Appendix — Pharmacia Corp. v. Alaska Electrical Pension Fund

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APPENDIX A

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 07-4500 & 07-4564

ALASKA ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND; CITY OF

SARASOTA FIREFIGHTERS’ PENSION FUND;

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS

LOCAL 132 PENSION PLAN; NEW ENGLAND HEALTH

CARE EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND; PACE INDUSTRY

UNION-MANAGEMENT PENSION FUND; CHEMICAL

VALLEY PENSION FUND OF WEST VIRGINIA,

as Class Representatives, on behalf of

themselves and all other similarly situated

Vv.

PHARMACIA CORPORATION; PFIZER, INC.; FRED HASSAN;

Dr. G. STEVEN GEIS; CARRIE COX

Alaska Electrical Pension Fund; City of Sarasota

Firefighters’ Pension Fund; International Union of

Operating Engineers Local 132 Pension Plan; New

England Health Care Employees Pension Fund;

Pace Industry Union-Management Pension Fund;

Chemical Valley Pension Fund of West Virginia,

Appellants in 07-4500

Pharmacia Corporation; Pfizer, Inc.;

Fred Hassan; Dr. G. Steven Geis; Carrie Cox,

Appellants in 07-4564

2a

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

(D.C. Civil Nos. 3-03-cv-01519, 3-03-cv-01691,

3-03-cv-01808, 3-03-cv-01964,

3-03-cv-02149, 3-03-cv-02283)

District Judge: The Honorable Anne E. Thompson

Argued: November 21, 2008

Before: BARRY, CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and

RESTANI, Judge

(Opinion Filed: January 30, 2009)

Eric A. Isaacson, Esq. (Argued)

Arthur C. Leahy, Esq.

Matthew P. Montgomery, Esq.

Coughlin, Stoia, Geller, Rudman & Robbins

655 West Broadway

Suite 1900

San Diego, CA 92101-0000

Peter S. Pearlman, Esq.

Cohn, Lifland, Pearlman, Herrmann & Knopf

Park 80 Plaza West One

Saddle Brook, NJ 07663-0000

Counsel for Appellants/Cross Appellees

Gregg S. Levin, Esq.

Joshua C. Littlejohn, Esq.

Joseph F. Rice, Esq.

Ann K. Ritter, Esq.

* Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States

Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.

3a

Motley Rice

28 Bridgeside Boulevard

P.O. Box 1792

Mount Pleasant, SC 29465-0000

Counsel for Appellant/Cross Appellee

Pace Industry Union-Management Pension Fund

Jonathan M. Hoff, Esq. (Argued)

Jason M. Halper, Esq.

Joshua R. Weiss, Esq.

Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft

One World Financial Center

New York, NY 10038-0000

William A. Dreier, Esq.

Steven A. Karg, I, Esq.

Robert Mahoney, Esq.

Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus

721 Route 202-206

P.O. Box 5933

Bridgewater, NJ 08807-0000

Counsel for Appellees/Cross Appellants

OPINION OF THE COURT

BARRY, Circuit Judge

In this securities fraud class action, plaintiffs al-

lege that defendants violated §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by making, with

scienter, materially false statements about a clinical

study of Celebrex, a popular anti-inflammatory medi-

cation. In particular, defendants are alleged to have

misled investors by distorting the study’s results with

the intent to show that Celebrex had a better safety

profile than similar medications. Finding the action

to be untimely, the District Court granted summary

4a

judgment to defendants. This appeal and cross-appeal

followed.

I. Factual Background

Celecoxib, known and marketed commercially as

Celebrex, is an anti-inflammatory prescription drug

sold by defendant Pharmacia Corporation. Substan-

tially more expensive than many other nonsteroidal

anti-inflammatory drugs (“NSAIDs”), Celebrex’s

promise was rooted in the hope that it would cause

fewer gastrointestinal (“GI”) side-effects than the less

costly NSAIDs.’ To help the hope become a reality,

defendants’ commissioned a long-term clinical study

of Celebrex’s effect on the GI system, the Celecoxib

Long-term Arthritis Safety Study (“CLASS study”).

This litigation focuses on the aftermath of that study.

According to the complaint, the results of the

CLASS study were a disappointment to defendants:

Celebrex did not show the desired reduction in GI

side-effects as compared to the other drugs studied.

Fearing a decrease in sales and stock price, defen-

dants allegedly undertook to distort the results of the

study so that it would appear that Celebrex pos-

sessed a better GI safety profile than, in fact, it did.

Towards this end, in April 2000, defendants released

only the results from the first six months of the

' Unlike traditional NSAIDs, which inhibit both the COX-1

and COX-2 enzymes, Celebrex is a selective COX-2 inhibitor.

Because the inhibition of COX-1 enzymes often leads to negative

GI side-effects, it was hoped that selective COX-2 inhibitors

would not possess the harmful side-effects associated with tradi-

tional NSAIDs.

? Defendants include Pharmacia Corp., Pfizer, Inc., and indi-

vidual defendants Fred Hassan, Steven Geis, and Carrie Cox.

5a

CLASS study; those results, divorced from the entire

set of data, were capable of positive construction.

Defendants released the truncated results of the

CLASS study with great fanfare, declaring that the

study “shows that Celebrex has a truly exceptional

safety profile,” and that “the long-term outcome data

paints a clear and compelling picture of Celebrex’s

safety versus NSAIDs.” (Joint App. (“JA”) 59, 64.)

Some documents issued by defendants noted that the

CLASS study lasted a full thirteen months, but the

reason for excising the last seven months from the

analysis was not revealed.

Scientists affiliated with defendants then drafted

an article based on the truncated results and submit-

ted it for publication to the Journal of the American

Medical Association (“JAMA”). As would become

known only later, however, neither defendants nor

the articie’s authors informed JAMA that the data in

the article was incomplete. In September 2000,

JAMA published the article, which reached the fol-

lowing conclusion: “The overall incidence of GI symp-

toms experienced by patients taking [Celebrex] was

significantly lower than by those taking NSAIDs, as

was the rate of withdrawal [from the study] due to GI

intolerability.” Ud. at 45.)

