained their ratings for Merck stock at ‘buy’
or ‘hold’ and/or continued to project increased future revenues
for Vioxx”).
18a
apparently legitimate scientific dispute arises be-
tween the FDA and a pharmaceutical company, and
note that the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4, itself suggests this
conclusion. A rule that would place investors on in-
quiry notice of fraud the moment that the FDA ques-
tions the seemingly good faith scientific analysis of a
pharmaceutical company would encourage putative
plaintiffs to file premature securities suits. In im-
posing heightened pleading requirements, Congress
evinced an intent to discourage such suits; our in-
quiry notice jurisprudence reflects this intent.
For inquiry notice to take hold, there must be some
indicia of potential malfeasance. Because no such in-
dicia existed here, we will vacate the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment.’”
B. Length of the Class Period
Largely for the reasons discussed above, we also
find that the District Court erred in terminating the
class period in February 2001. Particularly in light of
defendants’ repeated defense of the CLASS study and
their optimism regarding a potential label change, it
was reasonable for plaintiffs to rely upon defendants’
statements until the publication of the Washington
Post article on August 5, 2001."' Cf. Basic, Inc. v. Le-
© We note that inquiry notice—in securities fraud suits and
otherwise—is alive and well in this Court. Neither in Merck nor
here have we replaced inquiry notice with an actual notice stan-
dard. Here, we merely conclude that, in the absence of any indi-
cation that defendants did not believe the truth of their own
statements, investors were not on inquiry notice of § 10(b)
claims.
1! The appropriate date is August 5, 2001, and not the later
date, May 31, 2002, of the British Medical Journal article. As of
August 5, 2001, investors should have known that there was a
19a
vinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (outlining presumption of
reliance in fraud-on-the-market securities suits). Ac-
cordingly, we will reverse the Court’s order limiting
the class period to February 5, 2001.”
C. Cross-Appeal
1. Motion to Dismiss
The District Court correctly denied defendants’ mo-
tion to dismiss. In that motion, defendants asserted
that plaintiffs failed to meet the pleading require-
ments of the PSLRA, focusing on the admittedly thin
two paragraphs of the Amended Complaint labeled
“Scienter Allegations.” (JA 270-71.) When examined
as a whole, however, the Amended Complaint is rep-
lete with allegations that defendants acted with the
requisite scienter. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2509 (2007) (requiring
courts to “consider the complaint in its entirety”). In
particular, the Amended Complaint documents the
alleged scheme to trick JAMA, and thus the invest-
ment community, by using only the truncated data.
possibility that defendants’ claims were false. Any new informa-
tion found in the British Medical Journal article is different in
only degree, and not in kind.
2 Plaintiffs also challenge the District Court’s decision to seal
the record and presumably our decision to continue the seal
pending appeal. We will leave the question of continued sealing
to the District Court. We note, however, that we are unper-
suaded by the Court's reliance on the so-called “self-critical
analysis privilege” as a basis for sealing. The self-critical analy-
sis privilege has never been recognized by this Court and we see
no reason to recognize it now. Cf. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Mower,
219 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (calling the privilege
“novel,” and noting that the Ninth Circuit has not recognized
the privilege).
20a
While it is true that a legitimate disagreement over
scientific data does not give rise to a securities fraud
claim, plaintiffs alleged something quite different: a
bad faith misrepresentation of scientific data. Those
allegations are sufficient to withstand the “[e]lxacting
pleading requirements” of the PSLRA, which require
that the allegations give rise to a strong inference of
scienter. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2504-10.
The District Court correctly denied defendants’ mo-
tion to dismiss.
2. Class Certification
Defendants also argue that the District Court’s de-
cision to grant plaintiffs’ motion for class certification
was in error. The gravamen of this argument is that
the results of the CLASS study were immaterial as a
matter of law in light of the lack of movement in
stock price following the initial release of those re-
sults in April 2000. We disagree.
Plaintiffs’ own expert acknowledges that the an-
nouncement of the results of the CLASS study “had
little measurable effect on [Pharmacia’s] stock price.”
(JA 1298.) But that fact does not negate a finding of
materiality when the market was expecting that the
results of the study would be positive, and plaintiffs
have presented evidence indicating precisely that.
