Appendix — Lasting Beauty, LLC v. City of Chesapeake, Virginia (No. 06-1374)

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App. i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix to Petition

Order of

The Supreme Court of Virginia

Re: Refusing Petition for Appeal

entered October 25, 2006

Memorandum Opinion of

The Circuit Court for the City of Chesapeake

entered March 23, 2006

Order of

The Supreme Court of Virginia

Re: Denying Petition for Rehearing

entered January 19, 2007

Judgment and Final Order of

The Circuit Court for the City of Chesapeake

Re: Refusing Petition for Appeal

entered May 3, 2006

App. 1

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the

Supreme Court Building in the City of Richmond on

Wednesday the 25th day of October, 2006.

Lasting Beauty, L.L.C., et al., Appellants,

against Record No. 061586

Circuit Court No. CH04-626

City of Chesapeake, et al., Appellees.

[Entered: October 25, 2006]

From the Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake

Upon review of the record in this case and

consideration of the argument submitted in support

of and in opposition to the granting of an appeal, the

Court is of opinion there is no reversible error in the

judgment complained of. Accordingly, the Court

refuses the petition for appeal.

A Copy,

Teste:

Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk

By: ae FF

Deputy Clerk

App. 2

VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE

CITY OF CHESAPEAKE

THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE,

A Municipal Corporation, and

JAMES T. DAVIS, CZA, Zoning

Administrator,

Plaintiffs

Vv. Chancery No. 04-626

LASTING BEAUTY, L.L.C., and

DENISE HUMPHRIES,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On June 21, 2004, the City of Chesapeake (“the

City”) and James T. Davis, Zoning Administrator

(“Davis”) (collectively “plaintiffs”) filed a Bill: of

Complaint seeking declaratory judgment and a

permanent injunction against Lasting Beauty,

L.L.C, (“Lasting Beauty”) and Denise Humphries

(“Humphries”) (collectively “defendants”) for their

alleged violation of section 7-602 of the Chesapeake

Zoning Ordinance.

On June 24, 2004, the defendants filed a

demurrer and answer and cross-bill, which alleged

that the zoning scheme relevant to tattoo parlors

and permanent makeup’ establishments’ be

declared invalid. Defendants also filed a Bill of

Particulars, which alleged that Chesapeake’s zoning

scheme relatin= to tattooing/intradermal

micropigmentation (1) violates the Dillon Rule; (2)

is not rationally related to a proper government

App. 3

purpose and fails to meet the “fairly debatable”

standard; (3) unconstitutionally burdens free speech

and expression rights guaranteed by the United

States and Virginia Constitutions; (4) denies equal

protection and due process rights guaranteed by the

United States and Virginia Constitutions; and (5)

constitutes an illegal attempt by the plaintiffs to

avoid the impact of a prior final order of this

tribunal striking down the former ban on tattooing.’

The plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the

defendants’ answer and cross-bill. By an agreed

Order, dated May 12, 2005, both the defendants’

and plaintiffs’ demurrers were overruled. At trial,

the parties stipulated that Lasting Beauty operated

in a B-2 zoning district and practiced intradermal

micropigmentation, which constituted tattooing

under the relevant zoning ordinance. The parties

agreed that the burden shifted to the defendants,

and they proceeded with their case. At the end of

the defendants’ case, the plaintiffs moved to strike

the evidence. The Court took the motion under

advisement.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The evidence at trial established the following.

Humphries operates a business, Lasting Beauty,

located at 445 Battlefield. Boulevard, Suite Q,

’ Lasting Beauty filed an appeal from a decision of the

Chesapeake Board of Zoning Appeals denying Lasting Beauty’s

appeal of the violation letter issued to it on May 21,2003. By

Consent Order, dated May 5, 2005, this Court dismissed

Lasting Beauty’s appeal (CH04-26), but reserved to Lasting

Beauty the right to raise and pursue all claims and arguments

therein presented in this case.

App. 4

Chesapeake, Virginia 23320, that specializes in the

application of permanent makeup, also known as

micropigmentation. Lasting Beauty is located

within a B-2 zoning district. Section 7-602 of the

Chesapeake Zoning Ordinance does not permit the

operation of a tattoo parlor in the B-2 zoning

district. Section 3-403 of the Chesapeake Zoning

Ordinance defines tattoo parlor to _ include

permanent makeup services.