Defendants hoped to convince the FDA to allow

Celebrex to be marketed without the standard GI

warning label required for other NSAIDs, and so

submitted the complete data from the CLASS study

to the FDA in June 2000. FDA staff members, in

preparation for hearings on the warning label issue,

reviewed the data. On February 6, 2001, the reports

of those staff members were published on the FDA’s

website, alongside defendants’ own report. Defen-

dants’ report defended the decision to use only the

6a

truncated data, asserting that data after the six-

month point was biased in favor of the comparator

drugs:

The GI safety data presented are for the six-

month treatment timepoint based on the analysis

of risk factors prespecified in the protocol. In

brief, a disproportionate withdrawal of patients

at high risk of an ulcer complication from the en-

tire study was observed after six months (deple-

tion of susceptibles). Additionally, a significantly

greater withdrawal of patients on diclofenac for

GI intolerance occurred during the initial six

months of the study. The withdrawal of patients

for GI intolerance prematurely removed a group

at high risk for ulcer complications and sympto-

matic ulcers from the diclofenac treatment arm

(informative censoring).

Ud. at 381.)

The FDA staff reports, stating in part as follows,

disagreed with defendants’ reliance on the truncated

data:

e A rheumatologist’s report stated that it was

“unclear” that the rationale put forth by

defendants “represented a significant bias in

assessment of the outcome.” (/d. at 631.)

e A gastroenterologist’s report stated that defen-

dants’ “rationale for analyzing the first 6 months

as a meaningful endpoint independent of the

success at the study completion is not convinc-

ing.” Ud. at 472.) However, this report also stated

that “(t]he six-month analysis will be reviewed

only as a potentially supportive analysis.” Ud. at

482.)

7a

e A statistician’s report rejected the six-month

analysis as “not valid,” and asserted that there

was “no reason to include information only in the

first 6 months.” (/d. at 666.)

These reports were prepared to assist the FDA’s

Arthritis Advisory Committee (“Advisory Committee”)

in deciding whether to recommend the label change

sought by defendants. The day after the publication

of the reports, the Advisory Committee held hearings

on the issue, and ultimately declined to recommend

the label change. The staff reports and the Advisory

Committee’s recommendation received substantial

media attention. The market also took note of the

disappointing outcome: between February 6-8, 2001,

the price of Pharmacia’s stock dropped approximately

9.0%.

After these events, defendants issued a series of

positive statements about Celebrex’s GI safety profile

as well as about the chances for a label change. De-

fendants claimed, for example, that the CLASS study

data presented a “compelling case” for a label change,

and that because the CLASS study was “an extremely

rigorous and complex trial,” it was “difficult for the

{Advisory Committee] to analyze.” Ud. at 171, 1519.)

Financial analysts also continued to rate Pharma-

cia’s stock positively. Even while noting the reduced

chances for a label change and the disagreement over

the results of the CLASS study, JP Morgan, Merrill

Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bank of America all]

continued to rate Pharmacia’s stock as a “buy” or

“strong buy.” Several analysts noted the challenge to

defendants’ use of truncated data: JP Morgan wrote

that the staff reports called the six-month analysis

“unjustified and invalid,” and Bloomberg News wrote

that defendants were only able to show a benefit “by

8a

looking at selected parts of the data—a practice dis-

couraged by the [FDA].” (/d. at 714, 719.)

Months later, on August 5, 2001, the Washington

Post reported that defendants had withheld the full

CLASS study data from JAMA. In the article,

JAMA’s editor described herself as “disheartened”

and stated that “a level of trust . . . was, perhaps,

broken.” Ud. at 203.) Additionally, a scientist who

wrote an editorial published in conjunction with the

JAMA article stated that he was “flabbergasted”

when he saw the complete data; another scientist

“said he complained to JAMA after noticing differ-

ences between the published [JAMA] report and the

data presented to the FDA.” (/d. at 203-04.)

After the Washington Post article raised the red

flag of impropriety, other sources began to question

defendants’ good faith. For example, an article from

The Sunday Times noted that the scandal involving

the CLASS study had inspired medical journals to

“stop drug firms from ‘cheating’ on medical studies.”

(Id. at 1360.) On June 1, 2002, an article in the Brit-

ish Medical Journal called the “explanations for [the]

serious irregularities [in the JAMA article] . . . inade-

quate.” (id. at 757.) The article also stated that

“{plublishing and distributing overoptimistic short

term data using post hoc changes to the protocol,

while omitting disappointing long term data of two

trials ... is misleading.” (/d.) Following the publica-

tion of this article, the price of Pharmacia’s stock

dropped 7% in three days.

II. Procedural History

This action was initiated on April 7, 2003, when

the first securities fraud class action complaint was

filed. Related actions were shortly thereafter consoli-

9a

dated into it. The District Court denied defendants’

motion to dismiss and granted plaintiffs’ motion for

class certification, but shortened the class period by

more than a year, finding that investors could not

have reasonably relied on defendants’ alleged misre-

presentations after February 6, 2001, the date on

which the FDA staff reports were published.

Defendants subsequently moved for summary

judgment on statute of limitations grounds, asserting

that if reliance was unreasonable after February 6,

2001, plaintiffs must necessarily have been on in-

quiry notice of their claims at that time. Because the

first securities fraud suit was filed on April 7, 2003,

and the statute of limitations for § 10(b) claims is two

years, see 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b), defendants asserted

that plaintiffs’ claims were untimely. The District

Court agreed, and granted defendants’ motion for

summary judgment.

The cross-appeals of the parties are now before us

for our consideration.

Ill. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 15

U.S.C. § 78aa. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the

Court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion for

summary judgment and the decision to deny their

motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449

F.3d 502, 510 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006); Farber v. City of Pat-

terson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006). The decision

to certify a class action and the determination of the

class period are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213

F.3d 124, 136 (3d Cir. 2000).

10a

IV. Legal Analysis

There are a number of issues before us on these

appeals. Plaintiffs challenge, first and foremost, the

District Court’s grant of summary judgment on sta-

tute of limitations grounds. Plaintiffs also dispute the

Court’s determination of the class period. On cross-

appeal, defendants assert that the Court erred in de-

nying their motion to dismiss, and in granting plain-

tiffs’ motion for class certification. We address each of

these issues in turn.

A. Inquiry Notice and the Statute of Limitations

The District Court determined that investors were

on inquiry notice of possible securities fraud as of

February 2001. The statute of limitations will begin

to run when the plaintiff is on inquiry notice.