(See id. (citing Morgan Stanley report written the day
after the CLASS study results were released that
states, “we are making no change to our forecasts, as
we had anticipated the study to corroborate the
strong safety profile of the product”).) And, of course,
the materiality of the alleged misrepresentations is
self-evident when we look at the market’s negative
reaction—to the tune of a nine-percent drop in stock
Zla
price in three days—when defendants’ analysis of the
CLASS study was questioned in February 2001."
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judg-
ment of the District Court, and remand for proceed
ings consistent with this Opinion.
'S We also reject, without further discussion, defendants’
argument that the District Court erred in denying their motion
to strike certain documents.
22a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 07-4500 & 07-4564
ALASKA ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND; Ciry OF
SARASOTA FIREFIGHTERS’ PENSION FUND;
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS
LOCAL 132 PENSIONPLAN; NEW ENGLAND HEALTH
CARE EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND; PACE INDUSTRY
UNION-MANAGEMENT PENSION FUND; CHEMICAL
VALLEY PENSION FUND OF WEST VIRGINIA,
as Class Representatives, on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated
V.
PHARMACIA CORPORATION; PFIZER, INC.; FRED HASSAN;
Dr. G. STEVEN GEIS; CARRIE COX
Alaska Electrical Pension Fund; City of Sarasota
Firefighters’ Pension Fund; International Union of
Operating Engineers Local 132 Pension Plan; New
England Health Care Employees Pension Fund;
Pace Industry Union-Management Pension Fund;
Chemical Valley Pension Fund of West Virginia,
Appellants in 07-4500
Pharmacia Corporation; Pfizer, Inc.;
Fred Hassan; Dr. G. Steven Geis; Carrie Cox,
Appellants in 07-4564
23a
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civil Nos. 3-03-cv-01519, 3-03-cv-01691,
3-03-cv-01808, 3-03-cv-01964, 3-03-cv-02149,
3-03-cv-02283)
District Judge: The Honorable Anne E. Thompson
Present: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, BARRY,
AMBRO, FISHER, CHAGARES, and JORDAN,
Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,’ Judge
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING WITH
SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
The petition for rehearing en banc filed by
Appellees/Cross-Appellants having been submitted to
the judges who participated in the decision of this
Court, and to all the other available circuit judges in
active service, and a majority of the circuit judges of
the circuit in regular active service not having voted
for rehearing by the court en banc, the petition for
rehearing en banc is DENIED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Maryanne Trump Barry
Circuit Judge
Dated: 3 March 2009
“Honorable Jane A. Restani’s, Chief Judge, United States
Court of International Trade, vote is limited to panel rehearing
only.
24a
APPENDIX C
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
[Filed 10/30/2007 |
ALASKA ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND, ef al.,
Plaintiffs,
V.
PHARMACIA CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil No. 03-1519 (AET).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
THOMPSON, U.S.D.2J.
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on behalf of
Defendants Pharmacia Corporation (“Pharmacia”),
Pfizer, Inc., Fred Hassan, Dr. G. Steven Geis, and
Carrie Cox’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for
Summary Judgment [145]. The Court has decided
this motion based upon the submissions and oral ar-
guments of the parties on September 12, 2007. For the
reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
This case arises from Defendants’ effort to remove
the standard gastrointestinal (“GI”) warning on the
25a
label of the drug Celebrex. On April 7, 2003, Plaintiffs
filed a complaint alleging that Defendants violated
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,
by misrepresenting the results of a clinical study of
Celebrex. On January 25, 2007, the Court certified a
class consisting of purchasers of Pharmacia common
stock during the period of April 17, 2000 to February
6, 2001. On May 31, 2007, Defendants filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment claiming that Plaintiffs’
complaint is time-barred.
B. Factual Background
From approximately September 1998 to March
2000, Pharmacia commissioned a clinical study of
Celebrex entitled, The Celecoxib Long-Term Arthritis
Safety Study (“CLASS”), to support an application to
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), that
sought to remove the standard Gi warning from its
label. (See Declaration of William A. Dreier (“Dreier
Decl.”), Ex. 2 at 1247.)
