Opposition Brief — Collier v. Astrue (No. 06-1343)

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

CLAIRE G. COLLIER, PETITIONER

UV.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

PAUL D. CLEMENT

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

PETER D. KEISLER

Assistant Attorney General

MARLEIGH D. DOVER

ERIC J. FEIGIN

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the “20/40 Rule,” which requires an appli-

cant for Social Security Disability Insurance to have

received 20 quarters’ worth of earnings over the last 40

calendar quarters in order to qualify for benefits, see

42 U.S.C. 423(c)(1)(B)(i), is consistent with the equal

protection and substantive due process requirements of

the Fifth Amendment.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Page

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) .............. 4

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ............ 5

Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) ............... 5

Harvell v. Chater, 87 F.3d 371 (9th Cir. 1996) ........ 4,6

Helier v. Doe, GOB U.S. SIZ CIGRB) onc vc cc cccvccccvcecs 5

Johnson v. Wing, 178 F.3d 611 (2d Cir. 1999), cert.

CUNO, TS Bio SAE GD ona pwe vere eevevcsveenss 3

Personnel Adm’ v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) ....... 3,6

Tuttle v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare,

EF re Caen ety CPD hve edeesau dd ckeenéceres 4

United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.

MST 6 oars ot oo cad ck eee eee 5

Weinberger v. Salft, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) ............00.. 5

Constitution, statutes and regulation:

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Statutes and regulation—Continued: 3 Page

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Miscellaneous:

S. Rep. No. 2388, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) ........... 6

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 06-1343

CLAIRE G. COLLIER, PETITIONER

Vv.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-9a)

is reported at 473 F.3d 444. The decision of the district

court (Pet. App. 10a-31a) and recommended ruling of the

magistrate judge (Pet. App. 32a-58a) are unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

January 4, 2007. The petition for a writ of certiorari was

filed on April 4, 2007. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner Claire G. Collier was diagnosed with

amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) in late 2003. Pet.

App. la-2a. In January 2004, she applied for Social

(1)

Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. /d. at 2a.

Persons with ALS who are under age 65 and qualify

for such benefits become eligible to receive Medicare

hospital insurance benefits as well. See 42 U.S.C.

426(b)(2)(A)(i), 426(h).

Petitioner did not qualify for SSDI benefits, how-

ever, because she did not satisfy the “20/40 Rule,” 42

U.S.C. 423(e)(1)(B)(i). That Rule provides that individu-

als between the ages of 31 and 62 qualify for SSDI only

if they have earned 20 quarters of qualified earnings

over the 40 calendar quarters directly preceding the one

for which benefits are to begin. 42 U.S.C. 423(c)(1); see

20 C.F.R. 404.130(b)(2).. As a practical matter, this

means that a person must have worked, and paid a cer-

tain amount of Social Security taxes, in at least five of

the ten years leading up to the onset of his or her dis-

ability. It is undisputed that petitioner, who left the

workforce in 1994 to become a stay-at-home mother, did

not meet this requirement. Pet. App. 3a. Consequently,

she was denied SSDI benefits. Jd. at 2a.

2. After exhausting her administrative remedies,

petitioner sought review in district court, claiming that

the 20/40 Rule violated equal protection principles by

discriminating against women between the ages of 31

and 41 who leave the workforce to raise children. Pet.

App. 38a, 42a-43a. Petitioner further alleged that, as

applied to her, the statute violated the substantive due

process requirements of the Fifth Amendment because

it is contrary to the policies underlying the Social Secu-

rity program, the Medicare program, and congressional

initiatives seeking to aid those with ALS, and therefore

the statute is irrational. See id. at 28a-29a.

Applying rational basis review, the district court re-

jected both arguments. Pet. App. 18a, 26a-27a, 30a. The

court determined that Congress’s decision to limit the

availability of benefits to individuals with a recent his-

tory of Social Security-taxable income serves two legiti-

mate governmental purposes: (1) focusing SSDI bene-

fits on those persons with a demonstrated dependence

on employment income, and (2) maintaining the pro-

gram’s fiscal solvency. Jd. at 24a-25a. With regard to

petitioner’s equal protection challenge, the court found

that she had “failed to cite any evidence” that Congress

had intentionally discriminated against women in enact-

ing the statute. Jd. at 23a-24a.

3. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1la- 9a.

Although it recognized that petitioner had offered evi-

dence suggesting that the 20/40 Rule has a dispropor-

tionate impact on women, the court of appeals agreed

with the district court that petitioner had offered “no

evidence that Congress was motivated by an ‘invidious

discriminatory purpose’ in enacting” the Rule. Jd. at 6a-

7a. Because petitioner had shown, at most, that the stat-

ute was enacted “in spite of,” not “because of,” its poten-

tial adverse effect on women, the court of appeals ap-

plied rational basis review. /bid. (quoting Johnson v.