“Whether the plaintiffs, in the exercise of reasonable

diligence, should have known of the basis for their

claims depends on whether they had sufficient infor-

mation of possible wrongdoing to place them on in-

quiry notice or to excite storm warnings of culpable

activity.”’ Benak ex rel. Alliance Premiere Growth

Fund v. Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., 435 F.3d 396,

400 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). The inquiry notice determination requires a

“totally objective” analysis that pinpoints the time at

which “a reasonable investor of ordinary intelligence

would have discovered the information [demonstrat-

ing possible liability] and recognized it as a storm

warning.” Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc.,

260 F.3d 239, 252 (3d Cir. 2001).

* Plaintiffs do not contend that they “exercised reasonable

due diligence and yet were unable to discover their injuries.”

Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody, & Co., Inc., 260 F.3d 239, 252 (3d

Cir. 2001). Thus, if we find storm warnings of fraud, plaintiffs’

claims are untimely.

lla

In line with this objective analysis, plaintiffs are

“presumed to have read prospectuses, quarterly re-

ports, and other information relating to their invest-

ments.” Jd. However, the hypothetical reasonable in-

vestor need not be a scientific expert; to the contrary,

the relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable investor

of “ordinary intelligence” would have recognized the

available information as indicative of possible fraud.

Id.

Inquiry notice seeks to deter putative plaintiffs

from sitting on their hands, awaiting the discovery of

the elusive smoking gun. Inquiry notice will thus be

triggered when plaintiffs “should have discovered the

general fraudulent scheme,” In re NAHC, Inc. Secs.

Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1326 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal

citations and quotations omitted), and “cannot avoid

the time bar simply by claiming they lacked know-

ledge of the details or narrow aspects of the alleged

fraud.” Benak, 435 F.3d at 400 (internal citations and

quotations omitted).

Our recent decision in Jn re Merck & Co., Inc. Se-

curities, Derivative, & ‘ERISA’ Litigation, 543 F.3d

150 (3d Cir. 2008) (hereinafter “Merck”) informs our

decision here. In Merck, we were faced with a similar

set of factual circumstances: after a long-term clinical

study of Merck’s own blockbuster drug, Vioxx, the

company published a questionable interpretation of

the study’s results, allegedly in order to boost Vioxx’s

sales and Merck’s stock price. The questionable in-

terpretation advanced by Merck attempted to explain

why patients taking Vioxx experienced a higher rate

of negative cardiovascular events than patients tak-

ing the study’s comparator drug, naproxen. This so-

called naproxen hypothesis emphasized the possibil-

ity that naproxen had a positive impact on the cardi-

12a

ovascular system, and discounted the possibility that

Vioxx had a negative impact.

The science behind this explanation was debatable,

and, consequently, the FDA scolded Merck for its re-

peated promotion of the naproxen hypothesis. In a

public warning letter issued to Merck, the FDA called

the marketing campaign for Vioxx “false, lacking in

fair balance, or otherwise misleading . . . . and [mi-

nimizing of] the potentially serious cardiovascular

findings.” Jd. at 156 (internal citations and quota-

tions omitted). The FDA ordered Merck to send let-

ters to doctors in order “to correct false or misleading

impressions and information.” 7d. at 157. Despite the

public nature of these strong words, as well as, inter

alia, news reports questioning the naproxen hypothe-

sis and consumer lawsuits alleging negative cardi-

ovascular effects from Vioxx, we found that investors

were not on inquiry notice of securities fraud.

Most importantly for our purposes here, Merck

found that inquiry notice, in securities fraud suits,

requires storm warnings indicating that defendants

acted with scienter. “Thus, to trigger storm warnings

of culpable activity, in the context of a claim alleging

falsely-held opinions or beliefs, investors must have

sufficient information to suspect that the defendants

engaged in culpable activity, i.e., that they did not

hold those opinions or beliefs tn earnest.” Id. at 166

(emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations

omitted).

Accordingly, for investors to be on inquiry notice of

§ 10(b) claims, there must be some indication that de-

fendants did not, in fact, hold the views expressed.

Inquiry notice requires storm warnings of “culpable

activity.” See Benak, 435 F.3d at 400. Under § 10(b),

a corporation does not engage in culpable activity

13a

unless it acted with scienter.* Scienter is not inciden-

tal to § 10(b), it is elemental.°

In support of a finding of inquiry notice in Febru-

ary 2001, defendants point to the drop in the price of

Pharmacia’s stock, the FDA staff reports, uhe Advi-

sory Committee meeting, analyst reports discussing

the events at the FDA, and the fact that the full

length of the CLASS study had long been publicly

known. Whatever else those facts may have indicated,

they did not provide storm warnings of possible fraud.

For one thing, the drop in stock price following the

events of February 6-8, 2001 did not indicate fraud or

even the possibility of fraud. Rather, the drop in price

is easily explained by the fact that the market had

been expecting that the FDA would approve a label

change. When the Advisory Committee issued a neg-

“ Thus, as defamation is not assault, so is § 10(b) not § 11.

Section 11 does not require a plaintiff to plead or to prove scien-

ter; § 10(b) does. This is a distinction with a difference, both in

terms of what a plaintiff must show for recovery and in terms of

what information must be available for inquiry notice to take

hold. We did not find it necessary in Merck to discuss § 11, nor

do we find it necessary to do so here. Were this is a § 11 case,

which it is not, the evidence in the public realm as of February

2001 might well have given rise to storm warnings of misstate-

ments, and thus triggered the second step of the inquiry notice

analysis—the duty to investigate potential claims.

° “To state a valid claim under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must

show that the defendant (1) made a misstatement or an omis-

sion of a material fact (2) with scienter (3) in connection with the

purchase or the sale of a security (4) upon which the plaintiff

reasonably relied and (5) that the plaintiffs reliance was the

proximate cause of his or her injury.” Semerenko v. Cendant

Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added); see

also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring

more than evidence of negligence in § 10(b) cases).

l4a

ative recommendation, the market reacted accor-

dingly. But mere investor disappointment does not

ipso facto imply fraud.

Neither, in our view, does the content of the FDA

staff reports suggest fraud. Defendants rely on a

handful of words in those reports: to wit, “not valid,”

“unclear,” and “not convincing.” (JA 666, 631, 472.)