On June 20, 2001, the City Council enacted an

ordinance, which amended section 8-602 of

the Chesapeake Zoning Ordinance, permitting

tattoo parlors, including permanent makeup

establishments, to operate in the M-l and M-2

(“industrial”) districts within the City of

Chesapeake. The Council did so in response to

discovering that the previous ban on tattoo parlors

within the City of Chesapeake was not legal. The

evidence established that at the meeting on the

proposed ordinance, most of the City Council

members expressed opinions that tattoo parlors

should be banned. Additionally, Council members

were not presented with any evidence on the safety

concerns of tattooing when they decided to enact

the ordinance allowing the parlors to operate only in

industrial districts.

Evidence at trial established that since the

relevant ordinance concerning tattoo parlors was

enacted, at least one conditional use permit has

been granted to a tattoo parlor named Wally’s

American Pie Tattoo Company. Additionally,

another business named Holly’s Hair Nails and

More, operates in a B-2 district within the City of

App. 5

Chesapeake that applies permanent makeup.

Although known to the City, the City. has not

sought to bring an action against her such as it has

with defendants.

Evidence estab’ished that the clientele of Lasting

Beauty consists of women, generally 45 to 80 years

of age, who have an average annual income of

$50,000 or more. Additionally, defendants

presented evidence that individuals who receive

tattoos today differ from the perception of past

recipients and involve a greater diversity of

individuals. Finally, the evidence established that

there are 501.97 acres in the Greenbrier area alone,

and over 3,500 acres in the entire City, that are

zoned consistent with defendants’ requested use.

ANALYSIS

Defendants’ first argument is that the zoning

scheme is invalid because it violates the Dillon

Rule. This is so, defendants argue, because the City

has not been given the authority to ban the

operation of tattoo parlors. Defendants rely on this

Court’s June 5, 2001 ruling that section 15.2-912

does not permit localities to completely ban tattoo

parlors. Defendants contend that the current zoning

scheme acts as a de facto ban of tattoo parlors

within the City, exceeding the authority granted to

the City by § 15.2-9127>4n-response, the plaintiffs

argue that the City’s authority to zone tattoo

parlors is granted in Code §$§ 2280 - 2286, and the

zoning ordinance at issue was not enacted pursuant

to Code § 15.2-912.

The Dillon Rule provides that “municipal

governments have only those powers which are

App. 6

expressly granted by the state legislature, those

powers fairly or necessarily implied from expressly

granted powers, and those powers which are

essential and indispensable.” City of Virginia

Beach v. Hay, 258 Va. 217, 221, 518 S.E.2d 314, 316

(1999) (citing Commonwealth v. County Board of

Arlington County, 217 Va. 558, 574, 232 S.E.2d s30,

40 (1977)). The General Assembly has granted

authority to localities to enact zoning regulations.

VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-2280 - 2286. Additionally,

localities possess the authority to “regulate the

sanitary condition of the personnel, equipment and

premises of tattoo parlors... ..” VA. CODE ANN. §

15.2-912. On June 5, 2001, however, this Court

ruled that Code § 15.2-912 does not give localities

the authority to ban tattoo parlors. (Exhibit D-5.)

The operation of tattoo parlors, for conditional

use, is permitted in Chesapeake within those

districts zoned industrial. Chesapeake Zoning

Ordinance, § 8-602. The evidence at trial was that

over 3,500 acres of land is zoned consistent with

defendants’ requested use. The Greenbrier area of

Chesapeake alone contains 501.97 acres so zoned.

At trial, Humphries admitted that the Greenbrier

area, with the traffic that other businesses bring,

could be good for business. Additionally, on June 16,

2002, the Council approved a conditional use permit

for a tattoo parlor to operate within the City.

Accordingly, the evidence does not support the

defendants’ claim that the current zoning scheme

constitutes a de facto ban on tattoo parlors within

App. 7

the City of Chesapeake.’ Finally, the defendants

have not argued that the City has exceeded its

authority under Code §§ 15.2-2280 - 2286.

Therefore, the Court finds that the current zoning

scheme regarding tattoo parlors does not violate the

Dillon Rule.

Defendants’ next argument is that the subject

zoning restrictions, facially and/or as applied,

unconstitutionally burden free speech and

expression rights guaranteed by the United States

and Virginia Constitutions. Defendants maintain

that tattooing is an art form entitled to the

protections of the First Amendment to the United

States Constitution, as well as similar protections

from the Virginia Constitution. Defendants argue

that the City must prove that there are “no less

restrictive ways to accomplish any legitimate goals

or purposes the City is able to articulate.”

Defendants’ Bill of Particulars, *| 2.

Under the United States Supreme Court’s

First Amendment analysis, conduct constitutes

protected speech if it is “sufficiently imbued

with elements of communication.” Spence uv.

Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974). The

question, then, is whether the act of applying

permanent makeup, or tattoos, is sufficiently

communicative such that it falls within the

protection of the First and _ Fourteenth

* This conclusion also dispenses with the defendants’ claim that

the zoning scheme was enacted in an attempt to avoid the

impact of this Court’s order striking down the former ban on

tattoo parlors.

App. 8

Amendments. See Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp.

1248, 1254 (D. Minn. 1980).

Neither the United States Supreme Court, nor

the Supreme Court of Virginia has addressed this

- issue. Of the few courts that have, the majority of

them have concluded that the act of tattooing

cannot be considered speech under the First

Amendment. See State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420,

423, 348 S.C. 532, 537 (2002) (holding the appellant

had not made any showing that the process of

tattooing is communicative enough to

automatically fall within First Amendment

protection); Yurkew, 495 F. Supp, at 1253

(concluding that the process of tattooing was not

protected speech under the First Amendment);

State ex rel. Medical Licensing Bd. v. Brady, 492

N.E.2d 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (same); People v.

O’Sullivan, 96 Misc. 2d 52, 53 (N.Y. Misc. 1978)

(same). Moreover, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that when a

tattoo is intended only as a form of self-

expression, not intending to convey a

particularized message, it is not protected speech

under the First Amendment. Stephenson ov.

Davenport, 110 F.3d 1303, 1307, n.4 (8 Cir. 1997).

. Defendants direct the Court’s attention to one

unpublished opinion by the Superior Court of

Suffolk County, Massachusetts, which concluded

that the act of tattooing was expression protected

by the First Amendment of the United States

Constitution. Lanphear v. Commonwealth of

Massachusetts, Mass. Superior Court Slip Opinion

99-1896-B (October 20, 2000), aff'd Commonwealth

v. Lanphear, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 1107, 737 N.E.2d

App. 9

1281 (2000). The Massachusetts court did not find

Yurkew and Stephenson persuasive, concluding that

those cases simply decided, without analysis, that

tattooing did not constitute conduct protected under

the First Amendment. See id.

This court has the benefit of the analysis

conducted by the Supreme Court of South Carolina,

however, which the Massachusetts court did not

have when it decided Lanphear. The South

Carolina Court recognized that a_ general

presumption of validity attaches to legislative acts

when subjected to a constitutional attack. White,

560 S.E.2d at 422, 348 S.C. at 536. Virginia

precedent establishes the same presumption.

Wilkins v. West, 264 Va. 447, 462, 571 S.E.2d 100,

108 (2002). Unless the legislation is clearly shown

to violate a constitutional provision, it will be

upheld. Jd. Accordingly, defendants have the

burden of showing that the instant zoning scheme

clearly violates a constitutional provision.

The only evidence offered by defendants

attempting to show that the zoning scheme

violated the provisions of the First Amendment was

Humphries’ testimony that she considers a tattoo a

form of expression and considers herself an artist.

Defendant’s subjective belief, however, is not

sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity.

Defendants were required to show how the act of

tattooing or applying permanent makeup is

intended to convey a particularized message and

whether there is likelihood that the message would

be understood by those who viewed it. See White,

560 S.E.2d at 423, 348 S.C. at 537 (citing Texas uv.

Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)). Here, as in

App. 10

White, the defendants have not shown how the act

of injecting dye to create the tattoo, or permanent

makeup, is sufficiently communicative in nature to

warrant protection under the First Amendment.

Defendants also argue, however, that the zoning

scheme, relative to tattoo parlors and permanent

makeup establishments, is not even rationally

related to a proper governmental purpose, and

therefore fails to meet the ‘fairly debatable’

standard. Defendants’ Bill of Particulars, 7 1.

Both in their pleadings and at trial, the defendants

argued that because they had challenged the

reasoning behind and authority for the subject

zoning scheme, it was incumbent upon the City to

come forward with evidence to support the need and

basis for the regulations.

Defendants’ attempt to place the burden on the

City to prove that the zoning scheme is rationally

related to a legitimate government interest is in

error. The standard for judicial review of the

validity of zoning ordinances is well settled.

Board of County Supervisors v. The Southland

Corporation, 224 Va. 514, 522, 297 S.E.2d 718, 722

(1982). The action of a local governing body in

“enacting or amending its zoning ordinance is

presumed to be valid.” Jd. Where a party challenges

the presumptive reasonableness of a zoning

ordinance with “probative evidence of

unreasonableness, the ordinance cannot be

sustained unless the governing body meets the

challenge with some evidence of reasonableness.”