On approximately June 12, 2000, Pharmacia
submitted all of the data from CLASS to the FDA to
support its application. (Dreier Decl., Ex. 11.) In
addition, Pharmacia included “Briefing Documents,”
setting forth its own analysis of the data from
CLASS, and recommending that the FDA analyze
only results from the first six months of the study
(“six-month analysis”), rather than the results from
the entire thirteen-month study. (Dreier Decl., Ex. 13
at 1; id., Ex. 14 at 1.)
On September 13, 2000, the results of CLASS were
published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association (“JAMA”) (d., Ex. 1 4 45; id., Ex. 2.)
However, only the results from the six-month analy-
26a
sis were published in the JAMA article, results that
were favorable to Pharmacia. (/d., Ex. 2 at 1253-54.)
Moreover, it was Defendants who supplied JAMA
with information on CLASS, and thus, were largely
responsible for the contents of the article.
On February 6, 2001, the FDA posted the Briefing
Documents submitted by Pharmacia to its website.
The FDA also posted reports (“FDA Staff Reports”) by
two medical officers and a statistician. These reports
analyzed the CLASS data from the entire thirteen-
month study submitted to the FDA. See http://
www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/bnefing/3677b1.htm
(last visited Oct. 25, 2007). On February 7, 2001, both
the Briefing Documents and FDA Staff Reports were
available to the public on the FDA website. Id. The
reports concluded that using data from only the first
Six months, as opposed to the entire thirteen-month
study, was “not valid” and “not convincing,” and
opined that “the most critically relevant analysis cov-
ers the complete study period.” (Dreier Decl., Ex. 15
at 8-9; id., Ex. 13 at 14, 24.)
On February 7, 2001, an advisory committee,
comprising FDA-appointed independent experts
(“Arthritis Advisory Committee”), held a public hear-
ing to consider Pharmacia’s request to remove or
modify the standard GI warning from the Celebrex
label. (Dreier Decl., Ex. 21.) The Arthritis Advisory
Committee recommended that the standard GI warn-
ing remain. (I[d.) The decision and impact of the hear-
ing were widely reported in analyst reports and the
media on, and after, February 7, 2001.
On August 5, 2001, the Washington Post published
an article stating that Defendants had deceived
JAMA into publishing an article containing incom-
plete data. (Dreier Decl., Ex. 44.) The article stated
2ta
that Defendants did not provide JAMA with any of
the negative post-six-month CLASS data. (d.)
APPLICABLE LAW
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
A party seeking summary judgment must “show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Orson, Inc.
v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1366 (3d Cir.
1996).
In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of
material fact, the Court must view the underlying
facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);
Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236
(3d Cir. 1995); Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d
225, 231 (38d Cir. 1987). The threshold inquiry is
whether there are “any genuine factual issues that
properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact
because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of
either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (noting that no issue for trial
exists unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict in its
favor).
In deciding whether triable issues of fact exist,
Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides, in relevant part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made
and supported as provided in this rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allega-
28a
tions or denials of the adverse party’s pleading,
but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against the adverse party.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The rule does not increase or
decrease a party’s ultimate burden of proof on a
claim. Rather, “the determination of whether a given
factual dispute requires submission to a jury must be
guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that
apply to the case.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
The nonmoving party must “go beyond the plead-
ings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’
designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see
also Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871,
888 (1990) (“[T]he object of [Rule 56(e) ] is not
to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint .. .
with conclusory allegations of an affidavit”); Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249; Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of
N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992)
(“to raise a genuine issue of material fact ... the
[nonmoving party] need not match, item for item,
each piece of evidence proffered by the movant,” but
rather must exceed “the ‘mere scintilla’ threshold”),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993).
B. Statute of Limitations and the Standard for
Inquiry Notice
A claim for securities fraud under Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Exchange Act must be brought no
later than the earlier of “(1) two years after the
29a
discovery of the facts constituting the violation, or (2)
five years after such violation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b).
The triggering of the “two years after discovery of the
facts” prong is based on an inquiry notice standard.
In this case, the “two year after the discovery of the
facts” prong of the statute is controlling, as inquiry
notice under both parties’ arguments would be found
before the alternate five-year limitation.
Inquiry notice is found “whenever circumstances
exist that would lead a reasonable investor of ordi-
nary intelligence, through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, to discover his or her injury.” Mathews uv.