But the staff reports span over 250 pages of highly

complex scientific and statistical analysis. These few

words and phrases, lacking in accusatory intent and

buried like needles in a haystack, could not give rise

to storm warnings of fraud.°®

The Advisory Committee meeting and concomitant

negative recommendation also could not give rise to

storm warnings of fraud; indeed, the transcript of the

Advisory Committee meeting explicitly supports a

finding that the experts believed that the dispute be-

tween defendants and the FDA was a good faith, legi-

timate scientific dispute. We note, for example, the

following statements made at the Advisory Commit-

tee meeting:

[FDA Representative]: Just to add a couple of

other comments to that, . . . I don’t think that

there were differences between us and the com-

pany that were meaningful in terms of the find-

ings of the analyses that were done.

We spent more time describing certain analyses

and the company spent more time describing

other analyses, but I don’t think there is any dis-

pute that we have with what the company pre-

sented, and I think that the company under-

stands where we were coming from with our

® Additionally, one of the staff reports described the disputed

six-month model as a “potentially supportive analysis.” (JA 482.)

15a

analyses, and I don’t think that they are off target

either in terms of how the compariy sees them.

Ud. at 1189.)

{Advisory Committee Consu!tant]: The challenge

here for me is that it seems to me everybody is

speaking truth. I agree with everyone who speaks.

1 agree with the sponsor and their emphasis, I

agree with the FDA in their description ... . It

depends on which piece of this you pick out.

(id. at 1154 (emphasis added).)

As should be evident by these statements, the Ad-

visory Committee simply did not believe that any-

thing untoward had occurred, and we obviously will

not expect more of the reasonable investor than we

would expect of experts on the FDA’s Advisory Com-

mittee.

Arguably the most troublesome pieces of evidence

came in the form of two analyst reports discussing

the events at the FDA: a JP Morgan report stated

that the use ot the truncated data was “unjustified

and invalid,” and Bloomberg News stated that defen-

dants could only show a benefit “by looking at se-

lected parts of the data—a practice discouraged by

the [FDA].” Ud. at 714, 719.) Yet even in conjunction

with the other evidence to which defendants point,

we simply cannot conclude that these statements

would alert a reasonable investor that fraud, as op-

posed to a mere disagreement over the best method of

scientific analysis, had occurred.

Defendants also argue that storm warnings existed

by February 2001 because no new information was

revealed at that time or later: it was always known

that the CLASS study lasted longer than six months.

16a

But while defendants had acknowledged in April

2000 that the study lasted 13 months, there was no

indication that they deliberately withheld data from

JAMA, or improperly massaged the data, until the

Washington Post article in August 2001. The mere

fact that the study lasted thirteen months, and that

there was a technical dispute between scientists

about whether to use the full data or only a portion of

the data, would not have provided storm warnings of

fraud to the reasonable investor.’

Finally, defendants’ own reassuring statements af-

ter the Advisory Committee meeting foreclose their

argument here. In reaction to the Advisory Commit-

tee’s negative recommendation, defendants defended

the results of the CLASS study, and their use of the

truncated data. Defendants stated that they had a

“compelling case” for a label change, and that it had

been “difficult for the [Advisory Committee] to ana-

lyze” the study because it was “an extremely rigorous

and complex trial.” Ud. at 171, 1519.)

These reassuring statements operate as a sort of

antidote to any storm warnings that may have ex-

isted. See, e.g., Merck, 543 F.3d at 167 n.14 (“We

have recognized that reassurances can dissipate

apparent storm warnings if an investor of ordinary

intelligence would reasonably rely on them to allay

the investor’s cuoncerns.”) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Just as we require investors to

act upon public information indicating fraud, so, too,

‘ In a different context in this litigation, even defendants’

counsel acknowledged as much: “Well, what does that show?

That scientists can disagree on how you interpret the data. That

doesn’t make fraud. That means people have different interpre-

tations.” (JA 2028 (argument in opposition to class certification).)

lla

do we allow them to rely upon corporate statements

discounting the possibility of malfeasance.*

The totality of the evidence in the public realm as

of February 2001 did not indicate a possibility of

fraud or even hint at any malfeasance or intentional

impropriety; rather, the evidence only supported the

view that there existed a legitimate dispute over

scientific and statistical models.* But for inquiry no-

tice of § 10(b) claims, we require some reason to sus-

pect that defendants did not genuinely believe the ac-

curacy of their statements. No such evidence surfaced

until the publication of the Washington Post article

which stated that defendants withheld data from

JAMA.

We conclude that investors are not put on inquiry

notice of fraud when, in the context of this case, an

® Corporations are, of course, unlikely to admit to culpable

conduct, and we do not purport to state a rule that precludes a

finding of inquiry notice until they do so. But, under circums-

tances such as these, where the evidence of wrongdoing is

entirely speculative, reassuring statements are a_ relevant

consideration.

® Indeed, after the events of February 2001, reports portrayed

Celebrex’s outlook positively, and took seriously defendants’

truncated analysis. (See, e.g., JA 716 (JP Morgan analysis stat-

ing there is some “support(] [for Pharmacia’s] contention that

there was a [justified reason to limit the analysis to six months],

but the FDA statisticians dispute this”); id. at 1707-08 (calling

“the scientific evidence on this question . . . unclear”).)

Additionally, numerous financial analysts retained Pharma-

cia’s stock at a “buy” or “strong buy” rating. See Merck, 543 F.3d

at 157-58 (noting that, during the relevant period, “securities

analysts were of one voice in their projections for Merck and

Vioxx; . . . all maintained their ratings for Merck stock at ‘buy’

or ‘hold’ and/or continued to project increased future revenues

for Vioxx”).

18a

apparently legitimate scientific dispute arises be-

tween the FDA and a pharmaceutical company, and

note that the Private Securities Litigation Reform

Act (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4, itself suggests this

conclusion. A rule that would place investors on in-

quiry notice of fraud the moment that the FDA ques-

tions the seemingly good faith scientific analysis of a

pharmaceutical company would encourage putative

plaintiffs to file premature securities suits. In im-

posing heightened pleading requirements, Congress

evinced an intent to discourage such suits; our in-

quiry notice jurisprudence reflects this intent.