Wing, 178 F.3d 611, 615 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528

U.S. 1162 (2000), and citing Personnel Adm’ v. Feeney,

442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). The court concluded that the

statute is constitutional because “Congress could ratio-

nally choose to distribute a scarce resource among those

who both have contributed more recently to the system

and have indicated, by their actions, that they are more

dependent on the salaries they draw from being em-

ployed.” Jd. at 8a. “[F Jor similar reasons,” the court of

appeals rejected petitioner’s due process claim. J/bid.

(recognizing Congress’s “wide latitude to create classifi-

cations that allocate noncontractual benefits under a

social welfare program”) (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb,

430 U.S. 199, 210 (1977) (plurality opinion)). Although

the court of appeals sympathized with petitioner’s situa-

tion, it recognized that any remedy would have to be

provided by Congress, not the court. /d. at 9a.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner contends that the court of appeals erred

in rejecting her constitutional challenge to the 20/40

Rule. That claim does not merit this Court’s review.

The court of appeals correctly held, consistent with the

precedent of this Court and the decisions of every court

of appeals to have considered the issue, that 42 U.S.C.

423(c)(1)(B)(i) satisfies the equal protection and due

process requirements of the Fifth Amendment.

1. Petitioner urges this Court to conclude that the

20/40 Rule in 42 U.S.C. 423(c)(1)(B)(i) is irrational and

thus unconstitutional under the equal protection and due

process requirements of the Fifth Amendment. Pet. 10-

11. As petitioner acknowledges (Pet. 20-21), however,

every federal court to have addressed the question has

concluded otherwise. The statute rationally advances

legitimate government interests in (1) providing individ-

uals benefits only as a replacement for lost earnings,

and (2) supporting the solvency of the Social Security

fund. See Pet. App. 8a; Harvell v. Chater, 87 F.3d 371,

373 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Tuttle v. Secretary of

Health, Educ. & Welfare, 504 F.2d 61, 62-63 (10th Cir.

1974).

Although petitioner contends (Pet. 16-19, 25-26) that

the statute is not sufficiently tailored to achieve those

interests, “courts are compelled under rational-basis re-

view to accept a legislature’s generalizations even when

there is an imperfect fit between means and ends.”

Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993). “A classification

does not fail rational-basis review because ‘it is not made

with mathematical nicety or because in practice it re-

sults in some inequality.’” /bid. (quoting Dandridge v.

Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)). Rather, classifica-

tions under the Social Security Act must be sustained

unless they are “lacking in rational justification.” Wein-

berger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768 (1975) (quoting Flem-

ming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960)); see generally

id. at 768-776; see also United States R.R. Retirement

Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 (1980) (classification

must be sustained unless it is “patently arbitrary or irra-

tional”).

Accordingly, a classification under the Social Secu-

rity Act must be sustained if Congress “could rationally

have concluded” that the particular qualification would

protect against the consequence to which it is directed

—here, that disability benefits not be extended beyond

persons who have had sufficiently long and recent em-

ployment to indicate that they are probably dependent

upon their earnings—and that “the expense and other

difficulties of individual determinations justified the

inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule.” Salfi, 422

U.S. at 777, The 20/40 Rule readily satisfies that test.

2. Petitioner additionally contends (Pet. 15) that

Section 432(¢)(1)(B)(i) violates the equal protection com-

ponent of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause

because it “is predicated on women of child-bearing age

leaving the workforce” and thus invidiously discrimi-

nates against women.

In attempting to show an invidious purpose, peti-

tioner relies (Pet. 15-16) upon statements made by the

Social Security Administration that recognize that some

women leave the labor force in order to care for their

children and may depend on the Social Security benefits

of their husbands. As the court of appeals in this case

explained, however, the recognition that a statute may

adversely impact a particular group of individuals does

not render the statute unconstitutional. Pet. App. 7a. It

is only where the statute was enacted “because of,” not

“in spite of,” that adverse effect that the statute violates

equal protection requirements. Feeney, 442 U.S. at

279. Petitioner has offered no evidence that Congress

enacted Section 432(c)(1)(B)(G) “because of” its alleged

disproportionate effect on women. Pet. App. 6a-7a.

Rather, as every court of appeals that has considered

the issue has recognized, Congress adopted the 20/40

Rule in order to provide a “reliable means of limiting

[disability] protection to those persons who have had

sufficiently long and sufficiently recent covered employ-

ment to indicate that they probably have been depend-

ent upon their earnings.” /d. at 7a (quoting S. Rep.

No. 2388, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1958)); Harvell,

87 F.3d at 373; Tuttle, 504 F.2d at 68. The court of ap-

peals correctly applied the precedent of this Court, con-

sistent with the decisions of other courts of appeals, to

reject petitioner’s constitutional challenge to Seétion

423(¢)(1)(B)(i).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.