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 239, 251 (3d Cir.
2001). It is not necessary for a plaintiff to have
“actual knowledge or know all of the details of the
alleged fraud to trigger the [running of the] limita-
tions period.” In re Merck & Co. Sec., Deriv & “ER-
ISA” Litig., MDL No. 1658, C.A. Nos. 05-1151, 2007
WL 1100820, at *10 (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2007) (citing In
re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1325 (3d
Cir. 2002)).
To determine inquiry notice, the Court looks to see
if plaintiffs had sufficient information to excite
“storm warnings” of culpable activity. “Storm warn-
ings” include “the accumulation of information over a
period of time that conflicts with representations that
were made when the securities were originally pur-
chased, or any financial, legal, or other data that
would alert a reasonable person to the probability
that misleading statements or significant omissions
had been made.” Jn re NAHC, 306 F.3d at 1326 n.5.
The existence of “storm warnings” is an objective
inquiry. Mathews, 260 F.3d at 252 (“Plaintiffs need
not be aware of the suspicious circumstances or
understand their import. It is enough that a reasona-
30a
ble investor of ordinary intelligence would have
discovered the information and recognized it as a
storm warning”). Plaintiffs need not know all of the
details or narrow aspects of the alleged fraud to trig-
ger the limitations period; instead, the period begins
to run from the “time at which plaintiff should have
discovered the general fraudulent scheme.” In re Pru-
dential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F.
Supp. 584, 599 (D.N.J. 1997).
The defendants bear the initial burden of showing
the existence of storm warnings. Mathews, 260 F.3d
at 252. Once storm warnings rise to inquiry notice
and trigger the statute of limitations, plaintiffs must
investigate the basis for their claims. In re NAHC,
306 F.3d at 1326. If a defendant succeeds in estab-
lishing inquiry notice, the “burden shifts to the
plaintiffs to demonstrate that they were unable to
discover their injuries despite the exercise of reasona-
ble due diligence.” In re Merck, 2007 WL 1100820, at
*10. If a plaintiffs claims are time-barred under the
inquiry notice standard, then summary judgment in
favor of the defendant is appropriate. See Mathews,
260 F.3d at 250.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs were on inquiry
notice no later than February 7, 2001. Therefore,
since Plaintiffs’ complaint was filed on April 7, 2003,
it is time-barred under the two-year statute of limita-
tions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1658¢b). In support,
Defendants assert that the February 7, 2001 postings
of the Briefing Documents and the FDA Staff Reports
on the FDA website, the Arthritis Advisory Commit-
tee public hearing, and widespread media and finan-
cial analyst coverage of these materials and proceed-
ings, constituted “storm warnings” that placed Plain-
3la
tiffs on inquiry notice of Defendants’ alleged
misrepresentations.
The Briefing Documents published on the FDA
website, presented several analyses of the CLASS
data, including: (1) an analysis as specified in the
original study protocol, that is, based upon data from
the entire study period and the original primary end-
point, and (2) an alternative analysis based upon six-
months of data favored by Pharmacia. (Dreier Decl.,
Ex. 12.) However, the FDA Staff Reports posted on the
FDA’s website on February 7, 2001, disagreed with the
alternative analysis set forth in the Briefing Docu-
ments, and opined that “the most critically relevant
analyses covers the complete study period as speci-
fied in the original protocol.” (Dreier Decl., Ex. 15;
id., Ex. 13.)
Further, the Arthritis Advisory Committee hearing
on February 7, 200i, reiterated that the complete
study period was the proper analysis, and recom-
mended that the standard GI warning remain on the
Celebrex label. (Dreier Decl., Ex. 22 at 1.) Moreover,
the information on the FDA website, and the Arthri-
tis Advisory Committee’s decision was widely
reported in analyst reports and the media. By way of
example, but not exhaustive, analysts and media
reported as follows’
' See also February 6, 2001, Reuters News Service, “Celecoxib
did not demonstrate statistically superiority to NSAIDS... at
any point in the trial.” (Dreier Decl., Ex. 18.); February 8, 2001,
Chicago Tribune article entitled “Tests Fail to Show Celebrex
Drug Safer Than Rivals,” (“committee members said they saw
no edge for Celebrex over treatments such as ibuprofen when
comparing rates of the most serious ulcers.”) (/d., Ex. 23.);
February 7, 2001, Reuters News Service, “There is no clinically
meaningful safety advantage in upper (gastrointestinal) safety.”