For inquiry notice to take hold, there must be some

indicia of potential malfeasance. Because no such in-

dicia existed here, we will vacate the District Court’s

grant of summary judgment.’”

B. Length of the Class Period

Largely for the reasons discussed above, we also

find that the District Court erred in terminating the

class period in February 2001. Particularly in light of

defendants’ repeated defense of the CLASS study and

their optimism regarding a potential label change, it

was reasonable for plaintiffs to rely upon defendants’

statements until the publication of the Washington

Post article on August 5, 2001."' Cf. Basic, Inc. v. Le-

© We note that inquiry notice—in securities fraud suits and

otherwise—is alive and well in this Court. Neither in Merck nor

here have we replaced inquiry notice with an actual notice stan-

dard. Here, we merely conclude that, in the absence of any indi-

cation that defendants did not believe the truth of their own

statements, investors were not on inquiry notice of § 10(b)

claims.

1! The appropriate date is August 5, 2001, and not the later

date, May 31, 2002, of the British Medical Journal article. As of

August 5, 2001, investors should have known that there was a

19a

vinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (outlining presumption of

reliance in fraud-on-the-market securities suits). Ac-

cordingly, we will reverse the Court’s order limiting

the class period to February 5, 2001.”

C. Cross-Appeal

1. Motion to Dismiss

The District Court correctly denied defendants’ mo-

tion to dismiss. In that motion, defendants asserted

that plaintiffs failed to meet the pleading require-

ments of the PSLRA, focusing on the admittedly thin

two paragraphs of the Amended Complaint labeled

“Scienter Allegations.” (JA 270-71.) When examined

as a whole, however, the Amended Complaint is rep-

lete with allegations that defendants acted with the

requisite scienter. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &

Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2509 (2007) (requiring

courts to “consider the complaint in its entirety”). In

particular, the Amended Complaint documents the

alleged scheme to trick JAMA, and thus the invest-

ment community, by using only the truncated data.

possibility that defendants’ claims were false. Any new informa-

tion found in the British Medical Journal article is different in

only degree, and not in kind.

2 Plaintiffs also challenge the District Court’s decision to seal

the record and presumably our decision to continue the seal

pending appeal. We will leave the question of continued sealing

to the District Court. We note, however, that we are unper-

suaded by the Court's reliance on the so-called “self-critical

analysis privilege” as a basis for sealing. The self-critical analy-

sis privilege has never been recognized by this Court and we see

no reason to recognize it now. Cf. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Mower,

219 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (calling the privilege

“novel,” and noting that the Ninth Circuit has not recognized

the privilege).

20a

While it is true that a legitimate disagreement over

scientific data does not give rise to a securities fraud

claim, plaintiffs alleged something quite different: a

bad faith misrepresentation of scientific data. Those

allegations are sufficient to withstand the “[e]lxacting

pleading requirements” of the PSLRA, which require

that the allegations give rise to a strong inference of

scienter. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2504-10.

The District Court correctly denied defendants’ mo-

tion to dismiss.

2. Class Certification

Defendants also argue that the District Court’s de-

cision to grant plaintiffs’ motion for class certification

was in error. The gravamen of this argument is that

the results of the CLASS study were immaterial as a

matter of law in light of the lack of movement in

stock price following the initial release of those re-

sults in April 2000. We disagree.

Plaintiffs’ own expert acknowledges that the an-

nouncement of the results of the CLASS study “had

little measurable effect on [Pharmacia’s] stock price.”

(JA 1298.) But that fact does not negate a finding of

materiality when the market was expecting that the

results of the study would be positive, and plaintiffs

have presented evidence indicating precisely that.

(See id. (citing Morgan Stanley report written the day

after the CLASS study results were released that

states, “we are making no change to our forecasts, as

we had anticipated the study to corroborate the

strong safety profile of the product”).) And, of course,

the materiality of the alleged misrepresentations is

self-evident when we look at the market’s negative

reaction—to the tune of a nine-percent drop in stock

Zla

price in three days—when defendants’ analysis of the

CLASS study was questioned in February 2001."

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judg-

ment of the District Court, and remand for proceed

ings consistent with this Opinion.

'S We also reject, without further discussion, defendants’

argument that the District Court erred in denying their motion

to strike certain documents.

22a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 07-4500 & 07-4564

ALASKA ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND; Ciry OF

SARASOTA FIREFIGHTERS’ PENSION FUND;

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS

LOCAL 132 PENSIONPLAN; NEW ENGLAND HEALTH

CARE EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND; PACE INDUSTRY

UNION-MANAGEMENT PENSION FUND; CHEMICAL

VALLEY PENSION FUND OF WEST VIRGINIA,

as Class Representatives, on behalf of

themselves and all other similarly situated

V.

PHARMACIA CORPORATION; PFIZER, INC.; FRED HASSAN;

Dr. G. STEVEN GEIS; CARRIE COX

Alaska Electrical Pension Fund; City of Sarasota

Firefighters’ Pension Fund; International Union of

Operating Engineers Local 132 Pension Plan; New

England Health Care Employees Pension Fund;

Pace Industry Union-Management Pension Fund;

Chemical Valley Pension Fund of West Virginia,

Appellants in 07-4500

Pharmacia Corporation; Pfizer, Inc.;

Fred Hassan; Dr. G. Steven Geis; Carrie Cox,

Appellants in 07-4564

23a

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

(D.C. Civil Nos. 3-03-cv-01519, 3-03-cv-01691,

3-03-cv-01808, 3-03-cv-01964, 3-03-cv-02149,

3-03-cv-02283)

District Judge: The Honorable Anne E. Thompson

Present: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, BARRY,

AMBRO, FISHER, CHAGARES, and JORDAN,

Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,’ Judge

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING WITH

SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

The petition for rehearing en banc filed by

Appellees/Cross-Appellants having been submitted to

the judges who participated in the decision of this

Court, and to all the other available circuit judges in

active service, and a majority of the circuit judges of

the circuit in regular active service not having voted

for rehearing by the court en banc, the petition for

rehearing en banc is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Maryanne Trump Barry

Circuit Judge

Dated: 3 March 2009

“Honorable Jane A. Restani’s, Chief Judge, United States

Court of International Trade, vote is limited to panel rehearing

only.