Id. If the governing body supplies evidence of

reasonableness “sufficient to make the question

‘fairly debatable, the ordinance must_ be

App. 11

sustained.” Jd. at 522-23, 297 S.E.2d at 722 (citing

Fairfax County v. Snell Corp., 214 Va. 655, 202

S.E.2d 889 (1974) and Board of Supervisors v.

Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959)).

Defendants presented evidence, in the form of

testimony from a former City Council member, that

at the time the provisions of the zoning scheme

regarding tattoo parlors were enacted, a number of

the Council members expressed opinions showing

bias against tattoo parlors and that the Council

members did not think they should be allowed at all

in the City. The former Council member also

testified that in his opinion, the decision not to

allow tattoo parlors in retail areas was politically

motivated. He further testified that there was no

evidence or information presented to the Council

that tattoos are unsafe.

This evidence, however, falls short of probative

evidence of unreasonableness. First, in considering

whether a legislative act is reasonable, generally

the motives of the governing body in undertaking

the act are immaterial. Helmick -v. Town of

Warrenton, 254 Va. 225, 231, 492 S.E.2d 113

(1997). Accordingly, whether the Council members

thought that tattoo parlors should be allowed in

the City is immaterial, particularly in light of the

Court’s ruling above that the extant zoning scheme

is not a de facto ban of tattoo parlors within the

City. Secondly, merely because the Council did not

receive information that tattoos are unsafe is not

relevant to whether permitting tattoo parlors to

- operate only in industrial districts is unreasonable.

App. 12

At most, defendant Humphries presented her

own testimony that she desired to operate her

business in its present location, along with her

opinion that the zoning scheme was unreasonable.

Although the City did not supply any evidence of

reasonableness at trial, the burden rested on the

defendants to supply probative evidence of

unreasonableness. The defendants simply did not

meet their burden. Accordingly, the presumption of

validity given to the zoning ordinance remains

intact.

The same analysis is applicable to the

defendants’ argument that the zoning scheme at

issue denies them equal protection and due process

rights. Defendants argue that the “zoning scheme

is much more burdensome on them than the

majority of the rest of the zoning scheme is on

similarly-situated businesses and providers of

services.” Defendants’ Bill of Particulars, f 3.

Defendants also failed to meet their burden on this

issue.

The classifications of the relevant zoning

scheme are not inherently suspect and, as

‘discussed above, do not infringe upon the exercise

of -a fundamental right. Accordingly, the

classifications at issue are “permissible if the

governmental objective is legitimate and the

classifications bear a reasonable or substantial

relation thereto.” Estes Funeral Home v. Adkins,

266 Va. 297, 304, 586 S.E.2d 162, 165 (2003)

(internal quotations and citations omitted). The

classifications carry with them the same

presumptions and burdens as an ordinance itself

App. 13

and are presumed to be valid. Jd. at 304, 586 S.E.2d

at 165-55.

Accordingly, defendants must produce probative

evidence that the classification of which they

complain is discriminatory and not rationally

related to a legitimate government purpose. Board

of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 135, 216

S.E.2d 199, 206 (1975). As discussed above,

however, defendants offered little more than their

opinion that there can be no legitimate government

interest for limiting tattoo parlors and permanent

makeup establishments to industrial areas.

Moreover, defendants have not shown that the

zoning scheme treats similarly-situated businesses

differently. The zoning scheme does not allow any

business supplying tattoos or permanent makeup

to operate outside of an industria! district.

Defendants’ arguments that the City is

selectively enforcing the subject zoning scheme,

ignoring other similarly-situated businesses that

are operating in violation of the zoning ordinances,

does not save their equal protection claim.

Defendants’ contention on this point is that

defendants have been singled out and given an

undue amount of attention, and that selective

enforcement violates both equal protection and due

process rights. The most evidence that defendants

presented at trial on this issue established that

another business operates within the City of

Chesapeake that applies permanent makeup, and,

although kncewn to the City, it has not sought to

bring an action against her such as with defendants

here.

App. 14

To succeed on a selective-prosecution claim, the

defendants must “demonstrate that the prosecutor’s

decision ‘was based on an_ unconstitutional

motive.” Boyd v. County of Henrico, 42 Va. App.

495, 522, 592 S.E.2d 768, 781 (2004) (citing Rowsey

v. Lee, 327 F.3d 335, 343 (4th Cir. 2003)). The

prosecution must be “deliberately based upon an

unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or

other arbitrary classification, ‘including the exercise

of protected statutory and constitutional rights.” Jd.

(citation omitted). Defendants have not supplied

any evidence that the “undue attention” they claim

they have received from the City has been

deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard.