32a
e February 6, 2001, Bloomberg News article entitled
“Pharmacia Hasn’t Shown Celebrex Safety
Benefit, FDA Review Says”
Only by looking at selected parts of the data—a
practice discouraged by the agency—was the
company able to show a benefit, the reviewers
said. (Dreier Decl., Ex. 17.)
e February 7, 2001, Star-Ledger article entitled
“Firms Await FDA Word on 2 Rival Painkillers”
FDA documents released yesterday in advance
of the [advisory committee] meeting showed an
agency review of Celebrex found the drug isn’t
significantly less likely to cause stomach
problems than the older, cheaper painkillers.
(Dreier Decl., Ex. 20.)
Ud., Ex. 25.); February 8, 2001, Washington Post, “There’s no
proof that-much promoted arthritis drug Celebrex is gentler on
the stomach than older, cheaper painkillers, the government’s
scientific advisors decided.” (U/d., Ex. 27.); February 8, 2001,
Orlando Sentinel article entitled “Celebrex Fails to Impress.”
(Iid., Ex. 29.); February 8, 2001, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,
“the ruling was a blow to manufacturer Pharmacia Corp., which
had hoped the advisors would recommend that the [FDA] quit
requiring that Celebrex bear a warning that users risk ulcers.”
Ud., Ex. 30.); February 8, 2001, Asbury Park Press article
entitled “FDA Disputes Arthritis Drug Claim.” (/d., Ex. 31.);
February 8, 2001, CBS Marketwatch.com, “a panel found that
Pharmacia couldn’t show that Celebrex cause fewer gastroin-
testinal side effects than pain relievers of another class of
treatments.” (/d., Ex. 32.); February 9, 2001, CNBC Market
Week With Maria Bartiromo, “Pharmacia was really beaten back
this week by a setback from the FDA on a labeling issue.” (/d.,
Ex. 35.); February 9, 2001, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette article
entitled “FDA Rules Agaist Vioxx, Celebrex Labels.” (U/d., Ex.
36.); February 9, 2001, Salt Lake Tribune article entitled “FDA
Says Celebrex Not Easier On Stomach.” (/d., Ex. 37.)
33a
¢ February 7, 2001, J.P. Morgan Analyst Report,
entitled “FDA Review of Celebrex More Negative
Than Expected-Panel Could be Controversial”
The four main issues raised by the FDA are: (1)
Pharmacia’s analysis of data at only the 26-
week time point, rather than the 52-week time
point, is unjustified and invalid (and the data is
even less robust at 52 weeks) (Dreier Decl., Ex.
16.)
e February 7, 2001, Philadelphia Inquirer article
entitled “FDA Report Questions Claims about
Celebrex Painkiller”
A Food and Drug Administration advisory report
said Pharmacia Corp. had not shown that its
Celebrex painkiller was less likely to cause
stomach bleeding than the older treatments .. .
[t}he FDA review of a trial of Celebrex could
mean problems for Pharmacia today when it asks
and FDA advisory panel to endorse claims that
the drug is safer than traditional painkillers.
(Dreier Decl., Ex. 19.)
In contrast, Plaintiffs argue that the statute of
limitations period does not begin to run until plain-
tiffs have notice that the defendants acted with the
requisite scienter. (Pls.’ Opp’n. 21.) Plaintiffs assert
that requisite scienter was not shown until August 5,
2001, when the Washington Post article was pub-
lished. Therefore, Plaintiffs claim that they were not
on inquiry notice until August 5, 2001. Under Plain-
tiffs’ theory, their complaint was filed well within the
two-year statute of limitations. However, the Court
finds this argument untenable. Inquiry notice exists
when Plaintiffs discovered, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the gen-
34a
eral fraudulent scheme. In re NAHC, 306 F.3d at
1326. Plaintiffs need not have discovered the precise
profile of the alleged fraud, nor been prepared to draft
a complaint for a lawsuit at the time inquiry notice
arises. Jd. at 1327. So long as sufficient “storm
warnings” are on the horizon, inquiry notice may be
found to exist.
Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that “[DJefendants’
public, reassuring statements justifying the six-
month analysis prevented plaintiffs from being put
on inquiry notice.” (Pls.’ Opp’n. 28.) However, the
Court is not persuaded that assurances from Defen-
dants in the months before and after the publication
of the Briefing Documents, the FDA Staff Reports,
and the Arthritis Advisory Committee public hearing,
counterbalanced and offset the storm warnings.
Although reassurances given by a company may
dissipate storm warnings, an investor may not
reasonably rely on words of comfort from manage-
ment “when there are direct contradictions between
the defendants’ representations and the other mate-
rials available to plaintiffs regarding the possibility
of fraud.” In re Exxon Mobile Corp. Sec. Litig., 387 F.
Supp. 2d 407, 418 (D.N.J. 2005).
The Court determines that there were sufficient
“storm warnings” no later than February 9, 2001, to
place Plaintiffs on inquiry notice. A reasonable inves-
tor would have discovered this public, company-
specific information, and recognized it as storm
warnings. The February 7, 2001 publications of the
Briefing Documents, the FDA Staff Reports on the
FDA website, the FDA Arthritis Advisory Committee
public hearing, and the media and financial analyst
coverage of these materials and proceedings, consti-
35a
tuted storm warnings sufficient to place Plaintiffs on
inquiry notice of their claims.
Plaintiffs’ complaint is time-barred as it was
brought on April 7, 2003, more than two years after
Plaintiffs were on inquiry notice. Therefore, Defen-
dants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, and for good cause shown,
It is on this 29th day of October 2007,
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [145] is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal [150] is
DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike [151] is
DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Seal [155] is
DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike [156]
is DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ Cross-Motion to
Strike [157] is DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal [162] is
DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Seal [166] is
DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal [168] is
DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to
Appear Pro Hac Vice [174] is DENIED as moot; and it
is further
36a
ORDERED that this case is closed.
s/ Anne E. Thompson
ANNE E. THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.
37a
APPENDIX D
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
[Filed 05/20/2004]
ROBERT L. GARBER, ef al.,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
PHARMACIA CoRrRP., et al.,
Defendants
Civil No. 03-1519 (AET)
ORDER
THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.
This matter comes before the Court on the motion
of Defendants to dismiss this action pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and 12(b\6), and on the motion
of Plaintiffs to strike certain exhibits attached to
Defendants’ motion to dismiss; and the Court, having
reviewed the submissions of the parties and having
heard oral argument on May 17, 2004, and for good
cause shown,
It is on this 19th day of May, 2004,
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
DENIED; and it is further
38a
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to strike is
DENIED.
s/_ Anne E. Thompson
ANNE E. THOMPSON, U:.S.D..J.
39a
APPENDIX E
TITLE 15—COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 2B—SECURI'rIES EXCHANGES
Sec. 78u-4. Private securities litigation
* * *
(b) Requirements for securities fraud actions
* * *
(2) Required state of mind
In any private action arising under this chapter in
which the plaintiff may recover money damages only
on proof that the defendant acted with a particular
state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to
each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter,
state with particularity facts givirig rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind.
(June 6, 1934, c. 404, Title I, § 21D, as added and
amended Dec. 22, 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, Title I, §
101(b), Title II, § 201(a), 109 Stat. 743, 758; Nov. 3,
1998, Pub. L. 105-353, Title I, § 101(b)(2), Title ITI, §
301(bX(13), 112 Stat. 3233, 3236.)
40a
APPENDIX F
TITLE 28—JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL
PROCEDURE
PART V—PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 111—GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 1658. Time limitations on the commence-
ment of civil actions arising under
Acts of Congress
* a *
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a private right
of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit,
manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a
regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws,
as defined in section 3(aX47) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47)), may be
brought not later than the earlier of—
(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts consti-
tuting the violation; or
(2) 5 years after such violation.
(Added Pub. L. 101-650, Title III, § 313(a), Dec. 1,
1990, 104 Stat. 5114, and amended Pub. L. 107-204,
Title VIII, § 804(a), July 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 801.)
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.