24a

APPENDIX C

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

[Filed 10/30/2007 |

ALASKA ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND, ef al.,

Plaintiffs,

V.

PHARMACIA CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil No. 03-1519 (AET).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THOMPSON, U.S.D.2J.

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on behalf of

Defendants Pharmacia Corporation (“Pharmacia”),

Pfizer, Inc., Fred Hassan, Dr. G. Steven Geis, and

Carrie Cox’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for

Summary Judgment [145]. The Court has decided

this motion based upon the submissions and oral ar-

guments of the parties on September 12, 2007. For the

reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

This case arises from Defendants’ effort to remove

the standard gastrointestinal (“GI”) warning on the

25a

label of the drug Celebrex. On April 7, 2003, Plaintiffs

filed a complaint alleging that Defendants violated

Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange

Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,

by misrepresenting the results of a clinical study of

Celebrex. On January 25, 2007, the Court certified a

class consisting of purchasers of Pharmacia common

stock during the period of April 17, 2000 to February

6, 2001. On May 31, 2007, Defendants filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment claiming that Plaintiffs’

complaint is time-barred.

B. Factual Background

From approximately September 1998 to March

2000, Pharmacia commissioned a clinical study of

Celebrex entitled, The Celecoxib Long-Term Arthritis

Safety Study (“CLASS”), to support an application to

the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), that

sought to remove the standard Gi warning from its

label. (See Declaration of William A. Dreier (“Dreier

Decl.”), Ex. 2 at 1247.)

On approximately June 12, 2000, Pharmacia

submitted all of the data from CLASS to the FDA to

support its application. (Dreier Decl., Ex. 11.) In

addition, Pharmacia included “Briefing Documents,”

setting forth its own analysis of the data from

CLASS, and recommending that the FDA analyze

only results from the first six months of the study

(“six-month analysis”), rather than the results from

the entire thirteen-month study. (Dreier Decl., Ex. 13

at 1; id., Ex. 14 at 1.)

On September 13, 2000, the results of CLASS were

published in the Journal of the American Medical

Association (“JAMA”) (d., Ex. 1 4 45; id., Ex. 2.)

However, only the results from the six-month analy-

26a

sis were published in the JAMA article, results that

were favorable to Pharmacia. (/d., Ex. 2 at 1253-54.)

Moreover, it was Defendants who supplied JAMA

with information on CLASS, and thus, were largely

responsible for the contents of the article.

On February 6, 2001, the FDA posted the Briefing

Documents submitted by Pharmacia to its website.

The FDA also posted reports (“FDA Staff Reports”) by

two medical officers and a statistician. These reports

analyzed the CLASS data from the entire thirteen-

month study submitted to the FDA. See http://

www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/bnefing/3677b1.htm

(last visited Oct. 25, 2007). On February 7, 2001, both

the Briefing Documents and FDA Staff Reports were

available to the public on the FDA website. Id. The

reports concluded that using data from only the first

Six months, as opposed to the entire thirteen-month

study, was “not valid” and “not convincing,” and

opined that “the most critically relevant analysis cov-

ers the complete study period.” (Dreier Decl., Ex. 15

at 8-9; id., Ex. 13 at 14, 24.)

On February 7, 2001, an advisory committee,

comprising FDA-appointed independent experts

(“Arthritis Advisory Committee”), held a public hear-

ing to consider Pharmacia’s request to remove or

modify the standard GI warning from the Celebrex

label. (Dreier Decl., Ex. 21.) The Arthritis Advisory

Committee recommended that the standard GI warn-

ing remain. (I[d.) The decision and impact of the hear-

ing were widely reported in analyst reports and the

media on, and after, February 7, 2001.

On August 5, 2001, the Washington Post published

an article stating that Defendants had deceived

JAMA into publishing an article containing incom-

plete data. (Dreier Decl., Ex. 44.) The article stated

2ta

that Defendants did not provide JAMA with any of

the negative post-six-month CLASS data. (d.)

APPLICABLE LAW

A. Standard for Summary Judgment

A party seeking summary judgment must “show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Orson, Inc.

v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1366 (3d Cir.

1996).

In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of

material fact, the Court must view the underlying

facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);

Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236

(3d Cir. 1995); Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d

225, 231 (38d Cir. 1987). The threshold inquiry is

whether there are “any genuine factual issues that

properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of

either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (noting that no issue for trial

exists unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict in its

favor).

In deciding whether triable issues of fact exist,

Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides, in relevant part:

When a motion for summary judgment is made

and supported as provided in this rule, an

adverse party may not rest upon the mere allega-

28a

tions or denials of the adverse party’s pleading,

but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or

as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so

respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,

shall be entered against the adverse party.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The rule does not increase or

decrease a party’s ultimate burden of proof on a

claim. Rather, “the determination of whether a given

factual dispute requires submission to a jury must be

guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that

apply to the case.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

The nonmoving party must “go beyond the plead-

ings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’

designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see

also Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871,

888 (1990) (“[T]he object of [Rule 56(e) ] is not

to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint .. .

with conclusory allegations of an affidavit”); Anderson,

477 U.S. at 249; Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of

N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992)

(“to raise a genuine issue of material fact ... the

[nonmoving party] need not match, item for item,

each piece of evidence proffered by the movant,” but

rather must exceed “the ‘mere scintilla’ threshold”),

cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993).

B. Statute of Limitations and the Standard for

Inquiry Notice

A claim for securities fraud under Sections 10(b)

and 20(a) of the Exchange Act must be brought no

later than the earlier of “(1) two years after the

29a

discovery of the facts constituting the violation, or (2)

five years after such violation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b).

The triggering of the “two years after discovery of the

facts” prong is based on an inquiry notice standard.

In this case, the “two year after the discovery of the

facts” prong of the statute is controlling, as inquiry

notice under both parties’ arguments would be found

before the alternate five-year limitation.

Inquiry notice is found “whenever circumstances

exist that would lead a reasonable investor of ordi-

nary intelligence, through the exercise of reasonable

diligence, to discover his or her injury.” Mathews uv.

Kidder, Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 239, 251 (3d Cir.