9

Accordingly, to the extent that defendants argue

that the City has selectively enforced the extant

zoning scheme, their argument fails.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant

the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the defendants’

evidence. Additionally, the Court finds that

defendants are in violation of section 7-602 of the

Chesapeake Zoning Ordinance, and the City’s

prayer for an injunction permanently enjoining the

defendants from providing permanent makeup

services at 445 Battlefield Boulevard, Suite Q,

Chesapeake, Virginia, 23320 should be granted.

The Office of the City Attorney is hereby directed

to draft an order in accordance with this

Memorandum Opinion and circulate it for counsel’s

endorsements.

App. 15

The Clerk is hereby directed to send a certified

copy of this Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of

record.

Entered: [March 23, 2006]

| San

Circuit Court Judge

App. 16

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the

Supreme Court Building in the City of Richmond on

Friday the 19th day of January, 2007.

Lasting Beauty, L.L.C., et al., Appellants,

against Record No. 061586

Circuit Court No. CH04-626

City of Chesapeake, et al., Appellees.

(Entered: January 19, 2007}

Upon a Petition for Rehearing

On consideration of the petition of the appellants

to set aside the judgment rendered herein on the

25th day of October, 2006 and grant a rehearing

thereof, the prayer of the said petition is denied.

A Copy,

Teste:

Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk

By: original order signed by a

deputy clerk of the Supreme

Court of Virginia at the

direction of the Court

Deputy Clerk

App. 17

VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

CITY OF CHESAPEAKE

THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE,

A Municipal Corporation,

and

JAMES T. DAVIS, = CZA,

Zoning Administrator,

Plaintiffs,

v. IN CHANCERY NO.: CH04-626

LASTING BEAUTY, L.L.C.

and

DENISE HUMPHRIES,

Defendants.

JUDGMENT AND FINAL ORDER

In accordance with the Court’s memorandum

opinion dated March 23, 2006, the Court grants the

Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the Defendants’ evidence

introduced in support of the Defendants’ Cross Bill

and will grant the Plaintiffs’ prayer for a permanent

injunction. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that the

Defendants’ Cross Bill is dismissed and ORDERS

that the Defendants are perpetually enjoined from

providing permanent makeup services at 445

Battlefield Boulevard, Suite Q, Chesapeake, Virginia

23320. However, by agreement, the injunction

granted herein is stayed pending exhaustion of

Defendants’ appeal rights.

App. 18

Entered: [May 3, 2006]

/s/

Circuit Court Judge

ASKED FOR REGARDING THE RULING

RESULT, AND OBJECTED TO REGARDING THE

COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT NO

EVIDENCE WAS OFFERED AT TRIAL OF THE

REASONABLENESS OF THE ORDINANCE

REGULATING THE LOCATION OF TATTOO

PARLORS. EVIDENCE WAS OFFERED AND

ACCEPTED BY THE COURT THAT 501.97

ACRES IN THE GREENBRIER AREA AND OVER

3,500 ACRES IN THE ENTIRE CITY ARE

ZONED FOR THE OPERATION OF A TATTOO

PARLOR. THIS EVIDENCE CONSTITUTES

REASONABLENESS UNDER THE ‘FAIRLY

DEBATABLE” STANDARD.

/s/

Grady A. Palmer, Esq.

Office of the City Attorney

306 Cedar Road

Chesapeake, VA 23322

(757) 382-6586

(757) 382-8749 (facsimile)

Counsel for City of Chesapeake,

James T. Davis, CZA, Zoning Administrator

SEEN AND OBJECTED TO IN ACCORDANCE

WITH MATERIALS FILED WITH THE COURT,

EVIDENCE PRESENTED, AND ARGUMENTS

MADE ON THE RECORD. ALSO OBJECTED TO

ON THESE GROUNDS: 1) THE TRIAL COURT

ERRED IN FINDING THAT HUMPHRIES MADE

App. 19

ANY SORT OF MEANINGFUL ADMISSION

RELATING TO THE ARGUMENT THAT THE

ZONING SCHEME OPERATES AS A DE FACTO

OR QUASI-BAN; 2) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN

ITS INTERPRETATION OF DEFENDANTS’

DILLON RULE ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE;

3) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REJECTING

DEFENDANTS’ UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE AND

APPLYING THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD ON A

MOTION TO STRIKE.

/s/

Kevin E. Martingayle, Esq.

Stallings & Bischoff, P.C

2101 Parks Avenue, Suite 801

Virginia Beach, VA 23451

(757) 416-6009

(757) 428-6982 (facsimile)

Counsel for Lasting Beauty, LLC.

and Denise Humphries

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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