2001). It is not necessary for a plaintiff to have

“actual knowledge or know all of the details of the

alleged fraud to trigger the [running of the] limita-

tions period.” In re Merck & Co. Sec., Deriv & “ER-

ISA” Litig., MDL No. 1658, C.A. Nos. 05-1151, 2007

WL 1100820, at *10 (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2007) (citing In

re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1325 (3d

Cir. 2002)).

To determine inquiry notice, the Court looks to see

if plaintiffs had sufficient information to excite

“storm warnings” of culpable activity. “Storm warn-

ings” include “the accumulation of information over a

period of time that conflicts with representations that

were made when the securities were originally pur-

chased, or any financial, legal, or other data that

would alert a reasonable person to the probability

that misleading statements or significant omissions

had been made.” Jn re NAHC, 306 F.3d at 1326 n.5.

The existence of “storm warnings” is an objective

inquiry. Mathews, 260 F.3d at 252 (“Plaintiffs need

not be aware of the suspicious circumstances or

understand their import. It is enough that a reasona-

30a

ble investor of ordinary intelligence would have

discovered the information and recognized it as a

storm warning”). Plaintiffs need not know all of the

details or narrow aspects of the alleged fraud to trig-

ger the limitations period; instead, the period begins

to run from the “time at which plaintiff should have

discovered the general fraudulent scheme.” In re Pru-

dential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F.

Supp. 584, 599 (D.N.J. 1997).

The defendants bear the initial burden of showing

the existence of storm warnings. Mathews, 260 F.3d

at 252. Once storm warnings rise to inquiry notice

and trigger the statute of limitations, plaintiffs must

investigate the basis for their claims. In re NAHC,

306 F.3d at 1326. If a defendant succeeds in estab-

lishing inquiry notice, the “burden shifts to the

plaintiffs to demonstrate that they were unable to

discover their injuries despite the exercise of reasona-

ble due diligence.” In re Merck, 2007 WL 1100820, at

*10. If a plaintiffs claims are time-barred under the

inquiry notice standard, then summary judgment in

favor of the defendant is appropriate. See Mathews,

260 F.3d at 250.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs were on inquiry

notice no later than February 7, 2001. Therefore,

since Plaintiffs’ complaint was filed on April 7, 2003,

it is time-barred under the two-year statute of limita-

tions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1658¢b). In support,

Defendants assert that the February 7, 2001 postings

of the Briefing Documents and the FDA Staff Reports

on the FDA website, the Arthritis Advisory Commit-

tee public hearing, and widespread media and finan-

cial analyst coverage of these materials and proceed-

ings, constituted “storm warnings” that placed Plain-

3la

tiffs on inquiry notice of Defendants’ alleged

misrepresentations.

The Briefing Documents published on the FDA

website, presented several analyses of the CLASS

data, including: (1) an analysis as specified in the

original study protocol, that is, based upon data from

the entire study period and the original primary end-

point, and (2) an alternative analysis based upon six-

months of data favored by Pharmacia. (Dreier Decl.,

Ex. 12.) However, the FDA Staff Reports posted on the

FDA’s website on February 7, 2001, disagreed with the

alternative analysis set forth in the Briefing Docu-

ments, and opined that “the most critically relevant

analyses covers the complete study period as speci-

fied in the original protocol.” (Dreier Decl., Ex. 15;

id., Ex. 13.)

Further, the Arthritis Advisory Committee hearing

on February 7, 200i, reiterated that the complete

study period was the proper analysis, and recom-

mended that the standard GI warning remain on the

Celebrex label. (Dreier Decl., Ex. 22 at 1.) Moreover,

the information on the FDA website, and the Arthri-

tis Advisory Committee’s decision was widely

reported in analyst reports and the media. By way of

example, but not exhaustive, analysts and media

reported as follows’

' See also February 6, 2001, Reuters News Service, “Celecoxib

did not demonstrate statistically superiority to NSAIDS... at

any point in the trial.” (Dreier Decl., Ex. 18.); February 8, 2001,

Chicago Tribune article entitled “Tests Fail to Show Celebrex

Drug Safer Than Rivals,” (“committee members said they saw

no edge for Celebrex over treatments such as ibuprofen when

comparing rates of the most serious ulcers.”) (/d., Ex. 23.);

February 7, 2001, Reuters News Service, “There is no clinically

meaningful safety advantage in upper (gastrointestinal) safety.”

32a

e February 6, 2001, Bloomberg News article entitled

“Pharmacia Hasn’t Shown Celebrex Safety

Benefit, FDA Review Says”

Only by looking at selected parts of the data—a

practice discouraged by the agency—was the

company able to show a benefit, the reviewers

said. (Dreier Decl., Ex. 17.)

e February 7, 2001, Star-Ledger article entitled

“Firms Await FDA Word on 2 Rival Painkillers”

FDA documents released yesterday in advance

of the [advisory committee] meeting showed an

agency review of Celebrex found the drug isn’t

significantly less likely to cause stomach

problems than the older, cheaper painkillers.

(Dreier Decl., Ex. 20.)

Ud., Ex. 25.); February 8, 2001, Washington Post, “There’s no

proof that-much promoted arthritis drug Celebrex is gentler on

the stomach than older, cheaper painkillers, the government’s

scientific advisors decided.” (U/d., Ex. 27.); February 8, 2001,

Orlando Sentinel article entitled “Celebrex Fails to Impress.”

(Iid., Ex. 29.); February 8, 2001, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,

“the ruling was a blow to manufacturer Pharmacia Corp., which

had hoped the advisors would recommend that the [FDA] quit

requiring that Celebrex bear a warning that users risk ulcers.”

Ud., Ex. 30.); February 8, 2001, Asbury Park Press article

entitled “FDA Disputes Arthritis Drug Claim.” (/d., Ex. 31.);

February 8, 2001, CBS Marketwatch.com, “a panel found that

Pharmacia couldn’t show that Celebrex cause fewer gastroin-

testinal side effects than pain relievers of another class of

treatments.” (/d., Ex. 32.); February 9, 2001, CNBC Market

Week With Maria Bartiromo, “Pharmacia was really beaten back

this week by a setback from the FDA on a labeling issue.” (/d.,

Ex. 35.); February 9, 2001, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette article

entitled “FDA Rules Agaist Vioxx, Celebrex Labels.” (U/d., Ex.

36.); February 9, 2001, Salt Lake Tribune article entitled “FDA

Says Celebrex Not Easier On Stomach.” (/d., Ex. 37.)

33a

¢ February 7, 2001, J.P. Morgan Analyst Report,

entitled “FDA Review of Celebrex More Negative

Than Expected-Panel Could be Controversial”

The four main issues raised by the FDA are: (1)

Pharmacia’s analysis of data at only the 26-

week time point, rather than the 52-week time

point, is unjustified and invalid (and the data is

even less robust at 52 weeks) (Dreier Decl., Ex.

16.)

e February 7, 2001, Philadelphia Inquirer article

entitled “FDA Report Questions Claims about

Celebrex Painkiller”

A Food and Drug Administration advisory report

said Pharmacia Corp. had not shown that its

Celebrex painkiller was less likely to cause

stomach bleeding than the older treatments .. .

[t}he FDA review of a trial of Celebrex could

mean problems for Pharmacia today when it asks

and FDA advisory panel to endorse claims that

the drug is safer than traditional painkillers.

(Dreier Decl., Ex. 19.)

In contrast, Plaintiffs argue that the statute of

limitations period does not begin to run until plain-

tiffs have notice that the defendants acted with the

requisite scienter. (Pls.’ Opp’n. 21.) Plaintiffs assert

that requisite scienter was not shown until August 5,

2001, when the Washington Post article was pub-

lished. Therefore, Plaintiffs claim that they were not

on inquiry notice until August 5, 2001. Under Plain-

tiffs’ theory, their complaint was filed well within the

two-year statute of limitations. However, the Court

finds this argument untenable. Inquiry notice exists

when Plaintiffs discovered, or in the exercise of

reasonable diligence, should have discovered the gen-

34a

eral fraudulent scheme. In re NAHC, 306 F.3d at

1326. Plaintiffs need not have discovered the precise

profile of the alleged fraud, nor been prepared to draft

a complaint for a lawsuit at the time inquiry notice

arises. Jd. at 1327. So long as sufficient “storm

warnings” are on the horizon, inquiry notice may be

found to exist.

Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that “[DJefendants’

public, reassuring statements justifying the six-

month analysis prevented plaintiffs from being put

on inquiry notice.” (Pls.’ Opp’n. 28.) However, the

Court is not persuaded that assurances from Defen-

dants in the months before and after the publication

of the Briefing Documents, the FDA Staff Reports,

and the Arthritis Advisory Committee public hearing,

counterbalanced and offset the storm warnings.

Although reassurances given by a company may

dissipate storm warnings, an investor may not

reasonably rely on words of comfort from manage-

ment “when there are direct contradictions between

the defendants’ representations and the other mate-

rials available to plaintiffs regarding the possibility

of fraud.” In re Exxon Mobile Corp. Sec. Litig., 387 F.

Supp. 2d 407, 418 (D.N.J. 2005).

The Court determines that there were sufficient

“storm warnings” no later than February 9, 2001, to

place Plaintiffs on inquiry notice. A reasonable inves-

tor would have discovered this public, company-

specific information, and recognized it as storm

warnings. The February 7, 2001 publications of the

Briefing Documents, the FDA Staff Reports on the

FDA website, the FDA Arthritis Advisory Committee

public hearing, and the media and financial analyst

coverage of these materials and proceedings, consti-

35a

tuted storm warnings sufficient to place Plaintiffs on

inquiry notice of their claims.

Plaintiffs’ complaint is time-barred as it was

brought on April 7, 2003, more than two years after

Plaintiffs were on inquiry notice. Therefore, Defen-

dants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, and for good cause shown,

It is on this 29th day of October 2007,

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment [145] is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal [150] is

DENIED as moot; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike [151] is

DENIED as moot; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Seal [155] is

DENIED as moot; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike [156]

is DENIED as moot; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants’ Cross-Motion to

Strike [157] is DENIED as moot; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal [162] is

DENIED as moot; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Seal [166] is

DENIED as moot; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal [168] is

DENIED as moot; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to

Appear Pro Hac Vice [174] is DENIED as moot; and it

is further

36a

ORDERED that this case is closed.

s/ Anne E. Thompson

ANNE E. THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.

37a

APPENDIX D

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

[Filed 05/20/2004]

ROBERT L. GARBER, ef al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

PHARMACIA CoRrRP., et al.,

Defendants

Civil No. 03-1519 (AET)

ORDER

THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.

This matter comes before the Court on the motion

of Defendants to dismiss this action pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and 12(b\6), and on the motion

of Plaintiffs to strike certain exhibits attached to

Defendants’ motion to dismiss; and the Court, having

reviewed the submissions of the parties and having

heard oral argument on May 17, 2004, and for good

cause shown,

It is on this 19th day of May, 2004,

ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

DENIED; and it is further

38a

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to strike is

DENIED.

s/_ Anne E. Thompson

ANNE E. THOMPSON, U:.S.D..J.

39a

APPENDIX E

TITLE 15—COMMERCE AND TRADE

CHAPTER 2B—SECURI'rIES EXCHANGES

Sec. 78u-4. Private securities litigation

* * *

(b) Requirements for securities fraud actions

* * *

(2) Required state of mind

In any private action arising under this chapter in

which the plaintiff may recover money damages only

on proof that the defendant acted with a particular

state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to

each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter,

state with particularity facts givirig rise to a strong

inference that the defendant acted with the required

state of mind.

(June 6, 1934, c. 404, Title I, § 21D, as added and

amended Dec. 22, 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, Title I, §

101(b), Title II, § 201(a), 109 Stat. 743, 758; Nov. 3,

1998, Pub. L. 105-353, Title I, § 101(b)(2), Title ITI, §

301(bX(13), 112 Stat. 3233, 3236.)

40a

APPENDIX F

TITLE 28—JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL

PROCEDURE

PART V—PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 111—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 1658. Time limitations on the commence-

ment of civil actions arising under

Acts of Congress

* a *

(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a private right

of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit,

manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a

regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws,

as defined in section 3(aX47) of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47)), may be

brought not later than the earlier of—

(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts consti-

tuting the violation; or

(2) 5 years after such violation.

(Added Pub. L. 101-650, Title III, § 313(a), Dec. 1,

1990, 104 Stat. 5114, and amended Pub. L. 107-204,

Title VIII, § 804(a), July 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 801.)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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